Dao De Jing

The Laozi 老子 or Daodejing 道德經 has been profoundly influential, shaping many aspects of Chinese culture, from medicine to art to philosophy and religion. According to tradition, the text was written in the mid-sixth century BCE, but there has been little trace of it or its impact, until the third century BCE. Recent archeological discoveries of bamboo texts from the Warring States Period have begun to fill in this space. Several cosmogonic texts have been discovered, all buried around 300 BCE, providing some insight into the broader context in which the Laozi was written and took form. The most important discovery is the three sets of bamboo strips found at Guodian, known as Laozi A, B and C. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce these Guodian Laozi materials, with a particular focus on their philosophical significance. The first section provides an overview of the materials and the ways they differ from other versions of the text. Section two offers an interpretation of the content of the materials, showing that they share a coherent philosophical position. The third section discusses the nature of the materials as a text, and the fourth section considers their relationship to the complete Laozi.

El trabajo se propone desarrollar sucintamente la notable y poco explorada convergencia entre la doctrina de Spinoza y el taoísmo filosófico chino, tal como Lao Tsé lo inaugurara en el Tao Te King alrededor del siglo V a.C. A fin de iluminar la cuestión es conveniente distinguir los dos grandes “momentos” de la Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico: por un lado, el “momento metafísico”, en el que se despliega la definición de Dios/Substancia como principio ontológico absoluto, único, eterno e infinito, existente en y por sí por la necesidad de su esencia, causa de la esencia y la existencia de la totalidad del universo. Por otro lado el “momento ético”, consecuencia lógica del anterior, ya que la ética sólo tiene sentido para el ser humano como realización metafísica de su ethos particular. Esta realización no puede tener lugar sin un conocimiento adecuado de la potencia singular del hombre, que requiere a su vez el conocimiento de la potencia divina. La noción de conatus (como identificación de potencia y esencia) resulta aquí el nexo clave que habilita el pasaje de un “momento” a otro.
A través de una exposición resumida de la doctrina taoísta intentaremos entonces mostrar que ésta comparte intuiciones fundamentales con el spinozismo en los dos momentos ya señalados. Por una parte, su concepción metafísica del principio ontológico supremo (Tao) es muy similar a la spinoziana; por otra parte, también el taoísmo postula la paridad potencia/naturaleza en su concepto de Virtud (Te). Esto le permite derivar, partiendo de la ontología general, una ética de lo particular (humano), de la misma manera en que lo hiciera Spinoza siglos después.

The archeological discoveries of the past several decades have radically expanded our knowledge of the Lǎozǐ and its context.  Thus far, most research has focused on the various manuscript versions of the text itself, but there is another way in which archeological evidence has changed our knowledge of the Lǎozǐ: the discovery of several other cosmogonic texts, all dated to around the same time as the Guōdiàn materials.  While these texts share some concerns and assumptions, they also disagree and offer conflicting positions.  Thus rather than assuming that anything sounding vaguely like the Lǎozǐ is saying the same thing in different words, we should be attuned to subtle differences on issues ranging from cosmogony to conceptions of action. We should also allow for the possibility that the Lǎozǐ itself incorporates diverse positions.  This paper analyzes one particular example, the role of “the one” (yī 一) in the Lǎozǐ.  It argues that the five chapters discussing the one represent an attempt to incorporate what was originally a distinct position that took the one as the ultimate and had no concern with the interdependence of opposites. That position is expressed in the recently discovered Fánwù liúxíng.

Este trabajo se propone señalar ciertas zonas de resonancia entre la filosofía de Spinoza y el taoísmo filosófico clásico (siglos V-III a.C.), en lo referente a su tratamiento de la virtud. En uno y otro caso encontramos una concepción ético-ontológica en que la virtud se traduce como la espontaneidad de una acción determinada por la propia esencia. Entendida como una potencia innata de acción, la noción de virtud queda así lejos de todo juicio moralizante. En primer lugar, entonces, abordaremos la noción taoísta de De (traducida comúnmente como “virtud”), señalando su lugar en el esquema ontológico y la modalidad en que se manifiesta como ideal espiritual y práctico para el ser humano (el wuwei, “no actuar”). En este sentido cobra importancia la noción de ziran (lo natural o espontáneo, entendido como tendencia innata conferida por el Dao). La conclusión en este punto es que, para el taoísta, la mayor virtud se caracteriza por una acción máxima desde el punto de vista del Dao, y a la vez por una acción mínima desde el punto de vista humano. En segundo lugar, repasaremos brevemente la relación spinozista entre esencia, potencia y virtud, y su articulación con el proyecto ético humano. En este sentido, la máxima virtud y acción posibles para el hombre coinciden con la virtud divina y, por lo tanto, con un cierto “no-hacer” humano. En último lugar, entonces, a partir de lo expuesto señalaremos las principales resonancias y disonancias entre ambos pensamientos.

En un trabajo anterior (“La formulación de la ética en Spinoza y Lao Tsé”) expuse brevemente ciertas afinidades entre las filosofías spinozista y taoísta, tanto en lo referente a sus concepciones ontológicas como a las consecuencias éticas derivadas de éstas. La hipótesis que subyace a este intento de acercamiento entre dos pensamientos aparentemente tan alejados, es precisamente que ambos mantienen un mismo compromiso: la defensa de un proyecto ético de liberación humana que hunde sus raíces en una ontología impregnada por lo Absoluto. Para ello propuse distinguir dos “momentos” conceptuales: un momento metafísico-ontológico (exposición de la estructura de lo real, Dios/Tao), y un momento ético (normas de acción para el modelo ideal de la naturaleza humana, derivadas a partir de su inserción necesaria en aquella estructura).
Este trabajo se propone abordar con mayor detalle el primero de dichos momentos, utilizando como guía la estructura del De Deo propuesta por Pierre Macherey en su Introduction à l’ Ethique de Spinoza. Según Macherey el conjunto de las proposiciones del De Deo puede dividirse, para su exposición, en dos grupos: el primero de ellos versa sobre la Naturaleza de Dios (esto es, sobre la relación entre las nociones de sustancia y atributo y sobre los “propios” de Dios), mientras que el segundo trata la Potencia divina (características y resultados de la acción divina tal como se siguen de su Naturaleza). El recorrido del De Deo comienza entonces por la Sustancia y desemboca en la identidad necesaria entre ésta y los productos de su accionar. Encarar la ontología del Tao Te King siguiendo este modelo expositivo permitirá apreciar sus importantes concordancias con el spinozismo así como sus no menos importantes diferencias. Diferencias que no nos impiden considerar a ambos, Ética  y Tao Te King, como dos libros amigos.

Analysis from Philosophical and Hermeneutical Perspectives
Interpretations of Laozi 老子(aka Daodejing道德经)--解老
About classical interpretations in China of Laozi's Philosophy and his book Laozi(aka Daodejing) by Wang Bi.  His approach is the most appropriate one trying to fathom the framework of Laozi's book.

學術界一向把老子之自然哲學視作形上學和形容道為「形上實存」。「形上實存」指存在於時間空間以外，英文稱作transcendent。現代科學表明，實在不局限於經驗界，但科學之超經驗層級存在於時空以內。現代科學哲學中之科學實在論稱「感察不到但實存於時空以內」作unobservable。老子之道正符合unobservable之理解，而不屬於違反現代科學精神之transcendent。廣義上，把老子之自然哲學視作形上學並無不可，但有欠精準，因為道指涉unobservable，而unobservable乃科學哲學之專門概念，而非形上學之一般概念。「形而上」一詞出自《易傳‧系辭上》「形而上者謂之道」這一句。日本學者井上哲次郎按這一句把歐美哲學中之metaphysics譯作形而上學。其實，〈系辭上〉「形而上」的意義是承老子而指涉unobservable，井上以「形而上」這詞來翻譯metaphysics卻把它理解為指涉transcendent，故他這一譯並不符合〈系辭上〉的原來意義。本文就以上作出詳細分析，而為給老子之自然哲學作出充份說明，本文除討論老子外，還把他跟莊子之氣概念、《易傳》及古希臘之相關學說作出比較。

There are two images of Sir. Patrick Geddes that have been received by subsequent generations, Geddes the Liberal and Geddes the Mystic. This paper examines the ways in which revived sensitivity to the wisdom and limitations of Geddes the Mystic may help facilitate the process of transforming human-nature relations and staving off the cultural and ecological genocide of Modernity.

Nuestro texto caracteriza brevemente, en primer lugar, la concepción de la virtud y de los métodos necesarios para alcanzarla propia de la filosofía confuciana. Luego,  hace otro tanto desde el punto de vista de la filosofía taoísta. Por último, a partir de la caracterización que realiza Deleuze de uno de los postulados de la “Imagen dogmática del pensamiento”, retoma los enfoques confuciano y taoísta para interpretar en ellos dos concepciones antagónicas sobre el lugar de la cultura en la formación moral del ser humano. En este sentido, la formulación deleuziana permite redistribuir, entre estas dos vertientes de la filosofía china, las categorías de cultura, método, aprendizaje y saber. Finalmente, y en virtud de una toma de posición en favor de uno de los enfoques presentados, el texto deberá permanecer abierto, tras constatar la futilidad de intentar atrapar algo que jamás se detiene.

The concept of khôra, which was elaborated but quickly repressed by Plato in Timaeus, has caught the attention of a whole coterie of contemporary philosophers. It is often interpreted as "receptacle" or "uterus." Its presence in Deleuze's corpus is largely covert and easily overlooked. Foregrounding its significance in Deleuze's work allows us to get a firmer grasp of his vitalistic thought. Following the lineage of Plato-Leibniz-Whitehead, Deleuze takes khôra to be a screen, sieve, filter, or membrane that makes something issue from chaos, "even if this something differs only slightly." Khôra is the mother or locus of genesis, becoming, negentropy, and the event. Roughly speaking, the function of khôra is twofold: prehension and negative prehension, or simply selective prehension. Two statements made by Deleuze deserve our particular attention: first, "the brain is the mind itself"; second, "the brain is the screen." For our purposes, the second statement can be productively misinterpreted as, "the brain is the khôra." There is textual evidence in Deleuze's book, Negotiations, to support such an interpretation. After sorting out the rationale of Deleuzean vitalism through the lens of khôra, this article moves on to such notions as the intermind, composite khôra, and the global superbrain to probe into the human condition in the era of mental symbiosis between humanity and its artificially intelligent counterparts, and to negotiate the tension between control and becoming.

In his Laozi Commentary (老子注) and Structure of the Laozi's Subtle Pointers (老子微指例略), Wang Bi seems to identify the Dao with "absence" or "nothingness" (wu). Despite this identification, some modern commentators regard Wang Bi's Dao as a being. Other commentators deny that the Dao is a being but, nonetheless, seem to regard it as a reality of some kind. In contrast, I propose that Wang Bi's Dao is literal absence and that we need not reify this absence in any way. Wang Bi's descriptions of the Dao can be understood as metaphorical descriptions of mere absence. To support this proposal, I present an interpretation of Wang Bi's Dao and then apply this interpretation to the first section of Wang Bi's Laozi commentary and to the first section of the Structure of the Laozi's Subtle Pointers.

The paper uploaded here differs from the final published paper. For a view-only version of the published paper, follow this link: https://rdcu.be/cLiXd

This paper uses the example of passages of the DàoDé Jīng 《道德經》to make the point that when one is working with Old Chinese texts, it is important to pay attention to the rhyming patterns in the texts, as they give clues to the proper segmentation of lines and larger segments and to the proper pronunciation of some characters, and can alert us to where characters have been changed due to taboo or scribal error.

Wang Bi's Laozi weizhi lüeli (老子微指例略) is, along with Wang Bi's famous commentary on the Laozi/Daodejing, an attempt to unpack the Laozi's meaning. This is a translation of the first part (A1) of the Laozi weizhi lüeli, based on Rudolf G. Wagner's critical edition of the Chinese text.

It should come as little surprise to anyone familiar with his concept of ‘negative
capability’ and even a cursory understanding of Daoism that John Keats’ thought
resonates strongly with that tradition. Given the pervasive, reductive understanding of
Keats as a mere Romantic, however, this source of insight has been used to little
advantage. His poem Hyperion, for example, has been roundly criticized as an untidy
Romantic fragment. Here, by contrast, I will argue for a strategic understanding of
Hyperion as a masterpiece in the Daoist tradition.

Translating Religion advances thinking about translation as a critical category in religious studies, combining theoretical reflection about processes of translation in religion with focused case studies that are international, interdisciplinary, and interreligious. By operating with broad conceptions of both religion and translation, this volume makes clear that processes of translation, broadly construed, are everywhere in both religious life and the study of religion; at the same time, the theory and practice of translation and the advancement of translation studies as a field has developed in the context of concerns about the possibility and propriety of translating religious texts. The nature of religions as living historical traditions depends on the translation of religion from the past into the present. Interreligious dialogue and the comparative study of religion require the translation of religion from one tradition to another. Understanding the historical diffusion of the world’s religions requires coming to terms with the success and failure of translating a religion from one cultural context into another. Contributors ask what it means to translate religion, both textually and conceptually, and how the translation of religious content might differ from the translation of other aspects of human culture. This volume proposes that questions on the nature of translation find particularly acute expression in the domains of religion, and argues that theoretical approaches from translation studies can be fruitfully brought to bear on contemporary religious studies.

Contents
Introduction, Michael DeJonge and Christiane Tietz
1. Translating Dao: Cross-Cultural Translation as a Hermeneutic of Edification, Wei Zhang
2. Historical Translation: Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas, and the Unknown God, Michael DeJonge
3. Philological Limits of Translating Religion: śraddhā and dharma in Hindu Texts, Carlos Lopez
4. Translating Religion between Parents and Children, Andrea Schulte
5. Thick Translation of Religion between Cultures: The Basel Mission in Ghana, Ulrike Sill
6. Habermas’s Call for Translating Religion into Secular Language, Christiane Tietz
7. Does Allah Translate ‘God’? Translating Concepts between Religions, Klaus von Stosch
8. Translating Religious Symbol Systems: Some Preliminary Remarks on Christian Art in China, Volker Küster
9. Conclusion: What’s Lost and Gained? Michael DeJonge and Christiane Tietz

Christian theology in general, and Chinese theology in particular, has remained reticent toward the Needham Question originally posed by Joseph Needham in the 1930s. After a brief survey of the Christian response to the theory of evolution introduced into China in 1898, I address the Needham Question from a theological perspective. Then, building on Jürgen Moltmann's trinitarian proposal, which places science and theology on the common life plane of wisdom, I propose a pneumatological-trinitarian Chinese theology of science by integrating the natural wisdom and the revealed wisdom, the Chinese wisdom and the wisdom of other cultures.

This is the second of three lectures focusing on the different ways the Daodejing has been interpreted over time and across cultures.  In this first lecture, I discuss chapters 1 and 40.  There are more questions from the audience and I try to clarify some basic elements of the text.

This is the first of three lectures focusing on the different ways the Daodejing has been interpreted over time and across cultures.  In this first lecture, I give an overview of the textual history of the Daodejing (excavated texts and commentaries), some of its main themes, and some of the ambiguities that generate such a variety of meanings.