Children's Best Interests

The work focuses on private international law methods used in order to guarantee «the best interests of the child» in each decision concerning children (article 3 CRC). The a. tries to show how, and to what extent, «the best interests of the child» principle requires “flexibility”, or even derogations, to the traditional private international law methods, dealing with jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement of foreign judgments concerning children. The work focuses mainly on the EU Regulation 2201/2003 (and its recast) and the 1996 Hague Convention on parental responsibility and the protection of children, with some occasional references to Italian legislation (in particular, legislation on filiation).

Forensic psychology is the intersection of psychology and the law. Forensic psychologists are skilled in discerning a variety of behaviors and assessing criminality for the criminal justice system. Forensic Psychologists follow Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists and are specially trained in legal assessments. Within the standards of the Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Forensic Psychologists must ensure to obtain informed consent and a release of information. In conjunction with informed consent and a release of information, a proper explanation of what the limit of confidentiality entails and the forensic psychologists' role should be disclosed to all involved parties, answering relevant questions as they may arise. Neutrality is of utmost importance to eliminate bias and impartiality. Forensic evaluation is not directly beneficial to the evaluatee. The evaluatee, within reasonable means, should be informed that the forensic psychologist is a neutral party hired to evaluate the parents, child(ren), and internal/external influences related to the child(ren). Barring medical or mental health issues, all evaluated parties need to be informed and understand that the final submitted report is in the 'best interest of the child.' Finally, the purpose of a parental fitness evaluation is to compile and relate applicable information to the court or requesting party in an impartial and fair manner, excluding extenuating circumstances.

This bench book focuses on the legal rights and options for immigrant children who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected by at least one of their parents. Many of these children find themselves before the judiciary in state court proceedings and this bench book seeks to inform judges about immigrant children who may qualify for immigration relief offered through Special Immigrant Juvenile Status.

The purpose of this document is to provide background information about the condition of autistic children/adult in Bangladesh. The background information contained in this document are taken from objective sources such as reputable newspapers of Bangladesh; articles written by experts and information available online. This document would be helpful assessing the best interest of the children who are currently living outside Bangladesh.

Very little information is known about the situation of autistic children in Bangladesh. Parents of autistic children who are Bangladeshi origin but live outside the country may take into account the information contained in this document. The above background information would be helpful to compare with other countries before making any decision moving to Bangladesh permanently. The NGSs, Human Rights activists, lawyers and other organisations dealing with children’s best interest would find this document helpful to find background information.

In der vorliegenden Arbeit, die sich auf Deutschland, Österreich und Italien iVm der Judikatur des EGMR konzentriert, möchte man beleuchten, inwieweit und in welche Richtungen die Rechtsprechung Bezug auf Kindeswohlerwägungen nimmt, um die ihr vorgelegten Fällen zu entscheiden.
Nach einem einführenden Teil, der sich hauptsächlich mit der verwendeten Terminologie und der derzeitigen Rechtslage beschäftigt, werden die wichtigsten in die Thematik involvierten Rechtsinteressen grob skizziert. Anschließend wird dargestellt, wie die jüngste Rechtsprechung der drei analysierten Länder und des EGMR dazu tendiert, das Kindeswohl bzw das Wohl des jeweiligen Kindes als ausschlaggebendes Argument zu verwenden. Diese Forschungsergebnisse werden dann einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen. Die Arbeit wird mit einigen Gedanken de jure condendo abgeschlossen.

Der Beitrag nimmt die rechtlichen und politischen Regulierungen von Nähe-
und Fürsorgeverhältnissen in sogenannten Regenbogenfamilien zum Ausgangspunkt für die Erörterung der Frage, wie und welche familialen Lebensweisen normalisierenden Einschluss in politisch-rechtliche Regime erfahren. Indem die politische Debatte um das sogenannte Kindeswohl in Familien mit lesbisch, schwul, bisexuell und/oder trans* lebenden Eltern analysiert wird, macht d_ Autor_in deutlich, wie die Figur des »Glücks« darin zum Leitmotiv wird.

This article considers the inclusion of the best interests of the child standard in the family law regimes of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as its implications for our understanding of families in the Gulf region. Specifically, the degree and ends to which the concept of the best interests of the child have been used in formulating the rules governing domestic child law generally, and parental care in particular, will be investigated. As the best interests of the child standard remains a vague and largely undefined legal concept in all three family codes, the analysis will not limit its focus on statutory approaches to reforming child law. More importantly, this article also considers legal practice in child law and the courts’ interpretation of the best interests of the child standard. In doing so, the article: (i.) discusses how the introduction of the best interests of the child standard has served to reform family law
on its codification in Bahrain, Qatar, and the uae; and (ii.) explores what the interpretation of the concept of best interests of the child tells us about changing societal values, family structures, and present-day attitudes towards motherhood and fatherhood in the gcc. I argue that, although the best interests of the child standard has come to influence most aspects of child law in the three countries under review, its usage and meaning remains inconsistent. The concept serves multiple purposes in the area of parental care in particular. What is still missing in all three jurisdictions is a thoroughly grounded and all-encompassing framework to determine the best interests of the child standard and also an understanding of its overall function within family law.

Interview with Judge Marie-France Carlier, Family Courts of Namur and Dinant (Belgium) on the implementation of a model of cooperation "Judge, lawyers, parents, mediators and specialized actors" within the Dinant Family Court: a successful transposition of the consensus model known as "Cochem (Germany) consensus model"

This is a chapter in Elizabeth Brake and Lucinda Ferguson (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Children's and Family Law (OUP 2018).

This chapter's argument stems from the premise that legal language should speak for itself. The 'paramountcy' principle suggests the prioritization of children's interests, and 'children's rights' suggests some aspect of distinctiveness to children's interests. But there is academic consensus in respect of both that children's interests cannot and should not be prioritized over those of others. This chapter examines the justification for the contrary perspective, and for treating children as a prioritized 'special case' in all legal decisions affecting them.

Four key counter-arguments frame the discussion. First, the 'social-construct' objection: as a social construct, childhood cannot sustain the prioritization of children's interests over those of others. Second, the 'vulnerability' objection: children's vulnerability is either not unique or suggests dependency or interdependency, not prioritization. Third, the 'family autonomy' objection: parents' rights and the family unit justify deference of children's interests. Fourth, the 'equality' objection: equal moral consideration makes prioritization unjustifiable.

L’a. esamina le questioni che insorgono in materia di trascrizione nel registro di stato civile italiano di un
atto di nascita formato all’estero a seguito di gestazione per altri: dopo un confronto tra la disciplina
dell’accordo di gestazione per altri nell’ordinamento californiano e in quello italiano, vengono affrontati il
tema delle funzioni, di natura sia statuale sia privatistica, assolte dall’atto di nascita, e quello della sua
efficacia. Vengono, poi, riepilogate le conseguenze pregiudizievoli per il minore in caso di mancata trascrizione.
L’analisi si concentra infine sulle argomentazioni che militano a favore o contro la trascrizione
dell’atto, soffermandosi in particolare sul dibattito relativo alla sua conformita` o contrarieta` all’ordine
pubblico internazionale.

Calls for a harm threshold to mediate the best interests test have gained momentum following the case of Charlie Gard. This chapter considers normative and empirical claims made by proponents of the harm threshold. While I accept that the best interests test may need of reform, I deny that the harm threshold is the answer. The chapter is divided into two parts. Part one investigates the empirical basis of the claim about parental decision-making in medical practice. It uses an analysis of interviews that reveal some thresholds of decision-making that are volunteered by parents and healthcare professionals in discussions about non-treatment decisions in paediatric intensive care. To some extent I recognise that this data can be used to support the empirical claims made on behalf of the harm threshold. In the second part of the chapter, I take issue with the normative conclusion that this clinical picture means we ought to support the introduction of a harm threshold into medical law. I argue that a harm threshold is largely unmotivated because the current system of decision-making patently does consider the rights of parents as well as children. Proponents of the harm threshold may nevertheless be motivated simply by the desire to make medical law consistent with public law. I argue that there are differences in the level of certainty in clinical and social outcomes, that imply we need significantly more caution when making social welfare decisions. I also note that unintended consequences from the adoption of the harm threshold that may impinge on the rights of parents and increase conflict in the healthcare arena. Finally I argue that the very characterisation of arguments for parental rights as being about liberty is incorrect.

La Bioetica generalmente denominata “laica” si presenta spesso come "nuova etica del vivere e del morire", o più brevemente "Bioetica della qualità della vita", affermando che non è la vita in quanto tale (l’essere) ad avere valore ma la sua qualità (il ben-essere).
Questa prospettiva, dunque, quando considera il criterio “vita”, in realtà, non intende la vita 'tout court', bensì quella vita che possiede determinate caratteristiche che la rendono “degna di essere vissuta”.
Di conseguenza, la vita in tale prospettiva non è un bene in sé, ma un bene “strumentale” che serve, cioè, a raggiungere altri beni.
È certamente difficile riconoscere il profondo valore della vita umana quando, nonostante ogni sforzo assistenziale, essa continua ad apparirci nella sua debolezza e fragilità: la sofferenza continua a generare un’inesauribile domanda sul senso del vivere. Potremmo dire allora che la domanda sulla QUALITÀ DI VITA va riletta come una DOMANDA DI SENSO sulla vita stessa.
La cultura eutanasica ha abbassato il volume di questo grido che ci interpella tutti e che ci interroga sulla nostra umanità.
Ma proprio qui si gioca la scelta tra scansare (e poi eliminare) il sofferente o accoglierlo e accompagnarlo mentre muove i suoi ultimi passi in questa vita. E questo perchè «senza la compassione, chi guarda non rimane implicato in ciò che osserva e passa oltre; invece, chi ha il cuore compassionevole viene toccato e coinvolto, si ferma e se ne prende cura» (Samaritanus Bonus)

The results are publishes in a chapter of the book “Human Rights in Child Protection”, edited by Asgeir Falch-Eriksen and Elisabeth Backe-Hansen. The findings reveal significant differences between countries with regard to the interpretation of the principle of the child’s best interest, the strength of the principle compared with other principles, and the degree of discretionary power vested in decision-makers.

The authors argue that the findings indicates that what is deemed important for children’s interests across child protection systems differs hugely, and as such the right of the child in many jurisdictions has a long way to go. The child best interest principle appears oftentimes as a right that is open to wide discretionary interpretation.

Los trabajos aquí contenidos dan cuenta, en consecuencia, de una suerte
de desplazamiento progresivo del eje de las relaciones parento-filiales:
desde la potestad o poder paterno, hacia el ejercicio equitativo y permanente —entre padres y madres— de una responsabilidad específica por el cuidado y bienestar integral de sus hijos e hijas. Este desplazamiento
consolida una tendencia, ya de larga data, respecto a la disminución y
recomprensión de los antiguos poderes omnímodos concedidos históricamente al padre sobre sus hijos.

Cette recherchée, réalisée pour le compte de l'Observatoire de l'Enfance, de la Jeunesse et de l'Aide à la Jeunesse, s’est centrée sur les décisions concernant le droit des enfants à la vie familiale, en général, et plus spécifiquement dans les situations suivantes : enfants séparés de leurs parents, enfants de parents séparés, enfants adoptés, enfants qui vivent dans des modèles familiaux diversifiés (famille monoparentale, homoparentale, famille recomposée…), enfants issus de procréation médicalement assistée ou en recherche de leurs origines. Elle se fonde sur l’hypothèse que les enfants eux-mêmes sont en mesure de contribuer à la définition de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. Cette recherche a donc recueilli les points de vue, expériences et vécus d’enfants et de jeunes adultes qui ont été confrontés dans l’enfance à une prise de décision qui a eu un impact sur leur vie familiale. Son objectif principal était d’appréhender les conditions nécessaires pour la détermination d’une solution légitime dans les décisions en matière familiale et pour que cette décision respecte, protège et réalise la prise en compte de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant. La recherche s'est déroulée en trois phases: focus groupes avec des professionnels, entretiens semi-directifs avec des adultes, et entretiens semi-directifs avec des enfants.

This is Chapter 1 of Children, Autonomy and the Courts: Beyond the Rights to be Heard (Daly, 2018). This chapter proposes that, although CRC Article 12 focuses on ‘hearing’ children in proceedings about their best interests, instead the aim should be to facilitate children to exercise autonomy to the highest degree possible, through a children’s autonomy principle. In legal decisions in which the best interest of the child is the primary consideration, children should get to choose – if they wish – how they are involved (process autonomy) and the outcome (outcome autonomy) unless it is likely that significant harm would arise from their involvement or preferences. The examination in this chapter of the textual problems with CRC Article 12 will inform arguments later in the book around the moral and legal inconsistencies surrounding the treatment of children’s autonomy in practice.

Esta propuesta busca identificar tales limitaciones y sugerir avenidas para el reconocimiento y  protección de los derechos constitucionales de la niñez, de un modo coherente con los compromisos internacionales de Chile en materia de derechos humanos. En particular, se sugieren dos cuestiones fundamentales. Primero, que será necesario prestar atención a distintas formas de protección constitucional indirecta de los derechos de la niñez. Esto es, cláusulas constitucionales que, aun cuando no se redacten exclusiva y directamente para la protección de los derechos de la niñez, tendrán efectos importantes en su interpretación (por ejemplo: derecho a educación, derecho a la salud, derecho a la identidad, derecho a la igualdad y la no-discriminación, derecho a la vida familiar y/o derechos parentales). Segundo, se indica la necesidad de avanzar en formas de protección constitucional directa de los derechos de la niñez y su prioridad. Tal protección directa, a su vez, debiera reconocer tres tipos o categorías de derechos o intereses constitucionales de la niñez: a) derechos orientados a garantizar, de forma prioritaria, la vida y el pleno desarrollo de las niñas, niños y adolescentes, b) derechos reconocidos para asegurar la protección efectiva de la niñez frente a diversas formas de violencia y discriminación y, c) derechos que permitan garantizar los intereses de autonomía y participación de niñas, niñas y adolescentes, de conformidad con su edad y madurez.

The European Union is increasingly concerned with private international law instruments regarding, directly or indirectly, children. The UN Convention on the rights of the child (art. 3) and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (art. 24) require that in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration. It is therefore mandatory for EU Institutions, and for national judges, to construe and apply EU legislative instruments in compliance with this principle. The present work concerns rules on jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments that expressly refer to the best interests of the child in order to operate, and in particular the rules set in Reg. n. 2201/2003 (Brussels II-bis) concerning decisions on parental responsibility. It tries to show how, and to what extent, «the best interests of the child» principle introduce flexibility, or even derogate, to the traditional  private international law methods. The case-law of the European Court of Justice on Brussels II-bis regulation is examined, together with the main decisions of the Italian judges, in order to evaluate to what extent effectiveness to the aforementioned principle is guaranteed in the application of rules set in the regulation. It is also suggested that the regulation shall be construed in a way that permits, in some circumstances, the participation of the child in the proceedings for recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions.

במאמר זה נטען כי הרטוריקה הרווחת במשפט הישראלי יוצרת את האשליה שהמשפט הישראלי מציע הגנה מקיפה וממשית מפני כל פגיעה בשלום הילד, ושטובת הילד היא שיקול מכריע בענייניו. לאמיתו של דבר לא מוצעת לילד אלא הגנה חלקית בלבד, בעיקר מפני אנשים בסביבתו האינטימית, אך לא כאדם שלם בעל זהות ובעל זיקות למשפחה ולקהילה, כפי שמתחייב מאמנת האו"ם בדבר זכויות הילד. עוד נטען כי אף לטעמם של אלה המבקשים להגן על הילד במבודד ממשפחתו, בהתבסס על אתוס ליברלי-אינדיווידואליסטי של זכויות הילד, אין הדין הנוהג מגן על הילד כראוי –לא בתוך משפחתו ולא מחוץ לה. הסדר הגנת הילד במתכונת הקיימת בישראל עשוי טלאים-טלאים ואינו ראוי כמכלול. כדי להדגים את טענותינו, נצביע בפרקי המאמר על הכשלים הקיימים במשפט הנוהג בישראל בכל אחד מן השטחים העוסקים ברווחת הילד. כן נעמוד במאמר על הגישה האידיאולוגית-ההיסטורית באשר להגנת הילד בישראל ועל השפעתה בהווה, ובסיומו נביע עמדה בנוגע לשינוי היסודי הנדרש בדין הנוהג כדי להגן על שלום הילד באופן המיטבי

This document aims to outline the complex issue of the adopted person’s right, born from anonymous birth, to know their biological origins. The last is contrary to a woman's right to give birth in complete anonymity.

The historical-normative excursus presented here begins in the early 1990s - when the New York Convention of the Rights of the Child of 1989, and the Hague Convention on the protection of minors and cooperation in the field of international adoption of 1993, were adopted - and reaches the current italian and european jurisprudence on the subject. 

The paper is also concerned with outlining the importance, which has emerged in recent times, of the SER.I.O. Project.

A comparative analysis is also presented, which deals with comparing some different legal experiences with the italian legal system. In particular, there are three main legal systems that lend themselves to such a comparison: french, spanish and english.

Moreover, the international scene, in this field, is extremely complex and difficult to interpretate, due to different legal and cultural traditions and different legislations.

The concept of the ‘best interests of the child’ is both pivotal in family law and yet essentially contested. This paper reflects on the concept's position within a number of longer-term histories – of the jurisprudence surrounding child custody, of the social construction of childhood, and of the emotional constitution of family life more broadly. The turn to a co-parenting model from the 1970s onwards and the rise of the concept of the ‘civilized divorce’ is analysed by drawing on Norbert Elias's analysis of ‘processes of civilization’ in Western social life. The paper argues that the post-separation co-parenting model is only partially explained as the outcome of political manoeuvring by particular social and professional groups; it should also be understood as part of longer-term trends in family life, emotional management, and the socio-legal construction of childhood, as part of the on-going ‘civilizing of parents’.

Preventive newborn male circumcision has been at the center of scientific debate for many years. The reason for promoting preventive newborn male circumcision, is the reduction of the incidence of UTIs (in the first six months of life), penile cancer, transmission of STDs/HIV infection/AIDS. However preventive interventions in the newborn involving violations of bodily integrity elicit several ethical questions. In this article, we reviewed the literature regarding circumcision, the prevention of UTIs, penile cancer, transmission of STDs/HIV infection/AIDS and complications of this practice in the neonatal period. The very limited reduction of incidence of UTIs and the uncertain preventive role of newborn male circumcision towards penile cancer, STDs/HIV infection and AIDS, makes it difficult to justify male circumcision in newborns. Moreover, the challenge in obtaining a unanimous opinion on newborn male circumcision derives from the fact that, as a preventive intervention, it requires evaluation criteria that are not comparable to those of therapeutic treatments. Since preventive male circumcision determines permanent alteration of the body, some authors believe that it can be used only in subjects that are capable of giving their valid consent. In the case of a newborn, the " child's best interest " should be used as a standard, but preventive newborn male circumcision does not satisfy it.

This paper analyses the relevant case-law of the Supreme and Constitutional Courts of Germany, Austria and Italy with regard to surrogate motherhood and the rights of the child. After a brief overview of the legal regimes in the three countries, which ban this practice without regulating the consequences of illegal surrogacies, the author moves on to inquiring how the Courts are adopting the principles stated by the ECtHR. The child’s rights and best interests are essential for the recognition of parenthood for the intended parents and the continuation of the common life with them. The German Federal Court of Justice, as well as the Austrian Constitutional Court, has already accepted to give to the position of the involved child the priority. Italy, on the contrary, is showing more resistance, although a recent judgment of the Court of Cassation – taking into account the German case-law – acquitted the intended parents. The mere recognition of the relationship with the parents and granting of the possibility for them to live together with the child, however, could encourage parents to go abroad in order to make use of surrogacy. In the author’s view, this should be prevented providing for sanctions for the intended parents, without using the involved child as a means to an end.

Las contradicciones que el desarrollo de las técnicas de reproducción asistida provocan sobre los ordenamientos jurídicos tienen en la gestación subrogada su máximo exponente. A la mater­nidad tecnológica no la ha acompañado una adecuada regulación jurídica, lo que ha provocado que los tribunales y la DGRN convivan en una dualidad que provoca irremediablemente la pérdida del interés superior del menor. Tras cerrar las puertas a la inscripción de la filiación de menores nacidos por ges­tación subrogada, el TS apuntó a la adopción como modo de proteger los intereses de los menores. Sin embargo, recientes decisiones judiciales no parecen indicar que ese sea el camino ni más rápido ni más adecuado. Por tanto, hemos revisado diferentes planteamientos que el TS ha aceptado en temas análogos buscando una justificación o salida a estas situaciones. El reconocimiento por complacencia o el orden público atenuado son algunas de las opciones que se exploran ante la negativa actual de afrontar la de­manda social de una regulación justa y adecuada para todos los afectados.

The increase of divorce rate in western societies entails that family law must consider the welfare of children from divorced parents as one of its priorities. The judiciary recognizes that going to court to solve family disputes is usually unsatisfactory, as they tend to become chronic. That’s why we should consider and study the development of alternative dispute resolution methods (ADR). This paper focuses on ADR tools, such as collaborative law, parental coordination, early neutral resolution or family arbitration. It also addresses some specific aspects of mediation, such as the possibility of making its use compulsory (mandatory mediation) and the so-called “open” mediation. Successful experiences in comparative law can provide a foundation for recommendations aimed to optimize the management of family conflicts in our country.

The work moves from the consideration of some cases - those of Alfie Evans, Charlie Gard, Isaiah Haastrup and Fabiano Antoniani (c.d. DJ Fabo) - all concerning end-of-life issues, to reflect on the related case law in the light of constitutional principles. It is stressed the seriousness of decisions that have radically excluded parents from choices regarding the lives of their children and have affirmed the exclusive power of health structures and judges to identify the best interest of the children, expressing a kind of judicial paternalism and a form of ethical statalism. It is also critically looked the ECHR legal system, when interpreted in such a way as to allow, on the one hand, the interruption of vital care in controversial clinical cases, against the parents' opinion, and on the other, in the name of self-determination, as to allow an alleged right to die and to use someone else’s collaboration aimed at the production of death. As for the latter, a problem is that to qualify this kind of “help” as an activity or a function that contributes to the material or spiritual progress of society", ex Article 4 Const. Furthermore, the work focuses on the second paragraph of art. 32 of the Constitution and related interpretations. Finally the Author analyzes the case law of the Court of Strasbourg concerning the art. 2 ECHR, with particular reference to the alleged discrimination in obtaining death.
Lo scritto muove dalla considerazione di alcuni casi – quelli di Alfie Evans, di Charlie Gard, di Isaiah Haastrup e di Fabiano Antoniani (c.d. DJ Fabo) - tutti concernenti problematiche di fine vita, per riflettere sulle relative decisioni giurisprudenziali alla luce dei principi costituzionali. Viene rimarcata la gravità di decisioni che, nell’estromettere radicalmente i genitori dalle scelte terapeutiche concernenti la vita dei propri figli e nell’affermare in capo alle strutture sanitarie e ai giudici il potere di individuare il best interest dei figli, esprimono una sorta di paternalismo giudiziale e una forma di statalismo etico. Si sottolinea poi la pesante contraddittorietà del sistema giuridico europeo imperniato attorno alla CEDU, ove interpretato in modo da permettere, da un lato, l’interruzione di cure vitali in casi clinici terapeuticamente controversi, persino contro il parere dei genitori, e, dall’altro, in nome dell’autodeterminazione, un presunto diritto di morire e di fornire una forma di aiuto a tal fine. Quanto a quest’ultimo, si discute se possa davvero qualificarsi come «un’attività o una funzione che concorra al progresso materiale o spirituale della società», ex art 4 Cost. Un particolare approfondimento viene dedicato al secondo comma dell’art. 32 Cost., alle relative interpretazioni e alla loro conformità a Costituzione. Infine si analizza la giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo concernente l’art. 2 CEDU, con particolare riguardo al tema delle presunte discriminazioni nell’ottenere la morte.

La Guía de Recomendaciones para Profesionales que trabajan con menores que migran solos, colaboración entre el Observatoire de la Migration de Mineurs (Migrinter) y la Universidad de Zaragoza está en línea en su version española:

https://omm.hypotheses.org/

Esta publicación recoge los resultados de las Mesas Técnicas, realizadas durante 2019. De acuerdo a este calendario:
1. Presentación en febrero de 2019, con la participación de Daniel Senovilla, coordinador del OMM.
2. Mayoría de edad y emancipación (17 de junio),
3. Modelo de acogida residencial (2 de octubre),
4. Acceso a la autorización de residencia y representación legal independiente (25 de noviembre),
5. Determinación de la edad (25 de noviembre),
6. Mediación, familia y referentes (11 de diciembre).

La Guía que presentamos aquí recoge los informes que surgen de este proceso. Está estructurada en torno a dificultades detectadas y recomendaciones consensuadas por las y los profesionales participantes.
Nuestro reconocimiento  y gratitud al equipo de la Universidad de Zaragoza (Chabier Gimeno, Begoña Heras, Triana Cutillas, Aitor Ostáriz, Juan David Gómez y Debora T. de Lima) por su trabajo e implicación en este proyecto.
Nuestro agradecimiento igualmente al Gobierno de la Comunidad Autónoma de Aragón, a las entidades, a los profesionales y a los jóvenes participantes, por su colaboración para la realización de este proyecto.

The standard of the patient's best interests is the main bioethical standard used in the decision-making process that involves incompetent patients (i.e. neonatology, pediatric patients and incompetent adults). This standard has been widely criticized as being self-destructive, individualistic, vague, unknown, dangerous and open to abuse. With the purpose of defending it, several reforms of this standard have been proposed, especially in the pediatric field. We propose a redefinition of the standard based on two concepts: 1) medical futility as a negative criterion, and 2) the principle of proportionality as a positive criterion. Our work includes a new relationship between concepts in classical moral theology (i.e. ordinary / extraordinary; proportionate / disproportionate) applied to the bioethics of life-sustaining treatments for incompetent patients. RESUMEN: El estándar del mejor interés del paciente es el único estándar bioético utilizado en los procesos de de-cisión de tratamientos en enfermos no competentes (neonatología, pediatría y adultos no competentes). Este estándar ha sido ampliamente criticado por autodestructivo, individualista, vago, desconocido, peli-groso y abierto a abusos. Para defender el estándar se han propuesto varias reformulaciones especialmente en el ámbito pediátrico. Nosotros proponemos una redefinición del estándar basada en dos conceptos: 1) el de futilidad médica como criterio negativo, y 2) el principio de proporcionalidad como criterio positivo. Nuestro trabajo incluye una nueva relación entre los conceptos de la teología moral clásica (ordinario / extraordinario; proporcionado / desproporcionado) aplicados a la bioética de los tratamientos de soporte vital en pacientes no competentes.

In several recent decisions on cases concerning the international abduction of minors the European Court of Human Rights set the requirement of an «in-depth examination of the entire family situation» in order to comply with Article 8 ECHR. The present article considers the ef- fects of such principle on the role and on the proceedings of both the court of the State of the child’s habitual residence and of the court of the State of his refuge after abduction, especially when acting in the frame of Brussels II Regulation. While the requirement of «in-depth examination» seems overall synergetic to the role of the court of habitual residence, also when such court is judging on the return of the abducted minor pursuant to Article 11(8) Reg. 2201/2003, deeper concerns arise with reference to the role of the court of the State of refuge. When such a court is asked to enforce a decision for the return of the abducted child, the possible violation of the child’s fundamental right in the State of origin might raise the question of opposition to recognition and enforcement. The article thus endeavours to find a solution balancing the child’s fundamental rights and EU general fi- nality to strengthen the area of freedom, security and justice.

Contributo che parte dalla disamina del parere del Garante sul decreto del Ministro dell'Interno 31 gennaio 2019 per tratteggiare le problematiche relative al diritto al lecito e corretto trattamento dei dati personali per chiudere con un focus sul sacrificio del best interest of the child relegato ad “oggetto” dell’intervento normativo in contrasto con la giurisprudenza domestica ed europea.

The best interests standard has endured a sustained critique both from bioethics, and recently from those drafting the United Nations Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). At the heart of these critiques is a focus on either aspirational or minimal standards. Both aspirational and minimal approaches are imperfect; only by sustained empirical study of the complexities of decision-making processes in practice will we be able to judge whether the best interests standard is a sustainable approach. While Johan Bester directs welcome attention to conceptual problems with the harm principle (Bester 2018), it is also interesting that Bester’s explanation of children’s best interests should involve “reasonableness,” which is frequently advocated in this context. The frequency with which reasonableness occurs invites an immediate clarification about the nature of any “harm consensus” in bioethics.

Children's vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and determines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, children's general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on their care-givers entails that they have a right not to be subject to monopolies of care, and therefore determines the structure of legitimate authority over them. Second, children's vulnerability to the loss of some special goods of childhood determines the content of legitimate authority over them. My interest is in the so far little discussed goods of engaging in world discovery, artistic creation, philosophical pursuits and experimentation with one's self. I call these "special goods of childhood" because I individuals, in general, only have full access to them during childhood and they make a distinctive and weighty contribution to well-being. Therefore, they are part of the metric of justice towards children The overall conclusion is that we ought to make good institutional care part of every child’s upbringing.

On what basis should we judge whether a parent’s medical decision for their child is morally acceptable? In a recent article, Johan Bester attempts to answer this question by defending a version of the Best Interest Standard (BIS) for parental decision making. The purpose of this paper is to identify a number of problems faced by Bester’s version of BIS and to suggest ways to redress these problems. Accordingly, we intend to advance the project of formulating a method for guiding parents’ medical decision making for their children. We argue that Bester’s standard fails to accommodate the autonomy of the child and that his criteria for assessing the reasonableness of the parents’ argument for their decision are too weak. We conclude that properly addressing these worries renders his test otiose and that it ought to be replaced with the three commonly held principles of bioethics—the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence—and a standard of reasonableness.

Surrogacy is a widespread practice for childless parents. Surrogacy laws vary widely from State to State. Some States require genetic parents to obtain a jurisdictional order to have their names on the original birth certificate, without the name of the surrogate mother. Other States allow to put the name of the intended parents on the birth certificate. In Italy and in other countries (e.g. France, Spain) all forms of surrogacy are forbidden, whether it be traditional or gestational, commercial or altruistic. Stepping back from three recent judgments issued by the European Court of Human Rights (Mennesson v. France, n. 65942/11, and Labassee v. France, n. 65941/11, 26.6.2014, Paradiso e Campanelli v. Italie, n. 25358/12, 27.1.2015), in the cases where national rules forbid the transcription of birth certificates for public policy reasons, specifically the prohibition of surrogacy, this Article aims at an analysis of the subject, dealing with the contrast between public policy on the one side and the fundamental right to identity as stated by art. 8 ECHR, on the other. The ECtHR affirms, in some way, that subverting the effectiveness of the prohibition of surrogacy may be justified by the best interest of the child.  Anyway it is debatable if this fundamental principle ought to be read as an exception to the public policy clause or as a basic value of this.

This article sheds light on the socio-legal implications of the dissolution
of “mixed” marriages. By analyzing two legal cases
decided by Israeli shari‘a and civil courts, the article shows how
such dissolution transforms the map of social conflicts and coalitions
that was formed when the marital union was established. It
illustrates how the ex-spouses’ families and communities are
drawn into the custody struggles following the divorce, and how
communal/religious courts may side with the spouse of the same
community/religion. It argues that ex-spouses who converted to
their partners’ religion – more often women than men – might be
disadvantaged by this situation, and demonstrates how courts and
parties to the postmarital intercommunal conflict infuse the concept
of the “child’s best interests” with diverse cultural meanings.

Il presente lavoro prende in considerazione la recente pronuncia della Corte di Strasburgo sul noto caso Charlie Gard evidenziando gli aspetti critici emersi in ordine al diritto di autodeterminazione e alla rappresentanza genitoriale dell'interesse del minore nella relazione medico-paziente.


This paper focuses on the recent Court of Strasbourg decision on Application Charles Gard and Others against the United Kingdom. Particularly, the paper brings the critical issues about the concept of the people’s right to self-determination, about the parental right in the child’s best interest and the doctor-patient relationship.

The essay deals with the reconstruction of the main pronouncements of the Constitutional Court relating to the regulation of medically assisted procreation (law n. 40/2004). In particular, the analysis focuses on the two latest rulings (Constitutional Court, sentences nos. 32 and 33 of 2021) that specifically touch on the issue of recognition of the legal status of children conceived through heterologous fertilization procedures (by homosexual couples) and through surrogacy.