Perceptual Aquaintance and Informational Content
89
Perceptual Aquaintance and
Informational Content
Donovan Wishon
1 Introduction
Consider the case in which you are looking at a ripe red apple in standard
viewing conditions.What is it that you are aware of? Intuitively, one is aware
of the apple and its quality of redness. One is also in some sense aware of the
quality of one’s experience of the ripe red apple; one is aware of “what it’s
like” to perceive it visually in standard viewing conditions. What is the relation between these two things one is aware of, that is, between the qualitative
character of one’s experience of seeing the apple and the redness of the apple
itself? On the naïve realist view of perception, they are the same: the qualitative character of the experience of seeing red just is the redness that inheres
in the surface of the apple. In the case of veridical perception, one is aware
of the redness in the surface of the apple, and nothing else. On the indirect
realist view of perception, on the other hand, what one sees directly is the
qualitative character of one’s own mind-dependent sensation as of red, and
one explicitly or implicitly infers the redness of the apple itself.
Many currently working on a Russellian notion of perceptual acquaintance
and its role in perceptual experience tend to treat naïve realism and indirect
realism as an exhaustive disjunction of possible views.1 In this paper, I will
articulate a third, intermediate view. This view of perceptual acquaintance is
a form of direct realism, according to which one directly and literally sees the
apple and its redness without seeing something mind-dependent and without
making any intermediate inference. Nevertheless, it also maintains that the
qualitative character of perceptual experience is a mind-dependent feature
of our internal states of sentient awareness, and so is to be distinguished from
the redness of the apple. Indeed, I believe that only this combination of direct
realism and qualia internalism can provide an adequate characterization of
our perceptual experience of things.2
1
2
I have in mind here Campbell 2002a, 2002b, and 2009 and Tye 2009. I will say more about
how exactly we should understand the technical notion of ‘perceptual acquaintance’ in §
2 of this paper.
Qualia internalism is the view that any duplicate of a subject will have the same qualitative
experience regardless of the environment that he or she is in. Qualia externalism, on the
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To foreshadow things a bit, on my picture of perceptual experience we are
aware of the qualitative character of our sensations simply in virtue of having
them, and we are non-inferentially aware of the apple and its redness by being
attuned to what the occurrence of our sensations tells us about the rest of
the world. Consequently, we are presented with, and thus acquainted with,
both the apple (and its redness) and the qualitative character of our sensation
of the apple, albeit in very diferent ways. Indeed, perceptual experience has
what I call a “two-faced presentational character”: we are presented all at once
with external objects (and their perceptible features) and with the qualitative
character of our perceptual experience itself.
My view here particularly contrasts with recent work by John Campbell
and Michael Tye on Russell’s notion of acquaintance and its role in perceptual
experience, which has tended to emphasize the naïve realism of early Russell
(and G. E. Moore).3 For example, Campbell has recently claimed:
On a Relational View, the qualitative character of the experience is constituted by the qualitative character of the scene perceived…only this view,
on which experience of an object is a simple relation holding between
perceiver and object, can characterize the kind of acquaintance with objects
that provides knowledge of reference (Campbell 2002a: p. 115).
Similarly, Tye has argued that:
Phenomenal character is manifest to us in our being aware of…external
qualities. We cannot focus on it in any way that separates it from our focus
on external things and qualities… On this view, the phenomenal character
of the experience of red in a case of veridical perception is a feature of the
surface the perceiver sees. The surface has the phenomenal character (Tye
2009: p. 120).
On such views, when we have perceptual acquaintance with things, what we
directly and literally perceive are external objects and their perceptible features, where the qualitative characters of our perceptual experiences inhere
in, or are constituted by, those external objects and features.
There are, however, a number of well-known objections to naïve realism. First of all, our current best scientiic theories of perception subscribe
to the view that the right sort of neurobiological states of the brain are (at
least) causally suicient for the occurrence of a perceptual experience as
of external objects and features, even when there are no external objects
3
other hand, is the view that the qualitative characters of experiences are constituted by
features of the external environment.
This recent work includes Campbell 2002a, 2002b, and 2009 and Tye 2009.
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Perceptual Aquaintance and Informational Content
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present.4 And secondly, in cases of illusion or hallucination, subjects have the
falsidical experience as of an external object having such-and-such features
when either the object does not have those features, or there is no object
whatsoever. Together, these objections suggest that the qualitative phenomenal features of which we are aware in perceptual experience are minddependent features of the experiential states themselves rather than mindindependent features of external objects.
Campbell and Tye are unconvinced by these arguments, however. They
urge that we should embrace some variety of disjunctivism, the view that
there is no ‘common factor’ of phenomenal character or of content between
veridical perceptions and the cases of illusion or hallucination.5 On such a
disjunctivist view, in cases of veridical perception the perceived object or
features are constituents of the perceptual experience itself and the qualitative
characters of which we are aware inhere in them rather than in our internal
states of sentient awareness. However, in cases of non-veridical perception
or hallucination, the subject has an entirely distinct kind of perception-like
experience, one with a diferent phenomenal character and diferent content,
yet one that the subject cannot introspectively discern to be diferent from
the veridical case, despite the fact that it is.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the move to disjunctivism is unpromising.6
In particular, it is diicult to see how disjunctivism can provide an epistemologically and metaphysically plausible account of non-veridical perceptual
experiences. But in any case, I intend here to take a very diferent route in
developing an account of perceptual acquaintance. I’ll argue that once we
recognize the “two-faced presentational character” of perceptual experience,
we can safely avoid the prima facie dilemma between naïve realism and indirect realism.7 Indeed, once we fully recognize the informational character
of perceptual experience, we can see how our perceptual acquaintance puts
4
5
6
7
I say “(at least) causally suicient” because the relation between the relevant neurobiological
states of the brain and the conscious perceptual experience will be even more intimate on
any physicalist ontology.
In point of fact, Tye thinks that there is a common factor of phenomenal character and of
content schema, but no common factor of singular content. However, as I argue elsewhere,
it is hard to square this view with his professed qualia externalism. See chapter 3 of my
dissertation Russellian Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts.
See chapter 3 of my dissertation Russellian Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts.
It is worth noting that Russell’s own theorizing about the nature of perceptual acquaintance
was plagued by this false dilemma. One goal of this paper is to show that we needn’t follow
the early Russell in embracing naïve realism and its problematic qualia externalism, nor
the later Russell in combining qualia internalism with an undesirable indirect theory of
perceptual experience.
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us in direct experiential contact with external objects, features, and states-ofafairs even though the qualitative characters of our experiences are minddependent features of our own states of sentient awareness. Thus, we can
have the best of both worlds; we can be direct realists about the content of
perceptual experience and internalists about its qualitative character.
I will proceed as follows: In §2, I will explain how Russell conceived of
acquaintance and its role in cognition, reference, and perception. In §3, I
will present John Perry’s theory of information and informational content,
which I think is a useful framework for thinking about naturalized content
in general. In §4, I will explain how this theory of information and informational content helps us see how we can be direct realists about the content of
perceptual acquaintance. Finally, in §5, I will draw on recent work on perceptual intentionality by Searle to develop my own account of the “two-faced
presentational character” of perceptual experience, which helps explain how
we can be internalists about its phenomenal character while being externalists about its content.
2 Knowledge of Things and Knowledge of Thruths
Recent interest in a Russellian notion of perceptual acquaintance has been
fueled by the increased appreciation of Russell’s more general distinction
between two kinds of knowledge: knowledge of things and knowledge of
truths. Russell’s distinction here roughly corresponds with an ordinary distinction drawn in many natural languages between two uses of the term
‘know’. First of all, we ordinarily talk about knowing that such-and-such is
the case.This sort of knowledge paradigmatically involves conceptually articulated beliefs and is propositional in character; it involves cognitive attitudes
that can be evaluated in terms of their truth or falsity. However, there is also
another way in which we use the term ‘know’ in ordinary language: we talk
of knowing individuals in the sense that we have directly encountered them
and therefore have some familiarity with them. This is roughly what Russell
has in mind with his technical notion of knowledge of things, though it is
not entirely equivalent to the ordinary one.
According to Russell, our knowledge of things is a distinctive epistemic relation that plays a fundamental role in reference and cognition. Indeed, Russell introduces the notion of knowledge of things, or acquaintance, in order
to place a substantive cognitive constraint on what it takes for an individual
to have genuinely singular thoughts about, or to make genuinely singular
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reference to, individuals. In other words, our knowledge of things explains
what it takes to have thoughts or utterances whose contents are constituted
by the very individuals and features, if any, that the thoughts or utterances
are about rather than by some way of getting at or identifying them.8 In fact,
he argues that all cognition and linguistic designation ultimately rests on our
fundamental epistemic capacity to be acquainted with, or consciously aware
of, individuals and their features.
Russell’s basic picture of cognition and reference is this: There is some
special class of individuals (concrete and abstract alike) and their features
with which we have experiential contact. On the basis of this experiential
contact, we are in a position to direct conscious attention to those individuals
and features. Our conscious attention to these experienced individuals and
features in turn grounds our ability to make demonstrative, singular reference
to them (to designate them with a “logically proper name”) and puts us in
a position to acquire knowledge of such demonstrative, singular reference.
Furthermore, our conscious attention to experienced individuals and features
also puts us in a position to pick up information about, and thereby form
some conception of, these individuals and features. Finally, on the basis of
our conceptions of these individuals and features and our more general conception of how the world works, we can designate objects and features with
which we lack experiential contact. We do so by employing representations
that encode identifying conditions that an object or feature must uniquely
satisfy in order to be the designated individual or feature of the representation,
or by employing representations that are purely quantiicational in character.
But what exactly is acquaintance? Basically, Russell conceives of acquaintance as a fundamental experiential relation between a conscious subject and
individuals or features in the world, where the ‘knowledge of things’ that it
constitutes is logically independent of, but serves as the ultimate enabling
condition for, our knowledge of truths about, and conceptions of, the things
or features with which we are acquainted. As Russell puts it:
Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically
independent of knowledge of truths, though it would be rash to assume
that human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with things without at
the same time knowing some truth about them (Russell 1912/1997: p. 46).
For Russell, acquaintance is relational in the straightforward sense that it is
a relation that obtains between a conscious subject and the individuals or
8
I am being shamelessly terminologically anachronistic here, but I think doing so is helpful.
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features with which the subject is acquainted; both the subject and the individuals or features are constituents of the acquaintance relation.9 He holds
that acquaintance is fundamental in that:
[Acquaintance is] the simplest and most pervading aspect of experience…
All cognitive relations—attention, sensation, memory, imagination, believing, disbelieving, etc.—presuppose acquaintance (Russell 1992: p. 5).
Indeed, he holds that our acquaintance with things constitutes our most basic form of intentionality, or object-directedness, and grounds our ability to
make genuine singular reference to the individuals and features with which
we are acquainted. He contends that:
The faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main
characteristic of a mind. Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a
relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that
constitutes the mind’s power of knowing things (Russell 1912/1997: p. 42).
Russell is quite clear in holding that acquaintance is essentially an experiential
relation in which the conscious subject is presented with the objects of his
or her awareness. In his 1913 Theory of Knowledge, he remarks:
Now, since we have decided that experience is constituted by a relation, …
we shall employ synonymously the two words ‘acquaintance’ and ‘awareness’, generally the former.Thus when A experiences an object O, we shall
say that A is acquainted with O (Russell 1992: p. 35).
Elsewhere, Russell asserts that:
The distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about is the distinction
between the things we have presentations of, and the things we only reach
by denoting phrases (Russell 1905/2000: p. 212).
For Russell, an individual or feature is presented to a subject just in case it
makes the right sort of direct diference to that subject’s conscious and cognitive life such that the subject is aware of it.
Finally, Russell holds that the knowledge of things of which acquaintance
consists is unrelective, non-conceptual, and non-propositional. Knowledge
of things is ‘non-conceptual’ in the sense that it does not require a subject’s
having antecedent possession of any concept or conception of the thing or
feature with which he or she is acquainted. Indeed, acquaintance is precisely
the sort of unrelective and ‘objectual’ conscious awareness of which many
non-linguistic sentient animals and small children are capable.
9
More precisely, both the subject and the individuals or features are constituents of the
relational fact.
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Knowledge of things is ‘non-propositional’ in the straightforward sense that
it lacks genuine veridicality conditions. Indeed, on Russell’s view, either a
subject experiences such-and-such individuals or features, or the subject does
not. It is in this sense (alone) that we know a thing “perfectly and completely”
when we are acquainted with it.10 Of course, it goes without saying that the
epistemic mechanisms and faculties through which we become acquainted
with things are themselves fallible in that they can misrepresent the individuals and features we are experiencing. But acquaintance itself does not admit
of error; it is all or nothing.11
3 Information and Intentionality
In the previous section, I provided a basic sketch of Russell’s notion of acquaintance and its role in reference and cognition. In this section, I want to
provide a framework that I believe is crucial for thinking about the nature of
perceptual acquaintance. And while I ultimately aim to defend an internalist
account of the qualitative characters of our perceptual experiences, I will here
provide an account of the nature of perception that is, in its broadest features,
compatible with both naïve realism and its competitors. Indeed, I think that
any adequate account of perception must begin with a more primitive theory
about information, informational content, and intentionality. In developing my theory of perception, I will rely on the theory of information and
informational content advanced by John Perry in his “Information, Action,
and Persons.”12
To begin with, the basic unit of information on Perry’s account is a signal.A
signal is an object having a property, where both the object and the property
may be quite complex. Perry calls this object the carrier of information and
its relevant property the indicating property.13 Given this technical notion of
a signal, Perry characterizes information as:
What one part or aspect of the universe (the signal) shows about some other
part or aspect [of the universe] (the subject matter) (Perry 2002: p. 174).
10
11
12
13
Russell 1912/1997: pp. 46–7.
Note that Russell’s view here should not be understood as an endorsement of the so-called
“thesis of revelation”.
Perry 2002. Perry’s earlier work with David Israel and Syun Tutiya is also excellent for
thinking about the nature of information, but I will focus only on his later work on the
topic.
Perry 2002: p. 174.
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However, as Perry rightly notes, the mere occurrence of some state or
event in the world says nothing about how things are with the rest of reality
unless its occurrence is against the background of the way the world works,
or at least some conception thereof. Indeed, it is a common fault of informational-semantic theories that they fail to emphasize that signals only carry
information about other parts or features of the universe given a background
of constraints, where constraints are understood as states-of-afairs, some of
which are true. Perry nicely puts this point as follows:
[That a signal carries information about some other part or feature of the
universe] is possible only because events are constrained by laws of nature,
or as I prefer, because of its more liberal, common-sense, loose, and nonreductive connotations, by the way that things happen. The information
carried by a signal is what else things have to be like, for the signal to have
occurred, given the way things happen (Perry 2002: p. 175).
Perry’s idea is that a signal S carries the information that P if there are principles of how things actually happen such that given those principles, the
signal would not have occurred unless P were the case.
One crucial thing to notice about his notion of information here is that
it is factive. In other words, given the way the actual world works, it is not
possible for a signal to carry the information that P and for it not to be
the case that P. This is one reason that information is not a viable candidate to which we can reduce intentionality, for intentional states of systems
can be directed at, can have as conditions of satisfaction, states-of-afairs
that are not the case. Another reason that we cannot reduce intentionality to Perry’s notion of information is that any occurrence in the world
can constitute a signal that carries information about any other state of
the world relative to the right constraints about how the world actually
works. But one of the essential features of genuine original intentionality is
that it is directed at, or places conditions on, particular objects or states-ofafairs that, again, might or might not in fact obtain. Moreover, it is generally directed in some particular way at them. Thus, it is not enough for the
signal simply to causally-covary with some particular indicated object or
state-of-afairs.
Perry himself, of course, is quite aware of the fact that we cannot plausibly identify intentionality with, or reduce it to, mere information. Instead,
he maintains that naturalized intentionality is to be identiied with the
right sort of informational content. To see how informational content difers
from mere information, it is helpful to have the following rough general
schema:
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A signal S has the informational content that P if and only if, given
constraints C, S occurs if and only if P.
In the case of mere information, the constraints against which a signal acquires its informational content are true constraints governing the way the
actual world works. However, what is crucial for Perry’s notion of informational content is that the constraints we rely on in determining the content
of a particular signal need not be true, a fact which allows us to consider
counterfactual circumstances and which, as we’ll see, explains many cases of
informational error.
Furthermore, Perry maintains that for any signal there are numerous layers of informational content they have depending on which constraints and
circumstances are assumed in the background. Some of this information
content is what Perry calls relexive information, or information about the
signal itself.14 Other levels of the signal’s informational content are about
states or features of the rest of the world; Perry calls information of this
sort incremental information.15 Perry thinks we get from the relexive
information about the signal itself to the subject-matter, incremental information it has by adding to the background constraints particular details about the circumstances of the signal’s occurrence.16 In other words,
a signal will give us information about what some other part or aspect of
the world must be like given the signal’s occurrence, the circumstances in
which it occurred, and the way the world works. Borrowing one example
from Perry, an x-ray has the informational content that so-and-so has a
cavity in such-and-such tooth given the way that x-rays and tooth decay
work and given the circumstances that the x-ray was exposed to so-and-so’s
tooth.17
Perry thinks that many systems and devices depend on information and
informational content having these features. Indeed, he thinks that many
systems and devices are constructed in such a way that they harness the informational content of a signal in order to satisfy some goal. They do this
by having some sort of architectural design such that the occurrence of a
particular signal is also the cause an action that will be successful in just
those circumstances. To borrow one of Perry’s examples, the springing of a
mousetrap carries the information that there is a mouse in the trap relative
14
15
16
17
Perry 2002: p. 175.
Perry 2002: p. 176.
Perry 2002: p. 179.
Perry 2002: pp. 175–6.
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to the constraints that only mice will spring it, and it is designed to succeed
in trapping mice in precisely those conditions in which a mouse is in it.18 If,
however, the constraints are not satisied, then the occurrence of the signal
will fail in bringing about the designed efect.
Of course, in the case of the mousetrap, its informational content is ‘derived’ rather than ‘original’. That is, the occurrence of the trap’s signal has
the informational content that there is a mouse in the trap given the relevant
constraints and circumstances only because we have given it the job or goal of
trapping mice. For this reason, Perry acknowledges that it is not enough for a
signal simply to have informational content for it to have genuine intentionality. But what more is needed on Perry’s account to get to genuine original
intentionality? His answer is that what we need is a system whose indicating
states have natural jobs or goals to indicate some state-of-afairs in the world
and to guide actions that make sense given their occurrence. However, unlike
so-called ‘teleosemantic’ approaches to naturalized intentional content, Perry
does not limit the sources of natural functions of states to those supplied by
natural selection, learning, and social accretion.
Indeed, one striking feature of Perry’s account is that the qualitative characters of many of our states of sentient awareness are a vital source of naturally supplied goals. In particular, he maintains that the pleasant or unpleasant dimensions of the qualitative characters of many of our experiential
states provide us with a crucial source for deriving natural goals, a fact that
natural selection and social accretion make good use of in generating more
sophisticated natural goals for us.19 Hence, Perry’s own view bears a strong
resemblance to those according to which we cannot explain intentionality naturalistically, but only by appealing to consciousness itself. However,
where he parts company with such opponents of naturalized intentionality
is in holding that consciousness itself, and its qualitative characters, can in
principle be naturalized. Of course, it is absolutely crucial to point out that
Perry holds that the physical domain must be such that consciousness, in all
of its subjective and qualitative richness, can arise within it. So he is not the
kind of traditional naturalist who would seek to make consciousness out to
be less than it in fact is simply with the goal of making it it easier into an
overly impoverished conception of physical reality.
18
19
Perry 2002: pp. 178–9.
Of course, this can’t be the full story since many experiences, such as our experiences of
color, do not have a recognizable dimension of pleasantness or unpleasantness.
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4 Informational Content and Perceptual Content
In the previous section, I presented Perry’s account of informational content
as what one aspect of the world tells us about another aspect of the world
given relevant constraints and circumstances. But what exactly does this have
to do with perception? I think that what is central to perception is not its
causal character, as many believe, but rather its informational character. It is
that the states of our perceptual systems have informational content about
states of the world outside of our perceptual system in a way that we can harness this information to guide our thought and action. In fact, our perceptual
systems have been designed through processes of natural selection, social accretion, and learning to provide us with information about our environment
in order to help us be more successful in navigating it and thereby satisfying
our various practical goals.
Perception accomplishes this, of course, because we and our perceptual
systems are, as Perry puts it, ‘attuned’ to more-or-less accurate regularities
that hold between distal objects in our environment and the internal states
of our perceptual systems. The crucial notion of attunement here is of an
unrelective sensitivity to, or even diferential responsiveness to, some moreor-less accurate constraints on the way that the world works. This sensitivity to constraints allows us to track and harness the information carried by
states of our perceptual system about particular events in our environment.
We might even construe attunement as a set of capacities, abilities, or knowhow of the subject, or of his or her perceptual faculties.20 For example, many
birds are attuned to the constraint that the path to any clearly visible object is
unobstructed; indeed, their attunement to this constraint guides their (often
highly complex) behavior even though they lack an explicit and relective
appreciation of the constraint and even though the constraint is false (given
the advent of transparent windows).21
One beneit of thinking of perception in terms of informational content is
that it helps explain how direct realism might be true. For, as Searle remarks
in a similar context, it is important to note that an account of perception
does not get to declare itself a version of direct realism for free. Rather, direct
realism should be a consequence of an independently motivated account of
the intentionality of perception. And indeed, one crucial beneit of think20 I think that Perry’s notion of attunement to constraints bears important similarities to
Searle’s notion of the ‘background’ against which our intentional states have their particular
conditions of satisfaction. See Searle 1983.
21 I borrow this example from Perry 2002: p. 184.
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ing of perception in terms of informational content is that we evidently can
explain how direct realism about perception can be true. This is because the
informational content of a signal is literally about the very external objects,
feature-instances, or states-of-afairs, if any, for which, in the particular circumstances of its occurrence and relative to appropriate constraints, it has the
job of indicating. And in the case of perceptual experience, the constraints
governing our perceptual capacities are such that our states of perceptual
awareness are directly about perceptible external objects, feature-instances,
or states-of-afairs in our environment.
What’s more, this fact about the nature of informational content explains
how it is that perception can have several other important intentional features
noted by Searle and others.22 First, it explains why perception has an essentially indexical element; indeed, our perceptions are always about particular
objects, feature-instances, or states-of-afairs that bear some indexical relation
to us and our perceptual faculties. Secondly, it explains why perception is,
as Searle puts it, ‘causally self-referential’. The basic idea here is that in cases
of veridical perception, we are presented with the very objects, featureinstances, or states-of-afairs that cause our perceptual experience as of them.
And indeed, it is very natural to see the causal self-referential character of all
perception as a relexive informational content that is a constitutive feature
of perceptual signals. But we can also maintain the intuitive picture that the
subject-matter or incremental informational content of perceptual experiences is exhausted by the objects, feature-instances, or states-of-afairs, if
any, that constitute their conditions of satisfaction. In other words, we can
straightforwardly maintain that a perceptual experience is veridical if and
only if the particular things experienced are the way the perceptual experience represents them as being.
Most importantly, thinking of perception in terms of its informational
content also helps explain how it is that we can have non-veridical perceptual
experiences or hallucinations, ones that have a qualitative ‘common factor’
with (or subjectively indistinguishable diference from) veridical cases. This
is because a perceptual signal has its particular informational content only
relative to constraints and circumstances to which we are attuned, which suggests a very natural explanation of why, in cases of non-veridical or perceptual
experience, the states of our perceptual systems do not carry the information
we take them to. Indeed, the basic idea here is that in such non-veridical or
hallucinatory cases, we (or our perceptual systems) are attuned to false con22 Searle, in draft: pp. 19–25.
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straints on how the world works and we ind ourselves in circumstances that
bring out this fact. In cases of perceptual error and illusion, the conditions
under which we perceive some object, feature-instance, or state-of-afairs are
such that we have a perceptual experience whose qualitative character and
informational content do not accord with the actual information that the occurrence of the perceptual state carries. Hence, we take the perceived object,
feature-instance, or state-of-afairs to be other than it in fact is. Moreover,
in cases of hallucination, we ind ourselves in such abnormal circumstances
that we have the relevant perceptual experience without there being any sort
of corresponding object, feature-instance, or state-of-afairs required for the
satisfaction of its veridicality conditions.23
In fact, once we recognize that the singular content of perceptual experience is incremental informational content, we have a natural explanation for
why our perceptual experiences are error-prone in the irst place. For like
many information-harnessing devices, we needn’t be attuned to particularly
accurate constraints and circumstances for our perceptual faculties to perform
well enough at helping us pick up information about the environment suitable for guiding successful actions. All that is required is that our perceptual
faculties work well enough in the circumstances in which we most often ind
ourselves, and there is suicient reason to suppose that they do.
In any event, my account of the informational content of perception provides an intuitive explanation about why there at least seems to be a common
factor between the veridical and non veridical cases of perceptual experience.
The reason is that many of the possible errors can occur even if we have
exactly the same signal. For, as I’ve just noted, the veridicality of a particular
informational signal depends on factors external to it, such as background
constraints and circumstances. Hence, if the occurrence of the signal itself
suices for the instantiation of the qualitative character of our perceptual
experience, as I believe is the case, then we have a straightforward explanation for why there is a qualitative ‘common factor’. Indeed, the common
factor in such cases just is the occurrence of one and the same informational
content-bearing signal.
23 Obviously, this story is extremely over-simpliied. For instance, we are also attuned to the
fact that our perceptual faculties are fallible, which explains why we do not take visual
blackouts, double-vision, blurry vision, etc., to be qualitative features of the world. Indeed,
we generally take such perceptual experiences to provide information about the improper
functioning of our own perceptual faculties rather than information or misinformation
about the world.
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5 Two Kinds of Awareness
Now that we have at least a sketch of a framework of the informational character of perception, I want to consider how we might be internalists about
the qualitative character of perceptual experience without being indirect
realists about perception. My central claim in this section will be that given
a proper informational framework for thinking about perception, we can accomplish this, provided that we are careful to distinguish between intentional
and phenomenal awareness. I will also return to the question of how I see
the resulting theory of perception as itting into a broader Russell-inspired
account of acquaintance. What I hope to show, at least in outline, is that we
can indeed have an adequate model of perceptual acquaintance without
adopting naïve realism or disjunctivism.
In fact, I think we took the irst steps towards developing an adequate
model of perceptual acquaintance in the previous section when we made
the distinction between signals and their informational contents. Indeed,
what we saw was that we can usefully think of perceptual experiences as
signals whose incremental informational content is directly about the external objects, if any, for which they have the job of standing, relative to appropriate constraints and circumstances. Thus, we can respect the naïve and
direct realist insight that our perceptions are directly of, or about, external
objects, feature-instances, and states-of-afairs. On the other hand, we can
still suppose that the qualitative characters of our perceptual experiences are
identical with, or supervene on, intrinsic features of the signal itself. In fact,
I think that one of the crucial insights of Perry’s theory of information and
informational content is that it explains why information is useful in the
irst place. For recall that, fundamentally, it is what one state or aspect of the
world says about another state or aspect of the world, relative to constraints
and circumstances, in virtue of the properties it (i.e. the signal) has. Indeed,
the structure of information and informational content is important because
it allows us to get at the properties of an accessible signal in order to acquire
information about distal state-of-afairs to which we do not have as ready
access.
Of course, we have to be extremely careful here. Unlike in many cases in
which information is useful, we don’t literally look at, or perceive, the signals
in the case of our own perceptual experiences. Indeed, supposing that we
do so is exactly the mistake that the indirect realist about perception makes.
Instead, we simply have the perceptual experiences, and we are, in a relevant
sense, aware of (or at least sensitive to) the qualitative features they possess
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just by having them.24 Moreover, it is in virtue of having, and thereby being
aware of, such perceptual experiences that, in the right conditions, we directly
and literally perceive external objects, feature-instances, or states-of-afairs,
without any intermediate inference.
But how can we be aware of the qualitative features of our experiential
states just by having them? Unfortunately, I cannot hope to answer such a
deep question here. What I will say is that whatever metaphysical account
of consciousness we ofer, it must ultimately account for this somewhat remarkable fact. Indeed, I take it as a datum to be explained that we have
experiential states where the having is, in the relevant non-relective and
non-propositional sense, the knowing.25
This brings us to John Searle’s crucial distinction between the two senses
of ‘of ’ that he thinks are relevant to our perceptual awareness. According to
Searle, there are two fundamentally diferent kinds of awareness relation,
both of which are marked in English by the preposition ‘of ’.The irst is what
he calls ‘the ‘of ’ of constitution’, and the second is what he calls ‘the ‘of ’ of
intentionality’.26 To see what the distinction between these two relations are,
Searle asks us to consider the following two cases:
(1) When I feel my pain, I am aware of, or conscious of, the pain.
(2) When I see something red, I am aware of, or conscious of, the instance
of red.
What Searle hopes we’ll recognize is that the awareness relations involved in
(1) and (2) are quite diferent. Intuitively, in the irst case the awareness of the
pain just is the pain, but in the second case, the awareness of the red is not
itself the instance of red.27 Rather, in the case of (2), the instance of red is the
24 I want to note that the locution “aware of ” is somewhat problematic for characterizing
the phenomenal awareness we enjoy simply in virtue of having a perceptual experience.
Indeed, the locution “aware of ” suggests intentional awareness, which is to be distinguished
from phenomenal awareness. Unfortunately, I lack a better locution.
25 Galen Strawson makes roughly the same point on page 286 of Strawson 2009.
26 Searle, in draft: 14. It is important to note that we do not have follow Searle’s somewhat
dubious semantic thesis about the English preposition ‘of ’ to agree with him that there is
a distinction between the two sorts of awareness involved in perceptual experience.
27 I think that there are perhaps two diferent ways of interpreting Searle’s important notion
of ‘the ‘of ’ of constitution’. First, we can follow him in holding that the awareness of pain,
for example, just is the pain. But second, we might instead hold that the awareness of pain
is numerically identical with our having the pain. In my opinion, it is quite natural to say
that when we have a perceptual experience, and are thereby aware of it, this just is the state
of sentience, and so I prefer the second interpretation of Searle’s notion. However, I think
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Donovan Wishon
intentional object of our (in this case) veridical awareness as of something
red; it is what our perceptual experience as of red is directed at, or about.28
Searle quickly characterizes his distinction as follows:
In the case of pain, the pain is identical with the awareness or the consciousness.
There aren’t two things, the pain and the awareness of the pain.That is what
I call the “of ” of constitution. In this case the awareness is constituted by the
thing that I am aware of. But that “of ” is diferent from the “of ” of intentionality. When I see a red object, I am indeed aware of red, but the awareness in this case is of the red in the red object. The red is not identical with
the awareness, the “of ” is the “of ” of intentionality (Searle, in draft: p. 13).
Indeed, Searle thinks that it is absolutely crucial that we do not confuse the
‘of ’ of constitution with the intentional relation we bear to objects, featureinstances, or states-of-afairs in perception. If one does so, he argues, then it
is far too easy to form the mistaken belief behind indirect realism that:
Intentionality consists invariably of some sort of representation, and the
subject who has the intentional state has some sort of [conscious] relation
to these representations [rather than to their intentional objects] (Searle, in
draft: p. 14.)
What’s more, he continues:
That is what forces the analogy between the intentional theory of perception and [the] idea that intentionality would be like reading a newspaper
about the real world. I think, frankly, this is quite an absurd conception of
intentionality of perception… [And] if you think that all intentionality is
a matter of [conscious] relation to a representation, that the object of the
intentionality is the representation or some element of it, and that on an
intentionalistic account the awareness in the awareness of a hallucination
must be the same kind of awareness as the awareness of an object in a veridical perception, then it will seem to you that an intentionalistic account of
perception involves a denial of naive realism (Searle, in draft: p. 15).29
In fact, Searle thinks that it is roughly this line of reasoning that forces one
into the false dilemma of choosing naïve realism or adopting some version of
indirect realism. However, Searle thinks that we shouldn’t be moved by this
either way of construing the ‘of ’ of constitution is compatible with our English usage of
‘aware of ’ and little turns on the issue.
28 I take it that Searle holds that in this second case, what we are aware of, in the sense of the
‘of ’ of constitution, is the qualitative character of the experience as of red.
29 Note: Searle himself uses the term ‘naïve realism’ in the same fashion as I use ‘direct realism’.
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argument, and that we won’t be, provided we distinguish between the ‘of ’ of
constitution and the ‘of ’ of intentionality.
One lesson we should take from Searle’s distinction is that there is a fundamental diference between what we might call ‘phenomenal awareness’ and
‘intentional awareness’. In the case of phenomenal awareness, we are nonrelectively and non-propositionally aware of the qualitative characters of our
experiential states simply in virtue of having them. In the case of intentional
awareness, on the other hand, we are aware of some state of the world in virtue
of being in some representational state that is directed at it. Like our phenomenal awareness, such intentional awareness of things needn’t be relective or
propositional. Indeed, the subject need only be attuned to the informational
content (and to relevant background constraints and circumstances) indicated
by the representational state. However, unlike in the case of phenomenal
awareness, intentional awareness can be relective and propositional for sophisticated concept-wielding subjects. In fact, sophisticated enough conceptwielding subjects can even direct their relective intentional awareness to
think about their own states of phenomenal awareness using higher-order
so-called ‘phenomenal concepts’ of them. The crucial point, however, is that
this intentional awareness of our conscious experiences is a further cognitive
achievement from our more basic phenomenal awareness of them.
Returning to the central theme of this paper, what I think these considerations show is that there are various kinds of acquaintance involved in our
conscious perception of things.
On one hand, in having a conscious perception, we are acquainted with the
perceptual experience itself. Our states of sentient awareness are in this sense
‘self-presenting’; we are phenomenally aware of them when we have them in
precisely the same way that non-linguistic sentient animals are aware of their
own conscious experiences when they have them. And on the other, in having a conscious perception, we are acquainted with the external intentional
objects, if any, of the perceptual experience. We are thereby presented with
the objects, feature-instances, or states-of-afairs, if any, of which it is a perception. This fact follows from the very informational character of perception.
Putting these two aspects together, we can say that conscious perception has
what we might call a “two-faced presentational character”; we are presented
in conscious perception both with the object of our perceptual experience,
if any, and with the subjective, qualitative character of the experience itself.
In saying this, we must be careful to note that for Russell, acquaintance
does not carry with it any commitment to dubious epistemic theses such as
the so-called ‘thesis of revelation’ or overly strong views about the ‘intimating’
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Donovan Wishon
character of the objects of our acquaintance.30 Though Russell holds that acquaintance presents us with its objects, he does not claim that we thereby have
an exhaustive presentation of the essential nature of that object, as the thesis
of revelation would maintain. Nor do we automatically acquire any knowledge of truths about a thing simply by being presented with it in experience.
Indeed, I think we should take Russell’s contention that knowledge of things
is logically independent of any knowledge of truths absolutely seriously.
This goes for the alleged ‘self-intimating’ character of our states of sentient
awareness. We simply do not know that we are having such-and-such experiences simply in virtue of having them, at least if what we have in mind is
relective, semantically-articulated knowledge-that. Again, this is not to say
that we sophisticated, concept-wielding adults don’t often think about them
using phenomenal concepts, because we certainly do. The point is that this
is a cognitive achievement above and beyond what acquaintance with our
experiences provides all by itself.31
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that once we recognize what I’ve called the “twofaced presentational character” of perceptual experience, we can be direct
realists about the content of perceptual experience and internalists about
its qualitative character. We can be direct realists because the informational
character of perceptual acquaintance puts us in direct experiential contact
with external objects, features, and states-of-afairs. And we can be qualia
internalists because of the special self-presenting character of the perceptual
signals that have such informational content about the world. What I hope
I have shown, at least in rough outline, is that we can have an adequate account of Russellian perceptual acquaintance without embracing problematic
theories of perception such as naïve realism, disjunctivism, or indirect realism.
30 I grant, however, that there are some unfortunate passages that suggest otherwise. See
Wishon, In draft A.
31 Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, I want to at least note that one consequence
of this view is that our phenomenal judgments are prone to error. Contrary to the opinions of many, I think this is a welcome consequence. For more on the relation between
acquaintance and phenomenal concepts, see chapter 5 of my dissertation.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank John Perry, Krista Lawlor, Mark Crimmins, Daginn
Føllesdal, David Beisecker, John Campbell, and John Searle for comments and
suggestions regarding earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank
my wife, Christy, for her unwavering support.
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