Aetolian League

Relying on a critical analysis of the data available on the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC, this paper aims to trace back the origin of the claims and quarrels which embittered the relations between Romans and Aetolians throughout the 2nd century BC. A close examination of the prejudices of ancient authors, of the stereotypes of modern academic research, and of the information we may have about purely military aspects, leads us to the conclusion that neither Romans nor Aetolians acted in bad faith toward each other when emphasizing their own crucial role in this decisive battle. Both were reasoning in accordance with their own socio-military system of values, which made them unable to understand or fully comprehend that of their ally.

Se emprende un examen crítico de la batalla de Cinoscéfalas en el año 197 a.C., con el fin último de evaluar el origen militar de las afirmaciones y querellas que definieron las relaciones entre Roma y sus aliados etolios a lo largo del siglo II. Aproximándonos a los prejuicios clásicos, los estereotipos modernos y el análisis crítico de la información militar existente, arribamos a la conclusión de que etolios y romanos no apuntaron a proceder de mala fe uno contra el otro al reivindicar su papel en este combate decisivo, sino que a actuar en coherencia con sus propios sistemas de valores socio-militares, ignorando o malinterpretando en el proceso aquél de su contraparte.

This is a study of the vocabulary which the Greeks used to speak about states different from the polis (city-state). Some of these states, such as Boeotia in the fourth, and Achaea and Aetolia in the third century BC, reached superpower status in Greek politics. Nowadays these states are commonly called federal, but we lack any serious reflection of federalism in Greek political thought. In pursuit of specifically federalist language Rzepka examines the inscriptions testifying to the working of Greek leagues and the life of federal Greeks, as well as a vast range of Classical authors. He argues that the deliberate choice of technical terms, and especially the emergence of federalist jargon in the Hellenistic period, reflect the development of the federalist path in Greek political thought.

After the disturbances caused in the early 270s BCE by several forays of barbarians – soon called either Galatai or Keltoi in our sources – Delphi became an anchor for a vigorous strain of barbaromachic innovations, knowledge-ordering, and mythologization. Resources for these innovations included the tradition of Delphi’s preservation from the alleged Persian attack, the already-existing imagery from ethnographies of northern peoples, ideas about divine epiphany, and some mythistorical narratives such as the brigandage of Orchomenian Phlegyans. The different Hellenistic polities, dynasties and koina had widely differing motives for their use of the Delphic sanctuary as a conceptual hub for narratives of barbarian hubris and the defence of Hellas, but what is common to all is the creative reapplication of existing knowledge base that had connections to either the spatial, ritual or mythical aspects of Apollo’s sanctuary.

This paper will discuss Delphi’s role as an ideological and epistemological hub for Greek and Roman barbaromachic narratives from the Galatian invasions until the Late Republic. Many of the literary sources from the most fertile, Hellenistic period of innovations are fragmentary in nature, but enough has been preserved for us to draw some conjectures about the different uses that the Galatian attack was put to among the Greeks and even in inter-cultural communication. As the ‘new universal barbarians’ (Marszal 2000, 222), Galatae/Galli offered a common template for ancient debates on identity, belonging, piety, ritual, and Hellenicity. The paper will also propose that Delphi may have been instrumental for the Roman adoption of the ethnonym Galli as a common name tag for their North-Italian adversaries. The epistemological anchoring of Roman elite’s barbaromachic posturing on Delphi is clearly visible in the literary and epigraphic sources.

This paper examines the Aetolian deditio in fidem of 191 as described by Polybius
20.9–10. Erich Gruen influentially interpreted Polybius’ description as inconsistent and
exaggerated, on the grounds that Greeks and Romans from the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC had a common understanding of πίστις and fides and that Polybius’ own evidence on deditio was inconsistent. This paper reasserts the older view: that Greeks generally then had a hazy knowledge of Roman culture, including the practice of deditio, and that—even
if weight be granted to factors such as the Roman commander’s personal character and
ambitions or the historian’s supposed dislike of the Aetolians or his deployment of a degree of dramatic licence or a possible ‘hardening’ in the Romans’ general practice—this
passage properly emphasises a genuine cultural clash, thereby promoting Polybius’ fundamental paideia-objective of teaching Greek readers, above all Greek politicians, how to respond competently to the realities of Roman power.

The Romans sometimes took it upon themselves to request the military cooperation of new allies : in a position of weakness while negotiating, they had to make concessions and bring immediate benefits to their future partners in order to win the case. These agreements were negotiated in the field of military operations, with or without the authorization of the Senate, by magistrates or legates who took significant risks to reach their goals. Some of these agreements were ratified in Rome by the Senate and the people, and they sometimes created strong and lasting bonds between the two partners. It also happened that Rome failed in its attempts, or that the new allies turned out to be unreliable in the long run, but the Romans were partly responsible for these failures.

RESUMEN
En  el  libro  3  de  las  Historias  Polibio  afirma  que  la  causa  de  la  llamada  Guerra  de  Antíoco  fue  la ira  (orgé)  de  los  etolios.  Se  ha  asumido  generalmente  que  esta  explicación  del  historiador  aqueo  era algo  esquemática  y  lineal.  Sin  embargo,  si  se  establece  una  relación  entre  su  uso  del  término  ira  para caracterizar  el  comportamiento  etolio  en  aquella  oportunidad  y  la  explicación  de  la  orgé  encontrada en  la  Retórica  de  Aristóteles,  es  posible  reconocer,  en  cambio,  toda  la  complejidad  de  la  causalidad histórica  en  la  interpretación  polibiana.  En  ese  sentido,  en  este  artículo  se  sugiere  que  la  comprensión de  la  orgé  está  en  estrecha  relación  con  la  concepción  jerárquica  de  un  nuevo  sistema  interestatal  del Mediterráneo  oriental  en  el  siglo  II  a.C.  y  con  el  objetivo  didáctico  de  Polibio  de  enseñar  a  la  élite política griega cómo interactuar con seguridad con Roma en aquella época crítica.

ABSTRACT
In  book  3  of  the  Histories  Polybius  affirms  that  the  cause  of  the  so-called  War  of  Antiochus was  the  Aetolians’  anger  (orge).  It  has  been  generally  assumed  that  this  explanation  essayed  by  the Achaean  historian  was  somewhat  schematic  and  simple.  However,  if  a  relation  is  established  between his  use  of  the  term  anger  to  characterize  the  Aetolian  behavior  at  that  time  and  Aristotle’s  explanation of  orge  in  the  Rhetoric,  it  is  possible  to  recognize,  instead,  all  the  complexity  of  historical  causality  to Polybian  understanding.  In  this  sense,  this  article  suggests  that  the  understanding  of  the  orge  is  closely related  to  the  hierarchical  conception  of  a  new  interstate  system  in  Eastern  Mediterranean  during  the 2nd  century  BC.  and  with  the  didactic  aim  of  Polybius,  who  sought  to  teach  to  Greek  political  elite how to interact safely with Rome at that critical time.

This article aims to examine the turbulent course of the Aetolian League in the confused years after the Antiochian War (191-188) up until 160/159, when its leader at the time, Lykiskos, passed away. Military defeats, political developments and economic problems will be studied together in order to form an accurate interpretation of the internal strife inside the Koinon. In addition, the factor of Rome also needs to be taken into consideration, as the new power seems to have adopted a cautious stance, intervening in the League's internal politics only when it was considered necessary. Prominent (and relatively neglected in the modern literature) Aetolians of this era, like Thoas and Lykiskos, as well as their crucial political roles, are also analysed.

This paper aims to investigate the cultural-political relations that were established between the ethne of Central Greece belonging to the Aetolian League (3rd-2nd century BC) in order to strengthen the feeling of federal cohesion, and the results of these ties for the foreign policy of the Koinon as a whole.
Given the limited sources on this matter, the analysis will concentrate on the existing documentation: it will tackle some federal and local numismatic types, the public seals and marks of the Koinon and of the member states, the policy of displaying public statues, and the cult of founders as elements that may have shaped this feeling of cohesion. It will be shown that the interaction between these powerful ideological markers within the League is closely linked to religious ritual action, a matter that is not surprising given the prominent role played by religious and mythical behaviors in the construction of ancient Greek political communities, particularly beyond the polis.

The Romans sometimes took it upon themselves to request the military cooperation of new allies : in a position of weakness while negotiating, they had to make concessions and bring immediate benefits to their future partners in order to win the case. These agreements were negotiated in the field of military operations, with or without the authorization of the Senate, by magistrates or legates who took significant risks to reach their goals. Some of these agreements were ratified in Rome by the Senate and the people, and they sometimes created strong and lasting bonds between the two partners. It also happened that Rome failed in its attempts, or that the new allies turned out to be unreliable in the long run, but the Romans were partly responsible for these failures.

Nell'ambito de "Le Conferenze | Percorsi di storia militare antica" organizzate da Casus Belli - Arma Mater Studiorum, presento una disamina generale sulla corrispondenza militare romana a partire dalle lettere rivenute su papiri, ostraka e tavolette. https://www.facebook.com/CasusbelliArmamater/videos/609755059643731

This paper deals with the accounting money during Hellenistic times. It argues against the danger to take for real coins any quotations of value expressed in monetary terms. In particular, the words argurion or chrysion (as opposed to a arguron or chryson, without iota) don't have the restricted meaning of monetized silver or gold but, more genera. They signify more generally, signifies "expressed as the equivalent in silver or gold coins" as it is clear from many epigraphical and literary evidence. In several cases (the Persian treasuries captured by Alexander the Great, the Thracian ruler Seuthes, the gift from Ptolemy to the Rhodians, the penalties paid by Antiochus III and the Etolians to the Romans), the vast amounts of money evoked by textual evidence is not supported by corresponding coinages in terms of value. And this can also be true for small amounts of money as with the obols of Theagenes of Thasos. Such a revision of the words argurion and chrusion modifies the vision we can have of how monetized the Hellenistic world was.

Homer's Achilles lamented that anger 'spreads much sweeter than dripping honey' (Homer, Il. 18.100-120). In this paper, I propose a new interpretation of the sacking of the Aetolian Sanctuary of Thermon. I argue that if we consider the enmity which the Macedonian and Greek contingents in the army of Philip V had towards the Aetolians, we can obtain a clearer picture of the destruction of Thermon.

Polybius, who is our major source for the event (V.8 - 9), thought that this was the point where Philip's moral compass began to go awry. B. McGing, has illustrated in a recent study how Polybius' literary intent is to depict Philip as the fallen king. Polybius places some of the blame for the sack on the influence of Philip's 'friends', most notably Demetrius of Pharus. For F. W. Walbank, Aratus was the main culprit. The focus on Philip, Demetrius and Aratus only tells half the story.

The Epirotes and Acarnanians had lost territory to the expansion of the Aetolians. More recently, The Epirot sanctuary of Dodona had been sacked. The Acarnanians had fought the Aetolians at the Battle of Paxos in 229. Messenia had been attacked whilst still an ally of Aetolia. Soon after, Achaean territory was attacked. The Macedonians had been fighting the Aetolians since 219. Furthermore, the Aetolians had sacked the Macedonian sanctuary of Dion. Thus, it is little wonder that, when Philip's army penetrated into the heart of Aetolia, the men under him took the opportunity to have their revenge.

Aristotle and Thucydides both conveyed the idea that Ancient Greece’s polis was the one and only possible model for a decent citizen to organize social and political life. This biased view, which traditional historiography has helped to maintain, has been supported by the justification of Athenian imperialism. However, reality offers a rich panorama, full of federal states, confederations, leagues, amphictionies, and a long list of structures that also deserve being paid attention, without dismissing the polis model; rather, redefining it.