Batna

We challenge the assumption that having multiple alternatives is always better than a single alternative by showing that negotiators who have additional alternatives ironically exhibit downward-biased perceptions of their own and their opponent’s reservation price, make lower demands, and achieve worse outcomes in distributive negotiations. Five studies demonstrate that the apparent benefits of multiple alternatives are elusive because multiple alternatives led to less ambitious first offers (Studies 1–2) and less profitable agreements (Study 3). This distributive disadvantage emerged because negotiators’ perception of the bargaining zone was more distorted when they had additional (less attractive) alternatives than when they only had a single alternative (Studies 1–3). We further found that this multiple-alternatives disadvantage only emerges when negotiators used quantitative (versus qualitative) evaluation standards to gauge the extremity of their offers (Study 4), and when they base their offers on their own numerical alternative(s) versus on opponent information (Study 5).

Dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict sometimes seems like wading into quicksand. Far more good ideas and good intentions have been focused on this conflict than would seem possible, judging by the progress over the last forty years (or eighty years). And yet, good people on many sides of this conflict hope and expect that within their lifetimes, they will see the recognition of two states that can live with each other in peace. So, one might ask, given how entrenched the conflict is and the extent of the work necessary to bring about peace, why focus on the day after a peace treaty? In fact, as we have now seen in numerous international conflicts, unless the players recognize the impact of different choices for moving forward, conflicts have a tendency to slide backward. We tend to have a natural focus on 'getting to yes' or 'getting to peace' in order to end violence and resolve the dispute. This essay focuses on what peace will actually look like the day a...

Three experiments investigated the relations between buyers’ wealth or ability to pay (ATP) and sellers’ first offers. Study1demonstrateda positive correlation between sellers’first offers and their perceptions of the buyer’s ATP as well as its real economic power (indicated by the company’s market value). In Study 2, sellers in a field experiment made higher offers to potential buyers of higher ATP. Study 3 examined the relations between buyer’s ATP, the perception of its ability to obtain alternatives to a specific deal, and sellers’ first offers. We found a positive correlation between sellers’ perception of buyers’ ATP, real ATP (as indicated by market value), and sellers’ perception of buyers’ availability of alternatives. As in Study 1, here too, the unit of analysis was the behavior of the individual participant. However, when sellers were primed to concentrate on buyers’ alternatives, their first offers were negatively related to perceived buyer’s alternatives.