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Conventionalism is a thesis according to which there is an empty space between the experience and theories which must be “conventionally filled”. Because of empirical equivalence, scientists have nothing but to choose a theory on “soft”, that is non-evidential grounds. As the experience does not “impose” any theory, scientists are free to choose one. Yet, the thing to remember is that conventionalism is not a “homogenous movement”. It is more convenient to speak about conventionalisms. Jindřich Černý’s task is to sketch a line between two basic ways – instrumentalism and constructivism – and to develop the idea of latter with reference to French conventionalism (Poincaré 1902, Le Roy 1901) and Lwow-Warsaw School (Ajdukiewicz 1934). Both instrumentalism and constructivism are, as Le Roy used to say, “philosophies of freedom”, yet respective consequences of freedom are quite different, for, in case of constructivism, the freedom pertains not only to form of knowledge but to its content too. Constructivism” is an “anti-instrumentalism”, for it denies two emblematic consequences of instrumentalism. First, according to Constructivists, there is no essential difference between empirical and theoretical expressions; both kinds are meaningful. Second, not all statements formulated in vocabulary of empirical theories are “on a par”: epistemic status of some them is more “privileged” than others one. These statements could be termed “paradigmatic propositions”, or in Poincaréan fashion, “principles”. Paradigmatic propositions are constitutive of meanings and of object of cognition, so the theories which differ with respect to principle are not only untranslatable, yet quite literally incommensurable. There is no “invariant” factual or otherwise in virtue of which theories underlaid by different principles could be compared. The task amounts to find a new interpretation of relationships between spontaneity and receptivity. “A priori”, as already shown by Poincaré at the end of 19th century, cannot be taken as synonymous with “apodictic”. Yet it does not mean that Kantian spirit goes by the board. The emergence of non-Euclidean geometries calls for the substitution of relative linguistic concept of a priori for the absolute psychological one. The experience is still a result of mesh between receptivity and spontaneity, yet paradigmatic propositions (or principles) are not “innate”. What more, paradigmatic propositions do not “hang in the air”, for they have sensorial genealogy (Poincaré 1902). Even if principles cannot be empirically tested (for the experience depends on them), still they can be abandoned and substituted by different propositions, hence the facts – these primary targets the scientist aim at – are not made out of “nothing”. Freedom of choice is not whimsical. So to speak, constructivism, due to two-way relation between spontaneity and receptivity it postulates, overcomes traditional dichotomy between an “absolutistic” and a relativistic view on science.
In this thesis we propose a skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge. The scenario is composed of three main arguments: the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of deduction, and the rule-following paradox. We propose a solution for a priori skepticism that is based on two philosophical schools: conventionalism and contextualism. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition although hard to satisfy for relieving a priori skepticism
Qu'est-ce que le conventionnalisme ? Spéculant sur la modestie de leurs connaissances en philosophie, je me suis habitué à répondre aux "non-philosophes" qui voulaient en savoir un peu plus : le conventionnalisme est une théorie de la connaissance qui, s'exprimant sur la façon de justifier les connaissances verbalisées, s'oppose à l'empirisme aussi bien qu'à la philosophie kantienne. Et pour ceux qui étaient encore plus avancés : c'est une philosophie selon laquelle il existe, dans nos connaissances, des éléments qui, n'étant pas imposés par l'expérience, ne sont ni apodictiques (au sens kantien) ni arbitraires. En d'autres termes, le conventionnalisme est une philosophie sel on laquelle il existe une liberté de choix en ce qui concerne le domaine cognitif. Les connaissances dépendent non seulement de la réalité mais également du choix des théories qui servent à la représenter.
This article will address the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz-the leading representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will present arguments proving that the Polish philosopher could have anticipated contemporary metaontological discussions. In the first part, I will provide a profile of Ajdukiewicz as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will outline the assumptions of his metaepistemological projects: radical conventionalism and semantic epistemology. In the second part, I will argue that the former project resulted in views on existence similar to Hilary Putnam's and Eli Hirsch's, whereas the outcomes of the other project are views similar to those of Amie Thomasson and her easy ontology project.
de Paz, M. y DiSalle, R. (eds.), Poincaré, philosopher of science. Problems and Perspectives
The third way epistemology: a re-characterization of Poincaré's conventionalism2014 •
The aim of this paper is to clarify some crucial aspects of Poincaré’s philosophy of science, and especially the notion of ‘convention’. This will lead to a better understanding of the differing interpretations of his views that have been proposed, and to a reassessment of the conventionalist philosophy of science 100 years after Poincaré’s passing. The first section presents a short contextualization of conventionalism with the nineteenth century philosophical landscape. In the second one, we briefly expose two conflicting ways of interpreting Poincaré’s conventionalism regarding natural science, that is, physics and mechanics. In the third section, the core of this paper, we analyze the different concepts of convention that are found in Poincaré’s works. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks on Poincaré’s views in light of present-day philosophical concerns.
Philosophia Mathematica
Hitting a moving target: Gödel, Carnap, and Mathematics as Logical SyntaxThis paper investigates Gödel's criticism of Carnap's philosophy of mathematics. Gödel produced six drafts of a paper which was prepared for, but not included in, the Schilpp volume on Carnap. Gödel shows he is most familiar with Carnap's position from The Logical Syntax of Language (Syntax), and his arguments are nearly all directed against the position in this work. After looking at Syntax and identifying the problems with the philosophical position defended there, it will be seen that many of Gödel's criticisms are correct. While Gödel's arguments are not perfect, it will be argued that the problems with them are not those identified in well-known articles by Goldfarb and Ricketts or Awodey and Carus. G\"odel did not, however, intend his arguments to apply exclusively to the position of Syntax, he thought the same arguments, with minor adaptation, apply to Carnap's newer views. It will be shown that this is not the case and that Gödel failed to appreciate how much Carnap's position had changed from the early 1930s to the mid 1950s.
CLMPS 2011 Volume of Abstracts
Ontology Symposium310 Volume of Abstracts Ontology Symposium Ontology between philosophy and computer science Chairs: Heinrich Herre, Roberto Poli University of Leipzig (Germany), University of Trento (Italy) herre@ informatik. uni-leipzig. de, roberto. poli. tn@ gmail. com Contributions -Wholes in structural mereology Thomas Mormann University of the Basque Country (Spain) thomasarnold. mormann@ ehu. es -Freely faceted classification for knowledge organization Claudio Gnoli University of Pavia (Italy) gnoli@ aib. it -Ontology and Terminology Frédéric ...
Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) was one of the foremost twentieth-century philosophers of science. Although he attained infamy by embracing cultural relativism and by providing a searing critique of the claims of science, there has been, to date, no comprehensive critical study of the major themes in Feyerabend’s philosophy. This book rectifies that situation. The book traces the evolution of Feyerabend’s thought, beginning with his attempt to graft insights from Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning onto Popper’s falsificationist philosophy. The component parts of Feyerabend’s ‘model for the acquisition of knowledge’, the normative aspect of his project, and its roots in a Popperian conception of epistemology, are identified and critically evaluated. Feyerabend’s early work emerges as thoroughly post-Popperian, rather than as a contribution to the historical approach to philosophy of science with which he is usually associated. In his more notorious later work, notably the 1975 book Against Method, Feyerabend claimed that there was, and should be, no such thing as the scientific method. This ‘epistemological anarchism’ and Feyerabend’s attendant relativism are examined here in the light of his recognition that Against Method was a collage constructed out of his earlier thoughts. The roots of epistemological anarchism are exposed, and the weaknesses of Feyerabend’s later thesis of incommensurability are brought out. Throughout the book, the influence of Feyerabend’s thought on contemporary philosophers is tracked. The author draws attention to Feyerabend’s exciting but divided legacy. On the one hand, contemporary scientistic philosophers have used his earlier views in a vigorous defence of an uncompromising ‘eliminative’ materialist view of the mind. On the other hand, thinkers influenced by Feyerabend’s later work have begun a humanistic critique of science, scientific myth-making, and scientific claims to knowledge. The book will be of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students of philosophy, methodology, and the social sciences.
Research in History and Philosophy of Mathematics: The CSHPM 2016 Annual Meeting in Calgary, Alberta
Poincaré on the Foundation of Geometry in the Understanding2018 •
This paper is about Poincaré's view of the foundations of geometry. According to the established view, which has been inherited from the logical positivists, Poincaré, like Hilbert, held that axioms in geometry are schemata that provide implicit definitions of geometric terms, a view he expresses by stating that the axioms of geometry are "definitions in disguise."
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Henri Poincaré's philosophy of science1989 •
2015 •
Noema, Journal of the Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology of the Romanian Academy
Whitehead's Concept of Speculative Philosophy: a Metatheoretical Perspective2010 •
Philosophy of Science
Defending conventions as functionally a priori knowledge2003 •
homepage.villanova.edu
Quine's Appeal to Use and the Genealogy of Indeterminacy2003 •
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science
Arthur Pap’s Functional Theory of the A Priori2011 •
The Significance of the New Logic: A Translation of Willard Van Orman Quine's O Sentido da Nova Logica (Cambridge University Press 2018)
Willard Van Orman Quine's Philosophical Development in the 1930s and 1940s (Cambridge University Press)2018 •
2009 •
Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers, ed. by James R. Brown
Conventionalism: Poincaré, Duhem, Reichenbach2012 •
"Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook"
Analyticity and the A priori : Fifty Years of "Two Dogmas"2007 •
Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 30; pp.83-98
On some Standard Objections to Mathematical Conventionalism2017 •
Jindrich Cerny