CSCE

In the early 1970s, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the cornerstone of French foreign policy regarding East-West relations. It was considered by Paris as the best way to maintain dialogue with Moscow as well as an instrument to reach the Gaullist goal of overcoming the European status quo. This double objective explains why the French adopted an ambiguous attitude during the CSCE: Even though their goal was to challenge the Brezhnev doctrine and to initiate a process which would meet the aspirations of peoples under Soviet domination, they knew that this process would be long. For them, it was necessary to avoid provoking the Soviets by putting forward expressively liberal proposals. The French leaders of the 1970s saw the CSCE as the multilateral prolongation of the Gaullist policy of “détente, entente, cooperation”.

Bu tez çalışmasında, Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Konferansı’nın (AGİK)
Soğuk Savaş’ın barışçıl bir şekilde sona ermesindeki rolü araştırılmıştır. Çalışma kapsamında yapılan literatür taraması sonucunda, Birinci ve Üçüncü Sepetler bakımından AGİK’in Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesinde insan hakları, siyasi ve askeri alanlarda yaptığı etkiler incelenmiştir. Yapılan incelemelerin sonucunda, 1975 Helsinki Nihai Senedi’nin 1989 Doğu Avrupa Devrimlerine yol açan sivil toplum hareketlerine etkileşim kattığı, Güven ve Güvenlik Arttırıcı Tedbirlere (CSBM) dair 1990 Viyana Belgesi’nin askeri şeffaflık sağladığı ve 1990 Avrupa Konvansiyonel
Kuvvetler Antlaşması’nın (AKKA) Avrupa’da silahların kontrolü ve silahsızlanmanın çerçevesini sağladığı tespitlerine varılmıştır.

"El 1 de agosto de 1975, treinta y cinco jefes de Estado y de Gobierno firmaron el Acta Final de la Conferencia para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (CSCE) en Helsinki. El bloque comunista venía reclamado desde hacía dos décadas una reunión de esa naturaleza para consolidar el statu quo nacido tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Occidente había accedido a la convocatoria de dicha conferencia si la consideración por los Derechos Humanos también estaba sobre la mesa de negociaciones. Así, una de las partes más importantes del texto final, el “Decálogo de Helsinki”, incluía, además de la aceptación del orden territorial de Yalta, el respeto por los Derechos Humanos y las libertades fundamentales. Los países socialistas, deseosos de acabar la Conferencia cuanto antes y de obtener la “ratificación moral” de sus objetivos por parte occidental, rubricaron un texto que les comprometía, también a ellos, a respetar los derechos más fundamentales del ser humano. Ello se convirtió en una “trampa” para las naciones comunistas, pues aunque el Acta Final de Helsinki no era un tratado internacional, los Estados firmantes se habían comprometido a hacerlo “de obligado cumplimiento” y, como se verá en la comunicación, se encargaron de difundirlo masivamente en la opinión publicada de sus respectivos países.
La resolución a favor de los derechos más elementales del ser humano suponía un auténtico testimonio de apoyo a los disidentes de los regímenes comunistas, que comenzarían a exigir a sus respectivos Gobiernos el respeto por la libertad y los Derechos Humanos, lo que Tony Judt denominó “Movimiento por los Derechos de Helsinki”. En la presente comunicación, que trata uno de los temas de investigación de nuestra tesis doctoral en curso sobre la CSCE, nos concentraremos en analizar en perspectiva transnacional tres casos que prácticamente coincidieron en el tiempo (segundo lustro de los años 70) y en el espacio (tres países del Este): en la URSS en 1975, el “Grupo de Vigilancia de la aplicación de los Acuerdos de Helsinki”, cuyas cabezas visibles fueron Yuri Orlov, Alexander Guinsburg y Anatoly Sharansky, siendo también muy activas algunas de sus ramificaciones regionales, como la ucraniana o la bielorrusa; “Carta 77”, en Checoslovaquia, inspirado por el dramaturgo Václav Havel y el filósofo Jan Patočka; y, por último, los orígenes del sindicato independiente polaco “Solidaridad”, fundado en 1980 y liderado por Lech Wałęsa. Nos centraremos no en los actores estatales ni en los acuerdos e instituciones internacionales, sino en las instituciones de la sociedad civil y en los individuos.
En definitiva, se pretende analizar a estos movimientos, hasta qué punto el Acta Final influyó en sus acciones de forma coordinada; si fueron los precursores de una incipiente “sociedad civil” en sus respectivos países; sus vínculos, redes y transferencias, esto es, si hubo algún tipo de coordinación entre ellos al coincidir prácticamente en el tiempo; y comprobar, hasta qué punto, impulsados por el Acta de Helsinki, estos grupos asentaron en cierta medida las bases para el futuro “Otoño de las Naciones” que acabaría con los regímenes comunistas del Este a finales de la década de los 80 e inicios de los 90."

"On August 1, 1975 , thirty-five heads of state and government signed the Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( CSCE ) in Helsinki. The Communist bloc had been claiming for two decades one meeting like that one to consolidate the "status quo" born after the Second World War. West had agreed to the convening of such a conference if the consideration for Human Rights was also on the table. So, one of the most important parts of the final text , the "Helsinki Decalogue", included, in addition to the acceptance of territorial order of Yalta, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The socialist countries, eager to finish the Conference as soon as possible to get the "moral ratification" of their goals by Western bloc, signed a text which committed them also to them , to respect the most basic rights of human beings. Then, it became a "trap" for the communist nations , because although the Helsinki Final Act was not an international treaty, the signatories were committed to do "mandatory" and , as discussed in this paper, they were responsible of spread massively in the published opinion of their respective countries.
The resolution for the most basic rights of the human kind was a real testimony to support dissidents in communist regimes, who began to demand that their governments respect for freedom and human rights; a phenomenon calle by Tony Judt the "Rights Movement of Helsinki" . In this paper, which is one of the research topics of our ongoing doctoral thesis on the CSCE, we are focusing on transnational perspective to analyze three cases practically coincided in time (second half of the 70s ) and space ( three countries of the Central and Eastern Europe): in the USSR in 1975, the "Monitoring Group on the implementation of the Helsinki Accords", whose heads were visible Yuri Orlov , Alexander Ginzburg and Anatoly Sharansky  and with very active some of its regional branches; "Charter 77" in Czechoslovakia , inspired by the playwright Vaclav Havel and the philosopher Jan Patocka; and , finally , the origins of Polish independent trade union "Solidarity", founded in 1980 and led by Lech Wałęsa. We will focus not state actors or international agreements and institutions, but the institutions of civil society and individuals.
Thus, it aims to analyze these movements , to what extent the Final Act influenced his actions in a coordinated manner , whether they were the forerunners of an emerging "civil society" in their respective countries; also, their linkages, networks and transfers, that is, if there was any coordination between them to match virtually in time, and check to what extent , driven by the Helsinki Act , these groups settled in some of the basis for the future "Autumn of Nations" which would end the communist regimes in the late 80s and early 90s"

Based on declassified documents from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian National Archives, and the General Records of the Department of State, this paper argues that the creation of a permanent European security body gradually became one of the most important objectives for the Romanian diplomacy during the CSCE negotiations. The division of the European continent and the bipolar balance of power were the main threats for the security of the Romanian communist regime. Consequently, to overcome the Cold War status quo, Romania promoted the abolition of blocs and their replacement by a new security system in Europe, based on the commitment of the member states to solve their common issues through cooperation and consensus. The cooperation of the European states was meant to prevent the consecration of a bipolar hegemony in Europe by the United States and USSR.

W książce zamieszczono wspomnienia uczestników misji pokojowych i operacji stabilizacyjnych. Wstęp książki, wprowadzenia do rozdziałów i kilka wywiadów zostało przeprowadzonych przez Grzegorza Ciechanowskiego; The book contains memories of participants in peacekeeping missions and stabilization operations. The book introduction, introductions to the chapters and several interviews were conducted by Grzegorz Ciechanowski

Il ruolo di primo piano rivestito da Aldo Moro, Ministro per gli Affari Esteri dal 1969 al 1974, nella "costruzione europea": dalla sua chiara Visione per una Europa unita e più forte, all'impegno per la CSCE, all'Elezione Diretta del Parlamento Europeo.

La France, les Neutres et les Non-alignés durant le processus d'Helsinki, 1969-1975 Revue d'histoire diplomatique, 2017/1, pp.65-82 Nicolas Badalassi, Institut d'Etudes politiques d'Aix-en-Provence/CHERPA Si l'historiographie de la guerre froide s'est considérablement enrichie depuis la fin de la fin du conflit Est-Ouest, de nouveaux chantiers ont été ouverts sur les causes de son dépassement, mais aussi sur le rôle que des pays autres que les superpuissances américaine et soviétique et leurs principaux alliés ont joué dans les relations internationales après 1945. La question de la neutralité, du neutralisme et du non-alignement pendant la guerre froide a ainsi le vent en poupe, qu'il s'agisse d'évaluer la viabilité du statut de neutre ou de non-aligné dans un contexte idéologiquement très marqué 1 , de considérer les liens des Etats neutres et non-alignés (NNA) avec les deux blocs ou de voir comment ces pays ont pu influencer le cours des événements 2. L'historiographie a notamment bien mis en évidence l'importance du rôle des NNA européens-Autriche, Suisse, Suède, Finlande, Yougoslavie, Malte en particulier-dans la réussite de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (CSCE) qui, de 1972 à 1975, a réuni l'ensemble des pays d'Europe-sauf l'Albanie-et d'Amérique du Nord à Genève et à Helsinki 3. Or, ce « processus d'Helsinki » est désormais considéré par la plupart des historiens spécialistes de la période comme l'un des facteurs ayant contribué à mettre un terme à la fois au conflit Est-Ouest et à l'existence même du bloc socialiste 4. En parvenant à introduire dans son Acte final des références à la conception non-marxiste et universelle des droits de l'homme et en faisant des droits de l'homme un principe des relations entre Etats, les Occidentaux et les NNA ont affaibli l'importance des notions de souveraineté et de non-ingérence, considérées comme fondamentales par l'URSS 5. Le dynamisme des NNA à la CSCE a pu être mis en valeur du fait de la nature même de la conférence : la règle de l'unanimité y prévalait en matière de prise de décision et chacun pouvait s'exprimer indépendamment des alliances qu'il avait contractées. Ensuite, via les trois « corbeilles » d'Helsinki, les négociations de la CSCE portaient sur la quasi-totalité des thèmes qui faisaient de la guerre froide un conflit à la fois idéologique, politique, militaire, économique, technologique et culturel. Cela allait des mesures de confiance et des principes destinés à présider aux relations entre Etats (première corbeille) à la circulation des hommes, des idées et 1 Pour une analyse juridique des statuts de « neutre » et de « non-aligné », voir E. Bernard, « Neutralité et non-alignement en Europe. Une contribution juridique au regard des exemples espagnol et yougoslave », in N. Badalassi, H. Ben Hamouda (dir.), Les pays d'Europe orientale et la Méditerranée. Relations et regards croisés, 1967-1989, Les Cahiers Irice n°10, Paris, Irice, 2013, pp. 83-95. 2 S. Bott, J. M. Hanhimaki, J. Schaufelbuehl, M. Wyss (dir.), Neutrality and Neutralism in the Cold War : Between or Within the Blocs ?, Londres, Routldge, 2015 ; M. Kramer, A. Makko, P. Ruggenthaler (dir.), European Neutrality and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2017. 3

In this research paper, the backgrounds of the creation of the “Helsinki Final Act” and its influence on the dissolution of the Soviet Empire will be examined.
With the conclusion of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the dissident movement in the Soviet Union began to organize itself and to grow. This movement challenged the totalitarian Soviet regimes and left a deep impact on the civil society inside the Soviet Union itself. However, in 1975 the Helsinki Final Act was seen by many observers as a “Western defeat” and a Soviet diplomatic victory, since Leonid Brezhnev achieved the formal recognition of the Soviet influence sphere throughout Eastern Europe by the West. This initial “misconception” shall also be analysed in this paper.

The Madrid Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 1980–1983 was intended to deepen interstate cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki process. An impressive imprint on its implementation was the intervention of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979, the Polish events of 1981 and the permanent violations of human rights in the USSR. The issue of human rights in the Cold War has largely become a means of exerting pressure on Moscow from the West, first of all, the United States and Canada. A significant portion of the Canadian population’s structure of Ukrainian origin contributed to the focus of Canadian politics on the human rights situation in the Ukrainian SSR. This was evidenced by the Madrid Conference for CSCE, during which the Canadians repeatedly drew attention to the violations by the Soviet authorities of the provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE 1975. They proposed several important provisions that transformed human rights as well as monitoring it compliance in the Final Act of Madrid Conference. The real achievement of Ukrainians at the Madrid Conference for CSCE was the draw of attention to the Ukrainian issue in the USSR, in particular, the activities of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. The organization of the Ukrainian Diaspora played a key role in informing representatives of Western delegations about the human rights situation in the Ukrainian SSR.
Key words: human rights, Human Rights Commission of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Canada, Madrid Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

One of the main points of the CSCE Final Act signed in Helsinki in 1975 was the respect for Human Rights. In this paper we will try to analyze if that text was a “trap” for Warsaw Pact’s countries, since its resolution in favour of fundamental rights of human being was a real testimony of support to dissidents in Communist regimes. We will do it through two case studies: Charter 77 in former Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland.

Uno de los puntos principales del Acta Final de la CSCE, firmado en Helsinki en 1975, era el respeto por los Derechos Humanos. En el presente trabajo se pretende comprobar si ese texto se convirtió en una “trampa” para los países del Pacto de Varsovia, pues la resolución a favor de los derechos más elementales del ser humano supuso un auténtico testimonio de apoyo a los disidentes de los regímenes comunistas. Para ello, nos fijaremos en dos casos particulares de movimientos opositores: Carta 77 en la antigua Checoslovaquia, y Solidaridad en Polonia.

Futures contracts for agricultural products include soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, corn, oats, wheat and paddy rice. The oldest and most famous commodity exchange for futures contracts in the world is the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), while Cofee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) is a leading global exchange for forward and options for coffee, sugar and cocoa. Market futures contracts and options on the CSCE is the starting point for the pricing and behavior management companies that trade in these goods, as well as for investors who expect to profit from such trading. Hedgers are buying or selling contracts in order to reduce the risk of loss caused by price changes. Another important development is the continued use of data networks (DTN), e-commerce and the calculation of the index based on the total supply of a country through the narrow tedency correlate with cash prices to futures contracts like more effective tool for Risk Management.

"Entre 1980 y 1983, Madrid acogió una reunión de la Conferencia de Seguridad y Cooperación en Europa, como continuación de la Conferencia de Helsinki de 1975. Se trataba del primer encuentro internacional celebrado en suelo español desde la Conferencia de Algeciras (1906). Esta cita de seguimiento del Acta Final de Helsinki se celebró en medio de un complejo contexto internacional (“segunda Guerra Fría”) y una convulsa etapa interna para España (y con cambios importantes en su acción exterior). En la presente comunicación se pretende estudiar en qué consistió esta reunión, qué papel jugó España y qué consecuencias acarreó para la política exterior de este país y para el proceso de la CSCE.

Madrid hosted a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe between 1980 and 1983, following the 1975 Helsinki Conference. It was the first international meeting held in Spanish soil from Algeciras Conference (1906). This follow-up appointment of Helsinki Final Act was celebrated amidst an international complex context ("Second Cold War") and with a whooping internal stage for Spain (and major changes in its external action). The main goal of this paper is to study how this meeting was developped, what role Spain played in it and what consequences it entailed for the foreign policy of this country and to the CSCE process."

This book demonstrates that the West intentionally sowed the seeds of change in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). More importantly, it clearly proves that the European Community (EC) member states collectively took the leadership in forging the Final Act and setting intra-European relations on a new line of thinking. The book offers ‘a fascinating insight into how the Community began to operate as a single entity on the international stage and the extent of its successes’ (English Historical Review, cxxvi, 519).

Au tournant des années 1960 et 1970, l’URSS entend se servir de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe pour accroître ses relations économiques et commerciales avec les pays de la CEE tout en luttant contre la construction européenne à l’Ouest. Elle promeut l’idée d’intégration est-européenne pour parvenir à terme à l’unification économique paneuropéenne. Elle tente ainsi de faire reconnaître le Comecon comme étant l’équivalent socialiste du Marché commun, d’obtenir l’octroi de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée et de mettre sur pied un organisme de sécurité paneuropéen. Mais, à chaque fois, elle doit faire face à l’opposition des pays de la CEE.

The complex relationship between international norms and transnational networks of non-state actors is gaining increasing attention in international relations theory. This paper argues that transnational networks of non-state actors gain greater access to and influence over states when they identify with international norms that the states themselves have formally accepted--even if that formal acceptance did not initially reflect any serious intention to implement or monitor the norm in question. This process has been called the 'boomerang effect'. The resulting redefinitions of state interests raise the diplomatic salience of the norm in question, and thereby increase its effectiveness. The article illustrates this process with a study of changes in the US foreign policy towards Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the human rights norms of the Helsinki Accords in the mid-late 1970s.

The Ukraine crisis dramatically raised the profile of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the OSCE playing a role in discussions between Russia, Europe and the United States. It also provided an opportunity for the organisation to demonstrate its continued relevance to European security, forty years after the signing of the so called ‘Helsinki Final Act’ in 1975, which served as the foundation for the establishment of the OSCE. Martin D. Brown and Angela Romano provide an overview of the significance of the Final Act, its original aims and how its contents shaped future security developments up to the present day.

In January 1981, just days before Jimmy Carter left the White House, many of the president's officials were well satisfied with the administration's campaign to promote human rights. But as commentators, scholars, and the incoming president began to critique Carter's bipolar policy, it became clear that Carter had not only failed to persuade the American public that he had a clear grasp on the international role of the US, but he failed to build a lasting domestic consensus on foreign policy.

The Carter administration aimed to renew its ideological challenge to the USSR through human rights and to persuade the Soviets to ease internal repression in order to strengthen Congressional support for détente and arms control. Contrary to what he envisioned, the more vigorously the White House pursued a pro-human rights agenda, the more the Soviets lost interest in détente; the more the administration relegated human rights to quiet diplomacy, the more critics within the United States accused the President of abandoning his commitment to human rights. In the end, the White House lost the opportunity to stabilise bipolar relations and the domestic support Carter had managed to garner in 1976. Critics of détente, helped by the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, defeated him.

Based on recently declassified archival documents, A precarious equilibrium offers a fresh interpretation of President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy and its contradictory impact on US-Soviet affairs.

CONTENTS:
Introduction
1 Setting the Stage for a Human Rights Policy
2 Human Rights and the 1976 Presidential Election
3 Firmness Abroad; Consensus at Home, 1977-1978.
4 Coping with Critics: the Choice in Favour of Quiet Diplomacy, 1978.
5 Critics' Triumph: Quiet Diplomacy, SALT II and the Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979-1980.
Conclusions

The subject of this chapter is the analysis of the different, and substantially diverging, strategies that the Nixon Administration of the United States and the Brandt Government of the Federal Republic of Germany deployed in their first approach to a proposal for a conference on security in Europe during the early 1970s, especially concerning the problem of multilateral negotiations on military forces reductions in Europe. The sources available today at the German and American archives confirm that this topic was among the most debated inside the two respective governments, as in the course of the bilateral debates and in the wide range of multilateral (transatlantic) fora. If détente “easily [came] to represent a challenge to the stability of American-European relations”, the problem of a redefinition of a new “security” for Europe involving a broader, continuous dialogue between the countries of the two blocs proved to be the most potentially divisive between the United States and its (until then) most loyal ally in Europe, the FRG.
Moreover, the issue of a conference on European security represents a useful fil rouge in the analysis of the relations between the two countries during 1969–1972 for these main reasons:

1) initially, the proposal of a conference came neither from the two countries examined, nor from other partners of the Alliance: it was actually a long-standing Soviet aspiration, raised with greater emphasis by the “Budapest Appeal” of the Warsaw Pact at the beginning of 1969. Thanks to the sources available today, this “external” genesis allows us to understand the impact that the proposal had on the two administrations since its new launch;
2) however, during the age of the détente, the issue of European security did not represent a completely unexplored field, neither for the new American administration nor for the Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn. The “Budapest Appeal” arrived a few months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the Warsaw Pact, but also after the transatlantic tensions of the 1960s, signified by the exit of France from the NATO integrated command, the failure of the Multilateral Force project and the fear of a “condominium” between the United States and the Soviet Union over Europe, especially after the two Superpowers signed the Non Proliferation Treaty. Thus, the debate following the Budapest Appeal did not erase but, on the contrary, quickened and emphasized the projects, the aspirations and the fears of the two governments;
3) projects and aspirations that, in their turn, were born out of a realistic evaluation of the material conditions in which the two countries found themselves at the beginning of the ’70s: the real or supposed decline of the United States as well as the consolidation of western German economic power represented important elements in the approach to the issue of European security, especially when the problem of a fairer share of the burden for the common defence was another source of tensions in transatlantic relations. The reduction of these expenses was a major thrust towards Détente;
4) finally, the interest of the debate over a conference on European security mainly comes from the broad space-time coordinates involved by the issue, including a wide spectrum of further subjects concerning the relations between the United States and western Europe, and of these within communist bloc. The spatial dimension, attempting to cover the whole continent in a sole assembly, represented a substantial innovation with regard to the situation generated by the Cold War, full of new and stimulating opportunities (political, cultural and economic), but also of risks and doubts on the survival of the western Alliance and concerning a possible common direction towards Détente.

The changing relationship between the West and the Soviet Union contributed directly to the origination and unfolding of the Kuwait crisis. The rapidly receding threat from the East also demanded a major review of the Western military posture on the one hand and political consultation between governments and organisations on the other. Not in the least, institutional survival of many structures, both active or in virtual hibernation, was at stake. The second Gulf war caught them unprepared to play a significant role. In 1990, the new Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals had two platforms for consultations between East and West, namely the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Neither contributed significantly to the management of the Kuwait crisis. In fact, that management was - except for the USSR’s specific role - characterised by a US-led division of labour with each Western country participating individually. Even the United Kingdom and France had little choice but to place themselves under American command. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) played an atypical role during the entire crisis. Created specifically to meet military aggression from Communist East Europe, its application of force was territorially limited. NATO-led operations were thus only conceivable in case of Iraqi attacks against Turkey and then only to restore Turkey’s territorial integrity. Nonetheless, divisions assigned to NATO and stationed in Germany participated in the liberation of Kuwait. Always remaining under national control, their transfer to the Gulf, in a sense, compared with Washington’s relocation of troops and equipment to the Vietnam theatre of war more than two decades earlier. Bilateral agreements with NATO partners furthermore enabled the United States to mount air strikes against Iraq from within Europe. By contrast, the smaller European NATO member-states had to coordinate their military contribution within the West European Union (WEU), whose charter did not impose any territorial limitations on interventions. If anything, the Gulf crisis proved that the complexity of consultations among the different, but partially overlapping political and security organisations may constitute a serious handicap should Europe ever be forced to respond decisively to an external security threat.

Europa ha vivido el periodo de paz más extenso de su historia desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Sin embargo, esta “tranquilidad” ha sido interrumpida por los ataques terroristas contemporáneos. Hoy se necesita una Unión Europea fuerte, capaz de delimitar y fortalecer su política exterior, seguridad y defensa común para considerarse un actor político. Se presentan dos líneas para un nuevo sistema de seguridad para la región: dos organizaciones que integran las democracias liberales con intereses comunes (OTAN y UE). Además, una organización con una vocación menos inclusiva generada a partir de la CSCE (actualmente OSCE), para servir de punto de encuentro y crear la confianza entre sus miembros. Con estos escenarios, se busca tratar los asuntos de seguridad, mantener la paz y evitar el uso de la fuerza.

El presente libro es un recorrido a través del contenido de los documentos surgidos en las reuniones de Belgrado (1977), Madrid (octubre de 1980-septiembre de 1983), Viena (1986) de la Conferencia sobre Cooperación y Seguridad en Europa en las que se va perfilando el concepto de la Dimensión Humana. Textos que emergieron como fruto de dichas reuniones y que culminaron en la Carta de París, la cual fue el resultado alcanzado por la Conferencia sobre la Dimensión Humana, en la misma capital en 1989, y en la Conferencia de Copenhague de 1990, que trató de establecer las bases de un Estado de Derecho. Posteriormente vinieron las reuniones de Moscú, en 1991, y la denominada de la continuidad, en Helsinki, en 1992.

In PARLAMENTO E SICUREZZA NAZIONALE (a cura di Antonio Casu), Casa Editrice Nuove Ricerche, Ancona, 1995

Sommario: l.  Premessa. 2. Nozioni sulla costituzione e l'organizzazione delle Assemblee parlamentari internazionali: 2.1 Gli organismi fondati su norme di diritto internazionale. 2.2. Le Assemblee internazionali nate sulla base di intese interparlamentari.  2.3. Altre conferenze interparlamentari europee a carattere periodico. 3. Gli organismi parlamentari internazionali ed il nuovo scenario di sicurezza europeo: 3.1. L'Assemblea parlamentare dell'Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa. 3.2. L'Assemblea dell'Atlantico del Nord. 3.3. L'Assemblea dell'Unione dell'Europa occidentale. 3.4. L'Assemblea parlamentare del Consiglio d'Europa. 3.5. Conclusioni sul ruolo degli organismi parlamentari internazionali nel nuovo scenario di sicurezza europeo. 4. L'attività delle delegazioni parlamentari italiane in seno alle Assemblee internazionali: 4.l. La costituzione e la natura delle delegazioni parlamentari italiane. 4.2. L'attività dei componenti delle delegazioni parlamentari. 4.3. Ruolo svolto dai componenti delle delegazioni parlamentari italiane nel nuovo scenario di sicurezza europeo. 5. Conclusioni: effetti dell'attività svolta dalle Assemblee internazionali in materia di politica di sicurezza sui lavori parlamentari italiani: 5.1 Attivazione delle procedure che consentono di esaminare i testi degli organismi interparlamentari ed altre ripercussioni dell'attività svolta in sede internazionale. 5.2. Riflessioni conclusive sugli strumenti politici e procedurali di collegamento e coordinamento tra Assemblee internazionali e Parlamento.

The Internet of Things (IoT) industry increases rapidly and becomes progressively more devoted to critical business services. IoT adoption generates two kinds of challenges: cybersecurity risks and privacy concerns. In order to generate a trust environment and provide confidence to IoT business services, LIST will partnered with private companies to implement an integrated framework and software tools for assessing and monitoring IoT system's service security and privacy. SPRINT assessment and monitoring foresees (1) an aggregated publicly available security and privacy integrated referential database dedicated to IoT services (SPRINT-REF), and (2), an IoT service-oriented assessment and monitoring methods based on this referential (SPRINT-METH). Compared to existing approaches, SPRINT-METH innovation is that it is service-oriented rather than device-oriented, as well as based recognized existing professional standards. Finally, the SPRINT toolbox (3) will include two assets: a ...

Vienna Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 1986–1989 was intended to deepen interstate cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki process. It took place under the new conditions associated with the introduction of “glasnost” policy in the Soviet Union. Despite this, there was some distrust towards the sincerity of the Soviet leadership, which was based on further violations of human rights in the country including the persecution of dissidents. The issue of human rights was, in particular, at the focus of the Canadian delegation, which called the Soviet side to positively solving the family unification, freedom of religion and freedom of thought. Ukrainian Diaspora organizations, such as the Human Rights Commission of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, played a key role in lobbying for the protection of human rights in the Ukrainian SSR. The real achievement of Ukrainians at the CSCE Vienna Conference was to draw attention to the Ukrainian question in the USSR, accelerating the process of family reunification (only one in 1987 – more than 20 families). At that time, the Soviet government allowed to immigrate to Canada some Ukrainian political prisoners – Joseph Terelia and Danylo Shumuk. The participants of the Vienna review meeting welcomed the favorable development of the international situation and expressed their satisfaction with the fact that the CSCE process contributed to this.
Key words: Vienna Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Canada, human rights, Soviet Union, Human Rights Commission of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

Gli accordi di Helsinki, anche conosciuti come Conferenza per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa (CSCE), si tennero nella città finlandese tra il 1972 e il 1975, coinvolsero 35 paesi (tra cui gli Stati Uniti, il Canada, l’Unione Sovietica e gli stati della European Political Cooperation, embrione politico della Comunità Economica Europea) e si conclusero con la firma di un documento nominato Helsinki Final Act, in cui uno degli elementi più d’interesse risultarono essere i diritti umani.
In questa lezione esamineremo gli anni degli accordi di Helsinki, partendo dal periodo immediatamente precedente ai negoziati e arrivando al periodo immediatamente successivo, per coprire così un arco di dieci anni (1969-1979). Ci dedicheremo in particolare all’analisi del ruolo tenuto in quell’occasione dagli Stati Uniti, attraverso la loro politica estera, rispetto ai diritti umani.