Lex Specialis

Are human rights norms applicable to occupied territories in general, and to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) in particular, or are they not? This is the question explored in this paper. The Israeli government and international human rights bodies have taken antithetical positions on this matter: Israel maintains that they do not and international human rights bodies find that they do. The examination of the validity of these respective positions pertaining to the applicability of human rights instruments to areas beyond the recognized national borders of a State party lies at the core of this paper.

The issue of the applicability of human rights standards in occupied territories is one of fundamental theoretical and practical importance. From a jurisprudential perspective, it goes to the very essence of the principle of the universality of human rights and involves the delicate, yet fascinating problem of coordinating between overlapping international regimes – in this case, international human rights (IHR) law and international humanitarian law (IHL). From a practical perspective, it may well generate a redefinition of the precise scope of an occupying power's human rights obligations under international law, serving as a yardstick for measuring the lawfulness of a variety of concrete measures which affect human well being. While the effect of introducing IHR law in situations of occupation is mitigated by the more specific provisions of IHL, it still serves several important functions: it affects the interpretation of IHL norms, it fills normative gaps in the scope of protection afforded by IHL and it validates the legitimacy of the involvement of international supervisory mechanism in situations of occupation. 

The main proposition of this paper is that the doctrinal position that IHR law is not applicable to occupied territories is untenable. Rather, both IHR law and IHL regimes apply, in a manner which, while taking legitimate military considerations into account, is informed by the principle of the universality of human rights and provides a safety net designed to ensure that no person shall find her-self in a legal vacuum bereft of protection. We further submit that it is the very interaction between IHL and IHR law which determines the precise scope of the legal obligations the Belligerent Occupant has to shoulder vis-à-vis the population and the corresponding scope of the protection the latter enjoy, in any concrete situation. 

In order to substantiate this position, section II details the position of the Israeli government with regards to the inapplicability of human rights law in the Occupied Territories, expounding on both its legal and policy underpinnings. This position rests on three main grounds: the mutual exclusivity of both regimes; the narrow construction of the jurisdictional clauses of the major human right treaties; and, the lack of effective Israeli control over the territories pursuant to the Oslo Accords. Section III advances a critique of the Israeli official position, addressing each of its arguments in a manner substantiated by theory, policy, legal analysis and international jurisprudence. Section IV offers concluding observations regarding the interplay between IHR law and IHL and presents a broad yet flexible approach to the question of the applicability of human rights law in occupied territories in a manner that takes into consideration the legitimate concerns of an Occupying Power without sacrificing the principle of legality at the altar of political expediency.

This chapter explores the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the targeting of members of armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. It attempts to flesh out points of convergence between these two branches concerning their respective frameworks on the use of lethal force against persons. In this regard, the chapter analyzes the role played by ‘conduct’ and ‘function’ in determining the lawfulness of the use of lethal force in both legal regimes and demonstrates that these are not as far apart on this issue as it is generally believed. Hence, by applying the principle of systemic integration, it attempts to use these points of convergence to find a space in human rights law for a quasi- regime of status-based targeting of members of armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. The chapter nonetheless cautions against any exercise of interpretation that overstretches and distorts international human rights law or international humanitarian law. It thus highlights the limits in some circumstances of incorporating the abovementioned status- based regime, as well as guarding against attempts to align both legal branches to the detriment of their object and purpose.

In this contribution I engage with one of the thorniest and most controversial topics to bedevil international law concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict. First, I outline the various approaches to the problem from 1996 onwards, and my own – radical perhaps – response in 2009. Next, I turn to the fruitful jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights. Third, I engage with the refusal, perhaps wisely, of the European Court of Human Rights to engage with the spectre of lex specialis as a means of resolving the apparent tension between international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict. This culminated in the 2014 Grand Chamber judgment in Hassan v UK. Lastly, I turn to a recent intervention by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The present article stipulates on various disputable issues of applying the general legal maxims on overcoming the conflict of lex posterior derogate priori and lex specialis derogate legi generali based on the empirical examples of contemporary Russian criminal law. The objective is to clear the peculiarities of operating the lex posterior and lex specialis maxims including, inter alia, through appealing to the doctrine and positive law in the aspect of correlation with some specific colnflict rules. For this purpose, the author turns to a number of techniques, ways and methods of legal phenomena studies, such as, particularly, system approach, ascend from abstract to specific, using the logic of standard and normative statements, conceptual and definition analysis, speculative experiment, legal and dogmatic approach, legal simulation method, law comparison method. The main conclusion of the research is formulated as follows: though the principles of lex specialis and lex posterior are generated by the legal doctrine as criteria for selecting one out of two conflicting options, the principle that a law governing a specific subject matter overrides a law governing only general matters finds a wider scope of application compared to the principle of priority of a new law over the old one. The situation is explained by the fact that lex specialis is deliberately used by the legislators to construct logical relationships of legal rules, while lex posterior does not perform a similar function. Keywords: conflict of law and regulations, lex specialis, lex posterior, legal interpretation, retroactivity in law. Research area: theory and history of law and state; the history of the teachings of law and the state. Citation: Petrov, A.A. (2019). Lex posterior and lex specialis legal maxims in Russian criminal law.

В настоящей статье осмыслены различные спорные вопросы применения общеправовых максим преодоления коллизий юридических норм «специальная норма сильнее общей» и «последующая норма сильнее предыдущей» на эмпирическом материале уголовного права современной России. Цель работы ‒ прояснить особенности функционирования максим lex posterior и lex specialis, в том числе путем обращения к доктрине и позитивному праву в отраслевом срезе во взаимосвязи с конкретными коллизионными нормами. Для этого автор прибегает к различным приемам, способам и методам познания феноменов правовой реальности. Речь идет, в частности, о системном подходе, восхождении от абстрактного к конкретному, использовании логики норм и нормативных высказываний, концептуально-понятийном анализе, мыслительном эксперименте, юридико-догматическом методе, методе правового  моделирования, сравнительно-правовом методе. Основной вывод исследования таков: несмотря на то, что принципы lex specialis и lex posterior порождены юридической доктриной как критерии выбора одной из двух норм в случае их коллизии, принцип приоритета специальной нормы над общей имеет более широкую сферу применения в сравнении с принципом приоритета нового закона над старым. Причина такого положения вещей заключается в том, что lex specialis умышленно используется законодателем для
построения родо-видовых связей правовых норм, тогда как lex posterior не выполняет аналогичной функции.

Рецензируемая монография посвящена теоретико-правовой головоломке — сложным коллизиям норм права (совпадение коллизий, конкуренция коллизионных норм). В книге содержится ряд ценных идей по теме исследования. В частности, авторы верно разграничивают позитивизированные коллизионные нормы и разработанные юристами принципы (максимы) преодоления коллизий (коллизионные правила толкования), которые могут быть рассогласованными между собой. Это и порождает сложные коллизии. Авторы удачно показывают это на примере сложной судьбы принципа lex posteriori derogat priori в правовой системе Армении. В работе проводится сравнительно-правовое изучение правового регулирования разрешения коллизий норм, в том числе сложных коллизий, в постсоветских государствах. Весьма интересна иерархическая система коллизионных критериев, предлагаемая авторами для преодоления сложных коллизий норм права. Кроме того, в монографии подробно излагается проблематика «внесистемных коллизий» в праве, под которыми понимаются антиномии принципов и норм права и рассогласованности между принципами права. Вместе с тем в работе есть ряд спорных тезисов, например о приоритете гуманистического содержательного критерия разрешения коллизий над традиционными юридическими критериями (такими как lex superior, lex specialis, lex posterior); о необходимости выделения в качестве отдельных критериев преодоления коллизий компетенционного и отраслевого критериев; об ограничительной авторской интерпретации сферы применения коллизионного принципа lex specialis. Указанные спорные идеи аргументированно критикуются в рецензии.

Does the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts still exist or has it been virtually eliminated? If there are no distinctions and same set of rules govern both international and non-international armed conflicts, will the international humanitarian law apply as the lex specialis to the exclusion of the international human rights law in all armed conflicts, whether international or non-international in character? This article addresses these issues with the help of legal instruments and case laws.

Over the past few years, states have been entering into international agreements that increasingly displace their non-refoulement obligations. Non-refoulement is a legal norm that protects vulnerable people from being expelled and returned to a state where they might face serious mistreatement. This rule has been a cornerstone of the law on international migration and forced movement for a considerable period, even being viewed as a human right by some. However, recently states have begun entering into international agreements and treaties that overcome the non-refoulement obligation through a number of arrangements. This study will proceed by looking at three forms of contracting out of non-refoulement: agreements that establish facts, agreements that establish jurisdiction or agreements creating competing norms. This article seeks to draw attention to these effects, criticize them and emphasize that we should not lose sight of the need to protect vulnerable people from expulsion to situations of serious mistreatment.

In this contribution I engage with one of the thorniest and most controversial topics to bedevil international law concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict. First, I outline the various approaches to the problem from 1996 onwards, and my own – radical perhaps – response in 2009. Next, I turn to the fruitful jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights. Third, I engage with the refusal, perhaps wisely, of the European Court of Human Rights to engage with the spectre of lex specialis as a means of resolving the apparent tension between international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict. This culminated in the 2014 Grand Chamber judgment in Hassan v UK. Lastly, I turn to a recent intervention by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.