Hizb ut-Tahrir

The Islamic conservative turn in Southeast Asia has been an important subject of inquiry for many observers of Islam in the region. More recent studies of the conservative turn in the region have noted the differences in the religious orientation, modes of activism, and agendas of the different actors in the country (e.g. work on Front Pembela Islam [FPI], Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia [HTI], Salafis, Traditionalists). This article shows different articulations of Islamisation in Indonesia infiltrating the media after the fall of Soeharto. It seeks to examine new mediums of Islamic propagation promoted by different Islamic actors who use film, radio, and social media, all of which have different social implications in Indonesia’s Muslim society. Discussions of media in this article are intertwined with popular culture studies, a field of important scholarly inquiry often overlooked in political and social studies. The development of Islam-based media—in which Islamic pop culture also thrives—is a form of bottom-up Islamisation in Indonesia, which reflects resistance from the various layers of Indonesia’s Muslim society towards the Western-led process of globalisation. As apparent in this article, the Islamisation trend in the Indonesian media plays a key role both in pluralising the various discourses of Islam and normalising religious conservatism.

This project investigates the appeal of the group Hizb ut-Tahrir, primarily focusing on its Australian and British branches, and serves as a contribution to recent scholarly debates on why non-violent (vocal) radical forms of Islam still attract segments of Muslim communities in the West. This thesis places emphasis on a topic still neglected by the current literature: vocal and radical Islamists. Such groups advocate for the caliphate and for the implementation of shari’a but also reject violence as a tool to achieve these goals. This thesis questions the common opinion that terrorism stands out as the final manifestation of the multi-faceted process of radicalisation. This account of Hizb ut-Tahrir points out how an Islamist group can remain vocal and radical for over six decades, while continuing to expand around the world, recruiting new members and impacting the ideology of new groups. Unfolding the discourse through the structure/agent debate, this project uncovers the dual nature of Hizb ut-Tahrir, acting both as an agent (vis-a-vis the national political authorities and its competitors) and as a structure for its members, providing a specific system of values and a group identity, which not only assures the group new recruits in the contemporary Western context but also long-term memberships. Employing methods of semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and thematic analysis, this project uncovers the specific elements of Hizb ut-Tahrir that make it appealing for some segments of Muslim communities in the West. In particular, this project identifies four main factors that make Hizb ut-Tahrir appealing to some segments of Muslim communities in the West: Hizb ut-Tahrir’s evolution into a transnational organisation, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideological premises used to challenge the West at the political and social level, a set of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s unique features that make the group different from the plethora of Islamic revivalist groups advocating for the caliphate today,and Hizb ut-Tahrir’s role as a structure creating a strong system of meanings and identities for its members. Studying the main ideological tenets of vocal radicals like Hizb ut-Tahrir fosters a deeper understanding of both intellectual and violent forms of Islamic activism in the West, since they share the same ideological tenets but give voice to their claims in very different ways. Without denying that radicalization is the basis for any sort of violent ideological expression, this thesis argues that radicalisation and terrorism are not always necessarily intertwined.

After the 9/11 in the US and, in Europe, the Madrid (7/11/2004) and London (7/7/2005) terrorist attacks, most States became aware of the need to  identify and collaborate with moderates inside the Muslim community.
However, several Islamic organizations were chosen (and financed) to fight  jihadist terrorism simply because they advocate for a non-violent approach,  despite the fact many of them still pursue an agenda contrary to principles  of the Rule of Law.
In this context, it is relevant to answer the following question: is Islamic Radicalism ideology in its non-violent approach incompatible with liberal  democracy or is it an integration effort, bearing in mind the example of Hizb  ut Tahrir in Great Britain (1986-2015)?
On chapter one, it will be necessary to define the thesis object, the definition  of non-violent radical Islamism, and some operative concepts, considered essential for the development of the PHD thesis.
Chapter two will analyze the objectives and strategy of non-violent Islamic Radicalism that threaten liberal democracy.
Chapter three will assess the reason why these threats emerged and why they are so difficult to combat — from lack of knowledge to the legitimization of non-violent Islamic Radicalism by political decision-makers.
Chapter four will explore the radicalization process on Islamic extremism  and the combat against it.
Chapter five will analyze the impact of Hizb ut Tahrir — an Islamic group  that supports the ideology of non-violent Radical Islamism in Great Britain  from 1986 to 2015.
Chapter six will test the framework for political decision-makers to engage  with non-violent Islamic groups, which is based on two principles of the Rule of Law.
Finally, the doctoral thesis conclusions will be drawn

This paper explores the regional network of the Indonesian chapter of Hizbut Tahrir (HT), a transnational Islamic group aiming to revive the Islamic Caliphate. Focusing on the chapter of HT in Indonesia, the paper highlights how Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) supports the activities of other HT chapters in the region and beyond. The key argument of the paper is that an understanding of HTI's transnational activism brings new insights to the current understanding of HT as a transnational movement. The author seeks to show the linkages between HTI and other HT chapters around the world and to analyse the implications of HTI's transnational activism.

Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is a transnational Islamic movement operating in over forty-five countries. Literature on HT has focused mainly on its activities in Central Asia and Europe. As such, when the HT chapter in Indonesia organized the largest-ever political gathering staged by HT, many observers were caught by surprise. Yet despite the importance of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), little is known about the organization in the English-speaking world. This paper is an attempt to present empirical data on this group. The paper argues that HTI's usage of different mobilization strategies has resulted in its ability to effect policy changes in Indonesia.

Operating in over 43 countries in the world, Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is presently active in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and more recently in Asia. Today, HT is becoming increasingly prominent in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia. Yet despite its rapid growth in the region, little is known about HT chapters in Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia. In light of the dearth in scholarship on Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia (HTM), this article aims to shed some light on the HTM and analyze the likelihood of its emergence as a political force in the country.

After the 9/11 in the US and, in Europe, the Madrid (7/11/2004) and London (7/7/2005) terrorist attacks, most States became aware of the need to identify and collaborate with moderates inside the Muslim community.
However, several Islamic organizations, were chosen (and financed) to fight jihadist terrorism simply because they advocate for a non-violent approach, despite the fact many of them still pursue an agenda contrary to principles of the Rule of Law.
In this context, it is relevant to answer the following question: is Islamic Radicalism ideology in its non-violent approach incompatible with liberal democracy or is it an integration effort, bearing in mind the example of Hizb ut Tahrir in Great Britain (1986-2015)?
On chapter one, it will be necessary to define the thesis object, the definition of non-violent radical Islamism, and some operative concepts, considered essential for the development of the PHD thesis.
Chapter two will analyze the objectives and strategy of non-violent Islamic Radicalism that threaten liberal democracy.
Chapter three will assess the reason why these threats emerged and why they are so difficult to combat — from lack of knowledge to the legitimization of non-violent Islamic Radicalism by political decision-makers.
Chapter four will explore the radicalization process on Islamic extremism and the combat against it.
Chapter five will analyze the impact of Hizb ut Tahrir — an Islamic group that supports the ideology of non-violent Radical Islamism in Great Britain from 1986 to 2015.
Chapter six will test the framework for political decision-makers to engage with non-violent Islamic groups, which is based on two principles of the Rule of Law.
Finally, the doctoral thesis conclusions will be drawn.

Key words: Radical Islamism; Dawa; Non-violent threats; Radicalization; Counter-radicalization.

Após o 11 de setembro de 2001 e, no caso particular da Europa, após os ataques terroristas jihadistas de Madrid (11 de março de 2004) e de Londres (7 de julho de 2005), tornou-se premente para os Estados a necessidade de identificar e colaborar com grupos moderados dentro das diferentes comunidades de crentes islâmicos.
Todavia, diversas organizações islamistas, apesar de prosseguirem uma agenda contrária a princípios do Estado de Direito, pelo simples facto de condenarem o terrorismo, foram escolhidas (e financiadas) no combate ao terrorismo jihadista.
Deste modo, importa responder à seguinte pergunta: a ideologia do Islamismo Radical na sua vertente não violenta é incompatível com a democracia liberal ou será uma tentativa de acomodação, tendo como pano de fundo o Hizb ut Tahrir, na Grã-Bretanha (1986-2015)?
No capítulo 1, será necessário delimitar e definir o objeto da tese, isto é, a definição de Islamismo Radical na sua vertente não violenta, assim como alguns conceitos operativos essenciais para o desenvolvimento da tese de doutoramento.
No capítulo 2, serão analisados os objetivos e a estratégia da vertente não violenta desta ideologia que representam ameaças à democracia liberal.
No capítulo 3, importa analisar porque é que estas ameaças surgiram e porque é tão difícil combatê-las, em resultado do desconhecimento e da legitimação do Islamismo Radical não violento por parte de decisores políticos.
No capítulo 4, importa analisar o processo de radicalização no extremismo islâmico, assim como o seu combate.
No capítulo 5, numa análise micro, será analisado o Hizb ut Tahrir, grupo islamista não violento, na Grã-Bretanha (1986-2015).
No capítulo 6, após percorrer estas etapas, está-se em condições para testar o quadro concetual, composto por dois princípios de Estado de Direito, para os decisores políticos lidarem com grupos islamistas não violentos.
Posteriormente, serão gizadas as conclusões da tese de doutoramento.

Palavras-Chave: Islamismo Radical; Dawa; Ameaças não violentas; Radicalização; Contra-Radicalização.

Türkiye’de 1970’lerde başlayıp İran Devrimi ve Afgan Cihadı süreçlerinde yoğunlaşan İslami siyasi hareket metodu tartışmaları, genellikle Seyyid Kutub’un Yoldaki İşaretler’de söyledikleri etrafında yürütülmekteydi. İhvân-ı Müslimîn’den gelen itirazî cevaplar ile Kutub’un metodik “rabbânî hareket” teorisi üzerine özellikle Mısır ve Suriye’de yapılan düşünsel ve pratik eklemeler tartışma alanını zenginleştirdi.

İslami Davanın Güzergâhı'nda Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, eski hararetini kaybetmiş olsa da Türkiye’de ve İslam âleminde tartışılmaya devam eden bu konu bağlamında rabbânî ve nebevî hareket metotlarını ve –Türkiye’de çok daha az bilinen– Hizbü’t-Tahrîr’in metodik hareket metodunu tahlil ederek aralarındaki farklılıkları ve benzerlikleri mukayeseli olarak ele almaktadır.

Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is an Islamic organization that became famous and became the subject of discussion after being dissolved by the Indonesian government through PERPPU no. 2 Year 2017. Many different views on the struggle Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. The Indonesian government considers that the activities and ideas undertaken by HTI can divide the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). However, some national figures assume that HTI's struggle is not contradictory to the constitution and the idea conveyed by HTI namely the Khilafah is part of the teachings of Islam. In this paper, the author examines how HTI embodies the idea of the Khilafah. From the results of the study can be concluded that there are three strategies undertaken in realizing the Khilafah is first, the stage of coaching and cadre (tatsqif); second, interaction and struggle (marhalah tafaul wal kifah); third, the acceptance of power and application of law by the state (Marhalah tathbiq ahkamul Islam).

“Taqiudeen al-Nabhani”  (Periode Awal: 1911-1948)

Pertumbuhan Awal. Taqiyuddin lahir pada 1911 di Ijzim, dan menghafal al-Qur'an di bawah bimbingan ayahnya di usia muda. Ia kemudian melanjutkan sekolah menengahnya di kota terdekat, Akka. Pada 1928 Taqiyuddin melakukan perjalanan ke Mesir tempat dimana menyelesaikan pendidikan tingginya.
Menjadi Pembela Islam (pra-Hizbut Tahrir). Kehidupan Taqiyuddin melewati kondisi politik dunia Arab yang dinamis juga hancur pasca runtuhnya Khlafah Turki Usmani. Fakta kehidupan demikian mendorongnya tumbuh ‘tidak hanya sekedar’ menjadi faqih fiddin  namun juga menjadi pembela Islam yang mengharapkan perubahan .
Taqiyuddin merupakan kombinasi alami dari (keberadaan) aktivisme politik sang kakek, tradisi kuat keulamaan dari para ulama al-Azhar seperti sang dosen, Syekh al-Khidr Husain, dan dinamika perjuangan Islam pada masanya seperti Hasan Al- Banna & Izzudin Al-Qassam.

This project aims to answer the following research question: How has the development of a securitised lens impacted on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain and Denmark? To achieve this, it will explore the construction of a securitised lens, the impact of securitisation processes and the difference between responses within Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) in Britain and Denmark through the following three sub-questions: 1. How do we know securitisation is an issue for Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain and Denmark? 2. How can we understand securitisation as creating patterns of repression through perception? and 3. What are the long-term effects of this experience of perceived repression in the different contexts? It aims to do this through an approach that brings together the two theoretical discussions of social movement theories and securitisation theories through the nexus of repression. This enables the project to understand patterns of repression and mobilisation response, as well as respond to the limitations of both theoretical facets – social movement theory’s difficulty in understanding subtler, long-term and multi-spatial forms of repressions and securitisation theory’s disposition to assume power only travels downwards, from monolithic repressor to repressed, without an interactive response amongst all actors.

The project took an empirical approach grounded in interaction with members, ex-members and those who operate in and around security – something considered particularly important in the study of an organisation that is semi-clandestine in its operation. This included attendance at demonstrations, public talks, da’wah stalls, Friday prayers and mosques talks, as well as halaqat (private study circles), social events, meetings at coffee shops, family meals, weddings and even participation in football practice, with fieldwork conducted between 2015 and 2018. Conceptually, the thesis is designed to fill gaps in contemporary study of the Islamic Activist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir, updating the literature on an organisation that study has largely neglected in recent years but has become more relevant with the addition of discourse about ‘extremism’ in European counterterror. However, this thesis aims to offer a basic framework not just for understanding Hizb ut-Tahrir or even Islamic Activism, but for any forms of activism that are problematised under the increasing rubric of ‘extremism’, and explore how different groups from diverse movements change tactics in response to the threat or perception of repression by policies, practices or policing under the counterterror lens.

It suggests the following findings: 1. Increased securitisation has been instrumental in the decline of HT in Britain and Denmark; 2. However, securitisation has had different effects in the UK than in Denmark, leading to adaption and institutionalisation in the British context and a continuation of contention in the Danish context; and 3. This is because different perceptions of repression have been created by the use of different securitising mechanisms, suggesting that the concept of counterterror securitisation needs to be reconsidered as a more interactive and diversified process, to account for the quanta of securitisation and mobilisation responses produced.

Bu çalışmada, günümüzde dinde tekelci söylemin siyasî bir yansıması olarak değerlendirilen Hizbü’t-Tahrîr el-İslâmî’nin kuruluşu, siyasî görüşleri, temel kaynakları, faaliyet alanları ve çalışma metotları hakkında bilgi verilecektir. Ayrıca dini anlamada Selefî çizgiyi takip eden söz konusu oluşumun günümüz Müslüman toplumun din anlayışı üzerinde de etkili olması bakımdan dinî metinlerin yorumlanmasında, İslâm inanç esaslarının doğru tespit edilip, temellendirilmesinde hayati bir öneme sahip olan kelâm ilmine ve kelamcılara yönelik görüş ve eleştirilerine de yer verilecektir. Akabinde din anlayışlarında nasıl bir yöntem takip ettikleri tespit edilip, değerlendirmeye tabi tutulacaktır.  Partinin kurucusu Filistinli Nebhânî, 1909 ile 1977 yılları arasında yaşamış, Filistin ve Ürdün’ün çeşitli şehirlerinde hocalık ve hâkimlik yapmıştır. İsrail’in Filistin’i işgal etmesi (1948) üzerine siyasî hayata atılmış, İsrail ve İngilizlere karşı mücadele edebilmek için Hizbü’t-Tahrîri’l-İslâmî adıyla bir parti kurmuştur.  Batı’da ve İslâm dünyasında oldukça aktif faaliyetler gösteren söz konusu partinin temel amacı, işgal altındaki Filistin’i özgürlüğüne kavuşturmak, Müslümanları tek bir idare altında birleştirmektir. Fakat parti mensupları, propaganda aracı olarak kendileri gibi düşünmeyen Müslümanlara karşı tekelci, reddedici, ötekileştirici ve tekfirci bir söylem benimsemişlerdir. Bu söylemlerini meşrulaştırmak ve Müslümanlar arasında taraftar bulabilmek için Kur’an ve Sünnet’i esas aldıklarını iddia etmeleri bu hareketin aynı zamanda dinî bir hüviyete de sahip olduğunu göstermektedir

Hizb al-tahrir is an organization of radical Islam that was founded in 1952. It challenges all current governments in the Muslim world and calls for the re-establishment of the Caliphate. Its approach towards violence differs decisively from that of other radical groups because it refrains from militant action. The party has been active in Germany since the 1990s, but in January 2003, the Ministry of Interior in Berlin outlawed all its activities. This decision was based on the party’s anti-Western and anti-democratic attitude. In addition, it displays an aggressive anti-Semitism that is not tolerable for the German state with its historic responsibility towards the Jewish people and Israel. Nevertheless, the ban of hizb al-tahrir was mainly a symbolic act. It was a show of force and warning to demonstrate that German authorities were willing and able to act. The shift from toleration to repression thus reflects the new approach of the German state towards the activities of radical Islamist groups in the country.

This paper seeks to analyse the political and sociological landscape of Muslims in Britain. As such this paper focuses on tracing the roots and histories of all the major political, social and religious movements of British Islam. The effects of each of these movements are analysed by looking at their impact on the three main institutions of life of British Muslims: the home, school and the mosque. The problems which this impact causes are raised and then potential solutions are given. The paper concludes with the assertion that Muslims are caught in a vicious cycle and only through simultaneous action on all three fronts can progress be made.

This paper examines how practices of counter-terrorism (CT) have been perceived by legally-operating groups labelled ‘extremist’. Taking the cases of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain (HTB) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Scandinavia (HTS), the paper explores how two branches of the same Islamic activist organisation have experienced CT through interviews with party members and activists. Using existing models of repression, the paper maps how counter-terrorism is perceived by activist groups, revealing new information on Hizb ut-Tahrir and providing a framework for understanding the interaction of security with groups problematised as ‘extremist’ within a widening ‘securitised lens’. The paper finds that, whilst there are similarities in how CT has been articulated in Britain and Denmark, it has impacted on HTB and HTS differently, creating different strategies of response. In tracking these, we highlight the prominent role played by civil society actors in the UK in creating a hostile environment for Islamic activist groups. By using mechanistic models of repression, we conceptualise the impact of counter-terrorism and newer patterns of countering violent extremism (CVE) on contentious activist organisations at a moment when the so-called ‘risk’ of extremism is increasingly being conceptualised and responded to throughout Europe.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is one of the leading radical organizations in Indonesia. The group’s notoriety grew in 2017 when the government banned it through a decree signed by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo for opposing the state ideology Pancasila and seeking to establish a caliphate. While the ban was supported by some within Indonesia, others have argued that this measure limits freedom of speech in Indonesia and hence is viewed as an attempt by the government to silence dissent. My own research on HTI suggests that regardless of the ban, HTI was a movement on a decline.

HT was founded in 1953 with the aim of setting up an Arab caliphate in the Levant area with the aim of emancipating Palestine. In Indonesia, the seeds of HT were sown by Abdul Rahman Al-Baghdadi, a Lebanese born Australian who was invited to teach at the famous Al-Ghazali Islamic boarding house established by the prominent Indonesian religious figure, Abdullah bin Nuh.

Despite Indonesia being one of the largest Muslim countries, the HT leadership was not interested in supporting Al-Baghdadi in his efforts to establish a chapter of HT in the country. For them, the priority is to establish a caliphate in the Middle East.

It was not until 1998 that HTI came under the official structure of the global HT movement. HTI became the legal outfit in 2000 after the collapse of the New Order regime and has since grown with a presence in all Indonesian provinces.

Ironically, the scale of the alleged threat posed by HTI has been fed by members of HTI themselves. Estimates of HTI’s membership range from several hundred thousand to several million. These numbers are a gross exaggeration of the actual strength of the group.

In 2014, a former chairman of HTI told me that its membership stood at 30,000 members, a number that pales in comparison to other groups. Likewise, HTI members tend to overstate the group’s relationship with important political and military figures in Indonesia. The impression created is that these figures comprising important members of the Jokowi administration are sympathizers of HTI simply because they spoke at events organized by HTI.

While it is true that HTI has a significant following amongst students, the enthusiasm for the group would often wane several years after they graduate. The claim that HTI was instrumental in organizing the 212 rallies against the governor of Jakarta in 2016 does not hold water. While HTI members attended the rallies, none of the HTI leaders was represented in the organizing committee of the rallies which was largely supported by the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) and the Muslim Community Forum (FUI).

The formation of the Islamic State (IS) is perhaps the biggest challenge encountered by HTI and its parent organization, HT. While, HT has struggled for the creation of the caliphate for more than six decades without any success, IS was able to establish an actual state. Many members of HT had initially expected the HT leadership to pledge allegiance to the IS’ caliph, Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi, but was sorely disappointed when the ameer of HT, Khalil Ata Abu-Rashta declared the IS’ caliphate illegitimate and a Western conspiracy to divide the Muslim World.

It also declared the violence perpetrated by IS un-Islamic. Nonetheless, a small number of HT members left HT to join IS. In Indonesia, the most prominent former HTI member to join IS is Bahrum Naim, who was responsible for planning a number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

The IS issue also resulted in the rupture of HT internationally. Till date, at least two members of HT central leadership and key leaders of HT in Tunisia, India, Lebanon, Kuwait, Turkey, Bangladesh, Denmark and the United Kingdom have left the group due to their dissatisfaction with the ameer of HT.

The dissatisfaction was over the decision of the ameer to provide arms to members of HT in Syria to fight against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. The transfer of arms was apparently done under the auspices of the Turkish military. This runs contrary to the principles of HT that consider all Muslim governments as illegitimate and hence forbids any cooperation with these governments.

Likewise, HT’s charter clearly states that a “jihad” can only be declared by a caliph and since there is currently no legitimate caliph, it is illegal for the ameer to support an arm struggle in Syria. This disagreement with the ameer has resulted in significant number of HTI leaders leaving the organization. This exodus of leaders is likely to see the disintegration of HTI.

It cannot be denied that a group like HTI posed a genuine challenge for the Indonesian authorities due to its anti-Pancasila ideology and caliphate objective. Nonetheless, my research suggests that HTI remains a fringe movement within Indonesia. It is likely to die a natural death due to the rupture of the group internationally and its crisis of legitimacy regardless of the ban.

In fact, the real challenge for the Indonesian state lies in HTI’s offshoot groups such as the FUI and newer groups that could splinter out of HTI due to the ban. These groups are likely to be more radical as demonstrated by the case of FUI.

In summing up, the banning of HTI could have been a case of barking up the wrong tree.

In his study of the Bangladesh branch of the trans-national Hizb al-Tahrir (HTB) and the Bangladeshi public sphere, Ahmed Abidur Razzaque Khan argues that government authoritarianism, and its sponsorship of state-oriented Islamist parties with little public support, has favoured the HTB and its programme for a global caliphate. Within Bangladesh’s illiberal public sphere, and through global new media, HTB has successfully carved out its own ‘pseudo-public sphere’ where it communicates its messages without having to confront critics. A genuinely liberal public sphere would thus make it harder for HTB to sell their programme to the Bangladeshi people.

“Taqiudeen al-Nabhani”  (Periode Awal: 1911-1948)

Pertumbuhan Awal. Taqiyuddin lahir pada 1911 di Ijzim, dan menghafal al-Qur'an di bawah bimbingan ayahnya di usia muda. Ia kemudian melanjutkan sekolah menengahnya di kota terdekat, Akka. Pada 1928 Taqiyuddin melakukan perjalanan ke Mesir tempat dimana menyelesaikan pendidikan tingginya.
Menjadi Pembela Islam (pra-Hizbut Tahrir). Kehidupan Taqiyuddin melewati kondisi politik dunia Arab yang dinamis juga hancur pasca runtuhnya Khlafah Turki Usmani. Fakta kehidupan demikian mendorongnya tumbuh ‘tidak hanya sekedar’ menjadi faqih fiddin  namun juga menjadi pembela Islam yang mengharapkan perubahan .
Taqiyuddin merupakan kombinasi alami dari (keberadaan) aktivisme politik sang kakek, tradisi kuat keulamaan dari para ulama al-Azhar seperti sang dosen, Syekh al-Khidr Husain, dan dinamika perjuangan Islam pada masanya seperti Hasan Al- Banna & Izzudin Al-Qassam.

Since the demise of the last great Muslim Empire, the Ottoman Empire, a plethora of Islamic revivalist movements has emerged in response to the gradual decline of numerous Islamic institutions, the threat to the Muslim identity, and the disintegration of the Muslim world through the damaging processes of colonialism and imperialism. Muslim revivalist movements have consequently emerged to inculcate Islamic orthodoxy in the masses in the Muslim world as well as in diaspora communities through institutional developments, socio-political activities, missionary preaching, and propagation. Movements such as Hasan Al-Banna's Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Ilyas's Tabligh Jama'at, and Taquiddin an-Nabhani's Hizb ut-Tahrir share a common core commitment and objective to revive Islam and restore a lasting Islamic glory. In this article we propose to compare and contrast these movements and argue that they act as agents of change and reform, seeking a reconstruction of Muslim ummah (community).

This book offers a timely examination of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a chapter of the transnational movement Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), whose key aim is the revival of the caliphate.

It cautions against an overly simplistic read of a group like HTI and political Islam in Indonesia. While there is much to laud, particularly with regard to how leaders in Indonesia have attempted to counteract Islamist extremism, insofar as the trajectory of non-violent Islamism in Indonesia is concerned there are clear reasons for apprehension. Groups like the HTI have been adept at using the democratic space in Indonesia to propound their illiberal objectives, including encouraging the curtailment of Indonesian art forms deemed un-Islamic, and more importantly pushing for certain Islamic sects, such as the Ahmadiyahs, to be banned. Yet, despite its extreme posturing, HTI is

accepted as a mainstream Muslim organization. As such, the Indonesian chapter of Hizb ut-Tahrir represents a unique case: unlike other chapters, which are deemed extreme and fringe, HTI, though radical, still exists within the space provided by the Indonesian religio-political landscape.

This book offers new insights into HTI’s history, organizational structure and ideology, adding considerable new details about HTI and correcting errors in existing literature, while directing its primary focus on explaining HTI’s rapid growth in Indonesia. The central argument is that the key to understanding HTI’s growth lies in the role collective identity plays in attracting new members and retaining its existing members within the party. Factors such as institutional and non-institutional opportunities within the Indonesian political system, HTI’s resource mobilization strategies and the anti-systemic ideology of HTI serve as political, organizational and religious incentives for individuals to join the party and launch collective action. This goes on to emphasize and show that collective identity remains the most crucial factor in the party’s growth. Analysing this process of collective identity formation and its impact on recruitment and membership retention is central to this book.

This book will be of much interest to students of Southeast Asian politics, regional security, political Islam, and International Relations in general.

Home-grown terrorism has become an issue several Western states have to deal with. London 7/7 and – more recently - Paris 2015 have highlighted the need to better explore a new enemy from within, i.e. the “home-grown terrorists”. How shocking and frustrating it can appear, terrorism is a complex phenomenon, which can be regarded as the outburst of a multi-factor process known as radicalization. Radicalization was boldly defined by Neumann as “what happens before the bomb goes off” (Neumann 2008: 4), stressing its pivotal role as a necessary landmark towards any form of extremism. Although all radicals do not become terrorists, all terrorists were previously radicalized. Therefore, it is not possible to understand terrorism without having a good understanding of radicalization. Nowadays, radicalization has become a frequent word in the media considering also the growing presence of radical Islamist movements in the West, attracting a growing number of Muslim youth. The scenario of these groups is very broad ranging from the violent Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to the intellectual Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). In this panorama, one question remains quite unanswered, i.e. why should young people born and educated in the West turn to radical Islamist movements? This article aims at exploring this issue by reviewing the literature up-to-date to investigate the catalysts for young Muslims’ radicalization in Western states. In order to provide a clear picture of the discourse, I will focus on two broad categories, i.e. the “emotional factors” and the “environmental factors”. Furthermore, I will take into consideration the Constructivist approach to better explore the relationship between radical groups and their members as well as the groups’ capacity to create meaning and identities.