Industrial Disputes

1. Our recommendations help –

A. Entrepreneurs to downsize, right size or close their enterprise without government permission.
B. But, all workers who have been laid off must get PF and Severance Pay (as in Europe and Brazil)

2. Therefore we are AGAINST THRESHOLDS. Entrepreneurs and Workers suffer because of TWO THRESHOLDS.
A. SIZE: Units with 100+ workers suffer many restraints to Labour flexibility. This is disagreeable to Entrepreneurs.
B. DURATION: Only workers who have been employed for over 240 days are entitled to benefits. This seriously disadvantages workers.

We are against all thresholds as they:
i. Encourage small enterprises and not big scale, high technology ones
ii. Encourage employment of non-permanent casual workers; this blocks skill development

3. ALL WORKERS ARE ON THE MUSTER and are entitled to all benefits.

4. When worker is retrenched/laid-off, the benefits over and above PF, Bonus also includes SEVERANCE PAY (as in Europe and Brazil). We have allowed for exceptions in “Seasonal Industries”, but there are certain constraints in this sector too.

5. So now no enterprise gains from being
A. Small and Employing below 100 workers
OR
B. Firing workers before 240 days of Employment are over

6. So hiring contract /casual workers now become less attractive.
     
THEREFORE:
A. All workers hired for non-core jobs must come from a contractor’s firm where this job is a core one
B. All contract workers, no matter where they are currently hired to work, are on the Muster of their parent firm

7. On Dispute Resolution we suggest:
A. One Workers’ Council whose office bearers are elected by universal secret ballot BUT only by those inside the company.
B. Trade Unions can function within but the body representing workers will be the Workers’ Council.

8. Also a Three Tier Dispute Resolution Mechanism is suggested.
A. Workers’ Council, whose office bearers will be internal and elected internally as well.
B. Conciliation Committee, which will have labour representatives.
C. Labour Tribunal.

The time taken at each level is fixed without exceptions.

There are constitutional and statutory provisions for industrial conflict mediation in Nigeria. These include the Trade Dispute Act; the Arbitration and Conciliation Act; and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Trade Dispute Act specifically set out in Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 the various amicable processes that should be taken when industrial disputes arise. These processes range from non-governmental amicable dispute resolution processes, to government facilitated mediation and conciliation. Recourse to adversarial industrial dispute resolution is therefore a last resort, legally, that is, only when all avenues to negotiate, mediate and conciliate have failed. Very importantly, the Constitution of Nigeria mandates the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) to set up alternative dispute resolution (ADR) centers for the purposed of administering amicable dispute resolution process to industrial disputes. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides that parties' arbitration clauses do not prevent them from agreeing to use conciliation in the resolution of their disputes. This paper highlights these statutory mandates for industrial dispute mediation and conciliation. It also introduces the author's 10-Step-Mediation model of amicable industrial dispute resolution. Topics covered under the10-Step-Mediation description include: understanding of disputants' emotional situation; dealing with disputants' emotions; understanding disputants' problems; understanding disputants' unmet needs that fuel conflict; setting out issues for determination in dispute resolution; strategizing (brainstorming) for options for dispute resolution; sensitizing options; doing reality-testing; making offers for settlement; and, accepting offers for settlement. The 10-Step-Mediation model provide a step-by-step approach to dispute resolution that ensures that all issues in contention in a dispute are adequately examined and resolved.

Education plays a crucial role in driving the process
of sustainable national development. This originates from the
central position it occupies in nation building but unfortunately,
industrial disputes have remained pervasive in the nation’s
tertiary education sub – sector. This work is premised on
determining the causes and effects of industrial disputes by the
Academic Staff Union of Colleges of Education (COEASU) with
special reference to the Federal College of Education, Zaria
(FCEZ) from 1999 – 2014. It puts firmly that, the recent
industrial dispute between the Colleges of Education Academic
Staff Union (COEASU) and Federal Government of Nigeria
(FGN) relates to class dispute which is aimed at protecting the
interest of the present and future working force of the Colleges
of Education (CoEs) and sister institutions against any form of
exploitative tendencies from the Federal Government. The study
adopted the experimental survey research and it studied a
population of staff and students of the Federal College of
Education, Zaria (FCEZ) wherein a sample size of 268 was
drawn from the population accordingly using probability
sampling. A total of two hundred and sixty – eight (268)
questionnaires were administered to the sampled respondents by
means of the simple random sampling (SRS) technique while the
data was analysed utilizing the Chi – square inferential statistical
test.The research findings revealed that while the frequency of
dispute(s) in the college system still remains low till date, the
causes of dispute were not limited to the non – payment of
workers’ entitlements, lack of conducive working environment,
but more importantly government’s penchant renege for
agreements. Also, the effects include loss of man – hour, poor
academic performance amongst others. However, it recommends
that COEASU should explore effectively the principles of
collective bargaining through dialogue; periodic needs
assessment so as to address infrastructural deficiencies in the
Colleges; and the government should at all times respect and
fulfil agreements reached with the union so as to boost
productivity in the system through effective industrial relations

This paper draws on data acquired in semi-structured interviews to address the question of effective workplace trade unionism in China. These are rarely-sighted phenomena due to rigid prohibitions on organizing outside the Party-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Indeed some commentators are extinct. Evidence from a case study of the Yantian International Container Terminal suggests that this is not necessarily the case. The authors do not underestimate the very real constraints on labor organizing but rather turn the spotlight on working class power in the wider context of labor militancy and cautious trade union reform. We argue that the YICT union developed a system of annual collective bargaining in order to " tame " the power of militant dockworkers and prevent strikes. This required an effective enterprise-level trade union that was nevertheless able to manipulate members " somewhat ambiguous acceptance of its role.

It is a commonplace of labour history that a lengthy industrial dispute necessarily involved highly committed strikers. After all, long-running strikes, it is averred, invariably brought hardship and suffering in their wake. That strikers were willing to endure such assaults on their well-being, often for many months, has generally been interpreted as an indication of their fortitude. However, this accepted wisdom has been called into question by Steven Thompson in a thought-provoking study of the 1926 miners’ lockout in South Wales. The lockout lasted a full seven months and has long been accepted as a classic example of working-class tenacity in the face of immense suffering and hardship. Historians of the dispute have been content enough to rely on journalistic accounts of hungry, malnourished strikers and their dependants. But according to Thompson, the lockout, far from generating ill-health and premature death, should properly be understood as bringing about an improvement in the well-being of the population.

The implications of Steven Thompson’s re-evaluation of the impact of the 1926 lockout on the health and well-being of the coalfield population extend far beyond the confines of that particular dispute. His argument could be read as a gentle yet telling criticism of exponents of the ‘new’ labour history project that flourished in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Others have taken labour historians to task for a perceived tendency to over-romanticize the objects of their study. Had they done the same with starving strikers? Thompson suggests that in the case of the 1926 dispute in Wales historians had accepted, too uncritically, tales of starvation deaths and suffering. But might they have been guilty of doing so in other disputes? How much faith should we have in claims that strikers ‘were starved – literally starved – back to work’? For if death rates fell in 1926 notwithstanding newspaper claims of widespread destitution, might they not have also fallen during other lengthy stoppages? Were there other ‘healthy strikes’?
This paper ponders some of these more general questions through a consideration of the events that unfolded during another South Wales dispute – the great ‘Coal War’ of 1898.

From 21 February until 19 March, Britain’s university system was engulfed in its largest industrial dispute ever. Lecturers, professors and academic support staff at 61 universities, organised in the University and College Union (UCU), went on strike for 14 days to defend their pensions. At the time of writing (28 March), they continue to take actions short of striking, with 14 further days of strike action planned for the exam period.
In this article, I will give a brief overview of why lecturers, professors and academic support staff went on strike, how the strike movement developed and why the pensions dispute opened a whole array of other questions. By drawing on my own experiences during the strike, informal conversations, participation in union branch meetings and online fora, I argue that the proposed changes to lecturers’ pensions were the catalyst, whereas the causes of the unprecedented levels of strike action run deeper.

This article examines the case of the Yantian International Container Terminal (YICT) to consider under what conditions unions can provide effective workplace representation in China. The authors draw on semi-structured interviews to analyze how and why the union was effective, despite rigid prohibitions against organizing outside of the Party-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions. The authors argue that the YICT union developed a system of annual collective bargaining that tamed the power of militant dockworkers and helped prevent strikes. This outcome required an effective enterprise-level trade union that was nevertheless able to influence and manage members’ somewhat ambiguous acceptance of its role. Ultimately, workers’ interests were partially represented and their acquisition of associational power—in the form of trade unions—increased.