Clinical Death

We discuss the meaning of "being alive" and "being dead." Our primary aim is to pave the way for a sound and accurate ethical debate concerning these two concepts. In particular, we analyze a metabolic approach and a genetic one and discuss the reasons for their failure to constitute a good starting point for successive debates. We argue that any ethical or social discussion of topics involving life and death must introduce cultural constructs such as, on the one hand, the concept of clinical death and, on the other hand, the concept of existence. We argue that these two cultural constructs, although consistent with biomedical knowledge, cannot be ontologically grounded in it. To conclude, we apply our findings to the case of human embryos.

In this article we rejoin Gerald Woerlee's response in this issue to Smit's (2008) article, Corroboration of the Dentures Anecdote Involving Veridical Perception in a Near-Death Experience. We show the untenability of his claim that the man whose dentures were lost before his resuscitation in the hospital was initiated had been conscious virtually all the way from the moment he was found in the meadow up to his transport to the hospital's cardiac care unit.

Also, we question Woerlee's claim that the patient constructed an accurate mental picture of objects and persons in the resuscitation room simply by listening to the sounds caused by the actions around his body. In all, we question Woerlee's materialistic explanations of the out-of-body experience that occurred in this patient's near-death experience. Our conclusion is straightforward: We consider Woerlee's claims to be wrong.