Human Rights Quarterly

... the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co ... Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights correctly identifies language, religion, and ethnicity as rights that will be enjoyed, if at all, in a group community.40 (b ...

Experience suggests that public emergencies pose a heightened threat of grave and systematic human rights abuse. To address this threat, international law regulates states’ derogation from their human rights commitments through a two-tiered inquiry: First, are circumstances on the ground sufficiently dire to warrant a state of emergency? Second, if a state of emergency is warranted, are the state’s responsive measures strictly necessary to address the emergency? This article illuminates the normative basis for international law’s two-tiered approach to public emergencies by arguing that human rights are best conceived in Kantian terms as norms arising from a fiduciary relationship between states (or state-like actors) and the citizens and noncitizens subject to their power. States bear a fiduciary duty to guarantee subjects’ secure and equal freedom, a duty that flows from their institutional assumption of sovereign powers. The fiduciary theory of human rights clarifies the substantive and procedural principles that guide international law’s regulation of public emergencies. It also disarms Carl Schmitt’s critique of constitutionalism by explaining how emergency powers can be reconciled with the rule of law.

The United Nations Special Procedures system was described by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as " the crown jewel " of the UN Human Rights Machinery. Yet, in recent years, the system has expanded rapidly, driven by states creating new mandates frequently on topics not traditionally viewed as human rights. This article explores the connection between forms of governance and the states voting for and promoting these newer mandates. We explore states' potential motivations for expanding the system and the impact on international human rights law. This article forms an important part of discussions about Special Procedures and rights proliferation.

This article argues that the widely justified and internationally promoted
model of minority protection can only operate effectively by transcending
the still dominant framework of individual rights and incorporating the
concept of collective rights. In defending that position, this article will
elucidate the main legal theoretical dilemmas of the concept of collective
rights. Sustaining a coherent concept of collective rights requires recognition
of the intrinsic, non-instrumental value of certain collective entities
and of the fact that not all groupings are entitled to be moral and legal
rights bearers. Legal criteria for defining collective rights can also be
established, by distinguishing this notion from affirmative action measures,
jointly exercised individual rights, and somewhat universal general legal
norms. Furthermore, the lack of homogeneity within minority culture,
religion, language, etc., could be legally overcome if bodies representing
the interests of minorities are founded on the principles of voluntariness,
electoral accountability, proportionality, and democracy. Ultimately, although
this approach creates the possibility of conflicts between collective
and individual rights, it can provide legal techniques for balancing the
interests of individuals, respective collectives, and the state.

The rights-based approach to development has swept through the global development assistance sector during the last fifteen years. As a result, bilateral development donors, international organizations, and development-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly committed, in theory, to implementing human rights. This commitment has dramatically accelerated the discursive and organizational merger of the global human rights and development policy ...