Early Academy

In this master thesis, I investigate how Philo of Alexandria (ca. 15 BCE - 45 CE), as a Jewish philosopher, interpreted the Jewish figure of Wisdom (a personification that Proverbs 8 describes as having been present with God when he created the world) in the Platonic/Pythagorean philosophical context in which Philo operates. To this end, I examined the personification of Wisdom in the Hebrew wisdom literature (Proverbs, Job, Baruch & Ben Sira). Then, I searched through Plato's dialogues for similar ways of conceptualizing the world order and its relation to the divine. In my third chapter, I review the tradition of the early Academy and of neo-Pythagoreanism, which forms the hermeneutical paradigm for Philo's understanding of Plato. Then, I turn to the Greek translations of the Jewish wisdom literature, and to Aristobulus and Wisdom of Solomon, to look for attempts to relate Wisdom to Greek philosophy before Philo. Finally, I discuss a select number of passages in which Philo speaks about wisdom.

In Metaphysics Λ7 1072b30–1073a3, Aristotle introduces a Speusippean theory according to which ‘what is most beautiful and best is not en archē’. Through a detailed analysis of the passage, I argue that Aristotle’s refutation of Speusippus’ thesis is favoured by the introduction of the seed example, which conflates both ontological and temporal priority. The elements gathered from the analysis of Aristotle’s polemical strategy will support a broader conclusion: Speusippus’ reason not to characterise his principle(s) as (the) good is related to the problematic relationship Forms and sensibles had within Plato’s account, or, in other words, participation.

Full paper available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/classical-quarterly/article/hermodorus-of-syracuse-and-sextus-empiricus-pythagoreans-on-categories-and-principles/642FBDF271ECABED347797AC1173079E

Hermodorus of Syracuse, a Sicilian disciple of Plato, is reported by Simplicius to have set out a classification of beings, which is of a piece with an argument for principle monism (in Ph. 247.30–248.18 > F 5 IP2; 256.28–257.4 = F 6 IP2). A similar classification appears in Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus Mathematicos X (262–275), where it is officially ascribed to some ‘Pythagoreans’ (Πυθαγορικοί) or ‘children of the Pythagoreans’ (Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες), but seems ultimately based on Early Academic material. Virtually all commentators have read these classifications conjointly. More radically, both have been taken to record Plato’s oral teaching and to give essentially the same categorial scheme, which is regarded as the most developed instance of a so-called ‘Academic doctrine of the categories’. This article re-examines these texts and provides an alternative reading. Section 1 focusses on Hermodorus and defends three theses: (1) there was never such a thing as an ‘Academic doctrine of the categories’; (2) Hermodorus does not seem to recount what Plato said, but to propose an integrated interpretation and defence of aspects of his thought; (3) Hermodorus’ pronouncements about principles are incompatible with other testimonies on Plato’s unwritten teaching, notably Aristotle’s. Section 2 moves to Sextus and defends a fourth thesis: (4) despite their similarities, the classifications of Hermodorus and Sextus’ Pyrhagoreans are considerably different, though perhaps originated from the same debate.