25 CAVALRY IS DEPLOYED BY PATIALA PATHAN, COL NISAR ON THE MOST FATEFUL AND DECISVE 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965 , WHEN INDIAN ARMY WAS IN A POSITION TO DEFEAT PAKISTAN IN A FEW HOURS April 2023 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29434.57282 Agha H Amin MAJOR SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN KAIMKHANIS DESCRIPTION ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF 25 CAVALRY ON 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965 We had barely finished our tea, when the Technical Officer of the Regiment, Captain Farrukh Khan (later CGS) appeared on the scene and passed the following message "Indian tanks have crossed the border at Charwa. Advance immediately on Pasrur - Chawinda - Charwa track, behind B squadron, and stop the enemy where ever contacted. The Squadron Commander ordered me to lead and move with full speed. Due to excitement, I did not not realize that I was standing on Shehzada Level crossing and moved on track leading to shehzada village after negotiating the level crossing. The Squadron followed. It was only after covering quite a bit of distance that Major Raza realized that I was moving in the wrong direction. He ordered me to stop and turn left and hit Chawinda track. I flashed back "on my left are sugar cane fields, I cannot turn left". It was impossible to over run a sugarcane field in peace time. While making that transmission, it did not occour to me that war had started. Back came the reply from Major Raza "forget about the bloody sugarcane field, it is war, turn left". I immediately turned left and as the tank track crushed the four feet high sugarcane, it was confirmed to me that war had started. After hitting Chawinda track, I turned and moved with full speed behind B squadron. While we were going in direction of Chawinda, civilian population was moving towards Pasrur, mostly on foot, men, women and children. It was a pathetic sight. Most of them so scared that when our tank approached them they went to ground or hid behind trees. Probably they took us as Indians. Our infantry which was deployed on the border was also withdrawing towards Pasrur. A course mate of mine from 3 FF, who later became a full Col recognized me on the tank and waved at me. It was a strange sight. Elements of the same force were moving in opposite direction in a hurry. Our advance positions were subjected to intense artillery fire throughout the night. It was only in the morning that the Indian armour crossed the border and moved unopposed in the absence of our anti-tank weapons which unfortunately could not sustain the heavy bombardment and abandoned their positions before Indian armour showed up to be shot. Had our troops shown a fraction of tenacity as compared to the German soldiers who opposed the Allied forces in the battle of Kasserine pass, the situation today would have been quite different. As we passed through Chawinda, I noticed that the inhabitants were greatly relieved. Now they knew that the Indians would not be able reach their homes. They threw flowers on our moving tanks which gave us a feeling of strength and raised our spirits and morale. On the outskirts of Chawinda I saw my CO Lt Col Nisar Ahmed in his Jeep who had followed the leading B Squadron and was returning to Pasrur. He asked me about Major Raza. I informed him that he was following behind. The CO asked me to leave the track and move cross-country, keeping left of the track. My CO had followed the leading squadron which was now out of my sight. However, he knew the location of B squadron and the fact that enemy had been contacted and tank to tank battle had started. I now feel that he should have given that information to me. I acquired this information through a strange phenomenon. In tank warfare, eyes are more useful than ears. Suddenly I noticed that branches of trees were falling down. I ordered the driver to halt and picked up my binoculars. I noticed the little amount of dust which was raised when a tank shot hit the ground. I also noticed disturbances created in the sugarcane fields when a shot was fired, which otherwise was standing still. These observations indicated that I had reached very close to the enemy who was engaging our B squadron which was still out of my sight. Due to heavy vegetation, interspersed hutment, maize / sugarcane fields, observation was limited to 50 yards. The squadron had advanced non-stop in line ahead formation to contact the enemy from Pasrur till such time we hit Sialkot - Phillora track. Thereafter I controlled the movement of my Troop by adopting leap frog battle formation and made extensive use of binoculars. The enemy had reached the area much before us and was engaged in a firefight with B Squadron. It was the enemy which initiated the firefight with C squadron by firing a shot at my tank at about 8.00 am,2 which fell a few yards short of the tank. My instant reaction was to reverse my tank as I had not yet located the tank which had fired that shot. I took position behind a raised ground, probably a deserted kiln. I then passed message "hello 61, fired at from Gadgor side, I am safe, out". I tried to locate the enemy through binoculars but did not succeed. The squadron commanders tank was not visible, but he had directed the squadron not to go ahead of my tank, but to spread left of my tank. And then the squadron got deployed in extended line formatiom, left of Phillora - Charwa track. 'A' Squadron, which was following us was directed toward right of track and eventually got deployed right of B squadron. And thus 25 Cavalry adopted three squadrons up battle formation. I cannot say what was the frontage covered by B and A squadrons, but I can say that C squadron did not cover more than a 1000 yards on the left of the track, On our left, it was all unprotected. 2 Various published accounts state that C Squadron 25 Cavalry was launched at about 1130 Hours , so we assume that this may be a memory failure of Major Shamshad , although not really significant to this narrative , and in no way reduces the great significance of Major Shamshad’s narrative. While my Troop was deployed between the track and village Josun, it did not cover more than 500 yards frontage. The visibility was limited to 50 yards and I was more than satisfied if visual contact with one of my tanks could be maintained.

CHARLIE SQUADRON 25 CAVALRY AND COMPANY 2 PUNJAB ATTACK GADGOR ALREADY EVACUATED BY INDIAN ARMY AFTER 1700 HOURS 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965 AND CAPTURE IT WITH ZERO CASUALTIES-25 CAVALRY SQUADRON COMMANDER MYSTERIOUSLY SUFFERS AN INJURY AND IS EVACUATED TO HOSPITAL DURING THIS ATTACK • April 2023 • DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29224.85761 • Agha H Amin MAJOR SHAMSHAD ALI KHANS ACCOUNT OF THE ABOVE ATTACK:-- We had formed up some 1500 yards away from the village. The area between my tank and Gadgor village was flat with maize field and devoid of cover. I ordered the gunner to fire at the Mandir. It was a direct hit. I had ordered the tank commanders that whenever the tank was static, they should fire a few shots on the village even if they did not see the enemy. After one or two leaps, all four tanks would rush on the village. Enroute they could stop for a while to fire a few shots on the village in quick time and move again. As we started the attack, I was in a state of excitement and fear. Forgetting about my other tanks my eyes were fixed on the village. To be frank, I never expected to reach Gadgor. There were all the chances of getting hit in the absence of covering artillery fire. It is surprising that the enemy did not bring artillery fire on us, although we were forming-up under their nose. In few minutes time my four tanks reached the outer perimeter of the village and at this time I received a message from Dafadar Azam, the operator of my squadron commander " hello 61, Imam injured and has gone back, out". 3 I Immediately I went up on the air, " hello Charley 60, I take over command, advance, out". At this time my tank was passing two enemy burnt out Centurion tanks, a jeep and one or two dead Indian soldiers. These casualties we not inflicted by us during the attack but were the result of the tank to tank battle which was raging since morning. The other two troops of C Squadron were not visible to me. I could neither locate B Squadron which was supposed to be on the right of the Phillora - Gadgor track. The depth of this village was not more than 100 yards. It took us more time to negotiate the built up area than the time taken to cover the distance of 1500 yards from the Forming-Up-Place. The major difference being that the former distance was covered in great fear and apprehension, while the later was covered in high spirits 3 This was Major Raza , nickname GINGER RAZA. Major Shamshad’s narrative leads us to the impression that Major Raza’s injury was not serious but superficial. Lieutenant General Mahmud in his book fallaciously claims that Major Raza throughout stayed with his squadron during this days battle. as we had reached our objective without any casualties, with not a shot being fired at us from the village. 4 After clearing village Gadgor , we continued to advance 4 The Indian version was that withdrawal was ordered by Brigadier KK Singh ,commander 1st Indian Armoured Brigade , so there were no Indian troops at Gadgor .This is one most possible explanation of why no shot was fired at Shamshads attacking squadron from the village. along the track till such time we were fired at from area Manronwali.

Attack on Darbar Sahib was Indira Gandhi's conspiracy to cash Hindu votes.

A Very Thought Provoking Discussion About Battle of Bara Pind July 2021 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29074.58560 Project: Military History Agha H Amin

Indian 1st Armoured Brigade was ordered to withdraw to Sabzpir Crossroads at 1400 Hours 8th September 1965 and 2 Punjab Company and squadron 25 Cavalry counter attack on Gadgor village, launched after 1700 Hours 8th September 1965 had no connection with Indian 1st Armoured Division withdrawal from Gadgor April 2023 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26288.84486 Agha H Amin We had formed up some 1500 yards away from the village. The area between my tank and Gadgor village was flat with maize field and devoid of cover. I ordered the gunner to fire at the Mandir. It was a direct hit. I had ordered the tank commanders that whenever the tank was static, they should fire a few shots on the village even if they did not see the enemy. After one or two leaps, all four tanks would rush on the village. Enroute they could stop for a while to fire a few shots on the village in quick time and move again. As we started the attack, I was in a state of excitement and fear. Forgetting about my other tanks my eyes were fixed on the village. To be frank, I never expected to reach Gadgor. There were all the chances of getting hit in the absence of covering artillery fire. It is surprising that the enemy did not bring artillery fire on us, although we were forming-up under their nose. In few minutes time my four tanks reached the outer perimeter of the village and at this time I received a message from Dafadar Azam, the operator of my squadron commander " hello 61, Imam injured and has gone back, out". 3 I Immediately I went up on the air, " hello Charley 60, I take over command, advance, out". At this time my tank was passing two enemy burnt out Centurion tanks, a jeep and one or two dead Indian soldiers. These casualties we not inflicted by us during the attack but were the result of the tank to tank battle which was raging since morning. The other two troops of C Squadron were not visible to me. I could neither locate B Squadron which was supposed to be on the right of the Phillora - Gadgor track. The depth of this village was not more than 100 yards. It took us more time to negotiate the built up area than the time taken to cover the distance of 1500 yards from the Forming-Up-Place. The major difference being that the former distance was covered in great fear and apprehension, while the later was covered in high spirits 3 This was Major Raza , nickname GINGER RAZA. Major Shamshad’s narrative leads us to the impression that Major Raza’s injury was not serious but superficial. Lieutenant General Mahmud in his book fallaciously claims that Major Raza throughout stayed with his squadron during this days battle. as we had reached our objective without any casualties, with not a shot being fired at us from the village. 4 After clearing village Gadgor , we continued to advance 4 The Indian version was that withdrawal was ordered by Brigadier KK Singh ,commander 1st Indian Armoured Brigade , so there were no Indian troops at Gadgor .This is one most possible explanation of why no shot was fired at Shamshads attacking squadron from the village. along the track till such time we were fired at from area Manronwali.

Battle of FerozShah-First Sikh War June 2022 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.19431.11682 Project: sikh wars Agha H Amin

BRIGADIER KM NASIR ON BARA PIND FIASCO Brigadier K.M Nasir, SJ on Bara Pind Fiasco -2016 Discussion • • DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27033.02405 • Agha H Amin 2016 DISCUSSION PAVOCAVALRY #pakistanarmy #pakistan #criterion #ltgenabdulmajidmalik #msaeedkhalid AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL ABDUL MAJID MALIK HUM BHI WAHAN MAUJOOD THAI REVIEWED BY M Saeed Khalid- CRITERION - January March 2016- interesting book review . There are some factual mistakes as it was Gracey acting army c in c and not messer by who refused Mr JINNAH over orders to send army in KASHMIR in October 1947- Generals Sher khan and iftikhar did not die in helicopter crash but in orient air crash near Gadap at Karachi- Majeed Malik did not critically analyse the ham handed manner in which promotions were made in Pakistan army like Nisar hero of CHAWINDA and CHANGEZ force battle was never promoted a general but brigadier Irshad who was a total failure as DMI in 1965 war was promoted three star and most ineptly commanded 1 corps in1971- Majeeds assertions about PAKISTANI counter offensive being launched are also questionable as Indian army's corps were well deployed after 26 October 1971 while in 1 corps area failure was purely that of general Irshad -Majeed Maliks claim that PAKISTANS SSG performed well in 1965 are also questionable apart from capture of mail box of INDIAN strike corps which unfortunately was dismissed by PAKISTANS incompetent DMI as INDIAN deception plan- by and large Majeed Malik was a safe player and is not known for any stand that he took nor for any major war performance, Hussainiwala being a unit level action conducted by three battalions where the GOC unlike great Half French As gen Khwaja Zia claims or half PERSIAN as lt gen Ghumman claims EFTIKHAR Janjua never led from the front Pavo Cavalry March 29, 2016 ·#pakistanarmy #pakistan #criterion #ltgenabdulmajidmalik #msaeedkhalid AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL ABDUL MAJID MALIK HUM BHI WAHAN MAUJOOD THAI REVIEWED BY M Saeed Khalid- CRITERION - January March 2016- interesting book review . There are some factual mistakes as it was Gracey acting army c in c and not messer by who refused Mr JINNAH over orders to send army in KASHMIR in October 1947- Generals Sher khan and iftikhar did not die in helicopter crash but in orient air crash near Gadap at Karachi- Majeed Malik did not critically analyse the ham handed manner in which promotions were made in Pakistan army like Nisar hero of CHAWINDA and CHANGEZ force battle was never promoted a general but brigadier Irshad who was a total failure as DMI in 1965 war was promoted three star and most ineptly commanded 1 corps in1971- Majeeds assertions about PAKISTANI counter offensive being launched are also questionable as Indian army's corps were well deployed after 26 October 1971 while in 1 corps area failure was purely that of general Irshad -Majeed Maliks claim that PAKISTANS SSG performed well in 1965 are also questionable apart from capture of mail box of INDIAN strike corps which unfortunately was dismissed by PAKISTANS incompetent DMI as INDIAN deception plan- by and large Majeed Malik was a safe player and is not known for any stand that he took nor for any major war performance, Hussainiwala being a unit level action conducted by three battalions where the GOC unlike great Half French EFTIKHAR Janjua never led from the front Like Love Ravi Rikhye Indian plan was offensive. 10 Div was to attack with two brigades up and two back. Objective was Gujrat. Intent was to draw Pakistan 6 Armd and 17 Inf Divs away from Shakergarh side and facilitate advance of Indian I Corps (1 Armd, 36, 39, 54 Divs, 2 and 16 IABs). Just before outbreak of war, IIRC November 30, Indian COAS and Mrs. Gandhi's advisor DP Dhar arrived at Candeth's HQ. COAS told him very firmly there was to be no attack until AHQ aid so. Candeth protested, saying if he did'nt have the initiative, he would lose ground. COAS told him that he was not to lose ground. Candeth, however, kept the offensive option open. This is from his book. Okay, what does all this mean? What is top political advisor doing accompanying COAS? India WAS going to attack first in the West also. Moscow said to forget about it. That is what Dhar was doing, making 100% sure that the political directive was understood. Pakistan did NOT want war in the West because of the adverse odds. May I note that this did not mean some Pakistan generals did not want to attack first - many had been wanting to attack after Indian troops crossed the international border into East Pakistan November 21/22. There are always multiple ideas on how to proceed in any situation. PAF air attack on 3/4 December was NOT a preemptive move. It was a purely reactive move because Pakistan, not knowing the Indian offensive, which was to start that night, had been cancelled. Even at that time it was obvious from the tiny number of sorties that this was a last-minute decision. Of course, no one paid the slightest attention to what I was saying - story of my life. Like · Reply · March 29 at 7:19pm Ravi Rikhye So, what is the point of the post? Major Amin is 100% right that in light of 10 Div's revised plan, GOC should have replaced the minefields. Since, however, Candeth was still hoping he could attack, perhaps - I am guessing - this is why minefields were not relaid. If I may add, Indian I Corps has been heavily criticized for its slow advance in Shakergarh, and much of that is correct. Conversely, Pakistan's defenses, including three extensive minefields laid by Major Amin's father, were very strong. In the first days of an offensive against tough defenses, advance is going to be slow. Also please note very skillful tough fight put up by Pakistan 8 IAB. Had India moved faster, all that would have happened is that Pakistan reserves would have been committed earlier to stop the attack. People look at this from a post hoc position. But the war was not supposed to be 14-days long. That was just the first phase. Both sides had major offensives planned for night of 17/18 December and 19/20 December (I forget who was attacking first). India intended to continue the war, but again, on political level, it was cancelled due to pressure from Moscow, Washington, and UN. Please to understand I do not have the full story by any means, only a part of it. History is like the daily intelligence assessment: using information available, you make your best estimate. When new information comes, you make a new estimate. I would very much welcome corrections, additions etc. We are on this forum to learn from one another and try to get as close to the truth as possible. Of course, truth is an asymptote - you can never get to the final truth. Like · Reply · March 29 at 7:42pm Pavo Cavalry i guess the news arrived very late Like · Reply · March 29 at 7:44pm Raj Mehta Intrigued...We have Pakistani veterans saying 8 IAB messed up big time...and we have an Indian author saying that 8 IAB put up a very skillful tough fight...Could these opposing view points be rationalised? Unlike · Reply · 2 · Yesterday at 4:34am Pavo Cavalry 8 ARMD bde badly messed up no doubt - had they simply used more than 25 arty batteries in the area Poona horse would have been mincemeat- instead 13 lancers lost 22 killed in an hour whereas CHANGEZ force with a Sherman unit and just two tank regiments delayed two ARMD bdes and two ind diva with 22 killed for some 12 days- the right moment to attack with 8 ARMd Bde and two regiments of 6 ARMD SUV was when 54 div and armour was trapped between 2nd and 3rd layer of minefield for four days Like · Reply · 2 · Yesterday at 9:53am Ravi Rikhye Fascinating. What were the regiments in Changez Force and why was it formed? Thanks. Unlike · Reply · 1 · 22 hrs Pavo Cavalry MY dear friend you are not reading all the posts carefully Ravi Rikhye Like · Reply · 22 hrs Raj Mehta Thought as much...Was wondering why inadequate responses of 8 IAB would be termed skillful ones...Took part, have some idea of what was happening...We were diffident too...Could have done so much more and yes, Pakistan had their choices too... Unlike · Reply · 1 · 22 hrs Pavo Cavalry https://www.slideshare.net/AAmin1/changez-force Ravi Rikhye Ravi Rikhye Thanks for the info on Changez Force. You are right, Major Amin, that I dont read your many and valuable posts carefully! My sole excuse is time: I am researching 12 hours/day on many topics. Besides, a student can ask his teacher to explain something again! So what I see from the orbat is an ad hoc armored brigade. I am assuming the units came from 8 and 15 Divs? Was Changez Force the covering force for the Shakergarh defenses and 8 IAB the counter penetration reserve? Or were CF and 8 IAB defending different parts of the minefields? Unlike · Reply · 1 · 21 hrs Pavo Cavalry The idea was that 8 INDEP ARMD bde and 6 ARMD (2 tank regts) were to launch counterattack and destroy maximum INDIAN forces when trapped between 1st and 2nd layers of minefield but corps Comd lt gen Irshad was absolutely hopeless as he had been as DMI...See More Like · Reply · 20 hrs · Edited Pavo Cavalry Such was the petty mindset of corps Hq that they thought that CHANGEZ force will delay Indians for 48 hours and this was the mission assigned - but CHANGEZ force delayed Indians for 12 days with ease although one unit was just 35 tanks shermans while Indians had far superior t 55 and centurions Ravi Rikhye Like · Reply · 1 · 20 hrs Ravi Rikhye This is an OMG moment. Unbelievable. So the impression I had that 8 IAB stopped the Indian offensive is wrong, it was Changez Force. It speak's well for the OC that he could skillfully handle an ad hoc brigade with units from many other formations. Like · Reply · 20 hrs Pavo Cavalry 8 bde was absolute DIASASTER and only 13 lancers did the fighting Sqn comds on their own -31 cavalry role was limited although they lost 12 including dhobi - and 27 cavalry suffered no casualties not a single...

The Battle of Lahore and Pakistans Main Attack in 1965 The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational Analysis December 2001 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26574.08004 Project: MILITARY HISTORY Agha H AminAgha H Amin

Reason number ---ONE-for failure of 23 Division main attack on Mandiala on 4 th December 1971 December 2023 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22122.08649 My research is available on @ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376206406_Reason_number_-ONE-for_failure_of_23_Division_main_attack_on_Mandiala_on_4_th_December_1971?utm_source=twitter&rgutm_meta1=eHNsLUsrdHF2WnVxWVJGR2xpNlh6TUJOc0ZIL1Y1bVo4SlFwVlo4VkdPZFE2KzlzalVpRWxEVFlMdWZjR0tQOHBUQlJodzEvM1lSa2FSTFJQUSs2KzJuaUtnQT0%3D Reason number -ONE-for failure of 23 Division main attack on Mandiala on 4 th December 1971 • December 2023 • DOI: • 10.13140/RG.2.2.22122.08649 • Agha H Amin Reason number -ONE- for failure of 23 Division main attack on Mandiala on 4th December 1971 -Faulty understanding of artillery employment and incompetent artillery target analysis Pakistani artillery was commanded by brigadier Naseerullah Khan Babar , a very brave officer , who had served in the aviation corps for a large part of his service. Bravery was no substitute for artillery incompetence, and Babar’s appointment to command 23 Division artillery in August 1971 , was the death verdict of 23 Division’s ,main attack at Mandiala on 4th December 1971. That major general Eftikhar, had very limited understanding of artillery, was acceptable as he was an infantry officer , but NUK Babar ,made the situation irrevocably worse , since he was only artillery officer in name , and an aviator in practice . That NUK Babar’s shallow understanding of artillery doomed 23 Division, to date has not been properly analysed by Pakistani historians. Ignorance about artillery operations of 23 Division, is such that Indian military historian AJS Sandhu , praises Pakistani artillery in glowing terms , which to say the least , is a complete distortion of history ! Shaukat Riza thus described total failure of 23 Division (and 17 Division artillery also with 23 Division) as below:-- "The deployment of artillery firepower available to 23 Division was in contravention of the principle of concentration. The division was supported by eight regiments. This firepower was distributed to support simultaneous attack by four brigades. The distribution of artillery support militated against the suppression of hostile weapons to a level of acceptable opposition. West of Tawi Indians had border security forces backed by covering troops from regular forces. Their purpose was to delay and define Pakistani attack. By distributing our artillery fire power over 30,000 yards the Indians were able to attain their aim". 23 Division was well aware about its mission in Chhamb. They had Pakistani army headquarters resources available to carry out aerial photography of the Chhamb area. In addition the topography of the area was exhaustively known to Pakistan Army since , it had fought in the area in 1948 as well as 1965. Yet headquarters 23 Division failed to carry out a detailed target analysis of the Mandiala heights complex. Mandiala north and south which stood in the way of 23 Division’s main objective the west end of the Tawi river bridge, were two most dominating ridges 60 to 70 feet high . Why 23 Division failed to accurately carry out a detailed target analysis of these two ridges, which became death ground for Pakistani tanks on 4th and 5th December 1971 was due to following reasons :-- 1. The artillery commander NUK Babar , as earlier discussed was a phenomenally bad choice to lead the 23 Division artillery , as he had hardly served in artillery. 2. The divisional commander Eftikhar Khan Janjua , although an exceptionally brave man , had limited understanding of defensive potential of tanks. His views were conditioned by having commanded an infantry brigade in the same sector, where in 1965 war Indians were massively outgunned, out armoured and outnumbered , having a puny matchbox AMX 13 squadron to oppose six Pakistani tank squadrons , four of which were latest Patton tanks.

Indian Army 47 Brigade badly led but brave junior officers at Battle of Bara Pind Jarpal-View of Direct participant Major Ghiasuddin Babar-40 Punjab Regiment February 2021 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24616.29448 Project: Military History Agha H Amin