U
Uncertainty
Peter P. Wakker
Abstract
This article deals with individual decision
making under uncertainty (unknown probabilities). Risk (known probabilities) is not treated
as a separate case, but as a sub-case of uncertainty. Many results from risk naturally extend
to uncertainty. The Allais paradox, commonly
applied to risk, also reveals empirical deficiencies of expected utility for uncertainty. The
Ellsberg paradox reveals deviations from
expected utility in a relative, not an absolute,
sense, giving within-person comparisons: for
some events (ambiguous or otherwise) subjects
deviate more from expected utility than for
other events. Besides aversion, many other
attitudes towards ambiguity are empirically
relevant.
Keywords
Additive probabilities; Allais paradox; Allais,
M.; Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion; Ambiguity attitudes; Bayesian statistics; Bernoulli,
D.; Betweenness models; Concave utility; Convex analysis; Convex probability weighting;
Convex utility; Cumulative prospect theory;
De Finetti, B.; Decision theory; Decision
under risk; Disappointment aversion theory;
Ellsberg paradox; Existence of equilibria;
Expected utility; Gambling; Greenspan, A.;
Insurance; Kahneman, D.; Keynes, J. M.;
Knight, F.; Known probabilities; Likelihood;
Loss aversion; Moral hazard; Multiple
priors model; Neuroeconomics; Non-expected
utility; Objective probability; Pessimism;
Probabilistic risk attitudes; Probabilistic
sophistication; Probability; Prospect theory;
Ramsay, F.; Rank dependence; Rankdependent models; Rank-dependent utility;
Reference dependence; Revealed preference;
Risk; Risk aversion; Savage, L.; Sensitivity;
Separability; Source preference; State spaces;
Stochastic dominance; Subjective probability;
Sure-thing principle; Tversky, A.; Uncertainty;
Unknown probabilities; Wald, A.; Weighted
utility; Within-person comparison
JEL Classifications
D8
In most economic decisions where agents face
uncertainties, no probabilities are available. This
point was first emphasized by Keynes (1921) and
Knight (1921). It was recently reiterated by
Greenspan (2004, p. 38):
. . . how . . . the economy might respond to a monetary policy initiative may need to be drawn from
evidence about past behavior during a period only
# Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2018
Macmillan Publishers Ltd (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5
13970
roughly comparable to the current situation. . . . In
pursuing a risk-management approach to policy, we
must confront the fact that only a limited number of
risks can be quantified with any confidence.
Indeed, we often have no clear statistics available. Knight went so far as to call probabilities
unmeasurable in such cases. Soon after Knight’s
suggestion, Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1931), and
Savage (1954) showed that probabilities can be
defined in the absence of statistics after all, by
relating them to observable choice. For example,
P(E) = 0.5 can be derived from an observed
indifference between receiving a prize under
event E and receiving it under not-E (the complement to E). Although widely understood today,
the idea that something as intangible as a subjective degree of belief can be made observable
through choice behaviour, and can even be quantified precisely, was a major intellectual advance.
Ramsey, de Finetti and Savage assumed that
the agent, after having determined the probabilities subjectively (as required by some imposed
rationality axioms), proceeds as under expected
utility for given objective probabilities. The Allais
(1953) paradox (explained later) revealed a
descriptive difficulty: for known probabilities,
people often do not satisfy expected utility.
Hence, we need to generalize expected utility.
Another, more fundamental, difficulty was
revealed by the Ellsberg (1961) paradox (also
explained later): for unknown probabilities, people behave in ways that cannot be reconciled with
any assignment of subjective probabilities at all,
so that further generalizations are needed. (The
term ‘subjective probability’ always refers to
additive probabilities in this article.)
Despite the importance and prevalence of
unknown probabilities, understood since 1921,
and the impossibility of modelling these through
subjective probabilities, understood since
Ellsberg (1961), decision theorists continued to
confine their attention to decision under risk with
given probabilities until the late 1980s. Wald’s
(1950) multiple priors model did account for
unknown probabilities, but attracted little attention outside statistics.
Uncertainty
As a result of an idea of David Schmeidler
(1989, first version 1982), the situation changed
in the 1980s. Schmeidler introduced the first theoretically sound decision model for unknown
probabilities without subjective probabilities,
called rank-dependent utility or Choquet expected
utility. At the same time, Wald’s multiple priors
model was revived when Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) established its theoretical soundness; a
similar result was obtained independently by
Chateauneuf (1991, Theorem 2). These discoveries provided the basis for non-expected utility
with unknown probabilities that had been sorely
missing since 1921. Since the late 1980s, the table
has turned in decision theory. Nowadays, most
studies concern unknown probabilities. Gilboa
(2004) contains recent papers and applications.
This article concentrates on conceptual issues of
individual decisions in the possible absence of
known probabilities.
Theoretical studies of non-expected utility
have usually assumed risk aversion for known
probabilities (leading to concave utility and convex probability weighting), and ambiguity aversion for unknown probabilities (Camerer and
Weber 1992, section 2.3). These phenomena best
fit with the existence of equilibria and can be
handled using conventional tools of convex analysis (Mukerji and Tallon 2001). Empirically, however, a more complex fourfold pattern has been
found. For gains with moderate and high likelihoods, and for losses with low likelihoods, risk
aversion is prevalent indeed, but for gains with
low likelihoods and for losses with high likelihoods the opposite, risk seeking, is prevalent.
The fourfold pattern resolves the classical paradox of the coexistence of gambling and insurance, and leads, for instance, to new views on
insurance. Whereas all classical studies of insurance explain insurance purchasing through concave utility, empirical measurements of utility
have suggested that utility is not very concave
for losses, often exhibiting more convexity than
concavity (surveyed by Köbberling et al. 2006).
This finding is diametrically opposite to what has
been assumed throughout the insurance literature.
Uncertainty
13971
According to modern decision theories, insurance
is primarily driven by consumers’ overweighting
of small probabilities rather than by marginal
utility.
The fourfold pattern found for risk has similarly been found for unknown probabilities, and
usually to a more pronounced degree. Central qsts
in uncertainty today concern how to analyse not
only classical marginal utility but also new concepts such as probabilistic risk attitudes (how
people process known probabilities), loss aversion and reference dependence (the framing of
outcomes as gains and losses), and, further, states
of belief and decision attitudes regarding
unknown probabilities (‘ambiguity attitudes’).
We end this introduction with some notation
and definitions. Decision under uncertainty
concerns choices between prospects such as
(E1 : x1, . . . , En : xn), yielding outcome xj if
event Ej obtains, j = 1 , . . . , n. Outcomes are
monetary. The Ejs are events of which an agent
does not know for sure whether they will obtain,
such as who of n candidates will win an election.
The Ejs are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
No probabilities of the events need to be given.
Because the agent is uncertain about which event
obtains, he is uncertain about which outcome will
result from the prospect, and has to make decisions under uncertainty.
given for each event Ej. We can then write a
prospect as (p1 : x1, . . . , pn : xn), yielding xj
with probability pj , j = 1 , . . . , n. Empirical
violations of expected-value maximization
because of risk aversion (prospects being less
preferred than their expected value) led Bernoulli
P
(1738) to propose expected utility, nj¼1 pj U xj ,
to evaluate prospects, where U is the utility
function. Then risk aversion is equivalent to concavity of U.
Several authors have argued that it is intuitively
unsatisfactory that risk attitude be modelled through
the utility of money (Lopes 1987, p. 283). It would
be more satisfactory if risk attitude were also related
to the way people feel about probabilities. Economists often react very negatively to such arguments,
based as they are on introspection and having no
clear link to revealed preference. Arguments against
expected utility that are based on revealed preference were put forward by Allais (1953).
Figure 1 displays preferences commonly
found, with K denoting $1,000:
ð0:06 : 25K, 0:07 : 25K, 0:87 : 0Þ
≺ð0:06 : 75K, 0:07 : 0, 0:87 : 0Þ
andð0:06 : 25K, 0:87 : 25K, 0:07 : 25KÞ
ð0:06 : 75K, 0:87 : 25K, 0:07 : 0Þ:
Preference symbols , , ≺, ≼ and are as
usual. We denote the outcomes in a rank-ordered
manner, from best to worst. In Fig. 1a, people
usually prefer the ‘risky’ (r) prospect because the
high payment of 75 K is attractive. In Fig. 1b,
people usually prefer the ‘safe’ (s) certainty
of 25 K for sure. These preferences violate
expected utility because, after dropping the common (italicized) term 0.87 U (0) from the
Decision Under Risk and Non-expected
Utility Through Rank Dependence
Because risk is a special and simple subcase of
uncertainty (as explained later), this chapter on
uncertainty begins with a discussion of decision
under risk, where the probability pj = P(Ej) is
Uncertainty, Fig. 1 A
version of the Allais
paradox for risk
s
a
0.06
25K
0.07
25K
0.87
0
r
0.06
75K
0.07
0
0.87
0
Circles indicate ‘chance nodes’.
&
0.06
25K
s
0.87
25K
b
0.07
0
r
0.06
75K
0.87
25K
0.07
0
U
13972
expected-utility inequality for Fig. 1a and
dropping the common term 0.87 U (25 K)
from the expected-utility inequality for Fig. 1b,
the two inequalities become the same. Hence,
under expected utility either both preferences
should be for the safe prospect or both preferences
should be for the risky one, and they cannot
switch as in Fig. 1. The special preference for
safety in the second choice (the certainty effect)
cannot be captured in terms of utility. Hence,
alternative, non-expected utility models have
been developed.
Based on the valuable intuition that risk attitude should have something to do with how people feel about probabilities, Quiggin (1982)
introduced rank-dependent utility theory for risk.
The same theory was discovered independently
for the broader and more subtle context of uncertainty by Schmeidler (1989, first version 1982), a
contribution that will be discussed later. A probability weighting function w: [0, 1] ! [0, 1] satisfies w(0) = 0 , w(1) = 1, and is strictly
increasing and continuous. It reflects the (in)sensitivity of people towards probability. Assume
that the outcomes of a prospect (p1 : x1, . . . , pn :
xn) are rank-ordered, x1 . . . xn . Then
its
Pn
rank-dependent utility (RDU) is
j¼1 pj U xj ,
where utility U is as before, and pj, the decision
weight of outcome xj, is w(p1 + + pj) –
w(p1 + + pj–1) (which is w(p1) for j = 1).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) adapted their
widely used original prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979) by incorporating the rank
dependence of Quiggin and Schmeidler. Prospect
theory generalizes rank dependence by allowing a
different treatment of gains from that of losses,
which is desirable for empirical purposes. In this
article on uncertainty, I focus on gains, in which
case prospect theory in its modern version, sometimes called cumulative prospect theory, coincides with RDU.
With rank dependence, we can capture psychological (mis)perceptions of unfavourable outcomes being more likely to arise, in agreement
with Lopes’s (1987) intuition. We can also capture
decision attitudes of deliberately paying more
attention to bad outcomes. An extreme example
of the latter pessimism concerns worst-case
Uncertainty
analysis, where all weight is given to the most
unfavourable outcome. Rank dependence can
explain the Allais paradox because the weight of
the 0.07 branch in Fig. 1b may exceed that in
Fig. 1a:
wð1Þ wð0:93Þ wð0:13Þ wð0:06Þ:
(1)
This inequality holds for w-functions that are
steeper near 1 than in the middle region, a shape
that is empirically prevailing indeed.
The following figures depict some probability
weighting functions. Figure 2a concerns expected
utility, and Fig. 2b a convex w, which means that
wðp þ r Þ wðr Þ
(2)
is increasing in r for all p 0. This is equivalent
to w0 being increasing, or w00 being positive.
Equation 1 illustrates this property. Equation 2
gives the decision weight of an outcome occurring
with probability p if there is an r probability of
better outcomes. Under convexity, outcomes
receive more weight as they are ranked worse
(that is, r is larger), reflecting pessimism. It implies
low evaluations of prospects relative to sure outcomes, enhancing risk aversion.
Empirical studies have found that usually
w(p) > p for small p, contrary to what convexity
would imply, and that w (p) < p only for moderate
and high probabilities p (inverse-S; Abdellaoui
2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000; Gonzalez and
Wu 1999; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), as in
Fig. 2c, d. It leads to extremity-oriented behaviour
with both best and worst outcomes overweighted.
The curves in Fig. 2c, d also satisfy Eq. 1 and also
accommodate the Allais paradox. They predict
risk seeking for prospects that with a small probability generate a high gain, such as in public
lotteries. The inverse-S shape suggests a cognitive
insensitivity to probability, generating insufficient
response to intermediate variations of probability
and then, as a consequence, overreactions to
changes from impossible to possible and from
possible to certain. These phenomena arise prior
to any ‘motivational’ (value-based) preference or
dispreference for risk. Extreme cases of such
behaviour are in Fig. 2e, f (where we relaxed the
continuity requirement for w).
Uncertainty
13973
Insensitivity or lack of discrimination
1
w( p)
Aversion or elevation
Uncertainty, Fig. 2 (a)
Expected utility: linearity;
(b) Aversion to risk:
convexity; (c) Insensitivity:
inverse-S (d) Prevailing
empirical finding; (e)
Extreme insensitivity; (f)
Extreme aversion and
insensitivity
0
p
i¼1
j¼1
pj f x j
½
½
e
w( p)
w( p)
w( p)
b
d
f
pi f ðxi ÞUðxi Þ
n
P
w( p)
c
a
Starmer (2000) surveyed non-expected utility
for risk. The main alternatives to the rankdependent models are the betweenness models
(Chew 1983; Dekel 1986), with Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion theory as an appealing special case. Betweenness models are less popular
today than the rank-dependent models. An important reason, besides their worse empirical performance (Starmer 2000), is that models alternative
to the rank-dependent ones did not provide concepts as intuitive as the sensitivity to probability/
information modelled through the probability
weighting w of the rank-dependent models. For
example, consider a popular special case of
betweenness, called weighted utility. The value
of a prospect is
n
P
1
w( p)
(3)
for a function f : R ! Rþ . This new parameter
f can, similar to rank dependence, capture pessimistic attitudes of overweighting bad outcomes
by assigning high values to bad outcomes. It,
however, applies to outcomes and not to probabilities. Therefore, it captures less extra variance
of the data in the presence of utility than w,
because utility also applies to outcomes. For
example, for fixed outcomes, Eq. 3 cannot capture
the varying sensitivity to small, intermediate and
high probabilities found empirically. Both pessimism and marginal utility are entirely specified by
the range of outcomes considered without regard to
the probabilities involved. It seems more interesting
if new concepts, besides marginal utility, concern
the probabilities and the state of information of
the decision maker rather than outcomes and their
valuation. This may explain the success of rankdependent theories and prospect theory.
Phenomena Under Uncertainty that
Naturally Extend Phenomena Under Risk
The first approach to deal with uncertainty was the
Bayesian approach, based on de Finetti (1931),
Ramsey (1931), and Savage (1954). It assumes
that people assign, as well as possible, subjective
probabilities P(Ej) to uncertain events Ej. They then
evaluate prospects (E1 : x1, . . . , En : xn) through
P
their (subjective) expected utility nj¼1 P Ej U xj .
This model was the basis of Bayesian statistics and
of much of the economics of uncertainty
(Greenspan 2004). The empirical measurement of
subjective probabilities has been studied extensively (Fishburn 1986; Manski 2004; McClelland
and Bolger 1994). We confine our attention in what
follows to models that have been introduced
since the mid-1980s, models that deviate from
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13974
Uncertainty
Bayesianism. To Bayesians (including this author)
such models are of interest for descriptive purposes.
Machina and Schmeidler (1992) characterized
probabilistic sophistication, where a decision
maker assigns subjective probabilities to events
with unknown probabilities and then proceeds as
for known probabilities. The decision maker may,
however, deviate from expected utility for known
probabilities, contrary to the Bayesian approach,
and Allais-type behaviour can be accommodated.
The difference between objective, exogenous
probabilities and subjective, endogenous probabilities is important. The former are stable, and
readily available for analyses, empirical tests and
communication in group decisions. The latter can
be volatile and can change at any time by mere
further thinking by the agent. For descriptive studies, subjective probabilities may become observable only after complex measurement procedures.
Hence, I prefer not to lump objective and subjective probabilities together into one category, as
has been done in several economic works
(Ellsberg 1961, p. 645; Epstein 1999). In this
article, the term risk refers exclusively to exogenous objective probabilities. Such probabilities
can be considered a limiting case of subjective
probabilities, in the same way as decision under
risk can be considered a limiting case of decision
under uncertainty (Greenspan 2004, pp. 36–7).
Under a differentiability assumption for state
spaces, Machina (2004) formalized this inpt.
Risk, while not occurring very frequently, is especially suited for applications of decision theory.
The Allais paradox is as relevant to uncertainty
as it is to risk (MacCrimmon and Larsson 1979,
pp. 364–5; Wu and Gonzalez 1999). Figure 3 presents a demonstration by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992, section 1.3). The analogy with Fig. 1 should
be apparent. The authors conducted the following
within-subjects experiment. Let d denote the difference between the closing value of the Dow
Uncertainty, Fig. 3 The
certainty effect (Allais
paradox) for uncertainty
s
a
H
25K
M
25K
L
0
r
Jones on the day of the experiment and on the
day after, where we consider the events H(igh): d
> 35, M(iddle): 35d 30, L(ow): 30 > d. The
total Dow Jones value at the time of the experiment
was about 3,000. The right prospect in Fig. 3b is
(H:75K, L:25K, M:0), and the other prospects are
denoted similarly. Of 156 money managers during
a workshop, 77% preferred the risky prospect r in
Fig. 3a, but 68% preferred the safe prospect s in
Fig. 3b. The majority preferences violate expected
utility, just as they do under risk: after dropping the
common terms P(L)U(0) and P(L)U(25K)
(P denotes subjective probabilities), the same
expected-utility inequality results for Fig. 3a as
for Fig. 3b. Hence, either both preferences should
be for the safe prospect, or both preferences should
be for the risky one, and they cannot switch as in
Fig. 3. This reasoning holds irrespective of what
the subjective probabilities P(H), P(M) and P
(L) are.(The condition of expected utility that is
falsified here, Savage’s (1954) ‘sure-thing principle’, can be related to the separability preference
condition of consumer theory.)
Schmeidler’s (1989) rank-dependent utility
(RDU) can accommodate the Allais paradox for
uncertainty. We consider a weighting function
(or non-additive probability or capacity) W that
assigns value 0 to the vacuous (empty) event ∅,
value 1 to the universal event, and satisfies monotonicity with respect to set-inclusion (if A
B then W(A) W(B)). Probabilities are special
cases of weighting functions that satisfy additivity: W(A [ B) = W(A) + W(B) for disjoint events
A and B. General weighting functions need not
satisfy additivity. Assume that the outcomes of a
prospect (E1 : x1, . . . , En : xn) are rank-ordered,
x1 . . . xn. Then theP prospect’s
rankn
dependent utility (RDU) is
j¼1 pj U xj where
utility U is as before, and pj, the decision weight of
outcome xj, is W(E1 [ . . . [ Ej) W(E1 [ . . .
[ Ej 1)(p1 = W(E1)). The decision weight of xj
H
75K
M
0
L
0
&
H
25K
s
L
25K
b
M
25K
r
H
75K
L
25K
M
0
Uncertainty
13975
is the marginal W contribution of Ej to the event of
receiving a better outcome.
Quiggin’s RDU for risk is the special case with
probabilities pj = P(Ej) given for all events,
and W(Ej) = w(P(Ej)) with w the probability
weighting function. Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) improved their 1979 prospect theory not
only by avoiding violations of stochastic dominance, but also, and more importantly, by
extending their theory from risk to uncertainty,
by incorporating Schmeidler’s RDU.
Figure 3 can, just as in the case of risk, be
explained by a larger decision weight for the
M branches in Fig. 3b than in Fig. 3a:
convex W’s, implying low evaluations of prospects relative to sure outcomes.
Empirical studies have suggested that
weighting functions W for uncertainty exhibit patterns similar to Fig. 2d, with unlikely events overweighted rather than, as convexity would have it,
underweighted (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986;
Tversky and Fox 1995; Wu and Gonzalez 1999).
As under risk, we get extremity orientedness, with
best and worst outcomes overweighted and lack of
sensitivity towards intermediate outcomes
(Chateauneuf et al. 2005; Tversky and Wakker
1995).
W ð M [ H [ LÞ W ð H [ LÞ
W ðM [ HÞ W ðHÞ:
Phenomena for Uncertainty that Do Not
Show Up for Risk: The Ellsberg Paradox
(4)
This inequality occurs for W-functions that are
more sensitive to changes of events near the certain universal event M [ H [ L than for events of
moderate likelihood such as M [ H. Although
for uncertainty we cannot easily draw graphs of
W functions, their properties are natural analogs of
those depicted in Fig. 2a–f. W is convex if the
marginal W contribution of an event E to a disjoint
event R is increasing in R, that is,
W ð E [ RÞ W ð RÞ
(5)
is increasing in R (with respect to set inclusion) for
all E. This agrees with Eq. 4, where increasing
R from H to H [ L leads to a larger decision
weight for E = M. Our definition of convexity is
equivalent to other definitions in the literature
such as W(A [ B) + W(A \ B) W(A) + W(B).
(Take E = A – B, and compare R = A \ B with
the larger R =A.)
For probabilistic sophistication (W() = w(P
()), convexity of W is equivalent to convexity of
w under usual richness conditions, illustrating
once more the close similarity between risk and
uncertainty. Equation 5 gives the decision weight
of an outcome occurring under event E if better
outcomes occur under event R. Under convexity,
outcomes receive more weight as they are ranked
worse (that is, R is larger), reflecting pessimism.
Theoretical economic studies usually assume
Empirical studies have suggested that phenomena
found for risk hold for uncertainty as well, and do
so to a more pronounced degree (Fellner 1961,
p. 684; Kahn and Sarin 1988, p. 270; Kahneman
and Tversky 1979, p. 281), in particular regarding
the empirically prevailing inverse-S shape and its
extension to uncertainty (Abdellaoui et al. 2005;
Hogarth and Kunreuther 1989; Kilka and Weber
2001; Weber 1994, pp. 237–8). It is plausible, for
example that the absence of known probabilities
adds to the inability of people to sufficiently distinguish between various degrees of likelihood not
very close to impossibility and certainty. In such
cases, inverse-S shapes will be more pronounced
for uncertainty than for risk. This observation
entails a within-person comparison of attitudes for
different sources of uncertainty, and such comparisons are the main topic of this section.
For Ellsberg’s paradox, imagine an urn K with
a known composition of 50 red balls and 50 black
balls, and an ambiguous urn A with 100 red and
black balls in unknown proportion. A ball is
drawn at random from each urn, with Rk denoting
the event of a red ball from the known urn, and the
events Bk, Ra and Ba defined similarly. People
prefer to bet on the known urn rather than on the
ambiguous urn, and common preferences are:
ðBk : 100, Rk : 0Þ ðBa : 100, Ra : 0Þ
and ðBk : 0, Rk : 100Þ ðBa : 0, Ra : 100Þ:
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13976
Such preferences are also found if people
can themselves choose the colour to bet on so
that there is no reason for suspecting an
unfavourable composition of the unknown urn.
Under probabilistic sophistication with probability
measure P, the two preferences would imply
P(Bk) > P(Ba) and P(Rk) > P(Ra). However,
P(Bk) + P(Rk) = 1 = P(Ba) + P(Ra) yields a contradiction, because two big numbers cannot give
the same sum as two small numbers. Ellsberg’s
paradox consequently violates robabilistic sophistication and, a fortiori, expected utility. Keynes
(1921, p. 75) discussed the difference between the
above two urns before Ellsberg did, but did not put
forward the choice paradox and deviation from
probabilistic sophistication as Ellsberg did. We
now analyse the example assuming RDU.
In many studies of uncertainty, such as
Schmeidler (1989), expected utility is assumed
for risk, primarily for the sake of simplicity.
Then, W(Bk) = W(Rk) = 0.5 in the above example, with these W values reflecting objective probabilities. Under RDU, the above preferences
imply W(Ba) = W(Ra) < 0.5, in agreement with
convex (or eventwise dominance, or inverse-S;
for simplicity of presentation, I focus on convexity hereafter) weighting functions W. This finding
led to the widespread misunderstanding that it is
primarily the Ellsberg paradox that implies convex weighting functions for unknown probabilities, a condition that was sometimes called
‘ambiguity aversion’. I have argued above that it
is the Allais paradox, and not the Ellsberg paradox, that implies these conclusions, and I propose
another interpretation of the Ellsberg paradox
hereafter, following works by Amos Tversky in
the early 1990s.
First, it is more realistic not to commit to
expected utility under risk when studying uncertainty. Assume, therefore, that
W(Bk) = W(Rk) = w(P(Bk)) = w(P(Rk)) = w
(0.5) for a nonlinear probability weighting function. It follows from the Ellsberg paradox that
W(Ba) = W(Ra) < w(0.5). This suggests:
Hypothesis. In the Ellsberg paradox, the
weighting function is more convex for the
unknown urn than for the known urn.
Uncertainty
Thus, the Ellsberg paradox itself does not
speak to convexity in an absolute sense, and
does not claim convexity for known or for
unknown probabilities. It speaks to convexity in
a relative (within-person) sense, suggesting more
convexity for unknown probabilities than for
known probabilities. It is, for instance, possible
that the weighting function is concave, and not
convex, for both known and unknown probabilities, but is less concave (and thus more convex)
for the unknown probabilities (Wakker 2001, section 6; cf. Epstein 1999, pp. 589–90, or Ghirardato
and Marinacci 2002, example 25).
With information only about observed behaviour, and without additional information about the
compositions of the urns or the agent’s knowledge
thereof, we cannot conclude which of the urns is
ambiguous and which is not. It would then be
conceivable that urn K were ambiguous and urn
A were unambiguous, and that the agent satisfied
expected utility for A and was optimistic or ambiguity seeking (concave weighting function, Eq. 5
decreasing in R) for K, in full agreement with the
Ellsberg preferences. Which of the urns is ambiguous and which is not is based on extraneous
information, being our knowledge about the composition of the urns and about the agent’s
knowledge thereof. This point suggests that no
endogenous definition of (un)ambiguity is possible.
The Ellsberg paradox entails a comparison of
attitudes of one agent with respect to different
sources of uncertainty. It constitutes a withinagent comparison. Whereas the Allais paradox
concerns violations of expected utility in an absolute sense, the Ellsberg paradox concerns a relative
aspect of such violations, finding more convexity
(or eventwise dominance, or inverse-S) for the
unknown urn than for the known urn. Such a
phenomenon cannot show up if we study only
risk, because risk is essentially only one source of
uncertainty. Apart from some volatile psychological effects (Kirkpatrick and Epstein 1992; Piaget
and Inhelder 1975), it seems plausible that people
do not distinguish between different ways of generating objective known probabilities.
Uncertain events of particular kinds can be
grouped together into sources of uncertainty. Formally, let sources be particular algebras of events,
Uncertainty
which means that sources are closed under complementation and union, and contain the vacuous
and universal events. For example, source A may
concern the performance of the Dow Jones stock
index tomorrow, and source B the performance of
the Nikkei stock index tomorrow. Assume that A
from source designates the event that the Dow
Jones index goes up tomorrow, and B from source
B the event that the Nikkei index goes up tomorrow. If we prefer (A:100, not-A,0) to (B:100, notB:0), then this may be caused by a special source
preference for A over B, say, if A comprises less
ambiguity for us than B . However, it may also
occur simply because we think that event A is
more likely to occur than event B . To examine
ambiguity attitudes we have to find a way to
‘correct’ for differences in perceived levels of
likelihood.
One way to detect (strong) source preference
for A over B is to find an A -partition
(A1, . . . , An) and a B -partition (B1, . . . , Bn)
of the universal event such that for each j,
(Aj : 100, not Aj, 0) (Bj : 100, not B:j :
0) (Nehring 2001, definition 4; Tversky and Fox
1995; Tversky and Wakker 1995). Because both
partitions span the whole universal event, we cannot have stronger belief in every Aj than Bj (under
some plausible assumptions about beliefs), and
hence there must be a preference for dealing
with A events beyond belief. Formally, the condition requires that a similar preference of B over
A is never detected. The Ellsberg paradox is a
special case of this procedure.
Under the above approach to source preference, there is a special role for probabilistic
sophistication. For a source A for which not
some of its events are more ambiguous than
others, it is plausible that A exhibits source
indifference with respect to itself. This condition
can be seen to amount to the additivity axiom of
qualitative probability (if A1 is as likely as A3, and
A2 is as likely as A4, then A1 [ A2 is as likely as
A3 [ A4 whenever A1 \ A2 = A3 \ A4 = ∅),
which, under sufficient richness, implies probabilistic sophistication for A under RDU, and does
so in general (without RDU assumed) under an
extra dominance condition (Fishburn 1986; Sarin
and Wakker 2000). The condition also comprises
13977
source sensitivity (Tversky and Wakker 1995).
Probabilistic sophistication, then, entails a uniform degree of ambiguity of a source.
In theoretical economic studies it has usually
been assumed that people are averse to ambiguity,
corresponding with convex weighting functions.
Empirical studies, mostly by psychologists, have
suggested a more varied pattern, where different
sources of ambiguity can arouse all kinds of emotions. For example, Tversky and Fox (1995)
found that basketball fans exhibit source preference for ambiguous uncertain events related to
basketball over events with known probabilities,
which entails ambiguity seeking. This finding is
not surprising in an empirical sense, but its conceptual implication is important: attitudes towards
ambiguity depend on many ad hoc emotional
aspects, such as a general aversion to deliberate
secrecy about compositions of urns, or a general
liking of basketball. Uncertainty is a large
domain, and fewer regularities can be expected
to hold universally for uncertainty than for risk, in
the same way as fewer regularities will hold universally for the utility of non-monetary outcomes
(hours of listening to music, amounts of milk to be
drunk, life duration, and so on) than for the utility
of monetary outcomes. It means that there is much
yet to be discovered about uncertainty.
Models for Uncertainty Other Than
Rank-Dependence
Multiple Priors
An interesting model of ambiguity by Jaffray
(1989), with a separation of ambiguity beliefs
and ambiguity attitudes, unfortunately has
received little attention as yet. A surprising case
of unknown probabilities can arise when the
expected utility model perfectly well describes
behaviour, but utility is state-dependent. The
(im) possibility of defining probability in such
cases has been widely discussed (Drèze 1987;
Grant and Karni 2005; Nau 2006).
The most popular alternative to Schmeidler’s
RDU is the multiple priors model introduced by
Wald (1950). It assumes a set P of probability
measures plus a utility function U, and evaluates
U
13978
each prospect through its minimal expected utility
with respect to the probability distributions
contained in P. The model has an overlap with
RDU: if W is convex, then RDU is the minimal
expected utility over P where P is the CORE of
W, that is, the set of probability measures that
eventwise dominate W. Drèze (1961, 1987) independently developed a remarkable analog of the
multiple priors model, where the maximal
expected utility is taken over P, and P reflects
moral hazard instead of ambiguity. Drèze also
provided a preference foundation. Similar functionals appear in studies of robustness against
model misspecification in macroeconomics
(Hansen and Sargent 2001).
Variations of multiple priors, combining pessimism and optimism, employ convex combinations of the expected utility minimized over P
and the expected utility maximized over P
(Ghirardato et al. 2004, proposition 19). Such
models can account for extremity orientedness,
as with inverse-S weighting functions and RDU.
Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) proposed a similar
model where a prospect is evaluated through a
convex combination of the minimal and maximal
utility of its outcomes (corresponding with P
being the set of all probability measures). This
includes maximin and maximax as special cases.
Their approach entails a level of ambiguity so
extreme that no levels of belief other than ‘sureto-happen’, ‘sure-not-to-happen’ and ‘don’t
know’ play a role, similar to Fig. 2e, f, and
suggesting a three-valued logic. Other non-beliefbased approaches, including minimax regret, are
in Manski (2000) and Savage (1954), with a survey in Barberà et al. (2004).
Other authors proposed models where for each
single event a separate interval of probability
values is specified (Budescu and Wallsten 1987;
Kyburg 1983; Manski 2004). Such intervalprobability models are mathematically different
from multiple priors because there is no unique
relation between sets of probability measures over
the whole event space and intervals of probabilities separately for each event. The latter models
are more tractable than multiple priors because
probability intervals for some relevant event are
easier to specify than probability measures over
Uncertainty
the whole space, but these models did not receive
a preference foundation and never became popular in economics. Similar models of imprecise
probabilities received attention in the statistics
field (Walley 1991).
Wald’s multiple priors model did receive a preference axiomatization (Gilboa and Schmeidler
1989), and consequently became the most popular
alternative to RDU for unknown probabilities. The
evaluating formula is easier to understand at first
than RDU. The flexibility of not having to specify
precisely what ‘the’ probability measure is, while
usually perceived as an advantage at first acquaintance, can turn into a disadvantage when applying
the model. We then have to specify exactly what
‘the’ set of probability distributions is, which is
more complex than exactly specifying only one
probability measure (cf. Lindley 1996).
The simple distinction between probability
measures that are either possible (contained in
P ) or impossible (not contained in P ), on the
one hand adds to the tractability of the model, but
on the other hand cannot capture cognitive states
where different probability measures are plausible
to different degrees. To the best of my knowledge,
the multiple priors model cannot yet be used in
quantitative empirical measurements today, and
there are no empirical assessments of sets of priors
available in the literature to date. Multiple priors
are, however, well suited for general theoretical
analyses where only general properties of the
model are needed. Such analyses are considered
in many theoretical economic studies, where the
multiple priors model is very useful.
The multiple priors model does not allow deviations from expected utility under risk, and a
desirable extension would obviously be to combine the model with non-expected utility for risk.
Promising directions for resolving the difficulties
of the multiple priors model are being explored
today (Maccheroni et al. 2005).
Model-Free Approaches to Ambiguity
Dekel et al. (2001) considered models where outcomes of prospects are observed but the state
space has not been completely specified, as relevant to incomplete contracts. Similar approaches
with ambiguity about the underlying states and
Uncertainty
events appeared in psychology in repeated-choice
experiments by Hertwig et al. (2003), and in support theory (Tversky and Koehler 1994). This
section discusses two advanced attempts to define
ambiguity in a model-free way that have received
much attention in the economic literature.
In a deep paper, Epstein (1999) initiated one
such approach, continued in Epstein and Zhang
(2001). Epstein sought to avoid any use of known
probabilities and tried to endogenize (un)ambiguity
and the use of probabilities. (He often used the term
uncertainty as equivalent to ambiguity.) For example, he did not define risk neutrality with respect to
known probabilities, as we did above, but with
respect to subjective probabilities derived from
preferences as in probabilistic sophistication
(Epstein 1999, Eq. 2). He qualified probabilistic
sophistication as ambiguity neutrality (not uniformity as done above). Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002) used another approach that is similar to
Epstein’s. They identified absence of ambiguity
not with probabilistic sophistication, as did Epstein,
but, more restrictively, with expected utility.
The above authors defined an agent as ambiguity averse if there exists another, hypothetical,
agent who behaves the same way for unambiguous events, but who is ambiguity neutral for
ambiguous events, and such that the real agent
has a stronger preference than the hypothetical
agent for sure outcomes (or unambiguous prospects, but these can be replaced by their certainty
equivalents) over ambiguous prospects. This definition concerns traditional between-agent withinsource comparisons as in Yaari (1969). The stronger preferences for certainty are, under rankdependent models, equivalent to eventwise dominance of weighting functions, leading to nonemptiness of the CORE (Epstein 1999, lemma
3.4; Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002, corollary
13). These definitions of ambiguity aversion are
not very tractable because of the ‘there exists’
clause. It is difficult to establish which ambiguity
neutral agent to take for the comparisons. To
mitigate this problem, Epstein 1999, section 4)
proposed eventwise derivatives as models of
local probabilistic sophistication. Such derivatives exist only for continua of events with a linear
structure, and are difficult to elicit. They serve
13979
their purpose only under restrictive circumstances
(ambiguity aversion throughout plus constancy of
the local derivative, called coherence; see
Epstein’s Theorem 4.3).
In both above approaches, ambiguity and ambiguity aversion are inextricably linked, making it
hard to model attitudes towards ambiguity other
than aversion or seeking (such other attitudes
include insensitivity), or to distinguish between
ambiguity-neutrality or -absence (Epstein 1999,
p. 584, 1st para; Epstein and Zhang 2001, p. 283;
Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002, p. 256, 2nd para).
Both approaches have difficulties distinguishing
between the two Ellsberg urns. Each urn in isolation can be taken as probabilistically sophisticated
with, in our inpt, a uniform degree of ambiguity,
and Epstein’s definition cannot distinguish which
of these is ambiguity neutral (cf. Ghirardato and
Marinacci 2002, middle of p. 281). Ghirardato and
Marinacci’s definition does so, but only because it
selects expected utility (and the urn generating
such preferences) as the only ambiguity-neutral
version of probabilistic sophistication. Any other
form of probabilistic sophistication, that is, any
non-expected utility behaviour under risk, is
then either mismodelled as ambiguity attitude
(Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002, pp. 256–7), or
must be assumed not to exist.
We next discuss in more detail a definition of
(un) ambiguity by Epstein and Zhang (2001),
whose aim was to make (un)ambiguity endogenously observable by expressing it directly in
terms of a preference condition. They called an
event E unambiguous if
ðE : c, E2 : g, E3 : b, E4 : x4 , . . . , En : xn Þ
ðE : c, E2 : b, E3 : g; E4 : x4 , . . . , En : xn Þ
implies ðE : c0 , E2 : g, E3 : b; E4 : x4 , . . . , En : xn Þ
ðE : c0 , E2 : b; E3 : g, E4 : x4 , . . . , En : xn Þ
(6)
for all partitions E2 , . . . , En of not-E, and all
outcomes c, c0 , x4 , . . . , xn . . . , g b,
with a similar condition imposed on not-E. In
words, changing a common outcome c into another
common outcome c0 under E does not affect preference, but this is imposed only if the preference
concerns nothing other than to which event (E2 or
U
13980
E3) a good outcome g is to be allocated instead of a
worse outcome b. Together with some other
axioms, Eq. 6 implies that probabilistic sophistication holds on the set of events satisfying this condition, which in the interpretation of the authors
designates absence of ambiguity (rather than uniformity). As we will see next, it is not clear why
Eq. 6 would capture the absence of ambiguity.
Example Assume that events are subsets of
[0,1), E = [0, 0.5), not – E = [0.5, 1), and E has
unknown probability p. Every subset A of E has
probability 2pl(A) (l is the usual Lebesgue measure, that is, the uniform distribution over [0,1))
and every subset B of not-E has probability
2(1 – p)l(B). Then it seems plausible that event
E and its complement not-E are ambiguous, but
conditional on these events (‘within them’) we
have probabilistic sophistication with respect to
the conditional Lebesgue measure and without
any ambiguity. In Schmeidler (1989), the ambiguous events E and not-E are called horse events,
and the unambiguous events conditional on them
are called roulette events. Yet, according to Eq. 6,
events E and not-E themselves are unambiguous,
both preferences in Eq. 6 being determined by
whether l (E2) exceeds l (E3).
In the example, the definition in Eq. 6 erroneously ascribes the unambiguity that holds for events
conditional on E, so ‘within E’, to E as a whole.
Similar examples can be devised where E and not-E
themselves are unambiguous, there is ‘nonuniform’ ambiguity conditional on E, this ambiguity is influenced by outcomes conditional on not-E
through non-separable interactions typical of nonexpected utility, and Eq. 6 erroneously ascribes the
ambiguity that holds within E to E as a whole.
A further difficulty with Eq. 6 is that it is not
violated in the Ellsberg example with urns A and
K as above (nor if the uncertainty regarding each
urn is extended to a ‘uniform’ continuum as in
Example 5.8ii of Abdellaoui and Wakker 2005),
and cannot detect which of the urns is ambiguous.
The probabilistic sophistication that is obtained in
Epstein and Zhang (2001, Theorem 5.2) for events
satisfying Eq. 6, and that rules out the two-urn
Ellsberg paradox and its continuous extension of
Abdellaoui and Wakker (2005), is mostly driven by
Uncertainty
their Axioms 4 and 6 (the latter is not satisfied by
all rank-dependent utility maximizers contrary to
the authors’ claim at the end of their section 4; their
footnote 18 is incorrect) and the necessity to consider also intersections of different-urn events (see
their Appendix E). This imposes, in my terminology, a uniformity of ambiguity over the events
satisfying Eq. 6 that, rather than Eq. 6 itself, rules
out the above counterexs.
Multi-stage Approaches to Ambiguity
Several authors have considered two-stage
approaches with intersections of first-stage events
Ai, i = 1, ,‘ and second-stage events Kj,
i = 1, ,k, so that n =‘k events AiKj result, and
‘k
prospects Ai K j : xij i¼1j¼1 are considered. It can
be imagined that in a first stage it is determined
which event Ai obtains, and then in a second stage,
conditional on Ai, which event Kj obtains. Many
authors considered such two-stage models with
probabilities given for the events in both stages,
the probabilities of the first stage interpreted as
ambiguity about the probabilities of the second
stage, and non-Bayesian evaluations used (Levi
1980; Segal 1990; Yates and Zukowski 1976).
Other authors considered representations
‘
X
i¼1
k
X
P K j U xij
QðAi Þf
j¼1
!
(7)
for probability measures P and Q, a utility function U, and an increasing transformation f. For f
the identity or, equivalently, f linear, traditional
expected utility with backwards induction results.
Nonlinear f’s give new models. Kreps and
Porteus (1979) considered Eq. 7 for intertemporal
choice, interpreting nonlinear f’s as nonneutrality towards the timing of the resolution of
uncertainty. Ergin and Gul (2004) and Nau (2006)
reinterpreted the formula, where now the secondstage events are from a source of different ambiguity than the first-stage events. A concave f, for
instance, suggests stronger preference for certainty, and more ambiguity aversion, for the firststage uncertainty than for the second.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) considered cases where
the decomposition into A- and K-events is
Uncertainty
endogenous rather than exogenous. This approach
greatly enlarges the scope of application, but their
second-order acts, that is, prospects with outcomes contingent on aspects of preferences, are
hard to implement or observe if those aspects
cannot be related to exogenous observables.
Equation 7 has a drawback similar to Eq. 3. All
extra mileage is to come from the outcomes, to
which also utility applies, so that there will not be
a great improvement in descriptive performance
or new concepts to be developed.
Conclusion
The Allais paradox reveals violations of expected
utility in an absolute sense, leading to convex or
inverse-S weighting functions for risk and, more
generally, for uncertainty. The Ellsberg paradox
reveals deviations from expected utility in a relative sense, showing that an agent can deviate more
from expected utility for one source of uncertainty
(say one with unknown probabilities) than for
another (say, one with known probabilities). It
demonstrates the importance of within-subject
between-source comparisons.
The most popular models for analysing uncertainty today are based on rank dependence, with
multiple priors a popular alternative in theoretical
studies. The most frequently studied phenomenon
is ambiguity aversion. Uncertainty is, however, a
rich empirical domain with a wide variety of phenomena, where ambiguity aversion and ambiguity
insensitivity (inverse-S) are prevailing but are
not universal patterns. The possibility of relating
the properties of weighting functions for uncertainty to cognitive inpts such as insensitivity to
likelihood-information makes RDU and prospect
theory well suited for links with other fields
such as psychology, artificial intelligence (Shafer
1976) and neuroeconomics (Camerer et al. 2004).
See Also
▶ Allais Paradox
▶ Allais, Maurice (Born 1911)
▶ Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion
▶ Bernoulli, Daniel (1700–1782)
13981
▶ Certainty Equivalence
▶ De Finetti, Bruno (1906–1985)
▶ Decision Theory in Econometrics
▶ Expected Utility Hypothesis
▶ Extremal Quantiles and Value-at-Risk
▶ Kahneman, Daniel (Born 1934)
▶ Non-expected Utility Theory
▶ Rational Behaviour
▶ Rational Expectations
▶ Revealed Preference Theory
▶ Risk
▶ Risk Aversion
▶ Savage, Leonard J. (Jimmie) (1917–1971)
▶ Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility Model
▶ Separability
▶ Statistical Decision Theory
▶ Stochastic Dominance
▶ Tversky, Amos (1937–1996)
▶ Utility
Han Bleichrodt, Chew Soo Hong, Edi Karni, Jacob Sagi
and Stefan Trautmann made useful comments.
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Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner
Abstract
This article reviews alternative approaches to
incorporating uncertainty in Walrasian models.
It begins with a sketch of the Arrow–Debreu
model of complete markets. An extension of
this framework allowing for economic agents
to have different information about the environment is followed by a critique. When markets are incomplete and trades take place
sequentially, several types of equilibrium concept arise according to the hypotheses we make
about the way traders form their expectations.
We present conditions for the existence of
equilibria for two such equilibrium concepts,
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and discuss the possible failure to attain
Paretian welfare optima.
Keywords
Arrow–Debreu model; Bounded rationality;
Budget constraints; Competitive equilibrium;
Conditional probability; Consumption possibility set; Equilibrium; Existence of competitive equilibrium; Expectation formation;
Expected utility hypothesis; General equilibrium; Incomplete information; Incomplete
markets; Indicative planning; Inside information; Limited liability; Moral hazard; Nonprice
information; Optimality of competitive equilibrium; Pareto efficiency; Perfect foresight;
Production
possibility
set;
Pseudoequilibrium; Rational expectations; Rational
expectations equilibrium; Risk; Sequential
trading; Steady state; Temporary (or momentary) equilibrium; Uncertainty; Walras’s law
JEL Classifications
D58
One of the notable intellectual achievements of
economic theory during the second half of the
20th century has been the rigorous elaboration of
the Walras–Pareto theory of value; that is, the
theory of the existence and optimality of competitive equilibrium. Although many economists and
mathematicians contributed to this development,
the resulting edifice owes so much to the
pioneering and influential work of Arrow and
Debreu that in this paper we shall refer to it as
the ‘Arrow–Debreu theory’. (For comprehensive
treatments, together with references to previous
work, see Debreu 1959; Arrow and Hahn 1971.)
The Arrow–Debreu theory was not originally
put forward for the case of uncertainty, but an
ingenious device introduced by Arrow (1953),
and further elaborated by Debreu (1953), enabled
the theory to be reinterpreted to cover the case of
uncertainty about the availability of resources and
about consumption and production possibilities.
(see Debreu 1959, Ch. 7, for a unified treatment of
time and uncertainty.)
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
Subsequent research has extended the
Arrow–Debreu theory to take account of (a) differences in information available to different
economic agents, and the ‘production’ of information, (b) the incompleteness of markets, and (c)
the sequential nature of markets. The consideration of these complications has stimulated the
developments of new concepts of equilibrium,
two of which will be elaborated in this article
under the headings: (a) equilibrium of plans,
prices, and price expectations (EPPPE) and (b)
rational expectations equilibrium (REE). The
exploration of these features of real-world markets has also made possible a general-equilibrium
analysis of money and securities markets, institutions about which the original Arrow–Debreu theory could provide only limited insights. It has also
led to a better understanding of the limits to the
ability of the ‘invisible hand’ in attaining a Pareto
optimal allocation of resources.
Review of the Arrow–Debreu Model of a
Complete Market for Present and Future
Contingent Delivery
In this section, we review the approach of Arrow
(1953) and Debreu (1959) to incorporating uncertainty about the environment into a Walrasian
model of competitive equilibrium. The basic
idea is that commodities are to be distinguished,
not only by their physical characteristics and by
the location and dates of their availability and/or
use, but also by the environmental event in which
they are made available and/or used. For example, ice cream made available (at a particular
location on a particular date) if the weather is hot
may be considered to be a different commodity
from the same kind of ice cream made available
(at the same location and date) if the weather is
cold. We are thus led to consider a list of ‘commodities’ that is greatly expanded by comparison
with the corresponding case of certainty about the
environment. The standard arguments of the theory of competitive equilibrium, applied to an
economy with this expanded list of commodities,
then require that we envisage a ‘price’ for each
commodity, the resulting set of price ratios
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
specifying the market rate of exchange between
each pair of commodities.
Just what institutions could, or do, effect such
exchanges is a matter of interpretation that is,
strictly speaking, outside the model. We shall
present one straightforward inpt, and then comment briefly on an alternative inpt.
First, however, it will be useful to give a more
precise account of concepts of environment and
event that we shall be employing. The description
of the ‘physical world’ is decomposed into
three sets of variables: (a) decision variables,
which are controlled (chosen) by economic
agents; (b) environmental variables, which are
not controlled by any economic agent; and (c) all
other variables, which are completely determined
(Possibly jointly) by decisions and environmental
variables. A state of the environment is a complete
specification (history) of the environmental variables from the beginning to the end of the economic system in qst. An event is a set of states; for
example, the event ‘the weather is hot in
New York on 1 July 1970’ is the set of all possible
histories of the environment in which the temperature in New York during the day of 1 July 1970
reaches a high of at least (say) 75 F. Granted that
we cannot know the future with certainty, at any
given date, there will be a family of elementary
observable (knowable) events, which can be
represented by a partition of the set of all possible
states (histories) into a family of mutually exclusive subsets. It is natural to assume that the partitions corresponding to successive dates are
successively finer, which represents the accumulation of information about the environment.
We shall imagine that a ‘market’ is organized
before the beginning of the physical history of the
economic system. An elementary contract in this
market will consist of the purchase (or sale) of
some specified number of units of a specified
commodity to be delivered at a specified location
and date, if and only if a specified elementary
event occurs. Payment for this purchase is to be
made now (at the beginning), in ‘units of account’,
at a specified price quoted for that commoditylocation-date-event combination. Delivery of
the commodity in more than one elementary
event is obtained by combining a suitable set of
13985
elementary contracts. For example, if delivery of
one quart of ice cream (at a specified location and
date) in hot weather costs $1.50 (now) and delivery of one-quart in non-hot weather costs $1.10,
then sure delivery of one quart (that is, whatever
the weather) costs $1.50 + $1.10 = $2.60.
There are two groups of economic agents in the
economy: producers and consumers. A producer
chooses a production plan, which determines his
inpt and/or output of each commodity at each date
in each elementary event (we shall henceforth
suppress explicit reference to location, it being
understood that the location is specified in the
term ‘commodity’). For a given list of prices, the
present value of a production plan is the sum of
the values of outputs minus the sum of the values
of inputs. Each producer is characterized by a set
of production plans that are (given the technological know-how) feasible for him: his production
possibility set.
A consumer chooses a consumption plan,
which specifies his consumption of each commodity at each date in each elementary event.
Each consumer is characterized by: (a) a set of
consumption plans that are (Physically, psychologically, and so on) feasible for him: his consumption possibility set; (b) preferences among
the alternative plans that are feasible for him; (c)
his endowment of physical resources, that is, a
specification of the quantity of each commodity,
for example, labour, at each date in each event,
with which he is exogenously endowed; and (d)
his shares in each producer, that is, the fraction of
the present value of each producer’s production
plan that will be credited to the consumer’s
account. (for any one producer, the sum of the
consumers’ shares is unity.) For given prices and
given production plans of all the producers, the
present net worth of a consumer is the total value
of his resources plus the total value of his shares of
the present values of producers’ production plans.
An equilibrium of the economy is a list of
prices, a set of production plans (one for each
producer), and a set of consumption plans (one
for each consumer), such that (a) each producer’s
plan has maximum present value in his production
possibility set; (b) each consumer’s plan maximizes his preferences within his consumption
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possibility set, subject to the additional (budget)
constraint that the present cost of his consumption
plan not exceed his present net worth; (c) for each
commodity at each date in each elementary event,
the total demand equals the total supply: that is,
the total planned consumption equals the sum of
the total resource endowments and the total
planned net output (where inputs are counted as
negative outputs).
Notice that (a) producers and consumers are
‘price takers’; (b) for given prices there is no
uncertainty about the present value of a production plan or of given resource endowments, nor
about the present cost of a consumption plan; (c)
therefore, for given prices and given producers’
plans, there is no uncertainty about a given consumer’s present net worth; (d) since a consumption plan may specify that, for a given commodity
at a given date, the quantity consumed is to vary
according to the event that actually occurs, a consumer’s preferences among plans will reflect not
only his ‘taste’ but also his subjective beliefs
about the likelihoods of different events and his
attitude towards risk (Savage 1954).
It follows that beliefs and attitudes towards risk
play no role in the assumed behaviour of producers. On the other hand, beliefs and attitudes
towards risk do play a role in the assumed behaviour of consumers, although for given prices and
production plans each consumer knows his
(single) budget constraint with certainty.
We shall call the model just described an
‘Arrow–Debreu’ economy. One can demonstrate,
under ‘standard conditions’: (a) the existence of
an equilibrium, (b) the Pareto optimality of an
equilibrium, and (c) that, roughly speaking,
every Pareto optimal choice of production and
consumption plans is an equilibrium relative to
some price system for some distribution of
resource endowments and shares (Debreu 1959).
In another direction of research initiated by
Debreu (1970), the focus was to identify properties (like local uniqueness, finiteness) of
Walrasian equilibria that were generic (typical or
robust in a given context or in a class models). In
what follows we shall use the term ‘generic’ informally and invite the reader to verify the exact
definition from the original reference.
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
In the above interpretation of the Arrow–
Debreu economy, all accounts are settled before
the history of the economy begins, and there is no
incentive to revise plans, reopen the markets or
trade in shares. There is an alternative inpt, which
will be of interest in connection with the rest of
this article, but which corresponds to exactly the
same formal model. In this second inpt, there is a
single commodity at each date – let us call it
‘gold’ – that is taken as a numeraire at that date.
A ‘price system’ has two parts: (1) for each date
and each elementary event at that date, there is a
price, to be paid in gold at the beginning date, for
one unit of gold to be delivered at the specified
date and event; (2) for each commodity, date, and
event at that date, a price, to be paid in gold at that
date and event, for one unit of the commodity to
be delivered at that same date and event. The first
part of the price system can be interpreted as
‘insurance premiums’ and the second part as
‘spot prices’ at the given date and event. The
insurance interpretation is to be made with some
reservation, however, since there is no real object
being insured and no limit to the amount of insurance that an individual may take out against the
occurrence of a given event. For this reason, the
first part of the price system might be better
interpreted as reflecting a combination of betting
odds and interest rates.
Although the second part of the price system
might be interpreted as spot prices, it would be a
mistake to think of the determination of the equilibrium values of these prices as being deferred in
real time to the dates to which they refer. The
definition of equilibrium requires that the agents
have access to the complete system of prices when
choosing their plans. In effect, this requires that at
the beginning of time all agents have available a
(common) forecast of the equilibrium spot prices
that will prevail at every future date and event.
Extension of the Arrow–Debreu Model to
the Case in Which Different Agents Have
Different Information
In an Arrow–Debreu economy, at any one date
each agent may have incomplete information
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
about the state of the environment, but all the
agents will have the same information. This last
assumption is not tenable if we are to take good
account of the effects of uncertainty in an economy. We shall now sketch how, by a simple reinpt
of the concepts of production possibility set and
consumption possibility set, we can extend the
theory of the Arrow–Debreu economy to allow
for differences in information among the economic agents.
For each date, the information that will be
available to a given agent at that date may be
characterized by a partition of the set of states of
the environment. To be consistent with our previous terminology, we should assume that each such
information partition must be at least as coarse as
the partition that describes the elementary events
at that date; that is, each set in the information
partition must contain a set in the elementary
event partition for the same date. For example,
each set in the elementary event partition at a
given date might specify the high temperature at
that date, whereas each set in a given agent’s
information partition might specify only whether
this temperature was higher than 75 F, or not.
An agent’s information restricts his set of feasible plans in the following manner. Suppose that
at a given date the agent knows only that the state
of the environment lies in a specified set A (one of
the sets in his information partition at that date),
and suppose (as would be typical) that the set
A contains several of the elementary events that
are in principle observable at that date. Then any
action that the agent takes at that date must necessarily be the same for all elementary events in
the set A. In particular, if the agent is a consumer,
then his consumption of any specified commodity
must be the same in all elementary events
contained in the information set A; if the agent is
a producer, then his input or output of any specified commodity must be the same for all events in
A. (We are assuming that consumers know what
they consume and producers what they produce at
any given date.)
Let us call the sequence of information partitions for a given agent his information structure
and let us say that this structure is fixed if it is
given independent of the actions of himself or any
13987
other agent. Furthermore, in the case of a fixed
information structure, let us say that a given plan
(consumption or production) is compatible with
that structure if it satisfies the conditions described
in the previous paragraph, at each date.
Suppose that consumption and production possibility sets of the Arrow–Debreu economy are
interpreted as characterizing, for each agent, those
plans that would be feasible if he had ‘full information’ (that is, if his information partition at each
date coincided with the elementary event partition
at that date). The set of feasible plans for any agent
with a fixed information structure can then be
obtained by restricting him to those plans in the
full information possibility set that are also compatible with his given information structure.
From this point on, all of the machinery of the
Arrow–Debreu economy (with some minor technical modifications) can be brought to bear on the
present model. In particular, we get a theory of
existence and optimality of competitive equilibrium relative to fixed structures of information
for the economic agents. We shall call this the
‘extended Arrow–Debreu economy’. We should
add that differences among information structures
of the agents may lead to a significant reduction of
the number of active markets. (for a fuller treatment, see Radner 1968, 1982.)
Choice of Information
There is no difficulty in principle in incorporating
the choice of information structure into the
extended Arrow–Debreu economy. We doubt,
however, that it is reasonable to assume that the
technological conditions for the acquisition and
use of information generally satisfy the hypotheses of the standard theorems on the existence and
optimality of competitive equilibrium.
The acquisition and use of information about
the environment typically require the expenditure
of goods and services, that is, of commodities. If
one production plan requires more information for
its implementation than another (that is, requires a
finer information partition at one or more dates),
then the list of (commodity) inputs should reflect
the increased inputs for information. In this
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manner a set of feasible production plans can
reflect the possibility of choice among alternative
information structures.
Unfortunately, the acquisition of information
often involves a ‘set-up cost’, that is, the resources
needed to obtain the information may be independent of the scale of the production process in
which the information is used. This set-up cost
will introduce a non-convexity in the production
possibility set, and thus one of the standard conditions in the theory of the Arrow–Debreu economy will not be satisfied (Radner 1968).
Even without set-up costs, there is a general
tendency for the value of information to exhibit
‘increasing returns’, at least at low levels, provided that the structure of information varies
smoothly with its cost. This striking phenomenon
leads to discontinuities in the demand for information. (for a precise statement, see Radner and
Stiglitz 1984).
Critique of the Extended Arrow–Debreu
Economy
If the Arrow–Debreu model is given a literal inpt,
then it clearly requires that the economic agents
possess capabilities of imagination and calculation that exceed reality by many orders of magnitude. Related to this is the observation that the
theory requires in principle a complete system of
insurance and futures markets, which system
appears to be too complex, detailed, and refined
to have practical significance. A further obstacle
to the achievement of a complete insurance market is the phenomenon of ‘moral hazard’ (Arrow
1965).
A second line of criticism is that the theory
does not take account of at least three important
institutional features of modern capitalist economies: money, the stock market, and active markets
at every date.
These two lines of criticism have an important
connection, which suggests how the Arrow–
Debreu theory might be improved. If, as in the
Arrow–Debreu model, each production plan has a
sure unambiguous present value at the beginning
of time, then consumers have no interest in trading
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
in shares, and there is no point in a stock market. If
all accounts can be settled at the beginning of
time, then there is no need for money during the
subsequent life of the economy; in any case, the
standard motives for holding money are not
applicable.
On the other hand, once we recognize explicitly that there is a sequence of markets, one for
each date, and not one of them complete (in the
Arrow–Debreu sense), then certain phenomena
and institutions not accounted for in the
Arrow–Debreu model become reasonable.
First, there is uncertainty about the prices that
will hold in future markets, as well as uncertainty
about the environment.
Second, producers do not have a clear-cut natural way of comparing net revenues at different
dates and states. Stockholders have an incentive to
establish a stock exchange since it enables them to
change the way their future revenues depend on
the states of the environment. As an alternative to
selling his shares in a particular enterprise, a
stockholder may try to influence the management
of the enterprise in order to make the production
plan conform better to his own subjective probabilities and attitude towards risk.
Third, consumers will typically not be able to
discount all of their ‘wealth’ at the beginning of
time, because (a) their shares of producers’ future
(uncertain) net revenues cannot be so discounted
and (b) they cannot discount all of their future
resource endowments. Consumers will be subject
to a sequence of budget constraints, one for each
date (rather than to a single budget constraint
relating present cost of his consumption plan to
present net worth, as in the Arrow–Debreu
economy).
Fourth, economic agents may have an incentive
to speculate on the prices in future markets, by
storing goods, hedging, and so on. Instead of storing goods, an agent may be interested in saving part
of one date’s income, in units of account, for use on
a subsequent date, if there is an institution that
makes this possible. There will thus be a demand
for ‘money’ in the form of demand deposits.
Fifth, agents will be interested in forecasting
the prices in markets at future dates. These prices
will be functions of both the state of the
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
environment and the decisions of (in principle, all)
economic agents up to the date in qst.
Sixth, if traders have different information at a
particular date, then the equilibrium prices at that
date will reflect the pooled information of the
traders, albeit in a possibly complicated way.
Hence, traders who have a good model of the
market process will be able to infer something
about other traders’ information from the market
prices.
Expectations and Equilibrium in a
Sequence of Markets
Consider now a sequence of markets at successive
dates. Suppose that no market at any one date is
complete in the Arrow–Debreu sense: that is, at
every date and for every commodity there will be
some future dates and some events at those future
dates for which it will not be possible to make
current contracts for future delivery contingent
on those events. In such a model, several types
of ‘equilibrium’ concept suggest themselves,
according to the hypotheses we make about the
way traders form their expectations.
Let us place ourselves at a particular date-event
pair; the excess supply correspondence at that
date-event pair reflects the traders’ information
about past prices and about the history of the
environment up through that date. If a given
trader’s excess supply correspondence is generated by preference satisfaction, then the relevant
preferences will be conditional upon the information available. If, furthermore, the trader’s preferences can be scaled in terms of utility and
subjective probability, and conform to the
expected utility hypothesis, then the relevant
probabilities are the conditional probabilities
given the available information. These conditional probabilities express the trader’s expectations regarding the future. Although a general
theoretical treatment of our problem does not necessarily require us to assume that traders’ preferences conform to the expected utility hypothesis,
it will be helpful in the following heuristic discussion to keep in mind this particular interpretation
of expectations.
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A trader’s expectations concern both future
environmental events and future prices. Regarding expectations about future environmental
events, there is no conceptual problem. According
to the expected utility hypothesis, each trader is
characterized by a subjective probability measure
on the set of complete histories of the environment. Since, by definition, the evolution of the
environment is exogenous, a trader’s conditional
subjective probability of a future event, given the
information to date, is well defined.
It is not so obvious how to proceed with regard
to traders’ expectations about future prices. We
shall contrast two possible approaches. In the first,
which we shall call the perfect foresight approach,
let us assume that the behaviour of traders is such
as to determine, for each complete history of the
environment, a unique corresponding sequence of
price systems, say ’t ðet Þ, where et is the particular
event at date t. If the ‘laws’ governing the economic system are known to all, then every trader
can calculate the sequence of functions ’t . In this
case, at any date–event pair a trader’s expectations
regarding future prices are well defined in terms of
the functions ’t and his conditional subjective
probability measures on histories of the environment, given his current information. Traders need
not agree on the probabilities of future environmental events, and therefore they need not agree
on the probability distribution of future prices, but
they must agree on which future prices are associated with which events. We shall call this last
type of agreement the condition of common price
expectation functions.
Thus, the perfect foresight approach implies
that, in equilibrium, traders have common price
expectation functions. These price expectation
functions indicate, for each date-event pair, what
the equilibrium price system would be in the
corresponding market at that date-event pair. Pursuing this line of thought, it follows that, in equilibrium, the traders would have strategies (Plans)
such that, if these strategies were carried out, the
markets would be cleared at each date–event pair.
Call such plans consistent. A set of common
price expectations and corresponding consistent
plans is called an equilibrium of plans, prices and
price expectations (EPPPE).
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This model of equilibrium can be extended to
cover the case in which different traders have different information, just as the Arrow–Debreu
model was so extended. In particular, one could
express in this way the hypothesis that a trader
cannot observe the individual preferences and
resource endowments of other traders. Indeed,
one can also introduce into the description of the
state of the environment variables that, for each
trader, represent his alternative hypotheses about
the ‘true laws’ of the economic system. In this way
the condition of common price expectation functions can lose much of its apparent restrictiveness.
The situation in which traders enter the market
with different nonprice information presents an
opportunity for agents to learn about the environment from prices, since current market prices
reflect, in a possibly complicated manner, the
nonprice information signals received by the various agents. To take an extreme example, the
‘inside information’ of a trader in a securities
market may lead him to bid up the price to a
level higher than it otherwise would have been.
In this case, an astute market observer might be
able to infer that an insider has obtained some
favourable information, just by careful observation of the price movement. More generally, an
economic agent who has a good understanding of
the market is in a position to use market prices to
make inferences about the (nonprice) information
received by other agents.
These inferences are derived, explicitly or
implicitly, from an individual’s ‘model’ of the
relationship between the nonprice information
received by market participants and the market
prices. On the other hand, the true relationship is
determined by the individual agents’ behaviour,
and hence by their individual models. Furthermore, economic agents have the opportunity to
revise their individual models in the light of observations and published data. Hence, there is a feedback from the true relationship to the individual
models. An equilibrium of this system, in which
the individual models are identical with the true
model, is called rational expectations equilibrium
(REE).
This concept of equilibrium is more subtle, of
course, than the ordinary concept of the
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
equilibrium of supply and demand. In a rational
expectations equilibrium, not only are prices
determined so as to equate supply and demand,
but individual economic agents correctly perceive
the true relationship between the nonprice information received by the market participants and the
resulting equilibrium market prices. This contrasts
with the ordinary concept of equilibrium in which
the agents respond to prices but do not attempt to
infer other agents’ nonprice information from the
actual market prices.
Although it is capable of describing a richer set
of institutions and behaviour than is the Arrow–
Debreu model, the perfect foresight approach is
contrary to the spirit of much of competitive market
theory in that it postulates that individual traders
must be able to forecast, in some sense, the equilibrium prices that will prevail in the future under
all alternative states of the environment. Even if
one grants the extenuating circumstances mentioned in previous paragraphs, this approach still
seems to require of the traders a capacity for imagination and computation far beyond what is
realistic. An equilibrium of plans and price expectations might be appropriate as a conceptualization
of the ideal goal of indicative planning, or of a
long-run steady state towards which the economy
might tend in a stationary environment.
These last considerations lead us in a different
direction, which we shall call the bounded rationality approach. This approach is much less well
defined, but expresses itself in terms of various
retreats from the hypothesis of ‘fully rational’
behaviour by traders, for example, by assuming
that the trader’s planning horizons are severely
limited, or that their expectation formation follows some simple rules-of-thumb. An example
of the bounded-rationality approach is the theory
of temporary (or momentary) equilibrium.
In the evolution of a sequence of temporary
equilibria, each agent’s expectations will be successively revised in the light of new information
about the environment and about current prices
(see Grandmont 1987). Therefore, the evolution
of the economy will depend upon the rules or
processes of expectation formation and revision
used by the agents. In particular, there might be
interesting conditions under which such a
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
sequence of temporary equilibria would converge,
in some sense, to a (stochastic) steady state. This
steady state, for example, a stationary probability
distribution of prices, would constitute a fourth
concept of equilibrium (see Bhattacharya and
Majumdar 2007).
Of the four concepts of equilibrium, the first
two are perhaps the closest in the spirit to the
Arrow–Debreu theory. How far do some of the
conclusions of the Arrow–Debreu theory extend
to this new situation? We turn now to this qst. The
literature subsequent to the publication of Radner
(1967, 1968, 1972) is already voluminous. The
interested reader is referred to the reviews by
Magill and Shafer (1991), Geanakopolos (1990),
Shafer (1998), and the books by Duffie (1988),
Magill and Quinzii (1996), LeRoy and
Werner (2001).
Equilibrium of Plans, Prices and Price
Expectations
Consider now the model of perfect-foresight equilibrium sketched above, in which the agents have
common information at every date–event pair (for
a precise description of the model, see Radner
1972). Three features of the situation are different
from the Arrow–Debreu model: (1) there is a
sequence of markets (or rather a ‘tree’ of markets),
one for each date–event pair, no one of which is
complete: (2) for each agent, there is a separate
budget constraint corresponding to each
date–event pair; (3) even if there is a natural
bound on consumption and production, there is
no single natural bound on the positions that
traders can take in the markets for securities, if
short sales are permitted, (4) there is no obvious
objective for each firm to pursue, since each firm’s
profit is defined only for each date-event pair.
To deal with points (3) and (4), consider the
following assumptions. Regarding (3), although
there is no single natural bound on traders’ positions, some bound is natural; for example, a commitment to deliver a quantity of a commodity
vastly greater than the total supply would not be
credible to moderately well-informed traders.
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Regarding (4), assume that the manager of each
firm has preferences on the sequence of net revenues that can be represented by a continuous,
strictly concave utility function. We elaborate on
variations these and other assumptions. In other
respects, we make the ‘standard’ assumptions of
the Arrow–Debreu model.
A Canonical Model of Sequential Trading
For ease of exposition we sketch a matchbox
model of sequential trading, variations and extensions of which have provided useful building
blocks in the formal development beyond
the Arrow–Debreu framework. Our exposition
draws upon the excellent introduction to the literature by Shafer (1998). There are two periods,
0 and 1, with S states of nature in period l. In
each| period, ‘ commodities are traded, with the
trades in period 1 being contingent on the realized
state s: thus, there, are L
‘(s + 1) contingent
commodities in the model (that is, the commodity
space is RL. We have I 2 agents, each characterized by a utility function ui (representing the preferences) and an endowment vector wi (in RL++, the
set of all strictly positive vectors in RL). Denote by
w = (w1,. . .,wI) the list of endowment vectors. The
utility functions are assumed to have the appropriate
smoothness and boundary conditions, strict monotonicity and strict quasiconcavity properties. Each
agent is supposed to know his own characteristics
and each observes the true state when it occurs in
period 1. We write a vector y in RL in the form
y = (y(0), y(1), . . ., y(s)) with each y(s) in R‘.
A spot price system is a vector p in RL++. See Magill
and Shafer (1991) for a more complete description
and examples.
We first review the Arrow–Debreu competitive
equilibrium in this model in which all trades and
prices are decided in period 0. We denote a list of
prices by P = (P(0), P(s)); P(0) is the vector of
prices for goods consumed in period 0, and
P(s)(s 1) is the price vector in period 0 for
delivery of goods in period 1 contingent on state
s being the realized state. The ith agent’s optimization problem is maximizex ui(x)
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subject to: P(0)(x(0) – wi(0)) + s 1P(s)
[x(s) – wi(s)] = 0.
Note that the agent faces a single budget constraint.
A
competitive equilibrium is a collection
ðxi Þi 1 ,P such that
(i) xi solves agent i’s optimization problem at P;
and
(ii) i[xi(s) – wi(s)] = 0 for s = 0, . . ., S.
To introduce the model of sequential trading,
we suppose there are J assets (or securities) which
are traded in period 0 and return dividends in
period 1. A unit of asset j will cost qj units of
account payable in 0 (q = (q1, . . ., qJ)) in RJ) and
return Vj(s) units of account in period 1 in state s.
An asset is called nominal if the returns are given
exogenously; it is called real if the return at state
s is the market value of a commodity vector, that
is, if Vj(s) = P(s)aj(s) for some vector aj(s) in R‘.
Of course, mixtures are possible, but, for our
matchbox model, we consider only the pure real
asset case or the pure nominal asset case. Denote
by V the S J matrix of returns that has in row s
and column j the dividend, Vj(s), of asset j in state
s, and let v(s) denote the vector of the returns in
state s. In the real asset case, the list of vectors
a = (aj(s)) parameterizes the asset structure, and
the returns matrix V(P) is a function of p. In the
nominal case the returns matrix V itself parametrizes the asset structure. Denote by Zj the amount
purchased of asset j, with z = (z1,. . .,zJ) being the
portfolio of assets. The amount zj may be positive
or negative; the assets are considered to be in zero
net supply.
We now apply to this model the concept of an
equilibrium of plans, prices, and price expectations.
At a spot price system p and an asset price system q,
define an agent’s optimization problem as
maximizex,z ui(x)
subject to: P(0) x(0) – wi(0) = qz,
P(s)(x(s) – wi (s)) = Sj vj (s)zj, s = 1, . . .., S.
We should stress that the agent faces a multiplicity of budget constraints. The first constraint
listed is that the net expenditure on goods plus the
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
cost of the portfolio of assets must sum to zero.
The constraints for s 1 indicate that if s is the
realized state in period 1, the net expenditure on
goods must equal the dividends of the asset portfolio. The purchase of the assets in period 0 and
their dividends in period 1 provides a means both
for transferring income between period 0 and
period 1 and for transferring income across the
potential states in period 1. Note that these constraints preclude the agent from planning bankruptcy in any state; implicit in the constraints is an
infinite penalty for bankruptcy.
An equilibrium of plans, prices, and price
expectations is a list ((xi, zi)I 1, (P, q)) such that:
(i) ðxi , zi Þsolves age|nt i’s optimization problem
at ðp,qÞ;
X
(ii)
ðxi ðsÞ wi ðsÞÞ ¼ 0, s ¼ 0, . . . , S; and
i
X
(iii)
zi ¼ 0:
i
The interpretation of the EPPPE concept is as
follows. In period 0, each agent i observes the
current spot prices pð0Þand the asset prices q, the
‘prices’. Then, based on ‘price expectations’
about spot prices in period 1, say pe(s), s = 1,
. . ., S, the agent solves the optimization problem,
forming the ‘plans’ ðxi , zi Þ. If it turns out that the
price expectations of all the agents are the same
and the common expectation pðsÞðs ¼ 1, . . . , SÞ is
such that, together with the observed prices pð0Þ
and q, all markets clear, then we are in an EPPPE
equilibrium.
The information requirements of this model are
quite strict. Each agent is fully informed in the
sense that he or she will be able to verify the true
state once it occurs. In addition, each agent knows
exactly the distribution of returns of each asset
across the states (that is, each agent knows each
aj(∙) in the real asset case and each vj(∙) in the
nominal case).
We now define completeness of markets in this
model. The formal definition is that, for any possible vector of units of account across the S states
of nature, an agent can form a portfolio of assets
that gives this distribution of returns. That is, for
any S-vector y of net expenditures on goods in
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
period 1(ys = P(s)(x(s) – w(s))), there is some
portfolio z such that y = Vz. In our model, for
the nominal case this is equivalent to the returns
matrix V having the rank S, so that the column
vectors of V span all of RS. In particular, there
must be J S assets. In the case of real assets the
rank of the returns matrix V(P) is a function of p,
and is thus endogenous to the model. However,
since V(∙) is linear in p, it has a ‘generic’ rank (see
Magill and Shafer 1990, for a precise formulation), and this rank is the maximum rank the
returns matrix can take on at any p. The real
asset structure is defined to be complete if this
generic rank is S. Again this requires J S. We
note for later reference that, if one imposes restrictions on the size of trades an agent can make in the
asset market, then these markets cannot be complete regardless of the number of assets, since by
restricting asset trades z we cannot in general
expect to express every vector in RS in the
form Vz.
A very useful implication of completeness will
now be stated. Suppose the market is complete.
Then given a competitive equilibrium ðxi Þi1 P
one can construct a canonical model
with an
appropriate EPPPE equilibrium ðxi zi Þi1 ,p,q :
it should be stressed that the allocation ðxi Þi1
is
the same. Conversely, given an EPPPE
ðxi zi Þi1 ,p, q :, one can construct a competitive
equilibrium ðxi Þi1 ,P . This ‘translation’ of the
frameworks has been exploited in the formal analysis, and has clear implications for the optimality
of an EPPPE (see Magill and Shafer 1991; Shafer
1998).
Radner (1972) demonstrated that an equilibrium exists in a more general model provided we
impose bounds on the size of trades in the asset
markets.
Existence Theorem 1 In the canonical model
described above, if each agent’s optimization
problem is modified with an additional constraint
of the form z b, then an equilibrium of plans,
prices, and price expectations exists.
Reasonable or not, the ‘ad hoc’ constraint in
this result posed an intellectual challenge for subsequent researchers. Moreover, as Hart (1975)
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discovered, without exogenous bounds on the
size of trades in the asset markets, equilibria may
fail to exist. The main characteristic of Hart’s
example is that the returns matrix changes rank
with p, and one approach has been to restrict
attention to asset structures that do not exhibit
this behaviour. Cass (2006) and Werner (1985)
showed that, if one restricts attention to pure nominal asset structures, then equilibria exist without
imposing lower bounds. Similarly, Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986) observed that, in the
real asset case, if all assets are denominated in
terms of the market value of a single good, then
the returns matrix V(P) will have constant rank
and – just as in the nominal case – equilibria
always exist. In general, then, we have the following theorem.
Existence Theorem 2 In the canonical model, if
the asset structure is such that the matrix of
returns has constant rank, then an equilibrium of
plans, prices, and price expectations exists.
To get some insights into the non-existence
issue, we provide a simple example. Consider
the Radner model with one state in period 1, one
asset, two consumers, and two goods, with
the following data. Endowments are wi(s) =
(1, 1) for s = 0, 1. Utility functions are
u1(x) = v1(x(0)) + v1(x(1)) with.
v1(x) = (1/3)‘nx1 + (2/3)‘nx2 for agent 1 and
u2(x) = u2(x(0)) + (1/2)v2(x(1)) with v2(x) = (2/3)‘
nx1 + (1/3)‘nx2 for agent 2. The competitive equilibrium prices can be easily computed in this loglinear economy; they are P1 (0) = 11/36,
P2(0) = 10/36, P1(1) = 7/36, and P2(1) = 8/36.
Now consider a Radner version of the model, with
one real asset given by a1 = (8, 7). The return
on this asset in state 1 is V = P1(1)8 – P2(1)7, so
investing in this asset is essentially a bet that the
relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2 is
greater than 7/8. Since there is one state and one
asset, this is the complete markets case. Note that
the 1 1 returns matrix drops rank precisely in the
case the relative price is 7/8 in state 1.
We now show that this model does not have an
EPPPE equilibrium. First, we try for an equilibrium with the return V 6¼ 0. If such an equilibrium
existed, it would have to coincide with the
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competitive equilibrium since V has rank 1, but in
the unique competitive equilibrium the period-1
ratio is 7/8, so V = 0, a contradiction. Second,
consider the possibility of an equilibrium with
V = 0. Then there would be no transfers of income
between periods 0 and 1, so the period-1 equilibrium would have to coincide with the static competitive equilibrium with the utility functions v1
and v2. But it is easy to see from the symmetry of
the functions and the equal endowments that the
relative price ratio in this case would be 1, and
thus V 6¼ 0, again a contradiction. Thus no equilibrium exists. Note, however, that this example is
not robust: alter the asset a small amount so that
V 6¼ 0 at the price ratio 7/8 and then the complete
markets case will work; or alter endowments or
utility parameters a little so that the period-1 price
ratio is no longer 7/8, and the complete markets
case again works.
This example gives a clue on how to proceed
for the existence problem with real assets when
markets are complete. One aims at generic results.
In this case, remember, V(P) has constant rank
S on an open set of full measure in the space of
prices. As we have mentioned above, an EPPPE at
which V(P) has rank S is equivalent to a competitive equilibrium with a complete set of contingent
commodity contracts. That is, the allocations are
the same, and there is an easy correspondence
between competitive equilibrium prices and the
corresponding EPPPE prices. Thus a natural
approach is first to obtain a competitive equilibrium, which always exists in our model, and then
to construct the corresponding EPPPE prices. If at
these prices V(P) has rank S, then we have an
EPPPE.
Kreps (1982) made the critical observation
that, if the rank of the returns matrix is less
that S, then a perturbation of the returns structure
a will restore V(P) to full rank (as in our preceding ex), and thus we will have an EPPPE.
That is, generically in a, an EPPPE exists.
Similarly, Magill and Shafer (1990) observed
that a small perturbation of endowment would
cause the competitive equilibrium prices to
move into the region where V(P) has full rank,
and thus an equilibrium exists generically in
endowments.
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
Generic Existence Theorem 1 In the canonical
model:
1. if J S then, for each w RL++, an equilibrium of plans, prices, and price expectations
exists for almost all (asset structure) a in R‘JS
2. for each asset structure a for which V(∙) has
generic rank S, an equilibrium of plans, prices,
and price expectations exists for almost all
endowment lists w in RLI++.
In the case where both V(P) can change rank with
p and markets are not complete (in particular, if
J < S), the trick of first obtaining a competitive
equilibrium and then converting it to an EPPPE
equilibrium is no longer available. Nevertheless,
by defining a ‘pseudo’ equilibrium concept that
replaces the competitive equilibrium in the argument for the complete market case, Duffie and
Shafer (1985) were able to show that an EPPPE
equilibrium exists generically in both a and w.
Generic Existence Theorem 2 In the canonical
model with all real assets, an equilibrium of plans,
prices, and price expectations exists for almost all
(a, w) in R‘JS RL++
We now look at the issue of local uniqueness.
In what follows, in ‘counting’ equilibria we are
counting the number of equilibrium allocations,
since there may be certain redundancies in equilibrium prices. In the complete market case this is
fairly straightforward, requiring only an adaptation of Debreu’s (1970) argument, since competitive equilibria and EPPPE equilibria coincide
when the returns matrix has full rank. In the case
of incomplete markets and all real assets, an argument similar to Debreu’s applied to the ‘pseudo’
equilibrium also works.
Local Uniqueness Theorem 1 In the canonical
model, if the asset structure is such that markets
are complete, or if all assets are real, then for
almost all w in the space of endowment lists there
exist a finite number of EPPPE, and each equilibrium is locally a smooth function of endowment
lists w and asset structures a or V.
The situation with nominal assets and incomplete markets is, however, completely different. In
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
this case there is ‘serious indeterminacy’ as the
following result suggests.
Local Uniqueness Theorem 2 In the canonical
model with nominal assets, let the returns matrix
V satisfy J < S and I > J. Then, for almost all w in
the space of endowment lists, the set of allocations
of an EPPPE contains a set homeomorphic to RS-1.
(See Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell 1989, and a similar result by Balasko and Cass 1989.)
Next, we turn to Pareto optimality. At an
EPPPE equilibrium at which the returns matrix
has rank S, the resulting equilibrium allocation
will also be a competitive equilibrium allocation,
and thus fully Pareto efficient. This leads to the
following theorem.
Pareto Optimality Theorem 1 For the canonical model:
(1) in the nominal asset case, if V has rank S then
every EPPPE equilibrium allocation is
Pareto efficient;
(2) in the real asset case, if the asset structure is
such that the generic rank of V (∙) is S then, for
almost all w in the space of endowment lists,
EPPPE equilibrium allocations are Pareto
efficient.
In case of incomplete markets, one certainly
does not expect full allocative efficiency. The
following result (Genakopolos and Polemarchakis
1986) emphasizes the failure of the first fundamental theorem.
Non-Optimality Theorem 1 For the canonical
model, if J < S then, generically in (w, a) in RL++,
EPPPE equilibrium allocations are not Pareto
efficient.
One might hope that, in an appropriate sense,
EPPPE equilibria are constrained efficient. There is
still no generally accepted notion of what the correct
definition of ‘constrained efficiency’ might be in this
case; some argue that the concept cannot be properly
defined unless the reasons for incompleteness of
markets are endogenously embedded into the
model. Nevertheless, we can discuss certain efficiency properties of the equilibria. First, there are
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robust examples of the model with multiple equilibria in which two of the EPPPE equilibria have the
property that one Pareto dominates the second
(Shafer 1998). As a consequence of such robust
examples, any efficiency property that the incomplete market EPPPE equilibria may possess must be
‘weak’. One approach to constrained efficiency is to
follow the Lange-Lerner tradition: if a central planner were permitted to choose the asset portfolios for
the agents, and then allow agents to trade freely on
competitive markets for commodities, could the
planner improve upon an EPPPE equilibrium? The
answer is, in an appropriate generic sense, ‘yes’
(Geanakopolos and Polemarchakis 1986). This is,
of course, not possible if markets are complete.
Another ‘natural’ question to ask: is there a
connection between how inefficient the EPPPE
equilibria are and how incomplete the markets
may be? One measure of incompleteness is S – J,
assuming the J assets give the returns matrix a
generic rank J. By introducing a new asset, which
reduces the incompleteness in this sense, does efficiency improve? The answer is ‘no’, again due to
an example of Hart (1975), in which a new asset is
introduced but the new EPPPE equilibrium allocation is Pareto dominated by the original EPPPE
equilibrium allocation. This suggests that perhaps
this notion of ‘almost complete’ is at fault.
Production
We first discuss the question of existence of equilibrium, but before paraphrasing the existence
theorem we must define what we shall call a
pseudo-equilibrium.
The definition of pseudo-equilibrium is
obtained from the definition of equilibrium by
replacing the requirement of consistency of plans
by the condition that each date and each event the
difference between total saving and total investment (by consumers) is smaller at the pseudoequilibrium prices than at any other prices.
One can prove (Radner 1972) that under
assumptions about technology and consumer preferences similar to those used in the Arrow–Debreu
theory, and with the additional assumptions
sketched above: (a) there exists a pseudo-
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equilibrium; (b) if in a pseudo-equilibrium the current and future prices on the stock market are all
strictly positive, then the pseudo-equilibrium is an
equilibrium.
The crucial difference between this theorem and
the corresponding one in the Arrow–Debreu theory
seems to be due to the form taken by Walras’s Law,
which in this model can be paraphrased by saying
that saving must be at least equal to investment at
each date in each event. This form derives from the
replacement of a single budget constraint (in terms
of present value) by a sequence of budget constraints, one for each date-event pair.
In the above model with production, the ‘shareholders’ have unlimited liability, and therefore
have a status more like that of partners than of
shareholders, as these terms are usually understood. One way to formulate limited liability for
shareholders is to impose the constraint on producers that their net revenues be non-negative at
each date-event pair. However, in this case producers’ correspondences may not be upper semicontinuous. This is analogous to the problem that
arises when, for a given price system, the consumer’s budget constraints force him to be on the
boundary of his consumption set. In the case of
the consumer, this situation is avoided by some
assumption (see Debreu 1959, notes to
ch. 5, pp. 88–9; Debreu 1962). However, for the
case of the producer, it is not considered unusual
in the standard theory of the firm that, especially
in equilibrium, the maximum profit achievable at
the given price system could be zero (for example,
in the case of constant returns to scale).
What are conditions on the producers and consumers that would directly guarantee the existence
of an equilibrium, not just a pseudo-equilibrium?
In other words, under what conditions would the
share markets be cleared at every date-event pair?
Notice that, if there is an excess supply of shares
of a given producer j at a date-event pair (t, e), then
at date (t + 1) only part of the producer’s revenue
will be ‘distributed’. One would expect this situation to arise only if his revenue is to be negative
in at least one event at date t + 1; thus, at such a
date-event pair the producer would have a deficit
covered neither by ‘loans (that is, not offset by
forward contracts) nor by shareholders’
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
contributions. In other words, the producer
would be ‘bankrupt’ at that point.
One approach might be to eliminate from a
pseudo-equilibrium all producers for whom the
excess supply of shares is not zero at some
date–event pair, and then search for an equilibrium with the smaller set of producers, and so on,
successively reducing the set of producers until an
equilibrium is found. This procedure has the trivial consequence that an equilibrium always exists,
since it exists for the case of pure exchange (the
set of producers is empty)! This may not be the
most satisfactory resolution of the problem, but it
does point up the desirability of having some
formulation of the possibility of ‘exit’ for producers who are not doing well.
Although the above model with production
does not allow for ‘exit’ of producers (except
with the modification described in the preceding
paragraph), it does allow for ‘entrance’ in the
following limited sense. A producer may have
zero production up to some date, but plans to
produce thereafter; this is not inconsistent with a
positive demand for shares at preceding dates.
The creation of new ‘equity’ in an enterprise is
also allowed for in a limited sense. A producer
may plan for a large investment at a given dateevent pair, with a negative revenue. If the total
supply of shares at the preceding date-event pair is
nevertheless taken up by the market, this investment may be said to have been ‘financed’ by
shareholders.
The above assumptions describe a model of
producer behaviour that is not influenced by the
shareholders or (directly) by the prices of shares.
A common alternative hypothesis is that a producer tries to maximize the current market value
of this enterprise. There seems to us to be at least
two difficulties with this hypothesis. First, there
are different market values at different date-event
pairs, so it is not clear how these can be maximized simultaneously. Second, the market value
of an enterprise at any date-event pair is a price,
which is supposed to be determined, along with
other prices, by an equilibrium of supply and
demand. The ‘market-value-maximizing’ hypothesis would seem to require the producer to predict,
in some sense, the effect of a change in his plan on
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
a price equilibrium: in this case, the producers
would no longer be price-takers, and one would
need some sort of theory of general equilibrium
for monopolistic competition.
There is one circumstance in which the value
of the firm can be defined unambiguously, given
the system of present prices and common expectations about future prices. Call a price system
arbitrage-free if it is not possible to make a sure,
positive cash flow from trading, without a positive
investment. An equilibrium price system is, a
fortiori, arbitrage-free. One can show (see Radner
1967; Harrison and Kreps 1979; Duffie and
Shafer 1985 that an arbitrage-free price system
implicitly determines a system of ‘insurance premiums’ for a corresponding family of events. This
means that by suitable trading one can insure
oneself against the occurrence of any of these
events. If these events include all of the uncertain
events that may affect the (uncertain) revenues of
the firm, then they can be used in a natural way to
define a present value of the firm at any date–event
pair, for any production plan of the firm, and no
probability judgements are needed to calculate the
value. On the other hand, if the family of ‘insurable
events’ is not rich enough, then the value is a
random variable, and stockholders may not agree
on its probability distribution.
A survey of results on the generic existence of
equilibrium with production (and stock markets)
is given in Magill and Shafer (1991) (see also
Duffie 1988, ch. 2).
Rational Expectations Equilibrium
The formal study of rational expectations equilibrium was introduced by Radner (1967); it was
taken up independently by Lucas (1972) and
Green (1973), and further investigated by
Grossman, Allen, Jordan, and others. We should
emphasize that we are concerned here with the
aspect of ‘rational expectations’ in which traders
make inferences from market prices about other
traders’ information, a phenomenon that is of
interest only when traders do not all have the
same nonprice information. The term ‘rational
expectations equilibrium’ (REE) has also been
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used to describe a situation in which traders correctly forecast (in some sense or other) the probability distribution of future prices. (see Radner
1982, for references to the work of Muth and
others on this topic.)
The concept of REE has been used to make a
number of interesting predictions about the
behaviour of markets: see, for example, Futia
(1979, 1981) and the references cited there.
A sound foundation for such applications requires
the investigation of conditions that would ensure
the existence and stability of REE.
We adopt the convention that the future utility
of the commodities to each trader depends on the
state of the environment. With this convention, we
can model the inferences that a trader makes from
the market prices and his own nonprice information signal by a family of conditional probability
distributions of the environment given the market
prices and his own nonprice information. We shall
call such a family of conditional distributions the
trader’s market model. Given such a market
model, the market prices will influence a trader’s
demand in two ways: first, through his budget
constraint, and second, through his conditional
expected utility function. It is this second feature,
of course, that distinguished theories of rational
expectations equilibrium from earlier models of
market equilibrium.
Given the traders’ market models, the equilibrium prices will be determined by the equality of
supply and demand in the usual way, and thus will
be a deterministic function of the joint nonprice
information that the traders bring to the market. In
order for the market models of the traders to be
‘rational’, they must be consistent with that function. To make this idea precise, it will be useful to
have some formal notation. Let p denote the vector of market prices, e denote the (utility-relevant)
state of the environment, and st denote traders i’s
nonprice information signal (i = 1, . . ., I). The joint
nonprice information of all traders together will be
denoted by s = (s1,...,sI). We shall call s the ‘joint
signal’. (The term ‘state of information’ is also
commonly applied to this array.) Trader i’s market
model, say mi, is a family of conditional probability
distributions of e, given si and p. Given the traders’
market models, the equilibrium price vector will be
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Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
some (measurable) function of the joint nonprice
information, say p = ’ (s).
To model the required rationality of the traders’
models, suppose that, for each i, trader i has
(subjective) prior beliefs about the environment
and the information signals that are expressed by a
joint probability distribution, say Qi of e and s.
These prior beliefs need not, of course, be the
same for all traders. Given the price function ’,
a rational market model for trader i would be the
family of conditional probability distributions of
e, given si and p, that are derived from the distribution Qi and the price function ’; thus
(supposing e and s to be discrete variables),
mi e0 j s0i , p0 ¼ ProbQ1 ðe ¼ ensi and PðsÞ ¼ p0 Þ:
(1)
A given price function ’, together with the
rationality condition (1), would determine the
total market excess supply for each price vector
p and each joint information signal s, say Z(P,s, ’).
Note that the excess supply for any p and s depends
also on the price function ’, since (in principle) the
entire price function is used to calculate the conditional distribution in (1). We can now define a
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) to be a
price function ’* such that, for (almost) every s,
excess supply is zero at the price vector ’ (s), that is,
Zð’ ðsÞ, s, ’ Þ ¼ 0, for almost every s:
(2)
If markets are incomplete, the existence of
REE is not assured by the ‘classical’ conditions
of ordinary general equilibrium analysis. Even
under such conditions, if traders condition their
expected utilities on market prices, then their
demands can be discontinuous in the price function. Specific examples of the nonexistence of
REE due to such discontinuities were given by
Kreps (1977), Green (1977), and others. These
examples naturally led theorists to question
whether the absence of REE is pervasive or is
confirmed to a ‘negligible’ set of such examples.
The work of Radner, Allen, and Jordan (see Jordan and Radner 1982; Allen 1986, for references)
provided – in a certain context – an essentially
complete answer, which can be loosely summarized in the statement that REE exists generically
except when the dimension of the space of private
information is equal to the dimension of the price
space. (Recall that REE exists generically in a
given model if, for any vector of parameters
values for which REE does not exist, there are
arbitrarily small perturbations of the parameters
for which REE does exist.) Furthermore, if the
dimension of the space of private information is
strictly less than the dimension of the price space,
then generically there is a REE that is fully revealing, that is, in which the price reveals to each
trader all the nonprice information used by all
traders (Radner 1979; Allen 1981).
Equilibrium and Learning with Imperfect
Price Models
A more stringent ‘rational expectations’ requirement would concern the opportunities that traders
might have for learning from experience. For
example, suppose that there is a market at each
of a succession of dates t, and that the successive
exogenous vectors (et, st) are independent and
identically distributed. Suppose further that at
the beginning of date t trader i knows the past
history of environments, prices, and his own nonprice information. On the basis of this history he
updates his initial market model to form a current
market model. These current market models,
together with the nonprice information signals at
date t, then determine an equilibrium price at date
t, say pt*, as above. The updating of models constitutes the learning process of the traders. For a
given learning process, one might ask whether the
process converges in any useful sense, and if so,
whether the models are asymptotically consistent
with the (endogenously determined) actual relationship between signals and equilibrium prices,
that is whether they converge to a REE. In this
case one would say that the REE is stable (relative
to the learning process).
Thus far, answers to this question are only
fragmentary. Bray (1982) has studied a simpler
linear asset-market model in which, at each date,
each trader i updates his model by calculating an
Uncertainty and General Equilibrium
ordinary least-squares estimate of the regression of
e on p and si using all the past values (ei, pt*, sit). For
this example, Bray proves stability.
On the other hand, Blume and Easley (1982)
present a somewhat less optimistic view of the
possibility of learning rational expectations.
They define a class of learning procedures by
which traders use successive observations to
form their subjective models, where the term
model for trader i means a conditional distribution
of s, given si and p. They show that rational
expectations equilibria are at least ‘locally stable’
under learning, but that learning possesses may
also get stuck at a profile of subjective models that
is not an REE. The learning procedures defined by
Blume and Easley are applied to a fairly general
class of stochastic exchange environments that do
not possess the special linear structure of the
above example. However, to accommodate this
additional generality, Blume and Easley constrain
traders to choose their subjective models from a
fixed finite set of models and convex combinations thereof. Hence, for some profiles of subjective models, market clearing may result in a ‘true’
model that lies outside the admissible set. It is then
intuitively plausible that a natural learning procedure could get stuck at a profile of subjective
models that differs from the resulting true model
but is in some sense the best admissible approximation to the true model, even if the admissible
set contains an REE model. This phenomenon is
illustrated in Section 5 of their paper. For a review
of a number of themes related to learning, see
Blume and Easley (1998).
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Uncovered Interest Parity
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October 1986).
Uncovered Interest Parity
Peter Isard
Abstract
This article provides an overview of the uncovered interest parity assumption. It traces the
history of the concept, summarizes evidence
on the empirical validity of uncovered interest
parity, and discusses different interpretations
of the evidence and the implications for macroeconomic analysis. The uncovered interest
parity assumption has been an important building block in multi-period models of open economies and, although its validity is strongly
challenged by the empirical evidence, at least
at short time horizons, its retention in macroeconomic models is supported on pragmatic
grounds by the lack of much empirical support
for existing models of the exchange risk
premium.
Keywords
Arbitrage; Capital controls; Covered interest
parity (CIP); Credit risk; Exchange market
intervention; Exchange rate dynamics;
Exchange rate expectations; Exchange risk
premium; Forward exchange; Incomplete
information; Inflation expectations; Interest
rate differentials; Jensen’s inequality; Keynes,
J. M.; Peso problem; Portfolio balance models;
Prediction bias; Rational bubbles; Rational
expectations;
Rational
learning;
Risk
Uncovered Interest Parity
premium; Spot exchange; Unbiasedness
hypothesis; Uncovered interest parity (UIP)
JEL Classifications
F31
The assumption of uncovered interest parity (UIP)
is an important building block for macroeconomic
analysis of open economies. It provides a simple
relationship between the interest rate on an asset
denominated in any one country’s currency unit,
the interest rate on a similar asset denominated in
another country’s currency, and the expected rate
of change in the spot exchange rate between the
two currencies.
The theory of interest parity received prominence from expositions by Keynes (for example,
1923, pp. 115–139), whose attention had been
captured by the rapid expansion of organized
trading in forward exchange following the First
World War (Einzig 1962, pp. 239–241, 275).
Although an understanding of the forward
exchange market must have developed within
various banking circles during the second half of
the 19th century, apart from an isolated exposition
by a German economist, Walther Lotz (1889), the
19th-century literature on foreign exchange theory apparently dealt only with spot exchange rates
(Einzig 1962, pp. 214–215). Forward exchange
trading gave rise to the notion of covered interest
parity (CIP), which related the differential
between domestic and foreign interest rates to
the percentage difference between forward and
spot exchange rates. Since it was clear that forward rates also reflected perceptions about future
spot rates, it was a short step to the assumption of
UIP, which builds on the theory of CIP by essentially postulating that market forces drive the forward exchange rate into equality with the
expected future spot exchange rate.
Basic Concepts
The concept of interest parity recognizes that
portfolio investors at any time t have the choice
of holding assets denominated in domestic
14001
currency, offering the own rate of interest rt
between times t and t + 1, or of holding assets
denominated in foreign currency, offering the own
rate of interest r t . Thus, an investor starting with
one unit of domestic currency should compare the
option of accumulating 1 + rt units with the
option of converting at the spot exchange rate
into st units of foreign currency,
investing
in foreign assets to accumulate st 1 þ r t units of
foreign currency at time t + 1, and then
reconverting into domestic currency. If the
domestic and foreign assets differ only in their
currencies of denomination, and if investors
have the opportunity to cover against exchange
rate uncertainty by arranging at time t to reconvert
from foreign to domestic currency one period later
at the forward exchange rate ft (in units of foreign
currency per unit of domestic currency), then
market equilibrium requires the condition of CIP:
1 þ r t ¼ st 1 þ r t =f t :
(1)
If condition (1) did not hold, profitable market
arbitrage opportunities could be exploited without
incurring any risks.
Investors also have the opportunity to leave
their foreign currency positions uncovered at
time t and to wait until time t+1 to make arrangements to reconvert into domestic currency at the
spot exchange rate st + 1. Unlike ft, the value of
st + 1 is unknown at time t, and so the attractiveness of holding an uncovered position must be
assessed in terms of the probabilities of different
outcomes for st + 1. The assumption of UIP postulates that markets will equilibrate the return on
the domestic currency asset with the expected
value at time t(Et) of the yield on an uncovered
position in foreign currency:
1 þ r t ¼ Et st 1 þr t =stþ1
¼ st 1 þ r t Et ð1=stþ1 Þ:
(2)
This is essentially equivalent to combining the
CIP condition with the assumption that exchange
rates are driven, at the margin, by risk-neutral
market participants who stand ready to take
uncovered spot or forward positions whenever
U
14002
Uncovered Interest Parity
the forward rate deviates from the expected future
spot rate.
By manipulating condition (1), it is easily seen
that CIP implies
f t st 1 þ r t
1
¼
1 þ rt
st
(3)
Empirical Evidence
Hence, as a first approximation (for values of
1 + rt in the vicinity of 1):
rt rt
ðf t st Þ=st
(4)
In addition, when Jensen’s inequality – that
is, the difference between Et(1/st + 1) and
1/Et(1/st+1) – is ignored, the assumption of UIP
can be approximated as
rt r
Et ½ðstþ1 st Þ=st
¼ ðEt stþ1 st Þ=st :
providing the authorities with an effective policy
instrument in addition to interest rates. Thus, the
case for intervention has been considered by some
to depend on whether the empirical evidence
rejects UIP.
(5)
The assumption of UIP adds an element of
dynamics to the CIP condition by hypothesizing
a relationship between the observed values of
variables at time t and the value of the spot
exchange rate that market participants expect at
time t to prevail at time t + 1. As such, UIP has
been embedded in many multi-period models of
open economies. The CIP and UIP conditions can
be written for any duration of the time period
between t and t + 1. Thus, if the UIP assumption
was valid at all horizons, the observed values of
the spot exchange rate and the term structures of
domestic and foreign interest rates could be used
to infer the expected future time path of the spot
exchange rate (Porter 1971).
In addition to playing an important role in the
development of multi-period models of open
economies, the UIP condition has been a central
focal point in the policy debate over the effectiveness of official intervention in exchange markets
(Henderson and Sampson 1983). To the extent
that UIP was valid at short time horizons, official
intervention could not succeed in changing the
spot exchange rate relative to the expected future
spot rate unless the authorities chose to allow
interest rates to change. In this sense, exchange
market intervention could not be viewed as
The theory leading to the CIP condition – and
hence also to the UIP assumption – abstracts
entirely from any credit risks, capital controls, or
explicit taxes on domestic and foreign currency
investments. Keynes (1923, pp. 126–127) was
well aware that investor choices between foreign
and domestic assets do not depend on interest
rates and exchange rates alone:
. . . the various uncertainties of financial and political risk . . . introduce a further element which sometimes quite transcends the factor of relative interest.
The possibility of financial trouble or political disturbance, and the quite appreciable probability of a
moratorium in the event of any difficulties arising,
or of the sudden introduction of exchange regulations which would interfere with the movement of
balances out of the country, and even sometimes the
contingency of a drastic demonetization, – all these
factors deter . . . [market participants], even when
the exchange risk proper is eliminated, from
maintaining large . . . balances at certain foreign
centres.
In those circumstances where it is valid to
abstract from the types of considerations cited by
Keynes, the CIP condition has been generally
confirmed. As one source of evidence, interviews
at large banks have established that the CIP condition is used as a formula for determining the
exchange rates and interest rates at which trading
is actually conducted. Foreign exchange traders
use Eurocurrency interest rate differentials to
determine the forward exchange rates (in relation
to spot rates) that they quote to customers, while
traders in Eurocurrency deposits use the spreads
between forward and spot exchange rates to set
the spreads between the interest rates that their
banks offer on domestic and foreign currency
deposits (Herring and Marston 1976; Levich
1985). As additional evidence, Taylor (1989) has
constructed a database of the bid and offer rates
quoted contemporaneously for exchange rates and
Uncovered Interest Parity
14003
interest rates by foreign exchange and money
market brokers, as recorded on the ‘pad’ of the
chief dealer at the Bank of England. The data
include observations on one- two-, three-, six-,
and twelve-month maturities during selected
intervals between 1967 and 1987. Taylor’s study
found no evidence of unexploited profit opportunities during relatively calm periods in foreign
exchange and money markets, although potentially exploitable profitable arbitrage opportunities did ‘occasionally occur’ during periods of
market turbulence, where the frequency, size and
persistence of such opportunities were positively
related to length of maturity. Consistently, in circumstances when it is not valid to abstract from
capital controls and risks, empirical research has
confirmed that deviations from CIP can be related
systematically to the effective taxes imposed by
capital controls and to non-currency-specific risk
premiums associated with prospective controls
(Dooley and Isard 1980).
The UIP assumption is more difficult to test
than the CIP condition, since market expectations
of future exchange rates are not directly observable. Accordingly, UIP has generally been tested
jointly with the assumption that exchange market
participants form rational expectations, such that
future realizations of the exchange rate will equal
the value expected at time t plus an error term that
is uncorrelated with all information known at time
t. Together the two assumptions imply that
stþ1 ¼ f t þ utþ1
(6)
stþ1 ¼ st ¼ r t r t þ utþ1
(7)
and hence
where u represents a prediction error. This has led
economists to assess the UIP assumption empirically by estimating the values of the a and
b coefficients in the specification forms
stþ1 ¼ a0 þ a1 f t þ utþ1
and
(8)
stþ1 st ¼ b0 þ b1 r t r t þ utþ1
(9)
where it is assumed that the error terms have zero
means and are serially uncorrelated.
Empirical assessments of UIP as a framework
for predicting the future spot exchange rate have
distinguished two issues: the size of the prediction
errors, and the question of whether the predictions
are systematically biased. On the first issue, it has
become widely acknowledged that interest differentials explain only a small proportion of subsequent changes in exchange rates (Isard 1978;
Mussa 1979; Frenkel 1981). This finding has
been generally interpreted as implying that
observed changes in exchange rates are predominantly the result of unexpected information or
‘news’ about economic developments, policies
or other relevant factors.
The issue of whether predictions are systematically biased can be assessed by testing the
hypothesis of unbiasedness – namely, that
(a0, a1) = (0, 1) in Eq. (8) or (b0, b1) = (0, 1)
in Eq. (9). Notably, the test that the slope coefficient is unity receives strong support from studies
based on (8) but is soundly rejected by studies
based on (9) – at least for prediction horizons of
a year or less. However, the apparent conflict
between the two sets of regression evidence has
been resolved in favour of the latter finding, as it is
now accepted that (8) is not a legitimate regression equation (Meese 1989). The explanation is
based on the fact that the sample variances of the
spot rate and forward rate are essentially equal.
Although the empirical evidence strongly
rejects the unbiasedness hypothesis at prediction
horizons of up to 1 year, the evidence is much
more favourable to unbiasedness at horizons of
5–20 years. In particular, when data for industrial
countries are pooled, and when annual exchange
rate changes and interest differentials (for each
country relative to a numeraire country) are averaged over non-overlapping 5- to 20-year periods,
the slope coefficients in Eq. (9) become insignificantly different from unity (Flood and Taylor
1997, who note that the average one-year change
over n years is equivalent to the change over n
years multiplied by a scale factor; see also Chinn
and Meredith 2004).
U
14004
Does Prediction Bias Refute the UIP
Assumption?
Economists have not resolved how to interpret the
strong rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis at
short prediction horizons. Several possible explanations have been suggested, with different implications for UIP.
One interpretation rejects the UIP hypothesis
but not the rational expectations assumption.
According to this view, the finding of systematic
prediction bias suggests that market participants
are risk averse and require risk premiums to hold
uncovered foreign currency positions. The prediction bias is thus perceived as an omitted variable
problem that can be addressed, in concept, by
extending the righthand side of Eq. (9) to include
an expression for the risk premium. A second interpretation of prediction bias abandons the assumption that market participants are fully rational.
Other possible explanations do not require
rejection of either UIP or the rational expectations
hypothesis. These include explanations based on
the ‘peso problem’, simultaneity bias, incomplete
information with rational learning, and selffulfilling prophecies or rational ‘bubbles’.
The suggestion that prediction bias reflects a
‘peso problem’ is generally attributed to Rogoff
(1980) and Krasker (1980), who drew attention to
an episode in which the Mexican peso sold at a
forward discount for a prolonged period prior to
its widely anticipated devaluation in 1976.
Although market expectations eventually proved
correct and may well have been rational ex ante,
the fact that the devaluation did not occur immediately after it became anticipated made the forward rate a biased predictor over finite data
samples that included the pre-devaluation period.
The general point is that, even if market participants are risk neutral and form rational expectations, the forward rate can be biased as a predictor
of the future spot rate – and the interest rate
differential biased as a predictor of the change in
the spot rate – whenever market participants
repeatedly expect the spot rate to change in
response to a policy action or some other event
that fails to materialize over a relatively long
series of observations.
Uncovered Interest Parity
The suggestion that rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis reflects simultaneity bias was
alluded to by Isard (1988) and later emphasized
by McCallum (1994). In particular, given that the
monetary authorities in most countries rely on a
short-term interest rate as a policy instrument that
they are prepared to adjust, inter alia, in response
to undesired exchange rate movements, the estimates of b1 may be biased by the failure to
estimate (9) simultaneously with a second relationship between the interest rate differential and
the change in the exchange rate.
As suggested by Lewis (1988, 1989), prediction bias can also emerge under UIP and rational
expectations if market participants lack complete
information but engage in a process of rational
learning. This explanation is analogous to the
peso problem in so far as it provides an interpretation in which market participants are risk neutral
and fully rational but prone to make repeated
mistakes.
Yet another possibility consistent with UIP is
the conjecture that prediction bias arises from the
self-fulfilling prophecies of rational, risk-neutral
market participants. Such prophecies, which are
often referred to as ‘rational bubbles’, have
received attention as logical possibilities; but
few economists, if any, consider them to have
much plausibility as empirical phenomena
(Mussa 1990).
Where Things Stand
Because the validity of the UIP hypothesis cannot
be tested directly and is not resolved by the rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis, economists
have resorted to indirect tests as a means of
obtaining suggestive evidence. In particular, survey data on exchange rate expectations have been
collected by several different sources since the
early 1980s, and a number of studies have
shown that exchange rate expectations, as measured by the average forecasts of sample respondents, deviate considerably from prevailing
forward exchange rates (Frankel and Froot 1987;
Takagi 1991; Chinn and Frenkel 2002). To the
extent that survey measures of average
Uncovered Interest Parity
expectations are meaningful, this would appear to
be strong evidence against UIP.
That said, it also needs to be recognized that
intertemporal models of open-economy macroeconomics require equations that link current
spot exchange rates to expected future exchange
rates. Thus, on pragmatic grounds, the case for
abandoning the UIP hypothesis depends on how
well economists can model the deviation from
UIP – namely, the difference between the forward
exchange rate and the expected future spot rate,
which is generally referred to as the exchange risk
premium.
Behavioural hypotheses about the exchange
risk premium can be tested by embedding them
in models of observable exchange rates. The first
conceptual models of the exchange risk premium
were based on a portfolio balance framework in
which financial claims were distinguished by currencies of denomination but not by the countries
obligated to meet the claims (see, for example,
Dooley and Isard 1983). Empirical tests of this
class of portfolio balance model have explained at
most a small portion of the variation over time in
the exchange risk premium (Tryon 1983;
Boughton 1987). More sophisticated behavioural
hypotheses have recognized – in the spirit of the
quotation above from Keynes – that exchange
risks and credit risks are interrelated, and that the
magnitudes of these risks reflect the relative macroeconomic and political conditions, prospects,
and uncertainties of the countries that have issued
the portfolio claims (Dooley and Isard 1983; Isard
1988). While casual evidence suggests that this
type of hypothesis is broadly capable of
explaining the empirical behaviour of exchange
rates (Dooley and Isard 1991), formal empirical
tests that capture the many factors contributing to
exchange rate risk are difficult to design, and
economists have not yet provided a well-specified
replacement for the UIP assumption.
Accordingly, many intertemporal openeconomy macroeconomic models continue to
impose the UIP assumption – or the assumption
of UIP adjusted by an exogenous exchange risk
premium that provides a mechanism for analyzing
the effects of ‘exogenous’ changes in risk perceptions or asset preferences. However, consistent
14005
with the evidence that rejects the unbiasedness
hypothesis, it has proved difficult to mimic the
observed behaviour of key macroeconomic variables with models that impose the UIP assumption
and also treat exchange rate expectations as fully
model-consistent. Thus, models that impose the
UIP assumption tend to treat exchange rate expectations as not completely rational. One fairly common practice, for example, is to treat exchange
rate expectations (and inflation expectations) as
having both forward-looking (model-consistent)
and backward-looking components.
Quite apart from ongoing debates over the
validity of the UIP assumption as an ex ante
hypothesis, and the usefulness of incorporating
the UIP assumption into macroeconomic models,
there is abundant evidence, as noted above, that
the changes in spot exchange rates that are
expected ex ante are generally dominated by
unexpected changes. Thus, regardless of the usefulness of UIP as an ex ante hypothesis for macroeconomic modelling, it is quite clear that UIP by
itself provides a very inaccurate framework for
predicting the changes in exchange rates that are
observed ex post.
See Also
▶ Exchange Rate Dynamics
Bibliography
Boughton, J. 1987. Tests of the performance of reducedform exchange rate models. Journal of International
Economics 23: 41–56.
Chinn, M., and J. Frenkel. 2002. Survey data on exchange
rate expectations: More currencies, more horizons,
more tests. In Monetary policy, capital flows, and financial market developments in an era of financial globalization: Essays in honour of Max Fry, ed. W. Allen and
D. Dickinson. London: Routledge.
Chinn, M., and G. Meredith. 2004. Monetary policy and
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This article draws extensively on Isard (1991, 1995). The
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Underconsumptionism
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the Federal Reserve System.
Underconsumptionism
Michael Schneider
Keywords
Acceleration principle; Aggregate demand;
Baran, P. A.; Catchings, W.; Clark, J. B.; Disproportionate production; Emmanuel, A.;
Harrod–Domar growth model; Hoarding;
Hobson, J. A.; Imperialism; Kautsky, K.;
Keynesianism; Lauderdale, Eighth Earl of;
Underconsumptionism
Lenin, V. I.; Luxemburg, R.; Malthus, T. R.;
Marx, K. H.; Redistribution of income;
Rodbertus, J. K.; Saving equals investment;
Sismondi, J. C. L. S. de; Sweezy, P.M.;
Underconsumption; Underconsumptionism;
Wages fund
JEL Classifications
B1
‘Underconsumption’ is the label given to theories
which attribute the failure of the total output of an
economy to continue to be sold at its cost of
production (including normal profit) to too low a
ratio of consumption to output. According to
underconsumption theories, such deficient consumption leads either to goods being able to be
sold only at below-normal rates of profit, or to
goods not being able to be sold at all. These effects
are seen as leading in turn to cutbacks in production
and increases in unemployment. Underconsumption
theories are thus amongst those which seek to
explain cyclical or secular declines in the rate of
economic growth.
Where underconsumption exists in the sense
that the ratio of consumption to output is below
the optimum level, it follows that the ratio of
‘unconsumed’ output to total output must be too
high. For the period in which underconsumption
breaks out, underconsumptionists in general both
identify this ‘unconsumed’ output with saving, and
equate saving with investment. Thus Haberler, to
whose 1937 analysis of underconsumption and
related theories the reader should turn for the best
extended treatment of the subject, wrote that in ‘its
best-reasoned form . . ., the underconsumption theory uses “under-consumption” to mean “over-saving”’, and that in ‘the under-consumption or oversaving theory . . . savings are, as a rule, invested
. . .’ (Haberler 1937, pp. 115 and 117).
While the theories advanced by underconsumptionists overlap with some other macroeconomic theories in certain ways, their basic
characteristics make them distinct in other
respects. Underconsumption theories share with
Keynesian theories, for example, the characteristic that they are ‘demand-side’ (as opposed to
14007
‘supply side’) theories. However, there is a fundamental difference between the two, in that
Keynesian theories attribute the failure of total
output to reach the full employment level to a
deficiency of aggregate demand. The two types
of theory consequently have different implications. As Robbins succinctly put it, with reference
to the underconsumptionist J.A. Hobson, for
‘Mr Keynes, one way out of the slump would be a
revival of investment; for Mr Hobson, this would
simply make matters worse’ (Robbins 1932,
p. 420). A further difference between the two lies
in the fact that, by contrast with Keynesian theories,
hoarding plays no part in underconsumption theories. Underconsumptionists in general confine their
analyses to the real sector of the economy, and
where monetary factors are discussed at all they
are treated as secondary.
There are also some connections between
underconsumption theories and the accelerator
theory of investment. As Haberler pointed out,
the acceleration principle can be used ‘in support
of a special type of the under-consumption theory
of the business cycle’ (Haberler 1937, p. 30).
More importantly, a variant of the principle can
be seen as underlying all underconsumption
theories. When first expounded by J.M. Clark,
the acceleration principle was used to explain the
level of activity in the investment goods sector of
an economy by changes in the demand for finished goods. In essence, underconsumptionists
base their theories on the idea that changes in the
demand for consumption goods determine the
future level of activity in the investment goods
sector. By this means they draw the conclusion
that the level of activity in the economy as a whole
is wholly determined by consumption demand.
In a review of Harrod’s Towards a Dynamic
Economics, Joan Robinson suggested that
‘Mr Harrod’s analysis provides the missing link
between Keynes and Hobson’ (Robinson 1949,
p. 80). The resemblance of underconsumption theories to growth models of the Harrod–Domar type
is in fact greater than their resemblance to Keynesian theories. As Domar pointed out in the American
Economic Review article (1947) expounding his
growth model, he shared with Hobson a concern
with the capacity-creating effect of investment, a
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14008
question which Keynes hardly touched on in
the General Theory. The essential features of
underconsumption theories can in fact be captured
by a growth model of the Harrod–Domar type, in
which however the driving force is provided not by
the rate of growth of investment but by the rate of
growth of consumption. Such a model is particularly appropriate in the case of those theories which
treat underconsumption as a secular rather than a
cyclical phenomenon.
There are connections too between
underconsumption theories and explanations of
‘economic crises’ in terms of ‘disproportionate
production’, to use Marx’s terminology. By ‘disproportionate production’ Marx meant an allocation of labour time between sectors or industries
other than that required to satisfy social need as
reflected in demand. Now underconsumption
involves an allocation of too few resources to the
consumption goods sector and too many
resources to the investment goods sector. But as
Haberler pointed out, such ‘vertical disproportion’ should be distinguished from ‘horizontal
disproportion’. And unlike cases of horizontal
disproportion (if optimal stock levels are ignored),
vertical disproportion, involving industries not
equidistant from consumption goods industries,
cannot be rectified immediately by a return to
‘proportionate’ production. For the excessive production of investment goods consequent upon
underconsumption leaves a legacy in the form of
excessive productive capacity. Underconsumption
theories thus should be distinguished from the
more general category of ‘disproportionality’ theories; the disproportionality element they incorporate is specific and has distinctive consequences.
Over-investment theories provide a different
example of vertical disproportion. As they are
defined by Haberler, over-investment theories
offer an explanation of the excessive aggregate
demand characteristic of an economy during the
upswing of a trade cycle. Therefore they also
belong to a different category from underconsumption theories, even though the deficiency
of consumption characteristic of the latter is
accompanied by excessive investment.
Despite their basic similarities, underconsumption theories differ as to the cause of,
Underconsumptionism
and hence remedies for, underconsumption.
A view to be found in the writings of some
underconsumptionists, especially the less wellknown ones, is that underconsumption is due to
total purchasing power falling short of the value of
output. Since all the value of output accrues to the
owner of one factor of production or another, this
proposition as it stands cannot be sustained. This
view as to the cause of underconsumption should
not be confused, however, with a superficially
similar view relating to its effects, which is at
least implicit in all underconsumptionist thinking.
This is the idea that income is generated not by
production but by purchases of what is produced.
In underconsumptionist writings, by contrast for
example with Keynesian writings, income may
fall short of the value of output.
How this may be so is perhaps best seen
in terms of period analysis. An outbreak of
underconsumption will lead in the first period to
excessive saving accompanied by excessive
investment. In the second period the resulting
additional capacity will be used, and unless there
is an increase in consumption the level of output
will exceed the demand for it; hence in this period
the income generated by purchases will fall short
of the value of output, while at the same time
saving, if it is defined as that part of income
(as opposed to output) not consumed, will just
match investment demand. The deficient demand
in the second period will lead in the third period to
actual output falling short of potential output, that
is to excess capacity, with saving however continuing to equal investment.
One underconsumptionist who clearly did not
attribute underconsumption to lack of purchasing
power is Malthus. In his correspondence with
Ricardo, Malthus instead took the position that
‘a nation must certainly have the power of purchasing all that it produces, but I can easily conceive it not to have the will’ (Sraffa 1952, p. 132).
Like some other underconsumptionists, notably
Sismondi and Hobson, Malthus believed that
one cause of underconsumption is to be found in
the limited capacity of human beings to expand
their wants, at least in the short run. It was
Malthus’s view that men have a tendency towards
indolence once their needs for necessaries are
Underconsumptionism
satisfied. If in the face of such limited growth in
human wants capital accumulation continues
apace, the resulting increase in productive capacity will fail to be matched by an equal increase in
consumer demand. The remedy for this state of
affairs, suggested Malthus, is an increase in commerce, both domestic and foreign, so as to stimulate tastes by exposing the population to new
products.
Most commonly, however, underconsumptionists
find the cause of underconsumption in a maldistribution of income. The underlying argument is simple. If different economic classes have different
propensities to consume, the distribution of an
excessive share of income to classes with a relatively low propensity to consume will result in
underconsumption. Underconsumptionists agree
that a remedy cannot be found by a redistribution
of income towards the capitalist class, which they
see as having a relatively high propensity to save.
They differ, however, on the question of the
class to which income should in cases of
underconsumption be redistributed. The earliest
underconsumptionists ruled out a redistribution
of income towards workers, perhaps partly
because it was incompatible with their adherence
to the wages fund doctrine, according to which
total wages are fixed by the capital set aside in
advance to pay them. They advocated rather a
redistribution of income towards landlords. The
first underconsumptionist to advocate a redistribution of income towards workers was Sismondi,
whose example was followed by most later
underconsumptionists.
Underconsumption theories were first put forward in the 19th century. While some 17th- and
18th-century writers, most notably Mandeville
and the Physiocrats, advocated an increase in
expenditure on consumption goods, none of
them linked this with a corresponding reduction
in investment. Therefore although they may be
seen as predecessors of Keynes, they should not
be classified as underconsumptionists. The first to
advance an underconsumption theory in the sense
outlined above was Lauderdale, in An Inquiry into
the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth (1804).
Perhaps the best known of the subsequent
underconsumptionists are Malthus, Sismondi,
14009
Rodbertus, Hobson and Rosa Luxemburg. For a
fuller (and sometimes different) account of the
theories of these and other underconsumptionists
than is possible here, the reader should turn to
Bleaney (1976) or Nemmers (1956). Further,
additional light has been shed on the overall
nature of underconsumptionist theories by the
several attempts that have been made to express
the theory put forward by Malthus in the form of a
model, notably by Eagly (1974), Eltis (1980) and
Costabile and Rowthorn (1985).
While some underconsumption theories were
largely prompted by current or expected economic
events, in other cases the inspiration was mainly
intellectual. Both factors seem to have been
important in the case of Lauderdale, the earliest
underconsumptionist. Lauderdale was in part
reacting against the praise of parsimony by Adam
Smith, but he was also alarmed at the prospect of
the British government using its revenue after the
end of the Napoleonic wars for the purpose of
capital accumulation in place of wartime consumption. More generally, as a precaution against
underconsumption, Lauderdale advocated a lessening of the current inequality of wealth, as Malthus
was also to do. By contrast Spence, in Britain
Independent of Commerce (1807), developed an
underconsumption theory on the basis of Physiocratic ideas. His solution for underconsumption
was encouragement of consumption by landlords,
so as to restore the income of the manufacturing
class to its former level.
His correspondence with Ricardo shows that
Malthus had developed underconsumptionist
views by 1814. This fact is doubly significant. It
proves both that Malthus’s underconsumptionism
preceded the depressed economic conditions
which followed the ending of the Napoleonic
wars in 1815, rather than being a response
to them, and that Marx’s charge that Malthus
plagiarized Sismondi is unfounded. The underconsumptionist elements in Malthus’s thinking
are to be found not only in his correspondence
with Ricardo, but also in his Principles of Political Economy Considered with a View to their
Practical Application (1820). The latter had an
influence on the underconsumption theory put
forward in Chalmers’ Political Economy (1832).
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It may also have provided a stimulus for the
underconsumption theory advanced in a pamphlet
entitled Considerations on the Accumulation of
Capital (1822). Published anonymously, this
pamphlet was written by Cazenove, the friend of
Malthus who was later to edit (also anonymously)
the second edition of Malthus’s Principles.
Like Lauderdale, Sismondi reacted against
Adam Smith’s views on parsimony, and like Malthus he had become an underconsumptionist by the
end of the Napoleonic wars, as is evidenced by the
material contained in the article entitled ‘Political
Economy’ which Sismondi wrote in 1815 for
Brewster’s Edinburgh Encyclopaedia. A complete
account of Sismondi’s underconsumption theory is
only to be found, however, in his Nouveaux
principes d’économie politique (1819). Here Sismondi argued that where producers supply a large
anonymous market, competition for profits leads
each of them on the one hand to overestimate the
demand for the commodity he produces and overaccumulate capital accordingly, and on the other
hand so to depress wages that they grow at a slower
rate than profits. Sismondi’s remedies for
underconsumption include organization of industry on a local basis, and a redistribution of income
towards wages.
For a discussion of possible sources of the
underconsumptionist elements in the writings of
Robert Owen and the Ricardian Socialists the
reader is referred to King (1981). A more comprehensive underconsumption theory than in those
writings is to be found in Rodbertus’s ‘second
letter’ to von Kirchmann, published in 1850–51.
Rodbertus was reacting against the ideas of JeanBaptiste Say and his followers. His own view was
that in a laissez-faire economy underconsumption
must inevitably emerge and worsen, because ‘natural’ laws will ensure that an ever increasing
productivity of labour will be accompanied by
an ever decreasing share of income going to
wages. His remedy was ‘rational’ intervention in
the economy to counteract these ‘natural’ laws.
The emphasis in Marx’s economic theory on the
necessity in a capitalist economy for value not only
to be generated in production but also realized by
sale makes that theory well adapted to use to the
development of an underconsumption theory.
Underconsumptionism
Marx himself gave substantial praise to Sismondi
for his exposition of such a theory, and there
are several passages in Marx’s own writings
which put forward an underconsumptionist
view. On the other hand, there is a well-known
passage in volume 2 of Capital which condemns
underconsumption theories in no uncertain terms,
and in any case there are other elements in his
economic theory which are so much more important to Marx that he is not usually classified as an
underconsumptionist. Many, though by no means
all, of his followers have in fact condemned
underconsumption theories. Examples of such condemnation are to be found in some of Lenin’s
writings, notably his pamphlet entitled A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism (Sismondi
and our Native Sismondists), written in 1897.
This pamphlet was particularly directed at the
underconsumptionist views of the Russian ‘Populists’, or ‘Narodniks’, who had argued that capitalism could not survive in Russia without the
consumer markets provided by its then dwindling
peasant economy. It was Lenin’s view that for the
development of capitalism expansion of the market
for investment goods is more important than
expansion of the market for consumption goods.
Amongst Marx’s earlier followers, those who
most strongly supported the underconsumptionist
element in Marx’s thinking were Kautsky and
Rosa Luxemburg. Rosa Luxemburg’s main arguments were set out in The Accumulation of
Capital (1913). Contrasting the over-growing
generation of value in a capitalist economy with
the inability of workers and unwillingness of capitalists to realize that value by increasing their
consumption, she crossed swords with Tugan
Baranovski, who had argued that capitalists ‘see
to it that ever more machines are built for the sake
of building – with their help – ever more
machines’ (Luxemburg 1913, p. 335). Rosa Luxemburg took the same view as that advanced by
J.B. Clark, in his introduction to the English translation of Rodbertus’s ‘second letter’ to von
Kirchmann, namely that ‘this case presents no
glut: but it is an unreal case’ (Rodbertus 1898,
p. 15). She concluded that because it was inevitably faced by increasing underconsumption, a capitalist economy could only survive as long as it
Underconsumptionism
was able to dispose of its surplus to non-capitalist
consumers, either at home or abroad, the latter
accounting in her view for policies of imperialism.
Apart from Rosa Luxemburg, others who have
both drawn on Marx’s ideas and made use of
underconsumption theory include Sweezy in The
Theory of Capitalist Development (1942), Baran
and Sweezy in Monopoly Capital (1966) and
Emmanuel in Unequal Exchange (1969).
A causal connection between underconsumption and policies of imperialism was also
argued to exist by the non-Marxist writer
J.A. Hobson, in Imperialism: A Study (1902).
Jointly with A.F. Mummery, Hobson had reacted
to the depression in trade in the 1880s by putting
forward an underconsumption theory in The Physiology of Industry (1889), which was the first
underconsumptionist work actually to use the
term ‘underconsumption’. In this book Mummery
and Hobson argued that the sole source of demand
for investment goods is demand for consumption
goods. From this they drew the conclusion, as
Malthus had done, that there exists an optimum
ratio between saving (investment) and spending
(consumption). Like Sismondi, they stressed
the role of competition in causing supply to
exceed demand. They went beyond the earlier
underconsumptionists, however, in specifically
arguing that neither a fall in the rate of interest
nor a fall in the price level could remedy a state of
depression brought about by underconsumption.
Hobson’s subsequent restatement of this theory,
with various amplifications, made him the most
influential 20th-century exponent of underconsumption theories.
In The Physiology of Industry Mummery and
Hobson drew the policy conclusion that ‘where
Under-consumption exists, Savings should be
taxed’ (Mummery and Hobson 1889, p. 205). In
his later works, however, from The Problem of the
Unemployed (1896) on, Hobson laid most stress
on a redistribution of income from what he called
‘unearned income’ (income unrelated to effort) to
wages as the main remedy for underconsumption.
The most comprehensive expositions of Hobson’s
underconsumption theory are to be found in The
Industrial System (1909), which is characterized by
a more extensive treatment of underconsumption
14011
in a growing economy, The Economics of Unemployment (1922), and Rationalisation and
Unemployment (1930).
Other 20th-century exponents of underconsumption theories include Foster and Catchings, in a number of jointly written books. The
theories of Major Douglas, however, with their
lack of reference to over-investment and their
emphasis on the role of money and credit, do not
fit well into the underconsumptionist category.
Underconsumption theories have never been
acceptable to orthodox economists, perhaps partly
because underconsumptionists in general have
lacked rigour in the exposition of their ideas, and
partly because underconsumption theories have
been seen as a threat to the saving necessary for
economic growth in particular, and to capitalism in
general. They have also attracted less attention
since 1936 than before, because Keynes’s General
Theory satisfied the needs of many of those
whose intuitions led them to seek a ‘demand-side’
explanation of economic depression. However,
underconsumption theories can be argued still to
provide a useful supplement to Keynesian theories,
as a reminder that there is a limit to the extent to
which employment can be increased by increases in
investment alone. There is perhaps some recognition of this in the distinction which is now commonly made as to whether the current need is for an
‘investment-led’ or a ‘consumption-led’ recovery.
See Also
▶ Hobson, John Atkinson (1858–1940)
▶ Keynes, John Maynard (1883–1946)
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capital and its effects on profits and on exchangeable
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Underemployment Equilibria
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Underemployment Equilibria
P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Abstract
The standard model of general equilibrium is
extended by allowing for expectations about
supply opportunities by households and
firms. In this framework there is typically a
1-dimensional continuum of underemployment equilibria that range from equilibria
with arbitrarily pessimistic expectations to
equilibria with rather optimistic expectations.
An example illustrates the model and highlights some features of underemployment equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria has a
natural interpretation as being the result of
coordination failures. The results in this framework are compared with those of the fixprice
literature. Extensions to a monetary economy
are discussed.
Keywords
Agent
optimization;
Animal
spirits;
Arrow–Debreu model of general equilibrium;
Cobb–Douglas functions; Competitive equilibrium; Coordination failures; Economics of
general disequilibrium; Excess capacity;
Excess demand; Fixprice models; Game theory; General equilibrium; General equilibrium
models of coordination failures; Incomplete
markets; Involuntary unemployment; Keynes,
J.M.; Keynesianism; Market clearing; Neoclassical model; Non-market clearing prices;
Pareto optimality; Path connectedness; Positive externalities; Price rigidities; Rational
Underemployment Equilibria
expectations; Rationing; Seigniorage; Selfjustifying expectations; Spillover effects; Strategic complementarities; Supply opportunities;
Temporary equilibrium; Underemployment
equilibria; Wage rigidities; Walras’s law
JEL Classifications
C62; D51; E24; D5
Underemployment of resources refers to the situation where an increase in the resource utilization
rate could lead to a Pareto improvement. Typical
examples are involuntary unemployment and
idle production capacities. There are two quite
distinct views on the underemployment of
resources. In the standard neoclassical world of
the Arrow–Debreu model, underemployment
of resources cannot occur. In the competitive equilibrium, involuntary unemployment does not
exist, and production capacities are left idle
when only such is Pareto optimal.
The Keynesian tradition, in contrast, builds on
wage and price rigidities in its explanation of
underemployment of resources. Indeed, Keynes’s
contribution has been reinterpreted by Clower
(1965) and Barro and Grossman (1971) as the
economics of general disequilibrium, in which
price rigidities lead to quantity constraints for
households and firms, which generally have spillover effects in other markets. This lead has been
further developed in the fixprice literature, originating in the work of Bénassy (1975), Drèze
(1975), and Younès (1975), and in general equilibrium theories on temporary equilibrium (see
Grandmont 1977, for a survey).
Although the fixprice literature stresses wage
and price rigidities, Keynes himself postulates
that it is possible to encounter self-justifying
expectations, beliefs which are individually rational but which may lead to socially irrational outcomes (Keynes 1936, ch. 12). We therefore would
like to address the question whether underemployment of resources is possible when expectations are rational, agents optimize, and trade takes
place at competitive prices. The underlying reason
for underutilization of resources comes from
coordination failures, self-justifying expectations
14013
which are individually rational but socially
suboptimal.
In the literature, one may distinguish three
classes of models with coordination failures. The
first class consists of rather abstract gametheoretic models following the seminal work of
Bryant (1983), see Cooper (1999), for a state-ofthe art account. An important message coming
from this stream of the literature is that coordination failures may occur when there are strategic
complementarities and positive externalities.
However, these models typically lack a coordinating role for the price mechanism.
Strategic models with a coordinating role for
prices constitute the second class. Roberts (1987)
presents a model that meets these criteria. It is a
simple model of a closed economy that allows for
coordination failures in a strategic setting. However, outcomes in the second class of models are
often not robust to slightly different specifications
of the model (Jones and Manuelli 1992).
The third class of models consists of general
equilibrium models of coordination failures. We
refer to Citanna et al. (2001) for the most general
presentation of these ideas. The third class leads to
results that are robust and general. The methodological assumptions are shared with those of the
neoclassical model: agent optimization, market
clearing, and rational expectations. Underemployment of resources occurs as a consequence of selfconfirming, pessimistic expectations about supply
opportunities.
Competitive Equilibria
Consider the classical general equilibrium model
with H households, F firms and L commodities as
described in Debreu (1959). A household h is
characterized by its consumption set, for the sake
of simplicity equal to ℝLþ , a utility function uh
: ℝLþ ! ℝ, and initial endowments eh ℝLþ . The
feasible production plans of firm f are described
by the production possibility set Y f. If firm
f chooses production plan y f and the prices at
which trade takes place are p ℝL, then the
firm’s profits equal p y f. Household h receives
a share yfh of the profits of firm f.
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14014
Underemployment Equilibria
We assume both households and firms to be
price takers. If trade takes place at prices p, then
firm f faces the following profit maximization
problem:
max p y f :
y f Yf
Under standard assumptions the firm’s profit
maximization problem is well-defined. For the
remainder we assume the profit maximizing production bundle to be unique. This can also be
shown to hold under standard assumptions,
mainly requiring the strong assumption of
decreasing returns to scale.
The utility maximization problem of household h reads as follows:
maxL uh xh s:t:p xh
wh ,
xh ℝ þ
where wh equals the value of the household h’s
initial endowments, p eh, plus the household’s
share in the firms’ profits, f y fhp y*f, with y*f the
profit maximizing production bundle chosen by
firm f. Under standard assumptions, the maximization problem of the household has a unique
solution x*h.
Under the usual microeconomic methodological premises of agent optimization and market
clearing, together with rational expectations, one
defines a competitive equilibrium as a price system p* and an allocation (x*; y*) = (x*1,...,x*H,
y*1,..., y*F) such that at prices p* households maximize utility by choosing the consumption bundle
x*h and firms maximize profits by choosing the
production plan y*f.
Rationing
The puzzle as to how competitive equilibria are
achieved in real-world economies remains substantial. First, it is well-known that price adjustment processes need not converge to an
equilibrium (Debreu 1974; Saari and Simon
1978; Saari 1985). Blad (1978) stresses that convergence, even if it takes place, can take quite
some time. Second, in many situations some
agents, or coalitions of agents, set prices at levels
not compatible with competitive equilibrium.
Drèze (1989) models unions that set wages
above competitive levels. Herings (1997) and
Tuinstra (2000) show that political interference
in the market mechanism can be rational from a
partisan point of view and might be responsible
for sustained deviations from prices that clear
markets. Third, Drèze and Gollier (1993), Drèze
(1997), and Herings and Polemarchakis (2005)
argue that certain price rigidities are a welfareimproving response to market incompleteness.
This argument is particularly valid for the two
forms of underemployment most frequently
encountered, namely, unemployed labour and
excess capacities, two examples of commodities
for which future markets are hardly developed.
For the moment we maintain the assumption
that trade takes place at given prices p. Here,
p may or may not be competitive. We are not
focusing on a specific theory of non-market clearing prices, but rather are interested in knowing how
agents make decisions given that trade takes place
at prices p. We deviate from the standard framework and assume that it is not common knowledge
whether these prices are competitive or not. Even
when all agents know whether prices are competitive or not, it is not necessarily the case that all
agents know that all agents know whether prices
are competitive or not, and it is even less likely that
all agents know that all other agents know that all
other agents know whether prices are competitive
or not, and so on. Common knowledge of whether
prices are competitive requires structural knowledge about the economy, very much at odds with
the standard general equilibrium paradigm
whereby in a decentralized economy agents only
have to maximize utility given the prices that are
quoted in the marketplace.
Our price system p may or may not be competitive. Since this fact is not common knowledge, it
no longer makes sense for households and firms to
express their unconstrained demands and supplies, and they should form expectations about
supply and demand opportunities. One possible
choice for these expectations is optimistic expectations: all households and firms do not expect to
be constrained in either supply or demand. When
Underemployment Equilibria
14015
prices are competitive, we are back in the situation
of competitive equilibrium. The question is: are
these the only possible expectations compatible
with the microeconomic methodological premises
of agent optimization and market clearing,
together with rational expectations?
Motivated by the empirical regularity that constraints on the supply side are more common than
those on the demand side, as is suggested by
unemployment in labour markets or unused
capacities in production processes, we follow
van der Laan (1980) and Kurz (1982) and restrict
attention to constraints on the supply side. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we consider point
expectations about supply opportunities.
If trade takes place at prices p and firm f
expects supply opportunities of at most yf ℝLþ ,
then firm f’s profit maximization problem
becomes:
max p yf s:t:yf
yf Y f
yf :
At this point it should be noted that, if a firm
f does not produce a particular commodity l, the
value of y fl is entirely inconsequential. Again,
under standard assumptions the firm’s profit maximization problem is well-defined. In fact, the constraints related to the expected supply opportunities
ensure that the firm’s profits are bounded from
above, a property that does not hold in general for
the competitive model. At prices p and expected
supply opportunities of y f , the supply of firm f, that
is, the profit maximizing
production plan of firm f,f
f
f
is denoted
by s p, y and the firm’s profits by p
p, y f . The wealth of household h is then equal to
X h
wh ¼ p eh þ
yf p f p, y f . The utility maxif
mization problem of household h that trades at
prices p, expects supply opportunities equal to zh ,
and has budget wh equals:
max uh xh s:t:p xh
xh ℝLþ
zh
wh
and
xh eh :
Under standard assumptions, the maximization
problem
h ofh the household has a unique solution
h
d p, z , w :
Since supply may not equal demand, one
needs a rule to address discrepancies, called a
rationing mechanism. Expected supply opportunities should be related to the rationing mechanism, which determines the allocation in case of
excess supplies. For labour markets, one can think
of a priority system that determines which worker
is the first to become unemployed, who is next,
and so on and so forth. Another rationing mechanism would share the burden of unemployment
equally among workers, for instance by the imposition of an upper bound on the number of hours
worked per week.
For notational convenience we assume the latter rationing mechanism in all markets, implying
that in equilibrium rational agents face the same
expected supply opportunities, y1 ¼ ¼ yF ¼
z1 ¼ ¼ zH : We denote the commonly
expected supply opportunities by r ℝLþ : At
expected supply opportunities r, every firm
f faces the constraint yf r and every household
h optimizes utility subject to r xh eh. All the
results remain true with appropriate modifications
for general rationing systems; see Herings
(1996b) for a survey of rationing systems encountered in the literature.
A firm or household is said to be rationed in the
market of commodity l0 if the expected supply
opportunities in this market are binding. More
precisely, a firm f is rationed in the market of
commodity l0 at prices p and expected supply
opportunities r if pf ðp, r Þ > pf ðp, r Þ, where r l0 ¼
þ1 and, for l 6¼ l0, r l ¼ r l . A household h is
rationed in the market of commodity l0 at
prices p and expected supply opportunities r if
uh(dh(p, r, wh)) < uh(dh(p; r, wh)), where r is
related to r as before. There is rationing on the
market of commodity l0 if at least one firm or at
least one household is rationed on the market of
commodity l0 .
Definition An underemployment equilibrium of
the economy
E = ((uh, eh)h , ((Yf, (yfh)h)f) at prices p are
expected supply opportunities r* and an allocation (x*, y*) such that
(a) for every firm f, y*f = sf (p, r*),
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14016
(b) for every household h, x*h = dh(p, r*, w*h),
where w*h = p eh + f yfhpf (p, r*),
(c) hx*h = heh = f y*f.
An example As a simple example, let us consider
an economy with one household, one firm, and two
commodities. Let us interpret the commodities as
leisure and an aggregate consumption good, and
suppose that the household owns initially one unit
of leisure and nothing of the consumption good, e =
(1, 0). The household’s utility function is
Cobb–Douglas, u(x) = x1, x2. The firm transforms
the labour input into output by the production funcpffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
tion y2 ¼ 23 3y1 , where y1 0. When we normalize the price of output to be 1, turning the wage
rate into the real wage rate, it is not hard to verify
that the competitive equilibrium is given by p ¼
ð1, 1Þ, x ¼ 23 , 23 , and y ¼ 13 , 23 .
Now suppose that it is possible to trade at the
competitive equilibrium prices, so p = (1, 1), but
it is not common knowledge that these prices are
competitive, and as a consequence firms and
households form point expectations on supply
opportunities r = (r1, r2). We want to verify
whether such expectations can be self-confirming.
It is easily verified that for each r 1 0, 13 there is
an underemployment equilibrium with p
expected
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2
supply
opportunities
r*
given
by
r
¼
2
3 3r 1 , x
¼ 1 r 1 , r 2 , and y ¼ r 1 , r 2 . The household expects a constraint on labor supply equal to
r 1 yielding labour income r 1. The firm expects a
constraint
on the supply of output equal to r 2 ¼ 23
p
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
3r 1 . It optimally demands an amount of labour
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
equal to r 1 , leading to profits 23 3r 1 r 1 . Notice
that the optimal labour demand by the firm equals
the constraint on labour supply anticipated by the
household.pThe
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi household’s capital income is
2
equal
to
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 3 3r 1 r 1 , leading to total income of
2
3r 1, to be spent on the aggregate consumption
3
good. The optimal demand of the household for
the aggregate consumption good equals the supply opportunities expected by the firm, thereby
confirming those expectations. There is rationing
in both markets. The household is rationed in the
labour market andthe firm
in its output market.
Finally, every r 1 , r 2 with r 1 13 and r 2 23
sustains an underemployment equilibrium that
Underemployment Equilibria
coincides with a competitive equilibrium
in
terms of the allocation reached, x ¼ 23 , 23 ,
y ¼ 13 , 23 . In this case, there is no market
with rationing.
In the example, two extreme underemployment
equilibria stand out. One is the underemployment
equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations about supply opportunities, r* = (0, 0),
x* = (1, 0), y* = (0, 0). The other is the underemployment equilibrium with expectations about supply opportunities that are sufficiently optimistic to
obtain the competitive allocation; the minimally
optimistic
expectations to achieve this are
r ¼ 13 , 23 . These extreme underemployment equilibria are connected by a set of underemployment
equilibria with more moderate expectations on supply opportunities.
In the example, trade was supposed to take
place at competitive prices to highlight underemployment caused by mis-coordination of expectations and not by relative prices that are
incompatible with competitive equilibrium. One
may argue that it is a probability zero event that
trade takes place at competitive prices. The crucial
features of the example remain unchanged when
trade takes place at non-competitive prices. Suppose that trade takes place at a real wage p1 above
the competitive wage rate of 1. It can be verified
that there is still a no-trade equilibrium sustained
by completely pessimistic expectations on
expected supply opportunities. Although the
competitive allocation is no longer feasible when
the real wage is above the competitive level, it
can be verified that there is also an underemployment equilibrium where the firm does not face
rationing and the household observes rationing
of its labour supply; the minimally optimistic
expectations on supply opportunities that sustain
this equilibrium are given by
r ¼
1
2
,
3ðp1 Þ 3p1
leading to consumption and production
x ¼
!
!
2
1
2
,
,
1
,
:
3ðp1 Þ2 3p1
3ðp1 Þ2 3p1
1
Underemployment Equilibria
14017
The same underemployment allocation is
sustained by more optimistic expectations
r1 ¼
1
3ð p1 Þ
2
and r 2
2
:
3p1
Again, the two extreme equilibria are
connected by a continuum of underemployment
equilibria, with expectations ranging from
completely pessimistic to expectations that sustain an underemployment equilibrium without
rationing of the firm and with rationing of the
labour supply of the household.
When the real wage p1 is below the competitive level, there is still an underemployment equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations
about supply opportunities and no trade. There is
also an underemployment equilibrium without
rationing of the supply of the household but with
rationing of q
theffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
firm’s supply of output. Let r 2 be
equal to 4ð
1 þ 3ðp1 Þ2 =6p1 . Notice that r 2 is
below 2/3 when the real wage p1 is below 1. The
minimally optimistic expectations that sustain an
equilibrium without rationing of the household
are given by r ¼ ð1 r 2 =p1 , r 2 Þ leading to an
allocation x ¼ ðr 2 =p1 , r 2 Þ , y ¼ ðr 2 =p1 1r Þ .
The same underemployment equilibrium allocation is sustained by the more optimistic expectations r 1 1 r 2 =p1 and r 2 ¼ r 2 . The two
extreme underemployment equilibria are
connected by a continuum of underemployment
equilibria with more moderate expectations on
supply opportunities.
Animal Spirits
The example suggests that in general there is a
1-dimensional continuum of equilibria, ranging
from a no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations to an equilibrium with rather
optimistic expectations and without rationing in at
least one market. This result is almost true, except
that the case with completely pessimistic supply
expectations leads to zero income for the households, a case that is well-known to be problematic
for equilibrium existence. Inspired by preliminary
results in van der Laan (1982), Herings (1996a,
1998) and Citanna et al. (2001) provide conditions
under which the following result holds.
Theorem Under standard assumptions, the
economy E = ((uh, eh)h, (Yf, (yfh)h)f) where trade
takes place at prices p possesses a connected set
of underemployment equilibria E such that
for every r (0, !), there is an equilibrium
(r*, x*, y*) in E with maxl r l ¼ r. (A set is pathconnected if any two points in the set can be
connected by a path that does not leave the set.
Path-connectedness implies connectedness, a
slightly weaker topological property of sets,
which loosely speaking means that the set consists
of one piece.)
The theorem gives general equilibrium underpinnings to the Keynesian ideas that changes in
expectations, also referred to as animal spirits, can
affect equilibrium economic activity, in particular
the level of output and employment. The theorem
rules out the case with completely pessimistic
expectations, corresponding to maxl r l ¼ 0 . It
shows that the set E links equilibria with arbitrarily pessimistic expectations (maxl r l arbitrarily
small, but positive) to equilibria with rather optimistic expectations ( maxl r l arbitrarily large).
Notice that the condition maxl r l arbitrarily large
only implies that for one market expectations are
sufficiently optimistic to rule out rationing. The
expectations on supply opportunities on other
markets might still be completely pessimistic.
In the absence of production, the statement of
the theorem can be simplified somewhat. It is
shown in Herings (1998), under standard assumptions, that the economy E = ((uh, eh)h) where
trade takes place at prices p possesses a connected set of underemployment equilibria E such
that for every r [0, !) there is an equilibrium
(r*, x*, y*) in E with maxl r l ¼ r . In exchange
economies, the connected set includes an underemployment equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations.
The theorem demonstrates that the set of equilibria is at least 1-dimensional. In general, one
should expect the dimension of the set of equilibria to be exactly equal to 1. The reason is that the
model postulates L free variables corresponding
to the expected supply opportunities r and
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14018
L market clearing conditions. Let E be an
economy where trade takes place at prices p and
let z : RLþ ! RL denote the excess demand function of the economy, a function of expected supply
opportunities r. Because of Walras’s law, it holds
that for every r RLþ , p zðr Þ ¼ 0. This implies
that there are only L - 1 independent market clearing conditions. Since there are L free variables,
this leaves a 1-dimensional solution set.
At this point it should be observed that the
same reasoning also applies to the standard competitive model. And indeed, in general the set of
competitive equilibria is 1-dimensional too.
Whenever (p*, x*, y*) constitutes a competitive
equilibrium, so does (lp*, x*, y*) for l positive.
However, in the standard competitive model, the
excess demand function is homogeneous of
degree 1, implying that the same allocation is
sustained by p* and lp*. The homogeneity property holds for prices but not for expectations. In
general, the excess demand function z is not
homogeneous of any degree, and it is not the
case that lr* is part of an underemployment equilibrium when r* is. Generically, the set E of the
theorem contains a 1-dimensional set of distinct
equilibrium allocations.
Coordination Failures
The theorem makes clear that a multiplicity of
equilibria results even when prices are competitive. The interpretation of the multiplicity of equilibria as coordination failures and the link to the
macroeconomic literature on coordination failures
were made in Drèze (1997). It would be tempting
to conclude that, when trade takes place at competitive prices, then the connected set of underemployment equilibria contains the competitive
equilibrium allocation. Although it is true that
the competitive equilibrium allocation is an
underemployment equilibrium allocation sustained by trade at competitive prices coupled
with sufficiently optimistic expectations, it is possible to produce examples where it is outside the
connected set of the theorem (Citanna et al. 2001).
Under an additional assumption akin to gross
substitutability, the following result holds. If trade
Underemployment Equilibria
takes place at competitive equilibrium prices p,
then the economy E = ((uh, eh)h, (Yf, (yfh)h)f) possesses a connected set of underemployment equilibria E such that for every r (0, !) there is an
equilibrium (r*, x*, y*) in E with maxl r l ¼ r ,
and for every r (0, !) there is an equilibrium
(r*, x*, y*) in E with minl r l ¼ r. More precisely,
the following assumption on the aggregate excess
demand function suffices. If r, r ℝLþ with r r
and r l0 ¼ r l0 , then zl0 ðr Þ zl0 ðr Þ. The interpretation
of the assumption is the following. A weak
increase in expected supply opportunities in markets different from l0 should lead to a weak
increase in the excess demand for commodity l0 .
This assumption, though strong, is not unreasonable. On the household side, a household may
lower its supply of commodity l0 in exchange for
more supply of another commodity, for instance if
the household switches to a more attractive job.
A household may also increase its demand for
commodity l0 as a consequence of higher income.
Indeed, more expected supply opportunities of
commodities different from l0 weakly increase
the household’s income, which will lead to more
demand of commodity l0 if it is a normal good. On
the producer side, if l0 is an output for some firm,
then increased supply opportunities of other
goods, lead to a weakly lower supply of commodity l0 , when the firm directs more inputs to the
production of the other goods. If l0 is an input for
a firm, then increased supply opportunities of
other goods naturally lead to more production,
and thereby an increased input demand, in particular for commodity l0 . Notice that the assumption
needs to hold only in the aggregate.
Efficiency
It is not hard to argue that underemployment equilibria are not Pareto optimal in general. As soon as
there are two commodities, l and l0 , and two
households h and h0 , such that household h0 is
rationed in the market for commodity l0 but not
in the market for commodity l, whereas household
h is not rationed in the market for commodity l0 ,
then it follows almost immediately that the marginal rate of substitution of commodity l for l0 is
Underemployment Equilibria
not the same for households h and h0 . This contradicts Pareto optimality.
It has been argued before that price rigidities
may emerge for efficiency reasons. The argument
of the previous paragraph makes clear that such
is not the case in a complete markets setting
when coordination failures are absent. In an
incomplete market setting, however, Drèze and
Gollier (1993) and Herings and Polemarchakis
(2005) show that price rigidities may lead to equilibria that are Pareto superior to competitive equilibria. In general, it will depend on the magnitude
of the coordination failures, whether or not welfare improvements result.
Extensions
For illustrative purposes, we have so far considered the simplest case where trade takes place at
predetermined prices for all commodities. It is not
hard to generalize this set-up substantially, and
allow for general lower bounds p and upper
bounds p that define the set of admissible prices
at which trade may take place. The notion of
underemployment equilibrium should then be
extended by the requirement that only when the
price of a commodity l equals its lower bound is
rationing of the supply of commodity l allowed
for. In such a more general setting, it may be
interesting to also allow for demand rationing
when the price of a commodity equals its upper
bound.
Allowing for demand rationing will enlarge the
set of equilibria. By taking all pl equal to 1 and
all pl to 1, we obtain the notion of competitive
equilibrium as a special case. The results we mentioned before remain true in this more general
set-up.
The existence of a continuum of underemployment equilibria is a robust phenomenon. This
seems to be in striking contrast with the conclusion of the fixprice literature, where equilibria are
typically locally unique. The reason for this apparent disparity is that the fixprice literature puts one
additional constraint on the equilibrium set. It is
assumed that there is no rationing in the market of
14019
an a priori determined numeraire commodity,
called money. Not only is the interpretation of
one of the commodities as money controversial,
it is also misleading as far as the indeterminacy of
equilibrium is concerned.
Suppose we follow Drèze and Polemarchakis
(2001) and extend the model by a model of a
central bank, which produces money at no cost.
Households and firms need money to make transactions, a particular example being a cash-inadvance transactions technology. The central
bank sets the nominal interest rate at which it
accommodates all money demand. The central
bank redistributes the revenues from seigniorage
to the households in the form of dividends. Money
does not enter into the utility function of the
households.
This model fits exactly into the framework
discussed so far. Without loss of generality, commodity L may serve as money. The central bank
can be modelled as firm F, which can produce the
output money in arbitrary amounts without using
inputs. The profits of firm F are equal to the seigniorage of the central bank. The price of money is
equal to the interest rate. Since the central bank
accommodates money demand, the money supply
of the central bank is equal to that of a profitmaximizing firm F that expects a constraint on
the supply of commodity L equal to the aggregate
demand for commodity L (for strictly positive
interest rates). Our theorem on the existence of a
connected set of underemployment equilibria
therefore applies to the case where money is explicitly introduced, thereby contradicting the determinacy results obtained in the fixprice literature.
We have shown how underemployment equilibria result in a general equilibrium model where
agents are allowed to form expectations on
expected supply opportunities. We analyse
whether such expectations can be self-confirming
and argue that, even at competitive prices, a
continuum of equilibria results, including an equilibrium with approximately no trade and a competitive equilibrium. Such equilibria also arise at
other price systems, but are then a consequence of
both self-confirming pessimistic expectations
and of prices incompatible with competitive equilibrium. Expected supply opportunities in
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14020
underemployment equilibria bear a close resemblance to the self-justifying expectations of
Keynes (1936), beliefs which are individually
rational but socially suboptimal. The further
study of underemployment equilibria in models
with time and uncertainty, incomplete markets,
price-setting agents, and a monetary authority features prominently on the research agenda, as it
would allow for explicit links with the modern
macroeconomic literature on inflation, output
and unemployment.
See Also
▶ Determinacy and Indeterminacy of Equilibria
▶ Existence of General Equilibrium
▶ Fixprice Models
▶ General Equilibrium (New Developments)
▶ Involuntary Unemployment
▶ Money and General Equilibrium
▶ Rationing
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Drèze, J. 1989. Labour management, contracts and capital
markets: A general equilibrium approach. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Drèze, J. 1997. Walras–Keynes equilibria-coordination
and macroeconomics. European Economic Review
41: 1735–1762.
Drèze, J., and C. Gollier. 1993. Risk sharing on the labour
market. European Economic Review 37: 1457–1482.
Drèze, J., and H. Polemarchakis. 2001. Monetary equilibria. In Economics essays: A Festschrift for Werner
Hildenbrand, ed. G. Debreu, W. Neuefeind, and
W. Trockel. Heidelberg: Springer.
Grandmont, J.-M. 1977. Temporary general equilibrium
theory. Econometrica 45: 535–572.
Herings, P. 1996a. Equilibrium existence results for economies with price rigidities. Economic Theory 7: 63–80.
Herings, P. 1996b. Static and dynamic aspects of general
disequilibrium theory. Theory and decision library
series C: Game theory, mathematical programming
and operations research. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Herings, P. 1997. Endogenously determined price rigidities. Economic Theory 9: 471–498.
Herings, P. 1998. On the existence of a continuum of
constrained equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Economics 30: 257–273.
Herings, P., and H. Polemarchakis. 2005. Pareto improving
price regulation when the asset market is incomplete.
Economic Theory 25: 135–154.
Jones, L., and R. Manuelli. 1992. The coordination problem and equilibrium theories of recessions. American
Economic Review 82: 451–471.
Keynes, J.M. 1936. The general theory of employment,
interest and money. London: Macmillan.
Kurz, M. 1982. Unemployment equilibrium in an economy
with linked prices. Journal of Economic Theory 26:
100–123.
Roberts, J. 1987. An equilibrium model with involuntary
unemployment at flexible, competitive prices and
wages. American Economic Review 77: 856–874.
Saari, D. 1985. Iterative price mechanisms. Econometrica
53: 1117–1131.
Saari, D., and C. Simon. 1978. Effective price mechanisms.
Econometrica 46: 1097–1125.
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van der Laan, G. 1982. Simplicial approximation of unemployment equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Economics 9: 83–97.
Younès, Y. 1975. On the role of money in the process of
exchange and the existence of a non-Walrasian equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 42: 489–501.
Unemployment
Unemployment
Robert Topel
Abstract
The unemployed are individuals who are
without work but who are actively seeking
employment. The unemployment rate is the
percentage of the labour force – the total number of people either working or seeking work –
that is unemployed. The evidence suggests
that the ‘natural rate’ of unemployment
(or non-employment) is not a constant towards
which the labour market converges; rather, it
varies with labour market fundamentals.
Keywords
Disability insurance; Labour market institutions; Layoffs; Natural rate of unemployment;
Phillips curve; Search models of unemployment;
Unemployment;
Unemployment
insurance
JEL Classifications
J6
The unemployed are individuals who are without
work but who are actively seeking employment.
The unemployment rate is the percentage of the
labour force – the total number of people either
working or seeking work – that is unemployed.
Economists and others are interested in unemployment because it says something – we are not sure
exactly what – about the economic conditions generally and the success or failure of economic policy.
Some amount of unemployment is both inevitable and efficient because economic fundamentals are stochastic and information is costly. This
point was memorialized in the natural rate
hypothesis of Friedman (1968), Phelps (1974),
and Alchian (1969). As Friedman put it:
‘The natural rate of unemployment’... is the level
that would be ground out by the Walrasian system
14021
of general equilibrium equations, provided there is
embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of labor and commodity markets, including
market imperfections, stochastic variability in
demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities,
the costs of mobility, and so on.
This point may seem obvious today, but its
origins are fairly modern – the 1960s were not
so long ago in the history of economic theory. The
contributions of Friedman, Phelps and Alchian
were reactions to the place of unemployment in
Keynesian models, which posited a stable tradeoff between unemployment and inflation – the
‘Phillips curve’. But their broader impact was to
establish that unemployment is an equilibrium
phenomenon that occurs for the reasons stated
above. This view has framed virtually all subsequent research on unemployment, and its formalization is a continuing research endeavour.
Formalization began with the search theories
of McCall (1970), Mortensen (1970), and Gronau
(1971); see Rogerson et al. (2005) for a modern
survey. The subsequent ‘islands’ metaphor of
Lucas and Prescott (1974) established a formal
analysis of equilibrium unemployment. See
search models of unemployment.
Data on unemployment are collected by government statistical agencies, based on household
surveys that follow more or less uniform standards and definitions in developed countries. For
example, in the United States unemployment statistics are collected monthly as part of the Current
Population Survey, administered by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, which is a rotating sample of
roughly 60,000 households that records (among
other things) respondents’ self-reported labour
market activities during the previous week. Jobless persons who have engaged in some effort to
find employment in the past four weeks, or who
are awaiting recall to a previous job, are recorded
as unemployed. Jobless persons who do not report
search activities are recorded as ‘out of the labour
force’.
In a dynamic economy people may be unemployed for many reasons. Young, new entrants to
the labour force seek employment, and, as in
marriage, it is typically not a good strategy to
U
14022
take the first opportunity that comes along. Other
unemployed individuals may have left their previous job to look for something better, or they may
have been permanently laid off from a previous
job because of changing market conditions. Still
others may be on temporary layoff, anticipating
recall by their previous employer. These examples
demonstrate that unemployment (and other labour
force ‘states’) is inherently dynamic: the stock of
unemployed is ever–changing, and is determined
by labour market flows. New individuals are constantly joining the ranks of the unemployed via
quits, layoffs, or entry to the labour force – the
inflow to unemployment – while other unemployed job seekers locate and accept new jobs,
or choose to stop looking – the outflow from
unemployment. Changes in either flow affect the
level of unemployment.
No brief overview can do justice to the vast
literature on unemployment, nor can it evaluate
the myriad social polices – such as unemployment
insurance, public employment agencies or
‘active’ labour market programmes – that are
meant to reduce unemployment or soften its
impact on individuals. (Layard et al. 1991, is a
slightly dated survey of key issues.) So my aims
are more modest. I will summarize key facts about
unemployment in the United States, and the
factors that have affected the evolution of unemployment, while drawing parallels with other
developed economies. Following the arguments
in Juhn, Murphy and Topel (JMT) (1991, 2002)
and Murphy and Topel (1987, 1997), I provide
evidence of a long-term decline in the relative
demands for less-skilled workers, so the rewards
to employment have declined for marginal
workers. This would raise the ‘natural rate’ of
unemployment, but the story is complicated by
the fact that some of the unemployed eventually
leave the labour force. Over the long run, these
changes in economic fundamentals increase
joblessness – the total of unemployment and nonparticipation. This means that current unemployment data have a much different interpretation
than in the past. For example, the US unemployment rates of 1974, 1997 and 2006 were about
equal, at 4.9% of the labour force. Yet nonparticipation among prime-aged men rose from
Unemployment
5.2 per cent in 1974 to 8.2 per cent in 1987 and
9.4 per cent in 2006. The reason is that many
among the least-skilled had given up searching
for work – they were no longer counted as unemployed, but changing labour market forces had left
them jobless.
Labour Market Flows and the Evolution
of Unemployment
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the male
unemployment rate in the United States and several other developed economies since 1965, using
comparable definitions. (I present evidence on
men because women’s labour force participation
is typically more varied.)
Focusing on long-term changes, the key message is that unemployment drifted upward in most
industrial countries, but especially in Western
Europe. The United States is an exception – in
comparison with Western Europe, the United
States had relatively high unemployment in the
1960s, but substantially lower relative unemployment after about 1990.
Figure 1 also highlights the recent return to
‘low’ unemployment in the United States. By
2000 the US unemployment rate had reached its
lowest level in 30 years, and unemployment rates
in 1999–2000 were close to the extremely low
rates seen during the late 1960s. This is the culmination of a long downward trend in unemployment: the peak unemployment rates in the
recessions of 1982–1983, 1991–1992 and
2001–2002 were progressively lower over time,
reversing the trend of rising peaks between the
1970–1971, 1974–1975 and 1982–1983 recessions. (The recession of 1980 did not fit this pattern but as, seen in the figure, did not represent
much of a peak in terms of unemployment rates.)
It appears that US unemployment has come full
circle: unemployment rose for 15 years (from
1968 to 1983), and then fell over the next
17 years (from 1983 to 2000), with intervening
cyclical swings. One might conclude from these
data that the labour market conditions of the late
1960s and late 1990s were comparable. But in fact
the decline in unemployment masks more
Unemployment
14023
14.0
United States
France
Sweden
Germany
Unemployment Rate
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
0.0
1965
2.0
Year
Unemployment, Fig. 1 Unemployment rates in the United States and selected countries, 1965–2005 (Source: produced
by author)
14.0
United States
Canada
United Kingdom
Australia
12.0
Unemployment rate
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
U
2005
2003
1999
2001
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1983
1985
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
0.0
1965
2.0
Year
Unemployment, Fig. 2 Unemployment rates in the United States and selected countries, 1965–2005 (Source: produced
by author)
14024
Unemployment
fundamental changes in labour market flows,
driven largely by changes in labour demand that
have affected less skilled workers.
The level of unemployment is determined by
labour market flows in and out joblessness. One
reason for the divergence of US and European
unemployment rates is the importance of very
long unemployment spells in Europe. According
to data collected by the OECD, the average duration of unemployment spells in France, Germany
or Sweden is over 1 year, compared with only
4 months in the United States. (For Sweden,
I count individuals enrolled in active labour market programmes, which are required of persons
who have not found employment within a fixed
number of months.) For OECD Europe as a
whole, about 45 per cent of all unemployment
spells last more than one year, compared with
only 12 per cent in the United States. This means
that transitions out of unemployment in Europe
occur more slowly, which (other transitions equal)
raises the unemployment rate.
Suppose there are only two labour market
‘states,’ employment (E) and unemployment
(U). Denote by lEU the instantaneous transition
(hazard) rate from E to U – the inflow to
unemployment – and let lEU be the corresponding
hazard for transitions from U to E – the outflow
from unemployment. If these transition rates are
constant over time and across individuals, then the
probability that an individual is unemployed at
any date is simply:
u~ ¼
lEU
lEU þ lUE
(1)
Under these assumptions, Eq. 1 is also the
unemployment rate in a large population of identical individuals, with corresponding employment
rate e ¼ 1 u~. Equation 1 accords with the intuition about labour market flows stated earlier: the
unemployment rate will be higher the greater the
rate of inflow to unemployment, lEU, or the
smaller the rate of outflow from unemployment,
lEU. In this simple setup the expected duration of
an unemployment spell is D ¼ l1
UE , so policies,
institutions or events that increase the duration of
spells will increase measured unemployment. In
an accounting sense this is why unemployment in
Europe is so high – the unemployed remain so for
a very long time. Why are unemployment durations so long in Europe and relatively short in the
United States? I return to this issue below.
Equation 1 demonstrates the key elements of
labour market flows, but it isn’t very satisfactory
as an empirical tool, for (at least) two reasons.
First, as noted above, some jobless individuals
are not actively seeking employment, at least by
the definitions of labour market surveys, and are
categorized as ‘out of the labour force’ (O). Yet
many of these ‘non-participants’ do take jobs, and
they may join the ranks of the unemployed by
initiating job search. We can accommodate these
facts by adding ‘O’ as a third labour market state,
which also adds more transition possibilities
(lOE,lEOlUO and so on). Second, labour market
flows are obviously not constant – they vary over
time and generate corresponding fluctuations in
employment, unemployment and labour force
participation. So let transition rates be timevarying (for example, lEU(t) is the hazard rate
from E to U at time t). Define e(t), U(t) and o(t)
as the fractions of the relevant population that are
employed, unemployed or out of the labour force
at date t. (The unemployment rate is the fraction
of the labour force that is unemployed, or u~ðtÞ
uðtÞ
¼ 1o
ðtÞ.) Then the law of motion for u(t) is
duðtÞ
¼ eðtÞlEU ðtÞ þ oðtÞlOU ðtÞ
dt
uðtÞ½lUE ðtÞ þ lUO ðtÞ
(2)
As above, changes in unemployment are
driven by labour-market flows. Other things the
same, the fraction of the population that is unemployed increases when transitions to unemployment rise. These newly unemployed individuals
may have been employed (E) or they may be
previous non-participants (O) who have begun to
search for work. Similarly, unemployment will
fall if transition rates from unemployment rise.
One usually thinks of this in terms of greater
‘job finding’(lUE(t)), but (2) makes clear that
transitions to non-participation – say because of
deteriorating labour market opportunities that
Unemployment
14025
5.5
Entry rate (per month)
1.9%
4.5
1.6%
3.5
1.4%
Duration
(months)
1.1%
2.5
Averag e duration (months)
Entry rates (% per month)
2.1%
0.9%
0.6%
67
72
77
82
Year
87
92
97
1.5
Unemployment, Fig. 3 Entry rates and durations for unemployment, 1967–2000 (Source: produced by author)
reduce the return to continued search – will also
reduce unemployment.
JMT (Juhn et al. 2002) build on (2) to calculate
average entry rates and durations of spells for both
unemployment (U) and non-employment (N =
U + O) among American men from 1967 through
2000. Figure 3 shows their results for unemployment. Through the late 1980s entry rates and durations of unemployment spells showed a common
pattern, rising in recessions and falling in recoveries, with some evidence of a secular increase in
both components. But this tight correspondence
was broken in the 1990s – increased incidence of
spells played a minor role in the recession of
1991–1992, while durations soared. The ensuing
decline in unemployment during the 1990s expansion was driven almost entirely by a reduction in
the incidence of unemployment spells, while durations of unemployment remained high – in fact,
flows into unemployment fell below their levels in
low-unemployment 1960s, while durations were
roughly twice as long. With fewer but longer spells,
the population distribution of unemployment
became much more concentrated than before.
The dichotomy between incidence and duration is more extreme for nonemployment, N,
which measures total joblessness in the population without regard to whether individuals are
searching for a job. The incidence (entry rate) of
jobless spells roughly corresponds with the
incidence of unemployment – compare Fig. 3 –
but durations of non-employment show a steady
increase, more than doubling (to 15 months) since
the 1960s. The sharp increase in average durations
in the 1990s is especially noteworthy, reflecting
the increased proportion of American men who
have simply withdrawn from the labour force.
Why did this occur? In an accounting sense it is
because a large fraction of labour-force ‘withdrawals’ were temporary in earlier decades, but
by the 1990s many men had become ‘full-time’
non-participants. They had left the labour force
and made no efforts to find work, so that average
transition rates from non-employment to employment plummeted (Fig. 4).
Who Are the Jobless?
To get a handle on why this occurred, it is worth
examining the characteristics of those without
jobs. The most basic fact is that unemployment
and overall joblessness are much more common
among the least skilled. Measuring skill by years
of completed schooling, unemployment rates are
higher among those with fewer years of schooling, and they also increase more during recessions. JMT (2002) examine a broader definition
of skill, based on an individual’s position in the
overall wage distribution. (JMT impute wages for
U
14026
Unemployment
16.0
1.6%
14.0
Entry rate (per month)
1.4%
12.0
1.2%
10.0
1.0%
0.8%
8.0
Duration (months)
67
72
77
82
87
92
97
Average duration (months)
Entry rates (% per month)
1.8%
6.0
Year
Unemployment, Fig. 4 Entry rates and durations for non-employment, 1967–2000 (Source: produced by author)
year-round non-workers from the wage distribution of those who work very few weeks. See JMT
2002, for a description of their methods.)
Figure 5a, b show percentages of the population who are unemployed and out of the labour
force (OLF) by percentage intervals of the
wage distribution between 1967 and 2000. As
with education, both unemployment and nonparticipation are more common among the less
skilled, and in each recession their unemployment rates rise most sharply. Up through the
early 1990s, both components of joblessness
showed a secular increase that was concentrated
among low-wage individuals. For unemployment this trend was reversed in the 1990s but
non-participation continued to rise, especially
among the least skilled. By 2000 about 20 per
cent of men whose skills would put them in the
bottom decile of the wage distribution were out
of the labour force, which is more than double the
fraction of non-participants in the 1960s. Adding
the unemployed, by the end of the 1990s nearly
30 per cent of these men were jobless. By comparison, men whose skills put them above the
60th percentile of the wage distribution showed
virtually no long-term increase in either unemployment or nonparticipation. In other words, to
understand rising joblessness in the United
States, we must focus on changes in economic
fundamentals that have affected mainly the lower
end of the skill distribution.
The most obvious explanation is that shifts in
relative labour demands have reduced labour market opportunities available to the least skilled, so
they end up working less. Evidence consistent
with this is the well-documented decline in relative wages among low-skilled workers, shown in
Fig. 6. Between 1970 and 1993, real wages of men
in the first decile of the wage distribution declined
by over 25 per cent, with smaller though still
important declines for all workers below the
median of the wage distribution. The post-1993
growth in real wages, which affected the entire
skill distribution, corresponds to a convergence of
relative fractions of time spent unemployed
(Fig. 5), but non-participation remained quite
high among low-wage workers. The continue
rise in non-participation while real wage grew in
the 1990s suggests a shift in labour supply. Autor
and Duggan (2003, 2006) point to Disability
Insurance (DI), which became relatively more
attractive to low-skill workers who faced a longterm deterioration of labour market opportunities.
They document that participation continued to fall
because DI subsidized non-work, which was most
attractive to low-skilled workers. In earlier times
these individuals would have spent transitory
periods of unemployment or non-participation,
but they would have remained attached to the
labour force over the long run. By 2000, many
less skilled individuals – faced with declining
working opportunities – had simply withdrawn.
Unemployment
14027
Unemployment (% of weeks)
a 20.0%
16.0%
12.0%
1 to 10
11 to 20
21 to 40
41 to 60
61 to 100
8.0%
4.0%
0.0%
67
72
77
82
87
92
97
Year
OLF rate (% of weeks)
b 25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
1 to 10
11 to 20
21 to 40
41 to 60
61 to 100
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
67
72
77
82
Year
87
92
97
Unemployment, Fig. 5 (a) Unemployment rates by wage percentile groups, 1967–2000 (Source: produced by author).
(b) Out of labour force rates by wage percentile groups, 1967–2000 (Source: produced by author)
Conclusion: US and European
Unemployment Revisited
The broad message of the above evidence is
that the ‘natural rate’ of unemployment (or
non-employment) is not a constant towards
which the labour market converges; rather it
varies with labour market fundamentals – as originally suggested by Phelps (1974). But why have
unemployment rates evolved so differently in
the United States and Europe? A compelling interpretation is that differences in labour market
institutions generate differences in measured
unemployment despite similarities in labour
market fundamentals. In the United States, the
maximum duration of unemployment insurance
(UI) is dtypically six months, and the fraction of
earnings replaced by UI is about half. Aside from
DI, income support for the long-term jobless is
comparatively low. These features may accelerate
job-finding among those with marketable skills
but weaken labour force attachment among the
least skilled, whose opportunities have deteriorated. Then long jobless durations among the
least skilled show up in labour force withdrawal.
In Europe, UI coverage is much more liberal in
terms of both the level and duration of benefits, so
those who would leave the labour force in the
U
14028
Unemployment
Index real wage (1970 = 100)
120.0
110.0
100.0
1 to 10
11 to 20
21 to 40
41 to 60
61 to 100
90.0
80.0
70.0
1967
1972
1977
1982
Year
1987
1992
1997
Unemployment, Fig. 6 Indexed real wages by percentile group, 1967–2000 (Source: produced by author)
United States are counted as long-term unemployed. The forces at work and the employment
prospects of affected workers are not as different
as standard unemployment statistics may suggest.
See Also
▶ Labour Market Search
▶ Labour Supply
▶ Search Models of Unemployment
▶ Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross
Country Differences
▶ Unemployment Insurance
▶ Unemployment Measurement
Bibliography
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utilization. Western Economic Journal 7: 109–128.
Autor, D.H., and Mark G. Duggan. 2003. The rise in the
disability rolls and the decline in unemployment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118: 157–205.
Autor, H., and Mark G. Duggan. 2006. The growth in the
Social Security disability rolls: A fiscal crisis unfolding.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (3): 71–96.
Friedman, M. 1968. The role of monetary policy. American
Economic Review 58: 1–17.
Gronau, R. 1971. Information and frictional unemployment. American Economic Review 61: 290–301.
Juhn, C., K.M. Murphy, and R.H. Topel. 1991. Why has
the natural rate of unemployment increased over time?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1991 (1):
75–126.
Juhn, C., K.M. Murphy, and R.H. Topel. 2002.
Current unemployment, historically contemplated.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2002 (1):
79–136.
Layard, R., S. Nickell, and R. Jackman. 1991. Unemployment: Macroeconomic performance and the labour
market. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ljungqvist, L., and T.J. Sargent. 1998. The European
unemployment dilemma. Journal of Political Economy
106: 514–550.
Lucas, R., and E. Prescott. 1974. Equilibrium search and
unemployment. Journal of Economic Theory 4:
103–124.
McCall, J. 1970. Economics of information and job search.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 113–126.
Mortensen, D. 1970. A theory of wage and employment
dynamics. In Microeconomic foundations of employment and inflation theory, ed. E.S. Phelps et al.
New York: W.W. Norton.
Murphy, K.M., and R.H. Topel. 1987. The evolution of
unemployment in the United States. In NBER macroeconomics annual 1987, ed. S. Fischer. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Murphy, K.M., and R.H. Topel. 1997. Unemployment and
nonemployment. American Economic Review 187:
295–300.
Phelps, E.S. 1974. Economic policy and unemployment in
the 1960s. The Public Interest 34(Winter), 30–46.
Rogerson, R., R. Shimer, and R. Wright. 2005. Searchtheoretic models of the labor market: A survey. Journal
of Economic Literature 43: 959–988.
Topel, R.H. 1993. What have we learned from empirical
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Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences
Unemployment and Hours of Work,
Cross Country Differences
Richard Rogerson
14029
differences in labour market outcomes – specifically in terms of unemployment rates and hours of
work – that exist across rich industrialized economies. A large literature has emerged that documents the nature of these differences and seeks to
determine which factors can account for them.
This article provides a brief overview of this
literature.
Abstract
Since the 1960s labour market outcomes
among the world’s richest economies have
changed dramatically, especially in terms of
unemployment rates and time devoted to market work. This article summarizes the evidence
regarding these changes and discusses some of
the explanations that have been proposed for
why these labour market outcomes have
evolved so differently across economies.
Keywords
Barriers to entry; Common shock; Crosscountry differences in unemployment and
hours worked; Employment protection; Home
production; Hours worked; Income support;
Labour market regulation; Layoffs; Leisure;
Neoclassical growth theory; Product market
regulation; Productivity growth; Skill-biased
technical change; Technical change; Time
use; Unemployment; Unemployment insurance; Wage dispersion; Wage rigidity; Wage
setting institutions
Cross-Country Differences
in Unemployment
The literature on cross-country differences in
unemployment was motivated by a simple real
world development: a large and persistent rise in
unemployment in several continental European
countries relative to the United States, starting in
the mid-1970s. Figure 1 displays this fact by
showing the evolution of unemployment rates
since 1956 for the United States and the average
of four economies from Continental Europe:
Belgium, France, Germany and Italy.
As the figure reveals, prior to 1970 the unemployment rate in these European countries averaged around three per cent, while since 1990 it has
averaged more than ten per cent. This dramatic
increase is concentrated in the period 1975–85. In
contrast, while the United States also experienced
12
D4; D10
Understanding the forces that determine resource
allocations in decentralized economies is one of
the fundamental objectives of economics.
Because countries often differ greatly in terms of
economic policies and institutions, examining
how resource allocations differ across countries
provides a promising opportunity to learn about
these forces. Conversely, when we see large differences in allocations across countries, we are
presented with an important opportunity to learn
about what factors can generate these large differences. One prominent case in point is the large
10
Unemployment rate
JEL Classifications
Continental Europe
United States
8
6
U
4
2
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
Year
1990
2000
2010
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country
Differences, Fig. 1 Unemployment in the United States
and Continental Europe (Source: OECD Labor Market
Database)
14030
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences
an increase in average unemployment during the
1975–85 period, this increase is only transitory;
the US unemployment rate has averaged close to
five per cent in both the early and later time
periods. Faced with this dramatic change in relative unemployment rates across countries, economists were naturally led to ask why. Based on the
time series plots in Fig. 1, an answer to this question had to address two important issues:
1. Why did the increase occur in the 1975–85
period?
2. Why did it occur in some countries and not in
others?
At a general level, one can imagine two classes
of explanations. One class postulates that something changed in one set of economies during the
period 1975–85 but not in the others. A second
class postulates that something changed in all economies during the 1975–85 period, but that economies responded in different ways to this change
due to differences in their institutions or policies.
Krugman (1994) was the first to suggest that an
explanation of the second type seemed promising.
His story emphasized that the process of skillbiased technological change became more prominent beginning in the 1970s, thereby creating an
economic force tending to increase the dispersion
in individual wages. Although all economies were
subjected to this underlying change in technological progress, this change was propagated differently across economies. In the United States,
wage setting institutions were ‘flexible’ and the
result was increased wage dispersion and little
change in unemployment. In the economies of
Continental Europe, wage setting institutions
were ‘rigid’ and did not allow wages to become
more dispersed, so the result was instead an
increase in unemployment. While subsequent
work (see for example, Card et al. 1999) did not
provide support for this story, at least in its simplest
form, the contribution was important because it
suggested an important class of explanations.
The issue of rigorously distinguishing between
the two classes of explanations was subsequently
taken up in a paper by Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000). Based on statistical analysis, these authors
argued that the ‘common shock’ story was most
promising. The force of this conclusion is tempered
somewhat by two features of the analysis. First, the
result that the ‘different shocks’ explanation does
not provide a good account of the data is very much
dependent on what shocks are explicitly incorporated in the analysis. In particular, Blanchard and
Wolfers did not incorporate the fact that taxes
changed considerably over this time period, a
point we will return to below. Second, their analysis did not attempt to identify what the important
common shock(s) were, and did not construct
an explicit model to quantify how various institutions affected the propagation of these shocks.
However, making use of advances in general equilibrium modelling of unemployment (such as the
Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides matching model
or the Lucas–Prescott island model), subsequent
work has sought to remedy this limitation by quantitatively evaluating particular candidates from the
‘common shock’ class of explanations in the context of fully specified models.
An early example in this literature was Bertola
and Ichino (1995). They argued that the common
shock was a permanent increase in the transient
nature of production opportunities. The key differences in economic institutions were wage setting institutions that compressed wages and
employment protection policies that made layoffs
prohibitively costly. Several alternative analyses
have since followed. Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998) argue that the common shock was a permanent increase in the amount of ‘turbulence’ for
workers, and that the key institutional difference
is generosity of income support for displaced
workers. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and
Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) both construct
models in which the common shock was skillbiased technological change. While Mortensen
and Pissarides stress differences in unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits and employment protection as the key institutional differences, Marimon
and Zilibotti simply stress differences in UI benefits. Closely related, Hornstein et al. (2007) argue
that the common shock is an increase in the rate of
capital embodied technological change and that
the key institutional differences are taxes, income
support programmes, and employment protection.
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences
While explanations of the ‘common shock’
variety have become popular in the literature,
some researchers have argued against them.
Using purely statistical methods, Nickell
et al. (2006) challenge the Blanchard and Wolfers
finding. In terms of model based analyses, Daveri
and Tabellini (2000) argue that differences in the
changes in tax rates between Continental Europe
and the United States were central to understanding the different evolutions in unemployment
rates. They also argue that the impact of higher
taxes is very much influenced by wage setting
institutions, thereby explaining why some other
European countries that also experienced large
increases in tax rates did not experience sharp
increases in unemployment. This last point – that
the effects of individual policies and institutions
are not additive – has recently been emphasized
by both Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) and Pries
and Rogerson (2005). Another model-based analysis is contained in Pissarides (2007). He argues
that a significant part of the relative increase in
European unemployment is associated with the
slowing of productivity growth that came as European productivity converged to US levels.
The literature has made important headway in
evaluating specific combinations of driving forces
and propagation mechanisms, but there is still
much more work to be done. First, much of the
work to date has contrasted the behaviour of the
United States with an average European country.
Given the substantial heterogeneity within
Europe, in terms of both policies and outcomes,
it is desirable to push these exercises to consider
outcomes on a country-by-country basis. Second,
as noted above, the literature has focused almost
exclusively on accounting for the rise in unemployment in a handful of European economies
since 1970. There are also many other interesting
14031
episodes in the data. For example, Spain, the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands all experienced dramatic increases in unemployment similar to those documented earlier, but each of these
countries has subsequently experienced a sharp
decrease in unemployment. Understanding the
sources of these dynamics should also prove to
be very valuable.
While the above discussion has focused on the
efforts to understand the sharply different evolutions of unemployment across a small set of countries since the 1970s, the broader research issue is
to understand the quantitative consequences of
various policy and institutional features on aggregate unemployment. Alvarez and Veracierto
(1999) is one example of work that fits with this
more general objective. As motivation for this
general question one need only look at the distribution of unemployment rates across countries at
any point in time. For example, Table 1 shows the
distribution of unemployment rates in 2005.
As the reader can see, the dispersion of unemployment rates across countries is large. Understanding the forces that shape this distribution of
outcomes remains an open and challenging
research issue.
Other Measures of Labour Market
Outcomes
If one thinks more carefully about characterizing
resource allocations across countries, and specifically as this pertains to the labour market, it
becomes clear that differences in unemployment
rates may not be the best summary measure of
differences in labour market allocations. The
benchmark conceptual framework for modern
thinking about aggregate resource allocation is
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences, Table 1 Unemployment rates (2005)
u < 4.5
NZ (3.7)
Ireland (4.3)
Japan (4.4)
Switzerland (4.5)
4.5 < u <6
Norway (4.6)
UK (4.6)
Denmark (4.8)
Australia (5.1) US (5.1)
Netherlands (5.2) Austria (5.2)
Source: OECD Labor Market Database
6 < u <8
Canada (6.8)
Portugal (7.6)
Italy (7.7)
Sweden (7.7)
u >8
Belgium (8.1)
Finland (8.4)
Spain (9.2)
France (9.8) Germany (11.2)
U
14032
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences
the one-sector neoclassical growth model. This
model stresses two margins that economists
believe to be of first-order importance in thinking
about aggregate allocations: the fraction of available time that is devoted to market work, and the
fraction of output that is invested rather than consumed. Viewed from this perspective, the unemployment rate is the natural summary statistic to
focus on only if it is a good measure of time
devoted to market work. Historically, the framework of traditional Keynesian models assumed
that this was indeed the case: the simple versions
of these models assumed that labour supply is
represented as some constant volume of available
hours that was unaffected by any aspects of the
economic environment. The only reason that
observed hours of work would differ from this
given value was unemployment. In such a conceptual framework, unemployment and total
hours of work provide exactly the same information. But is this conceptual framework adequate to
examine labour allocations in modern industrialized economies? Developments such as the rise of
female labour force participation, the trend
towards early retirement, the changing workweek,
and the expansion of part-time work suggest that
to view labour supply as a fixed volume of work
determined only by the size of the population is to
neglect some important economic forces.
To pursue this issue further it is instructive to
take a closer look at the data. We look at data for
2005, but the basic messages of the analysis are not
affected by the choice of year. Table 2 reports hours
of work across countries, organizing the countries
into four groups based on their hours worked. For
each country, aggregate hours of work are computed as the product of two series from the OECD
Labor Market Database: total civilian employment
and annual hours of work per person in employment. It is important to note that the measure of
annual hours of work per person in employment in
this data-set attempts to take into account not only
the length of the standard workweek but also the
number of statutory holidays, sick days and vacation days. To compare aggregate hours of work
across countries one has to make some normalization based on population. One could imagine
different normalizations, such as the entire population, the adult population (those aged 15 and over),
or the working-age population (those aged 15–64).
The resulting patterns are not much affected by this
choice, and the numbers reported in Table 2 are
based on dividing total hours by the size of the
working age population.
The correlation between unemployment rates
and hours of work in the 2005 cross section is
0.58, indicating a fairly sizable negative correlation. This negative correlation is reflected in the
fact that Germany and France are both among the
highest unemployment countries as well as the
lowest hours-worked countries, while New
Zealand is the lowest unemployment country
and the highest hours-worked country. However,
there are also several counter-examples to this
pattern. The Netherlands and Norway, for example, have hours worked and unemployment rates
that are both substantially below the average,
while Canada has unemployment and hours of
work that are both substantially above average.
We conclude from this that even at a qualitative
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences, Table 2 Annual hours worked per person aged
15–64 (2005)
h < 1,000
Belgium (941)
Germany (954)
France (961)
Netherlands (979)
1,000 < h < 1,150
Norway (1,044)
Italy (1,046)
Ireland (1,122)
Austria (1,134)
Spain (1,145)
Source: OECD Labor Market Database
1,150 < h < 1,300
Finland (1,167)
Denmark (1,191)
Sweden (1,193)
Portugal (1,213)
UK (1,240)
Canada (1,284) Switzerland (1,286)
h > 1,300
Australia (1,323)
Japan (1,333)
US (1,339)
NZ (1,386)
level differences in hours of work and differences
in unemployment are sometimes quite distinct.
But more importantly, even when differences
in hours of work and differences in unemployment describe similar situations qualitatively, the
quantitative differences are dramatically different.
For example, consider the following question. If
the unemployment rate in a country such as
France were reduced to the same level as the
United States by placing some currently unemployed French people into employment, and having them work the same amount as those French
people who are currently working, by how much
would the gap in hours worked between France
and the United States drop? The answer is that the
gap would drop from its current value of 378 to
343, a decrease of less than ten per cent. From a
pure accounting perspective, differences in unemployment rates are an almost insignificant component of differences in aggregate hours of work. Put
somewhat differently, even if we completely
understood the factors that give rise to observed
differences in unemployment rates, we would
understand practically none of the differences in
hours of work.
Cross-Country Differences in Hours
of Work
The previous section suggests that, if one examines cross-country labour market outcomes from
the perspective of differences in resource allocations across economies, it will be useful to look at
differences in hours of work rather than unemployment rates. An interesting starting point is to
look at the evolution of hours worked for the two
sets of economies depicted earlier in Fig. 1.
Figure 2 presents this information, where the
reader is reminded that in this figure Continental
Europe reflects the simple average for the economies of Belgium, France, Germany and Italy.
Several features are worth noting. Hours of
work in Continental Europe decrease at a fairly
constant rate from 1956 through to the mid-1980s,
at which point they flatten out. The magnitude of
this decrease in hours worked in Europe is
Annual hours per person aged 15−64
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences
14033
1500
Continental Europe
United States
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
1950
1960
1970
1980
Year
1990
2000
2010
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country
Differences, Fig. 2 Hours of work in the United States
and Continental Europe (Sources: OECD Labor Market
Database; GGDC Database)
enormous – a drop of over 35 per cent. In contrast,
hours worked in the United States are virtually the
same in 2005 as they were in 1956, though there
are some low-frequency movements in the series
during this time period. In contrast with the unemployment rate evolutions, it is of particular interest
to note that there is nothing distinctive about the
period 1975–85 from the perspective of the
decline of hours in Europe.
Given the dramatic change in relative hours
worked across these two sets of economies, it is
not surprising that a literature has emerged that
seeks to understand this change. Here too, one can
imagine two different classes of explanations, one
based on changes in some feature of the economic
environment in Continental Europe relative to the
United States, and the other based on a common
change in the economic environments that has
been propagated differently in the two sets of
economies. There are two key differences relative
to the literature on unemployment rates: timing
and magnitude. Because we see changes beginning in the mid-1950s, and continuing at a fairly
constant rate through to the mid-1980s, we presumably need to identify changes that exhibit this
general time series pattern. The second difference
is that we are talking about changes that are
roughly an order of magnitude larger in terms of
implications for hours of work.
U
14034
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences
Interestingly, whereas the unemployment literature has for the most part pursued the ‘common
shocks’ explanation, the hours of work literature
has instead focused on differences in policy
changes across countries. This view has been
heavily influenced by the contribution of Prescott
(2004). He argues that, once cross-country differences in taxes are incorporated into the standard
growth model, hours of work in the United States
and several European economies in both the early
1970s and early 1990s are very close to those
predicted by the model that assumes no other
differences between the different economies.
This general finding is further supported by
Davis and Henrekson (2005), Ohanian et al.
(2006), and Rogerson (2007).
One argument against the tax explanation, as
noted by Alesina et al. (2005), is that it requires an
aggregate labour supply elasticity that is larger
than the individual labour supply elasticities typically found in estimation exercises using micro
data. Recent work suggests that this critique is
misplaced. Chang and Kim (2006) and Rogerson
and Wallenius (2007) both argue that, when
non-convexities are relevant for individual level
labour supply decisions, the tight connection
between micro and macro elasticities is broken.
In particular, both papers argue that reasonable
calibrations imply that small micro elasticities
are consistent with large macro elasticities. Additional discussion can be found in Prescott (2006)
and Rogerson (2006).
While an explanation based on taxes has been
the one most developed to date, there are competing explanations. In work that is closely related
but distinct from the Prescott analysis, Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2007) argue that it is the nature of
benefit programmes in Europe rather than the high
tax rates per se that are responsible for the large
differences in employment rates between the
United States and several European economies.
Interestingly, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007)
argue that large aggregate elasticities are inconsistent with the observed cross-country differences once one properly models benefit
programmes. On a very different note, Blanchard
(2005) has argued that the dominant factor is
differences in preferences across countries. In particular, he suggests that the income effect on leisure is larger in European countries than in the
United States, and as European productivity has
increased to near US levels since the 1960s, Europeans have responded with a larger increase in
leisure than that which occurred earlier in the
United States. An interesting connection between
this explanation and the one based on tax rates is
that it is the income effect that is central to generating the tax effects in the analysis of Prescott.
While the discussion has thus far focused on
understanding the reasons for the very different
evolutions of hours worked between the United
States and Continental Europe, the data in Table 2
reveal a host of other differences that are also of
interest. Rogerson (2006) describes some additional patterns of interest that are found when one
disaggregates the data by age, gender and sector as
well as along the employment and hours per
worker margins. At a general level, the issue is to
understand both qualitatively and quantitatively
how various policies or institutions influence
hours worked in an economy. Prominent examples
of the policies and institutions of interest include
such things as labour market regulations (for example, minimum wages, employment protection),
product market regulation (for example, entry barriers), tax and transfer policies (for example, unemployment insurance, social security, disability),
wage setting practices (for example, importance
of unions, centralized versus decentralized wage
negotiations). In addition to the papers mentioned
earlier, other examples of work that address some
of these issues are Bertrand and Kramarz (2002)
and Messina (2006) for entry barriers, and
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993) for firing taxes.
Economists have also recently begun to examine differences in time allocations across countries. If it is the case that individuals in one
country spend much more time in market work
than individuals in another country, where does
this show up in terms of other uses of time?
Specifically, to what extent do these differences
reflect differences in leisure versus differences
in time devoted to home production? In a
Unemployment and Hours of Work, Cross Country Differences
provocative paper, Freeman and Schettkat (2001)
analysed time use data for American and German
couples in the 1990s and found that total working
time was similar across the two economies, but
that there was a systematic difference in the composition of this total working time: couples in the
United States devoted more time to market work
than German couples, whereas German couples
devoted more time to home production than
American couples. This finding, coupled with
the fact that additional time use surveys have
been initiated both in Europe and the United
States, has spawned a growing literature on the
general issue of time allocations across countries,
including Freeman and Schettkat (2005) and
Hamermesh et al. (2007). Olovsson (2004),
Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) all argue that
modelling home production is important in understanding the differences in hours of market work
across countries.
Conclusions
Labour market outcomes differ dramatically
across industrialized countries along several
dimensions, including hours of work and unemployment. These differences have changed dramatically over time. Understanding the source of
these differences and their evolution over time is a
key challenge for economists, and will likely have
important consequences for policymakers as well
as yield important insights regarding the role of
various factors in shaping labour market outcomes. This article has provided a brief introduction to this line of research. While much progress
has been made to date, much more work remains
to be done.
See Also
▶ Hours Worked (Long-Run Trends)
▶ Labour Market Institutions
▶ Labour Supply
▶ Search Models of Unemployment
▶ Unemployment
14035
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Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment Insurance
Patricia M. Anderson
Abstract
Unemployment insurance (UI) is a social insurance programme in which compensation is paid
to unemployed workers. Much of the research
on UI has focused on the inherent disincentives.
For example, higher benefits have been found to
increase unemployment durations, with little
clear positive impact on the quality of new
jobs. Additionally, financing UI through payroll
taxes that are not completely experience-rated
provides an incentive for firms to lay off
workers. Thus, while UI is an important safety
net for unemployed workers, it may also
increase unemployment overall.
Keywords
Adjustment costs; Consumption smoothing;
Labour demand; Labour supply; Layoffs; Reservation wage; Search models of unemployment; Tax incidence; Unemployment;
Unemployment insurance
JEL Classification
J6
Unemployment insurance (UI) is a social insurance programme whereby compensation is paid to
unemployed workers. The federal–state UI programme in the United States dates from the Social
Security Act of 1935, while many European countries began national programmes even earlier. For
example, the National Insurance Act of 1911
established UI in the United Kingdom, while
Italy and Germany established programmes in
1919 and 1927, respectively.
Institutional Aspects of UI
While specific institutional details differ across
countries, a typical UI programme is limited to
Unemployment Insurance
workers who are unemployed through no fault of
their own (that is, who have neither quit nor been
fired for cause), who are actively looking for
work, and who have a demonstrated attachment
to the labour force, with the benefits being paid for
a limited period of time (see for example,
Atkinson and Micklewright 1991). Typically, the
weekly benefit amount (WBA) is based on previous earnings, using a replacement rate schedule
that is subject to a minimum and maximum WBA.
Financing of UI programmes also differs
across countries. In some cases it is funded out
of general revenues, while in most countries it is
funded by a flat tax levied on employers and
sometimes on employees (see Storey and Niesner
1997 for a complete overview of UI programmes
in the G-7 nations). Empirical evidence from the
United States, though, shows that even when the
tax is levied solely on the employer, the incidence
is largely on the employee (Anderson and Meyer
1997, 2000). In the United States, the employer
tax is also experience-rated. That is, a firm’s tax
rate depends on the use of the UI system by its
previous employees, with new firms typically
charged a rate based on industry experience for
the first few years. While each state has its own
institutions, a typical system can be characterized
by thinking of each firm as having an account with
the state UI authority. Taxes are paid into this
account, and benefits are paid out of it when the
firm lays off employees. A schedule then relates
the balance in this account to a tax rate, subject to
minimum and maximum rates. A high account
balance will merit a lower tax rate, while a lower
(possibly even negative) balance will merit a
higher tax rate. This characterization is a gross
simplification, but captures the basic components
of an experience-rated system.
Economic Incentives of UI
With experience rating, a firm which lays off a
worker today can expect to pay some fraction of
that worker’s benefits through higher tax payments in the future (for early theoretical work,
see Feldstein 1976; Baily 1976; Brechling
1977a, b). For the most common systems used in
14037
the United States, one can calculate this marginal
tax cost (MTC) of a layoff (see for example, Topel
1983; this derivation follows Anderson and
Meyer 1993). Let y be the growth of employment
(that is, Ntþ1 ¼ y Nt ), g be the growth in the
taxable wage base (that is, W tþ1 ¼ gWt ), and
approximate the tax schedule as a linear relationship with slope Z. The tax bill can then be
expressed in terms of benefits paid, N, Wand the
parameters g and . For interest rate i, when benefits paid increase by a dollar, the present value of
the change in this tax bill is
1
X
t¼1
y 2 g2
1 y 2 g2
1þi
1 y2 g 2
t
:
This sum converges to
y2 g 2
;
i þ y2 g 2
which is referred to as the marginal tax cost
(MTC) of a layoff. For firms at the maximum
(or minimum) tax rate, = 0 and this MTC will
be zero, implying that benefits to this firm’s
workers are completely subsidized. Alternatively,
the steeper the slope of the tax schedule the closer
this marginal tax cost is to 1, and the more perfectly experience-rated is the system.
The subsidy inherent from incomplete experience rating provides an incentive to lay off
workers. In fact, Topel (1983) estimates that
incomplete experience rating in the United States
could be responsible for about one-third of
temporary-layoff unemployment spells. More
broadly, the MTC can be thought of as a simple
adjustment cost, implying that tighter experience
rating would not only reduce layoffs in a downturn, but also reduce hiring in a boom, resulting in
decreased employment fluctuations (see for example, Anderson 1993; Card and Levine 1994;
Anderson and Meyer 1994).
More work exists on the employee disincentives of UI than the firm disincentives. Two
simple models imply that higher benefit levels
will result in longer unemployment durations.
First, as shown in Moffitt and Nicholson (1982),
U
14038
incorporating UI into the budget constraint of a
labour supply model results in income and substitution effects which both imply fewer weeks
worked. Similarly, a simple job-search model
implies that higher UI benefits lower the cost of
unemployment, thus increasing the reservation
wage and lowering the probability of accepting a
new job. The result is again an increase in the
duration of unemployment.
The simple job-search model is extended in
Mortensen (1977) to incorporate realistic UI programme features such as minimum work requirements for initial qualification, and limited
duration of benefits. In this model, for the unemployed who are not currently qualified to receive
UI, a new job that could lead to future UI qualification is more valuable the higher the benefit
level. In this case, a negative relationship between
duration and benefit level would be expected.
Allowing benefits to be of limited duration has
additional implications as well. First, the level of
benefits should have no effect on the reservation
wage after they run out. However, search intensity
may increase around exhaustion, implying that
potential duration of benefits may have a direct
effect on unemployment duration.
The economic effects of UI are not all negative.
For example, a job-search model also implies that
increased duration should result in higher-quality
jobs being found. Additionally, UI benefits can
allow individuals to smooth consumption during
unemployment spells. Finally, this consumption
smoothing benefit implies UI can also play an
important role as a macroeconomic stabilizer by
helping maintain aggregate spending. More
broadly, there is a growing literature on optimal
UI which takes into account the need to balance
costs and benefits (see for example, Baily 1978;
Chetty 2006, for partial equilibrium and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997; and Acemoglu
and Shimer 1999 for general equilibrium
analyses).
Unemployment Insurance
relationship between duration and benefit levels.
For example, studies of UI recipients in the United
Kingdom have found elasticities of around 0.3,
while those in the United States have found elasticities in the range of 0.4–1. Studies in other
OECD countries have typically found relatively
low elasticities, although they tend to be measured
without much precision (see Atkinson and
Micklewright 1991 for a review of these studies).
Additionally, empirical studies that allow for
the exit rate out of unemployment to ‘spike’
around the time of benefit exhaustion have found
just such an effect both overall (for example,
Meyer 1990) and for new jobs and recalls separately (for example, Katz and Meyer 1990). Additionally, studies in the United States have tended
to find that a 1-week increase in potential duration
results in between a 0.1 and 0.2 week increase in
unemployment, with Canadian studies finding
slightly larger effects (Atkinson and Micklewright
1991).
There are fewer empirical studies of the benefits of UI. A notable exception is Gruber (1997),
which finds a large consumption smoothing effect
of higher benefits. Finally, while a job-search
model implies that higher-quality jobs should be
found, empirical evidence is largely mixed on this
effect (see Decker 1997 for a review of US studies
of benefit effects). In particular, in the United
States, several re-employment bonus experiments
took place in which UI claimants were offered a
cash bonus if they found a new job within a
specific amount of time (see Meyer 1995, for
a review). The early experiments found significant
reductions in unemployment durations, but no
real decline in post-unemployment earnings as
would be expected if benefits were significantly
subsidizing search. Overall, then, while UI is an
important safety net for unemployed workers, it
may also increase unemployment.
See Also
Empirical Evidence on the Effects of UI
Most empirical work on UI focuses on the costs,
with studies generally confirming a positive
▶ Adjustment Costs
▶ Layoffs
▶ Social Insurance
▶ Unemployment
Unemployment Measurement
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D., and R. Shimer. 1999. Efficient unemployment insurance. Journal of Political Economy 107:
893–928.
Anderson, P.M. 1993. Linear adjustment costs and seasonal labor demand: Evidence from retail trade firms.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 1015–1042.
Anderson, P.M., and B.D. Meyer. 1993. Unemployment
insurance in the United States: Layoff incentives and
cross subsidies. Journal of Labor Economics 11(1, Part
II): S70–S95.
Anderson, P.M., and B.D. Meyer. 1994. The effects of
unemployment insurance taxes and benefits on layoffs
using firm and individual data, Working paper
no. 4960. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Anderson, P.M., and B.D. Meyer. 1997. The effects of firm
specific taxes and government mandates with an application to the U.S. unemployment insurance program.
Journal of Public Economics 65: 119–145.
Anderson, P.M., and B.D. Meyer. 2000. The effects of the
unemployment insurance payroll tax on wages,
employment, claims and denials. Journal of Public
Economics 78: 81–106.
Atkinson, A.B.., and J. Micklewright. 1991. Unemployment compensation and labor market transitions:
A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature 29:
1679–1727.
Baily, M. 1976. On the theory of layoffs and unemployment. Econometrica 45: 1043–1063.
Baily, M.N. 1978. Some aspects of optimal unemployment
insurance. Journal of Public Economics 10: 379–402.
Brechling, F. 1977a. The incentive effects of the
U.S. unemployment insurance tax. In Research in
labor economics, ed. R. Ehrenberg. Greenwich: JAI
Press.
Brechling, F. 1977b. Unemployment insurance and labor
turnover: Summary of theoretical findings. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 30: 483–494.
Card, D., and P.B. Levine. 1994. Unemployment insurance
taxes and the cyclical and seasonal properties of unemployment. Journal of Public Economics 53: 1–29.
Chetty, R. 2006. A general formula for the optimal level of
social insurance. Journal of Public Economics 90:
1879–1901.
Decker, P.T. 1997. Work incentives and disincentives. In
Unemployment insurance in the United States: Analysis of policy issues, ed. C.J. O’Leary and S.A. Wandner.
Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
Feldstein, M.S. 1976. Temporary layoffs in the theory of
unemployment. Journal of Political Economy 84:
937–957.
Gruber, J. 1997. The consumption smoothing benefits of
unemployment insurance. American Economic Review
87: 192–205.
Hopenhayn, H.A., and J.P. Nicolini. 1997. Optimal unemployment insurance. Journal of Political Economy 105:
412–438.
14039
Katz, L.F., and B.D. Meyer. 1990. Unemployment insurance, recall expectations, and unemployment outcomes. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105:
973–1002.
Meyer, B.D. 1990. Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells. Econometrica 58: 757–782.
Meyer, B.D. 1995. Lessons from the U.S. unemployment
insurance experiments. Journal of Economic Literature
33: 91–131.
Moffitt, R., and W. Nicholson. 1982. The effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment: The case of
federal supplemental benefits. Review of Economics
and Statistics 64: 1–11.
Mortensen, D.T. 1977. Unemployment insurance and job
search decisions. Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 30: 505–517.
Storey, J.R., and J.A. Niesner. 1997. Unemployment compensation in the group of seven nations. In Unemployment insurance in the United States: Analysis of policy
issues, ed. C.J. O’Leary and S.A. Wandner. Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Topel, R.H. 1983. On layoffs and unemployment insurance. American Economic Review 73: 541–559.
Unemployment Measurement
Katharine Bradbury
Abstract
Measures of unemployment tally people without a job who are looking for one. For measurement purposes, the critical question is what
constitutes ‘looking’. This article summarizes
how unemployment is measured in the United
States and Europe, and describes recent
research investigating the permeability of the
dividing line between the unemployed and
‘marginally attached’ subgroups of those out
of the labour market. A continuum between
unemployed and entirely inactive individuals
indicates that additional measures beyond
unemployment may be useful in judging the
state of the labour market.
Keywords
Labour force participation rate; Labour market
search; Non-employment; Unemployment;
Unemployment measurement
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14040
JEL Classifications
C8
Measures of unemployment attempt to count individuals who do not have a job but are looking for
one. While the concept is reasonably straightforward, various measurement approaches are used
to distinguish those out of work who are looking
from those who are not, generally based on the
specific methods these individuals use to search
for employment, how intensively they search,
and how long it has been since they ‘actively’
searched.
Official Measure in the United States
In the United States, unemployment is gauged by
comparing the number of unemployed individuals
with the size of the labour force, as determined by
a monthly survey of households. The civilian
labour force is defined as individuals aged
16 and older who are either employed or unemployed, but not on active duty in the armed forces.
(See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006; Jacobs
2006, pp. 4–8.)
Individuals are considered unemployed if (a)
they lack a job, (b) are available to work, and (c)
have actively sought employment in the four
weeks preceding the survey or are awaiting callback to an existing job (even if they did not
actively seek employment). Active job search
includes contacting employers or employment
agencies, sending out résumés, or placing or
answering advertisements; simply reading want
ads is not considered active job search. Individuals are employed if they worked at least one hour
as paid employees during the reference week, or
worked in their own business or farm, or worked
unpaid for 15 hours or more in a family business,
or had a job but were temporarily away from it due
to illness, vacation, labour management disputes,
parental leave, job training, or other personal or
family related reasons.
Anyone in the civilian non-institutional population (ages 16 and older and neither in the
Unemployment Measurement
military nor in an institution such as a prison or
mental hospital) who is not employed and not
unemployed is considered to be out of the labour
force. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
collects information on those out of the labour
force to assess the degree to which they may be
‘marginally attached’ to the labour force, by asking about their interest in and availability
for work.
Based on these questions, the BLS defines a set
of ‘alternative measures of labor underutilization’
that either subtract from the official unemployment
rate (for example, by counting only the long-term
unemployed) or add to it. The nature of the questions and the alternative measures were revised
as of January 1994. Figure 1 plots two of these
‘alternative measures’ and a third concept, along
with the official unemployment rate, over the
1994–2006 period. The line marked ‘discouraged’
adds to the official unemployed all discouraged
workers, defined as those who have given a job
market-related reason for not currently looking for
a job, including people who think that no work is
available, or who could not find work, or who
lack schooling or training, or who say potential
employers think they are too young or old, or
who believe they have been subject to other types
of discrimination. The next measure adds all other
marginally attached workers, defined as persons
who currently are neither working nor looking for
work but indicate that they want, and are available
for, a job and have looked for work at some time in
the preceding 12 months.
Beyond what the BLS defines as ‘marginally
attached’ is a group who has not looked for work
in the last 12 months but answers ‘yes’ to the
question ‘do you currently want a job?’ This line
is labelled ‘want a job’ in the figure. The alternative measures add from a few tenths of a percentage point (discouraged workers) to a percentage
point (marginally attached) to several percentage
points (want a job) to the official unemployment
rate. While too small to be seen clearly in
the figure, the number of individuals in these
marginal categories varied cyclically over the
1994–2005 period in a manner similar to the number unemployed.
% of (appropriately augmented) labour force
Unemployment Measurement
14041
12
10
Want a job
8
Marginally attached
6
4
Discouraged
Official unemployment rate
2
0
Jul-94 Jul-95 Jul-96 Jul-97 Jul-98 Jul-99 Jul-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 Jul-03 Jul-04 Jul-05 Jul-06
Unemployment Measurement, Fig. 1 US measures of
labour underutilization, 1994–2006 (Notes: Not seasonally
adjusted, 12-month centred moving averages. Discouraged
workers are a subset of the marginally attached; the marginally attached are a subset of those who say they want a
job. Each measure adds the noted group to ‘officially’
unemployed individuals and expresses that sum as a percent of the labour force plus the noted group. Sources: US
Bureau of Statistics and author’s calculations)
Unemployment Measures Elsewhere
in the Industrialized World
force in the United States) comprises employed
and unemployed persons.
According to Eurostat, the unemployed are
those aged 15–74 (or 16–74 in a few nations),
who (a) were without work during the reference
week, (b) were available to start work within two
weeks, and (c) had either actively sought work in
the past four weeks or had already found a job to
start within the next three months. The specific
steps that qualify as actively seeking work include
any of the following: being in contact with a
public employment office or a private agency to
find work, applying to employers directly, asking
among friends, relatives, unions, and so on, to find
work, placing or answering job advertisements,
studying job advertisements, taking a recruitment
test or examination or being interviewed, or
undertaking various activities to set up a business.
Thus, the EU includes those who only study
job advertisements as unemployed (if they pass
the other screens) – this is true in Canada as
well – while the United States does not consider
reading ads as active job search. In addition, persons waiting to start a new job are considered
unemployed in Europe, but they are not considered unemployed in the United States unless they
In most of the industrialized world, the concept of
unemployment is the same and the definition for
measurement purposes is quite similar. The
dimensions along which measures differ include
the type of job search activities that distinguish the
unemployed from the marginally attached, the
definition of ‘currently available’ for work, and
the treatment of individuals on layoff or waiting to
start a new job. In addition, age cut-offs may vary.
(For more detailed discussion of inter-country
definitional differences, see Sorrentino 2000.)
The measurement definition chosen by the Statistical Office of the European Communities
(Eurostat) in September 2000 is used to calculate
‘standardized’ unemployment rates for member
nations. Eurostat conducts the European Union
Labor Force Survey (EU LFS) on a quarterly
basis and also releases ‘harmonized’ monthly estimates based on data from member states. The EU
LFS divides the population of working age
(defined as ages 15 and older) into three groups:
employed, unemployed, and inactive. The economically active population (like the labour
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14042
have actively searched for work within the previous four weeks. Persons on temporary layoff are
considered unemployed in the United States even
if they do not seek work, but in Europe they may
be counted as employed, unemployed, or inactive,
depending on search activity and the strength of
their attachment to their job (based on pay and/or a
definite recall date within three months).
The Dividing Line Between Being
Unemployed and Out of the Labour
Force
Because the distinction is necessarily arbitrary for
measurement purposes, a research literature has
investigated the dividing line between the unemployed and those out of the labour force. One
strand of this literature focuses on transition probabilities among labour market states, investigating
the degree to which those out of the labour force
(or a marginally attached subset of them) are as
likely to move into employment as those labelled
unemployed. The issue is that measured unemployment might miss some signals of labour market
tightness or slack if those out of the labour force
behave similarly to the unemployed. Clark and
Summers reported that ‘many of those classified
as not in the labor force are functionally indistinguishable from the unemployed’ (1979, p. 31).
Flinn and Heckman (1983), by contrast, examined
young workers’ transition probabilities into
employment and rejected the hypothesis that the
distinction between unemployment and being out
of the labour force is behaviourally meaningless.
Several recent papers – including Jones and
Riddell (1999, 2006) focusing on Canada, Garrido
and Toharia (2004) for Spain, Brandolini
et al. (2006) for Italy, and Schweitzer (2003) for
the UK – describe selected groups of individuals
who are officially out of the labour force but might
be considered close to the unemployed, as they are
attached to the labour force in various ways. These
authors test hypotheses regarding behavioral
differences – most notably transition probabilities
to employment over various time horizons –
between the unemployed and subgroups of those
out of the labour force. For example, Jones and
Unemployment Measurement
Riddell consider those who say they want a job;
Brandolini, Cipollone and Viviano examine those
who searched for employment between five and
eight weeks before the survey; Garrido and Toharia
examine ‘passive’ job searchers; Schweitzer
subdivides those available for or wanting a job
according to their primary non-labour market activity. Jones and Riddell also subdivide the unemployed into several categories along similar
dimensions, and Schweitzer distinguishes the
long-term and short-term unemployed; they examine rates of transition to employment of these
unemployed subgroups as well.
These researchers find that most of the marginally attached categories lie between the unemployed and the remainder of the ‘inactive’ group;
that is, their transitions into employment are
higher than the completely inactive, but still generally lower than those of the unemployed. Jones
and Riddell and Schweitzer also find heterogeneity within the ranks of the unemployed and note
that some marginally attached categories have
higher transition rates into employment than
selected subcategories of the unemployed.
Measuring Labour Market Slack
These measurement issues are of more than academic interest because unemployment is the most
widely used indicator of the degree of tightness or
slack in the labour market and, by extension, in
the overall economy; as a consequence, it is used
by policymakers as a key signal of potential inflationary pressures. The research discussed above
points to a continuum of labour market attachment
among the non-employed, from those classified as
unemployed through various marginally attached
groups to people who expressly do not want a job.
Some of the research authors argue that unemployment should be defined and measured more
inclusively than it is currently. More generally, the
arbitrariness of the dividing line between the
states of being unemployed and out of the labour
force, together with heterogeneity among subgroups within the inactive population, suggest
that policymakers might gain useful information
by looking at a range of measures – along with the
Unemployment Measurement
official unemployment rate – in judging the state
of the labour market.
Because the relationship between the measured
unemployment rate and ‘true’ economic slack and
hence inflation may vary, depending on the specific definitions used in measuring unemployment, potential labour market entrants, the age
and gender composition of the population, and
labour market institutions, researchers have developed and investigated a variety of alternative
indicators of labour market slack. One set of alternative measures sidesteps the difficulty of choosing a dividing line between the unemployed
and inactive population by concentrating on the
distinction between employment and nonemployment. For example, the European Council
revised its labour market targets in 2000,
replacing the goal of reducing unemployment
with the goal of increasing employment rates
(employment–population ratios) (European Parliament 2000). Similarly, Juhn et al. (1991,
2002), and Murphy and Topel (1997) analyse
non-employment and argue that ‘the unemployment rate has become progressively less informative about the state of the labor market’ (1997,
p. 295). Others consider the labour force participation rate an indicator of interest along with the
unemployment rate (for example, Anderson
et al. 2005; Bradbury 2005). Complementary
approaches consider a variety of direct measures
of labour market tightness, either individually (for
example, Shimer’s 2005 job-finding rate among
the unemployed) or in combination (for example,
a composite measure of US labour market tightness compiled by Barnes et al. 2007).
See Also
▶ Labour Supply
▶ Natural Rate of Unemployment
▶ Unemployment
Bibliography
Anderson, K., L. Barrow, and K.F. Butcher. 2005. Implications of changes in men’s and women’s labor force
participation for real compensation growth and
14043
inflation. Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy 5(1) (Article 7).
Barnes, M., R. Chahrour, G. Olivei, and G. Tang. 2007.
A principal components approach to estimating labour
market pressure and its implicaitons for inflation. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Brief Series,
No. 07-2.
Bradbury, K. 2005. Additional slack in the economy: The
poor recovery in labor force participation during this
business cycle. Public Policy Brief No. 05–2. Boston:
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Brandolini, A., P. Cipollone, and E. Viviano. 2006. Does
the ILO definition capture all unemployment? Journal
of the European Economic Association 4: 153–179.
Clark, K.B., and L.H. Summers. 1979. Labor market
dynamics and unemployment: A reconsideration.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1979(1):
13–72.
European Parliament. 2000. Lisbon European Council
23 and 24 March 2000 presidency conclusions.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ lis1_en.htm.
Accessed 20 Dec 2006.
Flinn, C.J., and J.J. Heckman. 1983. Are unemployment
and out of the labor force behaviorally distinct labor
force states? Journal of Labor Economics 1: 28–42.
Garrido, L., and L. Toharia. 2004. What does it take to be
(counted as) unemployed: The case of Spain. Labour
Economics 11: 507–523.
Jacobs, E.E., ed. 2006. Handbook of U.S. labor statistics.
9th ed. Lanham: Bernan Press.
Jones, S.R.G., and W.C. Riddell. 1999. The measurement
of unemployment: An empirical approach.
Econometrica 67: 147–161.
Jones, S.R.G., and W.C. Riddell. 2006. Unemployment
and nonemployment: Heterogeneities in labor market
states. Review of Economics and Statistics 88:
314–323.
Juhn, C., K.M. Murphy, and R. Topel. 1991. Why has the
natural rate of unemployment increased over time?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1991(2):
75–142.
Juhn, C., K.M. Murphy, and R. Topel. 2002. Current
unemployment, historically contemplated. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2002(1): 79–116.
Murphy, K.M., and R. Topel. 1997. Unemployment and
nonemployment. American Economic Review 87:
295–300.
Schweitzer, M. 2003. Ready, willing, and able? Measuring
labour availability in the UK. Working Paper No. 03-03.
Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Shimer, R. 2005. Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment. Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Chicago.
Sorrentino, C. 2000. International unemployment rates:
How comparable are they? Monthly Labor Review
123: 3–20.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2006. How the government measures unemployment. http://ww.bls.gov/cps/
cps_htgm.htm. Accessed 20 Dec 2006.
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Unequal Exchange
Unequal Exchange
Ednaldo Araquem Da Silva
Marxists have long attempted to explain the
uneven development of ‘productive forces’
(labour productivity) and the resulting income
differences in the world capitalist economy primarily by means of the ‘surplus drain’ hypothesis
(see Emmanuel 1972; Andersson 1976).
Adopting Prebisch’s division of the world capitalist economy into the ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’,
Marxists have argued that surplus transfer has
restrained the economic development of the
periphery and exacerbated its income gap vis–àvis
the centre.
Before Emmanuel’s work, the surplus transfer
argument consisted of a loose intertwining of Prebisch’s thesis over the secular deterioration of the
terms of trade in the periphery, Marx’s writings on
‘the colonial question’, and Lenin’s theory of
imperialism. Although presented inelegantly in
terms of Marx’s tableaux, Emmanuel introduced
a coherent surplus drain theory utilizing Marx’s
transformation of values into production prices.
Emmanuel (1972) formulated his theory of
surplus transfer through unequal exchange by
comparing values with Marxian prices of production (see Okishio 1963, pp. 296–8). Subsequently,
Braun (1973) introduced unequal exchange utilizing Sraffa’s framework (see Evans’s 1984, critical
survey), Bacha (1978) introduced a neoclassical
counterpart, and Shaikh (1979) suggested an alternative preserving Marx’s theory of value.
Departing from recent reformulations, it is
helpful to explain Emmanuel’s unequal exchange
theory within its original Marxist framework. The
value (t) of a product is the sum of constant capital
(c), variable capital (v), and surplus value (s),
whereas its corresponding Marxian production
price (p) includes the average profit rate (r):
t¼cþvþs
(1)
p ¼ ð1 þ r Þðc þ vÞ
(2)
In a world capitalist system consisting of the
centre (A) and periphery (B) as trading partners,
unequal exchange is defined as the difference (g)
between Marxian production prices and values
(see Marelli 1980, p. 517). In fact, unequal
exchange compares two terms of trade under different assumptions about the wage rate in each
country:
gi ¼ pi ti
i ¼ A, B
(3)
A positive g denotes a surplus gain for
exporters, while a negative g denotes a surplus loss.
Emmanuel’s theory rests on the assumptions of
a single world-wide profit rate resulting from
international capital mobility, and the existence
of a wage gap resulting from the immobility of
labour from the periphery to the centre. The wage
rate is an independent variable. Based on these
assumptions, Emmanuel showed that unequal
exchange depends on a country’s rate of surplus
value and on its organic composition of capital in
relation to world average. Subtracting (1) from
(2), we obtain:
gi ¼ r ð c i þ v i Þ s i
(4)
now consider these definitions:
(a) si = eivi
(b) r = e/(1 + k)
(c) ci = Kivi
rate of surplus value,
average profit rate,
organic composition of capital.
After substituting the definitions for the rate of
surplus value, the average profit rate, and the
organic composition of capital into equation (4),
we obtain a formula to measure unequal
exchange:
gi ¼ v i e
1 þ ki
ei :
1þk
(5)
Unequal exchange will disappear when the
profit rate of the centre or the periphery
approaches the world average profit rate, i.e. ri =
r. This is satisfied when these conditions hold:
ðiÞ ei ¼ e and ðiiÞ ki ¼ k:
Unequal Exchange
14045
Emmanuel’s distinction between the broad and
strict definitions of unequal exchange can be easily understood by referring to equation (5). Even
when the wage rates and thus the rates of surplus
are equalized between the centre and the periphery, unequal exchange in the ‘broad sense’ occurs
resulting from differences in the organic composition of capital. This type of unequal exchange
can also exist within a country because of the
differences in the organic composition of capital
among sectors.
If condition (i) is satisfied and the rates of surplus
value in the centre and periphery are equalized, the
unequal exchange equation (5) becomes:
gi ¼ v i e
1 þ ki
1 :
1þk
(50 )
As a result, there will be a surplus gain through
trade when the individual organic composition of
capital exceeds the world average. Likewise, if
condition (ii) is satisfied and the organic compositions of capital are equal in both the centre and
the periphery, the unequal exchange equation (5)
becomes:
gi ¼ vi ðe ei Þ:
(500 )
In this case, corresponding to Emmanuel’s
unequal exchange in the ‘strict sense’, there will
be a surplus gain through trade when the world
average rate of surplus value exceeds the
individual rate.
The periphery tends to transfer surplus through
trade because its rate of surplus value is higher
than the world average, resulting from an international wage gap favouring workers in the centre.
Therefore, even if the organic compositions of
capital are equalized, unequal exchange results
from the existence of a wage gap between the
centre and the periphery, expressed as the rate of
surplus value being lower in the centre than in the
periphery (the rate of surplus value can be
expressed as one over the value of labour power
or ‘wage share’ minus one, e = (1/w)–1).
According to Emmanuel, unequal exchange in
the ‘strict sense’ characterizes the trade relations
between the centre and periphery.
Emmanuel’s (1972, p. 61) basic conclusions is
that ‘the inequality of wages as such, all other things
being equal, is alone the cause of the inequality of
exchange’. As a corollary, Emmanuel (1972,
p. 131) argued that ‘by transferring, through
non-equivalent [exchange], a large part of its surplus to the rich countries, [the periphery] deprives
itself of the means of accumulation and growth’.
Thus, an important implication of Emmanuel’s theory is that a widening wage gap leads to a deterioration of the periphery’s terms of trade, and a
subsequent reduction in its rate of economic growth.
Emmanuel’s work generated an interesting
international debate. One contentious issue is the
relationship of Emmanuel’s theory to Marx’s theory of value, leading to reformulations of
Emmanuel’s theory within the context of the
Marx–Sraffa debate (Gibson 1980; Mainwaring
1980; Dandekar 1980; Evans 1984; Sau 1984).
Another view holds that Emmanuel’s theory does
not sufficiently explain uneven development
because it omits the ‘blocking of the productive
forces’ by entrenched and reactionary social classes in the periphery (Bettelheim, in the Appendix
to Emmanuel 1972). Bettelheim also argues that
the rate of surplus value is higher in the centre
resulting from its higher labour productivity, thus
giving rise to unequal exchange reversal.
At the same time, Amin (1977) has emphasized
non-specialized trade between the centre and the
periphery, claiming the ‘end of a debate’, while the
debate survived a virulent ‘exchange of errors’
among Marxists in India (see Dandekar 1980; Sau
1984). De Janvry and Kramer (1979) criticize
unequal exchange as a theory of underdevelopment
because capital mobility tends to eliminate wage
differences by exhausting the ‘reserve army’ in the
periphery, an argument which is challenged by
Gibson (1980). Andersson (1976) surveys some
pre-Emmanuel views, adding a formalization similar to Braun (1973), while Liossatos (1979) and
Marelli (1980) have recast Emmanuel’s theory in a
modern, Morishima-like Marxian framework.
Although Emmanuel’s primary objective
involves ‘model building’, it is important to recognize that his references to standard trade theory are
dated, largely confined to the literature of the
1950s, perhaps indicating that his work suffered
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from a long gestation period. Therefore, one should
be cautious about treating Emmanuel’s work as a
critique of standard trade theory. Outside of
Ricardian and Marxian circles, the reception of
Emmanuel’s work has been tepid if not neglectful.
Looking ahead, Harris (1975) suggests that a
convincing theory of economic development
should include a theory of value and distribution
and a theory of accumulation on a world scale.
Emmanuel’s theory of unequal exchange, especially in subsequently more rigorous formulations
(Andersson 1976; Liossatos 1979; Marelli 1980;
Gibson 1980; Evans 1984; Sau 1984) has an
assured place in this curriculum. In this way,
Emmanuel’s theory of unequal exchange is
definitely linked to the original theory of
Prebisch, Singer, Lewis and Baran, on trade and
development.
Uneven Development
Harris, D. 1975. The theory of economic growth:
A critique and reformulation. American Economic
Review 65(2): 329–337.
Liossatos, P. 1979. Unequal exchange and regional disparities. Papers of the Regional Science Association 45:
87–103.
Mainwaring, L. 1980. International trade and the transfer
of labour values. Journal of Development Studies
17(1): 22–31.
Marelli, E. 1980. An intersectoral analysis of regional
disparities in terms of transfers of surplus value. Revista
internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali
27(6): 507–526.
Okishio, N. 1963. A mathematical note on Marxian theorems. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 91(2): 287–298.
Sau, R. 1984. Underdeveloped capitalism and the general
law of value. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
Shaikh, A. 1979. Foreign trade and the law of value: Part
I. Science and Society 43(3): 281–302. Part II was
published in 44(1).
Uneven Development
See Also
Donald J. Harris
▶ Periphery
Bibliography
Amin, S. 1977. Imperialism and unequal development.
New York: Monthly Review Press.
Andersson, J. 1976. Studies in the theory of
unequal exchange between nations. Abo: Abo
Akademi.
Bacha, E. 1978. An interpretation of unequal exchange
from Prebisch–Singer to Emmanuel. Journal of Development Economics 5(4): 319–330.
Braun, O. 1973. International trade and imperialism.
Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1984.
Dandekar, V. 1980. Unequal exchange of errors. Economic
and Political Weekly 15(13): 645–48. Continued in
16(6): 205–212.
De Janvry, A., and F. Kramer. 1979. The limits of unequal
exchange. Review of Radical Political Economics
11(4): 3–15.
Emmanuel, A. 1972. Unequal exchange: A study of the
imperialism of trade (with additional comments by
Charles Bettelheim). New York: Monthly Review
Press.
Evans, D. 1984. A critical assessment of some
neo-Marxian trade theories. Journal of Development
Studies 20(2): 202–226.
Gibson, B. 1980. Unequal exchange: Theoretical issues
and empirical findings. Review of Radical Political
Economics 12(3): 15–35.
Abstract
A striking characteristic of capitalist development is the phenomenon of uneven development, defined as persistent differences in levels
and rates of economic development between
different sectors of the economy. However,
much existing economic theory predicts that
many observed features of differentiation
would tend to wash out as a result of competitive market forces. This article seeks to bridge
this gap. It proposes a strategy for the analysis
of uneven development that advances toward a
historically and empirically relevant theory.
The analysis draws in part on elements of the
emerging paradigm of neo-Schumpeterian
evolutionary theory and on some documented
empirical regularities.
Keywords
Aggregation (theory); Bounded rationality;
Competition; Concentration; Creative accumulation; Creative destruction; Differentiation
among firms; Diffusion of technology;
Uneven Development
Endogenous growth; Evolutionary economics;
Firm, theory of; First-mover advantages;
Growth centres; Harrod–Domar growth
model; Industry evolution; Innovation; Invention; Irreversible investment; Learning; Lifecycle of industry; Market failure; Saturation
effect; Schumpeterian competition; Shift
effect; Technical change; Underdevelopment;
Uneven development
JEL Classifications
B25; B41; D2; D4; E12; F12; L1; L2; L6; N10;
N90; O1; O3; O4; O5; R11; R12
In examining the general character of the process
of capitalist development as it has appeared historically across many different countries over a
long period of time, it emerges that one of its most
striking characteristics is the phenomenon of
uneven development. Specifically, the process is
marked by persistent differences in levels and
rates of economic development between different
sectors of the economy.
This differentiation appears at many levels and
in terms of a multiplicity of quantitative and qualitative indices (Kuznets 1966; Maddison 1982;
Mueller 1990; Pritchett 1997; Salter 1966). Relevant measures that sharply identify the phenomenon include the level of labour productivity in
different sectors, the level of wages, occupational
and skill composition of the labour force, the
degree of mechanization and vintage of production techniques, rates of profit, rates of growth,
and the size structure of firms. The phenomenon
appears regardless of the level of aggregation or
disaggregation of the economy, except for the
extreme case of complete aggregation – in which
case, structural properties of the economy are
made to disappear. For example, it appears at the
level of comparing the broad aggregates of
manufacturing industry and agriculture, at the
level of individual industries within the
manufacturing sector, and at the level of individual firms in an industry. It appears on a regional
level within national economies as well as on a
global scale between different national economies. In this latter context, one form taken is the
14047
continued differentiation between underdeveloped and advanced economies, usually identified
as the problem of underdevelopment.
These disparities appear from observation of
the economy as a whole at any given moment and
over long periods of time. While the relative position of particular sectors may change from one
period to another, there is, nevertheless, always a
definite pattern of such differentiation. We may
say, therefore, and certainly it is an implication of
these observations, that these disparities are continually reproduced by the process of development. Uneven development, in this sense, is an
intrinsic or inherent property of the economic
process. Far from being merely transitory, it
appears to be a pervasive and permanent
condition.
Now, it is an equally striking fact that, when we
examine the theoretical literature on economic
growth, we find the completely opposite picture.
In particular, the dominant conception of the
growth process that has characterized the postSecond World War literature is constructed in
terms of uniform rates of expansion in output,
productivity and employment in all sectors of the
economy. In this sense, it is largely a literature of
steady-state growth, whether presented in multisectoral or aggregative models (Burmeister and
Dobell 1970; Harris 1978). Some notable and
relevant exceptions, including Haavelmo (1954),
Leon (1967), Nelson and Winter (1982), Pasinetti
(1981), Salter (1965), explicitly examine aspects
of the problem of persistent differentiation posed
here. The recent flurry of work in endogenous
growth theory seeks to incorporate some relevant
elements of the problem into the neoclassical conception of the growth process (Aghion and Howitt
1998). However, much of existing economic theory predicts that, given enough time, many of the
features of differentiation which we observe
empirically would tend to wash out as a result of
the operation of competitive market forces (Harris
1988). Such differentiation should therefore be
viewed only as a transitory feature of the economic process.
Thus, on the one side, we find a historical
picture of uneven development as a persistent
phenomenon, and on the other, a theory that
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14048
essentially negates and denies this fact. It is possible to go some of the way towards bridging this
gap. Accordingly, I consider here a strategy for
analysis of uneven development that breaks
through the narrow limits of the existing steadystate theory and advances towards a historically
and empirically relevant theory.
The Analytics of Uneven Development
It is necessary to start by recognizing the intrinsic
character of the individual firm as an expansionary
unit of capital with a complex organization. Various efforts have been made to develop a theory of
the firm on this basis. (See, for instance, Penrose
1959; Baumol 1967; Marris 1967; Winter 2006). In
this conception, growth is the strategic objective on
the part of the firm. This urge to expand is not a
matter of choice. Rather, it is a necessity enforced
upon the firm by its market position and by its
existence within a world of firms where each
must grow in order to survive. It is reinforced also
by sociological factors. It is this character of the
firm that constitutes the driving force behind the
process of expansion of the economy.
In the aggregate, the global economy is conceived to consist of an ordered system of firms
(an interlocking network of individual circuits of
capital) and its sectors (classified variously as industries, regions, national economies) likewise to be
clusters of the firms that are the component units of
this system. In this system, it is the firms that
compete, not industries or regions, national economies or ‘North’ versus ‘South’. The state sets the
rules and jointly determines the external conditions
(externalities) within which the firms operate.
This is a crucial starting point because it establishes the idea of growth as the outcome of a
process driven by active agents, not by exogenous
factors. In particular, in the context of the capitalist economy, growth is the outcome of the
selfdirected and self-organizing activity of firms,
each of which seeks to expand and improve its
competitive position in relation to the rest. Once
this principle is recognized it becomes possible to
move towards an understanding of the problem of
uneven development.
Uneven Development
The imperative of growth impels the firm constantly to seek new investment opportunities wherever they are to be found. Such opportunities may
lie within a wide range – in existing product lines,
in new products and processes, in new geographical spaces and natural resource frontiers, or in the
take-over of existing firms. However, at the core of
this movement, viewed historically over the long
term, are the invention, innovation and diffusion of
new technologies that give rise to new products and
services (Freeman 1982; Landes 1969, 1999; Marx
1906, ch. 15; Mokyr 1990, 2002).
The emergence of growth centres or leading
sectors is a reflection of this underlying process. It
is a consequence of the effort on the part of many
firms to create or to rush into those spheres where a
margin of profitability exists that allows them to
capture new profit and growth opportunities. It
may be conceived to take the form of a ‘swarm’
(Schumpeter 1934, p. 223) or ‘contagion’ (Baumol
1967, p. 101), marked by both entry and exit of
firms. Such spheres are opened up, typically
through complementary ‘macroinventions’ and
‘microinventions’ (Mokyr 1990, p. 13) and in a
sporadic and discontinuous pattern, as a consequence of the ongoing investment and innovative
activity of firms and the competitive interactions
among them. It is this constant flux, consisting of
the emergence of new growth centres, their rapid
expansion relative to existing sectors, and the relative decline of others, that shows up in the economy as a whole as uneven development.
The Process of Industry Evolution
The form of this process, as it appears at the level
of particular industries and products, has been
identified in terms of certain empirical regularities, though there are also significant variations
across industries and products. Studies show that,
with some exceptions, the growth of many new
industries and products follows a life cycle pattern
(Gold 1964; Gort and Klepper 1982; Klepper
1997; Klepper and Graddy 1990; MullorSebastian 1983; Wells 1972). It may be
represented schematically by an S-shaped curve
of the time-path of output as in Fig. 1. (For
Uneven Development
II
III
Industry output
I
14049
Time
Uneven Development, Fig. 1 Life cycle of an industry
simplicity, no distinction is made here between
products and processes, an industry is assumed
to produce a single product, and short-term
turbulence in the path of output is ignored.)
Accordingly, we may distinguish three phases of
expansion: I, the initial phase, where total output
is a minute share of aggregate output and grows at
a low rate; II, a phase of rapid growth in which
output expands rapidly and its share of aggregate
output grows; III, the sector reaches a threshold
beyond which its growth rate tends to level off and
perhaps to decline.
To characterize the associated pattern of technological innovation, Kuznets (1979) identifies a
sequence of four distinct phases constituting the
life cycle of ‘major’ innovations: (1) the preconception phase in which necessary scientific
and technological preconditions are laid; (2) the
phase of initial application involving the first
successful commercial application of the innovation; (3) the diffusion phase marked by spread in
adoption and use of the innovation along with
continued improvements in quality and cost;
(4) the phase of slowdown and obsolescence in
which further potential of the innovation is more
or less exhausted and some contraction may
occur. This taxonomy is not all-embracing, and
there are others that emphasize other features, but
it is suggestive in pointing to a certain internal
logic of the innovation process.
The process of industry evolution is also typically associated with a changing firm-structure of
the industry. In many industries, there is a proliferation of small firms in phase I. As the diffusion
of the product occurs and growth speeds up, there
is a ‘shaking out’ process by which many of the
smaller firms disappear (exit) and the available
market is concentrated in the remaining firms.
When the industry reaches ‘maturity’, in phase
III, there is likely to be a high degree of concentration. This association between industry life
cycle and changing firm-structure (commonly
called ‘co-evolution’) suggests that the dynamic
of expansion through innovation is simultaneously a process of the concentration of capital.
This sequence of a single product-cycle, schematically described here, is but a small segment of
the time sequence characterizing the historical
evolution of the economy. Given that firms are
growing, making profits, and seeking to continue
to grow, it must be supposed that at least some of
them, having entered into phase III, would seek to
launch into new investment opportunities. They
will therefore actively seek new products that will
initiate a corresponding new sequence. Alternatively, the new sequence could come from entry of
new start-up firms.
It follows that we can map out the dynamic
evolution of the economy as a sequential process
that is discontinuous, punctuated and stochastic,
with varying and overlapping time-scales of the
different product-cycles, where the overall growth
is accountable for on the basis of (1) the individual
growth of particular new products coming on
stream, (2) the growth of pre-existing products,
each of which is growing at a different rate
depending on the particular phase reached in
its life cycle, and (3) over time the irregular accretion of new products as the innovation process
continues.
In this context, the relative position of any
firm-cluster (region or national economy) at any
time on a relevant index of development may be
seen as a matter of the particular products it has
managed to capture as a result of the previous
pattern of accumulation, the ongoing activity of
firms operating within it and the particular timing
of their entry into the life cycle of new products.
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The causes that produce and sustain the
observed patterns of differentiation must then be
found within the internal dynamics of this process, leaving aside such historically contingent
factors as wars, colonial control, ‘foreign’ intervention, that may also be considered relevant and
important. What role is to be assigned to demand
as a factor in this process? At the level of individual consumer products or industries, a common
conception is that demand acts as an autonomous
factor with a definite influence on the life-cycle
pattern of evolution of the product. That influence
is exerted in the early phase of introduction of a
new product because of an element of resistance
due to ‘habit’ formed in a customary pattern of
consumption. It is exerted also in the maturity
phase because of the operation of ‘saturation
effects’ in consumption. But there are reasons to
doubt the strength and effectiveness of such factors, as well as their supposed autonomy.
First, in an economy undergoing regular and
rapid change, it is not evident what role there is for
habit except for the habit of change itself. The
experience of, and adaptation to, change may
create a high degree of receptivity to change.
What then becomes decisive in the evolution of
demand (for consumer goods) is the growth of
income, and the changing relative price and quality of products. Income and price elasticities of
demand are an imperfect, proximate expression of
this dynamic effect.
Second, in so far as these latter factors are
crucial to the formation of demand, it may be
argued that there is a certain self-fulfilling aspect
of the expansionary process at the level of industry
demand. In particular, investment generates the
demand that provides the market for the new products which investment itself creates. This occurs in
two ways. First structural interdependence in the
economy at the level of both production and expenditure patterns allows for the possibility of a certain
mutual provisioning of markets when expansion
takes place on a broad front. Second, as a new
product unfolds through the stages of the innovation process, it undergoes both improvements in
quality and a decline in price relative to other
products. This development provides a substantive
basis for making inroads into the market for
Uneven Development
existing closely related products and hence promotes demand through a shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’
products. It is perhaps this shift effect which is
mistakenly identified as a saturation effect by
adopting a one-sided and static view of a dynamic
and interdependent process.
Each and every individual firm must of course
secure a place in the market for its product. Its
success in this regard is dependent on its own
efforts and capabilities.
Competition, Firm Capabilities, Entry/
Exit Conditions, and the Social
Environment
Analytical treatment (including formal modelling)
of the process of industry evolution has flourished
since the 1980s in tandem with an outpouring of
empirical studies covering different industries,
countries and time periods. Much of this work is
done within the frame of an emerging paradigm in
the Schumpeterian tradition of evolutionary
dynamics (Futia 1980; Iwai 1984a, b; Nelson
and Winter 1982; Dosi 1984) and there are other
theoretical approaches (Loury 1979; Dasgupta
and Stiglitz 1980; Durlauf 1993). For a review
of the current state of the art and challenges for
research, focusing on the evolutionary approach,
see Malerba (2006). Relevant for the present purposes are the significant insights provided so far
by this work into the mechanisms and causal
factors that govern the process of industry evolution and account for the persistence of differentiation among firms.
The neo-Schumpeterian approach develops an
explicit formulation of ‘Schumpeterian competition’ in which firms innovate to win super-normal
profits, profits are reinvested to provide further
growth through innovation and market expansion,
and there are winners and losers due to the operation of selection mechanisms and learning mechanisms. Decisions are typically based on bounded
rationality. It is shown that such competitive
behaviour under specified conditions gives rise
to persistent differentiation among firms in terms
of size, productivity, costs of production, product
characteristics, profitability and growth and may
Uneven Development
breed long-term sustainable market concentration
among surviving firms, with or without entry.
Economies of scale and scope are not a necessary
part of the story; a key factor is increasing returns
to knowledge and learning. Though there exists a
strong tendency to concentration, it is not inevitable, and depends on industry characteristics that
vary across industries. There also exist dual tendencies of ‘creative destruction’ and ‘creative
accumulation’.
A distinctive feature of this approach is the
conception of the firm itself as an organizational
unit. The firm is conceived as the embodiment of
a set of strategic assets (competences or capabilities), tangible and intangible, consisting of
knowledge, skills, and routines, gained through
path-dependent experience and learning, that are
specific to each firm and non-tradeable. These
assets evolve over time (through ‘competence
accumulation’) with the ongoing process of evolution of the industry and through interaction
with the changing environment. Consequently,
diversity among firms is not only a characteristic
of the system of firms, it is also reproduced by
the evolutionary dynamics of the competitive
process.
Some key factors determining the evolutionary
path of industry structure in terms of firm composition are the following. (1) First- (second-, third-)
mover advantages arising from a combination of
unique internal attributes of the mover, product
characteristics, network effects among users, and
random chance events. (2) Non-pecuniary network externalities associated with cues and information gained from interacting with the ‘local’
social environment of firms, users of the product,
and institutions involved in knowledge creation
and information dissemination (on the national
level, the ‘national system of innovation’).
(3) Spillover effects among firms and across
industries, which may be both positive and negative. (4) Increasing returns to knowledge and
learning within the firm. (5) A firm may become
‘lockedin’ to its own trajectory of technology
development and reap increasing returns therefrom, but eventually suffer a disadvantage from
generating irreversibilities and inertia causing
inability to adjust to change (‘success breeds
14051
failure’). (6) The very same factors that confer
advantages upon early entrants and incumbent
firms may create barriers to entry for ‘latecomers’,
depending on the stage of industry evolution and
timing of entry.
Some relatively neglected factors that need to
be integrated into a more comprehensive analysis
include: (1) the role of market demand, as related
to the mutual interaction between producers and
users (consumers, other firms, and the state);
(2) the role of the financial system (Schumpeter
had assigned a crucial role to the granting of credit
‘as an order on the economic system to accommodate itself to the purposes of the entrepreneur’
(1934, p. 107)); (3) workplace and labour market
interactions, lightly touched upon by Mansfield
(1968, ch. 5) and vividly described in historical
detail by Braverman (1974); (4) the system of
governance by the state, that sets and enforces
the rules and norms, including property rights,
governing conduct by firms.
Within this extended framework of analysis, it
is possible to explain not only how some firms
(or firm-clusters) come to capture the position of
leaders (and may eventually lose it to others), but
equally how some are left behind, others drop out
altogether (exit), and still others remain on the
‘periphery’ (so to speak) lacking the internal and
external capabilities to enter. In this regard, the
explanatory power of this analysis is readily applicable to commonly discussed empirical and historical phenomena such as ‘deindustrialization’,
‘catching up’ (convergence), and ‘falling behind’
(divergence).
What emerges from this analysis also is an
understanding of the critical role of public policy
and programmes to foster economic development.
Because of the pervasiveness of externalities and
various forms of coordination problems, market
failures are intrinsic to the process, calling thereby
for collective intervention to achieve efficiency
and socially optimal results.
The Aggregation Problem
All the preceding analysis concerns the pattern of
industrial growth viewed at the level of an
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individual industry and the firms (or firm-clusters
interpreted as, say, regions or countries) that compose it. There is nothing in this analysis to indicate
how the pattern of growth of different industries
translates into aggregate expansion at the level of
the economy as a whole, or how the various
industrial patterns fit together to form a complete
whole. This is a substantive problem requiring
further analytical treatment on its own terms. Its
significance derives from recognition that the
economy as a whole is not just the sum of its
parts. Hence, the motion of the economy cannot
simply be deduced from the movement of its
parts. The usual methodological device of the
‘representative firm’ necessarily fails in the present context.
A related aspect of the problem is associated
with the manifold and complex ways in which
growth in one sector (however defined) mutually
conditions and is conditioned by growth in other
sectors. Such mutual interaction is a necessary
consequence of economic interdependence
in both production and exchange. (Hence,
models of international trade that claim to
show uneven development arising uniquely
from exchange of products give a one-sided
representation of the problem.) The existence
of such interaction implies that there is a certain
cumulative effect intrinsic in the growth process. Understanding the exact mechanisms
through which this effect operates is one of the
central analytical problems for the analysis of
uneven development.
There is no guarantee that in the aggregate
there is always sufficient demand for all products.
It is here that the analysis comes full circle, back to
the problem of overall effective demand that motivated the early post-war growth theory initiated
by Harrod (1948) and Domar (1957). This problem was a central focus of the analysis in the
Keynesian and Post Keynesian tradition, less so
in the case of the neoclassical tradition (as detailed
in Harris 1985). It appears now that it cannot be
escaped in making the transition to the analysis of
uneven development.
The analytical framework presented here lays
the groundwork for addressing this larger set of
problems.
Uneven Development
See Also
▶ Development Economics
▶ Economic Growth, Empirical Regularities in
▶ Endogenous Growth Theory
▶ Schumpeterian Growth and Growth Policy
Design
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Unforeseen Contingencies
Barton L. Lipman
Abstract
While unforeseen contingencies – possible
events that agents do not think of when planning or contracting – are often said to greatly
affect the nature of contracting, we lack useful
formal models. Most of the existing models
boil down to assuming that agents give zero
probability to some events that might actually
occur, an approach which is not particularly
useful for studying the effects of unforeseen
contingencies on contracting.
Keywords
Control rights; Expected utility; Incomplete
contracts; Long-term and short-term contracts;
Probability; Rationality, bounded; Short-term
contracts;
Uncertainty;
Unforeseen
contingencies
JEL Classifications
D8
Many writers have suggested that the nature of
contracting, firm structure, and even political constitutions cannot be well understood without
taking account of the role of unforeseen contingencies. As I explain in more detail below,
many definitions are possible, but I will define
unforeseen contingencies to be possibilities that
the agent does not ‘think about’ or recognize as
possibilities at the time he makes a decision. In
virtually any reasonably complex situation, real
people do not consider all of the many possible
situations that may arise. Because of this,
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14054
contracts, for example, typically assign broad categories of rights and obligations rather than calling for very specific actions as a function of what
might occur. Similarly, firms are designed to figure out what to do rather than simply being programmed to implement some given set of actions.
Finally, laws, especially sweeping ones such as
constitutions, are intentionally left vague to allow
adaptation to circumstances as they arise.
Unfortunately, while it is easy to find eloquent
statements in the economics literature regarding
the importance of unforeseen contingencies for
understanding the nature of economic and political institutions – see, for example, Hayek (1960);
Williamson (1975); or Hart (1995) – there is no
agreed formal model. I sketch a few known
approaches below, but none of them provides a
model that can be used to study these issues.
To make this point concretely, I focus on a
particular example of an aspect of contracting
that we would want a model of unforeseen contingencies to help us understand, namely, the
choice between long-term and short-term contracts. It seems obvious that one of the main
advantages of a series of short-term contracts is
that it is easier to anticipate the relevant contingencies for the near future than for the distant
future. Hence in environments with many
unforeseen contingencies relative to the value of
long-term contracting, we should expect to see
more short-term contracting. I will argue below
that none of the models of unforeseen contingencies in the literature can be used to illustrate this
simple idea.
Before discussing the approaches taken, it is
important to clarify what I mean by unforeseen
contingencies. First, as I use the term, unforeseen
contingencies are not events that the agent has
considered but assigned zero probability. This
notion is something standard models deal with
perfectly well. More importantly, the existence
of such events seems to have little to do with the
features of economic and political institutions we
believe to be related to unforeseen contingencies.
To be concrete, consider the trade-off discussed
above between long-term contracts and short-term
contracts. If the only sense in which some contingencies in the distant future are not foreseen is that
Unforeseen Contingencies
they are given zero probability, then the agents
will perceive zero costs to excluding them. Hence
they will see no ‘foreseeability’ advantage to
short-term contracts, so a model of unforeseen
contingencies based on such a definition cannot
say anything interesting about the trade-off.
It is also important to note that the use of the
term ‘unforeseen’ in law is often closer to the zero
probability definition than the definition I use
here. In particular, legal usage often seems to
suggest that a contingency is ‘unforeseen’ by an
agent if it occurred even though the agent gave it
‘low’ probability ex ante. For example, a 1997 US
tax law allows a person who sells his home to
exclude some of the capital gains from taxation
under certain conditions if ‘unforeseen circumstances’ precipitated the move. The Internal
Revenue Service (2006, p. 16) recently issued
regulations listing events that would ‘count’ as
such unforeseen circumstances, including
divorce, job loss, or multiple births from a single
pregnancy. Surely, most homeowners would not
be startled to learn that couples sometimes
divorce, that job losses can occur, or that a pregnancy could yield triplets, so these circumstances
are not ‘unforeseen’ in the sense used here.
Instead, such events are ‘unforeseen’ in the sense
that they were very unlikely ex ante, too unlikely
to influence the home purchase decision.
While this use of ‘unforeseen’ is evidently
valuable for some purposes, it does not seem to
be appropriate to the issues of interest here,
though it is closer than the zero probability definition. To see this, consider again the trade-off
between long-term and short-term contracts. If
‘unforeseen’ contingencies are recognized but
given low probability, they can still be incorporated into the contract and, in the absence of costs
to doing so, will be. Hence, in the absence of
contracting costs, again, short-term contracts will
have no foreseeability advantages if this is what
we mean by foreseeability. On the other hand, if
there are costs of writing ‘long’ contracts, it may
be optimal to exclude contingencies with low
probability. Hence a sequence of short-term contracts (which delays some of the writing costs)
may be better. On the other hand, it is not clear
that the advantage of short-term contracts is a gain
Unforeseen Contingencies
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This basic idea appears in numerous forms in
the literature. This partition description appears in
Ghirardato (2001) and Dekel et al. (2001), among
others. A more complex form appears in Li
(2006a) and in Heifetz et al. (2006a), both of
which allow the possibilities recognized by the
agent to vary with the true state of the world. For
example, it might be that when the true state is
(rain, revolution), the agent recognizes the possibility of the revolution, while if it is (rain, no
revolution), he does not.
While this idea for representing knowledge is
almost uniformly used in the literature, there is
greater variation in the way decision-making
is represented. Continuing with the rain and revolution example, suppose the agent has a certain
amount of money and can either use it to buy an
umbrella or invest it in country X or simply save
it. Suppose Table 1 gives the true, objective payoff
of the agent as a function of his choice and the real
state.
Turning to the agent’s perceptions, continue to
assume that he sees the possibilities only as rain
versus no rain. Intuitively, the consequences of
buying the umbrella or saving money are unambiguous since they only depend on this. Putting it
differently, these acts are measurable with respect
to the agent’s awareness, so there seems to be no
problem. On the other hand, how does the agent
perceive the payoffs to investment?
O ¼ fðrain, revolutionÞ, ðrain, no revolutionÞ,
A number of papers in the literature use models
that
treat the payoffs to investing in ‘states’ (rain)
ðno rain, revolutionÞ, ðno rain, no revolutionÞg:
and (no rain) as exogenously given (see, for examConsider an agent who has never considered ple, Heifetz et al. 2006b; Li 2006b). In a somethe possibility of revolution. This agent sees only what more restrictive version of the same idea,
two possibilities: rain or no rain. That is, the agent Modica et al. (1998) assume that if the agent does
has a subjective state space S, describing the possibilities as he perceives them, given by
in foreseeability so much as it is a delay in writing.
See Al Najjar et al. (2006) for a particularly interesting related model.
Turning to models, the idea of how unforeseen
contingencies are represented is common to most
of the models in the area, though with many
variations. (A different approach, which I do not
discuss, involves an explicit logic rather than
focusing on a state space. See Halpern and Rêgo
2005 for a good example of this approach and an
overview of much of this literature.) In standard
models of uncertainty without unforeseen contingencies, there is a set of states of the world, say O,
which represents the uncertainty. A state o O
should be thought of as a specification of every
possible circumstance conceivably relevant to the
agent’s situation. For example, for a firm, a state
might specify input prices, demand conditions,
technological possibilities, what is going on with
its rivals, and so on. Part of what is meant by the
phrase ‘every relevant circumstance’ is that, if we
know the state, then we know the exact consequence (profits or utility) the agent receives as a
function of whatever course of action he might
choose.
To give a concrete example, suppose there are
two relevant sources of uncertainty: whether it
rains and whether there is a revolution in country
X. This gives us four possible states of the world:
Unforeseen Contingencies, Table 1 Objective payoffs
S ¼ fðrainÞ, ðno rainÞg:
We can think of the ‘state’ (rain) as the event
{(rain, revolution), (rain, no revolution)} and
think of the ‘state’ (no rain) as analogous. Thus
the state space as seen by the agent is actually a
partition of the true state space. The variation
within an event of this partition is variation that
the agent has simply not thought of.
Objective state
(rain,
revolution)
(rain, no
revolution)
(no rain,
revolution)
(no rain, no
revolution)
Payoff if
buy
5
Payoff if
save
0
Payoff if
invest
100
5
0
10
6
8
100
6
8
10
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Unforeseen Contingencies
not foresee some possibility, this means he implicitly assumes some particular resolution of this
uncertainty. For example, perhaps the agent
implicitly assumes there will not be a revolution,
so he sees the payoff to investing in each ‘state’ as
ten. In other words, these approaches come down
to treating the agent’s view of the available actions
as given by Table 2 for some numbers x and x0 .
With more than one agent, these models generally do allow the agents to perceive different
possibilities and to assign payoffs differently.
For example, if two agents have to jointly agree
on what to do with their money in the example
above, we could assume that one of them perceives only rain versus no rain, while the other
perceives only revolution versus no revolution.
While such a model can be useful for some
purposes, it does not appear useful for studying
the kinds of issues mentioned in my opening
paragraph. To see this, note that the default
approach of Modica et al. (1998) is identical to a
model where the states (rain, revolution) and
(no rain, revolution) have zero probability. While
other values of x and x0 are not as directly
interpreted, again, the model is identical to one
where the agent believes a revolution is impossible (and may have ‘incorrect’ beliefs about his
payoffs). As argued above, if ‘unforeseen’ is
taken to mean ‘zero probability’, then short-term
contracts do not have foreseeability advantages
over long-term contracts. Hence, at least for the
purposes of studying the trade-off between shortterm and long-term contracts, this model of
decision-making does not appear to be useful.
Part of what this approach omits is recognition
by an agent that his conception of the world is
incomplete. Intuitively, what we need to understand the postulated trade-off between short-term
and long-term contracts is a recognition by the
agent that his conception of what the world will
be like in 2016 will be clearer in 2015 than
in 2006.
To state this more concretely in the context of
the example, the agent might perceive only the
possibility of rain versus no rain, but understand
that this omits many currently unforeseen possibilities. How might we represent such a situation?
One approach is to separate the agent’s uncertainty about what events may occur in the world
from his uncertainty about what his payoff will be
given a particular action. In the story above, we
said that the agent’s payoff to investing depends
on whether it rains and whether there is revolution. Presumably, the agent does not care about
rain or revolution per se but instead cares about
what utility or payoff he receives. That is, the
‘states’ as the agent perceives them may be more
usefully thought of statements about what payoff
the agent gets from each action. In the example,
then, any vector of three numbers (giving the
payoffs to the three actions in some order) could
be a ‘state’. Table 3 shows one possible representation along this line.
The subjective states (rain, 1) and (rain, 2)
represent the agent’s uncertainty about the payoffs
to investing when the only objective uncertainty
he can think of (rain versus no rain) is resolved in
favour of rain.
This idea also appears in various forms in the
literature. Fishburn (1970) includes an early statement of the idea and more involved treatments
appear in Ghirardato (2001), Kreps (1979,
1992), Dekel et al. (2001), Halpern and Rêgo
(2006) (embodied in their ‘virtual moves’), and
Epstein et al. (2007), among others. Some of these
models (for example, Kreps or Dekel, Lipman,
and Rustichini) use expected utility over these
Unforeseen Contingencies, Table 3 Perceived payoffs, version 2
Unforeseen Contingencies, Table 2 Perceived payoffs, version 1
Subjective
state
(rain)
(no rain)
Perceived
payoff if
buy
5
6
Perceived
payoff if
save
0
8
Perceived
payoff if
invest
x
x0
Subjective
state
(rain, 1)
(rain, 2)
(no rain, 1)
(no rain, 2)
Perceived
payoff if
buy
5
5
6
6
Perceived
payoff if
save
0
0
8
8
Perceived
payoff if
invest
10
20
20
10
Unforeseen Contingencies
‘states’, while others (for example, Ghirardato or
Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo) use models of agents
who are uncertainty averse with respect to what
the ‘right’ payoff is.
At first glance, this approach appears to be
capable of generating a model we could use for
the purposes of interest. In fact, this model looks
very similar to the ‘observable but unverifiable’
uncertainty story used by Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1988), and Hart (1995)
to model incomplete contracts. For brevity,
I henceforth refer to this as the GHM approach.
This approach assumes that some of the variables
relevant to the contracting parties are observed by
them but cannot be ‘shown’ to a court. As a result,
the parties cannot, according to this approach,
contract on these variables because a dispute
about their realizations cannot be settled by the
court. (These papers often also use the assumption
that certain actions are indescribable, but this
aspect of the GHM approach is not relevant
here.) Hence contracts can only allocate control
rights – that is, assign the rights to make various
decisions ex post. Intuitively, if some variables
cannot be contracted on, one has to rely on the
parties to choose appropriately in the relevant
contingencies.
Similarly, it seems natural to assume that these
subjective states cannot be contracted over. If a
‘state’ is simply a specification of a utility function
for each agent as a function of the actions, how
can such a state be verified? Thus the GHM
approach appears to fit naturally with this
approach to modelling unforeseen contingencies.
To be more concrete, consider again the tradeoff between short-term and long-term contracts. It
seems natural to assume that the set of subjective
states for a period far in the future is larger than the
set for a period closer to the present. In this sense,
any contract regarding a distant period cannot be
as ‘fine tuned’ as a contract for a close period. This
will naturally give a trade-off between the value of
contracting far in advance and the value of
contracting once the parties know more, and so
can contract better.
To be still more explicit, suppose the table
above gives the subjective state space. Suppose
that if the agents write a long-term contract today,
14057
it can only specify an outcome as a function of
whether it rains or not. On the other hand, assume
that they expect that if they wait and write a
contract at a later date, they will learn whether
the ‘correct’ state space is {(rain, 1), (no rain, 1)}
or {(rain, 2), (no rain, 2)}. Thus a contract written
later will not share risk as well, but can specify the
outcomes given rain and no rain more efficiently.
Unfortunately, the work of Maskin and Tirole
(1999) calls this conclusion into doubt. They
show that observable but unverifiable variables
(and indescribable actions) do not justify a departure from standard contract theory. More specifically, even with observable but unverifiable
variables, a mechanism can be designed that will
induce the parties to reveal to the court what the
values of the unverifiable variables are. Thus the
fact that they cannot prove these facts to the court
is not a problem since the court knows they will
tell the truth.
Given the similarity to GHM, this suggests that
the above model of unforeseen contingencies may
not yield results different from standard contract
theory either. In terms of the example above, the
agents might be able to set up a mechanism that
effectively enables them to write a contract specifying different outcomes in the subjective states
(rain, 1) and (rain, 2). If so, there cannot be any
gain in waiting.
In principle, there are ways one could introduce more realism to the Maskin–Tirole framework and overturn their conclusion. For example,
they suggest that bounded rationality may imply
that the agents do not understand and so cannot
use the complex mechanisms needed to enforce
truth telling. On the other hand, it seems surprising that considerations other than unforeseen contingencies would be needed to generate something
different from standard contract theory. Maskin
and Tirole do not allow the kind of aversion to
payoff uncertainty present in Epstein, Marinacci,
and Seo, so this is another direction that may be
fruitful.
In short, unforeseen contingencies appear to be
important to understanding economic and political institutions but, as yet, economic theory lacks
a formal model of the phenomenon that can be
used to study these issues.
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See Also
▶ Incomplete Contracts
▶ Long Run and Short Run
Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Eddie
Dekel, Jing Li, Aldo Rustichini, and Marie- Odile Yanelle
for discussions and comments.
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Epstein, L., M. Marinacci, and K. Seo. 2007. Coarse contingencies. Working paper. University of Rochester.
Fishburn, P. 1970. Utility theory for decision making, Publications in Operations Research, No. 18. New York:
Wiley.
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contingencies and non-additive uncertainty. Economic
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international joint conference on autonomous agents
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Hart, O. 1995. Firms, contracts, and financial structure.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hart, O., and J. Moore. 1988. Incomplete contracts and
renegotiation. Econometrica 56: 755–786.
Hayek, F. 1960. The constitution of liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Heifetz, A., M. Meier, and B. Schipper. 2006a. Interactive
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Heifetz, A., M. Meier, and B. Schipper. 2006b. Unawareness, beliefs, and games. Working paper. University of
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Uniqueness of Equilibrium
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and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press.
Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Michael Allingham
In general equilibrium theory, equilibrium prices
may be interpreted as those prices which coordinate the buying and selling plans of all the various
agents in the economy; equivalently, they may be
interpreted as the values of the commodities. Such
values will only be well defined if there is only
one system of coordinating prices, that is, if the
equilibrium is unique. If this does not obtain then
at least the set of equilibrium price systems should
not be too large, that is, there should be only a
finite number of equilibria.
The question of uniqueness was first posed by
Walras (1874–7), but received its first systematic
treatment by Wald (1936). In the present discussion we commence with a formal definition of
uniqueness. We then note that there may be multiple, and even infinitely many, equilibria, but
show that the latter possibility is unlikely. In the
light of this we examine various conditions which
are sufficient to ensure that equilibrium is unique.
Finally, we note some problems which may arise
in the presence of multiple equilibria.
We may represent an economy with
n commodities by the excess demand function f:
S ! Rn, where S ¼ Rnþ 0. The interpretation of
this is that f(p) is the vector of aggregate excess
demands (positive) or excess supplies (negative)
Uniqueness of Equilibrium
expressed at the price system p. Under some
reasonable assumptions on the underlying parameters of the economy, that is the individual preferences and endowments, this excess demand
function has the following properties:
Homogeneity: f(tp) = f(p) for all positive t.
Walras’ Law: pf(p) = 0 for all p.
Desirability: fi(p) is infinite if pi = 0.
Differentiability: f is continuously differentiable.
The price system p is an equilibrium price
system if f(p) = 0. Because of desirability it is
clear that if p is an equilibrium then p is strictly
positive. We shall denote by E the set of equilibrium prices. Now if p is in E then so is tp for any
positive t (because of Homogeneity), so we take
the equilibrium p to be unique if q is in E implies
that q = tp for some positive t. Equivalent formulations specify that the equilibrium p is unique if it
is the only equilibrium in the unit simplex in Rn, or
if it is the only equilibrium with, say, pn = 1. Of
course, the question of uniqueness of equilibrium
only arises if there is at least one equilibrium:
however, under the above four conditions on the
excess demand function this existence is assured
(Debreu 1959).
The first point to note is that equilibrium may
well not be unique: indeed, there may be infinitely
many equilibria. This follows from the fact that
the above four conditions are, at the most, the only
restrictions which economic theory places on the
excess demand function (Debreu 1970). It is
therefore straightforward to construct examples
of economies with many equilibria, and even of
economies in which all positive prices are equilibrium prices.
In the light of this point we first consider the
likelihood of encountering an infinite number of
equilibria. Let F(p) be the Jacobian of excess
supply, that is of f, at p with the last row and
last column deleted. We lose no information in
working with F rather than with the full Jacobian:
simply because we can set pn = 1 without loss
of generality (Homogeneity) and because if
fi(p) = 0 for all i other than n then fn(p) = 0
(Walras’ Law). The economy is said to be regular
if F(p) is of full rank at all p in E. The importance
14059
of this is that almost all economies are regular, in
that the set of economies which are not regular, or
critical economies, is a closed null subset of the
set of all economies, as may be shown using
Sard’s theorem (Debreu 1970).
With this in mind we may now observe that the
number of equilibria in a regular economy is finite.
This may be shown, using the Poincaré–Hopf
index theorem, by defining the index i(p) = 1 if
the determinant det F(p) > 0 and i(p) = 1 if det
F(p) < 0 and noting that the sum of i(p) over all
p in E is 1 (Dierker 1972). This result has two
immediate corollaries: the first is that the number
of equilibria in a regular economy is odd; the
second is that if det F(p) is positive for all p in
E then equilibrium is unique. Taking the above two
results together we note that in almost all economies the number of equilibria is finite.
The economic interpretation of det F(p) being
positive in the two-dimensional case is that excess
demand is ‘downward-sloping’ (or excess supply
‘upward-sloping’). It is intuitively clear that this
ensures uniqueness. In the general case, however,
the economic interpretation of this property is not
so clear; we therefore examine some more interpretable properties which ensure uniqueness.
An economy with excess demand function f has
the revealed preference property if p f (q) > 0
wherever p is in E and q is not in E. It is well
known that if g is an individual’s excess demand
function then q g(p) 0 (that is g(p) is available
to the individual at price q) implies that p f (q) > 0
(that is g(q) is not available at price p). If all individuals are identical this property will hold in
aggregate, where, if p is in E, q f (p) = 0 immediately, so that p f (q) > 0 if q is not in E. Thus if
all agents are identical the economy has the
revealed preference property. In fact the essential
reason why the property holds if all agents are
identical is that there is then no trade at equilibrium.
It can readily be seen that the property holds if there
is no trade at equilibrium for whatever reason. This
becomes relevant if we consider today’s endowments as being the result of yesterday’s trading,
with no intervening consumption or production.
Now assume that f has the revealed preference
property and let p and q be in E but suppose that r,
a proper linear combination of p and q, is not in E.
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Then if p f(r) > 0 and if q f(r) > 0 so that
r f(r) > 0 which contradicts Walras’ Law. This
shows that E is convex. Since in almost all economies E is finite, and the only finite convex set is a
singleton, it follows that in almost all economies
with the revealed preference property equilibrium
is unique.
An economy with excess demand function
f has the gross substitute property if pi > qi and
pj = qj for each j 6¼ i imply that fj(p) > fj(q) for
each j 6¼ i. If this property obtains then Walras’
Law implies that excess demand must be
‘downward-sloping’. The interpretation of this is
that all commodities are substitutes for each other
(in the gross sense, that is including income
effects as well as substitution effects). In fact, the
gross substitutes property implies the revealed
preference property; instead of showing this
implication we will demonstrate directly that the
gross substitutes property ensures uniqueness.
Let p be in E and for any q ¼
6 p define
m = maxi qi/pi = qk/pk say, and let r = mp. Then
ri ≧ qi for each i with equality for i = k and inequality for some i ¼
6 k, so by repeated use of the gross
substitutes property we have fk(r) > fk(q). But by
Homogeneity f(r) = f(p) = 0, so that fk(q) < 0 and
q is not in E. Thus equilibrium is unique.
If pi > qi and pj = qj for each j 6¼ i imply that
fj (p) ≧ fj (q) for each j 6¼ i then the economy has
the weak gross substitutes property. Arguments
analogous to that above show that in this case
E is convex, so that in almost all economies equilibrium is unique. Alternatively, if the economy is,
in addition, connected in some specific sense, then
equilibrium is definitely unique.
Finally, we should note that these properties of
revealed preference and gross substitutes do not
depend on differentiability. If we accept differentiability there are other properties which ensure
uniqueness. One such is diagonal dominance,
which is that F has a positive diagonal and
that there are some units in which commodities
can be measured such that each of their excess
demands are more sensitive to a change in their
own price than they are to a change in all other
non-numeraire prices combined.
It is clear from the above discussion that
uniqueness is a strong property. If it does not
Uniqueness of Equilibrium
obtain equilibrium prices will still coordinate individual agents’ plans, but they will not, of course,
define values uniquely.
One more specific problem which arises under
multiple equilibria concerns stability. Assume
that we have a process for changing prices such
that no change is made in equilibrium and define
an equilibrium price p to be stable under this
process if prices converge to p whatever their
initial values. Then if there are two equilibria,
say p and q, neither can be stable: the path
starting at p will remain at p so that q is not stable,
and conversely. This problem may be avoided by
considering only system stability, that is by
defining the set E of equilibrium prices to be
stable if all paths converge to E. It may also be
avoided by considering only local stability, that
is by defining p to be stable if prices converge to
p given initial values sufficiently close to p. It is
clear that even local stability requires equilibria
to be separated, and thus finite. As we have seen,
this applies in a regular economy; in this case the
index theorem then implies that if there are
2 k + 1 equilibria (we know the number to be
odd) then k + 1 will typically be locally stable
and k unstable.
A further specific problem which arises under
multiple equilibria concerns comparative statics.
Assume that we want to compare the set of equilibria E of the economy with the set of equilibria
E0 of some new economy obtained from the original economy by some specified parameter
change. If there are multiple equilibria we may
be able to say very little: for example if p is in
E and both p0 and q0 are in E0 and p0 < p < q0 all
comparative statics results are ambiguous. However, in regular economies, where not only are
equilibria separated but also the elements of
E and of E0 correspond to one another in a natural
one-to-one way, this problem may be avoided by
considering only local comparative statics,
interpreted analogously to local stability.
See Also
▶ General Equilibrium
▶ Regular Economies
Unit Roots
Bibliography
Debreu, G. 1959. Theory of value. New York: Wiley.
Debreu, G. 1970. Economies with a finite set of equilibria.
Econometrica 38(3): 387–392.
Dierker, E. 1972. Two remarks on the number of equilibria
of an economy. Econometrica 40(5): 867–881.
Wald, A. 1936. Über einige Gleichungssysteme der
mathematischen
Ökonomie.
Zeitschrift
für
Nationalökonomie 7: 637–670; trans. as: 1951. On
some systems of equations of mathematical economics,
Econometrica 19: 368–403.
Walras, L. 1874–7. Eléments d’économie politique pure.
Definitive edn, Lausanne: Corbaz, 1926. Translated by
W. Jaffé as Elements of pure economics. London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1954.
14061
Martingales; Model selection; Nonstationarity;
Polynomials; Present value; Probability;
Rational expectations business cycle models;
Real business cycles; Spurious regressions;
Statistical inference; Stochastic trends; Term
structure of interest rates; Unit root distributions; Unit roots; Wiener process
JEL Classifications
C22
Economic and financial time series have frequently been successfully modelled by autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) schemes of
the type
Unit Roots
aðLÞyt ¼ bðLÞet ,
Peter C. B. Phillips
Abstract
Models with autoregressive unit roots play a
major role in modern time series analysis and
are especially important in macroeconomics,
where questions of shock persistence arise,
and in finance, where martingale concepts figure prominently in the study of efficient markets. The literature on unit roots is vast and
applications of unit root testing span the social,
environmental and natural sciences. The present article overviews the theory and concepts
that underpin this large field of research and
traces the originating ideas and econometric
methods that have become central to empirical
practice.
Keywords
ARCH models; ARMA time-series processes;
Bayesian inference; Bayesian statistics; Bayesian time series analysis; Bias reduction; Break
point
analysis;
Classical
statistics;
Cointegration; Confidence intervals; Efficient
markets hypothesis; Forecasting; Functional
central limit theorem; GARCH models; Integrated conditional heteroskedasticity models;
Lagrange multipliers; Long-run variance;
(1)
where et is an orthogonal sequence (that is,
6 s), L is the backshift
E(et ) = 0, E(etes) = 0 for all t ¼
operator for which Lyt = yt1 and a(L), b(L) are
finite-order lag polynomials
aðLÞ ¼
p
X
i¼0
ai Li ,
b ð LÞ ¼
q
X
bj L j ,
j¼0
whose leading coefficients are a0 = b0 = 1.
Parsimonious schemes (often with p + q 3) are
usually selected in practice either by informal
‘model identification’ processes such as those
described in the text by Box and Jenkins (1976)
or more formal order-selection criteria which
penalize choices of large p and/or q. Model (1) is
assumed to be irreducible, so that a(L) and b(L)
have no common factors. The model (1) and
the time series yt are said to have an autoregressive unit root if a(L) factors as (1 L)
a1(L) and a moving-average unit root if b(L)
factors as (1 L)b1(L).
Since the early 1980s, much attention has been
focused on models with autoregressive unit roots.
In part, this interest is motivated by theoretical
considerations such as the importance of martingale models of efficient markets in finance and the
dynamic consumption behaviour of representative
economic agents in macroeconomics; and, in part,
U
14062
Unit Roots
the attention is driven by empirical applications,
which have confirmed the importance of random
walk phenomena in practical work in economics,
in finance, in marketing and business, in social
sciences like political studies and communications, and in certain natural sciences. In mathematics and theoretical probability and statistics,
unit roots have also attracted attention because
they offer new and important applications of functional limit laws and weak convergence to stochastic integrals. The unit root field has therefore
drawn in participants from an excitingly wide
range of disciplines.
If (1) has an autoregressive unit root, then we
may write the model in difference form as
Dyt ¼ ut ¼ a1 ðLÞ1 bðLÞet ,
(2)
where the polynomial a1(L) has all its zeros outside the unit circle. This formulation suggests
more general nonparametric models where, for
instance, ut may be formulated in linear process
(or Wold representation) form as
ut
¼ cðLÞet ¼
1
X
cj etj ,
j¼0
with
1
X
j¼0
c2j < 1,
(3)
or as a general stationary process with spectrum
fu(l). If we solve (2) with an initial state y0 at
t = 0, we have the important partial sum
representation
yt ¼
t
X
j¼1
uj þ y 0 ¼ St þ y 0 ,
(4)
showing that St and hence yt are ‘accumulated’ or
‘integrated’ processes proceeding from a certain
initialization y0. A time series yt that satisfies (2)
or (4) is therefore said to be integrated of order one
(or a unit root process or an I(1) process) provided
fu(0) > 0. The latter condition rules out the possibility of a moving-average unit root in the model for
ut that would cancel the effect of the autoregressive
unit root (for example, if b(L) = (1 L)b1(L) then
model (2) is Dyt = Da1(L)1b1(L)et or, after cancellation, just yt = a1(L)1b1(L)et, which is not I(1)).
Note that this possibility is also explicitly ruled out
in the ARMA case by the requirement that a(L) and
b(L) have no common factors. Alternatively, we
6 Dvt for some weakly stationmay require that ut ¼
ary time series vt, as in Leeb and Potscher (2001)
who provide a systematic discussion of I(1) behaviour. The partial sum process St in (4) is often
described as a stochastic trend.
The representation (4) is especially important
because it shows that the effect of the random
shocks uj on yt does not die out as the time distance between j and t grows large. The shocks uj
then have a persistent effect on yt in this model, in
contrast to stationary systems. Whether actual
economic time series have this characteristic or
not is, of course, an empirical issue. The question
can be addressed through statistical tests for the
presence of a unit root in the series, a subject
which has grown to be of major importance
since the mid-1980s and which will be discussed
later in this article. From the perspective of economic modelling the issue of persistence is also
important because, if macroeconomic variables
like real GNP have a unit root, then shocks to
real GNP have permanent effects, whereas in traditional business cycle theory the effect of shocks
on real GNP is usually considered to be only
temporary. In more recent real business cycle theory, variables like real GNP are modelled in such a
way that over the long run their paths are determined by supply side shocks that can be ascribed
to technological and demographic forces from
outside the model. Such economic models are
more compatible with the statistical model (4) or
close approximations to it in which the roots are
local to unity in a sense that is described later in
this essay.
Permanent and transitory effects in (4) can be
distinguished by decomposing the process ut in
(3) as follows
ut ¼ Cð1Þ þ ðL 1ÞC~ ðLÞ et
¼ Cð1Þet þ ee t1 ee t ,
(5)
X1
~ ðLÞet , C~ ðLÞ ¼
where ee t ¼ C
c~j Lj j and c~j ¼
0
X1
c The decomposition (5) is valid algebrajþ1 s
ically if
Unit Roots
14063
1
X
j¼0
j1=2 jcj j < 1,
as shown in Phillips and Solo (1992), where validity conditions are systematically explored.
Equation (5) is sometimes called the Beveridge–
Nelson (1981) or BN decomposition of ut,
although both specialized and more general versions of it were known and used beforehand. The
properties of the decomposition were formally
investigated and used for the development of
laws of large numbers and central limit theory
and invariance principles in the paper by Phillips
and Solo (1992). When the decomposition is
applied to (4) it yields the representation
yt ¼ Cð1Þ
¼ Cð1Þ
t
X
1
t
X
1
ej þ ee 0 ee t þ y0
e j þ xt þ y 0 ,
n1=2 Y ½nr ) Bðr Þ,
(6)
say,
(7)
where xt ¼ ee 0 ee t . The right side of (7) decomthe first is a marposes yt into three components:X
t
tingale component, Y t ¼ Cð1Þ 1 ej , where the
effects of the shocks ej are permanent; the second
is a stationary component, where the effects of
shocks are transitory, viz. xt ¼ ee 0 ee t , since the
process ee t is stationary with valid Wold represen~ ðLÞet under (6) when et is stationary
tation ee t ¼ C
with variance s2; and the third being the initial
condition y0. The relative strength of the martingale component is measured by the magnitude
of the (infinite dimensional) coefficient Cð1Þ ¼
X
1
c , which plays a large role in the measurej¼0 j
ment of long-run effects in applications. Accordingly, the decomposition (7) is sometimes called
the martingale decomposition (cf., Hall and
Heyde 1980) where it was used in various forms
in the probability literature prior to its use in
economics.
The
Yt ¼
Xt leading martingale term
Cð1Þ s¼1 es in (7) is a partial sum process or
stochastic trend and, under weak conditions on et
(see Phillips and Solo 1992, for details) this term
satisfies a functional central limit theorem
whereby the scaled process
(8)
a Brownian motion with variance o2 =
C(1) 2 s2 = 2pf u (0), a parameter which is called
the long-run variance of ut, and where [ ] signifies
the integer part of its argument. Correspondingly,
n1=2 Y ½nr ) Bðr Þ,
(9)
pffiffiffi
provided y0 ¼ op ð nÞ A related result of great
significance is based on the limit
n1
½nr
X
t¼1
Y t1 et Cð1Þ )
ðr
BdB
(10)
0
of the sample covariance of Yt1 and its forward
increment,
C(1)et. C(1)et. The limit process Mðr Þ
ðr
¼ BdB is represented here as an Ito (stochastic)
0
integral and is a continuous time martingale. The
result may be proved directly (Solo 1984; Phillips
1987a; Chan and Wei 1988) or by means of martingale convergence methods (Ibragimov and
Phillips,
Xk 2004) which take advantage of the fact
that
Y e is a martingale. The limit theory
t¼1 t1 t
given (9) and (10) was extended in Phillips
(1987b, 1988a) and Chan and Wei (1987) to
cases where the model (2) has an autoregressive
root in the vicinity of unity (r ¼ 1 þ nc , for some
fixed c) rather than precisely at unity, in which
case the limiting process is a linear diffusion
(or Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process) with parameter
c. This limit theory has proved particularly useful
in the analysis of asymptotic local power functions of unit root tests (Phillips 1987b) and the
construction of confidence intervals (Stock 1991).
Phillips and Magdalinos (2007) considered moderate deviations from unity of the form r ¼ 1 þ kc,
where k ! 1 but nk ! 0 , so that the roots are
local but further away from unity, showing that
central limit laws rather than functional laws
apply in this case (see also Giraitis and Phillips
2006). This theory is applicable to mildly explosive processes (where c > 0) and therefore assists
in bridging the gap between the limit theory for
the stationary, unit root and explosive cases.
Both (8) and (10) have important multivariate
generalizations that play a critical role in the study
U
14064
Unit Roots
of spurious regressions (Phillips 1986) and
cointegration limit theory (Phillips and Durlauf
1986; Engle and Granger 1987; Johansen 1988;
Phillips 1988a; Park and Phillips 1988, 1989).
0
In particular, if yt ¼ y0at , y0bt , ut ¼ u0at , u0bt
0 0 0
and
are vector processes and
0 et ¼ eat , ebt
E et et ¼ S, then: (i) the decomposition (5) continues to hold under (6), where |cj| is interpreted
as a matrix norm; (ii) the functional law (8) holds
and the
0 limit
process is vector Brownian motion
0 0
B ¼ Ba , Bb with covariance matrix O = C(1)S
C(1)0; and (iii) sample covariances converge
weakly to stochastic processes with drift, as in
n1
½nr
X
t¼1
0
Y at1 ubt )
ðr
0
0
Ba dBb þ lab r,
n1=2 y½nr ) Bðr Þ þ B0 ðkÞ :
¼ Bðr, kÞ,
a:s:,
which may be interpreted as a long run equilibrium (cointegrating) relationship between the stochastic trends (Yt) of yt. Correspondingly, we have
the empirical cointegrating relationship
b0 yt ¼ vt ,
among the observed series yt with a residual
vt = b0 (xt + y0) that is stationary. The columns of
b span what is called the cointegration space.
The above discussion presumes that the initialization y0 has no impact on the limit theory, which
will be so if y0 is small relative to the sample size,
pffiffiffi
specifically, if y0 ¼ op ð nÞ. However, if y0 ¼ Op
pffiffiffi
ð nÞ , for example if y0 ¼ y0yn is indexed to
depend on past shocks uj (satisfying a process
of the form (3)) to some point in the distant past yn
say
(12)
and
(11)
X1
where lab ¼
E ua0 u0bk is a one sided longk¼1
run covariance matrix. The limit process on
the right side of (11) is a semimartingale
(incorporating a deterministic drift function labr)
rather than a martingale when lab 6¼ 0.
The decomposition (7) plays an additional role
in the study of cointegration (Engle and Granger
1987). When the coefficient matrix C(1) is singular and b spans the null space of C(1)0 , then b0C(1)
= 0 and (7) leads directly to the relationship
b0 Y t ¼ 0,
which is measured in terms of the sample size n,
then the results can differ substantially. Thus, if
yn = [kn], for some fixed parameter k > 0, then
X½kn
y0yn ¼
uj ; and n1=2 y0yn ) B0 ðkÞ , for
1
some Brownian motion B0(k) with covariance
matrix O00 given by the long-run variance matrix
of uj. Under such an initialization, (9) and (11)
are replaced by
n1
½nr
X
t¼1
yat1 u0bt )
ðr
0
Ba ðs, kÞdBb ðsÞ0 þ lab r,
so that initializations play a role in the limit theory.
This role becomes dominant when k becomes
very large, as is apparent from (12). The effect of
initial conditions on unit root limit theory was
examined in simulations by Evans and Savin
(1981, 1984), by continuous record asymptotics
by Phillips (1987a), in the context of power analysis by Müller and Elliott (2003), for models with
moderate deviations from unity by Andrews and
Guggenberger (2006), and for cases of large k by
Phillips (2006).
Model (4) is of special interest to economists
working in finance because its output, yt, behaves
as if it has no fixed mean and this is a characteristic
of many financial time series. If the components uj
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
then yt is a random walk. More generally, if uj is
a martingale difference sequence (mds) (that
is orthogonal to its own past history so that
Ej1 (uj) = E(uj| uj1, uj2, . . . . ,u1) = 0 then yt
is a martingale. Martingales are the essential mathematical elements in the development of a theory of
fair games and they now play a key role in the
mathematical theory of finance, exchange rate
determination and securities markets. Duffie
(1988) provides a modern treatment of finance
that makes extensive use of this theory.
In empirical finance much attention has
recently been given to models where the
Unit Roots
14065
conditional variance E u2j j uj1 , uj2 , . . . , u1 ¼
s2j is permitted to be time varying. Such models
have been found to fit financial data well and
many different parametric schemes for s2j have
been devised, of which the ARCH (autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity) and GARCH
(generalized ARCH) models are the most common in practical work. These models come within
the general class of models like (1) with mds
errors. Some models of this kind also allow for
the possibility of a unit root in the determining
mechanism of the conditional variance s2j and
these are called integrated conditional heteroskedasticity models. The IGARCH (integrated
GARCH) model of Engle and Bollerslev (1986)
is an example, where for certain parameters o
0 , b 0, and a > 0, we have the specification
s2j ¼ o þ bs2j1 þ au2j1 ,
(13)
with a + b = 1 and uj = sjzj, where
the
zj are i.i.d.
innovations with E(zj) = 0 and E z2j ¼ 1. Under
these conditions, the specification (13) has the
alternative form
s2j ¼ o þ s2j1 þ as2j1 z2j1 1 ,
(14)
from which it is apparent that s2j has an autoregressive unit root. Indeed, since
E s2j j s2j1 ¼ o þ s2j1 ,
s2j is a martingale when o = 0. It is also
apparentfrom (14) that shocks as manifested in
the deviation z2j1 1 are persistent in s2j . Thus,
s2j shares some of the characteristics of an I(1) integrated process. But in other ways, s2j is very
different. For instance, when o = 0 then s2j !
0 almost surely as j ! 1 and, when o > 0, s2j is
asymptotically equivalent to a strictly stationary
and ergodic process. These and other features
of models like (13) for conditional variance
processes with a unit root are studied in
Nelson (1990).
In macroeconomic theory also, models such as
(2) play a central role in modern treatments. In a
highly influential paper, R. Hall (1978) showed
that under some general conditions consumption
is well modelled as a martingale, so that consumption in the current period is the best predictor of
future consumption, thereby providing a macroeconomic version of the efficient markets hypothesis. Much attention has been given to this idea in
subsequent empirical work.
One generic class of economic model where
unit roots play a special role is the ‘present value
model’ of Campbell and Shiller (1988). This
model is based on agents’ forecasting behaviour
and takes the form of a relationship between one
variable Yt and the discounted, present value of
rational expectations of future realizations of
another variable Xt+i(i = 0,1,2,. . .). More specifically, for some stationary sequence ct (possibly a
constant) we have
Y t ¼ yð 1 dÞ
1
X
i¼0
di Et ðXtþi Þ þ ct :
(15)
When Xt is a martingale, Et(Xt + i) = Xt and (15)
becomes
Y t ¼ yXt þ ct ,
(16)
so that Yt and Xt are cointegrated in the sense of
Engle and Granger (1987). More generally, when
Xt is I(1) we have
Y t ¼ yXt þ ct ,
(17)
X1
where ct ¼ ct þ y k¼1 dk Et ðDXtþk Þ, so that Yt
and Xt are also cointegrated in this general case.
Models of this type arise naturally in the study of
the term structure of interest rates, stock prices
and dividends and linear-quadratic intertemporal
optimization problems.
An important feature of these models is that
they result in parametric linear cointegrating relations such as (16) and (17). This linearity in the
relationship between Yt and Xt accords with the
linear nature of the partial sum process that determines Xt itself, as seen in (4), and has been
U
14066
extensively studied since the mid-1980s. However, in more general models, economic variables
may be determined in terms of certain nonlinear
functions of fundamentals. When these fundamentals are unit root processes like (4), then the
resulting model has the form of a nonlinear
cointegrating relationship. Such models are relevant, for instance, in studying market interventions by monetary and fiscal authorities (Park
and Phillips 2000; Hu and Phillips 2004) and
some of the asymptotic theory for analysing parametric models of this type and for statistical inference in such models is given in Park and Phillips
(1999, 2001), de Jong (2004), Berkes and Horváth
(2006) and Pötscher (2004). More complex
models of this type are nonparametric and different methods of inference are typically required
with very different limit theories and typically
slower convergence rates (Karlsen et al. 2007;
Wang and Phillips 2006). Testing for the presence
of such nonlinearities can therefore be important
in empirical practice (Hong and Phillips 2005;
Kasparis 2004).
Statistical tests for the presence of a unit root
fall into the general categories of classical and
Bayesian, corresponding to the mode of inference
that is employed. Classical procedures have been
intensively studied and now occupy a vast literature. Most empirical work to date has used classical methods but some attention has been given to
Bayesian alternatives and direct model selection
methods. These approaches will be outlined in
what follows.
Although some tests are known to have certain
limited (asymptotic) point optimality properties,
there is no known procedure which uniformly
dominates others, even asymptotically. Ploberger
(2004) provides an analysis of the class of asymptotically admissable tests in problems that include
the simplest unit root test, showing that the conventional likelihood ratio (LR) test (or Dickey and
Fuller 1979; Dickey and Fuller 1981, t test) is not
within this class, so that the LR test, while it may
have certain point optimal properties, is either
inadmissible or must be modified so that it
belongs to the class. This fundamental difficulty,
together with the nonstandard nature of the limit
theory and the more complex nature of the
Unit Roots
asymptotic likelihood in unit root cases partly
explains why there is such a proliferation of test
procedures and simulation studies analysing performance characteristics in the literature.
Classical tests for a unit root may be classified
into parametric, semiparametric and nonparametric categories. Parametric tests usually rely on
augmented regressions of the type
Dyt ¼ ayt1 þ
k1
X
i¼1
fi Dyti þ et ,
(18)
where the lagged variables are included to model
the stationary error ut in (2). Under the null
hypothesis of a unit root, we have a = 0 in (18)
whereas when yt is stationary we have a <
0. Thus, a simple test for the presence of a unit
root against a stationary alternative in (18) is
based on a one-sided t-ratio test of H0 : a ¼ 0
against H1 : a < 0. This test is popularly known
as the ADF (or augmented Dickey–Fuller) test
(Said and Dickey 1984) and follows the work of
Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) for testing Gaussian random walks. It has been extensively used in
empirical econometric work since the Nelson and
Plosser (1982) study, where it was applied to
14 historical time series for the USA leading to
the conclusion that unit roots could not be rejected
for 13 of these series (all but the unemployment
rate). In that study, the alternative hypothesis was
that the series were stationary about a deterministic trend (that is, trend stationary) and therefore
model (18) was further augmented to include a
linear trend, viz.
Dyt ¼ m þ bt þ ayt1 þ
k1
X
i¼1
fi Dyti þ et , (19)
When yt is trend stationary we have a < 0 and b
6 0 in (19), so the null hypothesis of a difference
¼
stationary process is a = 0 and b = 0. This null
hypothesis allows for the presence of a non-zero
drift in the process when the parameter m 6¼ 0. In
this case a joint test of the null hypothesis H0 : a
¼ 0 , b = 0 can be mounted using a regression
F-test. ADF tests of a = 0 can also be mounted
directly using the coefficient estimate from (18) or
Unit Roots
14067
(19), rather than its t ratio (Xiao and Phillips
1998).
What distinguishes both these and other unit
root tests is that critical values for the tests are not
the same as those for conventional regression Fand t-tests, even in large samples. Under the null,
the limit theory for these tests is nonstandard and
involves functionals of a Wiener process. Typically, the critical values for five or one per cent
level tests are much further out than those of the
standard normal or chi-squared distributions. Specific forms for the limits of the ADF t-test (ADFt)
and coefficient (ADFa) test are
ADFt )
ð1
0
ð1
ð1
WdW
1=2
W
,
ADFa
2
0
WdW
,
) ð0 1
2
W
(20)
0
where W is a standard Wiener process or
Brownian motion with variance unity. The limit
distributions represented by the functionals (20)
are known as unit root distributions. The limit
theory was first explored for models with Gaussian errors, although not in the Wiener process
form and not using functional limit laws, by
Dickey (1976), Fuller (1976) and Dickey and
Fuller (1979, 1981), who also provided tabulations. For this reason, the distributions are sometimes known as Dickey–Fuller distributions. Later
work by Said and Dickey (1984) showed that, if
the lag number k in (18) is allowed to increase as
the sample size increases with a condition on the
divergence rate that k = 0(n1/3 ), then the ADF
test is asymptotically valid in models of the form
(2) where ut is not necessarily autoregressive.
Several other parametric procedures have been
suggested, including Von Neumann ratio statistics
(Sargan and Bhargava 1983; Bhargava 1986;
Stock 1994a), instrumental variable methods
(Hall 1989; Phillips and Hansen 1990) and variable addition methods (Park 1990). The latter also
allow a null hypothesis of trend stationarity to be
tested directly, rather than as an alternative to
difference stationarity. Another approach that provides a test of a null of trend stationarity is based
on the unobserved components representation
yt ¼ m þ bt þ r t þ ut ,
r t ¼ r t1 þ vt :
(21)
which decomposes a time series yt into a deterministic trend, an integrated process or random walk
(rt) and a stationary residual (ut). The presence of
the integrated process component in yt can then be
tested by testing whether the variance s2v of the
innovation vt is zero. The null hypothesis is thenH0
: s2n ¼ 0 , which corresponds to a null of trend
stationarity. This hypothesis can be tested in a
very simple way using the Lagrange multiplier
(LM) principle, as shown in Kwiatkowski
et al. (1992), leading to a commonly used test
known as the KPSS test. If ^e t denotes the residual
from a regression of yt on a deterministic trend
(a simple linear trend in the case of (21) above)
^ 2e is a HAC (heteroskedastic and autocorrelaand o
tion consistent) estimate constructed from ^e t , then
the KPSS statistic has the simple form
n2
LM ¼
n
X
t¼1
^ 2e
o
S2t
,
where
Xt St is the partial sum process of the residuals
^e : Under the null hypothesis of stationarity,
j¼1 j
Ð1
this LM statistic converges to 0 V 2X , where VX is a
generalized Brownian bridge process whose
construction depends on the form (X) of the deterministic trend function. Power analysis indicates
that test power depends importantly on the choice
of bandwidth parameter in HAC estimation and
some recent contributions to this subject are Sul
et al. (2006) and Müller (2005) and Harris et al.
(2007). Other general approaches to testing I(0) versus I(1) have been considered in Stock (1994a,
1999).
By combining rt and ut in (21) the components
model may also be written as
yt ¼ m þ bt þ xt ,
Dxt ¼ axt1 þ t :
(22)
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14068
Unit Roots
In this format it is easy to construct an LM test
of the null hypothesis that yt has a stochastic trend
component by testing whether a = 0 in (22).
When a = 0, (22) reduces to
Dyt ¼ b þ t ,
¼ bt þ
t
X
1
or yt
i þ y0 ,
(23)
and so the parameter m is irrelevant (or surplus)
under the null. However, the parameter b retains
the same meaning as the deterministic trend term
coefficient under both the null and the alternative
hypothesis. This approach has formed the basis of
several tests for a unit root that have been developed (see Bhargava 1986; Schmidt and Phillips
1992) and the parameter economy of this model
gives these tests some advantage in terms of
power over procedures like the ADF in the
neighbourhood of the null.
This power advantage may be further exploited
by considering point optimal alternatives in the
construction of the test and in the process of
differencing (or detrending) that leads to (23), as
pursued by Elliott et al. (1995). In particular, note
that (23) involves detrending under the null
hypothesis of a unit root, which amounts to first
differencing, whereas if the root were local to unity,
the appropriate procedure would be to use quasi
differencing. However, since the value of the coefficient in the locality of unity is unknown
(otherwise, there would be no need for a test), it
can only be estimated or guessed. The procedure
suggested by Elliott et al. (1995) is to use a value of
the localizing coefficient in the quasi-differencing
process for which asymptotic power is calculated
by simulation to be around 50 per cent, a setting
which depends on the precise model for estimation
that is being used. This procedure, which is commonly known as generalized least squares (GLS)
detrending (although the terminology is a misnomer because quasi-differencing not full GLS is
used to accomplish trend elimination) is then
asymptotically approximately point optimal in the
sense that its power function touches the asymptotic power envelope at that value. Simulations
show that this method has some advantage in finite
samples, but it is rarely used in empirical work in
practice, partly because of the inconvenience of
using specialized tables for the critical values of
the resulting test and partly because settings for the
localizing coefficient are arbitrary and depend on
the form of the empirical model.
Some unit root tests based on standard limit
distribution theory have been developed. Phillips
and Han (2008), for example, give an autoregressive coefficient estimator whose limit distribution is standard normal for all stationary, unit root
and local to unity values of the autoregressive coefficient. This estimator may be used to construct tests
and valid confidence intervals, but tests suffer
power loss because the rate of convergence of the
pffiffiffi
estimator is n uniformly over these parameter
values. So and Shin (1999) and Phillips et al.
(2004) showed that certain nonlinear instrumental
variable estimators, such as the Cauchy estimator,
also lead to t-tests for a unit root which have an
asymptotic standard normal distribution. Again,
these procedures suffer power loss from reduced
convergence rates (in this case, n1/4 ), but have the
advantage of uniformity and low bias. Bias is a well
known problem in autoregressive estimation and
many procedures for addressing the problem have
been considered. It seems that bias reduction is
particularly advantageous in the case of unit root
tests in panel data, where cross-section averaging
exacerbates bias effects when the time dimension is
small. Some simulation and indirect inference procedures for bias removal have been successfully
used both in autoregressions (Andrews 1993;
Gouriéroux et al. 2000) and in panel dynamic
models (Gouriéroux, Phillips and Yu 2006).
Semiparametric unit root tests are among the
most commonly used unit root tests in practical
work and are appealing in terms of their generality
and ease of use. Tests in this class employ nonparametric methods to model and estimate the
contribution from the error process ut in (2), allowing for both autocorrelation and heterogeneity.
These tests and the use of functional limit theory
methods in econometrics, leading to the limit formulae (20), were introduced in Phillips (1987a).
Direct least squares regression on
Unit Roots
14069
Dyt ¼ ayt1 þ ut
(24)
gives an estimate of the coefficient and its t-ratio
in this equation. These two statistics are then
corrected to deal with serial correlation in ut by
employing an estimate of the variance of ut and its
long-run variance. The latter estimate may be
obtained by a variety of kernel-type HAC or
other spectral estimates (such as autoregressive
spectral estimates) using the residuals ^
u t of the
OLS regression on (24). Automated methods of
bandwidth selection (or order selection in the case
of autoregressive spectral estimates) may be
employed in computing these HAC estimates
and these methods typically help to reduce size
distortion in unit root testing (Lee and Phillips
1994; Stock 1994a; Ng and Perron 1995, 2001).
However, care needs to be exercised in the use
of automated procedures in the context of
stationarity tests such as the KPSS procedure to
avoid test inconsistency (see Lee 1996; Sul et al.
2006).
This semiparametric approach leads to two test
statistics, one based on the coefficient estimate,
called the Z(a) test, the other based on its t-ratio,
called the Z(t) test. The limit distributions of these
statistics are the same as those given in (20) for the
ADF coefficient and t-ratio tests, so the tests are
asymptotically equivalent to the corresponding
ADF tests. Moreover, the local power functions
are also equivalent to those of the Dickey–Fuller
and ADF tests, so that there is no loss in asymptotic power from the use of nonparametric
methods to address autocorrelation and heterogeneity (Phillips 1987b). Similar semiparametric
corrections can be applied to the components
models (21) and (22) leading to generally applicable LM tests of stationarity (s2 = 0) and stochastic trends (a = 0).
The Z tests were extended in Phillips and Perron (1988) and Ouliaris, Park and Phillips (1989)
to models with drift, and by Perron (1989) and
Park and Sung (1994) to models with structural
breaks in the drift or deterministic component. An
important example of the latter is the trend
function
ht ¼
¼
p
X
j¼0
f j tj þ
p
X
0
ðt m Þj
f m, j tjm ,
where
tjm
j¼0
t f1, . . . , mg
t fm þ 1, . . . , ng
(25)
which allows for the presence of a break in the
polynomial trend at the data point t = m + 1.
Collecting the individual trend regressors in (25)
into the vector xt, there exists a continuous
function X(r) = (1, r, . . . , rp)0 such that D1
n x½nr
! Xðr Þ as n ! 1 uniformly in r [0,1], where
Dn = diag(1,n, ... ,np). If m = limn ! 1(m/n) > 0
is the limit of the fraction of the sample where the
structural change occurs, then the limiting trend
function Xm(r) corresponding to (25) has a similar
break at the point m. All the unit root tests
discussed above continue to apply as given for
such broken trend functions with appropriate
modifications to the limit theory to incorporate
the limit function Xm(r). Indeed, (25) may be
extended further to allow for multiple break points
in the sample and in the limit process. The tests
may be interpreted as tests for the presence of a
unit root in models where broken trends may be
present in the data. The alternative hypothesis in
this case is that the data are stationary about a
broken deterministic trend of degree p.
In order to construct unit root tests that allow
for breaking trends like (25) it is necessary to
specify the break point m. (Correspondingly, the
limit theory depends on Xm(r) and therefore on m.)
In effect, the break point is exogenously determined. Perron (1989) considered linear trends
with single break points intended to capture the
1929 stock market crash and the 1974 oil price
shock in this way. An alternative perspective is
that any break points that occur are endogenous to
the data and unit root tests should take account of
this fact. In this case, alternative unit root tests
have been suggested (for example, Banerjee et al.
1992; Zivot and Andrews 1992) that endogenize
the break point by choosing the value of m that
gives the least favourable view of the unit root
hypothesis. Thus, if ADF(m) denotes the ADF
statistic given by the t-ratio for a in the ADF
U
14070
Unit Roots
regression (19) with a broken trend function like
(25), then the trend break ADF statistic is
^ Þ ¼ min ADFðmÞ,
ADFðm
m m m
h i
m ¼ nm , m ¼ ½nm ,
where
(26)
for some 0 < m < m < 1: The limit theory for this
trend break ADF statistic is given by
^Þ )
ADFðm
ð 1
inf
m ½m, m
W Xm dW
ð 1
0
0
W 2Xm
1=2
,
(27)
where WX is detrended standard Brownian motion
defined by
W X ðr Þ ¼ W ðr Þ
ð 1
0
WX
ð 1
0
XX
1
Xðr Þ:
The limit
process Xm(r) that appears in the functional W Xm
is dependent on the trend break point m over which
the functional is minimized. Similar extensions to
trend breaks are possible for other unit root tests
and to multiple breaks (Bai 1997; Bai and Perron
1998, 2006; Kapetanios 2005). Critical values of
the limiting test statistic (27) are naturally further
out in the tail than those of the exogenous trend
break statistic, so it is harder to reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root when the break point is
considered to be endogenous.
Asymptotic and finite sample critical values for
the endogenized trend break ADF unit root test are
given in Zivot and Andrews (1992). Simulations
studies indicate that the introduction of trend
break functions leads to further reductions in the
power of unit root tests and to substantial finite
sample size distortion in the tests. Sample trajectories of a random walk are often similar to those
of a process that is stationary about a broken trend
for some particular breakpoint (and even more so
when several break points are permitted in the
trend). So continuing reductions in the power of
unit root tests against competing models of
this type is to be expected and discriminatory
power between such different time series
models is typically low. In fact, the limit
Brownian motion process in (9) can itself be
represented as an infinite linear random
combination of deterministic functions of time,
as discussed in Phillips (1998), so there are good
theoretical reasons for anticipating this outcome.
Carefully chosen trend stationary models can
always be expected to provide reasonable representations of given random walk or unit root data,
but such models are certain to fail in post-sample
projections as the post-sample data drifts away
from any given trend or broken trend line. Phillips
(1998, 2001) explores the impact of these considerations in a systematic way.
From a practical standpoint, models with structural breaks attach unit weight and hence persistence to the effects of innovations at particular
times in the sample period. In effect, break models
simply dummy out the effects of certain observations by parameterizing them as persistent effects.
To the extent that persistent shocks of this type
occur intermittently throughout the entire history
of a process, these models are therefore similar to
models with a stochastic trend. However, if only
one or a small number of such breaks occur then
the process does have different characteristics
from that of a stochastic trend. In such cases, it
is often of interest to identify the break points
endogenously and relate such points to institutional events or particular external shocks that
are know to have occurred.
More general nonparametric tests for a unit
root are also possible. These rely on frequency
domain regressions on (24) over all frequency
bands (Choi and Phillips 1993). They may be
regarded as fully nonparametric because they
test in a general way for coherency between the
series yt and its first difference Dyt. Other frequency domain procedures involve the estimation
of a fractional differencing parameter and the use
of tests and confidence intervals based on the
estimate. The time series yt is fractionally integrated with memory parameter d if (1
L)dyt = ut and ut is a stationary process with
spectrum fu(l) that is continuous at the origin
with fu(0) > 0, or a (possibly mildly heterogeneous) process of the form given in (3). Under
some rather weak regularity conditions, it is possible to estimate d consistently by semiparametric
methods irrespective of the value of d. Shimotsu
and Phillips (2005) suggest an exact local Whittle
Unit Roots
14071
estimator d^ that is consistent
for all d and for
pffiffiffi
which n d^ d ) N 0, 14 , extending earlier
work by Robinson (1995) on local Whittle estimation in the stationary case where |d| < 1. These
methods are narrow band procedures focusing on
frequencies close to the origin, so that long run
behaviour is captured. The Shimotsu–Phillips
estimator may be used to test the unit root
hypothesis H0 : d ¼ 1 against alternatives such
as H1 : d < 1 . The limit theory may also be
used to construct valid confidence intervals for d.
The Z(a), Z(t) and ADF tests are the most
commonly used unit root tests in empirical
research. Extensive simulations have been
conducted to evaluate the performance of the
tests. It is known that the Z(a), Z(t) and ADF
tests all perform satisfactorily except when the
error process ut displays strong negative serial
correlation. The Z(a) test generally has greater
power than the other two tests but also suffers
from more serious size distortion. All of these
tests can be used to test for the presence of
cointegration by using the residuals from a
cointegrating regression. Modification of the critical values used in these tests is then required, for
which case the limit theory and tables were provided in Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) and updated
in MacKinnon (1994).
While the Z tests and other semiparametric
procedures are designed to cope with mildly heterogeneous processes, some further modifications
are required when there is systematic timevarying heterogeneity in the error variances. One
form of systematic variation that
allows for jumps
in the variance has the form E e2t ¼ s2t ¼ s2 g nt
t
, where the variance evolution function g n may
be smooth except for simple jump discontinuities
at a finite number of points. Such formulations
introduce systematic time variation
into the
errors, so that we may write et ¼ g nt t , where
ζt is a martingale difference sequence with variance Ez2t ¼ s2 . These evolutionary changes then
have persistent effects on partial sums of et,
thereby leading to alternate functional laws of
the form
ðr
n1=2 Y ½nr ) Bg ðr Þ ¼ gðsÞdBðsÞ,
0
in place of (8). Accordingly, the limit theory for
unit root tests changes and some nonparametric
modification of the usual tests is needed to ensure
that existing asymptotic theory applies (Beare
2006) or to make appropriate corrections in
the limit theory (Cavaliere 2004; Cavaliere and
Taylor 2007) so that there is less size distortion in
the tests.
An extension of the theory that is relevant in
the case of quarterly data is to the seasonal unit
root model
1 L4 y t ¼ u t :
(28)
Here, the polynomial 1 L4 can be factored as
(1 L)(1 + L)(1 + L2), so that the unit roots
(or roots on the unit circle) in (28) occur at
1, 1, i, and i, corresponding to the annual
(L = 1) frequency, the semi-annual (L = 1)
frequency, and the quarter and three quarter
annual (L = i, i) frequency respectively. Quarterly differencing, as in (28), is used as a seasonal
adjustment device, and it is of interest to test
whether the data supports the implied hypothesis
of the presence of unit roots at these seasonal
frequencies. Other types of seasonal processes,
say monthly data, can be analysed in the same
way. Tests for seasonal unit roots within the particular context of (28) were studied by Hylleberg
et al. (1990), who extended the parametric ADF
test to the case of seasonal unit roots. In order to
accommodate fourth differencing, the autoregressive model is written in the new form
D4 yt ¼ a1 y1t1 þ a2 y2t1 þ a3 y3t2
Xp
f D y þ et , (29)
þ a4 y3t1 þ
i¼1 i 4 ti
where D4 = 1 L4, y1t = (1 + L)(1 + L2)yt, y2t =
(1 L)(1 + L2)yt, and y3t = (1 L2)yt. The
transformed data y1t, y2t, y3t retain the unit root at
the zero frequency (long run), the semi-annual
frequency (two cycles per year), and the annual
frequency (one cycle per year). When
a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = 0, there are unit roots at the
zero and seasonal frequencies. To test the hypothesis of a unit root (L = 1) in this seasonal model, a
t-ratio test of a1 = 0 is used. Similarly, the test for
U
14072
Unit Roots
a semi-annual root (L = 1) is based on a t-ratio
test of a2 = 0, and the test for an annual root on the
t-ratios for a3 = 0 or a4 = 0. If each of the a’s is
different from zero, then the series has no unit
roots at all and is stationary. Details of the implementation of this procedure are given in Hylleberg
et al. (1990), the limit theory for the tests is developed in Chan and Wei (1988), and Ghysels and
Osborne (2001) provide extensive discussion and
applications.
Most empirical work on unit roots has relied on
classical tests of the type described above. But
Bayesian methods are also available and appear
to offer certain advantages like an exact finite
sample analysis (under specific distributional
assumptions) and mass point posterior probabilities for break point analysis. In addressing the
problem of trend determination, traditional
Bayes methods may be employed such as the
computation of Bayesian confidence sets and the
use of posterior odds tests. In both cases prior
distributions on the parameters of the model
need to be defined and posteriors can be calculated
either by analytical methods or by numerical integration. If (18) is rewritten as
yt ¼ ryt1 þ
k1
X
1
fi Dyti þ et
(30)
then the posterior probability of the nonstationary
set {r 1} is of special interest in assessing the
evidence in support of the presence of a stochastic
trend in the data. Posterior odds tests typically
proceed with ‘spike and slab’ prior distributions
(p) that assign an atom of mass such as p(r = 1) =
y to the unit-root null and a continuous distribution with mass 1 y to the stationary alternative,
so that p(1 < r < 1) = 1 y. The posterior
odds then show how the prior odds ratio y/(1 y)
in favour of the unit root is updated by the data.
The input of information via the prior distribution, whether deliberate or unwitting, is a major
reason for potential divergence between Bayesian
and classical statistical analyses. Methods of setting an objective correlative in Bayesian analysis
through the use of model-based, impartial reference priors that accommodate nonstationarity are
therefore of substantial interest. These were
explored in Phillips (1991a), where many aspects
of the subject are discussed. The subject is controversial, as the attendant commentary on that
paper and the response (Phillips 1991b) reveal.
The simple example of a Gaussian autoregression
with a uniform prior on the autoregressive coefficient r and with an error variance s2 that is known
illustrates one central point of controversy
between Bayesian and classical inference procedures. In this case, when the prior on r is uniform,
the posterior for r is Gaussian and symmetric
^ (Sims
about the maximum likelihood estimate r
and Uhlig 1991), whereas the sampling distribu^ is biased downwards and skewed with a
tion of r
long left-hand tail. Hence, if the calculated value
^ were found to be r
^ ¼ 1 , then Bayesian
of r
inference effectively assigns a 50 per cent posterior probability to stationarity {|r| <1}, whereas
classical methods, which take into account the
^,
substantial downward bias in the estimate r
indicate that the true value of r is much more
likely to be in the explosive region {r > 1}.
Another major point of difference is that the
Bayesian posterior distribution is asymptotically
Gaussian under very weak conditions, which
include cases where there are unit roots (r = 1),
^ are
whereas classical asymptotics for r
non-standard, as in (20). These differences are
explored in Kim (1994), Phillips and Ploberger
(1996) and Phillips (1996). The unit root case is
one of very few instances where Bayesian and
classical asymptotic theory differ. The reason for
the difference in the unit root case is that Bayesian
asymptotics rely on the local quadratic shape of
the likelihood and condition on a given trajectory,
whereas classical asymptotics rely on functional
laws such as (9), which take into account the
persistence in unit root data which manifest in
the limiting trajectory.
Empirical illustrations of the use of Bayesian
methods of trend determination for various macroeconomic and financial time series are given in
DeJong and Whiteman (1991a, b), Schotman and
van Dijk (1991) and Phillips (1991a, 1992), the
latter implementing an objective model-based
approach. Phillips and Ploberger (1994, 1996)
develop Bayes tests, including an asymptotic
Unit Roots
14073
information criterion PIC (posterior information
criterion) that extends the Schwarz (1978) criterion BIC (Bayesian information criterion) by allowing for potential nonstationarity in the data (see
also Wei 1992). This approach takes account of
the fact that Bayesian time series analysis is
conducted conditionally on the realized history
of the process. The mathematical effect of such
conditioning is to translate models such as (30) to
a ‘Bayes model’ with time-varying and datadependent coefficients, that is,
^ t yt þ
ytþ1 ¼ r
where
k1
X
1
^ Dy þ et ,
f
it
ti
(31)
^ ; i ¼ 1, . . . , k 1 are the latest
^ t, f
r
it
best estimates of the coefficients from the data
available to point ‘t’ in the trajectory. The
‘Bayes model’ (31) and its probability measure
can be used to construct likelihood ratio tests of
hypotheses such as the unit root null r = 1, which
relate to the model selection criterion PIC. Empirical illustrations of this approach are given in
Phillips (1994, 1995).
Nonstationarity is certainly one of the most
dominant and enduring characteristics of macroeconomic and financial time series. It therefore
seems appropriate that this feature of the data be
seriously addressed both in econometric methodology and in empirical practice. However, until
the 1980s this was not the case. Before 1980 it was
standard empirical practice in econometrics to
treat observed trends as simple deterministic functions of time. Nelson and Plosser (1982) challenged this practice and showed that observed
trends can be better modelled if one allows for
stochastic trends even when there is some deterministic drift. Since their work there has been a
continuing reappraisal of trend behaviour in economic time series and substantial development in
the econometric methods of nonstationary time
series. But the general conclusion that stochastic
trends are present as a component of many economic and financial time series has withstood
extensive empirical study.
This article has touched only a part of this large
research field and traced only the main ideas
involved in unit root modelling and statistical
testing. This overview also does not cover the
large and growing field of panel unit root testing
and panel stationarity tests. The reader may consult the following review articles devoted to various aspects of the field for additional coverage
and sources: (a) on unit roots: Phillips (1988b),
Diebold and Nerlove (1990), Dolado et al. (1990),
Campbell and Perron (1991), Stock (1994b),
Phillips and Xiao (1998), and Byrne and Perman
(2006); (b) on panel unit roots: Phillips and Moon
(1999), Baltagi and Kao (2000), Choi (2001),
Hlouskova and Wagner (2006); and (c) special
journal issues of the Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics (1986; 1992), the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (1988), Advances in
Econometrics (1990), Econometric Reviews
(1992), and Econometric Theory (1994).
See Also
▶ ARCH Models
▶ Bayesian Time Series Analysis
▶ Cointegration
▶ Markov Processes
▶ Martingales
▶ Present Value
▶ Statistical Inference
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14077
Awakening; Slavery; Smith, A.; Tucker, G.;
Turgot, A.R. J.; United States, economics in;
Vattel, E.; Wayland, F.; Wealth; Wells, D. A
JEL Classifications
B1
United States, Economics
in (1776–1885)
Pre-independence to 1820
Stephen Meardon
Abstract
Economics in the United States before 1885
was not a discipline of credentialled professionals. Its debates were published in political
pamphlets and newspaper editorials as well as
college textbooks and scholarly treatises. Its
principal project was to set the boundaries of
a doctrinal system of economic liberalism and
determine the appropriate functions of government. The system was characterized by the
sanctity of private property, the celebration of
individual labour, and the harmony of the economic and moral orders. Those parts of the
system that were imported from abroad were
adapted, sometimes ingeniously, to economic
and political circumstances at home.
Keywords
American Economic Association; American
Free Trade League; Banknotes; Bastiat, F.;
Bryant, W. C.; Cardozo, J. N.; Carey, H. C.;
Carey, M.; Catallactics; Combinations; Economic liberalism; Ely, R. T.; Enlightenment;
Finney, C.; Franklin, B.; Free banking; Free
labour doctrine; Free trade; George, H.; Great
Awakening; Hamilton, A.; James, E.; Jefferson, T.; Land tax; Leavitt, J.; Liberty Party;
List, F.; Madison, Bishop J.; Malthus’s theory
of population; McCulloch, J. R.; Physiocracy;
Paine, T.; Paper money; Patten, S. N.; Perry,
A. L.; Petty, W.; Political economy; Protectionism; Public works; Raymond, D.; Rent;
Ricardo, D.; Say, J.-B.; Second Great
Before US independence, the middle Atlantic colonies offered more fertile ground than New
England or the South for ideas of political economy from Britain and the European Continent to
take root. Eighteenth-century Philadelphia was
rivalled only by New York and Boston in its
population, which grew from over 4000 in 1700
to over 28,000 in 1790. It was unrivalled in its
cosmopolitanism. The religious diversity of Pennsylvania promoted tolerance of notions that, especially from the perspective of the New England
theocracy, were tainted by deism or secularism.
One consequence was a thriving press.
Philadelphia, therefore, was the destination of
Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790) when he ran
away from his printer’s apprenticeship in Boston
at the age of 17. The many ideas he published in
his new situation included his adaptation of the
work of Sir William Petty to American commercial policy. Franklin’s A Modest Enquiry Into the
Nature and Necessity of a Paper Currency (1729),
following Petty’s Discourse on Political Arithmetic (1690), emphasized the importance of the
quantity of specie in circulation to commercial
prosperity, and a favourable balance of trade to
the quantity of specie. Beyond Petty, Franklin
argued that issuance of paper money would at
once substitute for the specie that was then lacking
and, by stimulating production and exports,
improve the balance of trade – and thereby garner
more specie. Paper money, though commonly
disdained, could effect a virtuous circle of commercial vitality and specie accumulation.
In 1757, when Franklin was renowned in
America and abroad as a scientist and statesman,
he was appointed the Pennsylvania Assembly’s
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emissary to the Crown. The governor of the colony had vetoed the issuance of paper money and
other fiscal measures desired by the colonists;
Franklin was to convey their complaints. Following the onerous internal taxes established by the
Stamp Act of 1765 and the import duties of the
Townshend Acts of 1767, they would have more
cause to complain. The popular response was ‘No
taxation without representation’ coupled with the
colonists’ mutual agreement to refuse the importation of British goods. Franklin’s own response,
more nuanced but to the same effect, drew upon
the Physiocratic notion of the pre-eminence of
agriculture that had been impressed upon him in
France by Anne Robert Jacques Turgot. In his
Positions to be Examined, concerning National
Wealth (1769), Franklin explained that trade is fair
when both parties know the value of the traded
goods, meaning the value of labour embodied in
them; and value is most knowable when the goods
consist of agriculture, not manufactures, because
agriculture is derived more directly from labour.
The implication was that by creating a captive
market in America for British manufactured
goods, Britain was attempting to hoodwink the
colonists. The colonists’ eschewal of legal British
trade and their substitution of smuggled foreign
goods, therefore, were justified. Besides, Franklin
added, the frugality necessitated by the boycott
would make domestic farmers and tradesmen
more productive (Dorfman 1966, vol. 1, 191–3).
While Franklin engaged the politicaleconomic ideas of the Enlightenment in public
argument, he also sought to disseminate them in
higher education. His Academy of Philadelphia,
later to become the University of Pennsylvania,
commenced classes in 1751 with a non-sectarian
board of trustees, a progressive Scottish cleric as
president, and a curriculum including governance
and commerce. The institution’s secular orientation and curriculum stood in contrast to those of
Harvard (1636), the College of William and Mary
(1693), and Yale (1701), which were aligned
closely with the Congregational or Anglican
churches, directed to the training of ministers
and missionaries, and uncongenial to the innovations in moral philosophy and legal and commercial thought from Britain and Europe. Even
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
Princeton (1746), Columbia (1754), and Brown
(1764), which were intended to embody a new
spirit of religious tolerance, succumbed ultimately
to a more constrained orthodoxy. Indeed, so too
did Franklin’s Academy. But the Revolutionary
war shook the orthodoxy. Franklin’s curricular
plan made inroads at William and Mary in 1779
(O’Connor 1944, pp. 64–6). Bishop James Madison (1749–1812), the College’s president, cousin
of the fourth US president, and a man of radical
political views notwithstanding his prominence in
the Episcopal Church, became America’s first
teacher of political economy (O’Connor 1944,
pp. 20–1).
Madison is believed to have relied upon Emer
de Vattel’s The Law of Nations, or the Principles
of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the
Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns (1758). The
book stood out for its maxims of sovereignty more
than commercial policy. To Vattel, the sovereignty
of the state is inalienable. While in some times and
places the head of state may be a prince, nevertheless, ‘the State is not, and can not be, a patrimony’ (1758, pp. 29, 33). The sovereign is
obliged to serve the state’s interests, not his own.
Although they are peripheral, the book also
includes chapters on general commerce, the
financing of public roads and canals, money and
exchange, and commerce between nations. Vattel
makes brief but notable mention of the desirability
of defraying the expense of roads and canals from
the general revenue of the entire nation, and of the
ruler’s obligation to encourage trade that is beneficial but to restrict that which is hurtful. In the
latter category is that ‘ruinous’ trade which results
in a negative balance, entailing more gold and
silver leaving the country than entering it (1758,
pp. 44, 43).
In Vattel’s work, the political thought of the
enlightenment is bonded to mercantile economic
thought. Neither was particularly avant-garde for
the 1770s. Thomas Paine (1737–1809) did not
steel the colonists’ patriotic will with 25 editions
and 150,000 copies of his Common Sense (1776)
by arguing merely that King George had not fulfilled adequately a sovereign’s obligations to his
subjects. Paine remonstrated that monarchy yields
tyranny and war; only republican government
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
would serve the cause of liberty. The differences
of Paine from Vattel in political economy are
equally significant. ‘Our plan is commerce,’
Paine declared. It was no time to ponder which
particular avenues and products and circumstances of trade were hurtful and which were
not; it was time to throw off the commercial
shackles of Britain altogether and trade with all
the world. ‘Trade flourishes best when it is free’,
he continued a short while later, ‘and it is weak
policy to attempt to fetter it’ (Paine 1778, p. 153).
Paine wrote polemics for the literate multitudes. His work was not the stuff of college curricula; Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations was fitter
for that purpose. Smith exploded the ‘absurd’
balance-of-trade doctrine (Smith 1789, p. 456),
illuminating in more scholarly fashion than did
Paine the virtues of commercial freedom, whether
international or domestic, and nudging England
towards the ‘natural system of perfect liberty and
justice’ in the administration of its colonial trade
(1789, p. 572). Regarding roads and canals and
other means of facilitating commerce, Smith was
disinclined to see them financed with the general
revenue of the state. More consistent with his
system was their financing by tolls or by local or
provincial taxes (1789, pp. 682–3). The Wealth of
Nations was taken up at William and Mary sometime between the mid-1780s and the 1790s. It was
read, debated, and absorbed in America several
years earlier, however: an edition was published
in Philadelphia within a few years of the Revolution (O’Connor 1944, pp. 21–2).
Questions of foreign trade policy, and the role
of the federal government in undertaking public
works and institutions for promoting commerce,
dominated the economic debate of the early
republic. They were argued passionately because
it was believed that upon their answers depended
not only the nation’s prosperity, but its character
and survival. Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826)
sought free trade between America and Europe
less for the goods that Americans could obtain
than for the occupations they would undertake in
consequence. In his Notes on the State of Virginia
(1785), Jefferson observed that, if trade had not
been interrupted and manufactures stimulated by
the Revolutionary War, Americans in greater
14079
numbers would work the land and buy their textiles from abroad. The advantage of making a
living from the land lay in the republican virtues
that husbandry instilled in the smallholder. ‘Let
our workshops remain in Europe’, Jefferson
offered; ‘the loss by the transportation of commodities across the Atlantic will be made up in
happiness and permanence of government’
(Spiegel 1960, pp. 42–3).
Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804), Jefferson’s
ideological rival, did not repudiate the Virginian’s
vision of the free trade of American agriculture for
European manufactures. He just denied that,
under the circumstances, it was realizable. The
European powers regularly imposed barriers to
the importation of American products, and the
several American states had little power to persuade or compel them to do otherwise. Hamilton’s
answer was to change the circumstances of American government. The unlikelihood of the Jeffersonian ideal became an argument for a strong
central authority. In Federalist No. 11 (1788),
Hamilton argued that adoption of the Constitution
would create a central government with the power
to bargain for commercial privileges abroad. If
instead disunion persisted, ‘we should then be
compelled to content ourselves with the first
price of our commodities, and to see the profits
of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and persecutors.’
Hamilton envisioned a larger manufacturing
sector than did Jefferson, but he did not admit
that the growth of manufactures would retard
agriculture. In his famous Report on Manufactures (1791), composed during his term as the
nation’s first Secretary of the Treasury, he offered
two reasons. First, even if manufactures slowed
the extensive cultivation of land, they would ‘promote a more steady and vigorous cultivation of the
lands occupied’. Second, manufactures probably
would not slow the extensive cultivation of land,
anyway. Immigrants drawn to America by
manufacturing jobs would eventually leave them
for agriculture, attracted by the promise of independent proprietorship of land (Spiegel 1960,
p. 33).
The question that followed was, ‘Will manufacture develop by itself?’ Hamilton thought not.
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14080
The scarcity of labour, high wages, and lack of
capital conspired against American manufacturers. To survive against European competition
would be difficult – but not hopeless. Raw materials were more abundant in the United States and,
although wages were indeed higher, the greater
expense of labour was counterbalanced by the
expenses of transportation and customs duties
for those who would import foreign goods. The
scarcity of capital could be addressed by fostering
a banking system and by the Treasury’s issuance
of debt, which would serve as a form of money. To
Hamilton, as to Paine, the business of America
was commerce; but Hamilton was not as squeamish as Paine and his ilk, including Jefferson,
about using the powers of the newly constituted
federal government to build the institutions and
infrastructure of commerce and to encourage
industries that might otherwise languish.
Hamilton’s name was invoked often in ensuing
controversies that exercised Americans and their
representatives. Among them were questions of
the federal government’s role in financing ‘internal improvements’, including the national turnpike stretching from the Potomac to the Ohio
River, authorized in 1806; the First Bank of the
United States, the charter of which expired in
1811; the Second Bank of the United States, the
fate of which was decided in the presidential election of 1832; and the ‘American System’ of tariff
protection for domestic manufactures, which
sparked debate through most of the 19th century.
One of the many whom Hamilton inspired was
Daniel Raymond (1786–1849), who became in
1820 the first American author of a systematic
treatise on political economy.
From 1820 to the Civil War
Raymond penned his Thoughts on Political Economy in his free time as an underemployed Baltimore lawyer (Spiegel 1960, p. 55). His careful
definition of national wealth as ‘a capacity for
acquiring the necessaries and comforts of life’,
not the value of tangible assets, was intended to
combat the idea that the United States was
wealthy by virtue mainly of its climate, soil, and
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
nearly limitless territory. Raymond argued that
other things mattered too, and more: population
density, the distribution of private wealth, the
capital and technology applied to agriculture,
transport, and other industries, and above all
‘the industrious habits of the people’ (Spiegel
1960, p. 60). The list corresponded closely to the
priorities for government action envisioned by
Hamilton.
Raymond’s distinction in American economics
is that he was first in a class, not that he was
influential. More credit for influence is due to
Mathew Carey (1760–1839), an Irish publisher
and controversialist who emigrated to Philadelphia in 1784 and soon re-established himself in
the same vocations. On political economy, he
wrote prolifically – but not systematically in the
manner of Raymond, whose work he sponsored
(Spiegel 1960, p. 55). Carey was concerned
mainly with one issue: the tariff. His Addresses
of the Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of
National Industry (1819) responded to the
country’s financial crisis of 1819 with a call for
further tariff protection for domestic industry.
Although the tariff bill of 1820 did not pass, the
protectionists’ champion in Congress, Henry
Clay, acknowledged Carey’s importance to the
ferment of the tariff of 1824 (Dorfman 1966,
vol. 1, pp. 384, 389–90). Carey’s influence was
also exercised importantly, if indirectly, through
the writings of Friedrich List (1789–1846), the
German thinker who was renowned posthumously in his country and abroad for his protectionist ‘national system’ of political economy. List
devised his system during a five-year sojourn in
Pennsylvania from 1825 to 1830, in which time he
became acquainted with Carey’s ideas, lent them
his own voice and authority, and propagated them
through the protectionist periodical, the National
Gazette (Dorfman 1966, vol. 2, p. 577).
The protectionist trend in trade policy that gathered strength in the mid-Atlantic states caused
alarm in the South. Jacob Newton Cardozo
(1786–1873), publisher of Charleston’s Southern
Patriot, addressed the tariff and other questions in
light of David Ricardo’s system. An American
edition of Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and Taxation was published in 1819;
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
another avenue of his large influence was the
Encyclopædia Britannica article on ‘Political
Economy’ by John Ramsay McCulloch, Ricardo’s
chief expositor in Britain. The article was
republished in 1825 with introduction, summary,
and annotations by Columbia College’s Reverend
John McVickar (O’Connor 1944, p. 136).
Cardozo’s Notes on Political Economy
appeared in 1826. To Cardozo, the unenlightened
social arrangements of Europe – above all, impediments to the alienation of land – had obscured to
Ricardo what was evident in the United States. In
the absence of unwise customs and legislation,
rent was never pernicious. Indeed, some payments
that were nominally rent, but were really the
returns to the ingenuity of the cultivator, were
positively benign. Conversely, where rent was
pernicious, it was due to legislation that fomented,
in one way or another, ‘monopoly’. In the United
States, such legislation was the protective tariff.
The genius of Cardozo’s argument was that
indicted protectionism even more forcefully than
did Ricardo’s system, thereby serving the interests
of the cotton-exporting South and the entrepôt of
Charleston, while casting Southern landowners in
a productive rather than a parasitic role (Dorfman
1966, vol. 1, pp. 551–66).
Bank regulation and the sustenance of slavery
preoccupied the South as much as the bane of
protectionism. The question of greater urgency
varied with the occasion. The 1828 ‘Tariff of
Abominations’ and the crisis stemming from
South Carolina’s ‘nullification’ of the law in
1832 were occasions of substantive political–economic debate – but so was President
Jackson’s veto, in 1832, of the proposed
re-charter of the Second Bank of the United
States. While the Democratic and Whig parties
agreed that the currency should be convertible
for gold, there were large differences between
and even within them regarding the appropriate
degrees competition and regulation of banks,
especially those involved in issuing currency.
They also differed on the function of the Second
Bank of the United States as competitor, usurper,
and regulator in the domain of private and
state banks. Jackson’s objection to the Second
Bank of the United States was that its shareholders
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enjoyed a monopoly of the Federal government’s
bank transactions. Cardozo shared Jackson’s antimonopoly convictions, but appreciated the Bank’s
potential as a regulator of the note issuance of
other banks, and thus of the recurring cycles of
credit expansion, inflation, and contraction.
Banks of deposit and discount – ‘banking in its
legitimate meaning’ – should be subject to free
competition, according to Cardozo, but banks of
issue should be subject to severe restriction
(Leiman 1966, p. 112). This exception to perfect
freedom served, by means of a stable currency, to
protect the value of property and promote trade.
Cardozo’s justified similarly his support for slavery. Abolitionism was a ‘conspiracy against property’, while slavery heightened the United States’
comparative advantage in agriculture and its gains
from free trade (Leiman 1966, p. 176–7).
By the 1820s and 30s, the inviolability of
property and free trade were touchstones of economic thought not only in the South. In the North,
too, notwithstanding its traditional allegiance to
Hamiltonian federalism, the ideas had wide currency. Jefferson’s Embargo Act of 1807, which
prohibited exports in the (disappointed) expectation of compelling Britain and France to rescind
their restraints on American trade, provoked ferocious opposition in the Northeast. Ideas of free
trade, and economic liberalism more generally,
sank their roots, notwithstanding the irony of
their having been planted in opposition to one of
their leading advocates. William Cullen Bryant
(1794–1878), who began in 1826 his life’s work
as editor of the New York Evening Post, and concurrently one of the nation’s most renowned poets
and most prominent spokesmen for unfettered
commercial freedom, cut his literary and economic teeth during the embargo. The first poem
he published as a boy in rural Massachusetts was a
widely circulated satire on the subject. ‘In vain
Mechanics ply their curious art, / And bootless
mourn the interdicted mart’, complained the
13-year-old Bryant. Jefferson’s diplomacy, he
mocked, ‘His grand ‘restrictive energies’
employs, / And wisely regulating trade – destroys’
(Bryant 1808).
To gain acceptance in Northern colleges, however, economic liberalism had to be disassociated
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from French political radicalism and garbed in
religious piety. The first event was already accomplished in the mid-1790s, as the enthusiasm of
American partisans of the cause of the French
Revolution diminished. The second was the outcome of a longer process that started at the same
time and gathered momentum as political economy made its way into college curricula as a
subject in its own right. Most colleges introduced
political economy as such, and explicitly, in the
1820s: although Harvard, Columbia, and
Princeton did so between 1817 and 1819, they
were followed by Dickinson, Pittsburgh,
Bowdoin, Amherst, Yale, Rutgers, the US Military Academy, Geneva (later renamed Hobart),
Williams, Dartmouth, Brown, Union, and Hamilton, all in the years 1822–1827 (O’Connor 1944,
p. 100). In most cases the favoured text was Jean
Baptiste Say’s Treatise on Political Economy.
Because Say disapproved of several of the
social changes in France since the Revolution,
he passed the political test. Because he was a
protestant Huguenot, he passed the religious
one – although it was a close call (O’Connor
1944, pp. 120, 133–4).
The religious test became more stringent in the
1830s. Religious revivals had recurred with varying intensity since the Great Awakening of the
1730s–1750s, but none since had swept through
the country with as much intensity as those commencing in western New York in 1826 and
spreading outward, nationwide, through roughly
the decade that followed (Cole 1954, pp. 75–6).
‘Harvests’ of new souls were most bountiful
among the middle class and young in small
towns and rural areas (Cole 1954, p. 80). Colleges
were especially fertile ground: the demographics
were right, and in most cases so too was the
geography. College presidents, besides, saw
revivals as a way of boosting their institutions’
visibility and prestige. Students and faculty were
particularly amenable to the particular character of
the Second Great Awakening. In past eras evangelism sought the salvation of the individual; now
it sought that of the nation, even the world. The
most popular evangelist of the period, Charles
Finney, called upon his listeners to strive for temperance, moral reform in general, and the
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abolition of slavery (Cole 1954, p. 77). The last
of these causes, even within the flock, was controversial. That the awakened moral sensibilities
demanded an end to slavery, there was consensus;
that they required the North to impose abolition
upon an unwilling South, there was not. As evangelical religion asserted itself in the same citadels
where political economy was establishing its foothold, the subject required a text reflecting at least
the sensibilities, if not always the objectives, of its
teachers and students.
That text was Elements of Political Economy
(1837a, b) by Reverend Francis Wayland
(1796–1865), president of Brown University.
Wayland, who had already published his Elements
of Moral Science in 1835, was the exemplary
teacher of political economy for two generations
of antebellum men. Political economy partook of
moral philosophy; the two subjects were taught
proximately, but separately, in the students’ junior
or senior year. In the Moral Science students
learned the nature of their moral constitution,
including the power and limits of their unaided
conscience to discern right from wrong in their
private and public conduct. Inasmuch as conscience was limited, there was recourse first to
natural religion and finally to revealed religion.
Revealed religion was the study of God’s word as
manifested in the Bible; natural religion was the
study of God’s design as manifested in the consequences of human behaviour. Taking intemperance as an example, Wayland illustrated that one
could survey the vice and poverty that resulted
from the consumption of liquor, consider that
God has a design relating all causes to their
effects, and thereby infer that God’s design forbids intemperance ‘as though He had said so by a
voice from heaven’ (Wayland 1837a, b, p. 120).
Of course, one could study other sorts of behaviour and their consequences – production,
exchange, distribution, and individual and public
consumption – and infer God’s design therein,
too. To do so required another volume: that was
the thrust of Wayland’s Political Economy.
Wayland taught that the economic role of government is ‘to construct the arrangements of society as to give free scope to the laws of Divine
Providence’ (O’Connor 1944, p. 189). Man must
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
be free to produce what he will and dispose of the
product as he pleases. International trade should
be unencumbered by protective tariffs. Although
the incorporation of banks should be made conditional on arrangements to ensure the convertibility
of their notes into specie, nobody who is willing to
accept the conditions should be refused a bank
charter. Poor laws supporting those capable of
work were founded on the premise the rich were
obliged to support the poor by law instead of by
charity, and as such were a violation of property.
Combinations of workers, like combinations of
capital owners, were oppressive, even tyrannical.
All that man required was the right to sell his
labour and invest his capital freely. Legislation
granting one party or the other any additional
privileges was ‘impolicy’ (Wayland 1841,
pp. 108–23).
As a treatise in political economy, Wayland’s
book was rivalled, after 1848, by John Stuart
Mill’s Principles of Political Economy. Mill conveyed the requisite ethical tone, if not a religious
one, and allowed sufficient qualifications to the
cases for free trade and strict constraints on banknote issuance to appeal to a broader swathe of
political opinion than did Wayland. But Mill’s
book was too lengthy to serve as a college text
(Dorfman 1966, vol. 2, p. 710). In that role, Wayland’s was unrivalled. The Elements of Political
Economy went through no fewer than 24 printings
in Boston and New York between 1837 and 1875,
with three more in London and a translation to
Hawaiian (O’Connor 1944, p. 174).
For his large readership and his tightly
connected system of economic liberty, Wayland
has been designated the ‘Ricardo of evangelists’
(Cole 1954, p. 178). The designation is not, notably, the ‘evangelist of Ricardo’. The last would
not apply, for in one crucial respect Wayland was
not the system’s most fervent expositor. Those
who adhered to the doctrine that man’s liberty to
reap the fruits of his own industry was sacrosanct,
and who followed its implications wherever they
might lead, found their way in short order to the
question of slavery and determined that it could
not be countenanced. ‘Free labor’ was their slogan. Wayland did not travel with them so far: he
was silent on the slavery question for the better
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part of a generation. He believed that the Constitution left slavery a matter for states to decide
(Dorfman 1966, vol. 1, p. 760) – but even as a
matter of state law, Wayland was not exercised by
the subject.
The Reverend Joshua Leavitt (1794–1873)
proselytized a more thoroughgoing interpretation
of the free labour doctrine. In the same year that
Wayland first published the Elements of Political
Economy, Leavitt became editor of the Emancipator, an organ urging free trade, cheap postage,
temperance, and above all, the demise of slavery
by political action. The Emancipator also advocated the election of James G. Birney of the newly
formed Liberty Party as President of the United
States in 1840 and 1844 (Cole 1954, p. 40).
Although the Liberty Party was ineffectual and
Birney unsuccessful, Leavitt’s periodical and the
presidential campaigns it championed marked the
beginnings of a longer effort. Its objectives were
at once to intensify opposition to slavery and to
peel the opponents’ support away from the dominant Whig and Democratic parties.
The effort began to show effects once the Liberty Party was eclipsed by the Free Soil Party in
1848 and 1852. Northern ‘Barnburner’ Democrats, who sided with the majority of their party
in opposition to the protective tariff, national
bank, and internal improvements, but disfavoured
its pro-slavery orientation, drifted towards the
Free Soilers. So did radical ‘Conscience Whigs’,
who could not abide their own party’s concessions
to the Slave Power. In the run-up to the election of
1852, while Democrats were able temporarily to
quell their internal conflict, the cleavage among
Whigs widened. The radicals demanded political
abolition; the conservative ‘Cotton Whigs’, who
represented the party’s manufacturing constituency, were loath to disrupt commerce (and the
Northern mills’ supply of southern cotton) by
fuelling the sectional conflict. The rancour contributed to the Whigs’ loss of the presidency. At
that moment, the urgency for conservatives to
answer the articulation of the free labour doctrine
to political abolition was manifest.
The task was delicate: the Whig party cast itself
as a friend of labour and opponent of slavery. The
tariff, a central plank in its platform, had long been
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promoted by Whig icons such as Henry Clay and
Daniel Webster as a way of arming workers in ‘an
unequal contest with the pauper labor of Europe’
(Eckes 1995, p. 24). Advocacy of labour did not
require compromise of the interests of manufacturers: the party line maintained that in general, as
in tariff legislation, the interests of labour and
capital were in harmony (Foner 1970, pp. 20–1).
Nor did opposition to slavery require concrete
support for its abolition: inheritors of the mantle
of Clay and Webster detested slavery but did not
see fit to involve the federal government in the
fundamental question of its existence, except in
new states and territories where prior law did not
apply. In order for the conservatives to save the
Whig party without sacrificing their convictions,
the free labour doctrine and the presumption of
harmony of interests had to be retained, but both
had to be interpreted to support the protective
tariff and to oppose political abolition.
The task was taken up by 19th-century
America’s most original economic thinker, Henry
Charles Carey (1793–1879), son of Mathew Carey.
By 1852 the younger Carey was already an important framer of Whig doctrine. The title of his first
major book, The Harmony of Nature as Exhibited
in the Laws which Regulate the Increase of Population and of the Means of Subsistence: and in the
Identity of the Interests of the Sovereign and the
Subject; the Landlord and the Tenant; the Capitalist and the Workman; the Planter and the Slave
(1836) suffices to describe its contents. His second,
a two-volume Principles of Political Economy
(1840), developed more fully his system: its
centrepiece was a law of the progression of civilization that entailed a new refutation of the
Ricardian theory of rent. His third, The Past, the
Present, and the Future (1848), demonstrated that
the same law prescribed tariff protection for the
United States – an argument that he propounded
relentlessly to the end of his life. What remained
was to show what the law implied for slavery.
That Carey did in The Slave Trade, Domestic
and Foreign: Why it Exists and How it May be
Extinguished (1853). For the unacquainted reader
he reiterated the law of progression. Contrary to
Ricardo’s teaching, Carey showed that the land
that is cultivated first is not the most fertile, which
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
is at the bottom of river valleys where the vegetation is dense. The first settlers to an area do not
have the numbers or the technology to clear and
till the bottom land: they settle instead at higher
altitudes and cultivate less fertile land. As they eke
out a living and their numbers grow, they need not
confine their work to agriculture. Their employments diversify, and some produce manufactures.
Manufacturers devise machines and techniques
that are useful in agriculture, allowing the population to inhabit and cultivate more fertile land.
They move down the hillside; they produce
more food; their numbers grow, and they diversify
further their employments; their manufacturers
invent better machines and techniques; they
move further down the hillside and cultivate better
land; and so on. Thus progress requires the development of technology that passes into agricultural
use, whether by design or happenstance. Development of technology depends on the diversification of industry – or as Carey put it more vividly,
‘the natural tendency of the loom and the anvil to
seek to take their place by the side of the plough
and the harrow’ (Carey 1853, p. 50).
The natural tendency is interrupted at a
country’s peril. The United States inflicted upon
itself such an interruption, according to Carey, in
so far as it relaxed its impediments to foreign
trade, impelling settlers to go West and farm
more extensively for export rather than planting
roots and farming more intensively for the home
market. But that was not the only consequence of
excessive foreign trade. Amongst a geographically dispersed population with few and small
population centres, land tenure was characterized
by larger parcels, which were more congenial to
the cultivation of crops by slave labour, and correspondingly the demand for free labour was
small (Carey 1853, p. 51).
The extinction of slavery, then, was not to be
achieved by political abolition.
The sudden reversal of the relationship
between master and slave would produce indolence in the latter and cause the ruin of both (Carey
1853, p. 23–4). It was to be achieved by
abolishing the economic conditions that fostered
slavery. The conditions were reducible to the
small demand for free labour. To increase the
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
demand, it was necessary to ensure that land was
cultivated intensively, in small plots, and for sale
in a home market that also comprised manufacturers. To ensure that outcome, it was necessary to
restrain foreign trade with a protective tariff. Only
with the traditional programme of the Whig Party,
not the radical one of the Free Soil Party, would
both master and slave be set free: the master from
his dependence on distant markets, the slave from
his shackles.
Carey’s system ultimately failed to be the
cement to hold together the Whig Party, but not
because it was unpersuasive under the circumstances when he wrote it. Circumstances changed.
The Missouri Compromise of 1820 had prohibited the future admission of slave states above
latitude 36 300 . Because the compromise rendered the slavery question irrelevant in most of
the territory into which the United States would
expand, moderate opponents of slavery were willing to leave the question up to state legislatures in
the remaining areas. At least one professed opponent of slavery even argued, paradoxically, for its
expansion into those areas and beyond. George
Tucker (1775–1861), who introduced political
economy to curriculum of the University of Virginia in 1825, had earlier served his district in the
US House. There, in 1820, he borrowed Malthusian population theory to demonstrate that as the
nation expanded westward the means of subsistence would increase, so the number of slaves
could be expected to grow. If slaves were confined
to the South while only whites migrated to the
new areas, the stage would be set for a violent
confrontation. The slaves, growing more populous relative to whites in the South if not elsewhere, would rise up against their masters. If
slavery were allowed instead to spread westward,
then the value of white labour would fall, the
value of slave labour would follow, the price of
slaves would fall below the cost of their maintenance, and the slaves would eventually be freed
voluntarily (Dorfman 1966, vol. 2, p. 544).
Carey’s The Slave Trade was but a more comprehensive (and more plausible) justification for
maintaining the same inclination manifested for
so long by Tucker and many others: to oppose
slavery while conciliating slaveholders. At last,
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just one year after the publication of Carey’s
tract, the position was clearly untenable. The
Kansas–Nebraska Act, signed into law by President Franklin Pierce in 1854, allowed the slavery
question to be put to a vote in the two newly
organized territories, both of which were north
of 36 300 , and to admit them to the Union as
slave states or free according to the voters’ wishes.
In effect, the Act repealed the Missouri Compromise; and Tucker’s decades-old notion that such a
result would promote, not for ever postpone,
slavery’s demise could no longer be believed.
Erstwhile conservative Whigs, with Carey in the
front ranks, dissolved their party and joined the
Conscience Whigs and Barnburner Democrats to
organize the Republican Party.
Yet Carey’s free-labour protectionism had
become obsolete only in part. Former protectionist Whigs dominated the new Republican Party in
financial matters, including tariff policy. After the
outbreak of war, they instituted an irredeemable
currency and a succession of tariff increases,
mainly for war finance. Those who understood
the free labour doctrine to have the opposite implications for money and tariffs did not oppose the
new legislation: considering the stakes, they
acknowledged its expediency. But this marriage
of convenience between adherents to otherwise
rival political–economic doctrines lasted only as
long as the war.
From the Civil War to the American
Economic Association
The slavery debate was settled with the war’s end,
but the money and tariff controversies erupted
anew. Popular discontentment was aroused immediately by the myriad internal and external war
taxes. The Republican Congress established a
revenue commission to study the tax system and
recommend an overhaul; its chairman (and after
the first year, the sole commissioner) was David
A. Wells (1828–1898), known to be a disciple of
Henry Carey. From 1865 through 1867, in the first
three of his five annual reports, Wells took care
not to antagonize his mentor or his patrons. The
dominant view in the Republican Party was that
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tariffs, necessary for revenue in wartime, were
opportune for protection in peacetime. Wells
recommended accordingly that the internal
excises should be dismantled, but the tariffs,
which now yielded revenues of over 45 per cent
of the value of imports, should be maintained.
Wells’s report for 1868 marked a change of his
thinking, and more. Favourable and unfavourable
reviewers alike read it as an insider’s repudiation of
the American System. By attempting ‘indiscriminate or universal protection’, Wells determined, the
protective tariff rendered ‘all protection a nullity’
because the iron and steel industries’ output was
the textile manufactures’ input (Wells 1869, p. 3).
The problem could not be solved simply by raising
further the textile tariff: any modification of the
tariff law would incite a general scramble for
more protection. Given the political reality, Wells
reasoned that it was better to determine tariffs by a
simple and invariant principle than to attempt ad
hoc changes. The principle was a tariff for revenue,
not protection. Wells’s stand for it, which only
hardened in his reports for 1869 and 1870, widened
the divide within the Republican coalition. Arthur
Latham Perry (1830–1905) of Williams College,
an evangelist for free trade in the mould of Leavitt,
congratulated Wells for having written ‘our Bible
in onslaughts against the monopolists’; Henry
Carey published a missive likening Wells to Judas
Iscariot.
Although Wells arrived at the revenue tariff
position by way of expediency, he occupied it
thereafter as a sincere and doctrinaire exponent
of free trade. There he joined William Cullen
Bryant, who appended in 1866 the presidency of
the American Free Trade League (AFTL) to his
duties as newspaper editor and publisher; and
Perry, who barnstormed for the AFTL after completing in the same year his Elements of Political
Economy, the successor to Wayland’s work as the
principal American textbook on the subject. Bryant, a septuagenarian at the war’s end, was of an
older generation whose powers were waning;
Wells and Perry, in their thirties, were more representative of the spirit of the post-bellum decade.
Free trade was the cause that they championed
most actively, but they were led to it by attitudes
and methods of broader significance.
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
Both Wells and Perry were schooled in the
clerical system of Wayland and were moved by
the evangelical impulse of reform, but they were
also young enough to partake of the fascination
with science that characterized the American
mind of the 1840s and 1850s. The fascination
was stoked by the appearance of Darwin’s On the
Origin of Species in 1859, but, like the inquiry into
biological adaptation to which Darwin contributed,
was present much earlier. The famed Swiss geologist and zoologist Louis Agassiz arrived in the
United States in 1846, drew thousands to his public
lectures in Boston, and inspired textile magnate
Abbott Lawrence to establish a scientific school at
Harvard for him to lead. Wells was among the first
four graduates of the Lawrence Scientific School.
There he learned the talents of empirical observation and statistical argument that he displayed as
Commissioner of the Revenue. Perry’s scientific
inclinations were manifested differently from
Wells’s but were consonant with them.
Perry himself served up few statistics, but he
sought to purge political economy of metaphysical presumptions that were unanswerable by statistical measurement.
The goal could be achieved, he thought, by
circumscribing the science, which had been stymied by preoccupation with ‘wealth’. Because the
word admitted so many meanings, none of them
precise, whatever thing it named was hard to
measure. Because the thing was hard to measure,
the word was ‘the bog whence most of the mists
have arisen which have beclouded the whole subject’ and was ‘totally unfit for any scientific purpose whatever’ (Perry 1866, p. 29). A better word
than ‘wealth’ was ‘value’. Value was no sooner
determined than it was measurable; one had only
to relinquish any hope of finding an invariant
standard of it. The value of a thing was always
relative to the other thing for which it was
exchanged, and was determined only when the
exchange was made. The amount of money
exchanged depended on the exchanging parties’
estimates of their desires and the efforts required
for their satisfaction. Refashioned thus as the science of exchanges, political economy would concern itself only with things that are measurable
in units of money. ‘Catallactics’, or perhaps
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
‘economics’, was the more accurate name for such
a science, Perry allowed – but in this particular
question of terminology he was less fastidious.
Regardless of the science’s name, once metaphysics was ostensibly exiled from it, one groped with
difficulty within its scope for justification of government constraints of exchange. Therein lay
Perry’s enthusiasm for free trade, his unsurpassed
appreciation of Frédéric Bastiat, and his more
general presumption in opposition to commercial
legislation, foreign or domestic.
While Wells’s affinity for statistics and Perry’s
redefinition of political economy reflected the scientific aspirations of the post-bellum generation,
the American Social Science Association (ASSA)
reflected the union of those aspirations with the
generation’s reformist impulse. The impulse drew
urgency from the tremendous economic transformation that the war had merely paused, not
reversed. Fewer than 30 railroad miles were in
operation in the United States in 1830; in 1860,
the number exceeded 30,000. The railroad hastened migration from the eastern states to the
West, but it also changes patterns of life and work
within states. Urbanization, which encompassed
only nine per cent of the population in 1830,
swelled to 20 per cent in 1860 and continued
upwards. From its founding in 1865, the ASSA
directed itself to inquiry into the attendant problems: sanitary conditions, relief of the poor, prevention of crime, reform of criminal law, prison
discipline, treatment of the insane, in addition to
other matters in the domain of ‘social science’
(Haskell 1977, p. 98). Its organization, following
that of the British association upon which it was
modelled, consisted originally of four departments:
Education, Public Health, Jurisprudence, and
Economy, Trade, and Finance – the latter of
which was concerned with issues ranging from
the hours of work to prostitution and intemperance,
public libraries, tariffs and other taxes, the national
debt, regulation of markets, and the currency
(pp. 104–5). Because participants generally shared
the classical liberal assumptions of Wells and
Perry – indeed, Wells was an early head of the
Economy, Trade, and Finance Department and
later president of the Association, and Perry was a
regular contributor – their inquiries into these
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subjects tended not to yield proposals for ambitious
programmes of government subsidization or regulation. Instead they were aimed (as the Association’s constitution put it) at the diffusion of ‘sound
principles’ and at bringing people together ‘ for the
purpose of obtaining by discussion the real elements of Truth’ (p. 101).
In matters of foreign trade, sound principles
implied rejection of protectionism; in the currency, the resumption of specie payments. In the
‘labor question’, which Wells and Perry discussed
at a round table in 1866 and again in 1867
(pp. 113–14), sound principles called perhaps for
the collection of ample data regarding hours,
wages, and conditions of work, but not their regulation on behalf of able-bodied and able-minded
adults. Because the interests of workers and
employers were in harmony, where poor work
conditions existed they were the result either of a
general lack of material progress or lack of knowledge by the actors. The solution to lack of material
progress was to clear away any legislative impediments to it. The solution to lack of knowledge
was for the ASSA to produce and disseminate
it. In neither case was the solution to draw up
redistributive ‘class legislation’ or other assaults
on the prerogatives of property.
The panic of 1873, the depression in its wake,
and the great railroad strike of 1877 undermined
confidence in the solutions of the liberal reformers
and made room for challengers. The labour question had metastasized into ‘the social question’.
The most original and widely read author to
address it was Henry George (1839–1897), an
autodidact working as a journalist in California
when the publication of Progress and Poverty
made him famous in 1879. George admired
David Wells, and corresponded with him as
early as 1871. He joined Wells in advocating
free trade and denouncing ‘monopoly’ (Dorfman
1969, p. 142). But George was less deferential to
property than was Wells, in whose circles he was
viewed less of an ally than a danger.
George attributed the persistent poverty of
labour amidst material progress to the unearned
rewards of one particular kind of property. Land
was the free gift of nature: although improvements on it were the work of man and the returns
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to improvements were earned, the returns to land
were not. Yet the returns to land grew inexorably
as population and mechanical invention increased
and cultivation was extended. The solution that
George proposed was a single tax on land of
100 per cent of its annual value. Under such a
system it would matter little if one held title to
land, leased it to another, and paid a 100 per cent
tax on the rent; or if instead the state held formal
title to the land and leased it to (presumably) the
same person who would rent it from a private
owner. Private property in land could be formally
retained, but in effect land would be appropriated
by the state for the benefit of all.
At the same time, the right to all other property
would be respected more scrupulously than
before, because the single tax on land would obviate the need for all other taxes.
The political economists associated with liberal reform caught the scent of socialism from
George’s proposal, and they responded with
alarm. Yet Henry George shared most of the
values and even some of the legislative prescriptions with which the liberal reformers were most
closely identified. He departed from them importantly only in his assumption of the illegitimacy of
private ownership of one kind of possession. The
challenges that would follow in the middle of the
turbulent 1880s, from a new generation of economists including Edmund James (1855–1925),
Simon Nelson Patten (1852–1922), and Richard
T. Ely (1854–1943), were of another order
entirely. The professional credentials of the
young economists, which included doctoral studies in Germany and university positions in the
United States, were different from Wells’s and
Perry’s (let alone George’s); and rather than sharing the values and prescriptions of their elders,
they repudiated them thoroughly, defining themselves by opposition to economic liberalism.
These economists were the founders in 1885 of
the American Economic Association.
See Also
▶ American Economic Association
▶ Carey, Henry Charles (1793–1879)
United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
▶ Catallactics
▶ Free Banking Era
▶ George, Henry (1839–1897)
▶ Land Tax
▶ List, Friedrich (1789–1846)
▶ Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873)
▶ Slavery
▶ Tariffs
▶ United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
▶ United States, Economics in (1945 to present)
▶ Wells, David Ames (1828–1898)
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United States, Economics
in (1885–1945)
Bradley W. Bateman
Abstract
The history of American economics following
the founding of the American Economic Association in 1885 is not a simple linear narrative
of the triumph of neoclassical economics
over historical economics. On the contrary,
American economics remained a highly plural
enterprise until the 1930s. Although there was
strife in the 1880s over the proper method of
doing economic research, this strife quickly
gave way to a long period of détente. Only
following the secularization of economics in
the 1920s and the advent of the synthesis of
neoclassical and Keynesian economics in the
1940s did this pluralism end.
Keywords
Adams, H. C.; American Economic Association; Anderson, B.; Arrow, K. J.; Bain, J.;
Catchings, W.; Chamberlin, E.H.; Clark,
J. B.; Clark, J. M.; Commons, J. R.; Cowles
Commission; Cowles, A.; Currie, L.; Dantzig,
G. B.; Douglas, P.; Dunbar, C.; Econometric
Society; Elym, R. T.; Fetter, F.; Fisher, I.; Foster, W. T; German Historical School; Gibbs,
W.; Gilbert, M.; Great Depression; Haavelmo,
T.; Hadley, A. T.; Hamilton, W.; Hotelling, H.;
Institutionalism; Knight, F. H.; Koopmans,
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14090
T. C.; Kuznets, S.; Laissez-faire; Laughlin,
J. L.; Marginal School; Mason, E.; Mitchell,
W. C.; National Bureau of Economic Research;
Neoclassical economics; New Deal; Newcomb, S.; Patten, S. N.; Pollak Foundation for
Economic Research (USA); Probabilistic revolution; Progressivism; Real-bills doctrine;
Samuelson, P. A.; Seligman, E. R. A.; Snyder,
C.; Sumner, W. G.; Sumner, W. G.; Taussig,
F. W.; Underconsumptionism; United States,
economics in; Veblen, T. I.; Walker, F. A.;
Warburton, C.; Willis, H.P.; Young, A. A
JEL Classifications
B2
The 60-year period from the founding of the
American Economic Association (AEA) in 1885
to 1945 marks the period when American economics was first professionalized and then came
to take its characteristic, modern form. However,
this story is not a simple linear narrative, as the
events during this period were influenced by a
series of historical contingencies and social forces
that meant the outcome remained unpredictable
until sometime during the last decade of the
period.
Historians and economists alike have tended to
believe that the story is somewhat more straightforward than it actually was. The historian
Dorothy Ross (1991), for instance, has argued
that the rise to prominence of John Bates Clark
as America’s premier (and first native) economic
theorist at the turn to the 20th century marks the
triumph of neoclassicism in American economics.
More recently, Nancy Cohen (2002) has argued
that neoclassicism came to dominate even earlier
than Ross suggests, by as much as a decade. Both
of these arguments are based, in part, on the well
worn idea that American economics was characterized by a ‘Methodenstreit’, or ‘war of methods’
in which the Marginalist School defeated the previously strong Historical School by the end of the
19th century. But while it is true that there was a
crisis in American economics during the decade
after the founding of the AEA, it had a somewhat
different nature from that usually understood: it
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
was much more about the purpose of economics
than about method.
American Economics, Circa 1885
The first doctorate in political economy issued by
an American university was in 1886 when Henry
Carter Adams received his degree from Johns
Hopkins University. Before that time, if an American wanted a doctorate in economics, it was
necessary to travel to Europe to study. The vast
majority who chose this route studied in Germany,
to which 9,000 Americans travelled for this purpose between 1820 and 1920 (Herbst 1965). The
most prominent of these young Americans went
on to help found the AEA after their return,
including Richard T. Ely, J.B. Clark and Simon
Nelson Patten.
In Germany, these young economists found a
profession that was characterized by scepticism
towards Adam Smith’s system of ‘perfect liberty’
and his arguments for laissez-faire. It now seems
fair to say that the economic ideas that the
Germans were most disturbed by were in fact a
caricature of Smith: the ‘Manchesterism’ that they
found so offensive was more the product of David
Ricardo than Adam Smith, but their objection was
deep and profound to what they took to be an
argument unsuited for all nations at all times.
They believed that Smith had made universalizing
assumptions about human nature and human
behaviour that were not universally correct. In
the place of these assumptions, they intended to
build a more empirically accurate economics
based on careful historical study of how the individual behaviour and economic institutions of
different societies had come about. Thus, rather
than assuming that all people always weighed
their options and made their choices so as to
maximize their individual well-being, the leading
German economists in the second half of the 19th
century believed that it was necessary to study
how cultural customs had evolved and how these
shaped individual behaviour.
Known as the ‘Historical School’, the leading
German economists at this time espoused the idea
of ‘Nationalökonomie’, or the study of how each
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
nation had come to its current position. These
economists taught their students contemporary
methods of historical study: careful archival
work, the study of laws and customs, the collection of data, and the slow, inductive accumulation
of knowledge. However, this did not preclude the
study of marginal analysis. Karl Knies, at Heidelberg, who taught marginal techniques to the
Austrians Friedrich von Wieser and Eugen
Böhm-Bawerk, similarly taught the two most
important Americans in Germany, John Bates
Clark, the pioneer American marginalist, and
Richard T. Ely, one of the leading representatives
of American historical economics.
When Clark returned from Germany in 1875
and Ely in 1880 they found the American economics profession unprepared for much of what
they had to offer. American economists were anxious about their own lack of theoretical sophistication. Writing on the occasion of the nation’s
centennial in 1876, Charles Dunbar, Professor of
Economics at Harvard, had complained of the
unoriginal and derivative character of American
economics. Dunbar ‘observed that American
scholarship as yet contributed nothing to fundamental economic knowledge. In his reading,
American economics to date had been derivative,
stagnant, and sterile’ (Barber 2003, p. 231). This
may be have been an exaggeration, but it was the
case that American economics texts at this time,
mostly written by college presidents for undergraduate moral philosophy classes, lacked theoretical
sophistication, and the young economists returning
from Europe found an open field for the possibility
of producing a new American economics.
Another reason for this lack of theoretical
sophistication was that texts were written to propagate the virtues of free enterprise, hard work, and
republican democracy, a troika of American virtues
that posed a problem for the returning young economists. The crux of the problem was that the elders
who controlled the newly created academic positions that the young economists hoped to enter
expected anyone they hired to espouse the same
beliefs regarding laissez-faire. Francis Amasa
Walker, who taught at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) and who served as the
first president of the AEA, would reflect that
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laissez-faire, ‘was not made the test of economic
orthodoxy, merely. It was used to decide whether a
man were an economist at all’ (in Coats 1988,
p. 362).
Unfortunately for men like Clark and Ely, this
made employment in academe difficult, if not
impossible, for on their immediate return from
Germany they almost all adhered to Christian
socialism. In part, this commitment reflected the
enthusiasm they had acquired in Germany for social
reform. But it also reflected an effort on their part to
build an American ‘Nationalökonomie’. Trained to
believe that each country had a unique culture and
unique institutions, these young men latched onto
evangelical Protestant Christianity, and tried to use
it to fashion a native argument for economic reform.
Following the Civil War, after an era when the
importance of hard work, free enterprise and the
rights of capital had been universally preached
(Bateman 2005). American Protestantism had
begun to split into two ‘parties’ (cf. Marty 1986).
The ‘private party’ focused on individual salvation
and did not view the emerging economic conditions as a matter for Christian concern. The ‘public
party’, on the other hand, focused on social reform
while de-emphasizing the older evangelical concern with individual piety. In the new economic
order of the post-bellum world these two strands of
evangelical thought became emblematic of the two
most common (and opposing) responses to the
growth in industrial production, increasing urbanization, rapid immigration and growing inequality.
Each group took the Bible as its primary text, but
their purposes and understanding of the world
could not have been more different. Whereas the
private party Christians focused on individual
piety, the public party wanted to build ‘the Kingdom of God on this earth’ through collective action
and with the aid of the state.
The Progressive Era
At the centre of the public party of American
Protestantism were the young economists who
had returned from Germany. They had learned a
new scientific ethic of empirical study and had
made initial contact with marginal reasoning.
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But balanced against this, was the fact, uncomfortable for their elders, that almost to a person
these returning young economists were interested
in changing the balance of power between working men and the owners of the new, vertically
integrated enterprises that employed them. Thus,
the young German-trained economists had some
things that the profession craved, such as technical
prowess, but they also manifested a political attitude that was unacceptable to much of the
profession.
Laissez-faire in 19th-century America was not
a technical argument for the efficiency of free
markets, but rather a manifestation of a broader
Protestant ethos. It meant a limited role for the
state in the economy, but it also meant the unfettered right of capitalists to employ workers on the
capitalists’ terms; at the time of the Civil War, for
instance, virtually throughout the United States it
was still illegal to strike or to form a labour union.
Thus, when the young, German-trained economists challenged laissez-faire, they were as likely
to be arguing for the right of workers to strike as
they were to be arguing for the municipal provision of water. In the last decades of the 19th
century, then, laissez-faire meant both a limited
role for the state and privilege for the prerogatives
of capital. Men like Ely and Patten meant to
challenge these ideas head-on and they took their
warrant to do so as much from Christian scripture
as they did from economic theory: they saw their
work as economic theorists as an expression of
their Christian commitments.
However, they generally met scorn from the
older generation. Under the leadership of Ely,
Patten, and Clark, the young advocates of labour
and the possibility of beneficial state intervention
formed the American Economic Association
(AEA) in 1885, in part as an effort to provide
support for one another and to seek an alternative
form of professional recognition. But not all the
AEA’s members were economists; about a quarter
of the members at the first meeting in Saratoga
Springs, New York, were Protestant ministers.
The young economists with doctorates could perform empirical research showing the extent of
poverty, inequality and industrial dislocation in
the economy; the ministers could preach the
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
young economists’ findings from their pulpits on
Sunday morning to help motivate their parishioners to act to help build the Kingdom.
The formation of the AEA led to one of the
most well-known exchanges between the older
advocates of laissez-faire and the young economists who hoped to establish a role for the state in
the functioning of the economy. William Graham
Sumner at Yale University was the most highprofile advocate of laissez-faire at the time of the
founding of the AEA, but one of Ely’s colleagues
at Johns Hopkins, Simon Newcomb, was also
widely recognized. Newcomb was an acclaimed
astronomer and mathematician who occasionally
lectured on economics at Johns Hopkins and he
wrote widely on economics in the popular press.
Following the establishment of the AEA in 1885,
Science magazine asked members of the old and
new schools to debate their positions in a series
of exchanges (reprinted in Adams, 1886). The
exchange was often vitriolic, with Newcomb
accusing Ely of being a socialist, no small charge
in the immediate aftermath of the Haymarket
riots. Often unnoticed in the debate, however, is
the fact that both sides called on the authority of
Alfred Marshall and William Stanley Jevons to
establish their own points. More than anything in
the debate, this last fact perhaps illustrates the
extent to which the American economics profession at this time was animated by political differences over laissez-faire and the role of the
state, rather than primarily by an argument over
methods.
Much to the chagrin of Ely, the AEA did not
long remain a haven for advocates of the state.
With the pressure on the young economists to
demonstrate they were not radicals who advocated violence, they felt it necessary to show
themselves open to their older colleagues. And
since the Association was also billing itself as
the national organization for all economists, and
because the young economists depended on the
older generation for jobs and support, they hardly
felt that they could deny the older economists
membership in the new organization when they
asked to join. Thus, by 1892, virtually all the older
advocates of laissez-faire were members of the
organization and the founding statement of
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
principles in favour of a role for the state and
amelioration of economic dislocation, which Ely
had helped draft in 1885 at the time of the
founding, had been abandoned. Ely’s response
was to boycott the annual meeting that year.
At this point, it is undeniable there was great
tension in the profession. It is important to realize,
however, that, John Bates Clark, the premier
marginalist, and Richard T. Ely, the premier historical economist, had worked together to found
the AEA. It is true that Clark has dropped his
interest in Christian socialism by 1885, but he
had not turned completely against historical analysis. Nor, strictly speaking, was Ely an antimarginalist; Ely had introduced marginal utility
into his textbook writing as early as 1893.
E.R.A. Seligman, another of the AEA founders,
represents a good case study of the way that many
economists at this time balanced marginalist and
historical techniques in their work. The real conflict within the profession at this time was about
the possible role of the state and whether the
purpose of economics was to defend laissezfaire, rather than whether marginalism should be
used in economic analysis (cf. Yonay 1998).
The diversity within the profession is also
clearly manifest in the leading figures of the old
school that emerged during the last two decades of
the 19th century: Arthur Hadley, Frank Taussig,
and J. Laurence Laughlin. These three men
became the leaders respectively at Yale, Harvard
and Chicago in the era when departments were
emerging as the dominant institutions in the formation of the American economics profession.
The work of these men represents three of the
main economic problems facing the nation at the
end of the 19th century (international trade and
tariffs, railroads and monetary policy) and their
theoretical eclecticism, while adhering to some
form of the older cost-based theories of classical
economics, demonstrates the evolving nature of
the profession.
J. Laurence Laughlin was the most rigidly
classical of these three ‘young traditionalists’
(Dorfman 1949). Despite writing a dissertation
in history under Henry Adams, Laughlin gave
no credence to the Historical School and was the
last of the major figures in the old school to join
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the AEA (in 1904). Although not a prolific writer,
his History of Bimetallism in the United States
(1885) is a landmark study of the history of late
19th-century fights over currency and monetary
policy. Ironically, however, after founding the
Journal of Political Economy (1892), Laughlin
opened the journal to economists of all stripes,
and turned the book reviewing over to Thorstein
Veblen for several years.
Frank Taussig is probably the most well
remembered of the three, not least for his influence on the generation of students who enroled in
his ‘EC 11’ graduate seminar at Harvard. Widely
respected as a teacher, he was a gregarious person
who was the first of the old school economists to
join the AEA (in 1886). Although himself an
adherent of classical economics, particularly of
Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, Taussig was capacious in his analysis of economic problems and
was often willing to see the legitimacy of other
points of view. There is no better example of this
than in his Tariff History of the United States
(1888), an adaptation of his dissertation that
went through many revisions in its subsequent
editions; although he was a dedicated free trader,
Taussig had a subtle understanding of the use of
tariffs for revenue collection and appreciated, for
instance, the arguments for sometimes protecting
infant industries. Like Laughlin, Taussig was also
an eclectic and important early journal editor.
Charles Dunbar had founded the Quarterly Journal of Economics at Harvard (1886), but when
Taussig became its editor, he opened his pages to
economists of all views.
Arthur Hadley tackled one of the major economic issues in late 19th-century American capitalism, the railroads. His early reputation was
based on his Railroad Transportation (1885), in
which he argued that businesses with large fixed
costs would not necessarily shut down when
prices fell below the cost of production. Instead,
he pointed out that as long as the firm could cover
what are now known as variable costs and still
make some contribution towards paying fixed
costs such as interest payments, that they would
stay in business. Hadley represents an intriguing
figure for he acknowledged that his results on the
role of fixed cost contradicted some of Ricardo’s
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arguments and he also accepted the basic validity
of marginal utility reasoning. Thus, he seemed to
have transcended classical economics in many
regards. Yet his outlook was unmistakably
laissez-faire, and he believed that there was no
reason for further work in marginal utility theory,
since its validity had been shown and that more
work represented an unnecessary foray into psychology. In the end, his economics was driven
largely by the study of costs, as in classical economics, and his conclusions did not stray far from
the classic dogmas.
Members of the older generation were not
alone in forming strong departments during the
last decade of the 19th century. Johns Hopkins,
which was founded in 1876 to establish higher
education, especially graduate education, in the
German style in the United States, was the first
notable American graduate course in economics,
producing the first Ph.D. granted in economics in
the United States. The department’s two notables
were Simon Newcomb and Richard T. Ely. However, after his falling out with Newcomb, Ely left
Johns Hopkins in 1892 for the University of Wisconsin, where he quickly assembled one of the top
economics departments in the nation. Initially,
Ely’s move to Wisconsin was seen to be a possible
precursor for regional factionalism in American
economics. After Ely failed to attend the annual
meeting of the AEA in 1892, there was concern
among many Eastern economists that he would
lead a movement from the Midwest to create a
new professional organization that would promote his original challenge to laissez-faire.
However, following Ely’s academic trial in
Wisconsin in 1894 on charges of entertaining a
union organizer in his home and of advocating
socialism in his lectures, people from both camps
began to look for common ground. Ely selfconsciously chose to lower his profile after he
was acquitted in his trial, and the advocates of
laissez-faire began to realize that it was not good
for the profession’s credibility to have high-profile
public disagreement. What followed at the turn of
the century was the emergence of a kind of détente
in American economics: leading figures in the
profession continued to build strong departments
around the country, but economists were granted a
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
wide berth to examine social and economic conditions and to use the tools they saw best suited
for the specific question at hand. Support for
laissez-faire and government intervention were
both accepted; what was expected was a rigorous
approach to one’s position.
One basis for this détente was undoubtedly the
common Protestant background of most American economists at this time. Although Ely, Patten,
John R. Commons, and Henry Carter Adams were
asking American Protestants to turn away from
their traditional position in favour of the prerogatives of the owners of capital, they were making
the appeal on biblical grounds and were selfconsciously appealing to the emerging public
party of Protestantism. Since prominent members
of the group of younger economists (for example,
Ely and Adams) made it clear in their academic
trials that they were not advocating the overthrow
of the state, but rather the empirical study of the
conditions of labourers, it became harder to
demonize them for their impulse to seek what
were clearly Christian ends. For their part, the
older advocates on laissez-faire were willing to
begin the difficult work of absorbing new theoretical techniques and accepted the call of the younger economists to undertake more empirical work
and to let its results inform their understanding
of the true effects of relatively untrammelled
markets.
This détente between the younger and older
economists, and between advocates of laissezfaire and advocates of more rights for labourers,
created a fertile ground for American economics.
During this period, there was not a single orthodoxy in American economics; one could work
with marginalist ideas, historical ideas, or with
both. New School economists such as Ely, Clark,
and Seligman, as well as Old School economists
such as Taussig and Hadley, all employed both
techniques in their work. All that was required to
be taken seriously in this world of plural methods
was a dedication to the examination of the contemporary economic issues that were arising as
America became an industrialized, urbanized
nation. That the American Economic Review,
which was founded in 1911, showed no marked
tendency towards any school in its published
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
articles is strong evidence that there was no single
dominant school at this time.
Perhaps the most notable dissent from this
détente was the sui generis Thorstein Veblen.
Like the young economists returning from
Germany, Veblen was interested in a more ‘scientific’ economics. But he was never much interested in large-scale empirical work such as the
social survey movement fostered by Ely and
Commons at the turn of the century. Instead, Veblen wanted economics to be rebuilt as an evolutionary science based on Darwinian principles of
natural selection (Hodgson 2004). Veblen’s
greatest theoretical advances would come during
the first decade of the 20th century, but they were
offered as part of a sardonic and biting criticism of
Clark’s work and so not only alienated Clark and
his followers but also the bulk of the profession
who saw their toolbox as containing many different techniques, one of which might sometimes be
marginal reasoning. Veblen agreed that American
economists should examine the newly emerging
American capitalism, but he was not interested in
pluralism of techniques.
Perhaps the most visible sign of the emerging
détente among most American economists at this
time was Ely’s election to the presidency of the
AEA in 1900. Not only had his feared defection
been averted, but he had been successfully pulled
back into the centre of the organization. Ely and
Veblen never shared a close personal or professional relationship and Veblen would later harbour a bitter resentment that his brilliance and
originality had been ignored by the AEA in the
pivotal years when it would have helped his professional stature. Despite the fact that Ely and
Veblen shared an interest in historical analysis,
Veblen’s style and his self-certainty in the
Darwinian method kept him apart from the
mainstream.
The year 1900 also marked the beginning of
the Progressive Era, a profound shift in American
society that would propel economists like Ely,
Adams and Commons into the mainstream of
American thought. With the emergence of progressivism during the first two decades of the
20th century, the cultural, political, and religious
centre of American society would move away
14095
from 19th-century ideals of laissez-faire and
towards an ethos of active civic engagement in
trying to ameliorate the many social dislocations
of the new industrialism, emerging urban poverty
and concentrations of power in large corporations.
The public party of Protestantism was the central
force of progressivism in the first decade of the
new century and economists like Ely and Adams,
who had been subjected to political pressure to
mitigate their views in the late 19th century, now
found themselves in great demand and at the head
of progressive projects such as regulatory commissions and social survey projects (Furner 1975;
Bateman 2001). Just as the laissez-faire economists in the 19th century had benefited from the
dominant Protestant ethos, so too would the
young, so-called ‘ethical economists’ benefit
from the rise of public party Protestantism early
in the 20th century. This public recognition, and
the university positions that often came with it,
undoubtedly made it easier for the ethical economists to ignore Veblen’s criticisms. This is not to
say that the economics profession as a whole was
receiving the attention it believed it deserved. On
the contrary, for a significant part of the 20th
century, the AEA was actively concerned with
measures that would secure it an appropriate public profile (see Bernstein 2001).
The First World War and the End
of the Idyll
At the same time that the young economists who
had founded the AEA were rising to popular
prominence, another generation of marginalist
economists was also beginning to emerge. One
of the most distinguished of the new generation of
marginalists was trained by Ely. Allyn Young
received his doctorate working under Ely at Wisconsin and became the first of many to become
revisers and co-authors of Ely’s best-selling Principles text. Some of the new generation of
marginalists, such as Frank Fetter, examined the
psychological dimensions of utility and sought to
more clearly articulate the welfare implications of
marginal utility reasoning. Perhaps the most innovative marginalist thinker to emerge after Clark
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was Irving Fisher. Fisher’s mentors at Yale were
William Graham Sumner and Willard Gibbs.
Gibbs was one of the most prominent mathematicians of his generation and he influenced Fisher to
develop marginal economics in a more technical,
mathematical form that would later come to characterize American neoclassical economics.
While Fisher’s work was recognized and
lauded, it was not, however, representative of the
mainstream in the first two decades of the 20th
century. Progressivism defined the centre of
American political and intellectual life from
roughly the turn of the century to the end of the
First World War; but during the second decade of
the century it shed some of its public rhetoric of
Protestant reform as it began to pull in Jewish
writers like Walter Lippman and Herbert Croly.
Progressivism also became more focused on
industrial efficiency as many embraced Frederick
Taylor’s time and motion studies as a means to
achieve greater productivity and raise the standard
of living. But the moralism of Protestant reform
still suffused much of progressive thinking and
would lead to the movement’s quick demise after
the war.
The problem for progressivism after 1918 was
that one of its greatest proponents, Woodrow Wilson, had led the nation into war using the rhetoric
of reform and democracy. He had been supported
by the Protestant clergy, many of whom had used
their pulpits to preach the justness and necessity of
the war when America had entered the conflict in
1917. Thus, when the war was over, and the
atrocity of the trench fighting was driven home
to people, there was a quick and sudden turn
against progressivism and especially against the
moralism and rhetoric of moral improvement that
had underpinned it (Danbom 1987). The hope that
had supported the progressive movement was
now widely seen to have been based on an unrealistic understanding of human nature.
This shift away from progressive moralism had
a quick and deep effect upon all the American
social sciences that had been pioneered by public
party Protestants; sociology, political science, and
economics all made a sudden turn to a more ‘scientific’ and less ‘moralistic’ basis. Dorothy Ross
(1991) has called this ‘the advent of scientism’. Of
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
course, all three social sciences had considered
themselves scientific before the war (Furner
1975), and all had been interested in empirical
survey work of urban and rural populations; but
they had all operated on an implicit belief that if
this survey work revealed social pathologies such
as poverty and child labour, that good Christian
women and men would surely act to alleviate
them when faced with the evidence. After the
war, such a reliance on an idea that people were
well motivated and altruistic was abandoned. So,
too, was the idea that people who lived in
squalid social conditions would experience moral
improvement if the conditions were changed.
Thus, in the years immediately before 1920,
progressive social science quickly unravelled.
Realizing that they had lost the sympathy of the
larger populace, and faced with the need for serious soul-searching on their own part, all three
social sciences made an explicit effort to eschew
the optimistic, moralistic rhetoric of progressivism and embraced a new kind of ‘scientific’
endeavour. Entwined in their decisions to embrace
a more value-neutral approach to social enquiry
was a clear understanding that both public and
private funding hinged on catching the tone of
the times.
The name of this movement in economics was
‘institutionalism’ (see institutionalism, old; Rutherford 2000; Bateman 2004). The term was coined
in 1918, at exactly the moment when the break
from liberal Protestantism was happening in all
three of these social sciences. The men who formed
the nucleus of this emerging group, men like
Walton Hamilton and Wesley Mitchell, selfconsciously endeavoured to set up an empirical,
data-generated research project that would be
appealing to funding agencies such as the Carnegie
and Rockefeller Foundations. The founding of the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
with Mitchell as the director, was one of the signal
achievements of the early institutionalists.
One effect of the effort towards a more empirical basis for economic research was that subjects
that had been at the centre of American economics
for at least four decades, such as poverty and
philanthropy, were dropped from the research
agenda of almost all institutionalists. Instead,
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
intense attention was paid to the cost structure of
American industry, the business cycle, and the
working of the financial system; these seemed to
be the proper objects of serious economic scientists. Ultimately, the object of the institutionalists
was to find a more scientific basis for ‘social
control’, thus eradicating the need for the moralism of the progressives.
The most notable break with the past, however,
was that for the first time since the founding of the
AEA, there was now a group of American economists who were attempting to establish an institutional and historical approach to economics and
who did not want a détente with marginal analysis. The Methodenstreit that many people now
project back on to the late 19th century was actually beginning to emerge. The institutionalists
were interested in developing a behaviouralist
basis for individual behaviour and they eschewed
the idea that marginal decision-making was the
driving force behind most economic activity.
The institutionalists were also the first group of
American economists to work to establish an
explicitly secular economics. This reflected their
desire to distance themselves from the moralizing
rhetoric of the Christian economists who had
founded the AEA and drew from the work of
one of the institutionalists’ main influences in
pragmatic philosophy, John Dewey. While not
every individual American economist had been a
Protestant before the First World War, the ethos of
Protestantism had suffused and stabilized the
détente that held for most of the three decades
after Ely had been exonerated in his academic
trial. Liberal Protestant economists had believed
that a kind of moral Darwinism was at work in
American society and their common purpose in
exploring social questions to determine where and
when state intervention might (or might not) be
appropriate had been made possible by their
shared ethos. Now, however, the men who
stepped forward to found institutionalism were
making an explicit argument that science alone
should inform their work; they staked their future
on the idea that they could do better, more empirical science than the a priori marginalists who they
believed depended on untested and incorrect
assumptions about human behaviour.
14097
The marginalists were fully up to the fight,
however, and engaged the institutionalists after
1930 in an increasingly pointed dispute. In the
first decade of institutionalism’s rise, the détente
held reasonably well. And during the 1920s, institutionalism was at least as well represented in the
top graduate schools as marginalism. While
marginalist thinkers such as Irving Fisher went
about their work, the instituionalists controlled
two of the top four graduate courses (Columbia
and Wisconsin) and produced a large plurality of
American Ph.D.s (Bowen 1953; Backhouse 1998;
Biddle 1998).
The Great Depression and the New Deal
Contrary to the idea that American economics in
the 1920s and 1930s was characterized by a final
struggle between some latter-day historicists (that
is, institutionalists) against the dominant neoclassicists, the pluralism of this period was much
richer and represented a wide range of possibilities regarding the future direction of the profession. It might more correctly be said that no
school of thought in American economics was
completely dominant at this time. A nice example
of this diversity would be to consider Harvard in
the 1930s. Frank Taussig was still on the faculty
and remained one of the leading authorities on
international trade. Joseph Schumpeter would
join the department in 1932, bringing a Continental influence, if not exactly an Austrian one.
Edward Chamberlin would finish his work on
imperfect competition at Harvard during the
1920s, under the twin influences of Marshall and
Allyn Young. Young, who died in 1929, had been
one of America’s top theorists, but as noted above,
he was a student of Ely’s who had later tacked
hard to the marginalist tradition. One could not
define this department as simply neoclassical, but
neither was it simply institutionalist. The full secularization of American economics, however, had
prepared the ground for a more strident return to
laissez-faire arguments, much like the ones that
had existed before 1885.
For by the 1930s, leading marginalist thinkers
such as Frank Knight were prepared to engage in
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14098
what Yuval Yonay (1998) has termed ‘the fight for
the soul of economics’. Despite their control of
many of the top graduate courses (Backhouse
1998), and their initial success at fundraising, the
institutionalists were hit hard by the kind of criticism that Knight levelled against Sumner Slichter
in his 1932 review of Slichter’s new institutionalist textbook. Knight did not like Slichter’s
methods of analysis, but his real bête noire was
Slichter’s focus on intervention to improve the
performance of the economy. By this time, the
institutionalists had clearly staked out their position of advocacy for ‘controlling’ the economy,
and the advocates of marginalism, such as Knight
and Jacob Viner, strongly disagreed. However,
though some took clear sides, there were others
who straddled both camps: John Maurice Clark
(J.B. Clark’s son) drew on many neoclassical
tools, such as externalities, but his work on the
control of business went further in directions
favoured by institutionalists, turned away from
the cause in the 1930s, arguing that many of the
instituionalists’ concerns were best handled by
treating them as externalities within the neoclassical model; before his untimely death in 1929,
Allyn Young had done his pioneering work in the
economies of scale and supervised Chamberlin’s
doctoral thesis. The divide between institutionalism and neoclassicism was thus still blurred in this
period.
Equally destructive of the myth that American
economics was essentially a linear narrative of the
development of neoclassical economics after
1890 is the rich American tradition of work on
money, banking and the business cycle during the
inter-war years (Laidler 1999). The work in these
areas drew from the pre-First World War work of
major figures such as Laughlin, Fisher, and Mitchell, and represented a wide range of theoretical
development, as well as a full range of policy
options.
Perhaps the most well remembered work from
this period is Irving Fisher’s work on the quantity
theory and the relationships between money
growth, the price level, and economic activity.
Fisher (1911, 1923, 1925) was not alone in positing a close relationship between money and
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
prices. Carl Snyder (1924) of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York drew on Fisher’s work to
suggest that the close relationship between
money and prices supported a ‘money growth
guideline’ (Laidler 1999).
There was no orthodoxy in monetary and cycle
theory, however. For instance, Irving Fisher (1925)
came to believe that there was no business cycle,
simply fluctuations around the mean values of
prices. This outlook contrasted sharply with
Mitchell’s careful empirical search for the factors
that underlie what he believed were the regular
oscillations of the economy. Both Mitchell and
Alvin Hansen worked in the 1920s to develop
versions of the accelerator principle, a concept
previously developed by J.M. Clark in 1917, trying
to uncover the ways that a growing economy could
pick up momentum and how that same pattern of
growth could ultimately lead to a downturn.
Likewise, just as some economists did not
agree with Fisher’s conclusions about the nature
of the cycle, there were many who did not agree
with his conclusions regarding the relationship
between money and prices. In the inter-war
years, there developed what David Laidler has
termed an American version of the British Banking School. H. Parker Willis, who worked for the
Federal Reserve in the second decade of the 20th
century and later taught at Columbia’s School of
Business, and Benjamin Anderson, who had a
position at Harvard before becoming the chief
economist at Chase Bank, both argued against
Fisher’s use of the quantity theory. Willis had
studied under Laughlin at Chicago and he
followed in Laughlin footsteps in denying the
necessary connection between money and prices.
In this rich mix of work regarding money and
the business cycle, there was, not surprisingly,
widespread disagreement about the possibilities
for stabilization policy. Economists as diverse as
Fisher, Mitchell, and Allyn Young supported different kinds of stabilization policy. Others, like
Willis, adhered to a version of the real-bills doctrine, arguing that stability would come only
through a prudent effort on the part of the Federal
Reserve to limit its lending to those with highquality, short-term commercial paper. Although
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
they did not have academic appointments, William Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings (1923,
1925, 1928) used the Pollak Foundation for Economic Research as an effective platform to publicize a version of underconsumptionist theory.
They argued that there was a need for monetary
and fiscal expansion to sustain consumption and
avoid recession. Paul Douglas (1927) at Chicago,
who became a US senator from Illinois, made
these ideas popular with his call for large-scale
public works.
While there were, thus, many forms of arguments for fiscal and monetary efforts to sustain
prosperity, it might seem that the institutionalists’
predisposition for controlling the economy would
have been popular after 1929, but neither the
popular nor the professional tide turned toward
the institutionalists after 1929. In retrospect, it
was, perhaps, their unique bad luck to have played
a role in developing parts of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s initial response to the Great Depression, his first New Deal. Many institutionalists
joined Rexford Tugwell from Columbia University in Roosevelt’s first term of administration, but
they failed to provide a recognizably successful
policy for combating the depression. Although the
marginalist economists were not offering a popular plan for recovery, the institutionalists’ efforts
in the New Deal did not provide them with a set of
successes upon which to build their legacy
(Barber 1996).
It was also the bad luck of the institutionalists
that by the end of the 1930s, when John Maynard
Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Money,
and Interest (1936) came to be widely seen as
providing a theoretical underpinning for recovery,
that the emerging neoclassical theorists like Paul
Samuelson were already working to give his theory a neoclassical underpinning. The efforts to
cast the General Theory in a general equilibrium
model effected a remarkable and unexpected
transformation in the future prospects for American economics, overshadowing the fact that the
foundations of what came to be thought of as
Keynesian fiscal policy were laid by institutionalists (Barber 1996; Rutherford and DesRoches
2008). Before the Great Depression, economists
14099
of all stripes had argued about possible monetary
and fiscal interventions (see Barber 1985; Laidler
1999). Although the pure idea of ‘social control’
was an institutionalist construction, the potential
for using fiscal and monetary policy came from
almost every corner of the profession. Keynes’s
work provided a common analytical framework
for examining such macroeconomic interventions, and Samuelson’s work linked that analytical
framework to marginalist, neoclassical ideas.
Likewise, Alvin Hansen’s embrace of Keynes’s
theoretical framework after his initial resistance
lent important impetus to an alternative form for
analysis of the business cycle, even though
he turned to Keynesian economics only when he
saw that it could be used to defend ideas he
already held. Hansen built his graduate seminar
on fiscal policy at Harvard around his reinterpretation of Keynes’s General Theory, and in the
1940s and early 1950s wrote a series of texts
that embodied much of the institutionalist concern
with the business cycle and economic stabilization (see Mehrling 1997, chs 7–8). The project
that institutionalists had undertaken in the 1920s
to provide a new psychological basis for economic behaviour had never led to any substantive
advances, which helped to make the mathematical
elegance of Samuelson’s work all the more attractive. It did not hurt that the tools of neoclassicism,
in their Keynesian guise, were now seen to be
as amenable to intervention as they were to
laissez-faire. Edward Chamberlin’s (1933) work
analysing imperfect competition in the 1930s also
started to lend a new sense of realism and possibility to the emerging neoclassical framework.
In the 1930s, much empirical work had been
undertaken by institutionalists, but it was
Edward Mason and Joe Bain, who, drawing on
Chamberlin’s theory, developed the framework
that was to dominate empirical work on industrial
economics in the 1950s. Harold Hotelling’s theoretical breakthroughs in formulating mathematical
models of resource depletion in the 1930s added
even more lustre to neoclassicism. A new, sharp
sense of what it meant to be an economic theorist
was emerging, and institutionalism did not appear
to have a ready response.
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14100
The Econometric Movement
and the Second World War
The event that symbolized this confidence in more
formal theorizing than the institutionalists had
generally favoured was the foundation of the
Econometric Society in 1930. It was an international society, but Fisher, Schumpeter and other
American economists were influential in its formation. Its importance lay in providing a focus for
mathematical theories, covering both the cycle
and microeconomics, and statistical research. An
influential figure was Alfred Cowles, who not
only supported the Econometric Society and its
new journal, but also established the Cowles
Commission. This was an economic research
organization, set up in 1932, the heyday of
which was from 1939 to 1955 when it was based
in Chicago. Located outside the economics
department, it provided a focus for the development and propagation of neoclassical theory (with
particular emphasis on Walrasian general equilibrium theory) and statistical methods for testing
and applying the theory. It was here, in the early
1940s, that Tjalling Koopmans and Trygve Haavelmo developed the methods that led to what has
been called the probabilistic revolution in econometrics (Morgan 1990).
Two further developments were important in the
transformation of American economics that took
place in this period. One was the influx of a large
number of émigrés from Europe. The United States
had always been a home for such people, and in the
1920s many economists arrived from Russia and
Eastern Europe, but this increased dramatically in
the 1930s and 1940s. By the mid-1940s, almost
half the authors of articles in the American Economic Review had been born outside the United
States, most of these being affiliated to American
universities (Backhouse 1998).
The other influence was the Second World War
itself. This was, like no previous war, an economists’ war (Bernstein 2001). Economists were
recruited en masse into government. Many were
employed to tackle what were clearly economic
problems relating to domestic economic activity
or to the estimation of enemy economic capacity.
The most notable outcome of such work was
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
national income analysis. Official estimates of
US national income had first been calculated in
1933, in response to the onset of the depression,
when Simon Kuznets was seconded to the Bureau
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce from the
NBER, where he had been working on the problem (elsewhere Clark Warburton, at the Brookings
Institution, and Laughlin Currie had been working
on similar lines). Under Robert Nathan this work
was developed, and monthly figures were produced by 1938. But it was only during the war
that these estimates were developed, under Martin
Gilbert, into a system of accounts. One reason for
this was that national income proved indispensable to the war effort, its main achievement being
to calculate what Roosevelt could promise in his
Victory Program.
However, the significance of the war went further than this, for economists also became
involved in activities not traditionally associated
with their subject. Operations Research, initiated
in Britain in the 1930s, was taken up by the
American armed forces, through the Office of
Strategic Services (a forerunner of the Central
Intelligence Agency) where economists were
employed alongside mathematicians, statisticians
and physicists to solve problems related to military strategy and tactics. Out of this arose techniques that later proved influential, such as linear
programming, with which members of the Cowles
Commission (Koopmans and George Dantzig)
were heavily involved. Economists achieved a
high reputation as general problem-solvers. Most
important, however, was the effect on the way
economics was conceived. Much of this work
was focused on optimization and was highly technical. Economics came to be seen as akin to engineering. In the 1920s and for much of the 1930s it
had been institutionalism that was associated with
quantitative work; statistical work related to neoclassical theory did exist (for example work on
measuring demand functions) but there was no
parallel with the work being done at the NBER
and by the institutionalists. In contrast, by the
1940s, there was in place a serious research programme, with techniques that were perceived to
rival those of the hard sciences, in which theory
and data interacted in a way that was different
United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
from that found in inter-war institutionalism. The
transition was a very slow process: for instance,
when Kenneth Arrow entered Columbia as an
undergraduate in the 1940s, he was still not taught
modern price theory (Colander et al. 2004,
ch. 10), but rather the institutional economics of
the 1920s and 1930s. The scene was set for the
disputes that were, in the late 1940s and early
1950s, to determine the way economics was to
evolve after the Second World War.
Conclusions
At the beginning of the 20th century, America’s
economic heritage was still tied up with the cultural influence of Protestantism. By the 1930s,
that legacy had disappeared. The significance of
institutionalism was not that it continued the
earlier historical economics acquired by Ely,
J.B. Clark and their contemporaries in Germany
but that it was an organized movement for
a purely secular and scientific economics
(Rutherford 1999). Some 50 years after the
founding of the AEA, the profession was still
split deeply on the proper role of the state in the
economy, but everyone in the discussion now
believed that the role of the state was a scientific
question and was actively engaged in the development of the tools to answer the question. Neoclassical methods, the forerunners of those that
dominated the profession in the post-war era,
were being developed, but there was an immense
variety, which the labels neoclassical and institutionalist fail to capture. It was a period of
genuine pluralism in economics (Morgan and
Rutherford 1998).
In retrospect, it is possible to discern the
advance of neoclassical and more technical economics on a broad front. Young, Chamberlin,
Hotelling, Samuelson and others were
establishing a theoretical framework that could
animate both microeconomic and macroeconomic
work. However, rather than see this process as
inevitable it is important to see the importance of
external factors in determining the outcome of
inter-war pluralism. The Great Depression exerted
a profound effect; institutionalist planning was
14101
tainted by the failure of Roosevelt’s first New
Deal, in which planners such as Rexford Tugwell
were heavily involved. The Second World War
was perhaps even more important in helping
change perceptions of what economics was and
ideas about the position of economists in society.
The rise of the Nazi party and their policies in
Europe not only removed a major rival to the
supremacy of Anglo-American economics, but
caused an influx of economists into the United
States who proved highly influential.
In addition, it is important not to exaggerate the
extent of any neoclassical victory. Institutionalists
remained strong in many fields. The NBER’s
work in establishing a statistical basis on which
empirical analysis could be based was unrivalled.
Furthermore, even where there would appear to be
evidence for the conversion of institutionalists to
other approaches, significant elements of institutionalism remained, as in J.M. Clark’s work on the
control of business or Hansen’s use of Keynesian
methods for analysing the business cycle. The
legacy of institutionalism was widespread. There
was a swing away from institutionalism, which
can be documented in many ways (see, for example, Backhouse 1998; Biddle 1998) but the story
was not linear, and in the 1930s and 1940s it was
highly dependent on external events.
See Also
▶ American Economic Association
▶ Clark, John Bates (1847–1938)
▶ Ely, Richard Theodore (1854–1943)
▶ Institutionalism, Old
▶ Neoclassical Synthesis
▶ Young, Allyn Abbott (1876–1929)
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United States, Economics in (1945
to Present)
Roger E. Backhouse
Abstract
After 1945, American economics was transformed as radically as in the previous half
century. Economists’ involvement in the war
effort compounded changes that originated in
the 1930s to produce profound effects on the
profession, and many of these were continued
through institutions that developed during the
Cold War. This article traces the way the institutions of the profession interacted with the
content of economics to produce the technical
economics centred on a core of economic theory and econometric methods that dominate it
today. Attention is also drawn to the broader
role of American profession in economics outside the United States.
Keywords
Allied Social Science Association; American
Economic Association; American Enterprise
Institute; American Finance Association;
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Austrian economics; Axiomatics; Banking
School; Behavioural economics; Bounded
rationality; Brookings Institution; Chicago
School; Complexity theory; Council of Economic Advisers (USA); Cowles Commission;
Currency School; Development economics;
Econometric Society; Econometrics; Evolutionary game theory; Experimental economics;
Federal Reserve System; Formalism; Foundation for Economic Education; Friedman, M.;
Game theory; General equilibrium; Harvard
University; Heritage Foundation; Heterodox
economics; History of economic thought;
Industrialism; Institutional economics; International Monetary Fund; IS–LM model;
Keynesian
revolution;
Keynesianism;
Koopmans, T. C.; Liberty Fund; Macroeconometrics; Macroeconomics, origins and
history of; Marginalist controversy; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Mathematical
economics; Mathematics and economics;
Microeconomics; Microfoundations; Models;
Monopolistic competition; Mont Pèlerin Society; Nash, J.; National accounting; Old institutionalism; Operations research; Perfect
competition; Positive economics; Post
Keynesian economics; Preference reversals;
Probability distributions; Public choice; Radical economics; RAND Corporation; Rational
choice; Rockefeller Foundation; Schultz, H.;
Simultaneous equations; Statistics and economics; Stiglitz, J.; Systems analysis; Union
of Radical Political Economy; United States,
economics in; Vining, R.; Von Neumann, J.;
World Bank
JEL Classifications
B1
The Effect of the Second World War
The Second World War is more than a conventional dividing line, for it profoundly affected the
course of economics in the United States. The
interwar period had been one of pluralism within
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economics: there was a variety of competing
approaches to the subject, none of which was
dominant. It was also comparatively easy to discern distinctively ‘American’ trends in economics, which could be related either to the
intellectual environment (notably the pragmatism
of C.S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey) or
to economic circumstances (such as the recent
establishment of the Federal Reserve System).
Within a decade of the Second World War, if not
earlier, this had changed dramatically. Economics
was becoming more technical, the foundations of
an orthodoxy were being laid, and the position of
the United States in relation to other countries was
changing. The conventional explanation is the
Keynesian revolution, reinforced by the rise of
mathematical economics, but there is much more
to the story than that.
The key to this picture is the so-called ‘old’
institutionalism. In the interwar period, Institutionalism was a very broad movement aimed at
making economics more scientific through placing it on firmer empirical foundations. Though its
boundaries were very blurred, it is reasonable to
see it as covering economists as diverse in their
empirical work as Wesley Mitchell, Simon
Kuznets, Gardner Means, John Commons and
John Maurice Clark. Though they had connections with economists in Europe, it was a
distinctively American movement. Mathematical
economics is inherently less culturally specific,
but even here there were distinctive American
approaches to the subject: Paul Samuelson’s
early work, under E.B. Wilson, drew on a type
of mathematics very different from that used by
Europeans. The same could be said about the early
econometricians, from Henry Ludwell Moore to
Henry Schultz: there were important European
parallels, but they were pursuing research in a
way that was distinctive. Monetary economics
illustrates both the distinctiveness of American
economics and the blurred boundaries between
different approaches to the subject. Because the
Federal Reserve System had been established
much later than the major European central
banks, there was much more lively debate over
the principles on which it should be run. The result
was a rich mixture of arguments spanning the
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
divides between neoclassical and institutionalist,
Harvard and Chicago, Banking School and Currency School.
The Second World War was important for several reasons. First, economics became tied up with
the war effort. Economists were clearly involved
in places such as the Office of Price Administration, the Treasury or the War Production Board. It
was in the last of these that national income statistics, first calculated in 1933, were developed
into a system of national accounts, providing the
basis for planning the massive shift of resources
from civilian to military production that took
place after 1941. However, perhaps more significantly, economists became involved in fighting
the war, primarily through the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency which employed around 50 economists under Edward Mason in its Research and
Analysis division (Leonard 1991; Katz 1989). In
the OSS, economists and other social scientists
were employed alongside physicists and other
scientists in tasks where economics shaded imperceptibly into statistics and engineering. They
analysed intelligence, and became intimately
involved in questions of military strategy and
tactics, emerging from the war with an enhanced
reputation: not only was economic analysis
important, but many economists had proved
themselves useful as general problem solvers.
Operations research, a set of techniques centered
on optimization subject to constraints, came to be
much more central to economics.
At the end of the war, the Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act (1944), the so-called G.I. Bill,
offered financial support to US ex-servicemen
who wanted to continue their education. This
fuelled a dramatic increase in the university system. The number of bachelor’s degrees awarded
in US higher education institutions, which had
never risen above 187,000 before the war, rose
to 271,000 in 1947–8 (317,00 if higher degrees
are included too) and 432,000 in 1949–50, many
of these choosing to study economics. This accelerated the generational shift that was taking place,
providing academic openings for economists
returning from government service to civilian
life, many of these being in institutions that had
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
not been prominent before the war. While some
economics departments continued as before, there
was a shift in the profession’s center of gravity
away from places such as Wisconsin (the leading
centre for Institutionalism) towards ones like MIT,
Berkeley and Stanford – other places, such as
Columbia, Harvard, Chicago and Yale were
important before and after the war (Barber 1997;
Backhouse 1998). The subject began to be taught
using textbooks written by young economists
(Kenneth Boulding, Lorie Tarshis and Paul Samuelson) during the 1940s, in place of ones that had
their origins nearer the turn of the century.
The Cowles Commission and RAND
A particularly important center for quantitative
work in the 1940s was the Cowles Commission,
which had moved to Chicago in 1938, and of
which Jacob Marshak became Research Director
in 1943. He laid out a programme of research
focusing on the development of new methods to
take account of the specific features of economic
data, perceived to be simultaneity, the importance
of random disturbances and the prevalence of
aggregate time-series data. This programme proved to be one that attracted American economists,
many of whom were involved in the war effort,
and many of the highly technical European
emigrés such as Trygve Haavelmo, Tjalling
Koopmans and Abraham Wald. Not surprisingly,
the operations research side of economics was
dominant here, not simply in obvious ways, such
as the work by Koopmans and George Dantzig on
linear programming and the simplex method, but
in the broader conception of economics as engineering. This was not confined to the Cowles
Commission (one can see such an influence at
other places such as Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, MIT) but such work clearly centred
on Cowles.
The important idea that emerged from this
phase of the Cowles Commission’s work was
that the economic system could be analysed as
a probability distribution, the task of economics
being to identify the properties of that distribution. General equilibrium theory, embracing
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individual optimization within a system of simultaneous equations, provided an account of the
structural relationships. Statistical methods,
pioneered by Haavelmo and Koopmans, provided the means for relating that theory to data
that exhibited random shocks in addition to any
systematic relationships between the data, not
just estimating coefficients but also testing the theory. This has been called a probabilistic revolution
(Morgan 1991). Controversy over these new
methods erupted in 1947 when Koopmans (1947)
challenged, head on, what had previously been
considered the scientific way to do empirical economics – the National Bureau of Economic
Research’s (NBER) meticulous data-gathering and
comparatively informal data-analysis – represented
by Measuring Business Cycles, by Burns and
Mitchell (1946). As Rutledge Vining (1949), replying for the NBER, justly claimed, Koopmans had
written a manifesto for the Cowles Commission’s
new methods, privileging the testing of theory
over the search for hypotheses. In addition to the
techniques mentioned above, its fruits ranged
from the monetary theory that formed the heart
of Don Patinkin’s Money, Interest and Prices
Patinkin (1956), the leading exposition of macroeconomic theory till the 1970s, and Lawrence
Klein’s models of the US economy, from which
developed much of macroeconometrics.
In the late 1940s, the RAND Corporation, in
Santa Monica, California, emerged as a new focus
for technical economic analysis. RAND was initially a division of the Douglas Aircraft Company,
but from 1948 it became a non-profit organization, funded at first by the US Air Force, and later
by other bodies, of which the Ford Foundation
was the most important. It was an interdisciplinary
environment where economists worked alongside
scientists, mathematicians, engineers and other
social scientists. It was established by senior figures in the US Air Force and was motivated by the
Soviet threat and the emerging Cold War, and
embodied lessons learned in the Second World
War. Through H. Rowan Gaither, Chairman of
RAND’s Board of Trustees and, from 1953, President of the Ford Foundation, RAND became
closely linked to Ford: its overall product was
‘systems analysis’, a broad umbrella under
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which a range of mathematical work could be
sponsored, linked primarily by certain sets of
mathematical techniques and a vision of economics centered on rational choice. Though it was
associated with much else, from Kenneth Arrow’s
Social Choice and Individual Values Arrow
(1951) to Linear Programming and Economic
Analysis by Dorfman et al. (1958), its main significance was in game theory, bringing together
economists from Cowles (such as Arrow) with
economists and mathematicians from Princeton
(which included John Nash), the major academic
centre of research into game theory during the
1950s.
The precise significance of the military
involvement in economics is not yet clear. The
Office of Naval Research (ONR) provided much
funding, especially for game theory research, and
the US Air Force was behind RAND. Clearly
some projects were directly driven by military
imperatives, such as working out a strategy for
responding to (or anticipating) a Soviet nuclear
strike. There are also clear links from systems
analysis/operations research, and the techniques
associated with these, to military requirements.
Against this, those involved emphasize that
researchers at RAND were given great freedom
and military sponsorship had little or no effect on
what they did (see Mirowski 2002). However,
even if researchers did have a high degree of
freedom, there was certainly selection bias in the
types of projects and researchers who received
support from these sources, and the scale of such
funding makes it plausible to argue that may have
had a significant effect on the way the profession
developed.
Mathematics, Technique and the ‘Core’
To say that economics has become more mathematical in the post-war period is too obvious to
need justification. However, the significance of
this process and the way it came about are far
less obvious and need disentangling.
Mark Blaug (1999) has labelled what happened
to economics after the 1950s ‘the formalist revolution’. However, within this lie a number of very
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
different developments. One is the incursion into
economics of formalist mathematics. At the outset
of The Theory of Value, Debreu (1959) wrote that
he was approaching his subject with the degree of
rigour associated with the contemporary formalist
school of mathematics. His work formed part of a
broader movement towards placing economic theory on an axiomatic foundation, and comprising
the literature on existence, uniqueness and stability
of general equilibrium (see Weintraub 2002). Even
here, however, it is possible to discern strands that
on closer inspection are very different. Ingrao and
Israel (1990) distinguished the formal and interpretive branches, associating the former with Debreu
and the latter with Arrow. Others have traced differences to disputes over formalism in mathematics
(Weintraub 2002). The most eminent mathematician to engage with economics, John von Neumann, was not only a critic of formalism (in the
sense of Hilbert): his interest in economics
stemmed from a broader concern with artificial
intelligence that, Mirowski (2002) has argued, differentiated his views sharply from economists at
the Cowles Commission and others pursuing general equilibrium analysis.
More significant than this is the fact that most
economics, as Solow (1997) has observed, is not
formalistic in this sense. Rather, what has happened
is that economics has become more ‘technical’: he
was probably right to argue that axiomatics was of
no interest to most economists. Perhaps the most
influential exponent of mathematics in economics,
Paul Samuelson, whose Foundations of Economic
Analysis Samuelson (1947), written at Harvard and
the basis for the style of economics he established
at MIT, amounted to a manifesto for mathematical
economics. His work, which arose from a mathematical tradition very different from the European
traditions out of which von Neumann and Debreu
came, sought to be rigorous without being based on
axiomatization. Even further from formalism, but
equally influential, was the Chicago School, dominated from the 1940s to the 1970s by Milton
Friedman. Friedman favoured simpler models and
was more sceptical about complex mathematical
reasoning. Thus Hands and Mirowski (1998) have
distinguished three schools in post-war neoclassical price theory – Stanford (Arrow), MIT
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
(Samuelson) and Chicago (Friedman). Whether or
not one accepts the claim made by Hands and
Mirowski that these represent three responses to
the failure of Henry Schultz’s attempt to quantify
demand theory before his death in 1938, this
provides a useful way to represent the variety of
ways in which a common theoretical core was
developed.
However, becoming more technical is not synonymous with using mathematics. Another
dimension is the separation of theory and application. Though the distinction between theory and
applied work is taken for granted by most contemporary economists, the situation was very different before the Second World War. There was
much work where it is impossible to draw any
distinction between statements that are intended to
describe the world and ones that are at the level of
theory. In what we would now consider applied
work, the practice of clearly separating theory and
application is something that emerged only after
the Second World War (see Backhouse 1998).
This change is reflected in the language economists began to use: they began to talk in terms of
models. Though the idea of a model has deeper
roots, talking in terms of models took off only
from 1939, having been very rare before that.
As the discipline changed, so did the curriculum, something in which the American Economic
Association (AEA) became involved. During the
1940s, partly in response to demands of wartime,
and partly because of broader uncertainty about
how economics should be taught, the AEA
established committees on undergraduate education, the main outcome being a report in 1950. Out
of this rose the suggestion to review graduate
education, resulting in a report by Howard
Bowen, sponsored by the AEA and funded by
Rockefeller, which appeared in Bowen 1953. On
the grounds that ‘technical knowledge’ of economics would be useful for those working as
economists in government, business and education, this argued that ‘there should be a “common
core” for all students who are to be awarded
advanced degrees in economics’ (Bowen 1953,
p. 2). This core consisted ‘primarily of economic
theory including value, distribution, money,
employment, and at least a nodding acquaintance
14107
with some of the more esoteric subjects such as
dynamics, theory of games and mathematical economics’. No one, it was argued, had claim to an
economics Ph.D. without ‘rigorous initiation’ into
these and economic history, history of economic
thought, statistics and research methods (Bowen
1953, p. 43). Interestingly, mathematics was
placed alongside Russian, German and Chinese:
it was important to have some economists with
knowledge of it, but it was not necessary for all to
do so.
In Bowen’s report, the core was still very
broad – a statement of the range of knowledge –
that economics Ph.D’s should be expected to
have. Over the following two decades it came to
be used more narrowly. For example, Richard
Ruggles (1962, p. 487) wrote of the function of
graduate training being ‘to provide a common
core of basic economic theory’ that would be
used elsewhere in the programme, and observed
that ‘at a great many universities’ training in mathematics was required. However, this was still
discussed alongside language requirements.
Though such questions had been raised as early
as the Bowen Report, it was in the 1960s that the
AEA meetings hosted debates over the role of
economic history and history of economic thought
in the graduate curriculum. Gordon (1965)
conducted a survey implying, as Bowen had
found a decade earlier, that though most graduate
schools still offered the subject, history of economic thought was declining, and that there was
pressure for it to decline further, particularly from
younger faculty. In the survey by Nancy Ruggles
(1970), the subject was defined in the now familiar way of a unifying core of micro and macro
theory, quantitative methods (interestingly,
econometrics, simulation, survey methods and
operations research) and a range of applied fields
that did not include any history.
These trends continued to the end of the century. They are best summed up by saying that
economists were increasingly being trained, at
Ph.D. level, as technicians rather than as scholars
in the traditional sense of the term. In the 1940s,
when concerns were raised about this in AEA
meetings, it was still plausible to respond the
demands of scholarship, and breadth of education,
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were compatible with mastering the necessary
technical skills; but by the 1970s this was becoming more and more difficult. The demands of
technique were pushing courses that provided
breadth, symbolized by history of economic
thought, out of the curriculum. By the end of the
1980s, this had gone so far that some Liberal Arts
professors claimed that Ph.D.’s from the leading
graduate schools were no longer equipped to teach
at undergraduate level: not only did they know too
little of the past and present literature on economics, but they did not know enough about the institutions of contemporary market economies. There
were even signs that Ph.D. students themselves
were sceptical about the value of the hurdles over
which they were jumping (Colander and Klamer
1987, 1990). In response to these concerns, the
AEA established a Commission on Graduate Education in Economics, which reported in 1991
(Krueger 1991; Hansen 1991; see Coats 1992a,
for a comparison of this and Bowen’s report).
Though some changes were recommended, these
were minor and had little effect (Colander 1992).
When Colander (2005) repeated his earlier survey
a decade and a half later, he found much lower
levels of dissatisfaction, though concluded that
the students had adjusted to the more technical
syllabus, not the other way round.
Economic Analysis
The way the use of mathematics spread within
economics was inextricably linked with developments in economic analysis. It was not simply a
matter of making earlier, less rigorous, analysis
more precise. To be able to use the mathematical
techniques in the way they did, the basis on
which economics rested had to change. For the
institutionalists, very broadly interpreted, being
scientific meant basing economics firmly on evidence about how the world worked. It was because
he believed that empirical research would establish
accounts of human behavior that were more complex than those offered by economic theorists that
Mitchell (1925) had predicted that economists
would lose interest in an abstract, artificial man.
The result was that the 1930s and 1940s saw a
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
wealth of empirical work on industrial organization, pricing, labour markets and many other
aspects of economic behaviour. But mathematical
theory, given the techniques then available to economists, necessitated working with simpler assumptions, in which agents were maximizers operating
in markets where competitive structures were
precisely defined, and if possible were perfectly
competitive. It is perhaps because of the strong
institutionalist element in American economics
that the debates through which these simplifying
assumptions were established were dominated by
American economists.
The clash between institutionalism and new,
technical approaches explicitly came to the surface
in Koopmans’s review Koopmans (1947) of Measuring Business Cycles, by Burns and Mitchell
(1946). Koopmans presented his approach as
building on the work of those like Burns and
Mitchell who simply measured: it was necessary
to pass beyond that to the ‘Newton stage’ in economic theorizing, where theory and data analysis
informed each other. Data would be used to test
theory. Representing the old view, Rutledge Vining
(1949) pointed out that the Cowles Commission
methods involved more than this: that they presumed a specific type of theory and empirical
methods. If one did not know what theory was
suitable, different empirical methods were
required. Burns and Mitchell, Vining argued,
were concerned with discovery as much as with
testing, for, in the absence of empirical work, economists did not know what form theory should take.
Substantially the same issue arose in the
so-called ‘marginalist’ controversy, provoked by
Richard Lester’s article in the American Economic Review Lester (1946). Though Lester was
portrayed by critics as drawing naive conclusions
from surveys, and as presenting a radical challenge to profit maximization, he is better seen as
arguing that economics needed to be based firmly
on the mass of evidence that had been accumulated during the previous decade or more on how
firms behaved and on how labour markets
worked. Controversy here was more prolonged
and more complex, spilling over into discussion
of industrial organization, where Lester’s critics
included economists on both sides of the divide
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
between Harvard (dominated by Mason and
Chamberlin) and Chicago (where Friedman and
Stigler were; see Lee 1984; Mongin 1992). Fritz
Machlup changed the debate into one about marginal analysis and, together with Friedman,
established the principle that economics was
about explaining behavior, not explaining how
decisions were made. Though he did not intend
it that way, Friedman’s (1953) methodology of
positive economics, with its emphasis on testing
predictions, not assumptions, could be taken as
vindicating economic theory’s neglect of its
empirical foundations.
It is no coincidence that these controversies
took place in the pages of US journals, as did a
less prominent one a few years later on the role of
mathematics in economics (Novick 1954, and
ensuing discussion; see Mirowski 2002,
pp. 402–5). There were parallels in other countries, but it was in the United States, where in the
1930s institutionalists and neoclassicals had vied
with each other, that the most marked cleansing of
approaches that could not be formalized so easily
was taking place. In the 1950s and 1960s, formal
modelling based on maximization and, increasingly, competitive markets spread throughout the
discipline. Price theory became more formal and
increasingly dominated what came to be known as
microeconomics. Keynes’s behavioural microfoundations (based on ‘propensities’ and imprecise generalizations from observed behaviour
such as ‘animal spirits’) were replaced with optimizing ones and macroeconomics came to be seen
through the lens of utility maximizing agents, as
in Don Patinkin’s Money, Interest and Prices
Patinkin (1956). General equilibrium analysis,
summed up by Debreu’s Theory of Value Debreu
(1959), though never more than a minority activity, came to be seen as the fundamental theory on
which more workaday theorizing rested.
During this period, however, there were limits
to the application of formal theory. Though formal
microfoundations could be provided for many of
the functions, macroeconomics was seen as separate, not entirely reducible to a single, consistent
microeconomic theory. In microeconomics, strategy and industrial structure remained outside the
purview of formal theory, empirical work
14109
dominating work on industrial organization.
Development economics offers another example
of a field that stood apart from other fields,
reflecting the assumption, held widely though not
universally, that people in different societies
behaved in different ways. Thus, although economists later came to see the rise of formal theory and
mathematical methods as the key development
during the period, its progress was slow, and it
was anything but pervasive as late as the 1960s.
The way in which less formal approaches, based on
assumptions that ran directly counter to those
underlying what later became dominant, is nicely
illustrated by a project entitled ‘The InterUniversity Study of Labor Problems and Economic
Development’, undertaken by John Dunlop, Clark
Kerr, Frederick Harbison and Charles Myers (see
Cochrane 1979). Its thesis, that industrialism
required the development of a new type of man,
ensured that, as the assumptions underlying modern theory became established, it came to be seen as
a quaint relic of the past. However, its significance
rests in its being a large project, lasting over
20 years, receiving $855,000 from the Ford Foundation and $200,000 from Carnegie, producing
around 40 books and, in Cochrane’s view, helping
to define labour economics as that field existed in
the late 1970s. Though its final report came as late
as 1975, its objectives were framed against the
background of thinking on labour questions that
the older institutionalist economists would have
understood; its analysis drew on sociology and
industrial relations as well as on what would now
be recognized as properly economic analysis.
However, from the 1970s things changed. Formal methods, based on individual optimization,
were used to analyse problems of uncertainty and
information, the most prominent exponent of this
being Joseph Stiglitz. These ideas were applied to
labour markets, finance, and many other fields.
Macroeconomics turned away from what Lucas
called ‘free parameter’ models – ones containing
parameters that were not based on optimizing
behaviour. Public choice theory, which emerged
at the boundaries of economics and political science, brought government and much organizational behaviour within the scope of rational
choice (see Medema 2000). Initially, this was not
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widely considered to be economics, with the
result that public choice scholars found it hard to
publish in the major journals, leading James
Buchanan, Gordon Tullock and their associates
to establish the Public Choice Society, and to
develop their own journals. However, fairly soon
the main economics journals opened up to such
work. Methods were found to build models of
general equilibrium with monopolistic competition, these enabling trade theory to move away
from assumptions of perfect competition that were
thought unrealistic in many contexts. Game theory was introduced to analyse problems of strategy, first transforming industrial organization and
later being extended to almost every other field of
economics. Development economics, like macroeconomics, ceased to be considered as resting on
principles different from those in the rest of the
discipline. Rational choice methods were even
applied by economists with clear radical sympathies, such as in the rational choice Marxism of
John Roemer and Jon Elster.
Most of these developments were international
in their reach, but all were centred, squarely, in the
United States. In none of the cases just mentioned
would it be conceivable to write the story without
discussing the role of American economists and
economists based in the United States, whereas it
would be possible (if not always the full picture)
to do so without mentioning work in the rest of the
world. The collective effect of these developments was to transform a discipline in which,
though rational, maximizing behaviour was central, numerous exceptions and special cases
existed, to one where it could plausibly be argued
that economic theory was simply working out
the implications of maximizing behaviour. Economic theory could be seen as resting on a single
behavioural postulate.
Faced with this scenario, in which economic
theory in the United States became, methodologically, narrower, some economists rebelled. Radical economists, stimulated by the Vietnam War,
began to argue in the late 1960s, that economists
were systematically ignoring questions such as
power, class, and income distribution. Frustrated
by their inability to persuade their more orthodox
colleagues to take their ideas sufficiently seriously,
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
they formed the Union of Radical Political Economy, setting up networks, conferences and a journal (Coats 1992b, 2001). Shortly afterwards,
inspired by Joan Robinson’s Ely Lecture at the
AEA in 1971, Alfred Eichner, Jan Kregel and
others organized what developed into the grouping
known as Post Keynesian economics (Lee 2000).
‘Austrian economists’, influenced by the work of
Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Ludwig
Lachmann, encouraged by Hayek’s being awarded
the Nobel Memorial Prize in 1974, also began to
organize themselves. In all cases, the organization
of these groups was motivated by the sense of
exclusion they felt from the mainstream,
represented by the meetings of the American Economic Association and the leading economics
journals, who regarded their work as generally of
low quality. These movements remained small,
with strengths in particular institutions (Austrians
at New York and Auburn; Post Keynesians at
Rutgers and Tennessee; Public Choice in Virginia;
Radicals at Amherst and the New School).
These self-consciously ‘heterodox’ groups
were but part of a wider fragmentation of the
discipline. Technological changes meant that economic print runs for books and journals fell during
the period, and the costs of travel and communications fell. Together with the increased size of the
economics profession, these developments made
it easier for sub-fields of economics to organize,
represented most clearly by the rapid rise in the
number of specialist journals. The changing character of the profession was reflected in the Allied
Social Science Association (ASSA), the main
professional meeting of American economists,
organized by the AEA. By 1998, though the
AEA, the American Finance Association and the
Econometric Society dominated the meetings,
there were 52 societies affiliated with the ASSA
(compared with 34 in 1980), and the AEA was
having to restrict the number of sessions these
societies were organizing, something it had not
done two decades before.
The 1970s and 1980s were arguably years of
integration, when the American economics
became more homogeneous, the core of microeconomics based on individual optimizing behaviour
being applied to more and more. More than ever
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
before, and in dramatic contrast with the situation
before the Second World War, there was an orthodoxy. However, this was questioned and developed at both empirical and theoretical levels. One
reason was that developments in data collection
and in computing meant that economists were able
to analyse the behaviour of real individuals in a
way that economists of earlier generations (see, for
example, Mitchell 1925) could do little more than
dream about: ‘microeconometrics’ was recognized
with the 2000 Nobel Memorial Prize for James
Heckman and Daniel McFadden. It became possible to engage in quantitative analysis of microeconomics as never before. Another reason was that
economists turned to experimentation as a source
of data: experimental economics, considered esoteric as late as the 1970s, was given respectability
with the debates over preference reversals in the
pages of the American Economic Review and the
award of the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize to Daniel
Kahneman and Vernon Smith. This rapidly spread
throughout the profession. When ‘behavioural’
economics started being taken seriously in finance,
a field where predictive power was always paramount, it was a sign that alternatives to conventional views of rationality were being taken very
seriously. Bounded rationality, on which Herbert
Simon had been working since the 1950s at Carnegie Mellon, and for which he got the Nobel
Memorial Prize in 1978, moved from being something idiosyncratic, if respected, to being a mainstream technique. Evolutionary game theory and
complexity theory offered new ways to think
about economic change that expanded the boundaries of what was accepted in the subject. By the
end of the century, though rational choice models
remained immensely strong, it became much
harder to describe economics as dominated by an
orthodoxy. Once again, though these developments were international in their scope, they were
centred on the United States, just as were the
developments of the 1970s. Ideas whose main
supporters were European, such as the competing
views of consumer theory associated with Werner
Hildenbrand (who derived demand functions from
assumptions about distributions of characteristics
across individual consumers), had far less
influence.
14111
Economists, Ideology and Policy
Ideology was never far from the surface. In the
1940s concern with ‘Reds’ was common in the
United States, though economists might consider
the problem only to dismiss it. After 1945, as the
Cold War developed, these concerns with Communism grew, reaching their peak with Joseph
McCarthy’s search for Communist sympathizers.
Economists had frequently been viewed with suspicion amongst businessmen, some of whom were
important patrons of higher education, but the
stakes were raised. Planning was suspect, a legacy
from the days of the New Deal, and Keynes provided a convenient focus, for he was a more real
threat than Marx: according to the Chicago Tribune, he was the Englishman who ruled America
(see C.D.W. Goodwin 1998, on these episodes).
Influential figures argued that Keynesianism was
tantamount to Communism. Textbooks, such as
those of Lorie Tarshis and Samuelson, that
discussed Keynesian theory were attacked and
sometimes removed from syllabi under pressure
from aggrieved sponsors (Colander and Landreth
1996, 1998).
The cases where economists were forced out of
academic positions because of real or alleged Communist sympathies are comparatively easy to document (Goodwin 1998; Lee 2004). What is much
harder to prove is the effect this had on how economics pursued their work. There were certainly
great pressures to be technical, for arcane communications between specialists were much less likely
to be considered suspect than ideas that reached out
beyond academia. Using an evolutionary model,
Goodwin (1998, p. 79) distinguishes between ‘conceptual variation’ and ‘intellectual selection’ , arguing that the attitudes of economists’ patrons must
have influenced the latter. However, doubts about
its closeness to communism did not prevent
Keynesianism from becoming widely accepted in
academia, though that may have contributed to its
being expressed in more careful, technical language than might otherwise have been the case
(see Colander and Landreth 1996, p. 172).
This bias towards becoming more technical
chimed with another pressure – to be seen as
doing science. When the National Science Founda-
U
14112
tion was established in 1950, the inclusion of social
science was controversial and did not take place till
1956. If economists were to obtain support, they
had to ensure that their work was seen as
scientific. Given prevalent beliefs about science at
the time, this favoured narrower, more technical
work, and worked against the pluralistic interdisciplinarity that had been more common before the
war (Goodwin 1998, pp. 65–7). Similar issues arose
in the context of support by philanthropic foundations, of which Sloan, Russell Sage, Rockefeller
and Ford were the most important. Here, concern
with being rigorous was intertwined with suspicion
of planning and doubts about Keynesianism.
Similar considerations affected the body that
brought economists into the heart of the US government, the Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA) established by the Employment Act of
1946. This was intended to be a conservative
institution, providing expert advice with minimal
government interference. Its first chair, Edwin
G. Nourse, shared this view: unlike his colleagues
on the CEA, he was careful to avoid being seen as
an advocate for White House policy (Bernstein
2001, pp. 110–11). Unlike his successor, Leon
Keyserling, he viewed economics as providing
technical, disinterested expertise. Despite criticism, the CEA survived, achieving its greatest
influence in the Kennedy administration, when
Walter Heller, Kermit Gordon and James Tobin
applied Keynesian demand-management policy
to the problem of reducing unemployment.
Given that President Lyndon Johnson would
not let it compromise his Great Society program,
the escalating war in Vietnam led to rising federal
deficits. CEA members warned the President
about the consequences of this, but the CEA’s
Keynesian policies were nonetheless blamed for
the inflation and dislocation that followed during
the 1970s. After 1979, alongside the decline of
Keynesianism in academia, influence on stabilization policy rapidly shifted to the Federal
Reserve under Paul Volcker and later Alan Greenspan. This shift from the CEA to the Fed marked
not a decline in the influence exerted by economists, but a change in its structure: there was a
convergence between research done in academia
and in central banks and other agencies (see
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
McCallum 2000, p. 123), and a shift of emphasis
towards microeconomic policy. Economists
increasingly saw their role, not as engineers advising on how to operate fiscal and monetary levers,
but as designers of institutions and of systems
that would achieve desired outcomes in a world
where policymakers were seen as part of the system rather than outsiders manipulating it. Frequently this involved creating new markets, or
‘reinventing the bazaar’ (McMillan 2002).
There were also more conscious attempts to
impose an ideological agenda on economics.
RAND, the most influential think tank in the
1950s, became closely involved with the Ford
Foundation (these arguments are developed in
Amadae 2003). It was explicitly a non-political
organization, directed towards impartial research.
However, under the chair of its board of trustees,
H. Rowan Gaither, also president of the Ford
Foundation after 1953, RAND focused on ‘systems analysis’, based on principles of rational
action. Rational choice, central to the work of
RAND since its inception, could be seen as providing, though its focus on the independent individual, a justification for a free society, and an
alternative to Communist collectivism (see
Amadae 2003). RAND’s ideology, like that of
Ford, was one of technocratic management, by
experts using rigorous quantitative techniques.
This ideology became prominent in government
in the 1960s when applied by Robert McNamara,
who came from the Ford Motor Company, as
Secretary of Defense.
Others had a more explicit ideological agenda.
The American Enterprise Institute (established
1943), The Foundation for Economic Education
(1946) and the Liberty Fund (1960) were
established specifically to propagate free-market
ideas. There were followed in the 1970s by a series
of think tanks specifically to develop and apply
such ideas to policy. The Heritage Foundation
(1973) was specifically seen as providing a counterweight to the Brookings Institution (established
1927), which had come to be seen as part of finely
tuned liberal policymaking machine (liberal being
understood in the American sense). The aim of its
president, Edwin Feulner, was to create ‘a new
conservative coalition that would replace the New
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
Deal coalition which had dominated American politics for half a century’ (L. Edwards 2005, p. 371).
When Ronald Reagan took office, the Heritage
Fund provided policy ideas ready to put before the
new administration. Hayek, who had moved to
Chicago in 1950, played a particularly influential
role in stimulating such organizations, within the
United States and elsewhere, being part of an influential network centred on the Mont Pelerin Society,
an international group of libertarian thinkers
established in 1947, whose founders included four
Chicago economists and representatives from the
Foundation for Economic Education.
Businessmen and conservative foundations also
sought to stimulate free market thinking within
economics, many of them effectively targeting specific institutions and programs. Though tiny compared with the big foundations such as Rockefeller
and Ford, the Volker Fund (which supported Hayek
and Mises), the Earhart Foundation (with a programme of one-year fellowships), the Scaife,
Bradley and Olin foundations (which between
them targeted support at, inter alia, Chicago’s
Law and Economics programme, and various centres of public choice theory in Virginia) managed to
achieve influence out of proportion to their size
(see Backhouse 2005).
The International Dimension
After the Second World War, the United States
dominated the economics profession. Not only
had German economics been devastated by the
Nazi Party, but the resulting emigration contributed enormously to the expansion of American
economics. The United States was not the only
home for German and other European exiles,
many moving to Britain, but it received more
than any other country. Britain experienced no
such loss, but its university system was too small
for it to be a serious rival. The result was that
many ideas that had originated in Europe rapidly
came to be associated with the United States. The
clearest examples of this are general equilibrium
theory and econometrics, where European
emigrés, led by Jacob Marshak, were instrumental
in developing ideas that rapidly lost any close
14113
connection with their European origins. For
example, in the 1930s, general equilibrium analysis had been an almost exclusively Viennese
phenomenon (in Karl Menger’s seminar),
whereas by the 1950s, not only had those who
worked on it there (Wald and von Neumann)
moved to the United States, but its leading practitioners were an American (Arrow) and a Frenchman (Debreu), but both based in the United States.
Another clear example of this process is
Keynesian economics, central to the evolution of
American economics from the 1940s to at least the
1980s. This clearly originated in Britain, and British economists such as John Hicks and James
Meade played important parts in the subsequent
Keynesian revolution. However, Keynesianism
was rapidly Americanized. The key figure here
was Alvin Hansen, the force behind Harvard’s
fiscal policy seminar, and later author of the influential A Guide to Keynes Hansen (1953). As has
been argued by Mehrling (1998), Hansen’s ‘conversion’ did not involve a rejection of his earlier
ideas; rather, Keynesianism provided a vehicle
through which his ideas on policy, rooted in the
American institutionalist tradition, could be developed. Lawrence Klein (1947) provided another
interpretation of Keynesian economics, relating it
to with the econometric approach emanating from
the Cowles Commission. Samuelson (1948) integrated Keynesian ideas into a textbook aimed at
American students. During the 1950s and 1960s,
the most influential work on macroeconomics was,
with few exceptions, undertaken in the United
States. Friedman’s work on the consumption function provides another example of Keynesian ideas
being assimilated into an American tradition (the
empirical studies of the NBER).
What was happening here is that economics
was becoming more international, but centred on
the United States, a development made possible
by the openness of the American system at a time
when the profession was expanding and opportunities for immigrants were great. The United
States dominated, not simply because of its size,
but because of its resources. During the interwar
period, the Rockefeller Foundation had been
instrumental in building up economics in key
European institutions in Britain, Scandinavia and
U
14114
many other countries (cf. Goodwin 1998). After
1945, given the close American involvement in
Europe that resulted from the war and reconstruction, this influence increased, accelerated by the
reduced cost of international travel. In country
after country, the economics profession changed
in several ways. Academic systems became more
open and competitive, with increased emphasis on
publication in journals. There was a movement
away from publication in the native language
towards publication in English. Journals moved
away from being national organs to ones that
published articles by economists from a wide
range of countries. Graduate education moved
towards the American model, away from the traditional European model of a major thesis, publishable as a book, towards a Ph.D. comprising
advanced coursework and a short thesis that could
be the basis for three journal articles. The mathematical demands made of students rose progressively. Many economists either undertook
postgraduate study in the United States or spent
sabbaticals in US universities.
The speed and extent of these changes varied
enormously (see the case studies in Coats 1997).
For example, in the UK, the proportion of staff
with a degree from an American university rose
steadily from 1950 to the 1990s. The highest
proportion was at the London School of Economics, where it reached 45 per cent by the mid 1990s,
whereas in other universities it was only five per
cent. In Belgium, CORE at the Université
Catholique de Louvain was an important centre
for economists with strong US connections. Similarly, there was variability in the speed with
which Ph.D. requirements changed, some British
universities adopting the American model in the
1950s and 1960s, while others did not require any
coursework beyond undergraduate level till the
1990s. In Continental Europe, there was the complication of language, and in many cases of academic systems that were much more rigid and less
rapid to change, but many of these changes still
took place. Outside Europe, there was the further
factor of decolonization. At the end of the Second
World War, many countries were still closely
linked to former colonial powers, and the changes
involved a switch from those to the United States.
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
There is dispute over whether this process should
be labelled ‘Americanization’ or simply ‘internationalization’ (see Coats 1997, pp. 395–9). The process certainly did involve internationalization, and it
was arguable that many changes (such as the move
towards advanced coursework) were necessitated by
the rising technical demands made by the subject.
As has already been explained, many of the ideas on
which the period’s economics was based were European, not American in origin. Arguably, the United
States appeared to dominate what was primarily an
international system simply because of its size.
However, there are strong reasons for considering
the process as involving Americanization. In many
cases, in Europe and elsewhere, the United States
provided an example that was deliberately copied.
In other cases, changes were brought about through
connections with US universities. Harry Johnson,
Canadian, but a professor at Chicago and Geneva,
was important in bringing about changes at LSE
where he also held a chair in the 1960s. Chicago
economists developed close links with Latin American countries, consciously exporting Chicago economics to Chile: Chilean students studied in
Chicago, and Chicago staff taught at the Catholic
University of Chile (see A. Harberger 1997; Valdes
1995). Similar developments took place in Brazil,
though involving a much wider range of universities: Chicago, Berkeley, Harvard, Yale, Michigan,
Illinois and Vanderbilt (see M.R. Loureiro 1997).
The US Agency for International Development and
the Ford Foundation provided a significant role in
funding several of these inter-university agreements.
Similar remarks could be made about the US
role in the international organizations that emerged
after 1945, notably the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank: they were vehicles for the internationalization of economics,
along a model dominated by the United States.
Conclusions
Since the Second World War, economics in the
United States has been transformed as dramatically
as in its previous half-century. It is inevitable that
economists looking at these changes focus on the
economic ideas themselves, usually telling the story
United States, Economics in (1945 to Present)
as one of progress. However, this transformation
involved changes in the structure of the profession
(notably in the nature of graduate education) and its
place in society as well as changes in economic
analysis. It is natural for historians to focus on
connections between economic ideas and the institutions out of which they arose. To do this raises the
question of whether these external factors
influenced the course of economic ideas: of whether
things could have been different. The difficulty here
is that it is hard to construct a plausible account of
how things might have been different because, even
if it was the result of adaptation to chance events,
what actually happened generally looks inevitable
in retrospect. However, what can be done is to
sketch some of the possible routes that could have
been taken but were not.
Different paths were open for American economics in the 1930s. During the New Deal, economists such as Gardner Means had built up an
enormous body of statistical data on how product
and labour markets operated. From this starting
point, economists could have chosen to build
models that were less general but more securely
rooted in specific institutional detail than was
Walrasian general equilibrium theory. The route
the discipline actually took was determined, inter
alia, by the Second World War and the Cold War
and the encouragement it gave to certain types of
theorizing and certain types of empirical work.
Macroeconomics offers a second account of alternative paths that might have been taken. The
interwar literature contained discussions of rational expectations, dynamics, intertemporal equilibrium and credibility of policy regimes (see
Backhouse and Laidler 2004). However economists did not pursue such ideas but developed a
macroeconomics centred on a static equilibrium
framework (the IS–LM model); much of the
dynamics that had been lost was then
‘rediscovered’ in the 1970s. Had they developed
a different set of ideas from the interwar literature
(even from Keynes’s own work), macroeconomics could not have developed as it did.
To argue in this way is not to claim that one
path was right and the other wrong, or even that
economists were aware of the directions in which
their own theoretical choices (aimed at solving
14115
specific problems) would lead. Instead, historical
accounts generally rest on two pillars. First, the
standards by which economists judge their
work – their standards of scientific rationality –
reflect the intellectual climate in which they are
working. In some cases, likely factors can be
identified. For example, Weintraub (1998) has
argued that conceptions of what it meant to be
rigorous changed dramatically as a result of developments in quantum mechanics. But many of the
influences on the criteria economists use to assess
their work are harder to identify and have to be
disentangled, cautiously, out of the historical
record. Second, evolution requires not simply a
mechanism for generating new ideas but also a
selection process. To understand the way economic ideas have developed since the Second
World War, it is necessary to consider the demand
for economic ideas as well as the supply: thus,
even if the economists are resolutely impartial,
applying high scientific standards to their work,
the identities and view of their patrons may serve,
through favouring some types of inquiry rather
than others, to affect the evolution of the subject.
We may be too close properly to understand many
of the connections, but economics during this
period, just as much as the economics of earlier
centuries, cannot be divorced from the institutional setting in which it developed.
See Also
▶ United States, Economics in (1776–1885)
▶ United States, Economics in (1885–1945)
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Samuelson, P.A. 1948. Economics: An introductory analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill.
14117
Solow, R.M. 1997. How did economics get that way, and
what way did it get? Daedalus 126: 39–58.
Valdes, J.G. 1995. Pinochet’s economists: The chicago
school in chile. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Vining, R. 1949. Koopmans on the choice of variables to
be studied and of methods of measurement. Review of
Economics and Statistics 31(2): 77–86.
Weintraub, E.R. 1998. Axiomatisches missverstaendniss.
Economic Journal 108: 1837–1847.
Weintraub, E.R. 2002. How economics became a mathematical science. Durham: Duke University Press.
Uno, Kozo (1897–1977)
T. Sekine
Keywords
Marxian value analysis; Stages theory of
development; Uno, K.; Use value
JEL Classifications
B31
A prominent Japanese Marxian economist known
especially for his rigorous and systematic
reformulation of Marx’s Capital. Born in Kurashiki in western Japan in a year of intense social
unrest, Uno early took an interest in anarchosyndicalism and Marxism. Not being of an activist
temperament, however, he strictly disciplined
himself to remain, throughout his life, within the
bounds of independent academic work. For this
deliberate separation of theory (science) from
practice (ideology) he was frequently criticized.
After studying in Tokyo and Berlin in the early
1920s, Uno taught at Tohoku University
(1924–38), the University of Tokyo (1947–58)
and Hosei University (1958–68). During most of
the war years he kept away from academic institutions. He authored many controversial books,
especially after the war. His eleven-volume Collected Works were published by Iwanami-Shoten
in 1973–4.
The problem with Marx’s Capital, according to
Uno, is that it mixes the theory and history of
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capitalism in a haphazard fashion (described as
‘chemical’ by Schumpeter) without cogently
establishing their interrelation. Uno’s methodological innovation lies in propounding a stages
theory of capitalist development (referring to the
stages of mercantilism, liberalism, and imperialism) and using it as a mediation between the two.
Capitalism is a global market economy in
which all socially needed commodities tend to
be produced as value (that is, indifferently to
their use-values) by capital. This tendency is
never consummated since many use-values in
fact fail to conform to this requirement. Only in
theory, which synthesizes ‘pure’ capitalism, can
one legitimately envision a complete triumph of
value over use-values. The inevitable gap between
history, in which use-values appear in their raw
forms, and pure theory, in which they are already
idealized as merely distinct objects for use, must
be bridged by stages theory, which structures itself
around use-values of given types (as ‘wool’, ‘cotton’, and ‘steel’ respectively typify the use-values
of the three stages).
Uno’s emphasis on ‘pure’ capitalism as the
theoretical object has invited many uniformed
criticisms. His synthesis of a purely capitalist
society as a self-contained logical system follows
the genuine tradition of the Hegelian dialectic, and
is quite different from axiomatically contrived
neoclassical ‘pure’ theory. Unlike the latter
which takes the capitalist market for granted,
Uno’s theory logically generates it by step-bystep syntheses of the ever-present contradiction
between value and usevalues. The pure theory of
capitalism is thus divided into the three doctrines
of circulation, production, and distribution
according to the way in which this contradiction
is settled. By specifically articulating the abiding
dialectic of value and use-values, already present
in Capital, Uno has given Marxian economic
theory its most systematic formulation, a formulation which militates against the two
commonest Marxist errors known as voluntarism
and economism.
Uno’s approach is not dissimilar to Karl
Polanyi’s in appreciating the tension between the
substantive (use-value) and the formal (value)
aspect of the capitalist economy. Unlike Polanyi,
Urban Agglomeration
however, Uno ascribes more than relative importance to capitalism, in the full comprehension of
which he sees the key to the clarification of both
pre-capitalist and post-capitalist societies. Thus
Uno’s approach reaffirms and exemplifies the
teaching of Hegel (and Marx) that one should
‘learn the general through the particular’, and
not the other way round.
Bibliography
Albritton, R. 1984. The dialectic of capital: A Japanese
contribution. Capital and Class 22: 157–176.
Albritton, R. 1985. A Japanese reconstruction of marxist
theory. London: Macmillan.
Itoh, M. 1980. Value and crisis: Essays in marxian economics in Japan. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Sekine, T.T. 1975. Uno-Riron: A Japanese contribution to
Marxian political economy. Journal of Economic Literature 13: 847–877.
Sekine, T.T. 1984. The dialectic of capital: A study of the
inner logic of capitalism. Tokyo: Toshindo Press.
Uno, K. 1980. Principles of political economy: Theory of a
purely capitalist society. Trans. from the Japanese by T.
T., Sekine. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Urban Agglomeration
William C. Strange
Abstract
Urban agglomeration is the spatial concentration of economic activity in cities. It can also
take the form of concentration in industry clusters or in employment centres within a city.
One reason that agglomeration takes place is
that there exist external increasing returns, also
known as agglomeration economies. Evidence
indicates that there exist both urbanization
economies, associated with city size, and localization economies, associated with the
clustering of industry. Both effects attenuate
geographically. Theoretical research has identified many sources of agglomeration economies, including labour market pooling, input
sharing, and knowledge spillovers. Empirical
Urban Agglomeration
research has offered evidence consistent with
each of these.
Keywords
Input sharing; Knowledge spillovers; Labour
market pooling; Localization economies;
Migration; New economic geography; Production functions; Productivity; Rent seeking;
Systems of cities; Urban agglomeration;
Urban
wage
premium;
Urbanization
economies
JEL Classification
R12
Urban agglomeration is the spatial concentration
of economic activity in cities. It can also take the
form of concentration in industry clusters or in
centres of employment within a city.
That both kinds of concentration exist is not
debatable. Cities contain roughly 80% of the US
population, and urban population densities are
approximately four times the national average. It
is not just aggregate activity that is agglomerated;
individual industries are concentrated too. There
are many examples. Computer software is wellknown for its spatial concentration, especially in
the Silicon Valley. Automobile manufacturing,
finance, business services, and the production of
films and television programmes are other notable
examples of industrial clustering. Agglomeration
also takes place within cities in the form of
densely developed downtowns and sub-centres.
These patterns are not unique to the United States.
Capital and labour are highly agglomerated in
every developed country, and they are increasingly agglomerated in the developing world.
Localization and Urbanization
Economies
There are two sorts of agglomeration economies.
Urbanization economies are associated with city
size or diversity. Localization economies are associated with the concentration of particular industries. The idea that a city’s size or diversity
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contributes to agglomeration economies is often
attributed to Jacobs (1969), while the idea that
industrial localization increases productivity
goes back to Marshall (1890).
Economists have looked for evidence of these
effects in a number of ways. Since agglomeration
economies by definition enhance productivity,
one natural approach is to estimate a production
function. Estimating the production function
requires establishment level data on inputs,
including employment, land, capital, and materials. Data on labour is the easiest to obtain,
although even the most detailed data-sets are
incomplete, for instance by omitting experience
in a particular occupation. Although data on purchased materials are sometimes available, data on
internally sourced inputs typically are not. Measuring a firm’s capital presents serious problems,
including accounting for depreciation. Finally,
even with good input data it is necessary to control
for endogeneity of input use.
Despite the difficulties inherent in estimating
a production function, a substantial body of
research has estimated the impact of agglomeration on productivity. The very rough consensus is
that doubling city size increases productivity by
an amount that ranges from 2% to 8%. Some
estimates are lower. The diversity of the local
environment, another aspect of urbanization, has
also been shown to be positively related to productivity. In addition, there is evidence of localization economies of roughly similar magnitude
(see Rosenthal and Strange 2004, for a review).
There are other ways to look for evidence of
localization and urbanization economies. Glaeser
and Mare (2001) identify the existence of an urban
wage premium, with workers in cities of over a
million residents earning roughly a third more in
nominal wages than workers in cities of fewer
than 100,000. Even after controlling for the selection of highly productive workers into cities, a
significant premium remains. This is evidence
of agglomeration economies because firms
would not be willing to pay such premium in the
absence of a corresponding productivity advantage. Rosenthal and Strange (2003) consider the
arrival of new business establishments and find
that diversity encourages arrivals and that
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localization economies are more important than
urbanization economies for the industries examined. Finally, Henderson et al. (1995) analyse
employment growth in the United States during
the 1970–87 period. For mature industries, the
specialization of employment at the metropolitan
level is positively associated with growth. These
papers are fairly typical of those that have measured the existence of agglomeration economies.
The broad conclusion is that both urbanization
and localization economies are present.
The Sources of Agglomeration
Economies: Why Do Cities and Clusters
Exist?
Marshall (1890) identifies three forces that can
explain industry clustering: input sharing, labour
market pooling, and knowledge spillovers. Input
sharing exists when, for example, a clothing manufacturer in New York is able to purchase a great
variety of relatively inexpensive buttons from
a nearby company that specializes in button
manufacturing. Correspondingly, the button manufacturer also benefits because there will be many
nearby clothing manufacturers to whom it can sell
buttons. The process is, therefore, a circular one.
Labour market pooling exists when a film production company in the Los Angeles area can quickly
fill a position by hiring one of the many specialized production workers already present locally.
Similarly, a specialized worker in Los Angeles
can more easily find a new position without having to relocate. In both instances, labour pooling
reduces search costs and improves match quality,
providing valuable benefits for employers and
workers. Knowledge spillovers exist when industrial engineers can learn the tricks of the trade
from random interactions with other programmers
in the same location. Any of these forces can
explain industry clustering. They can also give
rise to cities. The sharing of business service
inputs can, for example, lead firms in very different industries to benefit from locating in close
proximity to each other. Similar sorts of stories
can be told about labour market pooling and
knowledge spillovers.
Urban Agglomeration
Marshall’s list is, of course, incomplete. Many
other forces can lead to agglomeration. First, there
is greater availability of consumer amenities in
large cities. A major league sports franchise, for
instance, requires a significant fan base in order to
be economical. Second, natural advantage can
explain both urbanization and localization. For
instance, heavy manufacturing has historically
developed near sources of minerals and where
water transportation was possible. Third, internal
economies of scale coupled with transactions
costs can lead to self-reinforcing agglomeration.
This explanation is the heart of the New Economic
Geography (NEG, Fujita et al. 1999), and it has
received much attention in recent years.
Various approaches have been adopted in
modelling agglomeration economies. Perhaps
the simplest is to assume that there is some sort
of public good that can be shared more economically in a larger city or cluster (Arnott 1979). This
force operates on both the production and consumption sides. Productivity is enhanced by infrastructure, and utility is increasing in public goods.
An alternative is to assume that there are local
externalities, with agents directly making their
neighbours better off (that is, more knowledgeable). Agglomeration economies can also arise
from thick market effects in search or matching
(Helsley and Strange 1990). The important common element from all these explanations is that
agglomeration is associated with situations where
market outcomes are not guaranteed to be efficient. Duranton and Puga (2004) provide a more
detailed survey of the sharing, matching, and
spillover micro-foundations of agglomeration.
The discussion thus far has suggested that
agglomeration is always a positive outcome, at
least as a second-best solution to market failures.
This need not always be the case. Another reason
to agglomerate is rent seeking. Ades and Glaeser
(1995) show that there are many situations where
urbanization can allow a city’s residents to
claim the output of other agents. They argue that
imperial Rome supported a population of more
than one million at least in part because the
rewards of empire were distributed to residents
of Rome as ‘bread and circuses’ in order to preserve domestic order. In this case, a city may exist,
Urban Agglomeration
not because it adds to productivity, but because it
allows redistribution.
Empirical work has provided evidence of the
presence of Marshall’s forces. Jaffe et al. (1993)
provide direct evidence, showing that patent citations are geographically localized. Holmes (1999)
considers local input sharing. He shows that more
concentrated industries have a higher value of
purchased input intensity, equal to purchased
inputs divided by sales. This is consistent with
the presence of input sharing. Costa and Kahn
(2001) consider one aspect of labour pooling:
matching between workers and employers. The
key result is that ‘power couples’, where both
partners have at least a college degree, have disproportionately and increasingly located in large
metropolitan areas. After considering other possible explanations, they conclude that power couples have become increasingly urbanized at least
in part because it easier for both individuals to find
good matches for their specialized skills. There is
also evidence of the non-Marshallian agglomeration economies. Glaeser et al. (2001) provide evidence of consumption effects. Kim (1995)
documents the importance of natural advantage.
Evidence of effects predicted by NEG is reviewed
by Head and Mayer (2004). Looking across industries at the sorts of industry characteristics associated with agglomeration, Rosenthal and Strange
(2001) find that all of the factors discussed above
contribute to industrial agglomeration. The evidence is strongest for labour market pooling.
The Geography of Agglomeration
Economies: Cities and Neighbourhoods
It is common to consider agglomeration economies at the city level. This is because it is significantly easier to carry out estimation of production
functions, wage premiums, births, or growth in
that sort of aggregate analysis. In the previous
section’s analysis, however, it is clear that
agglomeration economies depend on the distance
between agents rather than on the political boundaries of cities. Thus, it makes sense to consider the
degree to which agglomeration economies are at
work at different levels of geography. Are they a
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neighbourhood effect or do they operate at the city
level? In a sense, this question about the boundary
of an agglomeration is parallel to asking about the
boundary of a firm. The canonical question in the
theory of the firm literature is: make or buy?
Should an activity be carried out internally or
through market transactions? The parallel
agglomeration question is: near or far? Should
one activity take place in close proximity to
another or at a great distance?
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) address this
issue by using geo-coding software to measure
total employment and own-industry employment
within a certain distance of an employer. Using
these measures, the paper calculates the effects of
the local environment on the number of firm
births and on these new firms’ employment
levels for six industries (computer software,
apparel, food processing, printing and publishing, machinery, and fabricated metals). The key
result is that agglomeration economies attenuate
with distance. The effect of additional employment beyond five miles is shown to be roughly
one-quarter to one-half of the effect of additional
employment within a firm’s own zipcode (postal
code). This result is consistent with both the
concentration of employment downtown and in
sub-centres.
Agglomeration Economies in a System
of Cities or Regions
There has been considerable theoretical work on
the implications of agglomeration economies for a
system of cities or regions. Fujita and Thisse
(2002) review and synthesize the literature. With
apologies for oversimplification, the analysis in
the literature proceeds as follows. First, it is
assumed that there exists some sort of agglomeration economy. The specification may be of a
reduced form shifting of the production function
or of a particular agglomerative force. In the NEG
literature (Fujita et al. 1999), for instance,
agglomeration arises from backward linkages
between firms and input suppliers and forward
linkages between firms and consumers. Second,
equilibrium in the system is characterized.
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The equilibration always involves the individual
location decisions taken by firms and households. It may also involve some coordination by
a large agent, either a local government or a
profit-maximizing city developer. Finally, the
dynamic properties of the equilibrium are
considered.
The systems of cities literature obtains several
results. First, the characteristics of cities in an
equilibrium system depend crucially on the sorts
of agglomeration economies at work. If there are
only localization economies, then the system will
feature cities that specialize by industry. If there
are in addition, or instead, urbanization economies, then diverse cities can arise. Second, there
can be multiple equilibria. This means, for example, that there is no guarantee that the largest city
in the middle of North America would be where
Chicago is. Third, history matters. Agglomeration
economies can be a conservative force in that they
make it difficult for firms and workers to change
their locations. Fourth, there is potential for catastrophic change, with a small change in parameters inducing a large change in outcomes. The
attraction of other firms can cause an agglomeration to persist beyond the point at which it would
have arisen from de novo location decisions.
Eventually, however, when the attractiveness of
other locations becomes sufficiently great, the
agglomeration collapses suddenly. Fifth, equilibrium is not likely to be efficient. This result arises
most starkly in a model where city sizes are determined solely by individual migration decisions.
This ignores the existence of private developers
and governments, which are both rewarded from
realizing more efficient cities. However, in order
to realize an efficient allocation, a developer
would require unlimited control of city formation,
a condition that is unlikely to obtain (Helsley and
Strange 1997).
See Also
▶ New Economic Geography
▶ Spatial Economics
▶ Systems of Cities
▶ Urbanization
Urban Agglomeration
Bibliography
Ades, A., and E. Glaeser. 1995. Trade and circuses:
Explaining urban giants. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 195–227.
Arnott, R. 1979. Optimal city size in a spatial economy.
Journal of Urban Economics 61: 65–89.
Costa, D., and M. Kahn. 2001. Power couples. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 116: 1287–1315.
Duranton, G., and D. Puga. 2004. Micro-foundations
of urban agglomeration economies. In Handbook
of urban and regional economics, vol. 4, ed.
J. Henderson and J.-F. Thisse, 2063–2118. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Fujita, M., and J. Thisse. 2002. The economics of agglomeration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fujita, M., P. Krugman, and A. Venables. 1999. The spatial
economy: Cities, regions, and international trade.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Glaeser, E., and D. Mare. 2001. Cities and skills. Journal of
Labor Economics 192: 316–342.
Glaeser, E., J. Kolko, and A. Saiz. 2001. Consumer city.
Journal of Economic Geography 1: 27–50.
Head, K., and T. Mayer. 2004. The empirics of agglomeration and trade. In Handbook of urban and regional
economics, vol. 4, ed. J. Henderson and J.-F. Thisse,
2609–2670. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Helsley, R., and W. Strange. 1990. Agglomeration economies and matching in a system of cities. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 20: 189–212.
Helsley, R., and W. Strange. 1997. Limited developers.
Canadian Journal of Economics 30: 329–348.
Henderson, J., A. Kuncoro, and M. Turner. 1995. Industrial
development in cities. Journal of Political Economy
103: 1067–1085.
Holmes, T. 1999. Localization of industry and vertical
disintegration. Review of Economics and Statistics 81:
314–325.
Jacobs, J. 1969. The economy of cities. New York: Vintage.
Jaffe, A., M. Trajtenberg, and R. Henderson. 1993. Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as
evidenced by patent citations. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 108: 577–598.
Kim, S. 1995. Expansion of markets and the geographic
distribution of economic activities: The trends in U.S.
regional manufacturing structure, 1860–1987. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 881–908.
Marshall, A. 1890. Principles of economics. London:
Macmillan.
Rosenthal, S., and W. Strange. 2001. The determinants of
agglomeration. Journal of Urban Economics 50:
191–229.
Rosenthal, S., and W. Strange. 2003. Geography, industrial
organization, and agglomeration. Review of Economics
and Statistics 85: 377–393.
Rosenthal, S., and W. Strange. 2004. Evidence on the nature
and sources of agglomeration economies. In Handbook
of urban and regional economics, vol. 4, ed. J. Henderson
and J.-F. Thisse, 2119–2172. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Urban Economics
Urban Economics
John M. Quigley
Abstract
Urban economics emphasizes: the spatial
arrangements of households, firms, and capital
in metropolitan areas; the externalities which
arise from the proximity of households and
land uses; and the public policy issues which
arise from the interplay of these economic
forces.
Keywords
Cities; Congestion; Density gradient; Diversity
(ethnic and racial); Endogenous growth; External economies; Housing markets; Human capital; Labour markets; Land markets; Land use;
Monopolistic competition; Patents; Pollution;
Price discrimination; Property taxation;
Regional economics; Residential segregation;
Road pricing; Schelling, T; Social externalities; Spatial competition; Suburbanization;
Tipping point models; Transport costs; Urban
agglomeration; Urban consumption externalities; Urban economics; Urban production
externalities; von Thünen, J; Zoning
JEL Classifications
R0
Cities exist because production or consumption
advantages arise from higher densities and spatially concentrated location. After all, spatial competition forces firms and consumers to pay higher
land rents – rents that they would not be willing to
pay if spatially concentrated economic activity did
not yield cost savings or utility gains. Economists
have long studied the forces leading to these proximities in location, focusing first and foremost
upon the importance of transport costs.
Early theorists (for example, von Thünen, as
early as 1826; see Hall 1966) considered land use
and densities in an agrarian town where crops
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were shipped to a central market. Early models
of location deduced that land closer to the market
would be devoted to producing crops with higher
transport costs and higher output per acre. Cities
in the 19th century at this time were characterized
by high transport costs for both goods and people,
and manufactured goods were produced in close
proximity to a central node – a port or a railway
from which goods could be exported to world
markets. The high costs of transporting people
also meant that workers’ residences were located
close to employment sites.
Transport improvements in the late 19th century meant that urban workers could commute
cheaply by streetcar, thereby facilitating the suburbanization of population into areas surrounding
the central worksite. More radical technical
change in the first decades of the 20th century
greatly reduced the cost of transporting materials
and finished goods. The substitution of the truck
for the horse and wagon finally freed production
from locations adjacent to the export node. The
introduction of the private auto a decade later
further spurred the decentralization of US metropolitan areas.
Spatial Forces
The seminal literature in urban economics provides positive models of the competitive forces
and transport conditions which give rise to the
spatial structure of modern cities. These models
emphasize the trade-off between the transport
costs of workers, the housing prices they face,
and the housing expenditures they choose to
make. Relatively simple models can explain the
basic features of city structure – for example, the
gradient in land prices with distance to the urban
core; the house price gradient; the relationship
between land and housing price gradients; the
intensity of land use; and the spatial distribution
of households by income (see Brueckner 1987, for
a review).
Empirical investigations of these phenomena
reveal clearly that these gradients have been
decreasing over time. Indeed, the flattening of
price and density gradients over time has been
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observed in the United States since as long ago as
the 1880s. (Early work is reported in Mills 1972.)
In interpreting these trends, it is important to sort
out the underlying causes. The stylized model
described above emphasizes the roles of transport
cost declines (in part, as a result of technical
change and the role of the private auto), increases
in household income, and population growth in
explaining suburbanization. These models also
rely upon the stylized fact that the income elasticity of housing demand exceeds the income elasticity of marginal transport costs. The alternative,
largely ad hoc, explanations stress specific causes,
for example the importance of tax policies which
subsidize low-density owner- occupied housing,
the importance of neighbourhood externalities
which vary between cities and suburbs, or the
role of variations in the provision of local public
goods. There is a variety of empirical analyses of
the determinants of the variations in density gradients over time and space. A general finding is
that levels and intertemporal variations in real
incomes and transport costs are sufficient to
explain a great deal of the observed patterns of
suburbanization.
Durable Capital
But, of course, variations in many of these other
factors are highly correlated with secularly rising
incomes and declining commuting costs, so any
parcelling out of root causes is problematic. The
elegant and parsimonious models of urban
form have proven easy to generalize in some
dimensions – for example, to incorporate stylized
external effects and variations in income distributions across urban areas. It has proven to be substantially harder to recognize the durability of
capital in tractable equilibrium models. The original models assumed that residential capital is
infinitely malleable, and that variations in income
or transport costs would be manifest in the capital
intensity of housing over space in a direct and
immediate way. The decline in land rents with
distance from the urban centre means that developers’ choices of inputs vary with capital-to-land
ratios – declining with distance to the core.
Urban Economics
Dwellings are small near the urban core and
large at the suburban fringe. Tall buildings are
constructed near the urban centre, and more compact buildings are constructed in peripheral areas.
But, of course, these structures and housing units
are extremely durable, with useful lives exceeding
40 years or more. Thus, insights derived from the
perspective in which the capital stock adjusts
instantly to its long-run equilibrium position in
response to changed economic conditions are
limited.
Incorporating durable housing into models of
residential location and urban form implies some
recognition of the fact that ‘history matters’ in the
structure and form of urban areas. Cities with the
same distribution of income and demographics
and with identical transport technologies may
be quite different in their spatial structures,
depending upon their historical patterns of development. Extensions of these simple models analyse the form of urban areas when developers have
myopic or perfect foresight and when development is irreversible. With myopic developers,
land is developed at each distance from the centre
to the same density as it would have been built
with malleable capital, but, once built, its capital
intensity is frozen. Thus, with increasing opportunity costs of land over time, population and
structural densities may increase with distance
from the urban core.
With perfect foresight, the developer maximizes the present value of urban rents per acre,
which vary with the timing of urban development.
The present value of a parcel today is its opportunity cost in ‘agriculture’ until development plus
its market value after conversion (minus construction costs). With perfect foresight, developers
choose the timing of the conversion of land to
urban use as a function of distance to the urban
core, and development proceeds in an orderly
fashion over time. Locations are developed
according to their distance from the centre.
Of course, durable residential capital also
implies that structures may depreciate or become
obsolete. In particular, a historical pattern of
development along concentric rings from the
urban core, together with rising incomes, means
that the most depreciated and obsolete dwellings
Urban Economics
are the more centrally located. But embedded in
each of these parcels of real estate is the option to
redevelop it in some other configuration. Obsolete
and depreciated dwellings commanding low
prices are those for which the option to exercise
redevelopment is less costly.
Models of development with perfect foresight
in which residential capital depreciates imply that
the timing of initial redevelopment of residential
parcels depends only on their distance from the
urban core (since that indexes their vintage of
development). These models imply that the capital intensity of land use does not exhibit the
smooth and continuous decline with distance
from the core. Capital intensity does decline with
distance, on average, but the relationship is not
monotonic.
With uncertainty, developers take into account
their imperfect knowledge of future prices in making land use decisions today. But this means that
developers may make mistakes by developing
land too soon. As a consequence, land development may often proceed in a leapfrog pattern.
Landowners may withhold some interior land
from development in anticipation of higher rents
and profitable development later on (see Capozza
and Helsley 1990, for a unified treatment).
The key point in these modern models of
urban form which incorporate durable residential
capital is that the timing as well as the location of
development affect the choices made by housing
suppliers. History ‘matters’ in these models, just
as it does in the decisions of housing suppliers in
urban areas.
Externalities
Theory
Recent work has greatly extended these urban
models to address explicitly the production and
consumption externalities which give rise to
cities. The basic models combine Marshallian
notions of ‘economics of localized industry’ and
Jacobs’s (1969) notions of ‘urbanization economies’ with the perspective on monopolistic competition and product diversity introduced by Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977).
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On the consumption side, the general form of
these models assumes that household utility
depends on consumption of traded goods, housing,
and the variety of local goods. The markets for
traded goods and housing are competitive, while
the differentiated local goods are sold in a monopolistically competitive market. If there is less differentiation among local goods, then variety loses its
impact on utility; greater differentiation means that
variety has a greater effect on utility. Under reasonable assumptions, the utility of a household in the
city will be positively related to the aggregate quantity of local goods it consumes and the number of
types of these goods which are available in the
economy (see Quigley 2001, for examples).
On the production side of the economy, the
importance of a variety of locally produced inputs
can be represented in a parallel fashion. For example, suppose that the aggregate production function includes labour, space and a set of specialized
inputs. Again, the markets for labour and space
can be taken as competitive, while the differentiated local inputs are purchased in a monopolistically competitive market. If there is less
differentiation among inputs, then variety loses
its impact on output; greater differentiation
means that variety has a greater effect on output.
For example, a general counsel may operate
alone. However, she may be more productive if
assisted by a general practice law firm, and even
better served by firms specializing in contracts,
regulation and mergers. Again, under reasonable
conditions, output in the city will be related to
quantities of labour, space, and specialized inputs
utilized and also to the number of different producer inputs available in that city.
The theoretical models built along these lines
yield a remarkable conclusion: diversity and variety in consumer goods or in producer inputs can
yield external scale economies, even though all
individual competitors and firms earn normal
profits. In these models, the size of the city and
its labour force will determine the number of
specialized local consumer goods and the number
of specialized producer inputs, given the degree of
substitutability among the specialized local goods
in consumption and among specialized inputs in
production. A larger city will have a greater
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variety of consumer products and producer inputs.
Since the greater variety adds to utility and to
output, in these models larger cities are more
productive, and the well-being of those living in
cities increases with their size. This will hold true
even though the competitive and monopolistically
competitive firms in these models each earn a
normal rate of profit (see Fujita and Thisse 2001,
for a comprehensive treatment).
Applications: Pollution and Transport
As emphasized above, however, the advantages of
urban production and consumption are limited.
Explicit recognition of the land and housing markets and the necessity of commuting suggests that,
at some point, the increased costs of larger cities –
higher rents arising from the competition for space,
and higher commuting costs to more distant
residences – will offset the production and consumption advantages of diversity. Other costs like
air and noise pollution no doubt increase with size
as well. Nevertheless, even when these costs are
considered in a more general model, the optimal
city size will be larger when the effects of diversity
in production and consumption are properly reckoned. Urban output will be larger and productivity
will also be greater (see Quigley 1998).
The empirical evidence assembled to support
and test these theoretical insights about the
regional economy is potentially very valuable.
Hitherto, much of the discussion about the sources
of economic growth was framed at that national
level, and most of the aggregate empirical
evidence – time series data across a sample of
countries – was inherently difficult to interpret.
By framing these theoretical propositions at the
level of the region, it is possible to investigate
empirically the sources of endogenous economic
growth by using much richer bodies of data within
a common set of national institutions. Geographical considerations of labour market matching and
efficiency (Helsley and Strange 1990), of the concentration of human capital (Rauch 1993), and of
patent activity (Jaffe et al. 1993) have all been
studied at the metropolitan and regional levels,
and considerable effort is under way to use
regional economic data to identify and measure
more fully the sources of American economic
Urban Economics
growth. These are major research activities
exploring urban externalities in urban economies
throughout the developed world. This research
programme is still in its infancy.
Of course, specialization, diversity and agglomeration are not the only externalities arising in cities.
High densities and close contact over space reinforce the importance of many externalities in modern cities. Among the most salient are the external
effects of urban transport – congestion and pollution. Most work trips in urban areas are undertaken
by private auto. (Indeed, in 2000, less than four per
cent of commuting was by public transit; see Small
and Gomez-Ibanez 1999.) In most US cities, automobiles are the dominant technology for commuting from dispersed origins to concentrated
worksites. This technology is even more efficient
for commuting from dispersed residences to dispersed worksites in metropolitan areas. Since commuting is concentrated in morning and evening
hours, roads may be congested during peak periods,
and idle during off-peak periods. Road users pay the
average costs of travel when they commute during
peak periods. They take into account the out-ofpocket and time costs of work trips, and in this
sense commuters consider the average level of congestion in their trip-making behaviour. But commuters cannot be expected to account for the
incremental congestion costs their travel imposes
on other commuters. This divergence between the
marginal costs of commuting and the average costs
of commuting may be large during peak periods on
arterial roadways.
The imposition of congestion tolls, increasing
the average costs paid by commuters to approximate the marginal costs they impose on others,
would clearly improve resource allocation. In the
absence of efficient road pricing, the rent gradients in metropolitan areas are flatter, and the patterns of residential location are more centralized
than they would otherwise be. Land markets are
distorted and the market price of land close to the
urban core is less than its social value.
The obstacles to improved efficiency are technological as well as political. Until recently,
mechanisms for charging road prices were
expensive and cumbersome. But modern technology (for example, transponders to record tolls
Urban Economics
electronically) makes road pricing easy on bridges, tunnels and other bottlenecks to the central
business district. Regular commuters affix a
device to their autos, a device which can automatically debit the traveller’s account. It would be a
simple matter to vary these charges by time of day
or intensity of road use and to make the schedule
of these changes easily available to commuters.
So far, at least in the United States, about the only
form of price discrimination on bridges, tunnels
and bottlenecks has been by vehicle occupancy,
not by time of day and intensity of road use. It is
surely possible to profit from the experience of
other countries (such as Singapore) in pricing
scarce roadways.
Political resistance is a major factor inhibiting
the diffusion of road pricing. Typically, tolls are
imposed in new facilities and the proceeds are
pledged to retire debt incurred in construction.
Paradoxically, tolls are thus imposed on new
uncongested roads. Later on, when the roads
become congested, the initial debt has been
retired, and there is political support for removing
the toll. (After all, ‘the investment in the bridge
has been repaid.’) This is surely an instance where
economics can better inform public policy.
Applications: Social, Spatial and
Neighbourhood
Urban areas have always been characterized by
social externalities as well. The close contact of
diverse racial and ethnic groups in cities gives rise
to much of the variety in products and services
which enrich consumption. But the city is also
characterized by the concentration of poverty and
by the high levels of segregation by race and class.
The spatial concentration of households by
income is, of course, predicted by the models of
residential housing choice described above.
A central question is the extent to which poverty
concentrations give rise to externalities which disadvantage low-income households relative to
their deprived circumstances in the absence of
concentration. A great deal of qualitative research
by other social scientists suggests that this is the
case. Quite recent econometric research, however,
suggests that this proposition is quite hard to
demonstrate quantitatively by reliance on non-
14127
experimental data (see Manski 1995.) Nevertheless, the view that concentrations of disadvantaged households lead to more serious social
consequences simply because of concentration is
widely shared. For example, in low-wage labour
markets most jobs are found through informal
local contacts. If unemployed workers are spatially concentrated, it follows that informal contacts will produce fewer leads to employment.
Economic models of residential location also
suggest that households will be segregated by
race – to the extent that race and income are
correlated. Yet research clearly indicates that the
segregation of black households in urban areas is
far greater than can be explained by differences in
incomes and demographic characteristics.
Until quite recently, these patterns of segregation could be explained by explicitly discriminatory policies in the housing market. During
the period of black migration to northern cities,
rents were substantially higher in black
neighbourhoods than in white neighbourhoods.
As levels of migration tapered off in the 1970s,
price differentials declined. The patterns of residence by race may be explicable by the tipping
point models of Thomas Schelling (1971). In
these models, there is a distribution of tolerance
among the population, reflecting the maximum
fraction of neighbours of a different race tolerated
by any household. In this formulation, the race of
each household provides an externality to all
neighbouring households. It is easy to show that
the racial integration of neighbourhoods may be
impossible to achieve under many circumstances.
Despite this, there is widespread evidence of
conscious discrimination in the markets for rental
and owner-occupied housing (Ross and Yinger
2002), four decades after passage of the first Fair
Housing legislation.
Racial segregation in housing markets may
have particularly important welfare implications
as jobs continue to suburbanize at a rapid rate.
Racial barriers to opening up the suburbs for
residence may lead to higher unemployment
rates among minority workers (see Glaeser et al.
2004.)
The barriers to the integration of the suburbs by
race and income are also related to the fiscal
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externalities which are conferred by one category
of residents upon another category. Most local tax
structures emphasize ad valorem property taxes,
and in most urban areas towns are free to vary
property tax rates to finance locally chosen levels
of public expenditure. If local tax revenues are
proportional to house value, and if local public
expenditures are proportional to the number of
households served, local governments have
strong incentives to increase the property value
per household in their jurisdictions. To achieve
this outcome, local governments may simply use
zoning regulations to prohibit construction of
housing appropriate to the budgets of lowerincome households. The prohibition of highdensity housing and multi-family construction,
the imposition of minimum lot-size restrictions
and the imposition of development fees can all
be used as devices to increase property tax revenue per household. Importantly, these rules also
increase the price of low-income housing. Many
of these regulations can also be cloaked in terms
of ecological balance and environmental protection. The inability of higher levels of government
to achieve balance and equity in new residential
development in US urban areas is quite costly.
Summary
The field of urban economics emphasizes the spatial arrangements of households, firms, and capital
in metropolitan areas, the externalities which arise
from the proximity of households and land uses,
and the policy issues which arise from the interplay of these economic forces.
See Also
▶ Hearn, William Edward (1826–1888)
▶ Urban Production Externalities
▶ Urban Transportation Economics
Bibliography
Brueckner, J. 1987. The structure of urban equilibria:
A unified treatment of the Muth–Mills Model.
Urban Environment and Quality of Life
In Handbook of regional and urban economics,
vol. 2, ed. E. Mills. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Capozza, D., and R. Helsley. 1990. The stochastic city.
Journal of Urban Economics 28: 187–203.
Dixit, A., and J. Stiglitz. 1977. Monopolistic competition
and optimum product diversity. American Economic
Review 67: 297–308.
Fujita, M., and J.-F. Thisse. 2001. Economics of agglomeration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Glaeser, E., E. Hanushek, and J. Quigley. 2004. Opportunities, race, and urban location: The legacy of John
Kain. Journal of Urban Economics 56: 70–79.
Hall, P. (ed.). 1966. Von Thünen’s isolated state. Trans.
C. Wartenberg. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Helsley, R., and W. Strange. 1990. Matching and agglomeration economies in a system of cities. Regional Science and Urban Economics 20: 189–212.
Jacobs, Jane. 1969. The economy of cities. New York:
Random House.
Jaffe, A., M. Trajtenberg, and R. Henderson. 1993. Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as
evidenced by patent citations. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 108: 577–598.
Manski, C. 1995. Identification problems in the social
sciences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mills, E. 1972. Studies in the structure of urban economy.
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
Quigley, J. 1998. Urban diversity and economic growth.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(2): 127–138.
Quigley, J. 2001. The renaissance in regional research.
Annals of Regional Science 35: 167–178.
Rauch, J. 1993. Productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital. Journal of Urban Economics 34: 380–400.
Ross, S., and J. Yinger. 2002. The color of credit.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schelling, T. 1971. Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1: 143–186.
Small, K., and J. Gomez-Ibanez. 1999. Urban transportation. In Handbook of regional and urban economics,
vol. 3, ed. Paul C. Cheshire and Edwin S. Mills.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Urban Environment and Quality
of Life
Matthew E. Kahn
Abstract
Urban quality of life is a key determinant of
where the educated choose to live and work.
Recognizing the importance of attracting the
Urban Environment and Quality of Life
high-skilled, many cities are investing to transform themselves into ‘consumer cities’. This
essay examines the supply and demand for
non-market urban quality of life. It provides
an overview of hedonic methods often used to
estimate how much households pay for
non-market urban attributes such as temperate
climate and clean air.
Keywords
Compensating differentials; Congestion;
Crime; Hedonic functions; Internal migration;
Pollution; Population density; Quality of life;
Urban environment and quality of life; Urban
growth; Urbanization
JEL Classifications
R13
Soon a majority of the world’s population will live
in cities. In 1950, 30 per cent of the world’s
population lived in cities. By 2000, this fraction
had grown to 47 per cent. It is predicted to rise to
60 per cent by 2030 (United Nations Population
Division 2004). While the popular media focus on
the growth of ‘mega-cities’, much urbanization
occurs through the development of new cities
and the growth of smaller metro areas
(Henderson and Wang 2004).
People have migrated to cities in pursuit of
better economic opportunities than are available
in the countryside (Harris and Todaro 1970). In
the past, urbanization has been viewed as
representing a trade-off. Urban workers earned
higher wages than rural residents but suffered
from a lower quality of life. In the 1880s, the
average urbanite in the United States had a life
expectancy ten years lower than that of the average rural resident (Haines 2001). Frederick Engels
bemoaned the density and the squalor in Britain’s
manufacturing cities in the mid-19th century.
Urban historians have provided indelible descriptions of US cities in the past. In the 19th century,
dead horses littered the streets of New York
City, and thousands of tenement-dwellers were
exposed to stinking water, smoky skies, and
ear-shattering din (Melosi 1982, 2001). During
14129
the 19th and early 20th centuries, the skies
above such major cities as Chicago and Pittsburgh
were dark with smoke from steel smelters, heavy
industrial plants, and burning coal.
Since the early 20th century, many major cities
in the developed world have experienced sharp
improvements in quality of life. By 1940, the
urban mortality premium had vanished (Haines
2001). Starting in the early 1970s, air pollution,
water pollution and noise pollution have sharply
fallen in many major US cities. While there are
several causes of this progress, ranging from
effective regulation to industrial transition from
manufacturing to services and technological
advance, the net result of this trend is that past
‘production cities’ are transforming themselves
into ‘consumer cities’.
Cities that have high quality of life will have
greater success at attracting the footloose highly
educated to live there. Empirical studies have
documented that a location’s stock of educated
people plays an important role in generating
urban growth (Glaeser et al. 1995).
First, I sketch how a city ‘produces’ quality of
life. I then discuss the demand for urban quality
of life using a household production function
framework. While urban quality of life is a valued
‘commodity’, there are no explicit markets where
it can be purchased. Utility maximizing households face a trade-off in choosing where to locate.
In cities with higher quality of life, home prices
are higher. Measuring this price premium for quality continues to be a major focus of much environmental and urban empirical research.
The Supply of Urban Quality of Life
Each city can be thought of as a differentiated
product. Its attributes include some exogenous
factors such as climate and risk of natural disasters, and endogenous factors such as average commuting times, pollution and crime. Some of these
endogenous attributes are by-products of economic activity. A city of 10,000 bike-riding lawyers would have much cleaner air than another
city with 500,000 old-car-driving steel workers.
None of the steel workers driving old cars intends
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to pollute local air. Pollution represents an
unintended consequence of their daily commuting
mode and of local industrial production. This
example highlights the importance of scale, composition and technique effects in determining
local environmental quality. In the above example, scale refers to whether the city has 10,000
people or 500,000 people. Composition effects
focus on consumption patterns (such as bike versus car) and industrial patterns (such as law firms
versus steel plants). If one controls for a city’s
scale and composition, urban environmental quality can be high due to technique effects brought
about by government regulation or the free market
designing new capital with low emissions (for
example, hybrid cars such as the Toyota Prius).
Early research in urban economics emphasized
scale effects such that the biggest cities suffered
more quality-of-life degradation as they expanded
(Tolley 1974). Anyone can migrate to a big city
without paying an ‘entry fee’. When an extra
person moves to a big city from a smaller city,
this migration causes net social damage (due to
extra congestion and pollution). Migrants will
ignore the fact that their choice degrades local
public goods in the destination city, but a benevolent planner would not. In the absence of a big
city entry fee, the big city grows beyond its
efficient size.
Cross-city empirical research has documented
that such urban challenges as crime, pollution and
congestion are all greater in big cities than in
smaller cities (Glaeser 1998; Henderson 2002).
But this ‘cost’ of city bigness is declining over
time. In the 1990s, crime fell fastest in the largest
US cities (Levitt 2004). Ambient air pollution is
improving in many major cities despite a continued
increase in population (Glaeser and Kahn 2004).
The suburbanization of employment in all major
US metropolitan areas has meant that that population ‘sprawl’ has not increased commute times.
City size is not a sufficient statistic for determining a city’s quality of life. Other relevant factors are the city’s geography, industrial and
demographic composition, and government policy. A city’s geography determines its climate and
its capacity for handling local pollution. Put simply, some cities have it and some cities don’t. As
Urban Environment and Quality of Life
Billy Graham once said, ‘The San Francisco Bay
Area is so beautiful, I hesitate to preach about
heaven while I’m here.’
Cities differ in their ability to absorb growth
without suffering urban quality-of-life degradation. World Bank researchers have recently
documented the importance of climate and topological features of the city in determining how
much air pollution is caused by economic growth
(see Dasgupta et al. 2004). Windier cities and
cities that receive more rainfall suffer less ambient
pollution from a given amount of emissions.
The composition of city economic activity also
plays a key role in determining the supply of
quality of life. All else equal, a city that specializes in manufacturing relative to services will
have a lower quality of life. Such a city will
have greater levels of ambient particulate and
sulphur dioxide pollution. Water pollution will
be greater, and more hazardous waste sites will
be created. The rise and decline of manufacturing
in the US rust belt over the 20th century provides
dramatic evidence documenting these effects
(Kahn 1999). A similar ‘natural-experiment’ has
played out as communism died. In major cities in
the Czech Republic, Hungry and Poland air pollution improved in the 1990s because the phase
out of energy subsidies contributed to the shutdown of communist era industrial plants (Kahn
2003). As major cities such as New York and
London and Chicago have experienced an industrial transition from manufacturing to finance and
services, more people work in the service and
tourist industries, and these workers have a financial stake in keeping the city’s quality of life high.
A city’s demographics also play a role in determining its quality of life. A city filled with senior
citizens will offer a different set of restaurants and
cultural opportunities from a city filled with immigrants and young parents. If a city can attract the
highly educated, then a virtuous circle can be set
off. Since more highly educated people earn more
income, this will attract better restaurants and
other commercial amenities.
Government policy plays a role in determining
a city’s quality of life. Boston’s Big Dig project
has cost over US$14 billion and is intended to
beautify Boston by submerging its ugly highways
Urban Environment and Quality of Life
14131
connecting the city centre to the waterfront and
increasing the supply of green parks. Successful
Clean Air Act regulation has sharply reduced
vehicle emissions in Los Angeles. Rudy Giuliani,
Mayor of New York City, achieved wide acclaim
for improved policing that some have argued contributed to the sharp decline in the city’s crime rate
in the 1990s.
The supply of urban quality of life varies
across cities and within cities. Some variation
such as proximity to a major park or body of
water is exogenously determined, but public policy can also have differential effects on quality of
life across a city’s neighbourhoods. The Clean Air
Act has reduced Los Angeles’ smog by much
more in inland Hispanic communities than along
the Pacific Ocean (Kahn 2001). Economists are
just starting to investigate the general equilibrium
impacts of regulations that differentially improve
urban quality of life in some parts of a city relative
to other parts of the same city (Sieg et al. 2004). If
the improvements in quality of life were unexpected, then homeowners in such areas will
receive a windfall. Long-standing renters in communities that have experienced regulationinduced improvements in local public goods will
pay higher rents and may no longer be able to
afford to live in their old community.
non-market attributes and economic opportunities. Some cities such as San Francisco are beautiful but home prices are very high. Other cities
such as Houston offer warm winter weather and
cheap housing but its residents face severe summer humidity. Market products can offset such
city’s disamenities. Before the advent and diffusion of cheap air conditioning, humid cities would
feature much lower home prices to compensate
households for summer humidity. The diffusion of
the air conditioner has allowed households to
enjoy the benefits of living in warmer cities such
as Houston during winter without suffering from
humidity in summer (Rappaport 2003). This market product has increased the demand for living in
humid cities.
Households may reveal different willingness to
trade off non-market goods depending on the
household’s age, income and demographic circumstances. A household with children may
place greater weight on communities with good
schools. Households may differ in their demand
for urban attributes. Asthmatics will avoid highly
polluted cities and skiers will not mind the cold
New England winters. Household demand may
also hinge on idiosyncratic factors; for example,
an individual who grew up in a specific city may
want to remain living near his childhood friends.
Demand for Urban Quality of Life
The Hedonic Equilibrium Approach
for Valuing Urban Quality of Life
The household production function approach
offers a framework for modelling the demand for
non-market local public goods such as climate,
street safety and local environmental quality.
A person gains utility from being healthy, safe
and comfortable. To achieve these goals, one purchases market goods such as doctor visits, home
alarm systems and home entertainment systems.
In addition, this person might choose a city and a
residential community within this city featuring a
temperate climate, low smog levels and safe
streets.
Each household must choose a city and a community within that city to live in.
Households that value quality of life face a
trade-off in that each city represents a bundle of
The theory of compensating differentials says that
it will be more costly to live in ‘nicer’ cities
(Rosen 2002). This theory is really a ‘no arbitrage’
result. If migration costs are low across urban
areas and if potential buyers are fully informed
about the differences in non-market urban attributes bundles, then real estate prices will adjust
such that homes in cities with higher quality of life
will sell for a premium.
An enormous empirical literature has estimated cross-city and within-city hedonic price
functions to estimate the implicit compensating
differentials for non-market goods. In these studies, the dependent variable is the price of home i in
city j in community m in year t. Define Xit as home
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Urban Environment and Quality of Life
i’s physical attributes in year t. Ajt represents city
j’s attributes in year t and Amjt represents the
attributes of community m located in city j in the
year t. Given this notation, a standard real estate
hedonic regression will take the form:
Priceijmt ¼ b0 þ b1 Xit þ b2 Ajt þ b3 Amjt
þ eijmt
(1)
Multivariate regression estimates of this
regression yield estimates of the compensating
differentials for city level local public goods
(based on b2) and community-level local public
goods (based on b3). These coefficients represent
the marginal implicit prices for small increases in
the consumption of local public goods. Studies
that control for a vector of local public goods are
able to pinpoint the relative importance of different features of cities and communities ranging
from climate to air pollution to urban crime.
Equation (1) highlights the fact that households
face a rich set of choices both across cities and
across communities within the same city.
Environmental studies have used this hedonic
framework to estimate compensating differentials
for a myriad of different environmental local characteristics. For example, Costa and Kahn (2003)
examine the compensating differential for living
in nice climate in 1970 and in the year 1990. In
1970, a person would have to pay $1,288 (1990
dollars) in higher home prices per year to purchase
San Francisco’s climate over Chicago’s climate.
In 1990, this yearly price differential increased by
$6,259 (1990 dollars) to $7,547. Chay and Greenstone (2005) use 1980 and 1990 data for all US
counties find that a ten per cent reduction in ambient total suspended particulates increased home
prices by three per cent. While much of the urban
quality of life literature has focused on US city
data, a promising research trend is examining
international evidence.
Conclusion
Urban economic development policymakers have
pursued very different growth strategies. Some
cities subsidize sports stadiums while others
build airports or downtown cultural centres.
Such targeted investment is unlikely to yield the
key urban anchor. This essay has argued that cities
than can provide and enhance urban quality of life
will attract the high-skilled. An end result of
attracting this group is a more vibrant, diversified
local economy. As per-capita incomes continue to
rise, the demand for living and working in high
quality-of-life cities will increase. The empirical
literature continues to inquire into what the key
components of quality of life are.
See Also
▶ City and Economic Development
▶ Environmental Kuznets Curve
▶ Urban Agglomeration
▶ Urban Growth
▶ Urbanization
Bibliography
Chay, K., and M. Greenstone. 2005. Does air quality matter? Evidence from the housing market. Journal of
Political Economy 113: 376–424.
Costa, D., and M. Kahn. 2003. The rising price of nonmarket goods. American Economic Review 93:
227–232.
Dasgupta, S., Hamilton, K., Pandey, K. and Wheeler,
D. 2004. Air pollution during growth: Accounting for
governance and vulnerability. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3383. Washington, DC:
World Bank.
Glaeser, E. 1998. Are cities dying? Journal of Economic
Perspectives 12(2): 139–160.
Glaeser, E., and M. Kahn. 2004. Sprawl and urban growth.
In Handbook of urban economics, ed. V. Henderson
and J. Thisse, Vol. 4. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Glaeser, E., J. Scheinkman, and A. Shleifer. 1995. Economic growth in a cross-section of cities. Journal of
Monetary Economics 36: 117–143.
Haines, M. 2001. The urban mortality transition in the
United States 1800–1940. Historical Paper 134. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Harris, J., and M. Todaro. 1970. Migration, unemployment
& development: A two-sector analysis. American Economic Review 60: 126–142.
Henderson, V. 2002. Urban primacy, external costs, and
quality of life. Resource and Energy Economics
24(1/2): 95–106.
Henderson, V. and Hyoung Gun Wang 2004. Urbanization
and city growth. Online. Available at http://www.econ.
Urban Growth
brown.edu/faculty/henderson/papers.html. Accessed
29 June 2005.
Kahn, M. 1999. The silver lining of rust belt manufacturing
decline. Journal of Urban Economics 46: 360–376.
Kahn, M. 2001. The beneficiaries of Clean Air Act legislation. Regulation 24: 34–39.
Kahn, M. 2003. New evidence on Eastern Europe’s pollution progress. Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy
3(1), article 4. Online. Available at http://www.bepress.
com/bejeap/topics/vol3/iss1/art4. Accessed 28 June
2005.
Levitt, S. 2004. Understanding why crime fell in the 1990s:
Four factors that explain the decline and six that do not.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(1): 167–190.
Melosi, M. 1982. Garbage in the cities: Refuse, reform and
the environment: 1880–1980. College Station: Texas
A&M Press.
Melosi, M. 2001. Effluent america: Cities, industry, energy
and the environment. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Rappaport, J. 2003. Moving to nice weather. Research
Working Paper 03–07. Kansas: Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City.
Rosen, S. 2002. Markets and diversity. American Economic Review 92: 1–15.
Sieg, H., V. Smith, H. Banzhaf, and R. Walsh. 2004.
Estimating the general equilibrium benefits of large
changes in spatially delineated public goods. International Economic Review 45: 1047–1077.
Tolley, G. 1974. The welfare economics of city bigness.
Journal of Urban Economics 1: 324–345.
United Nations Population Division. 2004. World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database. Online. Available at Accessed 28 June 2005.
Urban Growth
Yannis M. Ioannides and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
Abstract
‘Urban growth’ refers to the process of growth
and decline of economic agglomerations. The
pattern of concentration of economic activity
and its evolution have been found to be an
important determinant, and in some cases the
result, of urbanization, the structure of cities,
the organization of economic activity, and
national economic growth. The size distribution of cities is the result of the patterns of
urbanization, which result in city growth and
14133
city creation. The evolution of the size distribution of cities is in turn closely linked to
national economic growth.
Keywords
Agricultural development; Cities; Congestion;
Demography; Economic growth; Neoclassical
model; Industrial revolution; Internal migration; Knowledge spillovers; New economic
geography; Population density; Production
externalities; Quality ladder model of economic growth; Returns to scale; Rural growth;
Spatial distribution; Symmetry breaking; Systems of cities; Urban agglomeration; Urban
economic growth; Vs national economic
growth; Urban economics; Urban growth;
Urbanization; Zipf”s Law
JEL Classifications
R11
Urban growth - the growth and decline of urban
areas - as an economic phenomenon is inextricably linked with the process of urbanization.
Urbanization itself has punctuated economic
development. The spatial distribution of economic activity, measured in terms of population,
output and income, is concentrated. The patterns
of such concentrations and their relationship to
measured economic and demographic variables
constitute some of the most intriguing phenomena
in urban economics. They have important
implications for the economic role and size distribution of cities, the efficiency of production in
an economy, and overall economic growth. As
Paul Bairoch’s magisterial work (1988) has
established, increasingly concentrated population
densities have been closely linked since the dawn
of history with the development of agriculture and
transportation. Yet, as economies move from
those of traditional societies to their modern
stage, the role of the urban sector changes from
merely providing services to leading in innovation
and serving as engines of growth.
Measurement of urban growth rests on the
definition of ‘urban area’, which is not standard
throughout the world and differs even within the
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same country depending upon the nature of local
jurisdictions and how they might have changed
over time (this is true even for the United States).
Legal boundaries might not indicate the areas
covered by urban service-providers. Economic
variables commonly used include population,
area, employment, density or output measures,
and occasionally several of them at once, not all
of which are consistently available for all countries. Commuting patterns and density measures
may be used to define metropolitan statistical
areas in the USA as economic entities, but major
urban agglomerations may involve a multitude of
definitions.
The study of urban growth has proceeded in a
number of different directions. One direction has
emphasized historical aspects of urbanization.
Massive population movements from rural to
urban areas have fuelled urban growth throughout
the world. Yet it is fair to say that economics has
yet to achieve a thorough understanding of the
intricate relationships between demographic transition, agricultural development and the forces
underlying the Industrial Revolution. Innovations
were clearly facilitated by urban concentrations
and associated technological improvements.
A related direction focuses on the physical structure of cities and how it may change as cities grow.
It also focuses on how changes in commuting
costs, as well as the industrial composition of
national output and other technological changes,
have affected the growth of cities. Another direction has focused on understanding the evolution
of systems of cities - that is, how cities of different
sizes interact, accommodate and share different
functions as the economy develops and what the
properties of the size distribution of urban areas
are for economies at different stages of development. Do the properties of the system of cities and
of city size distribution persist while national population is growing? Finally, there is a literature
that studies the link between urban growth and
economic growth. What restrictions does urban
growth impose on economic growth? What economic functions are allocated to cities of different
sizes in a growing economy? Of course, all of
these lines of inquiry are closely related and
Urban Growth
none of them may be fully understood, theoretically and empirically, on its own. In what follows
we address each in turn.
Urbanization and the Size Distribution
of Cities
The concentration of population and economic
activity in urban areas may increase either
because agents migrate from rural to urban areas
(urbanization) or because economies grow in term
of both population and output, which results in
urban as well as rural growth. Urban centres may
not be sustained unless agricultural productivity
has increased sufficiently to allow people to move
away from the land and devote themselves to
non-food producing activities. Such ‘symmetry
breaking’ in the uniform distribution of economic
activity is an important factor in understanding
urban development (Papageorgiou and Smith
1983). Research on the process of urbanization
spans the early modern era (the case of Europe
having been most thoroughly studied; De Vries
1984) to recent studies that have applied modern
tools to study urbanization in East Asia (Fujita
et al. 2004). The ‘New Economic Geography’
literature has emphasized how an economy can
become ‘differentiated’ into an industrialized core
(urban sector) and an agricultural ‘periphery’
(Krugman 1991). That is, urban concentration is
beneficial because the population benefits from
the greater variety of goods produced (forward
linkages) and may be sustained because a larger
population in turn generates greater demand for
those goods (backward linkages). This process
exploits the increasing returns to scale that characterize goods production but does not always
lead to concentration of economic activity. The
range of different possibilities is explored extensively in Fujita et al. (1999). These ideas have
generated new lines of research; see several
related papers in Henderson and Thisse (2004).
The process of urban growth is closely related
to the size distribution of cities. As the urban
population grows, will it be accommodated in a
large number of small cities, or in a small number
Urban Growth
of large cities, or in a variety of city sizes? While
cities have performed different functions in the
course of economic development, a puzzling fact
persists for a wide cross-section of countries and
different time periods. The size distribution of
cities is Pareto-distributed, is ‘scale-free’. Gabaix
(1999) established this relationship formally. He
showed that, if city growth is scale independent
(the mean and variance of city growth rates do not
depend on city size: Gibrat’ s Law) and the growth
process has a reflective barrier at some level arbitrarily close to zero, the invariant distribution of
city sizes is a Pareto distribution with coefficient
arbitrarily close to 1: Zipf’s Law. (Empirical evidence on the urban growth process as well as
Zipf’s Law is surveyed by Gabaix and Ioannides
2004.)
These results imply that the size distribution of
cities and the process of urban growth are closely
related. Eeckhout (2004) extends the empirical
investigation by examining in depth all urban
places in the United States and finds that the
inclusion of the lower end of the sample leads to
a log-normal size distribution. Duranton (2004)
refines the theory by means of a quality-ladder
model of economic growth that allows him to
model the growth and decline of cities as cities
win or lose industries following technological
innovations. Ultimately, the movements of cities
up and down the hierarchy balance out so as to
produce a stable, skewed size distribution. This
theory is sufficiently rich to accommodate subtle
differences across countries (in particular the
United States and France) that constitute systematic differences from Zipf’s Law. Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright (2004) use a neoclassical growth
model that is also consistent with observed systematic deviations from Zipf’s Law: in particular,
the actual size distribution of cities shows fewer
smaller and larger cities than the Pareto distribution, and the coefficient of the Pareto distribution
has been found to be different from 1 although
centred on it. They identify the standard deviation
of the industry productivity shocks as the key
factor behind these deviations from Zipf’s Law.
The evident similarity of the conclusions of those
two papers clearly suggests that the literature is
14135
closer than ever before to resolving the Zipf’s
Law ‘puzzle.’
Urban Growth and City Structure
Understanding urbanization and economic
growth requires understanding the variety of factors that can affect city size and therefore its shortterm dynamics. All of them lead to the basic
forces that generate the real and pecuniary externalities that are exploited by urban agglomeration,
on one hand, and congestion, which follows from
agglomeration, on the other. Three basic types of
agglomeration forces have been used, in different
varieties, to explain the existence of urban
agglomerations (all of them were initially proposed in Marshall 1920): (a) knowledge spillovers, that is, the more biomedical research there
is in an urban area, the more productive a new
research laboratory will be; (b) thick markets for
specialized inputs: the more firms that hire specialized programmers, the larger the pool from
which an additional firm can hire when the others
may be laying off workers; and (c) backward and
forward linkages. Local amenities and public
goods can themselves be relevant agglomeration
forces.
The size of urban agglomerations is the result
of a trade-off between the relevant agglomeration
and congestion forces. Urban growth can therefore be the result of any city- specific or economywide change that augments the strength or scope
of agglomeration forces or reduces the importance
of congestion forces. One example that has been
widely used in the literature is reductions in commuting costs that lead to larger cities in terms of
area, population, and in most models also output
(Chatterjee and Carlino 1999). Another example
is the adoption of information and communication
technologies that may increase the geographical
scope of production externalities, therefore
increasing the size of cities.
Changes of underlying economic factors cause
cities to grow or decline as they adjust to their new
equilibrium sizes. Another more subtle factor is
changes in the patterns of specialization that are
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associated with equilibrium city sizes. That is, the
coexistence of dirty industry with high-tech industry generates too much congestion, and therefore
cities specialize in one or the other industry.
Adjustments in city sizes and patterns of specialization in turn may be slow, since urban infrastructure, as well as business structures and housing are
durable, and new construction takes time (Glaeser
and Gyourko 2005). However, this type of change
lead only to transitional urban growth, as city
growth or decline eventually dies out in the absence
of other city-specific or economy-wide shocks.
Even when any of the economy-wide variables,
such as population, grows continuously, the growth
rate of a specific city will dwindle because of new
city creation (Ioannides 1994; Rossi-Hansberg and
Wright 2004).
Much attention has also been devoted to the
effect that this type of urban growth has on urban
structure. Lower commuting costs may eliminate
the link between housing location choices and
workplace location. This results in more concentration of business areas, increased productivity
because of, say, knowledge spillovers, and lower
housing costs in the periphery of the city. Urban
growth can therefore lead to suburbanization as
well as multiple business centres, as in Fujita
and Ogawa (1982) or Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg
(2002). Those phenomena become increasingly
important because of the decline in transport and
commuting costs brought about by the automobile
along with public infrastructure investments. In
other words, urban growth is associated with
sprawl (Anas et al. 1998).
Urban and National Economic Growth
Most economic activity occurs in cities. This fact
links national and urban growth. An economy can
grow only if cities, or the number of cities, grow.
In fact, Jacobs (1969) and Lucas (1988) underscore knowledge spillovers at the city level as a
main engine of growth. The growth literature has
also argued that, in order for an economy to
exhibit permanent growth, the aggregate technology has to exhibit asymptotically constant returns
to scale (Jones 1999). If not, the growth rate in an
Urban Growth
economy will either explode or converge to zero.
How is this consistent with the presence of scale
effects at the city level? Eaton and Eckstein
(1997), motivated by empirical evidence on the
French and Japanese urban systems, study the
possibility of parallel city growth, which is
assumed to depend critically on intercity knowledge flows together with the accumulation of
partly city-specific human capital across a given
number of cities. Rossi-Hansberg and Wright
(2004) propose a theory where scale effects and
congestion forces at the city level balance out in
equilibrium to determine the size of cities. Thus,
the economy exhibits constant returns to scale
through the number of cities increasing along
with the scale of the economy. Hence, economic
growth is the result of growth in the size and the
number of cities. If balanced growth is the result
of the interplay between urban scale effects and
congestion costs, these theories have important
implications for the size distribution of cities and
the urban growth process. These implications turn
out to be consistent with the empirical size distribution of cities, that is, Zipf’s Law, and with
observed systematic deviations from Zipf’s Law.
To summarize: urban growth affects the efficiency of production and economic growth, and
the way agents interact and live in cities. Understanding its implications and causes has captured
the interest of economists in the past and deserves
to continue doing so in the future.
See Also
▶ City and Economic Development
▶ Endogenous Growth Theory
▶ Location Theory
▶ New Economic Geography
▶ Power Laws
▶ Spatial Economics
▶ Symmetry Breaking
▶ Systems of Cities
▶ Urban Agglomeration
▶ Urban Economics
▶ Urban Environment and Quality of Life
▶ Urban Production Externalities
▶ Urbanization
Urban Housing
Bibliography
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structure. Journal of Economic Literature 36:
1426–1464.
Bairoch, P. 1988. Cities and economic development.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Chatterjee, S., and G. Carlino. 1999. Aggregate metropolitan employment growth and the deconcentration of
metropolitan employment. Working paper. Philadelphia: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
De Vries, J. 1984. European urbanization: 1500–1800.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Duranton, G. 2004. Urban evolutions: The still, the fast,
and the slow. Working paper. London: Department of
Geography and Environment, London School of
Economics.
Eaton, J., and Z. Eckstein. 1997. Cities and growth: Theory
and evidence from France and Japan. Regional Science
and Urban Economics 27: 443–474.
Eeckhout, J. 2004. Gibrat’s law for (all) cities. American
Economic Review 94: 1429–1451.
Fujita, M., and H. Ogawa. 1982. Multiple equilibria and
structural transition of nonmonocentric urban configurations. Regional Science and Urban Economics 12:
161–196.
Fujita, M., P. Krugman, and A. Venables. 1999. The spatial
economy: Cities, regions, and international trade.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fujita, M., T. Mori, J. Henderson, and Y. Kanemoto. 2004.
Spatial distribution of economic activities in Japan and
China. In Handbook of regional and urban
economics, ed. J. Henderson and J.F. Thisse, Vol.
4. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Gabaix, X. 1999. Zipf’s law for cities: An explanation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 739–767.
Gabaix, X., and Y. Ioannides. 2004. The evolution of city
size distributions. In Handbook of regional and urban
economics, ed. J. Henderson and J.F. Thisse, Vol. 4.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Glaeser, E., and J. Gyourko. 2005. Urban decline and
durable housing. Journal of Political Economy 113:
345–375.
Henderson, J., and J.-F. Thisse, ed. 2004. Handbook of
regional and rban economics. Vol. 4. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Ioannides, Y. 1994. Product differentiation and economic
growth in a system of cities. Regional Science and
Urban Economics 24: 461–484.
Jacobs, J. 1969. The economy of cities. New York: Random
House.
Jones, C. 1999. Growth: With and without scale effects.
American Economic Review P&P 89(2): 139–144.
Krugman, P. 1991. Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy 99: 483–499.
Lucas, R. Jr. 1988. On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics 22(1): 3–42.
Lucas, R., and E. Rossi-Hansberg. 2002. On the internal
structure of cities. Econometrica 70: 1445–1476.
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Marshall, A. 1920. Principles of economics. 8th ed.
London: Macmillan.
Papageorgiou, Y., and T. Smith. 1983. Agglomeration as
local instability of spatially uniform steady-states.
Econometrica 51: 1109–1119.
Rossi-Hansberg, E., and M. Wright. 2004. Urban structure
and growth. Working paper. Stanford: Department of
Economics, Stanford University.
Urban Housing
D. Harvey
The specifics of history and geography indicate a
vast array of urban housing types and patterns
within equally divergent sets of urban circumstance. The problem is to bring all this particularity and variety into a frame of reference that will
help us understand the social, economic, cultural
and political significance of urban housing.
Housing means more than just shelter from the
elements. It defines a space of social reproduction
that necessarily reflects gender, familial, and other
types of social relations. It can also function as a
place of manufacture and commerce, of leisure,
education and religious observance, of ordered
social intercourse. Whether or how it performs
such functions depends on the nature of the social
order – its dominant mode of production, consumption and reproduction, its hegemonic class,
gender and ethnic relations, its cultural requirements and form of urbanization.
The separation of working and living in the
capitalist city, for example, arises out of a mode
of production founded on wage labour. In the
medieval city working and living were often
kept under the same roof. In many pre-capitalist
muslim cities, on the other hand, concern over
privacy and the seclusion of women pushed the
activities of artisans and traders out of the house
and into the streets and markets. Thus did gender
relations in one place forge a pattern of uses made
necessary by class relations in another.
The ability of the house to accommodate
diverse functions has also varied considerably.
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Apart from technological and organizational limitations on housing construction and design (interior
plumbing being perhaps the most important), competition for urban space and housing costs sometimes make it impossible to meet basic needs
within the house. Working class immigrants to
19th-century Paris, for example, found such limited accommodation that most were forced to eat
on the streets or in the cafés and cabarets. Recent
muslim immigrants into Ibadan likewise find it
hard to procure housing suited to the perpetuation
of kinship relations. In both cases, problems of
urban housing provision forced sometimes disruptive social adaptations. Eating out in the modern
American city has, however, a quite different social
signification (particularly for the upper classes),
reflecting in part the attractions of urban alternatives and the limitations of time (rather than space)
in a society where the role of women has undergone a significant transformation.
Considerations of law, social structure and culture therefore intersect with those of economy and
technology to dictate the status of housing provision and use. Courtyards and compounds – the
former being the oldest of all known urban housing types – suit a kinship system and can be easily
adapted, as they have in the muslim world, to
societies where polygamy and the seclusion of
women are important. Within compounds, housing units are built or allowed to collapse as households form or dissolve within the kinship frame.
Increasing density and the shift from collective to
private property ownership put pressures on such
flexible use of space, though the populations in
the muslim quarters of even the highest-density
African and Asiatic cities go to extraordinary
lengths to preserve such possibilities by elaborate
use of rooftops and interior adjustments of housing design. While kinship does not necessarily die
out with modern high-rise apartment block living,
it does become harder to sustain. This accounts for
the social preference in many third-world cities
for squatter settlements that subvert private property rights and permit the replication of more
traditional social structures within more flexible
spaces than those provided by public or commercial housing systems (often based on nuclear family concepts).
Urban Housing
Housing construction entails more than a simple technological capacity to defy the laws of
gravity and vault a roof over covered space.
Though building technologies have changed
over the ages housing styles have remained
remarkably persistent. Geographical variation is
much more emphatic because housing has to
respond to different environmental conditions
(climate, drainage, disease, etc.) using local construction materials and labour skills. The house
also embodies local cultural preferences for light,
ventilation and privacy, while responding to the
needs of security, mobility, economy, and social
structure. The range of primitive housing types
extends from the eskimo igloo through the Berber
tent to the cave dwelling, the wattle hut, the log
cabin, and the adobe house. Out of these primitive
house types a wide variety of vernacular
pre-industrial architectures were evolved (see
Rapoport 1969), many of which could be adapted
to urban circumstances.
But urbanization always imposes social, economic and political as well as physical constraints.
Modifications to rural vernacular led urban housing to evolve in quite distinctive ways. Furthermore, the pursuit of permanence and physical
symbols of authority led to a much greater emphasis upon monumental forms of building in urban
settings. These required new techniques and
styles, elements of which could be incorporated
into house building activity, in the first instance
for the ruling class but later on for less privileged
strata. Urbanization therefore entailed a complex
interaction between these monumental styles and
urban vernacular (Kostof 1985). Traditional vernacular forms do not necessarily disappear however. They can be reimported by rural migrants
(in the contemporary shanty towns), or
resurrected by architects as better physical or
commercial adaptations (as with the use of Japanese or Islamic open style housing in California).
Urban housing cannot be understood independently of the kind of urbanization in which it is
embedded. Urbanization depends upon the production, appropriation and geographical concentration of economic surpluses under the aegis of
some ruling class. Different modes of production
and appropriation associate with different class
Urban Housing
structures and produce different types of urbanization. The theocratic cities of the ancient world,
meso-America and pre-colonial Africa had much
in common with each other in spite of wide separations in time and space, than they did with
the bureaucratic cities of the Orient and Asia, the
classical urbanization of Greece and Rome, the
feudal cities of medieval Europe, the industrial
and so-called ‘post industrial’ cities of advanced
capitalism, and the contemporary cities of the
neo-colonial or socialist bloc worlds. The quantities, qualities, and functions of urban housing
reflect and help create such differences.
The organization of space and of dwelling
units in a theocratic city that depended on the
direct appropriation of agricultural surpluses
expressed the symbolic and hierarchical requirements of the theocratic order. Where people lived
and the nature and style of their building symbolized social position directly. As theocratic cities
evolved into bureaucratic centres of organized
political and military power, leavened by some
degree of market exchange and artisanal production, so the organization of space and housing
provision had to be opened up to more divergent
functions and influences. It was, however, still
subject to state regulation because location, style
and function continued to signify positions of
relative power and prestige within the social
order. Political and social conflict over housing
has often been, therefore, a signal of deeper
stresses in society. Transitions from one mode of
production and class domination to another have
always coincided with rapid shifts in the forms
and functions of urban housing. This general
theme can perhaps best be illustrated by the evolution of urban housing in the passage from Western feudalism to capitalism and beyond.
Urbanization under feudalism was supported
primarily out of the direct extraction of economic
surpluses from the land (tithes, money rents,
taxes) or their accumulation out of often tightly
controlled trade. Towns were religious, political
and military centres with ancillary market activities and artisanal production. Buildings, even
those alienable under laws of private property,
were not generally produced as commodities but
as use values. Even though regulated guild labour
14139
(the predominant form of organization of construction) was frequently pushed to adapt vernacular or imported building styles for purposes of
conspicuous display, the tight ordering of the
social structure made the unrestrained flouting of
individual wealth through building dangerous.
Even as late as the 17th century, Louis XIV of
France would brook no rivals in house building
and the aristocracy applied the same pressure to a
nascent bourgeoisie. Only in the Italian city states
did a more powerful and autonomous merchant
class permit a broader basis to conspicuous housing consumption (with effects visible to this day).
Merchants, shopkeepers, artisans and administrative officials built soberly under the jealous eye
of church and state, but did so on a sufficient scale
to house themselves, their families, servants,
apprentices and employees. Only wage labourers
(of which there were always fluctuating numbers)
and the urban poor were forced to find independent means of shelter. Shanty towns, though frequent, were ephemeral and frowned on by
authority, forcing the conversion of older structures into overcrowded lodging houses for rent.
This commodification of housing had important
consequences. Not only did it force the urban poor
to become wage labourers in order to pay their
rooming costs, but it also stimulated the production of housing as a speculative commodity wherever the wage labourers increased in numbers.
Sold to landlords anxious to turn a profit out of
the labourers’ paltry wages, the new housing was
cheaply built (often by casual rather than craft
labour), thus forming the instant slums of many
medieval towns. Ironically, the only other strata
served by such speculative building were the aristocrats and high state functionaries needing to rent
temporary accommodations close to the centres of
political power.
The commodification of housing within the
medieval frame had all kinds of social and physical consequences. Not only did it open up location and house building to the power of money
and markets, but it also hinted at radical changes
in social relations that came to fruition only with
the rise of industrial capitalism. Entrepreneurial
activity in building and the widespread use of
wage labour in construction was an important
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and often underestimated step in the transition
from feudalism to capitalism.
Speculative house building was of two types.
‘It is’, noted Marx, ‘the ground rent, and not
the house, which forms the actual object of building speculation in rapidly growing cities.’ The
traditional power of landowners remained
unchallenged while the builders remained undercapitalized and weak, usually beholden to the
superior financial power of the landed capitalists.
This style of speculation produced the large
estates of upper class housing in older urban centres as well as in the new spas and resorts. The
Georgian terraces in England provide excellent
examples (Chalkin 1974). This system would
later be adapted in England to the production of
densely packed back-to-back housing for workers
in industrial cities.
Speculative builders were of a different breed.
Viewing land as just one of many inputs to their
production process, they sought to produce housing for profit. Originating as craft workers who
organized other craft workers and casual labour
into an entrepreneurial production system, they
were initially short on capital and credit, remained
small-scale and locked into vernacular designs
using traditional construction methods. Though
entrepreneurial, they found it difficult to liberate
themselves from the overwhelming power of
landowners. And even when they could, the tyranny of lot size and land scarcity, coupled with
lack of effective demand, constrained what they
could build (awkward lot size played a key role,
for example, in shaping the extraordinary design
of New York’s tenement housing). Only when
finance capital (armed with new institutions and
powers) came to control both land development
and building jointly, did the industrialization of
urban housing production become possible.
The rise of industrial capitalism changed the
face of urbanization. The industrial city’s business
was the production of surpluses through the
exploitation of wage labour in production organized within the urban frame. The radical reorganization of labour processes under industrial
capitalism undermined craft distinctions and
reorganized an ever-growing working class into
a hierarchy of skills and authority positions to
Urban Housing
which there corresponded a hierarchy of wage
rates. The housing needs of this vast and growing
mass of heterogeneous wage labourers had to be
met by commodity production. But how? Industrial capitalism had to find an answer to that question or simply collapse under the weight of its own
inability to assure the reproduction of labour
power as its most valuable commodity.
The conversion of pre-existing structures to
lodging houses, tenements and rooming units,
and the opening up of damp cellars and attics
ill-protected from the elements formed one set of
solutions. To this were added the efforts of speculative builders creating blocks of housing here
(the back-to-backs of Britain, the cités ouvrières
of France, the terrace housing of the United
States) or jerry-built structures on odd land lots
there. Only occasionally did employers seek to
provide worker housing on their own account
(Bourneville and Port Sunlight in England; Lowell and Pullman in the United States). Short of
capital and low on income, most workers were
forced to rent, and although the quality of housing
varied, the net effect was to produce the dramatic
overcrowding and all the signs of physical and
social breakdown that made the industrial city
such an appalling place. The more privileged
strata of wage workers and the middle and upper
classes for their part increasingly used their
money power to escape contact with what they
saw as dens of disease, vice and misery (to say
nothing of the threats of the urban rabble). As
early as 1844, Engels showed how suburbanization (later aided and abetted by revolutions in
urban mass transportation) and residential differentiation reflected class-bound stratifications in
money power. The housing spaces of the capitalist
city came to be seen as ‘natural’ outcomes of
competition and the commodification of housing
provision and use in spatially segregated markets.
Bourgeois concerns over health, social unrest
(the ‘housing question’ played an important role
in sparking such events as the Paris Commune as
well as movements towards municipal socialism)
and the qualities of labour power, coincided with
strengthening working-class movements to produce substantial housing reform movement
throughout the capitalist world in the latter half
Urban Housing
of the 19th century. If commodity provision and
delivery (through landlordism) could not meet the
needs and aspirations of the mass of urban
workers, then other solutions to the housing question had to be found.
The first solution was to treat housing as an
inalienable use value. Social housing produced
through state action became a conspicuous feature
of urban housing in all advanced capitalist countries in the 20th century, with the exception of the
United States. The quantity, quality and location
of this housing depends upon state policies
(a question of political power and class interests),
fiscal restraints (the tax base and borrowing costs),
and the ability to organize production (land procurement, industrialization of building technologies, economies of scale, etc.). Organized state
planning of housing provision was problematic,
at least in part because it smacked heavily of some
transition from capitalism to socialism. The second solution, therefore, was to reorganize housing
provision around the principle of home ownership
(‘the last defence against bolshevism’, as the head
of the British Building Society movement put it in
the 1920s). This solution depended upon rising
worker incomes and job security coupled with
new financial instruments that organized flows
of savings and mortgage credit to the more
privileged segments of the working class. State
support was essential to the creation of such conditions, both in legalizing limited trade union
power and supporting homeownership mortgage
markets. Once the mass market had been clearly
established (particularly after World War II), speculative building could gear up to mass produce
privatized housing (the suburban building estates,
the Levittowns, etc.). Revolutions in building
technology together with the declining power of
landowners relative to finance capital and the
state, transformed housing provision. And finally,
with increasing interest in tools for government
intervention after the depression of the 1930s,
housing became a target of fiscal and monetary
policy. In the United States, for example, government policies accelerated suburbanization and
access to individualized homeownership after
1945 so as to contain business cycles and sustain
the post-war boom. The consequent deterioration
14141
of inner-city housing was an unfortunate side
effect that played an important role in massive
urban unrest. Housing continues to be a central
issue in many urban social movements as well as
in local and national politics.
Disparities in money power, modified by legal
conditions of tenure and state intervention, typically generate marked residential differentiation
in housing types and qualities. While the focus on
the nuclear family is very strong, housing is still
used to signal status, prestige and class power as
well as life-style preferences, cultural affinity,
gender relations and religious or ethnic identity.
The ‘housing question’ remains a serious social
and political issue in advanced capitalist cities and
periodically becomes the focus of intense political
struggles that sometimes touch at the very root of
the capitalist form of urbanization. That this is so
testifies to the cogency of Engels’ remark that the
‘manner in which the need for shelter is satisfied
furnishes a measure for the manner in which all
other necessities are supplied’.
See Also
▶ Housing Markets
▶ Property Taxation
Bibliography
Abrams, C. 1964. Man’s struggle for shelter in an urbanizing world. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ball, M. 1981. The development of capitalism in housing
provision. International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 5: 145–177.
Burnett, J. 1978. A social history of housing, 1815–1970.
Newton Abbott: David and Charles.
Chalkin, C. 1974. The provincial towns of Georgian
England: A study of the building process. London:
Edward Arnold.
Dwyer, D. 1975. People and housing in third world cities.
London: Longmans.
Engels, F. 1844. The condition of the working class in
England. London: Parker, 1974.
Harvey, D. 1985. The urbanization of capital. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Houdeville, L. 1969. Pour une civilisation de l’habitat.
Paris: Editions Ouvrières.
Kostof, S. 1985. A history of architecture: Settings and
rituals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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14142
Rapoport, A. 1969. House form and culture. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Schwerdtfeger, F.W. 1982. Traditional housing in African
cities. New York: Wiley.
Vance, J. 1966–7. Housing the worker. Economic Geography 42: 294–325; 43, 94–127.
Urban Housing Demand
Urban Housing Demand
(Rosenthal and Strange 2003). Today, urban
America is where housing demand is most likely
to exceed housing supply and generate rising
house prices, where the tax system provides the
greatest subsidy to owner-occupied housing, and
where the housing market is the most volatile. In
this article I discuss some of the causes and consequences of urban housing demand, and the
supporting evidence.
Todd Sinai
Location
Abstract
Urban housing demand is a reflection of households’ desire to live in cities. In this article,
I discuss possible reasons why US households
have exhibited an increasing taste for urban
living, including employment, urban amenities, and consumption opportunities. Next,
I explain how growing urban housing demand
led to rising house prices and a sorting of
households across cities by income. That
dynamic generated a divergence across housing markets in the value of the tax subsidy to
owner-occupied housing as well as housing
market risk. Those factors, in turn, had a feedback effect on urban housing demand.
Keywords
Housing markets; Housing supply; Housing
tax subsidies; Internet, economics of; Monocentric city models; Population growth; Preference externalities; Productivity growth;
Superstar cities; Urban housing demand;
Willingness-to-pay
JEL Classification
R21
At its core, the demand for urban housing is just
the manifestation of the demand for living in
urban areas. On net, residence patterns suggest
that most people want to live in or near cities,
and that desire is increasing over time. In fact,
by 1999, 75% of US households lived in cities
The classic explanation for the concentration of
households in cities is that people want to live
close to their jobs. That notion, developed in the
monocentric city model of Alonso (1964), Mills
(1972) and Muth (1969), leads to a prediction that
is rarely as evident in reality as it is in theory:
housing costs should rise as the distance to the
employment centre falls since households would
be willing to pay more in order to save time
getting to work. Instead, households often settle
for a longer commute in exchange for other positive qualities of a non-urban community, such as
the density of development, the calibre of the
school system, local taxes and amenities, and the
similarity of the other residents to themselves.
Since the 1960s, the patterns of where people
live have begun to shift back to cities, even though
people are now less likely to work in the downtown areas. According to Glaeser et al. (2001),
between 1960 and 1990 the rate of growth of
commutes where the household lives in the city
increased while the growth rate of commutes originating in the suburbs fell. Within cities, the highincome population has been moving closer to the
central downtown area. Glaeser et al. argue that
nowadays thriving cities are ‘consumer cities’,
ones that attract highly educated households
through appealing cultural amenities, such as
museums, restaurants and opera. In fact, between
1977 and 1995, a temperate and dry climate, a
coastal location, and more live performance
venues and restaurants per capita predicted future
population growth. By contrast, having more
bowling alleys was correlated with population
decline.
Urban Housing Demand
Indeed, the very congestion that urban economists typically point to as a reason that cities
become unattractive may lead to an availability
and quality of goods and services that are appealing. In a city, the large number of residents living
in close proximity makes it feasible for even niche
markets to be served since a critical mass of
potential customers exists. Joel Waldfogel
(2003), who in a series of papers termed this
phenomenon ‘preference externalities’, found
empirical support in the markets for broadcast
radio, newspapers, and restaurants. For example,
when there is a larger local consumer base for a
certain format of radio station, calibre of newspaper, or style of restaurant, the more of them exist
in a city. By revealed preference, that greater
variety increases city dwellers’ welfare, because
the more options there are for residents that share
a particular set of tastes the more they consume.
Even the advent of the Internet has not dampened the consumption appeal of living in cities.
Since the Internet makes information and goods
universally available to anyone, no matter where
they live, it substitutes for living in a city. However, Sinai and Waldfogel (2004) find that the
number and variety of websites focused on a city
increases with the city’s population. By enhancing
the welfare benefits of living in cities – perhaps by
mitigating the effects of congestion or facilitating
communication and connection among city
residents – these sites have an offsetting positive
effect on urban housing demand.
Urban Housing Demand and House
Prices
Two measures of the intensity of urban housing
demand are house prices and the rate of house
price growth. In some cities, housing is in inelastic
supply because there is little or no open land and
local regulations either restrict development or
make it prohibitively expensive or slow. In that
case, demand for a location leads to bidding up of
the price of land in order to equilibrate housing
demand with the available supply. Indeed, when
one compares house prices across cities and
town, areas that presumably have higher demand
14143
because they offer better amenities and fiscal conditions exhibit higher house prices (Roback
1982). Another indication of high demand for a
city is population growth, which occurs when
housing development is easy. I focus on high
house prices because they can change the character of a city, which then has a further effect on
urban housing demand.
Since the 1950s, a handful of metropolitan
areas experienced real house price growth that
significantly exceeded the national average,
leading to a widening gap across locations in
average house prices. For example, in 1950 the
average house price in San Francisco was 37%
higher than the average across all metropolitan
areas. By 2000 the gap had grown to 218%. In
order for land prices to continually grow in one
location relative to another, the demand for that
location must be growing as well. One possible
explanation is that productivity growth in a handful of cities has exceeded the national average,
and residents pay more to live in productive
cities because their wage rises with their productivity. Another potential rationalization is that
some cities are becoming more appealing over
time and residents are paying more for increasingly higher quality.
Another possibility is that the rapid growth in
the number and earnings of high- income households in the United States has led to an increased
willingness-to-pay for scarce locations. Since some
cities are in such limited supply, households have
to outbid each other to live there, leading to land
prices that grow with the aggregate spending
power of the clientele that prefers that particular
city. In ‘Superstar Cities’, Gyourko et al. (2006)
show that inelastically supplied, high-demand cities have income distributions that are shifted to the
right: low-income families can live there only if
they have a very strong preference for the city,
while high-income families can live there even if
they only modestly prefer it. As the national highincome population grows, the greater number of
high-income families outbid relatively low-income
families (as well as some high-income families)
who are unwilling or unable to pay a higher premium to live in their preferred location. Gyourko,
Mayer and Sinai find that such superstar locations
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experience supra-normal house price growth and a
shift of their income distributions to the right as
they experience inflows of high-income households and outflows of their lowest-income residents. This pattern has been intensified as cities
have begun to ‘fill up’ due to the growing national
population. For example, in 1960 only Los
Angeles and San Francisco were demonstrably
inelastically supplied. By 2000 more than 20 cities
were. Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai show that cities
that ‘fill up’ experience a right- shift in their income
distributions and higher price growth after their
transition into superstar city status.
These findings imply that there must be something unique and attractive about superstar cities,
otherwise potential residents would turn to cheaper
locations and superstar cities would not be able to
sustain excess price growth. A niche-market appeal
may be due to particular amenities, or the kind of
preference externalities described by Waldfogel.
As preference agglomerations form, the highest
willingness- to-pay households are those that
share the same preferences. If such sorting is
along income lines, rising house prices can lead
to high-income homogeneity, which itself makes
an area more desirable to high-income residents.
That dynamic implies that certain urban markets
will evolve into luxury areas and grow increasingly
unaffordable for the average household.
The inelasticity of housing supply also leads to
price changes, and a correlated change in the
demand for urban housing, in cities that are
experiencing declining demand. Glaeser and
Gyourko (2005) point out that, since housing
does not quickly depreciate once built, if the
demand for a city declines then house prices must
fall since quantity cannot easily adjust downwards.
That decline in prices can spur demand by
low-income households that cannot afford to live
anywhere else, leading to sorting into low-income
enclaves rather than high-income ones.
Urban Housing Demand
houses, which in turn affect the demand for urban
housing. One such benefit in the United States
that often is especially valuable in cities is the
favourable Federal income tax treatment for
owner-occupied housing, worth a total of $420
billion in 1999. The nature of these tax benefits
is well-documented in this edition of the New
Palgrave (housing policy in the United States).
Gyourko and Sinai (2004) note that two conditions are necessary in order to receive a high value
of this tax subsidy: a high-priced home, so that the
subsidy operates on a larger base, and a high tax
rate, which in the progressive US tax system follows from having a high income.
Because of this, the very same superstar city
dynamic discussed earlier leads to an unequal
distribution of the housing subsidy across the
country. Superstar cities experience both house
price growth and relatively high-income residents, and thus should also have the highest tax
subsidies, further increasing the demand for urban
housing in hot markets. Indeed, the tax subsidy is
highly concentrated in a handful of cities, with
just five metropolitan areas receiving more than
85% of the total tax benefits in 1990. Between
1980 and 2000, the rise in house prices in superstar cities more than offset declining marginal tax
rates, leading to a greater concentration of tax
benefits in a handful of metropolitan areas.
This tax subsidy has been shown to lead to
higher house prices, either because the subsidy
induces households to consume a larger quantity
of housing or simply because house prices capitalize the present value of the future tax savings.
Recent estimates of the after-tax price elasticity of
housing demand cluster around 0.5, and the
income elasticity around 0.25. Urban areas tend
to exhibit relatively high demand elasticities, as
demand is more readily capitalized into land
prices rather than the limited new supply. By
contrast, rural areas have much lower measured
elasticities of housing demand.
The Tax Subsidy to Owner-Occupied
Housing
Risk and the Demand for Urban Housing
Differences in house prices among cities also
affect the benefits homeowners obtain from their
Since urban housing markets tend to have inelastic supply, they are more volatile as shocks to
Urban Political Economy
14145
housing demand are transmitted more completely
into rents and prices. That higher risk may deter
households from living in urban areas since they
would face more uncertainty over housing costs,
whether they rented or owned. Also, house price
volatility generates an additional cost because it
distorts other investment decisions (Flavin and
Yamashita 2002). A mitigating factor, demonstrated in Sinai and Souleles (2005), is that long
length-of-stay households can reduce their effective risk by owning their houses, in essence
prepaying their housing costs. Other research suggests that uncertainty over house price growth
simply may lead households to purchase housing
in a city sooner than they otherwise would have in
order to prevent housing costs from outpacing
their income growth.
Mills, E. 1972. Studies in the structure of the urban economy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Muth, R. 1969. Cities and housing. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Roback, J. 1982. Wages, rents, and the quality of life.
Journal of Political Economy 90: 1257–1278.
Rosenthal, S.S., and W.C. Strange. 2003. Evidence on the
nature and sources of agglomeration economies. In
Handbook of urban and regional economics, ed. J.V. Henderson and J.-F. Thisse. Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
Sinai, T., and N. Souleles. 2005. Owner-occupied housing
as a hedge against rent risk. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120: 763–789.
Sinai, T., and J. Waldfogel. 2004. Geography and the
Internet: Is the internet a substitute or complement for
cities? Journal of Urban Economics 56: 1–24.
Waldfogel, J. 2003. Preference externalities: An
empirical study of who benefits whom in differentiated
product markets. RAND Journal of Economics 34:
557–568.
See Also
Urban Political Economy
▶ Housing Policy in the United States
▶ Housing Supply
▶ Residential Real Estate and Finance
▶ Residential Segregation
▶ Tiebout Hypothesis
▶ Urban Agglomeration
▶ Urban Economics
▶ Urban Environment and Quality of Life
▶ Urban Political Economy
▶ Urbanization
Robert W. Helsley
Bibliography
Alonso, W. 1964. Location and land use. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Flavin, M., and T. Yamashita. 2002. Owner-occupied housing and the composition of the household portfolio over
the life cycle. American Economic Review 92: 345–362.
Glaeser, E., and J. Gyourko. 2005. Urban decline and
durable housing. Journal of Political Economy 113:
345–375.
Glaeser, E., J. Kolko, and A. Sarz. 2001. Consumer city.
Journal of Economic Geography 1: 27–50.
Gyourko, J., and T. Sinai. 2004. The (un)changing geographical distribution of housing tax benefits: 1980 to
2000. In Tax policy and the economy, vol. 18, ed.
J. Poterba. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gyourko, J., C. Mayer, and T. Sinai. 2006. Superstar cities,
Working paper, vol. 12355. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Abstract
Models of local public finance generally
emphasize the roles of household mobility
and community heterogeneity in the provision
of local public services. In contrast, the emerging field of urban political economy examines
how economic and political institutions influence the formation of local public policies. Key
issues include the strength of the local executive, whether local politicians are elected ‘at
large’ or to serve the interests of particular
wards, the norms that govern behaviour and
decisionmaking within city councils, and institutional innovation, especially the growth of
so-called ‘private governments’.
Keywords
Common pool problem; Local public finance;
Minimum winning coalitions; Parliamentary
systems; Presidential systems; Principal and
agent; Private government; Tiebout hypothesis; Urban political economy
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JEL classification
R51
Economic models of local government applied to
the United States generally suppress the roles of
politics and political institutions. Indeed, the dominant model of local government, the Tiebout
(1956) model of the provision of local public
services to mobile residents, can be seen as an
explicit attempt to eliminate the need for politics
in cities. If individuals are highly mobile and
communities offer a diverse menu of local taxes
and expenditures, then there is no need for political expression – households can satisfy their
demands for local public services by choosing to
live in the community that provides their optimal
bundle. Households ‘vote with their feet’. When
local politics are explicitly considered, the political process is usually treated as an idealized form
of majority rule in which residents vote directly on
tax and spending programmes, and the political
outcome corresponds to the most preferred policy
of the median voter. This ‘institutionless’ view of
local public finance has in fact been quite successful in, for example, characterizing the demand for
local public goods (Rubinfeld 1987).
Local Political Institutions
However, most local policy choices are not made
directly by residents. According to the International City/Council Management Association
(ICMA), 43.7% of US municipalities with
populations over 2500 were governed by the combination of a mayor and a city council in 2000,
while 48.3% were governed by the combination
of a city council and a city manager. Thus, 90% of
US municipalities were governed at least in part
by a representative body. Council members may
be elected ‘at-large’, that is, from the entire city, or
by wards or districts within the city. Some cities
adopt a mixed system, in which the council contains both at-large and ward representatives.
Mayors (or their offices) are traditionally classified as being either ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. Strong
mayors have broad powers, including a veto over
Urban Political Economy
some city council decisions. Strong mayors also
prepare the city’s budget, and have hiring and
firing authority over the heads of city departments.
In weak mayoral systems, most executive and
legislative authority rests with the city council;
the mayor performs largely ceremonial and organizational functions. Strong mayors are generally
elected independently from members of the city
council, and are more common in mayor–council
systems. Baqir (2002), based on a sample of
roughly 2000 US municipalities in 1990, reports
that 98% of mayors in mayor–council systems
were independently elected, compared to 65% of
mayors in council–manager systems.
Strong mayors are generally associated with
fiscal discipline, and there is some support for this
view in other branches in the political economics
literature. For example, the literature on comparative politics suggests that presidential systems have
greater accountability to voters and less collusion
within and between the branches of government
than parliamentary systems (Persson et al. 1997,
1998, 2000). Persson et al. (2000) show that presidential systems have lower levels of government
spending as a share of national product. Inman and
Fitts (1990) show that between 1795 and 1988
‘strong’ presidents (those with ‘independent political strength’, identified from a survey of historians) were associated with lower levels of federal
spending in the United States. Baqir (2002) suggests that a strong mayor may have a similar disciplinary effect on local government spending.
Many studies of local political institutions in
North America examine the impacts of the reform
movement of the early twentieth century. The
reform movement brought a number of changes
in local government structure that were allegedly
designed to limit the exercise of private interest
and patronage in city politics and promote the
pursuit of public interests and professional management. Some of the specific institutional
changes that followed included the introduction
of at-large and non-partisan elections for city
council (a change that has since been partially
reversed), the council–manager form of local government, civil service exams as a basis for
appointment and promotion in the bureaucracy,
and, in some areas, the replacement of the
Urban Political Economy
mayor–council form with a group of city ‘commissioners’, each of whom had executive and
legislative responsibility for a different city
department.
Early studies of reform governments expressed
the hope that managerial expertise and autonomy
in personnel matters could lead to lower costs for
the delivery of local public services, and in
particular, lower labour costs for municipal
governments. However, subsequent empirical
studies provide little support for this view: public
expenditure levels and patterns in US cities
seem to have been largely unaffected by the adoption of city managers, at-large representation and
non-partisan elections.
The most compelling study of the reform movement in the recent economics literature is Rauch
(1995). Rauch’s hypothesis is that by creating a
population of career bureaucrats in city government, the reform movement put in place incentives
that encouraged investment in infrastructure and
other ‘long-gestation-period’ projects. Rauch
views the relationship between the city council
and the bureaucracy as a principal–agent problem.
Before reform, the agent, that is, the bureaucracy, is
assumed to act as a political appointee who shares
the council’s immediate focus on retaining office.
After reform, the bureaucracy is professionalized
and the agent is assumed to have some job security
and therefore a longer time horizon. The agent may
then use his ‘powers of information collection and
expenditure oversight’, in combination with costly
or imperfect monitoring by the principal to direct
resources towards longer-term projects that may
further the agent’s career. The implication is that
this type of reform should increase the share of
expenditures devoted to investment, as opposed
to current public consumption. Using a panel of
144 cities over 23 years, Rauch regresses the infrastructure share of municipal expenditure on
dummy variables for the use of civil service
exams, the presence of a city manager, and the
adoption of a commission form of local government. After accounting for the inertia generated by
the durability of infrastructure investment, use of
the civil service is found to have a positive impact
on the share of expenditure devoted to infrastructure. Interestingly, in the cases where they are
14147
statistically significant, the presence of a city manager and the adoption of a commission form of
government are both associated with lower levels
of infrastructure spending.
The Common Pool Problem in City
Councils
City councils are, in effect, local legislatures. One
way to model the operation of a city council is by
analogy with models of other legislative institutions. In that spirit, imagine a city council in which
each councillor represents a well-defined local
constituency. If councillors are elected by ward
or district, then the constituencies will be geographic, as in most national, state and provincial
legislatures. Councillors elected at-large may
have non-geographic constituencies that are
defined by a common ideology or policy initiative. Suppose that each councillor is motivated by
holding office and that this gives him or her an
incentive to pursue programmes and policies that
provide net benefits to his or her constituents. It is
generally assumed that the policies and programmes that are chosen by legislatures are ‘distributive’ in the sense that their costs are more
widely distributed than their benefits. For example, benefits may be restricted to a particular district or group, while the supporting tax payments
are made by residents of the entire city. Spending
and tax choices are made by a majority vote of
council members.
The literature on legislative decision-making
discusses a number of issues that relate to the
efficiency of the policy choices that will emerge
in this context. First, there is an incentive for
‘minimum winning coalitions’ within the legislature to form for the purpose of approving distributive policies (Riker 1962). A minimum winning
coalition is the smallest set of legislators that can
guarantee passage of a proposal under majority
voting. If proposals or projects have spillover
costs and benefits, as distributive policies generally do, then the exclusion of the interests of
delegates outside of a winning coalition will lead
to inefficient choices. Second, minimum winning
coalitions should be highly unstable, since
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excluded delegates have strong incentives to alter
the coalition structure. Each member of the legislature faces some probability that he or she will be
excluded from the minimum winning coalition for
any particular policy proposal. Third, Weingast
et al. (1981), Shepsle and Weingast (1984), and
others suggest that the resulting uncertainty helps
explain the practice of ‘universalism’, in which
the size of coalitions and the set of approved projects exceed the minimum winning size. In its
extreme form, universalism involves a ‘norm of
reciprocity’ in which each delegate supports the
project of every other, and so a project for every
delegate or constituency is approved. Finally,
Weingast et al. (1981) argue that politicians in
such a setting have an incentive to count the
resource costs of geographically earmarked programmes as benefits. They refer to this as the
‘Robert Moses’ effect: ‘pecuniary gains in the
form of increased jobs, profits, and local tax revenues go to named individuals, firms, and localities from whom the legislator may claim credit
and exact tribute’ (1981, p. 648). Such ‘political
cost-accounting’ will obviously encourage individual representatives to support higher than efficient levels of public spending.
More formally, following Persson and
Tabellini (2000, section 7.1), imagine that there
are M seats on the city council and that the fixed
population of each constituency is N. Thus, the
aggregate population of the city is MN. If council
members are elected by district or ward, so the
constituencies are geographic, then the assumption of fixed constituencies implies that the population is immobile. Suppose that all residents are
identical and have quasi-linear preferences of the
form U ðgÞ þ x, where g is per capita consumption
of a publicly provided good, x is the numeraire
and the sub-utility function U() is increasing and
strictly concave. All residents have the same
exogenous income y. Public services are financed
through lump-sum taxes that balance the city’s
budget. Each councillor is assumed to be a perfect
representative of his or her constituent group.
If one takes utilitarianism as a normative benchmark, the efficient provision of public services in
this symmetric setting maximizes aggregate utility
Urban Political Economy
MðU ðgÞ þ xÞ subject to the resource constraint M
N ðy x gÞ ¼ 0 . The first-order condition for
this problem implies U0 ðgÞ ¼ 1: the marginal benefit of the public service should equal its marginal
cost in every constituency. Represent this efficient
level of provision by g*.
In contrast, under extreme universalism, or with
decentralized provision and centralized finance,
each delegate chooses a level of the public service
to maximize the utility of a representative constituent, taking the levels chosen by other delegates as
fixed. If one lets g0 represent the conjectured level
chosen by others, the balanced budget requirement
implies that the lump-sum tax t for any group
satisfies tM ¼ g þ ðM 1Þg0. Thus, an individual
delegate chooses g to maximize
y
g þ ð=M 1Þg0
þ UðgÞ:
M
(1)
The first-order condition for this problem
implies U0 ðgÞ ¼ 1=M Each member of the legislature perceives that they pay only a fraction 1/M
of the costs of the public services that they
acquire. This is known as the common pool problem. If one lets gU represent the level of provision
under this extreme form of universalism, the concavity of U() implies gU > g . The common pool
problem thus leads to overprovision. Persson and
Tabellini (2000, p. 163) summarize the nature of
the distortion as follows: ‘The problem here lies in
the collective choice procedure, in which the tax
rate is residually determined once all spending
decisions have been made in a decentralized fashion. Concentration of benefits and dispersion of
costs lead to excessive spending when such
spending is residually financed out of a common
pool of tax revenue.
The first-order condition for gU implies
dgU
1
¼
>0
MU 00 ðgÞ
dM
(2)
by concavity. Thus, the level of overprovision
increases as the constituencies become smaller,
ceteris paribus. Finally, if one allows GU ¼ M
gU to represent aggregate spending, we have
Urban Political Economy
dGU
dgU
> 0:
¼ gU þ M
dM
dM
14149
(3)
This is an instance of Weingast et al. (1981)
‘law of 1/n’: aggregate spending, and therefore the
inefficiency of excessive spending increases with
the number of constituencies or the size of the
legislature.
This implication of the common pool problem
seems to be supported by the evidence. Landbein
et al. (1996), based on a sample of 192 cities in
1980, all of which have a council–manager form
of government and a weak mayor, find that local
government expenditure per capita is positively
related to the number of elected members of the
city council. Baqir (2002) finds that the size of US
local governments (measured by expenditures or
employment per capita or expenditures as a share
of total income) increases with the size of the city
council. Baqir also finds that expenditures (per
capita or as a share of total income) are not significantly different in councils where a majority of
members are elected at-large, but that local government employment per capita is lower when
at-large councillors are in the majority. However,
evaluated at the sample means, employment per
capita is actually higher where a majority of councillors are elected at large. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that at-large councillors serve their
(non-geographic) constituencies in much the
same manner that ward councillors serve the interests of their wards. The positive relationship
between the size of the government and the size
of the council is unaffected by the presence of
at-large elections. Baqir also examines the impact
of a strong city executive, and finds that expenditures do not increase with council size when the
city has a strong mayor with the power to veto city
council decisions. As noted above, this is consistent with recent models and results from the literature on comparative politics.
Private Government
Private governments are voluntary, exclusive
organizations that supplement services provided
by the public sector. There are two broad classes
of private governments in the United States. Residential private governments, sometimes called
residential community associations (RCAs), common interest developments (CIDs), or homeowner
associations (HOAs), exist to further the interests
of residential property owners. Commercial private governments, sometimes called business
improvement districts (BIDs) or business investment areas (BIAs), exist to further the interests of
their member firms. Private governments are
highly controversial. Garreau (1991) labels them
‘shadow governments’, and argues that they are
undemocratic, discriminatory, and operate outside
of the constitutional restrictions that public
governments face.
Residential private governments are an
increasingly important component of housing
markets and local government systems in North
America. Garreau (1991, p. 189) estimates that
there may have been as many as 130,000 RCAs
in the United States in 1988. McKenzie (1996)
reports that the number of CIDs in the United
States grew from a few hundred in 1960 to
150,000 in 1993 and that they then housed 32 million people. The Community Associations Institute (an industry trade association) maintains that
there were 231,000 RCAs in the United States in
2002, housing 57 million people. The 2001 American Housing Survey from the US Bureau of the
Census reports that 28% of all new-housing residents paid community association fees in 2001.
Residential private governments provide security
and sanitation services, and manage and maintain
common facilities, including recreational facilities
and infrastructure. They also regulate property use
and individual conduct through covenants, codes,
and restrictions in property deeds.
There are fewer commercial private governments, but their impacts are also substantial.
Pack (1992) estimates that there were 400 BIDs
in the United States in 1992, while Mitchell’s
(2001) survey found 404 independently managed
BIDs in the United States in 1999. BIDs typically
provide security, marketing and sanitation services. Mitchell reports that 94% of BIDs engage
in marketing, 85% provide maintenance and
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14150
sanitation services, and 68% provide security.
Mitchell’s survey also found that 88% of BIDs
engaged in some form of policy advocacy, like
lobbying governments on behalf of business interests. BIDs have become a key component of
downtown revitalization strategies in many, if
not most, major North American cities.
Private governments raise a number of interesting economic issues. First, they may have significant impacts on the traditional public sector.
To the degree that private and public spending are
substitutes, private governments provide a mechanism for the public sector to withdraw from
certain activities. Helsley and Strange (1998,
2000a) show that such ‘strategic downloading’ is
a characteristic of equilibrium in a game where
public and private governments simultaneously
choose levels of provision to maximize the
welfare of their citizens and members, respectively. Cheung (2004) finds evidence of strategic
downloading in a sample of California communities. Second, membership in private governments
may be inefficient. Helsley and Strange (1999)
argue that one of the essential features of gated
communities is that they divert crime to other
areas. This increases the incentive for other communities to engage in similar private policing
activities (the activities are strategic complements), and may lead to excessive gated community development. Third, private governments
have complex welfare effects. Citizens with high
demands for public services are generally made
better off by this form of privatization. By joining
the private government, they can supplement
what is for them an inadequate level of public
provision. If strategic downloading occurs, citizens with low demands, who choose not to join a
private government, are also better off, since the
level of public provision falls towards their optimal level.
However, citizens in the middle of the
distribution – whose demands were relatively
well served by the traditional public sector – are
made worse off.
The field of urban political economy is in its
infancy. The roles that economic and political
institutions play in the formation of local public
policies are clearly deserving of further study.
Urban Political Economy
See Also
▶ Local Public Finance
▶ Systems of Cities
▶ Tiebout Hypothesis
▶ Urban Economics
▶ Urban Environment and Quality of Life
Bibliography
Baqir, R. 2002. Districting and government overspending.
Journal of Political Economy 110: 1318–1354.
Caro, R.A. 1974. The power broker: Robert Moses and the
Fall of New York. New York: Knopf.
Cheung, R. 2004. The interaction between public and
private governments: An empirical analysis. Mimeo:
Department of Economics, Florida State University.
Garreau, J. 1991. Edge cities: Life on the new frontier. New
York: Doubleday.
Helsley, R.W. 2004. Urban political economics. In Handbook of regional and urban economics, vol. 4, ed.
J.V. Henderson and J.F. Thisse. Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
Helsley, R.W., and W.C. Strange. 1998. Private government. Journal of Public Economics 69: 281–304.
Helsley, R.W., and W.C. Strange. 1999. Gated communities and the economic geography of crime. Journal of
Urban Economics 46: 80–105.
Helsley, R.W., and W.C. Strange. 2000a. Potential competition and public sector performance. Regional Science
and Urban Economics 30: 405–428.
Helsley, R.W., and W.C. Strange. 2000b. Social interactions and the institutions of local government. American Economic Review 90: 1477–1490.
Inman, R.P., and M.A. Fitts. 1990. Political institutions and
public policy: Evidence from the U.S. historical record.
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:
79–132.
Landbein, L.I., P. Crewson, and C.N. Brasher. 1996.
Rethinking ward and at-large elections in cities. Public
Choice 88: 275–293.
McKenzie, E. 1996. Homeowner association private
governments in the American political system. Papers
in Political Economy, 75, University of Western
Ontario.
Mitchell, J. 2001. Business improvement districts and the
new revitalization of downtowns. Economic Development Quarterly 15: 115–123.
Pack, J.R. 1992. BIDs, DIDs, SIDs, SADs: Private government in urban America. The Brookings Review 10:
18–21.
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2000. Political economics.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini. 1997. Separation
of powers and political accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1163–1202.
Urban Production Externalities
Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini. 1998. Towards
micropolitical foundations of public finance. European
Economic Review 42: 685–694.
Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini. 2000. Comparative politics and public finance. Journal of Political
Economy 108: 1121–1161.
Rauch, J.E. 1995. Bureaucracy, infrastructure, and economic growth: Evidence from U.S. cities during the
progressive era. American Economic Review 85:
968–979.
Riker, W.H. 1962. The theory of political coalitions. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Rubinfeld, D.L. 1987. The economics of the local public
sector. In Handbook of public economics, vol. 2, ed.
A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein. Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
Shepsle, K.A., and B.R. Weingast. 1984. Political solutions
to market problems. American Political Science Review
78: 417–434.
Tiebout, C. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditure.
Journal of Political Economy 64: 416–424.
Weingast, B.R., K.A. Shepsle, and C. Johnsen. 1981. The
political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical
approach to distributive politics. Journal of Political
Economy 89: 642–664.
Urban Production Externalities
Antonio Ciccone
Abstract
Urban production externalities (agglomeration
effects) are external effects among producers in
areas with a high density of economic activity.
Such external effects are the main explanation
for why productivity is usually highest in those
areas of a country where economic activity is
densest. There is some disagreement about the
strength of urban production externalities.
What is clear, however, is that even weak
urban production externalities can explain
large spatial differences in productivity.
Keywords
Congestion; Increasing returns; Instrumental
variables; Intermediate inputs; Knowledge
spillovers; Labour productivity; Local technological externalities; Localization economies;
Mincerian wage regression; Non-transportable
14151
input sharing; Non-transportable intermediate
inputs; Outsourcing; Schooling externalities;
Spatial externalities; Skill-biased technical
change; Urban agglomeration; Urban production externalities; Urbanization economies;
Spatial wage differentials
JEL Classifications
R0
Urban production externalities (agglomeration
effects) are external effects among producers in
areas with a high density of economic activity.
Such external effects are the main explanation
for why productivity is usually highest in those
areas of a country where economic activity is
densest. The best understood urban production
externalities are technological externalities due
to knowledge spillovers and non-transportable
input sharing, both of which are already discussed
by Marshall (1920).
That local technological externalities translate
into increasing returns at the city level is demonstrated formally by Henderson (1974). Building
on the analysis of Chipman (1970), he also
shows that such increasing returns are compatible
with perfect competition. Abdel-Rahman (1988),
Fujita (1988, 1989), and Rivera-Batiz (1988) present a rigorous analysis of decentralized market
equilibria with increasing returns at the city level
due to intermediate input sharing. These contributions build on the formalization of monopolistic
competition of Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to show how increasing returns to
city size emerge when some intermediate inputs
are non-transportable and produced subject to
increasing returns at the plant level.
There is some disagreement about the strength
of increasing returns to the density (or scale) of
local economic activity and therefore about the
strength of urban production externalities. This
is partly because the best approach to estimation
is still unclear. What is clear, however, is that even
weak urban production externalities can explain
much of the large spatial differences in productivity observed in many countries. This is because
spatial differences in the density of economic
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14152
activity are very large, so that even a small
degree of increasing returns to density can explain
sizable spatial productivity differences. Moreover, mobile physical capital and tradable intermediate inputs imply that the strength of
increasing returns to density exceeds the strength
of urban production externalities (by approximately a factor of two).
The remainder of this article first illustrates the
link between the strength of urban production
externalities and the strength of increasing returns
to the density of economic activity (or increasing
returns at the city level). It then turns to the advantages and drawbacks of different empirical
approaches to urban production externalities.
A Model of Urban Production
Externalities and Increasing Returns
The link between urban production externalities
and increasing returns to the density of economic
activity is easily illustrated using the technologyspillover model of Ciccone and Hall (1996)
extended to include costlessly tradable intermediate inputs. This extension is important for understanding why the strength of increasing returns to
density is approximately twice the strength of
urban production externalities. Including urban
production externalities due to non-transportable
intermediate-input sharing in the model would be
straightforward (see Ciccone and Hall 1996) but
not change any of the relevant conclusions.
Model Set-Up
Let f(nf, kf, mf; Qc, Ac) be the production function
that describes the amount of output produced by
firm f on an acre of space when employing
n workers, m units of costlessly tradable intermediate inputs, and k units of capital (lower-case
letters denote per-acre quantities). The acre is
embedded in county c with total output Q and
total acreage A (upper-case letters denote total
county-level quantities). The simplest production
function to deal with is one where the externality
depends multiplicatively on the density of economic activity Q/A, and the elasticity of f(n, k,
Urban Production Externalities
m; Q, A) with respect to all its arguments is constant. In this case,
1r Q
c
qf ¼ aaf kbf m1ab
f
Ac
l
(1)
l 0 captures the strength of urban production
externalities (agglomeration effects); for example,
l = 2% means that a doubling of the density of
economic activity is associated with a two per cent
increase in the output of the firm (for a given
amount of inputs used by the firm). 0
a
1
and 0 b 1 determine the relative importance
of labour, capital and intermediate inputs in production. And 0 r 1 captures possible decreasing returns to labour, capital and intermediate
inputs when holding the amount of land used in
production constant (congestion effects).
Input Demand and Value Added
Firms maximize profits taking factor prices and
aggregate output in each county as given. Profit
maximization implies that firms employ capital up
to the point where its marginal product is equal to
the national rental price of capital R (measured in
units of output), which gives rise to a demand for
capital equal to kf = b(1 r)qf/R. The demand for
intermediate inputs can be determined analogously
as mf = (1 a b)(1 r)qf, where we have
assumed that one unit of intermediate inputs can
be produced with one unit of output. Substituting
these factor demand functions in (1) and solving for
output at the firm level yields that qf is proportional
to (nf)a(1r)/(1(1r)(1a)) (Qc/Ac)l/(1(1r)(1a)).
Moreover, the demand for intermediate inputs
implies that value added at the firm level (y) and
county level (Y) are a fraction 1 (1 a b)(1
r) of the total value of production at the firm and
county level respectively, that is, yf = qf mf =
(1 (1 a b)(1 r))qf and Yc = Qc
Mc = (1 (1 a b)(1 r))Qc. Hence, value
added at the firm level is linked to firm-level
employment and county-level value added by
að1rÞ
Yc
yf ¼ gnf 1ð1rÞ ð1aÞ
Ac
l
1ð1rÞ ð1aÞ
where g is an unimportant constant.
,
(2)
Urban Production Externalities
14153
Increasing Returns to Density
The amount of labour N employed in a county is
taken to be distributed uniformly in space;
nf = Nc/Ac for all firms f in the county. Substituted
in (2), this yields that output per acre in a county is
linked to employment per acre by
Yc
¼
Ac
g
Nc
Ac
1þy
,
(3)
where the strength of increasing returns to the
density of economic activity y is given by
y¼
l
:
a ð1 rÞ ð1 rÞ
(4)
As expected, increasing returns to density are
stronger when urban production externalities l are
strong and congestion effects r are weak.
A necessary condition for productivity to be
greater in areas with dense economic activity is
that urban production externalities (agglomeration effects) more than offset congestion effects,
y > 0.
From Increasing Returns to Density to Urban
Production Externalities
The relationship between increasing returns to the
density of economic activity y and the strength of
net agglomeration effects l r in (4) depends on
a(1 r), the elasticity of output with respect to
labour. In equilibrium, this elasticity equals the
share of labour in the total value of production.
In the United States, the share of labour in value
added is around two thirds (for example, Gollin
2002) and the share of intermediate inputs in value
added around one half (for example, Basu 1995),
which implies a share of labour in the total value
of production of around one third. To see that this
implies that urban production externalities are
magnified, note that for small values of l r
(4) implies
yffi
lr
¼ ðl rÞ,
a ð 1 rÞ
(5)
where we have made use of a(1 r)= 1/3. A
one-point increase in the strength of urban
production externalities therefore implies a
three-point increase in the strength of increasing
returns to the density of economic activity. Much
of this magnification is due to the presence of
intermediate inputs. In a model without intermediate inputs where physical capital earns one third
of value added, the factor of magnification would
have been (only) 3/2.
Empirical Approaches and Results
Increasing Returns to City or Industry Size
Early empirical studies of urban scale effects by
Sveikauskas (1975), Segal (1976), Moomaw
(1981, 1985), and Tabuchi (1986) focused on the
link between city size and productivity at the city
and the city-industry level. The empirical results
indicate that doubling city size increases productivity by between three and eight per cent.
Nakamura (1985) and Henderson (1986, 2003)
extend the analysis by distinguishing between
urbanization economies and localization economies. Localization economies are increasing
returns related to the size of city industries,
while urbanization economies refer to increasing
returns to overall city size. Henderson concludes
that scale effects are mostly at the industry level,
but Nakamura finds evidence for both urbanization and localization economies.
Most studies of the strength of agglomeration
economies measure output as the value of production or value added from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Census of Manufacturers. This data-set
does not contain information on the value of services that plants purchase in the market or obtain
from headquarters. Census of Manufacturers data
will therefore overstate the value added of city
industries. This bias is likely to be greater in larger
cities, for two reasons. First, there is more service
outsourcing in larger cities, due to the larger variety of services available (Holmes 1999; Ono
2007). Second, headquarter services are more
likely to be counted twice in larger cities, as
such cities are more likely to contain both a plant
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Urban Production Externalities
and its headquarters. The total value of production
from the Census of Manufacturers has the additional disadvantage of counting twice all intermediate inputs traded within and across industries
located in the same city.
Increasing Returns to Density
and the Productivity of US States
In the United States, the finest level of geographical detail with reliable data on value added is the
state level. Ciccone and Hall (1996) therefore
estimate increasing returns to the density of economic activity by combining state-level value
added data with the model in (3). Aggregating
county-level value added to the state level yields
that labour productivity in state s, Ys/Ns, is equal to
Ys
¼ Dc ðyÞ
Ns
Cs
X
gN c
Ac
c¼1
1þy
Nc
,
Ns
(6)
where Cs is the number of counties in the state.
Hence, the strength of increasing returns to the
county-level density of economic activity can be
estimated by combining cross-state variation in
labour productivity and the state-level density
index Dc(y), which depends on county-level
employment density and the distribution of
employment across counties. Ciccone and Hall
find y to be just above five per cent, using a
least-squares approach. Because of large differences in the density of economic activity, this
limited degree of increasing returns to density
can explain more than half of the sizable differences in output per worker across US states.
Ciccone and Hall’s work is about the degree of
increasing returns to the density of economic
activity, not about the strength of urban production externalities. Going from one to the other is
rather straightforward, however. Using (5) yields
that y equal to five per cent corresponds to a net
agglomeration effect l r of 1.7 per cent.
According to the Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, 1982–1990 prepared by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(1997), the share of land in the total value of
production r in the private sector outside of agriculture and mining is around 0.5 per cent. Hence,
l is between 2 and 2.5 per cent, which implies that
a doubling of the density of economic activity in a
county is associated with a 2–2.5 per cent increase
in the output firms produce with a given amount of
inputs (see (1)). Mobile physical capital and tradable intermediate inputs therefore imply that the
strength of increasing returns to density exceeds
the strength of urban production externalities by a
factor of two. Hence, more than half of the differences in output per worker across US states can
be explained by rather weak urban production
externalities.
An important concern when estimating
agglomeration economies is potential feedback
from productivity to the density of economic
activity. To address this possibility, Ciccone and
Hall (1996) use an instrumental variables
approach. The instruments for the state-level density index used are the population and population
density of US states between 1850 and 1880, as
well as the presence or absence of a railroad in
each state in 1860 and the distance of states from
the eastern seaboard. The identifying assumption
is that the original sources of agglomeration in the
United States have remaining influences only
through the preferences of people about where to
live. The instrumental variables estimates of y are
between 5.5 and 6.1 per cent, and therefore very
similar to the least squares estimates.
Agglomeration Effects in Europe
For many European countries, value added data is
available at a much finer level of geographic detail
than for the United States. Employing such data
for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK,
Ciccone (2002) finds an average degree of
increasing returns to the local density of economic
activity of between four and five per cent, only
slightly below estimates for the United States.
Rice et al. (2006) find a similar result using geographically detailed earnings data for the
UK. They also take into account the scale of
production in neighbouring locations weighted
by travel times, and find that productivity benefits
diminish quickly with travel distance.
Human Capital Externalities?
An open question is whether there are agglomeration economies associated with the geographic
Urban Production Externalities
14155
concentration of human capital. Rauch (1993)
examines this issue by augmenting a standard
Mincerian wage regression (for example, Card
1999) with data on the characteristics of cities
where people live. His empirical model relates
wages of individuals i in cities c, wic to relevant
individual characteristics (for example, education,
experience), Xic, and to the average level of
schooling of the city, Sc, and other city characteristics, Zc,
logwic ¼ aXic þ bSc þ cZ c þ eic ,
(7)
where eic summarizes all other (unobserved) factors affecting individual wages across cities.
Least-squares estimation of (7) using US data for
1980 yields a positive and significant coefficient
on average schooling in the city (b), and Rauch
therefore concludes that there are human capital
externalities at the city level.
A drawback of Rauch’s approach is that it
cannot account for time-invariant unobserved
city characteristics that increase both schooling
and wages. Another drawback is that city-level
schooling is taken to be exogenous. Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001) address these drawbacks by
taking US states, rather than cities, to be the
relevant aggregate unit in (7). In this case, the
data allow for an analysis of the effects of
increases in average state-level schooling on
individual wages. Moreover, Acemoglu and
Angrist show that changes in average schooling
at the state level can be instrumented by statelevel changes in compulsory-schooling and
child-labour laws. Their approach yields no evidence of significant schooling externalities
between 1960 and 1980.
Ciccone and Peri (2006) show that a positive
effect of average schooling in a Mincerian wage
equation like (7) may not reflect human capital
externalities but a downward sloping demand function for human capital. They therefore propose an
alternative approach, which exploits the fact that
the wage differential between more and less educated workers reflects differences in marginal
social products of the two worker types when
human capital externalities are absent. This
approach does not yield evidence of significant
human capital externalities at the level of US cities
or states between 1960 and 1990.
Moretti (2004a) finds that US cities where the
labour force share of college graduates increased
most between 1980 and 1990 also saw the largest
wage increase for college graduates. Using
Census of Manufacturers plant-level data, Moretti
(2004b) finds that the output of plants in high-tech
city industries rises with levels of schooling in
other high-tech industries in the same city. This
evidence is consistent with human capital externalities. An alternative explanation could be that
skill-biased technological progress translated into
increases in the productivity and wages of college
graduates in high-tech industries. Cities that specialized in industries experiencing rapid productivity growth would in this case see faster output
growth and attract more college graduates. This
alternative hypothesis is especially plausible for
the 1980–90 period, which was marked by rising
college wage premia due to skill-biased technological progress (for example, Katz and Murphy
1992).
See Also
▶ Externalities
▶ New Economic Geography
▶ Urban Agglomeration
Bibliography
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monopolistic competition and city size. Regional Science and Urban Economics 18: 69–86.
Acemoglu, D., and J. Angrist. 2001. How large are the
social returns to education: Evidence from compulsory
schooling laws. In NBER macroeconomic annual
2000, ed. B. Bernanke and K. Rogoff. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Basu, S. 1995. Intermediate goods and business cycles:
Implications for productivity and welfare. American
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. 1997. Flow of funds accounts of the United
States, 1982–1990. Washington, DC: Federal
Reserve.
Card, D. 1999. The causal effect of education on earnings.
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and D. Card. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
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Chipman, J.S. 1970. External economies of scale and competitive equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics
84: 347–385.
Ciccone, A. 2002. Agglomeration effects in Europe. European Economic Review 46: 213–227.
Ciccone, A., and R.E. Hall. 1996. Productivity and the
density of economic activity. American Economic
Review 86: 54–70.
Ciccone, A., and G. Peri. 2006. Identifying human capital
externalities: Theory with applications. Review of Economic Studies 73: 381–412.
Dixit, A.K., and J.E. Stiglitz. 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity. American Economic Review 67: 297–308.
Fujita, M. 1988. A monopolistic competition model of
spatial
agglomeration:
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product
approach. Regional Science and Urban Economics
18: 87–124.
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city size. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gollin, D. 2002. Getting income shares right. Journal of
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Henderson, J.V. 1974. The sizes and types of cities. American Economic Review 64: 640–656.
Henderson, J.V. 1986. Efficiency of resource usage and
city size. Journal of Urban Economics 19: 47–70.
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of Urban Economics 53: 1–28.
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disintegration. Review of Economics and Statistics 81:
314–325.
Katz, L.F., and K.M. Murphy. 1992. Changes in relative
wages, 1963–1987: Supply and demand factors. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 35–78.
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Moomaw, R.L. 1981. Productivity and city size: A critique
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675–688.
Moomaw, R.L. 1985. Firm location and city size: Reduced
productivity advantages as a factor in the decline of
manufacturing in urban areas. Journal of Urban Economics 17: 73–89.
Moretti, E. 2004a. Estimating the social return to higher
education: Evidence from longitudinal and repeated
cross-sectional data. Journal of Econometrics 121:
175–212.
Moretti, E. 2004b. Workers education, spillovers, and productivity: Evidence from plant-level production functions. American Economic Review 94: 656–690.
Nakamura, R. 1985. Agglomeration economies in urban
manufacturing industries: A case of Japanese cities.
Journal of Urban Economics 17: 108–124.
Ono, Y. 2007. Market thickness and outsourcing
services. Regional Science and Urban Economics 37:
220–238.
Rauch, J.E. 1993. Productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital: Evidence from the cities.
Journal of Urban Economics 34: 380–400.
Urban Transportation Economics
Rice, P., A.J. Venables, and E. Patacchini. 2006. Spatial
determinants of productivity: Analysis for the regions
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Tabuchi, T. 1986. Urban agglomeration, capital
augmenting technology, and labor market equilibrium.
Journal of Urban Economics 20: 211–228.
Urban Transportation Economics
Alex Anas
Abstract
Advances by economists in understanding the
demand, capacity and supply, pricing, finance
and performance of urban transportation systems is reviewed. The economics of urban
transportation has emphasized externalities
such as traffic congestion. The effects of transport systems and travel behaviour on real estate
prices, urban land use and density and urban
expansion as well as the reciprocal effects of
urban form on the nature and utilization of
transport systems are studied by economists.
Keywords
Congestion; Congestion tolls; Derived
demand; George, H.; Labour market discrimination; Land markets; Land taxes; Land use;
Land values; Land-use zoning; Pigouvian
taxes; Residence location choice; Samuelson,
P.; Spatial mismatch; Static assignment
models; Stationary state models; Transport
externalities; Transport system performance;
Urban economics; Urban sprawl; Urban
Urban Transportation Economics
transportation economics; Value of time; Work
location choice
JEL Classifications
R4; R14; H23; H41; H54
The study of transportation in urban areas relates
to urban economics and to public economics and
finance. The development of cities and their land
use patterns cannot be understood without studying the transportation systems that shape them,
nor can urban transportation systems be understood independently of the urban economy.
Unique aspects of urban transportation economics relate to demand, capacity and supply,
the performance of urban transportation systems,
and pricing and finance. We provide a discussion
of the key conceptual issues and knowledge in
each of these areas of the field and point out
some challenges that remain. (For reviews of
transportation economics focused less on its relationship to urban economics and more on technical issues internal to transportation, see Arnott and
Kraus 2003; Small and Verhoef 2006.)
Demand
The demand for transport is ‘derived demand’.
Travel provides utility mostly because it is a
means to an end, be it a consumer purchase,
getting to work or to recreation. The travel itself
usually has a disutility which varies according to
the quality, reliability and safety of the transport
system or the particular trip. Hence, virtually all
transport choices involve a trade-off between the
inconvenience and cost of a trip on the one hand
and the frequency with which that trip is chosen
relative to other trips on the other.
Beginning with the emergence of the telephone,
the demands for travel and for communication
have become increasingly interlinked in an urban
setting. While travel and communication are substitutes because a phone call, fax or e-mail (or a
messenger or letter in the pre-telephone days) may
reduce the need for a trip, they are also complements because cheaper communication generates
14157
higher demand for goods, services and personal
contacts. From this higher demand more travel is
subsequently derived.
An important aspect of urban travel is the fact
that the out-of-pocket cost of travel can be low
relative to the value of time expended in that
travel. As such, travel competes with leisure and
with work as a key activity to which time must be
allocated. The dominance of time–cost means that
market prices are less important than full opportunity costs in the explanation and measurement
of travel behaviour. Values of time vary greatly
among consumers since wage rates vary but also
because of other factors. Thus, consumers who
undertake similar trips frequently incur vastly different opportunity costs.
The demand for urban travel by consumers is
derived from a complex set of hierarchically
linked choices. At the top of the hierarchy and
slowest to change are decisions relating to where
to work and where to reside. Lower in the hierarchy and more malleable are choices about the
number and type of cars to own including the
possibility of dispensing with cars and relying
on walking or public transport for some trips.
Yet lower on the hierarchy are choices about the
destinations and frequency of discretionary trips,
the frequency of commuting (to the extent that
work arrangements do not require daily commuting), the destination of the commute being
implicit in the residence–workplace choice, and
the mode of transport (private automobile, taxi,
public transit or walking) that will be used on each
such round trip. There is the choice of the time of
day during which particular trips are made and the
trip chaining decision about whether several trips
may be combined into a tour. In a tour, the trips are
linked sequentially, beginning and ending at the
point of origin (for example, the consumer’s
home). Finally, also important are the choices of
particular routes (of the highway network, for
example) on which trips occur. Firms make a
similar set of choices. At the top of the hierarchy
is the location of the plant vis-à-vis suppliers and
markets, followed by the choice of a vehicle fleet
and associated decisions of the modes (barge, rail,
truck and so on) to use to get products to market or
procure them from suppliers.
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The study of travel demand using econometric
techniques has not yet advanced to the point where
a unified theory of travel can be tested that deals
simultaneously with all or even most of the levels
in the hierarchy. Led by McFadden (1973), transport economists have mostly focused on mode
choice: the split of the demand for travel between
competing modes such as auto, urban rail or
bus and car pooling on a particular trip or
round trip. This has resulted in the widespread use
of a rich variety of discrete choice models (such as
logit, nested logit or probit) that are designed to
predict the probability that a randomly selected
traveller will choose a particular mode to commute
to work. Modelling the choice of residence or job
locations has not received much attention from
transportation economists. Virtually all studies in
this area can be found in the urban economics
literature, and some have emphasized the joint
choice of residence location and mode of commuting (Anas and Duann 1985). Most travel demand
studies focus exclusively on commuting, ignoring
the fact that discretionary non-work travel is continually increasing with incomes, car ownership
and suburbanization. And the trade off between
commuting and discretionary trip-making under a
time budget constraint has remained relatively
unexamined.
Another area of demand that has received attention is the choice of travel route on a congested
highway network. The work of Beckmann et al.
(1956) counterfactually conceived traffic on a network as a stationary state process of steady flow,
rather than as a system of queues and bottlenecks
causing complex flow dynamics. Despite this, the
simplicity of the model led to the prolific development of static assignment models by operations
researchers. These models use system optimization
principles to simulate how travellers choose the
least costly route on a congested network. Stochastic cost perceptions have been introduced into this
type of stationary state models (Daganzo and
Sheffi 1977). More recently, a variety of dynamic
simulation models that recognize the queue and
bottleneck nature of traffic are under development
based on the principle that travellers choose not
only a route but also departure–arrival times
(Arnott et al. 1990).
Urban Transportation Economics
Capacity and Supply
One aspect of supply is that most transport is
made possible in large part by consumer effort,
time, and by inputs purchased by the consumer
such as car, gasoline, vehicle maintenance and
garage. Viewed this way supply becomes virtually
inseparable from demand. As such it would make
sense to model a part of the supply decision within
a household production context.
Another aspect of supply is that the public
sector is involved in the planning, provision and
operation of most travel infrastructure. This
includes highways as well as buses and urban
rail. A key decision variable is capacity, measured
as the throughput of passengers per hour that can
be transported in a particular direction at a given
time during the day on a particular facility. This
throughput determines the user’s travel time. Also
important, however, are the safety, privacy, reliability and quality of the travel time and its components such as in-vehicle time, waiting at a
station, searching for parking and time walking
to and from stations and parking lots.
The key supply decision is the quantity of
streets and highways and public transit rights-ofway. Road capacity relative to demand determines, in part, the level of traffic congestion in
an area. Since land is the prime input in roads,
more road building reduces the land available for
other uses such as housing or production, raising
the market price of land in such uses. In turn, the
price of land chiefly determines how much land is
allocated to create road capacity in an area. Thus,
the most congested areas are also the ones
where land is the most expensive. With extremely
expensive land as in Tokyo, London, Paris or
downtown New York, the substitution of capital
for land results in tunnelling for transit systems
(subways) and even for some roads.
An important supply question is whether economies of scale exist in congested highway traffic
flow. Congestion occurs when the vehicles sharing the same road segment at the same time reach
a critical value relative to road capacity. The addition of one more vehicle then begins to delay the
other vehicles. The total cost experienced by the
vehicle stream increases by a marginal cost that is
Urban Transportation Economics
higher than the cost privately born by the marginal
vehicle’s passengers. The difference between this
social marginal cost and the private average cost is
the monetary value of the sum of delays the marginal vehicle imposes on all the vehicles travelling
with it on the road segment. The evidence seems
to suggest that this congestion process exhibits no
economies of scale at least at a crude level. Scaling up (or down) road capacity and the volume of
traffic in the same proportion, would not increase
the average cost of travel. Capital costs of highways, on the other hand, were found to exhibit
significant scale economies by the engineering
estimates of Meyer et al. (1965), but since then
Keeler and Small (1977) and others have found
statistical evidence of weak or virtually no scale
economies.
In contrast to highways, rail-based public transit systems are subject to scale economies and,
more importantly, to economies of density. As
more passengers use these systems (for example
by reducing headways between successive trains),
the per-passenger total average cost comes down
because of the high fixed costs involved in system
construction and maintenance. This is the chief
reason why such rail infrastructure is uneconomical in US cities below some critical size such as
one million or more people, or in suburban areas
of low land use densities where the passengers’
time-costs of accessing transit stations can be high
(Kim 1979).
System Performance
The reconciliation of supply and demand results
in system performance. Unlike other markets in
which price is the only salient outcome of market
performance, in transport the outcomes include
travel time, the level of congestion or travel
delay, air pollution from car traffic, accidents,
system reliability (that is, the variability of travel
time from day to day or hour to hour), and pecuniary and non-pecuniary externalities caused by
the transport system. While travel time, congestion and reliability costs are primarily born by
the travellers, air pollution and accidents have
costs that are born by travellers as well as by
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non-travellers. Thus, the economic performance
of a transport system cannot be measured
completely without evaluating the social costs
and benefits created by these external effects.
The purely pecuniary externalities of transport
are pervasive. For example, as noted, the creation
of transport capacity has a direct effect on the
supply and price of land available for other uses
and can thus cause land scarcity. But this is only
the direct effect of capacity provision. The indirect
effect on land values and land use is quite different
and works at both the extensive and intensive
margins. At the extensive margin, cities endowed
with more road and transit capacity can expand to
land areas that were previously inaccessible. At
the intensive margin, transport systems work by
changing the relative accessibility of land parcels.
Areas that are made relatively more accessible
than before gain value, while areas made relatively less accessible lose value. As a result of
these shifts, windfall gains and losses in land
markets should be among the chief measures of
transport system performance evaluation. The
aggregate change in land values can be positive
or negative. Since most land is owned by consumers (such as homeowners) transport system
changes play an important role in redistributing
private wealth and public revenues from ad
valorem property taxes by changing an existing
pattern of accessibility.
Transportation, land use and land prices are the
central foci in urban economics and a variety of
models have been developed. Virtually all of these
assume that all jobs are located at a predetermined
centre, an anachronism given that current downtowns in US cities contain no more than ten per
cent of the jobs. Versions of this basic model based
on linear programming have been developed to
model road capacity provision and transit investment in congested cities (Mills 1972; Kim 1979).
Other pecuniary externalities centre on the
improved discretionary mobility enabled by transport systems. Such mobility improvements have
received praise as well as criticism. Improved
mobility enables easier, cheaper and more frequent
contacts among firms and among firms and consumers. This should result in positive social benefits enhancing productivity and boosting economic
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growth. It has been noted in the large literature on
spatial mismatch that central-city minorities in the
United States who are less-mobility enabled, are at
a disadvantage competing for suburban employment. While discrimination and suburban land use
exclusion cause minorities to be clustered and
socially cloistered in central cities, lower car ownership may also hinder their ability to compete for
distant suburban jobs.
Improved mobility induces economic agents to
locate in a more spread out pattern, substituting
cheaper outlying land for more expensive, centrally located land. The resulting urban land use
pattern, common in the United States, has been
dubbed ‘urban sprawl’. Sprawl has been blamed
for a variety of ills stemming from the increased
dependence on cars and reduced pedestrian
mobility that sprawled land use promotes.
Among such perceived ills, for example, is the
alleged demise of social and neighbourhood cohesion and the rising obesity of American children
and adults.
Pricing and Finance
In practice, urban roads and transit systems are
subsidized. In the United States a large part of the
cost of highways and roads comes from general
income taxes. The rest of the cost comes from
taxes on gasoline and taxes on real property.
Urban rail systems are also heavily subsidized
with fares covering only about half of the operating and maintenance costs. Hence, for all forms of
urban transport with the possible exception of
unregulated taxis and jitneys, market-based user
fees and marginal cost prices do not play the role
they do in other markets.
What does economic theory tell us about how
urban transport systems should be priced and
financed? The answer will be different for highway and rail systems, primarily because the latter
are subject to economies of scale.
The congestion externality is key in highway
pricing and investment (Vickrey 1969). Economic
efficiency requires that each traveller pay his full
marginal social cost on each road segment that he
uses. As we saw earlier, the full marginal social
Urban Transportation Economics
cost includes the monetary value of the delay each
traveller imposes on his cotravellers. This is
higher where congestion is high, falling to zero
where congestion is not present. It has been shown
that if congestion tolls can be properly calculated
and levied on travellers, then with no economies
of scale in roads, the tolls collected from the
vehicles using a particular road segment would
in the long run cover the amortized costs of road
construction and maintenance. The only requirement is for road planners to build more (less) road
capacity where toll revenue exceeds (falls short)
of these amortized costs.
The congestion toll has three coincident theoretical interpretations. First, it is a Pigouvian tax
(Pigou 1947) because it levies, on the source of a
negative externality, a tax that closes the gap
between the social marginal cost and the private
average cost. In this role, the toll causes travellers
to economize on travel by internalizing the negative externality they create. Second, because a
road can be viewed as a (congested) public
good, the congestion toll in the long run serves
to equate the marginal benefit of road capacity
with the marginal cost of supplying it, the
Samuelson rule for the optimal finance of a public
good (Samuelson 1954). The toll itself is a marginal benefit since it measures the reduction in
total travel cost that would be realized if one
more unit of road capacity were to be added,
while the marginal cost of the capacity is the
cost of purchasing the additional capacity. Third,
since the aggregate toll revenue from the road
segment is equal to the land rent the road would
fetch in an alternative use, the aggregate toll is
equivalent to a confiscatory tax on the owners of
the land, the Henry George rule (George 1879).
On the view that the land used for roads is privately owned and operated by competitive or contestable firms, the Pigouvian pricing described
above would be the outcome of profit maximization, and the aggregate toll revenue would confiscate the profits of these private road owners. On
the alternative view that the land used for roads is
owned by society, the congestion tolls are the fees
travellers pay society for the right to use the road,
and in the long run these fees add up to the rent on
land, provided land markets are competitive.
Urban Transportation Economics
Keeler and Small (1977) empirically estimated
what congestion tolls should be in the San
Francisco Bay Area on the assumption of fixed
land use. The effects of tolls on urban form have
been studied within the naïve theoretical urban
model that assumes all jobs are at a central point
(Arnott and MacKinnon 1978) or a central point
and a suburban ring (Sullivan 1983). Simple simulations based on such models show small efficiency gains of up to one per cent of income for
reasonably congested cities. Recent studies, based
on modern assumptions of completely dispersed
employment, show similar efficiency gains (Anas
and Xu 1999). All of these studies show that
congestion tolls could significantly reduce travel
times. But the welfare benefits of tolls would
come mostly from changes in travel mode and
the timing of travel during the day, rather than
from land use adjustments.
Congestion tolls have become more popular in
recent years and have seen such prominent implementation as in central London. But the correct
calculation of first-best tolls is a quagmire. Chief
among the difficulties is the fact that one must
know how the value of travel time is distributed
among travellers using the same road segment. If
I share the road with higher (lower) income
drivers, the toll on me should be higher (lower).
Without knowledge of the distribution, accurate
first-best tolls cannot be computed because values
of time vary so widely among people. A second
difficulty is that road use varies enormously
throughout the day, requiring that first-best tolls
should similarly vary. The problem is simplified
somewhat by dividing the day into peak and
off-peak periods. A third difficulty is that the
technology used to detect congestion and calculate tolls should not be so obtrusive on travel as to
create more congestion than the tolls would alleviate. Automatic vehicle identification by several
means is feasible and not expensive. This may
contribute to a wider use of tolls in the future.
Although the calculation of first-best tolls is
highly daunting, a number of second-bests are
available. Tolls levied on major roads but not on
local roads may be effective second-bests. A tax
on the market price of parking in heavily
congested destinations such as the downtowns of
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major cities would achieve some of the efficiencies of first-best tolls. Taxes on gasoline are not
nearly as effective, because gasoline usage is not
closely related to the congestion created on a
trip. Such taxes heavily penalize driving on
congestion-free roads, for example.
Unlike highways, rail transit should be priced
as a regulated natural monopoly. Since marginal
cost is below average cost at any scale, marginal
cost pricing ensures efficiency but requires a subsidy to the transit operator to cover fixed costs.
Thus for transit systems, theory tells us that fares
should be set to cover variable operating costs,
while other taxes should be used to purchase the
fixed inputs, including land (right-of-way). The
debate then, should be about what these other
taxes should be. Considerable evidence exists
showing that land around transit stations appreciates in value after a transit investment is
announced or constructed. Anas and Duann
(1985) used an empirically estimated general
equilibrium model to predict prior to construction
that residential property values around the proposed stations of the Chicago Midway line
would increase, with the increase sharply tapering
off with distance from the stations. They estimated that the aggregate increase could pay for
about 40 per cent of the construction cost.
McMillen and McDonald (2004) used ex post
data on housing sales and confirmed that these
predictions were accurate. Taxing such windfall
gains is one source of revenue for fixed facilities,
although there are practical complications about
how to accurately measure and document the
land value appreciation in a legal-administrative
context.
Transportation as a Tool to Shape Land
Use
It has been observed that the underpricing of road
travel, especially as it relates to the unpriced congestion externality makes travel cheaper than its
marginal cost. This not only causes excessive
urban expansion but also induces planners to
use faulty cost-benefit measures and thus invest
in too much road building as argued by
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Kraus et al. (1976). Excessive road capacity in
turn reinforces the excessive urban expansion.
In view of the many pecuniary externalities of
transportation, and since perfect pricing is not
possible, a combination of judicious capacity provision and land-use zoning to ensure better accessibility to main roads and rail lines could have
significant benefits. Such economies of transport–land use interdependence may be possible
to exploit in urban planning and urban design at
the level of smaller areas and neighbourhoods.
Boarnet and Crane (2000) have examined whether
land use policy and urban form can significantly
affect travel behaviour in such settings. Similar
concerns exist at the macro urban level (Gordon
et al. 1989). In the future, planners could use such
knowledge when major decisions are made on
how much capacity to supply, where to supply it
and how much to restrict development around
it. More often than not, however, when urban
planners intervene with land use controls they
may fail to find the golden rule, causing distortions in land markets that could outweigh the
efficiencies that can be gained by influencing
travel.
See Also
▶ Coase Theorem
▶ Congestion
▶ External Economies
▶ George, Henry (1839–1897)
▶ Land Markets
▶ Pigouvian Taxes
▶ Time Use
▶ Urban Economics
▶ Value of Time
Bibliography
Anas, A., and L. Duann. 1985. Dynamic forecasting of
travel demand, residential location and land development: Policy simulations with the Chicago area transportation/land use analysis system. Papers of the
Regional Science Association 56: 38–58.
Anas, A., and R. Xu. 1999. Congestion, land use and job
dispersion: A general equilibrium model. Journal of
Urban Economics 45: 451–473.
Urban Transportation Economics
Arnott, R., and M. Kraus. 2003. Principles of transport
economics. In Handbook of transportation science,
2nd ed, ed. R. Hall. Boston: Kluwer.
Arnott, R., and J. MacKinnon. 1978. Market and shadow
land rents with congestion. American Economic
Review 68: 588–600.
Arnott, R., A. de Palma, and R. Lindsey. 1990. Departure
time and route choice for the morning commute. Transportation Research B 24: 209–228.
Beckmann, M., C. McGuire, and C. Winsten. 1956. Studies
in the economics of transportation. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Boarnet, M., and R. Crane. 2000. Travel by design: The
influence of urban form on travel. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Daganzo, C., and Y. Sheffi. 1977. On stochastic models of
traffic assignment. Transportation Science 11:
253–274.
George, H. 1879. Progress and poverty, , 1955. New York:
Robert Shalckenbach Foundation.
Gordon, P., A. Kumar, and H. Richardson. 1989. The
influence of metropolitan spatial structure on commuting time. Journal of Urban Economics 26: 138–151.
Keeler, T., and K. Small. 1977. Optimal peak-load pricing,
investment, and service levels on urban expressways.
Journal of Political Economy 85: 1–25.
Kim, T. 1979. Alternative transportation modes in an urban
land use model: A general equilibrium approach. Journal of Urban Economics 6: 197–215.
Kraus, M., H. Mohring, and T. Pinfold. 1976. The welfare
costs of non-optimum pricing and investment policies
for freeway transportation. American Economic Review
66: 532–547.
McFadden, D. 1973. Conditional logit analysis of
qualitative choice behavior. In Frontiers in
econometrics, ed. P. Zarembka. New York: Academic
Press.
McMillen, D., and J. McDonald. 2004. Reaction of
house prices to a new rapid transit line: Chicago’s
Midway line, 1983–1999. Real Estate Economics 32:
462–486.
Meyer, J., J. Kain, and M. Wohl. 1965. The urban transportation problem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mills, E. 1972. Markets and efficient resource allocation in
urban areas. Swedish Journal of Economics 74:
100–113.
Pigou, A. 1947. A study in public finance, 3rd ed. London:
Macmillan.
Samuelson, P. 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure.
Review of Economics and Statistics 36: 387–389.
Small, K., and E. Verhoef. 2006. Urban transportation
economics, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Sullivan, A. 1983. The general equilibrium effects of congestion externalities. Journal of Urban Economics 14:
80–104.
Vickrey, W. 1969. Congestion theory and transport investment. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 59: 251–260.
Urbanization
Urbanization
Sukkoo Kim
Abstract
Cities first arose in the Fertile Crescent a few
thousand years after the discovery of agriculture. Yet the history of urbanization is not one
of steady progress. Pre-industrial urbanization
rose with technological advances in agriculture
and transportation which fostered population
growth and trade, but fell with famine and
disease. Just as important, cities rose and fell
with the military fortunes of city states, territorial empires and nation states. With the
Industrial Revolution, urbanization rose dramatically. As population shifted out of agriculture into manufacturing and services, cities
became the dominant landscape of human
civilization.
Keywords
Amenities; Civilization; Division of labour;
Early industrialization; Face-to-face interaction; Feudalism; Globalization; Industrial Revolution; Labour markets; Labour productivity;
Marshallian externalities; Middle East; North,
D; Transaction costs; Transportation costs;
Transportation revolution; Urbanization
JEL Classifications
R11
The Rise of Cities in the Ancient Middle
East
The first city in human history is believed to have
emerged around 3200 BC in Sumer, Mesopotamia, between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, as a
consequence of the Neolithic Revolution which
saw a shift in food production from hunting and
gathering to agriculture based on domesticated
14163
plants and animals (Childe 1950). The emergence
of cities in Sumer marked the beginning of an
‘urban revolution’, but the revolution was an
exceedingly slow one. Since agriculture began in
the Fertile Crescent around 8500 BC, the first city
emerged several thousand years after the discovery of agriculture. Moreover, the emergence of
cities was not unique to Mesopotamia. Interestingly, cities emerged independently in at least two
other places, China and the New World, places
where major domestication of plants and animals
arose independently.
While it is extremely difficult to determine the
causes of the emergence of cities in ancient times,
scholars such as Childe (1950) and Bairoch
(1988) believe that agriculture caused cities to
form because it increased population growth and
provided surplus food for a non-agricultural population. Since demand for food is believed to be
income inelastic, an increase in income from a rise
in agricultural productivity will increase demand
for secondary and tertiary products (Wrigley
1987). The urban concentration of secondary
and tertiary employment, such as crafts and commerce, enabled the exploitation of the division of
labour, fostered technological innovations in
many areas of the economy from irrigation, transportation, metallurgy to writing, and lowered the
costs of coordinating long-distance trade.
Even more importantly, cities were centres of
states before the rise of territorial empires and
nation states. A city state was composed of a
governing city and its food-producing hinterlands. It was a distinct geographical, political
and economic unit of organization. By
establishing a body of formal and informal rules
of property rights, city states provided their citizens with the incentives to improve productivity
or, more fundamentally, to acquire more knowledge (North 1981). Cities probably became centres of government because close face-to-face
interactions between the ruling elite and its administration increased the efficiency of governing by
lowering the costs of generating, collecting and
processing information. In addition, dense, walled
cities provided effective defence against raiders.
The cities that arose in Sumer, Mesopotamia,
were independent city states. Archaeological
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evidence indicates that there may have been as
many as 15 city states by 3000 BC. A typical city
state may have contained population of 25,000
with rural population of about 500,000. Hammond (1972) suggests that the impetus for city
states in Sumer may have been the need to coordinate the provision of public goods such as largescale irrigation, drainage, communal storage, and
defence against other city states. Over the following millennium, the number and size of cities
grew in this region, some reaching populations
of 100,000 or more.
When the Sumerian cities were conquered by
Babylon by 1800 BC, the era of early city states
gave way to the era of territorial empires such as
those of Babylon, Egypt and Canaan. Scholars
generally believe that urbanization suffered
under these empires except for cities, like Babylon, that served as political and military centres.
Babylon at its height may have reached
populations of 200,000–300,000. While the
exact causes of the rise of these territorial empires
are not clear, among them may have been the
growing benefits of trade over longer distances
and changes in military technology which allowed
for the control of larger areas.
Of the major empires, it was in Egypt that cities
declined most significantly. Indeed, many scholars
would argue that Egypt was an empire without
cities. To the extent that cities existed in Egypt,
they were centres of religion and administration.
The lack of cities in Egypt is often attributed to the
Pharaoh’s centralized control of irrigation, trade and
all other facets of the economy (Hammond 1972).
Cities also declined in the other territorial empires,
but probably less, as many remained relatively independent. Despite the general decline of urbanization
during this period, a new type of coastal city
emerged in Phoenicia. These cities, which grew in
numbers around 1200 BC, arose principally to trade
goods throughout the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Cities first emerged in the Middle East, but
reached their greatest heights in the Mediterranean
in the ancient era. Most likely, cities arose later in
the Mediterranean because agriculture arrived in
this region a century and a half after its discovery
in the Fertile Crescent. It arose first in the Fertile
Crescent because of favourable geography and
Urbanization
climate, which provided an abundance of indigenous species suitable for domestication (Diamond
1997). From there, agriculture spread about 0.7
miles per year and reached the Mediterranean
region sometime between 7000 and 6000 BC. By
2000–1450 BC, Aegean civilization seems to have
constructed small city states with relatively limited
agricultural hinterland and trade. However, urbanization flourished under the Greek and Roman civilizations, as the Mediterranean Sea became the
highway of transport and communications.
The Greeks formed small, independent city
states composed of coastal cities and their adjoining farmlands between 800 and 146 BC. Their
largest city, Athens, may have reached 100,000
in population, but most other cities rarely
exceeded 40,000. Bairoch (1988) estimates that
perhaps as much as 15–25 per cent of the Greek
population lived in cities with more than 5000
inhabitants. Because the Greek soil was relatively
poor, a large portion of the population was
engaged in local and long-distance trade in the
Mediterranean. The Greek invention of coined
money facilitated market exchanges. The Greek
cities are also known for their political innovations. While most city states and territorial
empires, with the exception of the Phoenician
city states, were ruled by monarchy or aristocracy,
democracy arose in many Greek cities.
The formation of the Roman Empire between
146 BC and AD 300 represented the largest
political and economic integration of territory
in the ancient world. Rome, as the military and
administrative centre, grew to an astonishing
size, surpassing 800,000 inhabitants and perhaps
reaching a million by AD 2. Unlike in the earlier
territorial empires such as Egypt, cities prospered
under the Roman Empire. Politically, cities
became military and administrative centres and
collected taxes from the surrounding countryside
for Rome; economically, cities acted much like
independent city states. Under conditions of
peace and uniform law a great numbers of cities
emerged as commercial activity increased.
Bairoch (1988) estimates that about 8–15 per
cent of the population resided in cities. While
most cities were small, 20 or more may have
reached 20,000 or more inhabitants.
Urbanization
When the Roman Empire disintegrated around
AD 476, it signalled the decline of the Mediterranean world. In the resulting so-called Dark Ages
between AD 500 and 800, urbanization fell as
frequent wars and invasions contributed to economic insecurity. But the two centuries following
this period were a period of urban renaissance. By
this time, Europe was divided into two regions.
The southern Mediterranean part was conquered
by Arab Muslims while the northern part was
composed of Christian Europe. In Muslim Spain,
the urban population rose rapidly. In Christian
Europe, urbanization grew in some places for
defensive reasons, but in Italy commercial city
states rose to great heights (Bairoch 1988).
Ruled by merchant elites, Italian city states
engaged in extensive long-distance trade using
newly developed technology such as the compass,
but cities like Venice also grew because their
naval powers provided protection for their ships
in the Adriatic Sea and beyond (Lane 1973).
The Growth of Cities in Western Europe
The period called the Middle Ages, between AD
1000 and 1500, marked the beginning of the rise
of western Europe. Because this region was further away from, and possessed a very different
climate from the Fertile Crescent, agriculture
arrived between 6000 and 2500 BC, much later
than in the Mediterranean (Diamond 1997). In the
Middle Ages, technological advances such as the
heavier plough, horse collar, and the three-field
system increased the agricultural productivity of
western Europe significantly. Between 1000 and
1340, there was a strong growth in urbanization
based on feudal city states. Under feudalism, a
lord provided protection using a castle and
knights; in exchange for protection, slaves, serfs
and free labourers offered free labour.
The rise of western Europe was interrupted
between 1300 and 1490 as famine, disease and
wars led to major losses of population and
de-urbanization. Famines between 1315 and
1317, the plague and the Black Death between
1330 and 1340 and between 1380 and 1400, and
series of wars, civil wars, feudal rebellion and
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banditry afflicted much of Europe and contributed
to the decline of the medieval economy (Palmer
and Colton 1965). Urbanization fell as feudal city
states crumbled. North (1981) argues that a series
of major technological advances in military warfare, such as the introduction of the pike, longbow,
cannon, and eventually the musket, as well as a
growing market for mercenaries, contributed to
the decline of feudalism since a feudal lord could
no longer provide adequate protection for his
manor against these new military developments.
The modern period in history begins with the
year 1500. Between 1500 and 1800, the opening of
Atlantic commerce and the formation of nation
states fundamentally transformed Europe and the
world. Advances in ocean shipping, which led to
the discovery of maritime routes to the Americas
and Asia, ushered in a new era of international
trade. Although cities in the Mediterranean
remained important, the focus of urbanization
shifted toward the Atlantic as urbanization grew
rapidly in nations with easy access to the open
ocean such as Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands. In addition, nation states based
on monarchies arose throughout Europe and
established colonies in Africa and the New World.
These new nation states were supported by an
unprecedented growth in military and civil administration financed by taxes and debt (Brewer 1990).
The rise of western Europe and globalization
were accompanied by a significant growth in
urbanization. In Europe, while the upward trend
was not uniform over time, de Vries (1984) finds
that the number of cities with populations of at
least rose from 154 to 364 between 1500 and
1800. The growth in urbanization was concentrated in the very largest cities, whose main functions were to serve either as a government capital
or as a port city (de Vries 1984; Bairoch 1988).
The concentration of merchants in cities lowered
the costs of financing and coordinating trade
around the globe. Likewise, governments became
concentrated in cities since the efficiency of military and government operations involved the collection and processing of an enormous amount of
information (Brewer 1990).
The pre-industrial cities in the Middle East and
Europe possessed a variety of political regimes
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across space and over time. Most often, city states
were ruled by kings with absolute power, but in
some instances they were ruled by merchant
elites. While the rulers of city states provided
order and stability, they also imposed heavy tax
burdens on their subjects. Between 1000 and
1800, city states that were ruled by absolutist
governments grew much less significantly than
those governed by merchants or assemblies
(De Long and Shleifer 1993).
Industrialization and Urbanization
The Industrial Revolution, which began in Britain
around 1700, transformed the modern world in a
short period of time. In pre-industrial times, which
spanned thousands of years from the ancient and
medieval periods to the first two centuries of the
modern era, cities became important centres of
government, trade and artisan manufacturing,
but most of the population lived in rural farms
and villages. Yet, within a little over a century
after the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the
majority of people in Britain lived in cities. As
industrialization spread to other European nations
and the United States in the 19th century, and
eventually to an ever growing list of nations in
the 20th century, world urbanization rose rapidly.
The Industrial Revolution’s transformation of
the urban order began in the countryside. The
early factories arose in rural villages and towns
rather than in established major urban centres,
and less urbanized places industrialized more rapidly in Europe and in the United States (Bairoch
1988). However, as industrialization matured it
was significantly correlated with urbanization.
The rise of the manufacturing sector was not only
responsible for the emergence of new industrial
cities, but also contributed to the growth of traditional urban centres. Between 1800 and 1900, the
share of the urban population in industrialized
countries almost tripled, from 11 to 30 per cent
(Bairoch 1988).
It remains unclear why early industrialization
was rural or why late industrialization was urban.
Scholars generally believe that early factories
chose rural locations because of the availability
Urbanization
of water power, coal or unskilled labour (Bairoch
1988). Because early factories used women and
child labour intensely, Goldin and Sokoloff
(1984) believe that, in the United States, early
industrialization arose in rural New England
rather than in the rural South because the relative
labour productivity of women and children was
less than that of men in the former region. For
Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2004), industrialization caused urbanization as firms adopted the
Corliss steam engine as their primary power
source.
Kim (2005a, b) suggests that explanations of
why industrialization led to urbanization are likely
to rest on the rise of division of labour and the
labour market. Prior to industrialization, goods
were produced by self-employed artisans who
made the entire product. With industrialization,
factory owners hired workers in a labour market
and employed them in specialized tasks. Because
early industrialization was concentrated in a limited number of industries and was limited in scale,
firms located in rural places since the costs of
recruiting workers were relatively modest. However, as industrialization rose in scale and spread
to numerous industries, the agglomeration of
workers and firms in cities deepened the extent
of the division of labour and lowered labour market transaction costs.
One of the major developments associated
with the Industrial Revolution was a transportation revolution. In the pre-industrial period, the
bulk of long-distance trade occurred over bodies
of water such as canals, rivers, lakes, seas and
oceans. With the introduction of the railroad and
later trucks and airplanes, overland transportation
costs fell dramatically. In the United States, the
integration of regional economies led to a significant increase and then decrease in regional specialization (Kim 1995). The rise of US regional
trade led to the rise of many large inland cities
like Chicago, which emerged to coordinate the
increase in domestic trade.
In the second half of the 20th century, although
the rate of urbanization slowed in industrialized
nations, cities remain a vital component of the
modern economy. Scholars believe that one or
more factors, such as Marshallian externalities
Urbanization
(technological spillovers, non-traded industry
specific inputs, and labour market pooling), market size and natural advantages, cause the formation and growth of cities (Henderson and Thisse
2004). Moreover, while economic factors are
much more significant in modern than in
pre-modern times, political factors, such as tariffs
and dictatorships, remain important for urbanization (Ades and Glaeser 1995).
Patterns of World Urbanization
Urbanization was not confined to the Middle East
and Europe. Cities arose indigenously in India
(1000–400 BC), China (700–400 BC) and the
New World (100 BC). Cities diffused to Korea
(108 BC–AD 313) and Japan (AD 650–700) from
China, and to south-west Asia (AD 700–800)
from China and India. In the New World, cities
arose independently in Mesoamerica in Mexico
and the Andes in South America. With the arrival
of maize agriculture from Mesoamerica, urbanization reached the south-western and eastern parts
of North America. Whereas China and Japan
contained some of the largest pre-industrial cities,
and had urbanization rates comparable to, or perhaps even higher than, pre-industrial European
societies, the cities in the New World were
smaller, fewer in number, and less stable.
In Africa, there is considerable uncertainty as
to whether agriculture and cities arose independently. While there is evidence of domesticated
agriculture in Sahel (5000 BC) and tropical West
Africa (3000 BC), scholars remain unsure
whether founder crops arrived from elsewhere
(Diamond 1997). There is evidence of cities in
Africa as early as 1000 BC, but it is also not clear
whether these cities resulted from outside influences (Bairoch 1988). In Australia, no cities
arose indigenously as the aboriginal population
remained hunters and gatherers.
The coming of the modern era in 1500 not only
transformed western Europe but also decisively
altered the path of development around the world.
As European nations colonized the New World
and parts of Africa and Asia, they transplanted
their technologies, agriculture, germs and political
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institutions to their colonies. From the colonies,
the Europeans extracted new plants and resources
and traded them around the globe. The demography of the New World colonies was fundamentally altered as the native population suffered and,
to a varying extent, was supplanted by European
immigrants and African slaves. In general, colonization and globalization were accompanied by a
rapid growth in urbanization in Europe and the
colonies.
In the 19th and the 20th centuries, the uneven
diffusion of the Industrial Revolution around the
globe determined the patterns of world urbanization. While there is no general consensus on the
causes of uneven economic development, explanations usually rest on one or more factors related
to geography, technology, trade and institutions
(see Aghion and Durlauf 2005). In nations that
developed, industrialization led to a rapid growth
in urbanization; in those that did not, urbanization
remained relatively low. In addition, most of the
urban population in poor nations became concentrated in a handful of very large cities.
Summary
Cities in history arose with the advent of agriculture as they became centres of governments,
crafts, religion and universities. As markets and
trade developed, cities became centres of finance
and commerce. While the patterns of urbanization
differed greatly over space and time, the causes of
urbanization were the same around the world.
Pre-industrial urbanization rose with technological advances in agriculture, artisan manufacturing, transportation and trade, but fell with
environmental degradation, famine and disease.
Just as importantly, cities rose and fell with military and administrative efficiency of city states,
territorial empires and nation states.
With the Industrial Revolution, cities became
centres of factories and offices. Although early
industrialization began in rural areas, the shift in
the employment composition from agriculture to
manufacturing and services led to rapid urbanization. The formation and growth of industrial or
modern cities are attributed to benefits from a
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variety of market and non-market factors such as
the division of labour, lower search costs of
matching specialized workers and firms, information spillovers, market size, and non-traded intermediate inputs (Henderson and Thisse 2004).
With the rise in disposable incomes, cities became
centres of arts, entertainment and other amenities.
The history of civilization is the history of
urbanization. Without cities, the pillars of
civilization – literature, science and the arts –
would not exist. But as the industrial era gives
way to the information era, will cities disappear?
Leamer and Storper (2001) believe that face-toface interactions in cities are likely to remain
important for some time to come. For these
scholars, the coordination of complex, unfamiliar
and innovative activities depends on the successful transfer of uncodifiable messages and requires
long-term relationships, trust, closeness and
agglomerations. Wherever the new innovative
activity may arise, be it in commerce, finance,
politics, arts or science, the future of civilization
is likely to rest on the success of its citizens.
See Also
▶ Central Place Theory
▶ Location Theory
▶ Marketplaces
▶ New Economic Geography
▶ Regional Development, Geography of
▶ Spatial Economics
▶ Systems of Cities
▶ Urban Agglomeration
▶ Urban Economics
▶ Urban Growth
▶ Urban Political Economy
▶ Urban Production Externalities
Bibliography
Ades, A., and E. Glaeser. 1995. Trade and circuses:
Explaining urban giants. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 195–227.
Aghion, P., and S. Durlauf (eds.). 2005. Handbook of
economic growth. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Bairoch, P. 1988. Cities and economic development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ure, Andrew (1778–1857)
Brewer, J. 1990. The sinews of power: War, money and the
English state, 1688–1783. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Childe, V. 1950. The urban revolution. Town Planning
Review 21: 3–17.
De Long, J., and A. Shleifer. 1993. Princes and merchants:
European city growth before the industrial revolution.
Journal of Law and Economics 36: 671–702.
de Vries, J. 1984. European urbanization 1500–1800.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Diamond, J. 1997. Guns, germs, and steel. New York:
W.W. Norton.
Goldin, C., and K. Sokoloff. 1984. The relative productivity hypothesis of industrialization: The American case,
1820–1850. Quarterly Journal of Economics 99:
461–488.
Hammond, M. 1972. The city in the ancient world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Henderson, J., and J.-F. Thisse (eds.). 2004. Handbook of
regional and urban economics, vol. 4. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Kim, S. 1995. Expansion of markets and the geographic
distribution of economic activities: The trends in U.S. regional manufacturing structure, 1860–1987. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 881–908.
Kim, S. 2005a. Industrialization and urbanization: Did the
steam engine contribute to the growth of cities? Explorations in Economic History 42: 586–598.
Kim, S. 2005b. Division of labor and the rise of cities:
Evidence from U.S. industrialization, 1850–1880.
Mimeo. St. Louis: Washington University.
Lane, F. 1973. Venice: A maritime republic. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Leamer, E., and M. Storper. 2001. The economic geography of the internet age. Journal of International Business Studies 32: 641–665.
North, D. 1981. Structure and change in economic history.
New York: W.W. Norton.
Palmer, R., and J. Colton. 1965. The history of the modern
world. New York: Alfred Knoft.
Rosenberg, N., and M. Trajtenberg. 2004. A general purpose technology at work: The Corliss steam engine in
the late-nineteenth-century United States. Journal of
Economic History 64: 61–99.
Wrigley, E. 1987. People, cities and wealth. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Ure, Andrew (1778–1857)
William Lazonick
Andrew Ure, MD, was professor of chemistry and
natural science at Anderson’s College, Glasgow
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
from 1804 to 1830. In 1830, he introduced the
word ‘thermostat’ into the English language in
conjunction with a patent that he secured
(Standfort 1982, p. 659). At about the same time,
he moved to London to serve as a consultant in
analytical chemistry to the Board of Customs.
From 1832 to 1834, his major research assignment was to ascertain the wastage rate of raw
material in sugar refining in order to determine
the rebates on raw sugar import duties that British
refiners could legitimately claim. Ure (1843, p. iv)
complained that his research saved the exchequer
£300,000 but yielded him only £800 in remuneration and cost him his health.
To recuperate, he ‘spent several months in
wandering through the factory districts of Lancashire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, &c., with the happiest results to his health; having everywhere
experienced the utmost kindness and liberality
from the mill-proprietors’ (Ure 1835, p. viii).
Two important books were the result. The Philosophy of Manufactures (1835) and The Cotton
Manufacture of Great Britain (1836) are detailed
technical treatises on the industry at the heart of
Britain’s industrial revolution, interlaced with
commentary on the salutary moral, intellectual
and physical effects of factory life on the workers.
Ironically, it was Karl Marx who established
Ure’s place in the history of economics. Ure’s
blatantly pro-capitalist stance, combined with his
obvious technical expertise, made him the perfect
‘horse’s mouth’ in Marx’s attempt to show how
capitalists used technology to throw adult males
out of work and turn women and children into
mere appendages of the machine. Marx (1867
[1977], pp. 560, 563–4) invoked the authority of
Ure, who, in the conflict-ridden 1830s, argued that
the diffusion of more automated technology
would ‘put an end . . . to the folly of trades’
unions’, proving that ‘when capital enlists science
into her service, the refractory hand of labour will
be taught docility’ (Ure 1835, pp. 23, 368).
Writing some three decades later, however,
Marx failed to distinguish pro-capitalist ideology
from ongoing reality. Contrary to Ure and Marx,
adult male workers had not been definitively humbled, even in the presence of mechanization.
Rather, certain groups of workers had maintained
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substantial control of work organization and had
built up considerable union power (Lazonick
1979). In effect, Marx’s uncritical use of Ure
provided the ‘evidence’ needed to confirm that,
in their confrontation with capitalists armed with
technology, workers had ‘nothing to lose but their
chains’. Theory and history were parting company in Marx’s theory of capitalist development
(Lazonick 1986).
See Also
▶ Taylorism
Selected Works
1835. The philosophy of manufactures. London:
Knight.
1836. The cotton manufacture of Great Britain.
London: Knight.
1843. The revenue in jeopardy from spurious
chemistry. London: Ridgway.
Bibliography
Lazonick, W. 1979. Industrial relations and technical
change: The case of the self-acting mule. Cambridge
Journal of Economics 3: 231–262.
Lazonick, W. 1986. Theory and history in Marxian economics. In The future of economic history, ed. A.J. Field.
The Hague: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Marx, K. 1867. Capital, vol. I. New York: Vintage, 1977.
Standfort, J.T. 1982. Thermostat. In Encyclopedia Americana, vol. 26. New York: Grolier.
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
Zachary K. Kimball and Paul S. Willen
Abstract
A mortgage is an exchange of a collection of
rights between a borrower and a lender. In this
article, we describe those rights and explain
both their economic logic and their implications
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for economic analysis and policy. We briefly
discuss the medieval origins of the American
mortgage contract and its evolution into its present form. We then turn to topics relevant for
contemporary economic research – including
title and lien theory; recording and registration
of documents; judicial versus power-of-sale
foreclosure; deficiency judgments and recourse;
assignments; the Mortgage Electronic Registration System; and methods for avoiding foreclosure, including deeds-in-lieu and short sales.
Our discussion focuses on real property law
and its economic implications; we do not discuss, for example, securities law related to mortgage contracts.
Keywords
Equity; Default; Foreclosure; Housing; Law
and economics; Mortgage; Residential real
estate and finance
JEL Classifications
G21; G22; G28
Introduction
Mortgages underlie a great deal of property
ownership in the USA, both commercial and
residential – more than 69% of US owneroccupied housing units are subject to a mortgage
(US Census Bureau, 2010 Census). These critical
tools aid in the smooth operation of the housing
market, and residential mortgages allow borrowers to live in homes that they otherwise
could not afford to own. But for such an instrumental component of the economy, mortgages are
widely – and wildly – misunderstood. We explain
the complex legal and economic structure of a
modern mortgage, including its applications to
foreclosures and public policy. Our goal is to
provide a conceptual overview, not comprehensive coverage of all aspects of mortgage law; this
article is not written to provide legal advice.
To understand mortgage law, it is useful to go
back to its historic origins in medieval England.
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
The original common-law mortgage was a
repurchase agreement in which the borrower
sold the property to the lender and promised to
buy it back by repaying the loan, plus interest, on
an agreed date known as law day. If the borrower
failed to appear on law day, the repurchase agreement was void and the lender received clean title
to the property – title unencumbered by the borrower’s right to repurchase. English courts of
equity viewed this contract as unfair because the
value of the property could exceed the balance of
the loan, in which case failing to appear on law
day would lead to an excessive transfer of wealth
from borrower to lender. To remedy this, courts in
16th century England gave the borrower the right
to repurchase, or redeem, the property, even if he
or she had failed to appear. The borrower could
exercise this repurchase right by paying off the
loan, including interest and any associated costs.
The courts understood that there needed to be
some limit on this right of equitable redemption,
as it became known, because otherwise lenders
could never obtain clean title and, under such
circumstances, no property could ever serve as
good collateral for a loan. To solve this issue,
courts allowed lenders to petition to foreclose the
borrower’s right of equitable redemption. This
basic legal concept is the principle behind foreclosure to this day.
As we explain in section “Legal Frameworks:
Title Theory and Lien Theory” below, in 30 US
jurisdictions a mortgage contract is still a
repurchase agreement as it was in medieval
England. But even where it is not, the repurchase
metaphor goes a long way towards explaining
some counterintuitive concepts about mortgage
law. For example, in common usage a mortgage
transaction involves the lender giving a mortgage
to the borrower; however, in the eyes of the law,
the borrower is actually granting the mortgage to
the lender. The logic is that the mortgage transaction, as in medieval England, is the grant of the
property from the borrower to the lender.
In a sense, a mortgage contract establishes a
form of shared ownership of a residential property, in which each party can extinguish the
other’s ownership rights under certain conditions.
For the borrower, the equitable right of
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
redemption provides the power to claim the property by paying some agreed amount of money. In
the event that the borrower fails to repay the loan
as promised, the lender gets the right to extinguish
the borrower’s ownership interest by following
the appropriate foreclosure procedure.
In this article, we first discuss the mortgage
contract, including the two principal legal regimes
behind the transfer of ownership rights, as well as
the standards for recording mortgage documents
with the relevant authorities. We then discuss
foreclosure proceedings, including how they are
affected by the different legal regimes, why such
formal procedures are necessary, and some repercussions and complications that can emerge.
The Mortgage Contract
A mortgage is an exchange of a collection of
rights between a borrower and a lender. Although
in common usage a mortgage refers to a loan
secured by real estate, legally the loan is called a
‘note’ and is secured by a separate instrument
called a ‘mortgage’. The note is a debt contract
which specifies the amount lent and the schedule
for repayment – including the interest rate,
amortisation schedule, prepayment penalty and
any other relevant information such as the index
used for adjustable-rate mortgages. With the mortgage, the borrower conveys to the lender an interest in the property in order to secure the debt
evidenced by the note.
The contract works simply. If the borrower
makes the scheduled payments according to the
note, the lender can exercise essentially no property rights. The lender cannot sell the property, or
even set foot on it, without the permission of the
borrower. By repaying the loan, the borrower
satisfies the note and redeems the mortgage,
extinguishing the lender’s security interest in the
property. If the borrower violates the terms of the
note, or defaults, the lender can exercise the right
in the mortgage to foreclose the borrower’s equity
of redemption and extinguish the borrower’s
interest in the property. What constitutes default
is specified in the note; it includes failing to make
a scheduled payment, but may also include other
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violations of the contract, such as failing to insure
the property or renting the property without permission. It is important to recognise that problems
with the borrower’s finances or with the collateral
property do not directly constitute default on a
mortgage, and that this is different from many
other types of loan. For example, the borrower is
not required to maintain a certain amount of
equity in the property, as would be required with
a margin loan against a stock holding. We discuss
default and foreclosure proceedings in more detail
in section “Foreclosure Proceedings”.
Almost all mortgage contracts today are
uniquely connected to both a particular property
and a particular borrower. Historically, however,
lenders offered both assumable and portable mortgages. An assumable mortgage is tied to the property and can be transferred to a new owner after a
sale; today, a typical mortgage includes a due-onsale clause which requires the borrower to pay off
the loan when the property is sold. A portable
mortgage follows a borrower from property to
property, allowing the borrower to keep, for
example, a low interest rate even if market rates
have increased; such loans are rare.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss two
topics relating to mortgage contracts. The first
involves the two conceptually distinct US legal
frameworks for mortgages, known as title theory
and lien theory. The second is the role of the
recording process for mortgage documents.
Legal Frameworks: Title Theory and Lien
Theory
Although the USA inherited much of its property
law from England, individual states have since
developed distinct branches. The main difference
across jurisdictions relates to the ownership
framework. According to the first such framework, title theory, the mortgage actually conveys
legal title to the property from the borrower to the
lender with a mortgage deed. It is only upon
satisfying the mortgage note – by paying off the
debt – that the borrower becomes a legal
homeowner. Meanwhile, the borrower retains
equitable title to the property and, for all intents
and purposes, remains the apparent and effective
owner of the property. In Massachusetts, the
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Supreme Judicial Court described the phenomenon thusly: ‘to all the world except the [lender],
a [borrower] is the owner of the mortgaged
lands’. Dolliver v. St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. 128 Mass. 315, 316 (1880).
Over time, because the lender could not exercise any property rights despite having legal title
to the property, some jurists argued that ‘the
[lender] could no longer be said to have legal
title. . . and the interest of the [lender] was only a
security interest which was called a lien’ (Osborne
1951, p. 311). Statutes were enacted in a minority
of states, the earliest of which was South Carolina
in 1791, officially effecting this change and
establishing the alternate theory of conveyance,
lien theory, which allows the borrower to maintain
legal title to the property. In a lien-theory state,
property rights are conveyed by a mortgage lien.
In contrast to a deed, a lien does not transfer title to
the property. Instead, a lien grants the right to
recover debt through the sale of the property if
the borrower defaults on the note, although this
usually requires a lawsuit.
Thus title theory, which is used in 30 US jurisdictions, including Arizona, California and
Nevada, is the most directly analogous to the
medieval legal regime in which the mortgage
was an explicit repurchase agreement. However,
lien theory, used in the other 21 jurisdictions,
including Florida, Illinois and New York, can
also be construed in roughly the same terms.
So under either framework the borrower
retains effective ownership of the property until
one of two possible events occurs. The first is that
the borrower satisfies the note by paying off the
debt, at which point either, under title theory, legal
title reverts to the borrower or, under lien theory,
the lien is extinguished. The other possibility is
that the borrower defaults, usually by failing to
make a periodic payment. A borrower in default
maintains the right to repay the debt in
full – including late payments, fees and other
expenses – and thereby satisfy the note. Under
title theory, a defaulted borrower satisfying the
note does not automatically regain legal title
unless the lender reconveys it, but a court can
compel this reconveyance; under lien theory, satisfying the note automatically extinguishes the
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
lien, and insodoing the borrower immediately
has free and clear ownership of the property
(Osborne 1951, pp. 836–7).
As long as the borrower maintains the equity of
redemption – the ability to satisfy the note and
regain title to the property – the lender’s ownership is in question. In order to remove this cloud
from the title, a lender must foreclose on the
borrower’s equity of redemption. By doing so,
the borrower loses his or her right to redeem the
mortgage and regain clear title; this process of
extinguishing the borrower’s equity of redemption is the foreclosure. In a title-theory state, foreclosure is usually carried out through a
foreclosure auction (see section “Foreclosure
Types: Strict Foreclosure and Foreclosure by
Sale”). In a lien-theory state, because the lender
does not yet possess legal title to the property, the
lender usually must go to court to effect the foreclosure. Thus, in most lien-theory states, foreclosure is carried out through a judicial process (see
section “Foreclosure Methods: Judicial Foreclosure and Power-of-Sale Foreclosure”).
Borrowers in all states can redeem the mortgage debt before foreclosure. About half the states
also have a statutory right of redemption explicitly permitting borrowers or their successors a
limited time – generally six months to two
years – to redeem the mortgage after a foreclosure,
usually for the price of the foreclosure sale
(Nelson and Whitman 1985, p. 616). This action
nullifies the foreclosure sale, but it is hardly ever
used in practice (Nelson and Whitman 1985,
p. 622).
Mortgage Records: Document Recording,
Registration, and Priority
As a general rule, all mortgages in the USA are
publicly recorded at a town or county registry,
while records of the note are kept privately by
the borrower and the lender.
Public records generally contain most transfers
of interests in a property from one party to
another. However, they typically do not contain
the title to the property because there is usually no
physical document showing title. To establish that
a particular person has title to a property, one must
show that anyone with a previous interest in the
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
property has relinquished it – in other words, all
previous owners have deeded the property to
someone else, forming a chain of ownership, and
all previous mortgages have been discharged.
This system of recording transfers and inspecting
the historical record to establish a chain of title is
the de facto standard throughout the country.
However, in some jurisdictions there is title
registration for property more analogous to title
registration for vehicles, which usually involves
physical documents. Such a method ‘registers and
determines title to land so as to amount to practically a government patent to each purchaser’, but
these systems have not been fully utilised even
where they have been formally adopted (Osborne
1951, p. 496). In Massachusetts, for example, one
of the states which permits land registration, only
about 20% of land is registered.
The role of the public records differs across
states. In some states, only recorded documents
have legal standing. In other states, a deed is valid
even if it is never recorded. In the latter states,
however, a recorded deed almost always takes
precedence over an unrecorded deed, so failure
to record is rare. To understand the issue, consider
an example. Suppose Alex sells a house to Bailey
and Bailey does not record the sale deed. In some
jurisdictions, this transaction is perfectly valid and
Bailey has title to the property. Now suppose Alex
also sells the house to Casey and Casey’s deed is
recorded. Then both Bailey and Casey think they
own the house, but in some states, the courts
would hold that Casey, as the first to record the
purchase, is the legal owner of the property. In
other words, recording provides protection to the
buyer, even if the contract is valid without being
recorded. (Of course, Bailey could then sue Alex
for damages, but Bailey has no power over
Casey’s valid ownership. However, if Casey had
knowledge of Bailey’s deed before buying the
house from Alex, Casey’s deed would be considered invalid in some, but not all, states. These
details are governed by state recording statutes,
which are known generally as one of ‘race’,
‘notice’ or ‘race-notice’. See Hunt et al. (2011)
for a brief discussion.)
Documents eligible for recording include purchase deeds between homeowners, mortgage
14173
deeds and liens between borrowers and lenders,
and more controversially, assignments which
transfer ownership of mortgages between lenders.
Unlike deeds involving homeowners and borrowers, which are almost always recorded, assignments between lenders frequently go unrecorded.
To make matters even more confusing, in the
1990s the mortgage industry set up the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System (MERS). MERS
was created for many reasons. One was because
an increase in securitisation meant that assignments were more common and consequently
their frequency was more burdensome. Another
was that most registries still required paper copies.
But a third important reason was that, during the
savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s,
bank failures resulted in serious title problems as
mortgages changed hands, often several times and
without clear documentation.
To use MERS, the lender assigns MERS as the
mortgage owner of record in the registry. MERS,
in turn, keeps track of any underlying assignments of ownership from one lender to another.
If and when the controlling lender needs a
recorded interest in the property, MERS goes to
the registry and records an assignment of the
mortgage to that lender. MERS has worked
smoothly since its inception in 1995, but during
the foreclosure crisis that started in 2007, some
people raised questions about its legality, in particular with respect to foreclosures. In general,
appellate courts have found in favor of
MERS, but it remains controversial and litigation
continues.
Most US jurisdictions respect the doctrine that
‘the mortgage follows the note’, meaning that any
time a mortgage note is sold from one party to
another, ownership of the mortgage goes along
with it automatically, without requiring a separate
assignment. The two notable exceptions are Massachusetts and Minnesota. Reliance on this doctrine may simplify foreclosure, because the
foreclosing party need only demonstrate possession of the note in order to have the right to
foreclose that is provided by the mortgage. However, this simplification has recently been called
into question, particularly regarding its interplay
with MERS assignments.
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Foreclosure Proceedings
The fundamental principles of foreclosure date
back centuries, but the actual procedures have
evolved considerably over time. To understand
the logic of the foreclosure proceeding, it is
important to understand the motivations of the
two key parties. For the lender, the primary goal
is to ensure that there is no risk that the original
borrower can recover the property, which allows a
new buyer of the property to get clean title. For the
courts, the overarching concern is to prevent a
lender from injuring a borrower by taking more
than the lender is owed. Under current foreclosure
law, the court is not generally concerned with
whether the original loan was suitable for the
borrower or whether the lender made efforts to
prevent foreclosure, because the court’s narrow
focus is on whether borrower and lender upheld
their respective ends of the mortgage contract. In
particular, neither the mortgage contract nor current legal principles oblige the lender to modify
the loan or work with the borrower to prevent
foreclosure.
Foreclosure Types: Strict Foreclosure
and Foreclosure by Sale
Before the 19th century, foreclosures were what are
now called ‘strict’, meaning that the lender took
possession of the property and it was disposed of at
the lender’s discretion. However, US courts found
that this was unsatisfactory for largely the same
reason the English courts of equity distrusted the
original medieval mortgage – the value of the
property could exceed the amount owed and in
that case ‘there is injustice to the [borrower]’
(Osborne 1951, p. 904). The solution to this issue
became known in the USA as ‘foreclosure by sale’,
whereby foreclosure is effected by a public auction
of the property and the borrower receives any proceeds in excess of the amount owed (Osborne
1951, p. 908). It is important to emphasise that
the auction does not take place after the foreclosure; the auction itself is the legal foreclosure. In
other words, the equitable right of redemption vanishes the moment the auctioneer sells the property.
Most often, the auction is something of a formality where the lender is the high bidder and the
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
property ends up in the ‘real-estate owned’, or
REO, portfolio of the lender. At the auction, the
lender usually starts the bidding, often with an
offer much higher than the actual market value
of the property. This at first appears puzzling, but
recall that the goal of the lender in the foreclosure
process is to ensure that title to the property is
clean. Since a borrower could contest the foreclosure if the lender does not get the best possible
price at auction, a low winning bid could potentially cloud title to the property. By setting the
opening bid sufficiently high – often only slightly
less than the borrower owes, which is generally
more than the property is worth – the lender can
forestall any challenge to the foreclosure.
Foreclosure Methods: Judicial Foreclosure
and Power-of-Sale Foreclosure
Two types of foreclosure by sale emerged in US
law. The first is foreclosure by judicial sale, in
which the lender petitions the court and the court
orders a foreclosure auction. Judicial sale is available in every jurisdiction. The alternative approach
is that, when the mortgage is originated, the borrower gives the lender the right to carry out a
foreclosure auction in the event of default, a right
known as the ‘power of sale’ (Osborne 1951,
p. 992). Although rare in the early 19th century,
power-of-sale foreclosure became more common
in the USA over time (Osborne 1951, p. 993).
Power-of-sale foreclosure is available in a
majority of states. In general, states in the south
and west of the country offer power of sale and
states in the north and east are judicial; whether
power-of-sale or judicial foreclosure is the preferred method aligns almost exactly with whether
the state follows title or lien theory, respectively.
Of the states with the most severe foreclosure
problems in the current crisis, Arizona, California
and Nevada all allow power-of-sale foreclosure,
while Florida only allows judicial foreclosure.
Other notable judicial states include Illinois,
New York and New Jersey. For fuller discussion
of judicial and power-of-sale foreclosure, see
Gerardi et al. (2011) and National Consumer
Law Center (2010).
Some have suggested that the judicial procedure, by giving the borrower an opportunity to
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
appear in court, is friendlier to the borrower.
Meanwhile, power of sale is generally viewed as
lender-friendly because lenders face no official
supervision by the courts. But the truth is more
nuanced. Under power of sale, the desire for clean
title leads to implicit supervision. Specifically,
most buyers of residential real estate need title
insurance – lenders usually require it before
funding a loan – and title insurers will not insure
a foreclosed property if there is any chance that a
previous owner could contest the title and that the
courts could declare the foreclosure invalid. So, in
a sense, title insurers act as third-party enforcers in
place of the courts in power-of-sale states.
In judicial states the courts provide explicit
supervision, but that supervision provides surprisingly little, if any, additional protection to borrowers. To get the court to order a foreclosure in
a judicial state, a representative of the lender must
attest that three key conditions are met: the borrower took out a mortgage, pledged the property
as collateral, and defaulted on the mortgage. This
attestation usually comes in the form of an affidavit certifying that the representative has reviewed
the borrower’s loan file. Since effectively all borrowers facing foreclosure meet these conditions,
the borrower has little to contest in court and
borrowers rarely succeed in blocking foreclosure;
borrowers contesting judicial foreclosures usually
yield only delays. During the recent foreclosure
crisis, some lenders’ representatives signed affidavits without complete knowledge of the loan
files, a practice often referred to as ‘robosigning’.
Because of these affidavits, borrowers were able
to raise questions about the validity of the attestations despite the fact that the foreclosure files met
the three key conditions.
The data suggest that judicial foreclosure is
borrower-friendly and lenderunfriendly only in
the sense that it extends the foreclosure timeline.
Gerardi et al. (2011) show that fewer than half of
initiated foreclosures are completed within three
years in 14 of the 18 judicial states, whereas the
same is true in only seven of the 33 power-of-sale
jurisdictions. Nor do borrowers benefit from judicial foreclosure in other ways – they are not more
likely to cure a serious delinquency in judicial
states than they are in power-of-sale states, and
14175
they are not more likely to receive a mortgage
modification.
Legal scholars have long argued that the
power-of-sale procedure can replicate the protections of the judicial process at much lower cost.
Nelson and Whitman (1985, p. 536), for example,
write that
The underlying theory of power of sale foreclosure
is simple. It is that by complying with the above
type statutory requirements the [lender] accomplishes the same purposes achieved by judicial foreclosure without the substantial additional burdens
that the latter type of foreclosure entails. Those
purposes are to terminate all interests junior to the
mortgage being foreclosed and to provide the sale
purchaser with a title identical to that of the [borrower] as of the time the mortgage being foreclosed
was executed.
Mortgage Deficiency: Deficiency Judgments,
Lender Recourse, and Second Liens
The concern of the courts, as we have discussed,
has historically been that a foreclosure would
injure a borrower who owned a property worth
more than the loan balance. That is, of course,
ironic because a borrower with a property worth
more than the loan balance is virtually never
foreclosed upon; the borrower can simply sell
the property and pay off the debt. Rather, the
overwhelming majority of foreclosures involve
the opposite scenario: borrowers with negative
equity. In this situation, when the borrower owes
more on the loan than the value of the property, the
amount recovered from the auction will not cover
all the money the borrower owes. In the language
of the mortgage contract, the security for the
mortgage will not cover the debt specified in the
note. This gap is called a deficiency, but it is not
automatically a debt owed by the borrower, since
the note has been extinguished. (The balance of a
deficiency may become a debt due the lender as
part of a strict foreclosure proceeding, although
these are relatively rare (Nelson and Whitman
1985, p. 595).) Historically, lenders in the USA
could sue the borrower and get a deficiency judgment, which converts the deficiency into an
unsecured debt. This process of pursuing a
mortgage deficiency is called recourse and is
common throughout the world. During the Great
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Depression, however, US lenders abused deficiency judgments by underbidding at auction in
order to inflate deficiencies; consequently, some
states enacted anti-deficiency statutes. The antideficiency laws often have confusing subtleties: in
California, for example, deficiency judgments can
only be pursued for judicial foreclosures of refinance mortgages, and even then the deficiency is
limited and the borrower is provided a right of
redemption. According to Ghent and Kudlyak
(2011), only 11 states have legal systems that are
effectively non-recourse. Statutorily, most mortgages in the USA are recourse loans.
It is true, however, that lenders generally do not
pursue deficiency judgments on first mortgages
and, as mentioned earlier, set an opening bid that
is close to the amount owed on the loan in order to
ensure a small deficiency, even if the REO sale
price (i.e. the price the lender receives when
reselling the property to a third party) leads to a
large loss. The main reason lenders do not pursue
deficiency judgments is that borrowers who lose
their homes typically have few or no other assets.
US bankruptcy also law allows borrowers to discharge deficiency judgments. Moreover, a deficiency judgment may cause the court to question
the fairness of the foreclosure, in particular the
auction and bidding process, regardless of the
circumstances. Thus, lenders often forgo pursuit
of a deficiency judgment because of the inclination of mortgage law towards borrower protection; in this way, most first mortgages are
effectively non-recourse in practice.
In contrast to lenders of first mortgages,
lenders of second mortgages have only a limited
amount to gain from foreclosure, because the collateral for the second mortgage is not the property
itself but the borrower’s equitable right of
redemption. In other words, if the second lender
forecloses, the buyer at auction acquires the property with the first mortgage still in force. Such
foreclosures on second mortgages are rare; much
more common is foreclosure of a first mortgage on
a property which also has a second mortgage. In
that case, the second lender is entitled to recover
its debt from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale,
but only after the first lender’s debt has been
satisfied. If the auction price is insufficient to
US Mortgage and Foreclosure Law
cover the amount owed on the second mortgage,
as is usually the case, the second lender can pursue
a deficiency judgment against the borrower; deficiency judgments for second mortgages are much
more common than deficiency judgments for first
mortgages.
Avoiding Foreclosure: Deeds-in-Lieu
and Short Sales
Given the time, expense and complexity of foreclosure, many in the current crisis have asked if
there are alternatives. Alternatives such as mortgage modifications that allow the borrower to
retain ownership do not generally involve real
property law and are beyond the scope of this
article. However, there are two procedures
designed to generate the same outcome as a foreclosure at a lower cost.
A deed in lieu of foreclosure, or simply a deedin-lieu, is when the borrower deeds the property to
the lender in exchange for forgiveness of most or
all of the mortgage debt. A short sale is when the
borrower sells the property for less than the outstanding balance of the loan and the lender agrees
to discharge the mortgage despite the deficiency.
Both procedures benefit the lender, saving time
and expense, and the borrower, who gets a cleaner
exit from an unfortunate situation and a less damaged credit history than would result from foreclosure. Further, lenders agreeing to deeds-in-lieu
or short sales generally choose to forgo the possibility of a deficiency judgment; choosing to forgo
the deficiency also helps to preclude accusations
of exploiting the borrower. The downside of a
deed-in-lieu or short sale from the borrower’s
perspective is that he or she cannot live rent-free
while waiting for a foreclosure auction – a wait
that can often take months or years.
Deeds-in-lieu and short sales each face a serious obstacle: they avoid a true foreclosure. At
first, it may be surprising that this is an obstacle
at all, particularly in light of concerns about foreclosures and their impact during the recent financial crisis. The courts, however, have historically
viewed the foreclosure process, and the foreclosure auction in particular, as a central protection
for the borrower. Without an auction, there is no
way to know for sure whether the borrower
Use of Experiments in Health Care
surrendered a property worth more than the mortgage debt. The courts might then question
whether the lender coerced or misled the borrower
into giving up the right to a full foreclosure and
thereby circumvented, or clogged, the borrower’s
equity of redemption. It is for this reason that ‘the
deed in lieu of foreclosure can create substantial
problems for the [lender] and is often, from its
perspective, a dangerous device’ – the same holds
true for a short sale (Nelson and Whitman 1985,
p. 474). This is even more true when the borrower
has a second mortgage, because deeds-in-lieu and
short sales negotiated with a first lender do not
extinguish subordinate mortgages; in those cases,
‘the only prudent alternative for the [first lender] is
to foreclose’ (Nelson and Whitman 1985, p. 476).
See Also
▶ Foreclosure, Economics of
▶ Household Portfolios
▶ Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Bibliography
Gerardi, K., L. Lambie-Hanson, and P.S. Willen. 2011. Do
borrower rights improve borrower outcomes? Evidence
from the foreclosure process. Public Policy Discussion
Paper 11-9. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Available at http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/
ppdp/2011/ppdp1109.pdf
Ghent, A.C., and M. Kudlyak. 2011. Recourse and residential mortgage default: Evidence from US states.
Review of Financial Studies 24(9): 3139–3186.
Hunt, J.P., R. Stanton, and N. Wallace. 2011. The end of
mortgage securitization? Electronic registration as a
threat to bankruptcy remoteness. Manuscript. Available
at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/stanton/papers/pdf/
mers.pdf
National Consumer Law Center. 2010. Foreclosures, The
consumer credit and sales legal practice series,
3rd ed. National Consumer Law Center.
Nelson, G.S., and D.A. Whitman. 1985. Real estate finance
law, Hornbook series, student edition, 2nd ed. St. Paul:
West Publishing.
14177
Osborne, G.E. 1951. Handbook on the law of mortgages,
Hornbook series. St. Paul: West Publishing.
U.S. Census Bureau, 2011. 2010. Census summary file 1 –
United States.
Use of Experiments in Health Care
Joseph P. Newhouse
Abstract
Two of the best known randomised trials in
health economics are described in detail in
this chapter: the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment and the Oregon Health Insurance
Experiment. The RAND Experiment randomised participants to health insurance plans
that varied the cost of care from free care at
one extreme to an approximation of a large
deductible at the other. Those on the free
care plan increased their use of services by
about 30% relative to those on the large
deductible plan. For the average participant
there appeared to be little or no effect on health
outcomes from this change in use. Among the
poor with hypertension (high blood pressure),
however, blood pressure was better controlled
on the free care plan, which projected to about
a 10% decrease in the risk of mortality. The
Oregon Experiment randomised its participants to Medicaid or to remaining uninsured;
those with Medicaid insurance used more services and suffered less from depression.
Keywords
Field experiments; Health insurance; Health
insurance experiment; Randomised trials
JEL Classifications
I13; I18; C9
Disclaimer The views expressed are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.
Medicine adopted the randomised controlled trial
in the immediate post-Second World War period
to determine the clinical effects of various drugs,
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14178
procedures and devices. Since that time results
from tens of thousands of clinical trials have
been reported in the medical literature, in part
because such a trial is generally required to obtain
approval to market a new drug in the USA, the
European Union and many other countries. Trials
in the economics of health care are, of course,
much less common than trials in clinical medicine, but there have been well-known influential
health economics trials, and one may expect their
use to increase. Such trials are the subject of this
chapter. As a semantic note, medicine tends to use
the word trial and social scientists tend to use the
word experiment to mean the same thing; I shall
use the two words interchangeably.
One virtue of a randomised experiment is well
known; assuming the randomisation is successful
and there is no selection introduced from refusal
to participate or attrition during the experiment,
the treatment assignment is independent of both
observed and unobserved variables. As a result,
ignoring issues around refusal and attrition, a simple comparison of means between the treatment
and control groups – or of means between alternative treatment groups – yields an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. Rather than simply
comparing means, however, analysts frequently
estimate a regression equation with a treatment
effect and covariates to lower residual variation.
In principle this improves power and can adjust
for any minor imbalances across treatment and
control groups, but it can also lead to overfitting,
meaning that mean square error can be larger if
covariates are included than if they are not (Duan
et al. 1983). Thus a reasonable precept in designing an experiment is that power should be sufficient without using covariates.
Randomisation thus directly addresses the
problem that often arises when economists use
observational data to estimate causal effects,
namely that the allocation of persons to various
treatments may not be independent of
unobserved – or more accurately uncontrolled –
variables that also influence the outcome, thereby
creating bias in the estimate of treatment effects.
For example, one may want to know how the
generosity of the insurance contract affects
demand for medical services, but standard theory
Use of Experiments in Health Care
implies that, ceteris paribus, individuals who
have chosen more generous insurance expect to
use more services, typically because they are, or
expect to be, sicker (Rothschild and Stiglitz
1976). In other words, when estimating a demand
curve from observational data the consumer’s
insurance contract is endogenous, at least in individual insurance markets where consumers have a
choice of plan. Failure to address the endogeneity
can result in overestimating the effect of insurance
generosity on the use of services; some of the
additional use by those with generous insurance
contracts stems from their being sicker in ways
that the analyst cannot control for. If, however,
there is a negative correlation between risk aversion and sickness, the bias may result in an underestimate; in that case the healthy could buy a more
generous insurance policy than the sick because
they are more risk-averse.
The standard econometric treatment for endogeneity is, of course, the use of instrumental variable(s), but finding suitable instruments can be
difficult in observational data. The randomised
experiment is in fact a special case of instrumental
variable analysis, in which the instrument is the
initial randomised treatment assignment. Under
standard assumptions, instrumental variable analysis can be used in the context of a randomised
experiment to adjust for differential refusal to
accept various treatment assignments or differential attrition among treatment assignments. The
Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (OHIE)
that I describe below used instrumental variable
analysis in this fashion.
In addition to addressing the issue of endogeneity, there are other, less well appreciated virtues of designed experiments. Most importantly,
the experimenter can choose the treatments whose
effects are to be assessed, whereas the analyst
using observational data must take the treatments
as given. If the observational data do not include
the region of interest, they are not very useful.
Moreover, if there are multiple treatments of interest, the experimenter can take account of any
differential interest in the various treatments
when determining the proportion of the total sample to be assigned to each treatment. The example
of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment
Use of Experiments in Health Care
(RHIE) described below illustrates both these
features.
The field of health economics began in the
1960s with the seminal theoretical paper of
Kenneth Arrow (1963), and empirical work was
not long behind. In fact, the RHIE, one of the bestknown experiments in health economics, was carried out relatively early in the development of the
field in the 1970s and early 1980s. I directed that
experiment and describe it next; more details are
available in Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group (Newhouse and The Insurance
Experiment Group 1993). I then describe a much
more recent experiment, the OHIE (Finkelstein
et al. 2011; Baicker et al. 2013; Taubman et al.
2014). Like the RHIE, the OHIE is also well
known; in addition to their prominence in the
literature, I have chosen to describe those two
experiments here since I participated in both and
know them well.
Of course, other experiments have been
conducted in health economics, both in the USA
and elsewhere, for example the China Health
Insurance Experiment (Sine 1994); a randomised
experiment on cost sharing in Ghana (Ansah et al.
2009; Powell-Jackson et al. 2014); the MI FREEE
trial of making effective drugs free for post-heart
attack patients (Choudhry et al. 2011, 2014); the
Accelerated Benefits Demonstration and Evaluation Project, a randomised trial to determine if
earlier access to Medicare would improve health
or promote an earlier return to work among new
Disability Insurance recipients (Michalopoulos,
et al. 2011); and the PNPM Generasi Program in
Indonesia, a randomised trial of a community
block program to improve health and education
(Olken et al. 2011). I close with some data on the
frequency of randomised experiments and a
pointer toward additional experiments in health
economics that are now in progress.
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment
(RHIE)
This experiment sought to measure the price elasticity of demand for medical services. Because
many persons, even many economists, do not
14179
want to assign normative meaning to observed
demand curves, the RHIE also sought to determine the effects on health outcomes of induced
changes in the use of services from different
degrees of cost sharing. When the RHIE began
in the early 1970s, the USA was debating various
legislative proposals to establish a national health
insurance plan, and a key point of contention was
the role of cost sharing for services. One school of
thought, represented most prominently by Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-MA), held that medical care
should be free at the point of service. Adherents of
this view often argued that if persons had to pay
for care they would put off receiving care and/or
not comply with prescribed clinical regimens,
with detrimental effects for their health and potentially higher subsequent cost of treatment. The
opposing school of thought, led by the Nixon
Administration, relied on standard economic theory, and argued in effect that free health care
would encourage moral hazard, or in the vernacular, would lead to the overuse of care. Ultimately,
as is well known, the USA did not adopt a national
insurance plan at that time, but to generate evidence on the effect of cost sharing the Nixon
Administration authorised the RHIE.
The RHIE was to some degree modelled after
so-called income maintenance experiments, several of which began in the 1960s and were being
carried out at the time the RHIE was conceived
(Robins 1985). These experiments sought to
determine the effect on labour supply of a minimum guaranteed income that was taxed away as
earnings rose. The treatments in the income maintenance experiments varied the level of the guarantee and the size of the tax rate.
The treatments in the RHIE were patterned
after the prevailing indemnity health insurance
plans of the early 1970s. Those insurance plans
passively reimbursed participants’ expenses for
medical services subject to a deductible and a
coinsurance rate, which was often in the range of
20%. Some insurance plans, however, especially
in unionised industries, had little or no cost sharing. There were rather loose upper limits on fees
that could be charged. Insurers did not generally
intervene in the delivery of care; managed care
techniques that are common today in the USA
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were rare. Thus, most of the 2,000 families in the
RHIE were allocated to plans in which they either
paid nothing for care, which I will term the free
plan, or paid 25% coinsurance up to a stop loss, or
paid 95% coinsurance up to a stop loss. The 95%
coinsurance plan was intended to approximate a
deductible, but reimbursed, 5% of the family’s
medical expense to give the family a modest
incentive to file a claim. (At the end of the experiment an audit study showed that claim filing rates
were around 7–9% less in dollar value in the 95%
plan than in plans with lower coinsurance rates
and correspondingly higher incentives to file a
claim. As will be seen below, 7–9% is small
relative to the differences in use among the
plans.) Because there was some interest in the
shape of the demand curve between 25% and
95%, the RHIE also allocated some families to a
plan with 50% coinsurance, but it received a
smaller share of families because of less interest
in such a coinsurance rate. Almost all medical
services and drugs were covered because information on use came from claims forms that the
families filed with the RHIE, so there would be no
administrative information on the use of a service
if it were not covered.
In 1973 the United States Congress enacted the
Health Maintenance Organization Act, which was
intended to spur the growth of organisations that
would agree to accept a capitated or fixed amount
in return for supplying ‘necessary’ medical services. Support for this act was based on observational data from a few Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs). Those data suggested
the HMOs had less utilisation with no obvious
detrimental health effects, although little effort
had been made to determine effects on health
outcomes. There also was concern that the lower
observed utilisation might have arisen from
favourable selection. One part of the RHIE therefore randomised families to an HMO. Ignoring
one small and inconclusive randomised prior
experiment in a new HMO, the RHIE was the
first effort to carry out a randomised experiment
with an HMO and remains the only such experiment I know of.
The RHIE sought to enrol a representative
sample of the non-elderly American population.
Use of Experiments in Health Care
(The Nixon Administration did not want to experiment with cost sharing in the Medicare plan that
covered those over 65 years of age.) Given the
budget constraint for the experiment, the fixed
costs of operating in a given site, and estimates
of between-site and within-site variances, the
optimal number of sites was six. In order to ensure
a degree of representativeness, the sites were purposively chosen to represent all four census
regions, to vary in population from two small
rural sites to a large metropolitan area (Seattle,
WA), and to vary in the wait for an appointment
for a non-urgent problem. (The latter dimension
was an observational study within the RHIE;
because of the likelihood that a national plan
with free care would lead to some form of
non-price rationing, at least in the short run, the
experiment sought to determine what observable
consequences there were, if any, from variation
across sites in waiting times to see a physician for
a non-urgent problem. The only observable effect
turned out to be that more persons sought care in
the emergency department if waiting times for
office visits were longer.) To determine if
low-income families were differentially affected
by cost sharing, those families were oversampled;
in addition, the upper 3% of the national income
distribution was excluded, as were individuals
who were institutionalised at baseline. Thus, the
sample consisted of persons under age 62 at the
time of enrolment who were living in the community. They participated for either a three-or fiveyear period. (Those randomly assigned to the fiveyear enrolment period were under age 60 at the
time of enrolment so that they would not become
eligible for Medicare during the experiment.)
Most enrolled families, of course, had health
insurance prior to the experiment, typically
through the employer of an adult in the family. If
those families were randomly assigned to a plan
with cost sharing, they could well rationally refuse
to enrol because their current insurance could be
more generous than the experimental plan. Therefore the RHIE included an unconditional lump
sum side payment that guaranteed the family
they would not be financially worse off from
participating and in fact with near certainty
would be better off from participating and
Use of Experiments in Health Care
14181
Free
25%
50%
95%
5
4.5
4.5
4
3.3
3.5
3.0
3
2.7
2.5
2
1.5
1
1.28
1.02
1.05 0.92 0.99
0.82 0.76
0.70
0.5
0
Spending (1000's $)
Admissions (/1000)
Visits per person
Use of Experiments in Health Care, Fig. 1 Annual
spending and utilisation, by coinsurance (Notes: The
spending results are those predicted from a model that
transformed raw spending into the logarithm of spending
and then retransformed the logarithm back to dollars, but
results from raw means are similar. Spending data are in
1991 dollars. Error bars show one standard deviation error.
Further details are in Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group (Newhouse and The Insurance Experiment
Group 1993))
completing the experiment irrespective of the
plan to which they were assigned. Some random
variation was built into this lump sum to
estimate the income effect that the side payments
caused; the results showed the income effect to be
quantitatively unimportant. Interestingly, the side
payments in the RHIE are analytically similar to
an employer’s deposits in a Health Savings
Account.
Despite there being no financially rational reason to refuse or drop out, both refusals and attrition were somewhat lower on the free plan than on
the plans with cost sharing; this difference in those
refusing, however, was not related to any observable pre-experiment variable, including the use of
services or self-rated health status. There have
been two critiques of the RHIE that have
emphasised the differential refusal and attrition
rates as potentially leading to an overestimate of
the demand response (Nyman 2007; Aron-Dine
et al. 2013), but subsequent observational data
have generally been consistent with the RHIE
results (Newhouse et al. 2008; Chandra et al.
2010 2014; Baicker and Goldman 2011).
Figure 1 shows the main results on the annual
utilisation of services and spending in plans with
four different coinsurance rates, the free plan (zero
coinsurance), and plans with 25%, 50% and 95%
coinsurance. In the latter three plans annual
out-of-pocket spending was capped at $1000
($750 in the 95% plan); this cap was scaled
down for low-income families. In general,
utilisation decreased as coinsurance increased.
The one exception was hospital admissions in
the 25%, 50% and 95% plans; many people in
these plans who were hospitalised, however,
reached the annual out-of-pocket limit, in which
case the cost of an admission was simply the
amount of the out-of-pocket limit ($750 or
$1000; less for lower income persons) less any
other out-of-pocket health spending during the
year. Thus a more meaningful comparison of hospital admission rates is between the free plan and
all the cost sharing plans taken together. That
difference is substantial.
Spending was about 30% less in the 95% coinsurance rate plan and about 20% less in the 25%
coinsurance plan than in the free plan. Hospital
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14182
admissions were about 20% less in all the costsharing plans taken together, and there were
between one and two more physician visits per
year by those with free care than by those in plans
with cost sharing.
In standard welfare economics, of course, the
additional utilisation in the free plan would be
treated as a welfare loss from moral hazard
(Pauly 1968). Doing so overstates the loss, since
there is a gain from reduced risk in the free plan,
but the overstatement is modest because of the
stop loss feature (Newhouse and the Insurance
Experiment Group 1993). Many, however, reject
the application of standard welfare economics in
this context because of consumer ignorance and
agency problems (e.g. Evans 1984; Rice 1998;
Cookson and Claxton 2012). To address these
concerns the RHIE collected many measures of
physiologic health, self-rated general health and
health habits such as smoking and exercise. In this
context the question was whether the additional
services in the free plan translated into better
health on these dimensions.
In general the answer to that question was that
they did not. The one important exception was
that there was better control of hypertension
(high blood pressure) in the free plan among persons in the lowest 20% of the income distribution
and the lowest 25% of the health distribution,
which implied a 10% reduction in that group’s
predicted risk of future mortality. Also there was
marginally better corrected vision (eyeglasses
were a covered service), and there were fewer
unfilled cavities (dental services were covered)
in the free plan. But for most of the population
the additional visits and hospital admissions in the
free plan did not result, on average, in better
outcomes.
Why this was so must be speculative, but, as
mentioned above, those who participated in the
RHIE were under 62 at the time of enrolment and
were living in the community, meaning they were
not institutionalised. Most such persons were reasonably healthy. Although the marginal additional
services in the free plan almost certainly benefited
some individuals, they could well have harmed
others, either through medical error or poor quality care, such as prescribing antibiotics for a viral
Use of Experiments in Health Care
condition (Institute of Medicine 1999, 2001). On
average, the potential benefits and harms in this
population seemed to offset except for poor
hypertensives, where the prior odds of benefiting
from additional services were higher. Interestingly, more of the difference in blood pressure
control across the plans was from a higher likelihood of a diagnosis conditional during a visit in
the free plan rather than the higher likelihood of a
visit.
Although undertaken to support a decision
about a national health insurance plan in the
1970s, the results of the RHIE were published in
the 1980s when the American political environment had changed and there was no active discussion of such a plan. As a result, the RHIE had its
immediate impact on commercial health insurance. Cost-sharing in commercial health insurance increased substantially after the results were
published, especially cost-sharing for hospital services; because most of those with commercial
insurance were not in the lowest 20% of the
income distribution, this was probably on average
a welfare gain that considerably outweighed the
cost of the experiment (Manning et al. 1987).
Although the data from the RHIE are now old,
its results are still generally accepted as the best
available estimates of the effects of cost-sharing
(Congressional Budget Office 2006, 2010, 2013).
Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office continues to use the RAND results to estimate the
cost of various legislative proposals, including the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010. Perhaps the RHIE results have held up
despite the changes in medical treatment because
much of the effect of cost-sharing appeared to be
on the patient’s decision to seek care at all; once
having sought care, medical problems appeared to
be treated similarly on the various plans in the
experiment.
The Oregon Health Insurance
Experiment (OHIE)
The OHIE began with a decision by the state
of Oregon to expand its Medicaid program to
reduce the number of uninsured in the state.
Use of Experiments in Health Care
The expansion was to take place among childless
adults, exactly the population that the Medicaid
expansion of the Affordable Care Act targeted.
Because federal law required that eligibility for
an expansion be granted on a non-discriminatory
basis, the state randomised a pool of uninsured
either to eligibility for Medicaid or to a control
group. This pool of uninsured persons was formed
from those who applied for a lottery in which
10,000 winners and members of their household
would be eligible for Medicaid. After a five-week
intensive marketing campaign, almost 90,000 persons applied. To apply, an adult in the household
had to send in a postcard with basic information
such as name, address, telephone number and
language preference. Alternatively, a person
could transmit that information to the state using
the telephone or the web.
The state sent the 10,000 winners of the lottery
a packet of forms, the purpose of which was to
determine their eligibility for Medicaid, meaning
that the household had to describe, among other
things, its income and assets. Only about 60% of
those who were sent packets returned the application, and of that 60% only around half were eligible for Medicaid. In the end, only about a quarter
of those who ‘won’ the lottery were ultimately
enrolled in Medicaid. Because the randomisation
took place among those who returned the postcard
with the basic information, there was no assurance
that those who finally enrolled, i.e. the quarter of
the group who won the lottery, resembled the
control group. Therefore the OHIE investigators
calculated both intent-to-treat results (that is,
results including all those who were randomised
to the treatment group irrespective of whether
they returned the forms to determine eligibility
or whether they were even eligible for Medicaid)
as well as results using the randomised assignment as an instrumental variable for Medicaid
eligibility. The latter estimate effectively
assumed that all of the effect of the treatment
that was estimated in the intent-to-treat analysis
came from those who ultimately enrolled and
that none of it came from those who did not.
Because only a quarter of those randomised to
the treatment group ultimately enrolled in Medicaid, the instrumental variable estimate of the
14183
treatment effect was four times that of the intentto-treat estimate (4 = 1/0.25).
Relative to the RHIE, the strength of the OHIE
was that one of its two arms was an uninsured
group and the OHIE thus provided a direct estimate of the effect of expanding insurance among
the uninsured. The RHIE did not and could not
have such a group, since it would have been both
unethical and impractical to randomise families
with insurance to be uninsured. In addition, the
OHIE was able to collect data on the principal
economic purpose of health insurance: to protect
the household against large random losses of
wealth. In particular, it obtained information
from credit rating agencies on bankruptcies and
bills sent to collection, among other indicators of
financial strain. The RHIE had not been able to do
that because credit rating agencies were in their
infancy when it was carried out.
The OHIE, however, had three weaknesses relative to the RHIE. Whereas the RHIE had all its
participants file claims forms (except for the HMO
group, where utilisation information was obtained
from the HMO’s administrative data), the OHIE
could not do this for the uninsured group. The
OHIE was, however, able to obtain administrative
data on hospitalisations and emergency department
use from data that hospitals filed with the state for
all admissions; it successfully matched these data
to its participants. Information on physician office
visits and pharmaceutical use, however, was limited to self-reports by participants. This had two
consequences. First, data on total spending in the
control group was inferred from average payments
by the uninsured in a national survey. Second, data
on exactly what was done during the physician visit
and in particular what procedures were carried out
was lacking.
A second weakness of the OHIE relative to the
RHIE was less control over refusal and attrition.
Both were at rather modest levels in the RHIE,
because it was never in the economic interest of
participants to either refuse or withdraw. The analogue of refusal in the OHIE was not returning the
Medicaid application form after winning the lottery or returning the form but being ineligible for
Medicaid. As mentioned above, this effectively
meant that 75% of those randomised to the
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treatment group were refusals. In addition, attrition both among the 25% who were actually
enrolled in Medicaid as well as among the control
group was an issue. If a control group household
obtained insurance, for example by taking a job
that offered employment-related insurance, it
effectively ceased to be a useful observation. Similarly, Oregon recertified eligibility for Medicaid
every six months. If because of increases in
income or assets a household no longer qualified
for Medicaid, it also effectively ceased to be a
useful observation.
Most of the research funds for the OHIE went
to a one-time effort to collect biomarkers for such
indicators as blood pressure and measures of diabetes and cholesterol. Because of the loss of sample from both the treatment and control groups
over time, these measures were collected at 18 to
24 months after the start of enrolment rather than
the three-or five-year period of the RHIE. In addition, the state offered Medicaid to the control
group after this period, so no additional data collection was carried out.
A third weakness came from the OHIE’s
timing. It was beginning in the field at approximately the same time as the analysis group formed
to determine the information to collect; as a result,
there was no time to carry out a proper baseline
interview. Although this did not cause bias, it did
cause a loss of power, especially for the biomarker
results. Over a short period most biomarkers are
reasonably stable absent medical intervention; as
a result, a baseline observation on their values is
especially useful in improving power. Perhaps for
this reason none of the biomarkers showed a statistically significant change in the Medicaid population, although there were substantial increases
in the treatment group in those diagnosed with
diabetes and high cholesterol and also substantial
increases in the number of (self-reported) individuals on anti-diabetic and lipid lowering (anticholesterol) medication.
The OHIE, consistent with the RHIE, showed
that having insurance increased utilisation. Having Medicaid rather than being uninsured also
favourably affected depression. (There was no
biomarker for depression, only screening questions.) Consistent with the improved depression
Use of Experiments in Health Care
score among those with Medicaid, the point estimate implied a substantial increase in the use of
anti-depressants among the Medicaid group, but
the p-value for rejecting the null hypothesis of no
difference between the groups in the use of antidepressants was only 0.07. Some of the salient
findings from the OHIE are shown in Table 1.
Conclusion
Experiments with the delivery and financing of
health care, especially when the investigator controls the design of the experiment, as was the case
in the RHIE, offer an exciting opportunity to
establish the effects of various programs or
Use of Experiments in Health Care, Table 1 Selected
findings of the effect of Medicaid at 18–24 months compared with being uninsured
Current
number of
prescription
drugs
Physician
office visits/
year (no.)
Had a usual
source of care
(%)
Out-of-pocket
spending ($)
Catastrophic
spending (%)
Depression (%)
Current use of
medication for
depression
Mean of
control group
(uninsured)
1.8
Change in
Medicaid group
(95% CI in
parentheses)
0.66 (0.21, 1.11)
5.5
2.7 (0.91, 4.49)
46.1
23.75 (15.44,
32.06)
553
215 (409,22)
5.5
4.48
(8.26,0.69)
9.15
(16.7,1.6)
5.5 (0.46, 11.45)
30
16.8
Notes: Catastrophic spending was defined as annual
out-of-pocket spending that exceeded 30% of annual
household income. The depression measure is from a questionnaire commonly used to screen for depression; consistent with the depression result, the results also showed an
improvement in questions that formed the mental health
subscale of a general self-rated health measure
Source: Baicker et al. (2013)
Use of Experiments in Health Care
14185
Number
Number Randomized
% Randomized
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
US Health Care,
Top Medical
Journals
US Health Care,
Top Economics
Journals
Int’l Health Care,
Top Medical
Journals
Int’l Health Care,
Top Economics
Journals
Education,
Top Economics
Journals
Use of Experiments in Health Care, Fig. 2 Frequency
of randomised trials in health reported in leading journals,
2009–2013 (Source: Finkelstein and Taubman (2015). The
top medical journals were defined as the New England
Journal of Medicine, JAMA, Annals of Internal Medicine
and PLoS Medicine. BMJ and Lancet were excluded
because they published no studies of US health care delivery, but if they had been included the number of international studies would surely have been higher. The top
economics journals were defined as the American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal
of Political Economy and Econometrica.)
incentives on behaviour. But how often are experiments used?
To answer that question Amy Finkelstein and
Sarah Taubman tabulated the total number of
studies of health care delivery and financing in
top medical and top economic journals over the
five-year period 2009–2013, as well as the number of those studies that were randomised
(Finkelstein and Taubman 2015). Their results
are shown in Fig. 2. There were 76 studies on
the US health care delivery system published in
that time period in the top medical and economic
journals; 33 of them were randomised. Almost all
of those 33 randomised studies (31 of them) were
published in medical journals, not economics
journals. In the international context there were
only about half as many studies of health care
delivery and financing published in the same
journals (34 studies), but a higher proportion of
them were randomised than was the case with
the American studies (20 of the 34). Like the
American studies, however, almost all of the international studies were published in medical
journals; only one was published in an economics
journal. Interestingly, the economics of education
made more use of randomised study designs than
health economics; there were 22 studies of education in top economics journals, and 8 of them
(36%) were randomised.
Not surprisingly, the top medical journals
published many more studies of medical treatment than of medical organisation and financing
in both the US and the international context,
176 and 177, respectively (not shown in Fig. 2).
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14186
Furthermore, a much higher proportion of the
studies of medical treatment than the studies of
financing and delivery were randomised, 79% and
77% in the American and international contexts,
respectively. In sum, the randomised controlled
trial is the dominant method for evaluating medical treatments throughout the world, but
randomised trials or experiments in the domain
of delivery and financing remain a minority of the
published studies in top journals, especially top
economics journals.
This paucity of randomised experiments, however, appears to be ending. Although it is not likely
that anything as large as the RHIE will be carried
out any time soon, there are numerous small-scale
experiments being undertaken in the USA and
elsewhere under the auspices of J-PAL North
America. A description of these projects can be
found at http://www.povertyactionlab.org/health.
See Also
▶ Health Behaviours, Economics of
▶ Health Econometrics
▶ Health Economics
▶ Health Insurance, Economics of
▶ Health Outcomes (Economic Determinants)
▶ Health State Evaluation and Utility Theory
▶ Population Health, Economic Implications of
▶ Risk Adjustment
▶ Statistical Analysis of Clinical Trial Data for
Resource Allocation Decisions
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User Cost
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User Cost
Paul Davidson
John Maynard Keynes developed the concept of
user cost as a significant component of the supply
price of any business enterprise. By introducing
user cost as an expectational variable, Keynes
hoped to bring the existing unrealistic economic
theory back ‘to reality’ (Keynes 1936, p. 146).
Keynes believed that the concept of user cost
had ‘an importance . . . for the theory of value
which has been overlooked’ (ibid., p. 66).
Keynes’s General Theory was based on Marshall’s micro (value) theory foundations enlarged
14187
by Keynes’s chapter 5 argument that entrepreneurial expectations determine output and
employment. Accordingly, for theoretical completeness, Keynes had to augment Marshall’s
analysis of value theory with the concept of user
costs, to show how profit-seeking entrepreneurs,
in an uncertain world, would have ‘no choice but
to be guided by these expectations’ (Keynes 1936,
p. 46) in deciding today’s employment hiring and
production flow schedules.
While borrowing the name ‘user cost’ from
Alfred Marshall (1890), Keynes’s user cost notion
involved components of cost different from those
in Marshall’s concept. Marshall believed that user
cost was simply the additional ‘wear and tear of
plant’ caused by current use of equipment compared to leaving it unused. Keynes, on the other
hand, defined user cost as ‘the reduction in value
of the equipment due to using it as compared to
not using it, after allowing for the cost of the
maintenance and improvements’ (1936), (p. 70;
italics added). For Keynes, therefore, user cost
was based on the idea of entrepreneur’s
intertemporal (profit) opportunity costs; that is,
the sacrifice of expected future profits due to
using equipment today rather than in the future.
Calendar time is a device which prevents
everything from happening at once. Production
takes time and hence profit-maximizing enterprises must make current production decisions
based on expectations of future outcomes. The
firm uses long-lived durable equipment in its production process; the present value of this equipment depends on expectations of the costs of
future production flows and future sales from
this equipment. The flow of production undertaken in time period t1 will affect both the future
ability of the firm to produce and the future market
conditions it will face, and hence its ability to
make profits in time period t2 (as well as in periods
further in the future).
Normally, use of any equipment in t1 will
impair its ability to render service in future
periods, thereby raising future costs of production
and/or affecting future investment decisions in
new plant and equipment. More importantly, any
rate of production and sales in the present period
can often be expected to affect market demands
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(and hence profit opportunities) in the future.
Current profit-maximizing production decisions,
in an intertemporal setting, will therefore not only
involve estimates of current market conditions
and current prime labour and materials costs, but
they must also involve potential expected changes
in future costs and market demands and hence
future profit opportunities vis-à-vis leaving the
plant and equipment idle.
For Keynes, user cost involved these expected
changes in future profit opportunities arising from
the current use of equipment in the production
process. In a world where the economic horizon
extends beyond a single future period, the user
cost attributable to any current period production
flow will be equal to the discounted (present)
value of the expected greatest potential profit
change due to using equipment compared to leaving it idle.
The additional ‘wear and tear of plant’ caused
by current use equipment compared to leaving it
unused was first identified, by Marshall, as the
user cost which was associated with the prime or
short-run marginal costs of production. Pigou
(1933, p. 42), however, expressedly assumed
that the differences in wear and tear suffered by
equipment by being used in the production process as compared to being left idle could be
ignored as being of ‘secondary importance’, so
that one could assume that disinvestment in equipment through use, as opposed to time depreciation, was zero. Most economists writing in the
1920s and 1930s either followed Pigou’s lead in
assuming the cost of use depreciation to be negligible, or else argued that the costs of additional
wear and tear would be equal to the additional
maintenance costs necessary to restore the equipment to its original pre-use condition. In the latter
case, marginal maintenance costs encompassed
Marshall’s user cost concept.
Keynes, on the other hand, believed that user
cost or ‘the marginal disinvestment in the firm’s
own equipment involved in producing marginal
output’ (Keynes 1936, p. 67) could differ substantially from marginal maintenance costs. Hence
user cost could affect employment and production
decisions more than what would be expected
merely from correctly accounting for the
User Cost
components of maintenance expenditures into
(1) those overhead expenditures for maintenance
which had to be made only if the machine was idle
and (2) those maintenance costs incurred only if
the machine was used. Even if the potential maintenance costs incurred only if equipment is idle
might offset the marginal maintenance cost of
using equipment (where the latter was included
in variable costs), Keynes (ibid., p. 67) insisted
that it was ‘illegitimate’ to assume marginal user
cost was zero and hence would not affect entrepreneurial production and employment decisions.
To drive home his point that marginal user
costs differed from marginal maintenance costs,
Keynes used what he believed was an obvious
example – namely, the mining of mineral raw
materials. The example used had been worked
out in detail in his earlier Treatise on Money
(1930, vol. 2, ch. 29), where Keynes demonstrated
that, in a recession, the production of material
goods today depended on the entrepreneurial
expectations of when the market’s surplus stock
of materials will disappear. In the case of the
production of raw materials, as Keynes put it, ‘if
a ton of copper is used today, it cannot be used
tomorrow and the value which the copper would
have for the purposes of tomorrow must clearly be
reckoned as part of the [today’s] marginal costs’
(Keynes 1936, p. 73).
The user costs associated with the mining or
production of any mineral is, Keynes (ibid., p. 73)
noted, but ‘an extreme case’ of user costs associated with any current production flows using
existing durables.
Keynes’s concept of user costs highlighted the
fact that when the same equipment can be used
either in today’s or tomorrow’s production flows,
then prime production costs as well as market
demand conditions are (or at least may be
expected to be) time interdependent. Hence
expectations regarding this intertemporal
interdependence will affect today’s employment
and production decisions.
Furthermore, when future economic outcomes
are due to a nonergodic stochastic process so that
the future is uncertain (i.e. future events are not
statistically predictable based on the historical
evidence), then expected changes in future profit
User Cost
opportunities on the basis of expected future costs
and/or future demand conditions (the user costs of
utilizing equipment today) can only be guessed
at. Hence, forward-looking profit-maximizing
employment decisions in a nonergodic, calendar
time setting, must necessarily be subjective and
uncertain – and the uncertainty (nonstatistical predictability) of future economic events is one of the
essential characteristics that made Keynes’s monetary system operate differently from a ‘real
exchange’ system where money was a veil.
Thus, for Keynes, the user cost construction was
an essential aspect for bringing economic theory
‘back to reality’ (Keynes 1936, p. 146) where the
nonneutrality of money in an uncertain environment dominated economic decision-making
processes.
If different firms foresee different future situations, even if they currently possess identical
equipment, there will not be any simple, uniform
profit-maximizing production decision amongst
the competing firms. In such a world of nonergodic uncertainty, therefore, where different
agents can, with the same historical information,
perceive different futures, there can be no such
thing as a unique path of optimal resource allocation over future time.
Keynes’s user cost analysis, as developed in
The General Theory, was one way Keynes
attempted to introduce the reality of ‘the bundle
of vague and more various possibilities’ (Keynes
1936, p. 24) which are the basis of entrepreneurial
expectations in a statistically nonpredictable, nonergodic world; where these expectations are the
determinant on today’s production decisions.
Keynes (1936, p. 146) argued that the assumptions of orthodox economic theory regarding the
predictability of the future (what today’s neoclassical economists call rational expectations, i.e. the
absence of systematic errors in entrepreneurial
expectations) introduced ‘a large element of unreality’. By introducing the concepts of user cost
and the marginal efficiency of capital (both based
on expectations in an uncertain, non-ergodic
world), Keynes hoped to bring microeconomic
theory ‘back to reality, whilst reducing to a minimum the necessary degree of adaption’ (1936,
p. 146).
14189
Since Keynes’s 1936 analysis, user costs
have been mainly developed and applied to the
question of the intertemporal production flows
from depletable resources by many economists
(e.g. Adelman 1972; Bain 1937; Davidson 1963;
Davidson et al. 1974; Neal 1942; Scott 1953;
Weintraub 1949). In general however, economists
have not significantly developed the concept of
user costs as an intertemporal opportunity cost in
the traditional analysis of nonmineral production
processes using durable equipment – despite
Keynes’s suggestion. Nor have many economists
used the concept for the analysis of intertemporally related demand conditions.
Weintraub is the only economist who has
developed the user cost concept of across-time
profit opportunities with intertemporally related
demands of monopolistically competitive firms
(especially in a world where consumers buy
often on the basis of habit, follow fashion trends
or purchase replacements for their existing stock
of durables). For example, production and sales
this period at ‘special’ prices can affect future
profit opportunities by altering future demands
relative to future production costs. Thus, although
not often recognized as such, negative user cost
considerations are involved in ‘introductory offer’
situations where future demands are complementary to current sales (Weintraub 1949, p. 381).
See Also
▶ Aggregate Supply Function
Bibliography
Adelman, M.A. 1972. The world petroleum market. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Bain, J.S. 1937. Depression pricing and the depreciation
function. Quarterly Journal of Economics 51:
705–715.
Davidson, P. 1963. Public problems of the domestic
crude oil industry. American Economic Review 53:
85–108.
Davidson, P., et al. 1974. Oil: its time allocation and project
independence. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
2: 411–448.
Keynes, J.M. 1930. A treatise on money, vol. 2. London:
Macmillan.
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Keynes, J.M. 1936. The general theory of employment,
interest and money. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Marshall, A. 1890. Principles of economics. London:
Macmillan.
Neal, A.C. 1942. Industrial concentration and price inflexibility. Washington, DC: American Council on Public
Affairs.
Pigou, A.C. 1933. The theory of unemployment. London:
Macmillan.
Scott, A.D. 1953. Notes on user cost. Economic Journal
63: 368–384.
Weintraub, S. 1949. Price theory. New York: Pitman.
User Fees
Edwin S. Mills
Keywords
Benefit taxes; Mills, E. S.; Tiebout hypothesis;
User charges: see user fees; User fees
JEL Classifications
H4
The genealogy of the term ‘user fees’ (or, synonymously, ‘user charges’) is neither long nor coherent. Neither Marshall nor Pigou appears to have
used the term. The term was in common usage in
the USA during the early post-World War II years;
see e.g. Stockfisch (1960). Throughout its short
history, the term seems to have been employed
much more frequently in the United States than
elsewhere. Since about 1970, the term has
appeared in the indexes of most US public finance
textbooks.
No writer has provided a careful definition of
the term or distinguished it from similar terms.
Rosen (1985) defines a user fee as a price charged
for a commodity or service produced by a government. Some writers appear to restrict the term to
charges for services produced by governments. To
add confusion, many writers apply the term ‘user
fee’ to charges levied by a government for the
discharge of wastes to the air and water environment. In this usage, the term is synonymous with
‘effluent fee’. Although most economists believe
User Fees
that governments should protect the environment
by fees or regulations, since the environment has
the characteristics of a public good, the environment is not in any reasonable sense a commodity
or service produced by a government.
How is a user fee distinguished from two
related concepts, a benefit tax and a price? There
is a legal and constitutional difference between
fees and taxes levied by governments, but the
issue here is the economic content of the terms.
A benefit tax is any tax levied proportionately
to benefits received by the taxpayer from a commodity or service provided by a government. The
appropriate distinction is that a fee is paid only if
the consumer decides freely to consume the commodity or service, whereas the taxpayer may be
forced to pay a benefit tax even though he or she is
not free to decide whether to consume the commodity or service. If the term ‘benefit tax’ is
restricted to taxes whose amounts are no greater
than the value to the taxpayer of the commodity or
service consumed, the important distinction disappears. No rational consumer would refuse to
pay a tax which is less than the benefit which the
consumer receives from commodities or services
financed by the tax. Thus, the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary payment becomes
unimportant. In practice, governments levy
many taxes in the name of benefits even though
they are larger than the benefits derived from the
commodity or service provided. Most ostensibly
benefit taxes are only approximations to fees for
the commodity or service consumed. A gasoline
tax is an approximation to a fee for road consumption or congestion and pollution externalities. The
Tiebout theory (1956) implies that all local government taxes can be viewed as benefit taxes.
There seems to be no important distinction
between a user fee and a price except that the
term ‘user fee’ is used when government is the
supplier. Public finance economists frequently use
the term ‘user fee’ when reference is to a service,
such as electricity, provided by government, even
though the service is sometimes provided by private suppliers and the charge is then referred to as
a price.
Why make the distinction between a user fee
and a price? There seems to be no justification
Usher, Abbot Payson (1884–1965)
except to identify the supplier. Yet that typically
is, and always could be, clear from the context. It
appears to be unjustified to coin a different, and
indeed clumsy, term merely to identify the supplier. One suspects that some intellectual product
differentiation is behind the distinction.
See Also
▶ Environmental Economics
▶ Externalities
Bibliography
Rosen, H. 1985. Public finance. Homewood: Richard
D. Irwin.
Stockfisch, J.A. 1960. Fees and service charges as a source
of city revenue: A case study of Los Angeles. National
Tax Journal 13 (2): 97–121.
Tiebout, C. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures.
Journal of Political Economy 64: 416–424.
Usher, Abbot Payson (1884–1965)
William N. Parker
Keywords
Clapham, J. H.; Economic history; Inventions;
Kondratieff
cycles;
Measurement;
Schumpeter, J. A.; Technical change; Usher,
A. P.
JEL Classifications
B31
Usher occupied the chair of European economic
history at Harvard University from 1936 to 1949
and was surely the most productive and original
scholar to occupy this post. For economists of later
decades, his most significant book was A History of
Mechanical Inventions (1st edn, 1929; 2nd edn,
1954). In it he identified invention as a four-stage
process in which the individual inventor, being
14191
seized of a problem in the presence of the intellectual and physical elements for a solution, achieves
the primary insight (called by Usher the ‘saltatory
act’ and by his students the ‘ah-ha!’ or ‘Eureka’
moment) and completes the invention through a
stage of ‘critical revision’. Usher’s work here
became noticed by economists when it was taken
up by J.A. Schumpeter to form the historical basis
of his descriptive and theoretical work on Business
Cycles (1939) and also through its relation to the
Kondratieff ‘long waves’ based on the clustering of
a few major inventions at discrete points in and
around the 19th century (1770–80, 1840–60,
1890–1910). At a time when economists treated
technological change as an element as exogenous
to economics as physical geography, Usher alone
thought it worth examining as a complex socioeconomic ‘thread’ in history. In this he was the
forerunner of such modern students as Schmookler,
Mansfield, Ruttan, Nelson and Rosenberg, though
his book largely emphasized the technical (supplyside) aspects of the process.
The identification of Usher with the study of
technological change is unfortunate, since his
many monographs and articles, his two textbooks,
and his classroom teaching reveal a comprehensive grasp of the experience of the West in economic life and organization in all its major
aspects. It is perhaps fair to say that his mind
was fascinated with those points where societies
face nature. Population growth, geographical
resource patterns, transport, industrial location,
technology, physical costs and physical constraints on social action and organization were
the themes around which his view of economic
history was organized. His insights were those of
the engineer, not those of the sociologist.
This bias in Usher’s work undoubtedly derived
from a deep-seated liberal ideology which regulated both his topics and his methods of research.
He looked on economic history not simply as an
interesting outlet for scientific curiosity but as an
instrument to help societies achieve a rational
control over their environment. But, himself the
most modest and unpolitical of men, he evidently
saw little use to studies where the social control
to which they could lead impinged on the individual’s personal and private life and values.
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And methodologically Usher was a committed
empiricist. He evinced, and often reiterated, a
deep distrust of what he called the idealistic formulations of Marx, Weber and Parsons. Yet his
admiration of the British school typified by
Clapham was moderated by an uneasiness over
its commitment to a purely literary or descriptive
methodology. He was most at home in the study of
specific limited topics in which a quantifiable
trend could be observed over a long period and
where measurement and economic theory of a
Marshallian variety could be employed. His concrete applications of the German theories and
models of industrial location were particularly
powerful, and inspired the later work of
E. Hoover, W. Isard and others. He must be
accounted, along with S. Kuznets and
A. Gerschenkron as a patriarch of the so-called
‘new’ economic history in the United States, and
of those three, Usher’s grasp of the relation
between theory, measurement and the phenomena
of historical change must be accounted to have
been the most philosophical and careful, and the
best exemplified in concrete historical studies.
Selected Works
A bibliography of Usher’s writings is contained in
Lambie (1956). This volume also contains an
essay on Usher’s thought and writings. See
also the article by John Dales in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
vol. 16 (1968), and the generous memorial
tribute by A. Gerschenkron, retained in the
files of the Harvard Department of Economics.
Among Usher’s books and articles, A History of
Mechanical Inventions (1929; 1954), and his
two advanced level texts, An Introduction to
the Industrial History of England (1920) and
(with W. Bowden and M. Karpovich) An Economic History of Europe since 1750 (1937),
were the most durable and highly valued by
students. His major contributions to early modern European economic history are The History of the Grain Trade in France, 1400–1710
(1913) and The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe (1943). Usher’s
Usher, Abbot Payson (1884–1965)
attitudes toward economic history and methodology are best stated in three articles, (1932,
1949 and 1951) and in Chapter 4 of A History
of Mechanical Inventions. His attitude toward
economics and economic policy is well stated
in his 1934 address to the American Economic
Association.
1913. The history of the grain trade in France,
1400–1710. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
1920. An introduction to the industrial history of
England. Boston: Houghton Miffin.
1929. A history of mechanical inventions,
2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1954.
1932. The application of the quantitative method
to economic history. Journal of Political Economy 40: 186–209.
1934. A liberal theory of constructive statecraft
(Address to the American Economic Association). American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings 24: 1–10.
1937. (With W. Bowden and M. Karpovich.) An
economic history of Europe since 1750.
New York: American Book Company.
1943. The early history of deposit banking in
Mediterranean Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
1949. The significance of modern empiricism for
history and economics. Journal of Economic
History 9: 137–155.
1951. Sir John Howard Clapham and the empirical reaction in economic history. Journal of
Economic History 11: 148–153.
Bibliography
Dales, J. 1968. Usher, Abbot Payson. In International
encyclopedia of the social sciences, vol. 16.
New York: Macmillan.
Gerschenkron, A. 1965. Abbot Payson Usher: A memorial
tribute. Files of the Department of Economics, Harvard
University.
Lambie, J., ed. 1956. Architects and Craftsmen in History.
Festschrift für Abbot Payson Usher. Veröffentlichungen der List Gesellschaft, vol. 2. Tübingen:
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Schumpeter, J.A. 1939. Business cycles. 2 vols. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Usury
Usury
Henry W. Spiegel
Usury, in the scholastic economic thought of the
Middle Ages, referred to a lender’s intention to
obtain more in return than the principal amount of
the loan. As a general rule this meant that
any interest-taking was usurious and forbidden,
whereas in modern parlance only exorbitant interest is considered usurious. Usury was outlawed by
lay and clerical authorities, who addressed the
prohibition at first only to the clergy but expanded
it later to lay persons as well and repeated it
frequently and in strong terms.
In the age of faith during which scholastic
economic thought flourished, the authorities
that outlawed interest would justify their view
by reference to the Bible, several passages of
which are critical of interest-taking. Another
consideration, later fortified by the thought of
Aristotle, was the view that money was
barren – which, of course, it is if kept in a strongbox or under a mattress. Still another consideration looked at interest as a payment for the
passage of time, something considered not to be
the private property of the creditor. References
were also made to the Roman-law distinction
between fungible and non-fungible goods, the
former being moveable goods that are measured
by number or weight and consumed by use, such
as food or fuel. Fungibles are repaid by being
returned in their species rather than individually.
In varying formulations and for various reasons,
the scholastic authorities forbade interest on the
loan of fungibles or certain fungibles. Some
stressed that the borrower bears the risk of the
loss of the good and is obliged to return its
equivalent even if the original amount that was
borrowed has been stolen or lost. Others emphasized that in the case of fungibles use and consumption coalesce and that a separate charge for
use in addition to the claim for return would
require payment twice for the same thing. Attention was drawn to the evil effects of usury on the
14193
community and it was held that usury violated
the commands of charity, justice and natural law.
The enforcement of the canonical prohibition
of usury largely relied on the conscience of the
faithful, who would make restitution or abstain
from interest-taking rather than die in sin and be
refused a Christian burial. The frequent reiteration
of the usury prohibition points to the fact that
many could not resist temptation. There was
even a wolf in sheep’s clothing who urged Saint
Bernardin of Siena on to preach more insistently
against usury. Little did the Saint know that
the person in question was the town’s most notorious usurer, who was eager to discourage his
competitors.
Under the primitive economic conditions that
prevailed during the early Middle Ages the typical
loan may have been a consumption loan, where
the potential for the exploitation of the lender is
stronger than it is in the case of production loans.
During the later Middle Ages, when flourishing
cities were replete with commercial activities,
ways were found to secure the lender of funds a
return over and above the principal. As time went
on, these devices to avoid the effects of the usury
prohibition became so numerous and potent as to
leave the prohibition an empty shell.
To begin with, it had for long been allowed to
employ interest as a means of economic warfare
by charging it to political enemies such as the
Saracens during the Crusades. Second, and of
greater practical significance, it became an
established rule that the loan contract might
include a provision arranging for a conventional
penalty to be paid by the borrower if he failed to
return the principal at the appointed time, that is,
in the case of default. Third, default itself came to
constitute in time a justification for charging interest. By means of these provisions the parties to the
loan contract, by arranging for very short loans
and simulating default, could make interest look
respectable. Fourth, it became recognized that if
the creditor would suffer damage on account of
the loan, having perhaps himself to borrow from
others at usurious terms, he could claim compensation for the damage. Fifth, more haltingly, it was
also allowed that the lender be compensated for
the gain that escaped him because he granted the
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loan. Thus a lender who used capital in his business could claim compensation under this title,
which would legitimize a wide range of financial
transactions. Sixth, although many loans were
secured by pledges, an element of risk-taking
was inherent in virtually all of them. In view of
this consideration, interest was allowed as a riskpremium. Seventh, since the legal form in which
the financial transaction was clothed was of crucial importance, the owner and prospective user of
loan funds, instead of arranging for a loan, might
form a partnership, with profit and loss divided
among them in various ways. Eighth, persons
reluctant to assume the burden of entrepreneurship could obtain a return on their money by
investing it in annuities. They would turn over
their funds to a private or public agency that
promised to deliver them the annual return from
a productive asset. Ninth, a banker might accept
deposits without expressedly promising interest
but rewarding the depositors with payments
ostensibly in the nature of gifts. This was indeed
a characteristic feature of early deposit-banking.
Tenth, the parties might engage in a credit transaction involving a bill of exchange. As the name
of this credit instruments implies, it used originally to be drawn on a foreign locality, with the
opportunity of employing a foreign-exchange rate
that would favour the creditor and yield him a
return in excess of the principal. Such was indeed
the origin of the bill of exchange, later as often
used in domestic transactions as in foreign ones.
In England, the first legal case dealing with an
inland bill of exchange occurred in 1663.
The Christian society of the time persecuted
and discriminated against the Jews in many ways.
With their opportunities for making a living
severely restricted, and with the canonical injunction not addressed to them, many were driven into
money-lending at interest. Some were busy in
lowly pawnshops, others served as bankers to
princes and popes.
With the coming of the age of individualism
and laisser faire the usury doctrine fell
into disuse. When in the 1820s and 1830s inquiries were made with the ecclesiastical authorities
in Rome as to what should be done in cases
where the faithful had charged interest as
Usury
allowed by the law of the land, the response
invariably was that they were not to be troubled.
An Irish priest, Fr. Jeremiah O’Callaghan, who
insisted on the application of the original usury
rule in all its strictness, was suspended from
office by his bishop. In the twentieth century,
the Code of Canon Law of 1917 allowed a creditor to accept the legal rate of interest and under
certain circumstances even more. The Code of
Canon Law of 1983 goes still farther by imposing a duty to pay interest when due on an administrator of ecclesiastical goods who has incurred
a debt.
Secular legislation became permissive during
the sixteenth century. For example, in England
after the break with Rome interest up to 10%
was allowed by law in 1546. After some wavering
this rule was confirmed in 1571. The legal maximum was gradually reduced, but in 1854 the
usury laws were abolished altogether.
The economists’ reaction to the usury rule mirrored the temper of their time. Turgot, in his
Memorial on Money Loans of 1769, poked fun
at the casuistry of the scholastics and insisted that
Christ in no way had intended to condemn all
lending at interest. A few years later, in 1787,
Bentham published his Defence of Usury, in
which he took Adam Smith to task for endorsing
legislation that put a ceiling on interest rates and
in which he made a strong plea for absolute
liberty in setting up the terms of loans. It is not
known whether Bentham converted Smith, who,
however, did not appear to be offended and sent
Bentham a gift shortly before Smith’s death in
1790. In our own time, the usury doctrine was
defended by Keynes, who himself favoured low
rates of interest. In the General Theory, Keynes
praised the scholastics for having attempted to
keep the schedule of the marginal efficiency of
capital high, while keeping down the rate of
interest (p. 352). However much these opinions
vary, it is likely that the usury rule had the important effect of channeling funds into equity investments rather than loans. Thereby the usury rule
helped to nourish a spirit of enterprise that eased
the march into capitalism, the same capitalism
which, in turn, brought about the usury’s rule
downfall.
Utilitarianism
See Also
▶ Aquinas, St Thomas (1225–1274)
▶ Just Price
▶ Scholastic Economic Thought
Bibliography
Baldwin, J.W. 1970. Masters, princes and merchants, vol.
2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Part IV.
Consult Spiegel (1983, pp. 63–9, 696–70, with ample
bibliography); Noonan (1957), the work of a legal
historian; Nelson (1969), a sociological study inspired
by the ideas of Max Weber; Baldwin (1970, Part IV), an
historical study of the views of 12th-century churchmen, and the other works cited below. Langholm
(1984) offers a new interpretation of the scholastic
theory of usury on the basis of recently discovered
medieval treatises.
Langholm, O. 1984. The Aristotelian analysis of usury.
Bergen: Universitetsforlaget; distributed in the USA
by Columbia University Press, New York.
Nelson, B.N. 1969. The idea of usury. 2nd edn, enlarged.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Noonan Jr., J.T. 1957. The scholastic analysis of usury.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Poliakov, L. 1965. Jewish bankers and the Holy See from
the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. Trans.
M. Kochan, London: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1977
Spiegel, H.W. 1983. The Growth of Economic Thought.
Revised and expanded edn, Durham, North Carolina:
Duke University Press.
Viner, J. 1978. Four articles on religious thought and economic society. History of political economy 10(1),
Spring, 9–45; 46–113; 114–50; 151–89. Also available
as Religious thought and economic society: Four chapters of an unfinished work by Jacob Viner, ed. J. Melitz
and D. Winch, Durham: Duke University Press, 1978.
Utilitarianism
C. Welch
14195
Jeremy Bentham added these ‘memoriter
verses’ to a revised edition of An Introduction to
the Principles of Morals and Legislation to fix in
the reader’s mind those points ‘on which the
whole fabric of morals and legislation may be
seen to rest’ (Bentham 1789, p. 38). And indeed,
although his formulation equates utility with pleasure in a way that many contemporary utilitarians
would reject, Bentham does implicitly identify the
central propositions that continue to inform philosophical utilitarianism today: i.e. (1) individual
well-being ought to be the end of moral action;
(2) each individual is to ‘count for one and no
more than one’; and (3) the object of social action
should be to maximize general utility (or, in
Bentham’s phrase, to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number).
This moral position was not, of course, original
to Bentham. It was held in some form by a wide
array of 18th-century writers – the English theologians Brown, Tucker and Paley, as well as the
French philosophes Helvetius and Holbach. The
distinctive doctrine associated with Bentham and
James Mill, however, was first labelled utilitarianism. Originally coined by Bentham, and subsequently rediscovered by John Stuart Mill in a
novel by Galt, the term entered the general lexicon
in the 1820s. It connoted a systematic ideology
composed of sensationalist psychology, ethical
hedonism, classical economics, and democratic
politics. Early utilitarianism – also known as
Philosophical Radicalism – inspired an influential
movement of reform in English law and politics
during the early 19th century. But more important,
the philosophy of utility as articulated by Bentham and revised by his successors has retained
a central place in the theoretical debates that have
dominated economics, sociology, and moral and
political philosophy into the 20th century.
Bentham’s Theory of Utility
Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure–
Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure.
Such pleasures seek if private be thy end;
If it be public, wide let them extend.
Such pains avoid, whichever be thy view;
If pains must come, let them extend to few.
Bentham’s theoretical innovations were not striking; like earlier utilitarians he stated both that men
are in fact pleasure-seeking creatures and that the
promotion of general pleasure or happiness
should be the criterion of moral goodness.
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But Bentham’s utilitarianism aspired to be both
scientific and systematic. It derived these scientific pretensions from three tendencies that were
particularly pronounced in his thought. First, he
held a reductionist version of the empiricist theory
of mind in which ideas – born of sensations – were
formed by mental associations prompted by the
urges of pleasure and pain. Bentham assumed that
there was a correct association of ideas that would
yield a correspondingly rationalized language. He
believed that this rationalization of language was
a necessary prerequisite to the proper calculation
of selfinterest, and always held to the Enlightenment hope that moral language could be made
scientific by purging it of irrationalities and illusions. Second, Bentham stated unequivocally that
pleasure is homogeneous and thus quantifiable.
He used mathematical ‘metaphors’ – the felicific
calculus, axioms of mental pathology, the table of
the springs of action – images that suggested
concreteness and precision. Finally, he gave
detailed and systematic attention to ‘sanctions’,
i.e. painful disincentives to action. Unlike the
theological utilitarians, he neglected the godly
sanction and concentrated on those earthly penalties of public opinion and legal punishment that
could be placed under the influence or control of
the legislator.
Bentham’s importance lay not in these refinements of utilitarianism, except insofar as they
apparently strengthened its claim to certainty, but
rather in his lucid and single-minded application
of the doctrine to criticize the ‘fallacies’ of
English public discourse. In this crusade he
attacked both the authority of custom and the
‘anarchical’ philosophy of natural rights.
Bentham’s rhetorical assault on the French Declarations of Rights was occasioned by his recoil
from the Terror, but his arguments against the
language of rights remained consistent throughout
his life. He makes two powerful claims: (1) rights
are not anterior to political society but are created
by law; hence an inalienable or non-legal right is a
self-contradictory notion; and (2) a philosophy of
natural rights offers no way to adjudicate the
competing claims of such rights to priority; a
non-legal moral right is a ‘criterionless notion’
(Hart 1982, p. 82). This distinction between law
Utilitarianism
and morals is further developed by Austin and is
fundamental to the legal positivist tradition, as
well as to contemporary criticisms of rightsbased moral theories.
If natural rights offered no clear theory to guide
moral or social choice, utility, according to Bentham, did offer such guidance. The main body of
his work lay in substituting utility for alleged
logical fictions as a rationale for legislation. In
his extensive writings on penal law, for example,
he attempted to provide a ‘calculus of harm’ to
facilitate the legislator’s task of imposing the minimum sanction that would deter certain undesirable actions. Because Bentham’s reformist
ambitions encompassed civil and constitutional
law, his work also touched directly on contentious
public issues, such as abolition of the corn laws
and reform of the suffrage. Bentham was a
Smithian in economics and became a radical democrat in politics, but the logic of the original connections between utilitarianism and economic and
political reform become clearer by considering the
contributions of James Mill.
James Mill and Philosophical Radicalism
According to J.S. Mill, ‘it was my father’s opinions which gave the distinguishing character to
the Benthamic or utilitarian propagandism of the
time’ (Mill 1873, p. 72). This propagandism was
energetically carried out by a small group of selfstyled Philosophical Radicals, including Francis
Place, Joseph Hume, George Grote, Arthur Roebuck, Charles Buller, Sir William Molesworth,
and – most important – John Stuart Mill. In a
series of articles in the Westminster Review
(beginning in 1824), they launched a political
movement to begin the radical revitalization of
English public life.
Bentham’s work on sanctions (and some of his
theoretical statements) suggest that individual
interests would have to be associated ‘artificially’
through the manipulation of legal penalties. At the
same time his faith in the general harmony
between individual interests and the public interest implies that interests are harmonized ‘spontaneously’ (see Halevy 1903). Among Bentham’s
Utilitarianism
political disciples, and largely through the influence of James Mill, this tension was resolved
decisively in favour of the latter conception.
Underlying the Philosophical Radicals’ programme lay a dogmatic belief that the sum of
enlightened self-interests would yield the general
interest, in both economics and politics. It was the
scientific reformer’s job to attack the systematic
distortions of self-interest that were charged to the
account of ‘King and Company’, i.e. to the crown,
the aristocracy, and the church.
In economics, the Philosophical Radicals
endorsed the ‘system of natural liberty’ and the
classical economic programme of competition,
minimal state interference, free trade, and the abolition of monopolies. Given the rule of law necessary to produce a sense of individual security, men
would be spurred to productive labour and to a
rational pursuit of their interests by the operation
of the natural sanctions of hunger and desire for
satisfaction. Self-interested exchanges would then
lead to the establishment of ever-wider markets
and eventually to the production of the greatest
possible satisfaction of wants. The principle of
‘utility’ was thus linked to an economic programme; however, the central problem of theoretical economics, i.e. the notion of ‘value’, was not
conceptualized directly in utilitarian terms.
One could argue that there is an inherently
democratic and critical dimension to the politics
of utilitarianism because of the assumption that
every man is the best judge of his interest, and
because of the perception that individual freedom
is necessary to recognize and formulate ‘rational’
interests. But the democratic logic of the original
utilitarian radicals, put forward most forcefully in
James Mill’s Essay on Government (1820) was
tailored closely to the historical problem of
reforming the British aristocratic polity. James
Mill argued that government is by definition
rule by some group that is less than the whole
‘people’. The circumstances of power, however,
tempt these rulers to aggrandize themselves in a
fashion neither in their own nor the people’s
long-term interests. They develop corporate, or
in Bentham’s terms, ‘sinister’ interests. This
aristocratic corruption can be checked only
through democratic representative institutions.
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Philosophical Radicals insisted on breaking the
hold of Britian’s aristocratic elite through education of the electorate, extension of the suffrage,
frequent Parliaments, and the secret ballot. This
sort of radicalism was distinguished from that of
other democrats by its appeal to a science of
politics rather than to the rights – natural
or prescriptive – of Englishmen, and from that of
liberal Whigs by its ahistorical and doctrinaire
view of that ‘science’. In the wake of the highly
charged but inconclusive debates of the French
revolutionary period, the appeal of a rational arbiter in politics was very attractive, especially to
Britain’s small emerging ‘intelligentsia’. The
Radicals’ endorsement of the neutral standard of
utility had strong affinities with the views of certain continental radicals who attempted to exorcize the terrors of the French Revolution by
repudiating its language while retaining the substance of moderate republicanism (Welch 1984).
In both cases, however, the reformers overestimated the attractions of their programme for
the middle classes, and underestimated the possibility of the growth of a distinctively workingclass consciousness. In England, the Philosophical Radicals never achieved their goal of creating
a fundamental political realignment, although
they clearly had an ideological impact much
greater than their immediate political one.
J.S. Mill
The most famous proselytizer of Philosophical
Radicalism, and its most notable apostate, was
John Stuart Mill. Although Henry Sidgwick has
often been called the last ‘classical’ utilitarian, the
name can better be applied to Mill in the sense that
he was the last thinker to attempt to integrate a
utilitarian moral and social theory with a fullblown psychology and a theory of politics. In
politics Mill came to question the iron-clad logic
of his father’s Essay, to distrust the tendency to
uniformity that he perceived in democracy, and to
seek a theory of counterpoise and leadership. In
economics he was both the last important thinker
in the classical tradition and a sharp critic of
existing capitalism. But his intent in all of his
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writings was, as he said, to modify the structure of
his beliefs without totally abandoning the
foundations.
An important discussion of the moral
foundations of those beliefs can be found in Utilitarianism (1861). The argument here rests, inauspiciously enough, on the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ that
underlay the work of Bentham and so many other
18th-century moralists; Mill’s case for the moral
worth of happiness rests on the ‘fact’ that people
desire it:
. . . the sole evidence it is possible to produce that
anything is desirable, is that people do actually
desire it . . . No reason can be given why the general
happiness is desirable except that each person, so
far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own
happiness (p. 44).
By ‘desirable’ Mill clearly seems to mean
‘ought to be desired’ rather than the less problematical ‘can be desired’. Mill, then, was not unduly
troubled by Bentham’s psychological hedonism,
which he largely shared, or by the derivation of
ethical hedonism from this descriptive theory.
Rather what bothered Mill was the suggestion
that this psychological theory implied (1) a narrow materialistic view of pleasure, and (2) egoistic
hedonism (i.e. the notion that every person ought
to maximize his own pleasure). Egoistic hedonism, Mill correctly intuited, is not an ethical
theory at all. To meet the first problem Mill proposed his notorious defence of qualitative differences in pleasure, a defence that only contributed
to the common view that Utilitarianism is a casebook of logical blunders. For if there are higher
and lower pleasures, it has often been pointed out,
another standard than pleasure is clearly implied
as the criterion of judgement between them. This
tension between ‘utility’ and some notion of
‘moral perfection’ runs unresolved through most
of Mill’s mature works, and reappears in his
defences of liberty and of democracy. To meet
the second objection, Mill is careful to state,
more clearly than his predecessors, that utilitarianism is a system of ethical hedonism, i.e. that
the criterion applied to individual moral action is
general happiness not individual interest. The difficult question, of course, is how to account for
the motivation to moral action, given the
Utilitarianism
psychological assumption that people act only to
increase their own satisfactions. Mill moves away
from Bentham’s tendency to see the problem as
one of ‘conditioning’ the agent to recognize the
general interest as his self-interest, and offers a
more sophisticated theory (reminiscent of Hume)
of sympathy or disinterested altruism and its
empirical connections with a sense of justice.
The power of Philosophical Radicalism as it
entered the ideological arena (in a time when
seismic political and industrial change had unsettled forms of social intercourse) was that it fused
psychology, economics, and moral and political
theory into a compelling ‘fit’, just how compelling
a study of J.S. Mill’s intellectual development
would confirm. But this synthesis soon began to
unravel in the hands of both friends and critics.
Utilitarianism: Reconstructions
and Influence
If utilitarianism were only the doctrine of an
unsuccessful 19th-century sect of reformers, it
would hardly be of much contemporary interest.
But as the exemplar of a ‘type’ of analysis, a type
often held to be radically defective, it has served
and continues to serve as a point of departure in
discussions of economic, social and moral theory.
Utilitarianism and Economics
Utilitarianism has overtly triumphed in only one
area of what were once termed the moral sciences,
namely, economics. Indeed, the idea of welfare
economics, i.e. of determining a ‘welfare function’, is irreducibly utilitarian in the sense that it
seeks to measure individual wantsatisfaction and
to construct indices of utility. The principle of
decreasing marginal utility, which was to give a
decisive turn to the evolution of modern economics when applied to the determination of value,
was clearly stated by Bentham for the case of
money (Principles of the Civil Code, 1802). Paradoxically, however, the roots of the marginalist
revolution cannot be traced to the formulations of
the original utilitarians in any straightforward
Utilitarianism
way. The technical innovations of Gossen, Jevons, Menger and Walras seem to have come at
least in part from a greater sensitivity to the market
position of consumers. Since then, the increasingly sophisticated mathematical structure of utility theory has generated many of the innovations
that have dominated debates within the field.
The early marginalists, however, continued to
think of utility in terms of the pleasurable sensations associated with consuming a good. They
generally defended the cardinal measurability of
utility; some even dreamed of a ‘hedomiter’ to
measure it. The important theoretical break with
the classical tradition was to abandon this notion
of pleasure as a quality inherent in a good that
could be measured in favour of a theory of choice
based on the possibility of ranked individual
preferences. However, although the problem
underlying welfare economics is today construed
differently – not as measurement of pleasure but
as ranking of preferences – the analysis is still
fundamentally akin to Bentham’s calculus.
Indeed, insofar as economists have addressed the
larger issue of intellectual debts and affinities,
they have acknowledged the formative influence
of the classic utilitarians (see Harsanyi 1977). The
issue that philosophically-inclined economists
must address is that of the reach of this sort of
analysis. Deep divisions remain about what sorts
of issues a utilitarian theory of social choice can
illuminate, and about whether the attempted solutions are morally compelling. The former issue
has been posed most trenchantly by sociologists;
the latter by moral philosophers.
Utilitarianism and Sociology
If the hypothesis of the rational economic maximizer has been retained in economics because of
its heuristic strength in addressing a range of
econometric questions, it was abandoned by the
earliest of ‘sociologists’ because of its perceived
heuristic weakness. From the beginning of the
19th century, social theorists have criticized methodological ‘individualism’ as incapable of generating insights into social life because such a view
does not attribute constitutive power to social
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forces, but rather takes individual desires, purposes, and aspirations as the starting point of
social analysis.
Sociology was born of the perceived problematic status of order in societies that had, at least in
theory, repudiated the ties of ‘tradition’. From
St. Simon and Comte through Durkheim to
Talcott Parsons, sociologists have singled out utilitarianism as singularly incapable of illuminating
this problem. For these theorists, utilitarianism
represents the notion of society conceived as a
set of competing egoisms; this notion is thought
to be peculiarly congenial to the English-speaking
world and is often loosely and simplistically
equated with liberalism. On this view, the utilitarian pedigree includes Hobbes, Locke and Smith,
and its progeny the evolutionary utilitarianism of
Spencer and McDougall. Durkheim’s attack on
Herbert Spencer (in The Division of Labor,
1893) can be taken as paradigmatic of the sociological critique.
Spencer was greatly attracted by organic analogies, but he applied them to social analysis in a
way that radically maintained the notion that
consciousness exists only in the individual
‘parts’ of society. He developed a strict utilitarian
theory of ethics, which described the moral ideal
as the individual pursuit of long-term pleasures
(a calculation that involved cooperation with
others through self-interested exchanges). The relative predominance of this sort of calculus over
one in which individuals sought immediate gratification distinguished advanced from primitive
societies. Durkheim argues that Spencer, and by
extension individualist social theory, is not only
inadequate but incoherent conceptually in its reliance on the notion of exchange to comprehend the
patterning of social life. Formalized exchange
makes sense only against the background of a
culture that has internalized a particular set of
social norms. Talcott Parsons takes up the theme
insistently in The Structure of Social Action
(1937). He argues that any theory which postulates the ‘randomness of ends’ cannot account for
the ultimate reconciliation of those ends in society
except by unacknowledged assumptions, sleight
of hand, or a providential deus ex machina. Thus,
on Parsons’ view, an analogous function is served
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by the Leviathan (for Hobbes); God and natural
law (for Locke), the invisible hand (for Smith);
and the necessities of evolution (for Spencer).
Bentham’s utilitarian policy oscillates uneasily
between Leviathan and the prior assumption of a
natural harmony.
According to many sociologists, then, utilitarianism as the quintessential ‘individualist’ social
theory is fundamentally wrongheaded because
individuals are defined, shaped, and constrained
within social structures. Nevertheless, a
reconstructed and simplified ‘utilitarianism’
remains the indispensable foil from which they
delineate and justify the contributions of their own
discipline.
Utilitarianism
on this tradition to refine ever more subtle versions of utilitarianism.
Much of this literature focuses on the arena
of personal ethics. However, the public
dimension – so obvious among the Philosophical
Radicals who employed utility principally as an
argument for or against public rules, institutions
and policies – has always been implicit. Contemporary discussion of the issue occurs largely
within an overlapping group of practically minded
philosophers and philosophically minded welfare
economists. A utilitarian theory of social justice
has been explicitly argued for in the works of such
thinkers as R.M. Hare, J.J.C. Smart, P. Singer and
J. Harsanyi. They endorse utility, as did the classical thinkers, as the only reasonable criterion of
justice in a secular society.
Utilitarianism and Philosophy
The debate engaged between utilitarians and sociologists is between an intentionalist versus a
structuralist theory of action, between a theory
that heuristically treats individual preferences as
random and one that emphasizes the determining
constraints on those preferences. The moral philosopher engaged with utilitarianism – either as
advocate or critic – has a rather different perspective and set of questions, although the philosophic
criticism, especially those of ‘communitarian’
critics, sometimes overlap with those of sociologists. In general, however, the debates within
moral philosophy take place within the camp of
liberal ‘individualism’, in the sense that they have
focused on the problems of individual moral
agency. Philosophers do not ask how we can
understand social order, but rather how we can
judge the rightness or wrongness of individual
action. The utilitarian answer (i.e. by the goodness
or badness of the action’s consequences) can be
taken as the starting point for constructing both an
analysis of moral judgements and a system of
normative ethics. The utilitarian tradition of the
philosophers, however, differs from that of the
sociologists; it harks back to Hume and Shaftesbury rather than to Hobbes, and forward to
Sidgwick, Edgeworth and Moore, rather than to
Spencer. In an attempt to give a general account of
moral thinking, modern philosophers have drawn
Philosophical Utilitarianism
There are three separate but related issues that
have been crucial in the evolution of utilitarian
moral theories. The first, that of justifying the
imperatives of utility, has produced a measure of
agreement among contemporary utilitarians and at
least some of their critics. The second and third,
how to decide what is a good consequence, and
how to determine the right way to assess these
consequences, have spawned a host of subtle distinctions that continue to preoccupy and provoke
theoretical argument.
The problem of justification in utilitarianism is
best approached through the work of Henry
Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics, 1874). Unlike
Bentham or J.S. Mill, Sidgwick did not base his
utilitarianism on the psychological theory that
individuals always act to obtain their own good.
He does argue that desirable or pleasant states of
consciousness are the only intrinsic good, and that
an act is objectively right only if it produces more
good than any other alternative act open to the
agent, but he presents these principles as moral
imperatives, implicit in common sense morality,
not descriptions of actual behaviour. They come
to us through a sort of moral intuition that is selfevident and not susceptible of further analysis.
Sidgwick narrowed the focus of utilitarianism to
Utilitarianism
a theory of moral choice, theoretically separable
from any particular metaphysical doctrine, psychological theory, or political and institutional
programme. He distanced himself not only from
the sensationalist psychology of the earlier radicals, but also from their democratic reformism.
This narrowed field is still characteristic of
much, though not all, contemporary utilitarian
theory. However, the arguments advanced for
why we should accept utilitarian moral precepts
have changed. Although he clarified the problem
of justification by recognizing the illegitimacy of
the slide from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, Sidgwick’s own
theory of moral intuitions proved extremely
vulnerable.
The 20th-century analytic movement in philosophy has tended to discredit the notion of a proof
of normative ethics altogether, and to disregard
‘intuition’ as vague and arbitrary. Nevertheless,
the analytic philosopher’s preoccupation with the
meaning of moral language and the types of moral
reasoning that are valid has led to a widespread
belief that, even in the absence of epistemological
certainty, good moral arguments can be distinguished from bad ones, fallacious statements
from true ones. It is on this basis (greater plausibility or reasonableness) that arguments for utility
are generally defended. Given some ultimate attitude that is acknowledged to be shared (usually
generalized benevolence) the utilitarian hopes to
convince others that his system of ethics is more
plausible, that is, less prone to conceptual confusions and more coherent, than either unreflective
moral sentiments, or some alternative general
account of these sentiments. Insofar as some
moral critics share the desire to apply to moral
argument the established canons of rationality,
there is common ground for discussion of the
utilitarian viewpoint. John Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971) is developed largely through an antagonistic dialogue with utilitarianism on just this
common ground.
A second issue that has been important in
debates within the utilitarian moral tradition is
the problem of how consequences are to be
defined. A ‘consequentialist’ moral theory is one
in which the results of action, not the motives to
action, are the objects of rational assessment.
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Bentham, for example, stated that ‘there is no
such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a
bad one’ (1789, p. 100). The classic discussion of
this issue took place within the rubric of hedonism; pleasure – in narrow or more expansive
senses – was the desired end of moral action.
G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica, 1903), building
on the dissatisfactions already expressed by
J.S. Mill, offered a theory of ‘ideal’ utilitarianism
that was consequentialist, but not hedonistic.
Moore argued that pleasure was but one of many
desirable goods, among which he included truth
and beauty. Another answer to this question arises
from the attempt to accommodate the common
sense moral judgement that it is better to relieve
suffering than to promote pleasure. Hence the
so-called ‘negative’ utilitarianism attributed to
Karl Popper, which argues that moral experience
is uniquely concerned with the prevention of harm
to others.
Among many contemporary thinkers the problem of defining the good is thought to be obviated
by considering the good in terms of maximizing
‘preferences’. The power of legitimation falls, in
this view, on the process of choice, not on what is
chosen; it is ‘topic neutral’. Despite the intuitive
appeal and apparent methodological advantages
of this reformulation, the constraints imposed by
the process of ‘sum-ranking’ and by the theory of
rationality, as well as by common empirical
assumptions about what people do in fact choose,
lead choice-based utilitarianism inexorably back
to the notion of maximizing ‘well-being’ or
‘interest’.
The most important distinction developed
within modern utilitarianism is that between
‘act’ and ‘rule’ utilitarianism, or ‘unrestricted’
and ‘restricted’ utilitarianism. This distinction
has to do with the proper procedure for determining consequences. The modern statement of the
problem dates back to R.F. Harrod (1936), but the
intuitive sense of the distinction is quite old and is
certainly present in the classical thinkers, who are
usually classed as act utilitarians.
An act utilitarian assesses the rightness of an
action directly by its consequences, i.e. he judges
that action A is to be chosen because the total
happiness expected to be produced by A exceeds
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that of any alternative action open to the agent.
This position has been criticized in a number of
ways (for instance, it is said to hold the agent to an
impossibly exigent standard of behaviour), but the
most serious objections have centred on the possibility that the course of action that would be
chosen on act utilitarian principles would clash
violently with common sense moral judgements.
Two examples, separated by two centuries, bring
out the nature of this objection.
The utilitarian William Godwin (1793) argued
that, if given a choice between saving one’s
mother from a burning building or saving a great
man whose works were more likely to benefit
mankind, one ought to save the great man and
leave one’s mother to the fire. A modern critic of
utilitarianism, H.J. McCloskey (1963), offers one
version of a familiar example involving not personal but public ethics. A small-town sheriff
would be able to prevent serious public disturbances (in which hundreds would surely die) if
he were to execute an innocent person as a scapegoat. (One could present the case, McCloskey
argues, in such a way that the sheriff is certain
both that his act will not be found out and that the
riots will occur.) A strict utilitarian would have to
recognize that, on his principles, the correct moral
choice would be to kill an innocent person. Or at
least he would have to recognize that such a
judgement was theoretically possible. Utilitarianism, then, seems to commit one to the possibility
of acting in ways abhorrent to the common sense
of domestic obligation and justice. To avoid these
implications, many have proposed differing versions of rule utilitarianism.
A rule utilitarian assesses the rightness of an
action by asking whether it would have good
consequences if it became part of general practice.
Thus general rules, like ‘promises must be kept’,
are given moral status indirectly through their role
in fostering long-term utility. All utilitarians have
recognized the indirect utility of rules like
promise-keeping, if only as short-cuts (‘rules of
thumb’) to the process of calculating consequences. Bentham and Mill, for example, distinguished between first-order harm and the secondorder evil that comes from the example of
law-breaking. However, attempts to defend a
Utilitarianism
distinctive rule utilitarian position have proved
problematical. Either rule utilitarianism collapses
into act utilitarianism in disputed cases (e.g. when
general rules conflict), or it departs from the particular utilitarian viewpoint by asserting that some
rules are so necessary as to become good in themselves. Many have attempted to gain a foothold on
the slippery slope between these two possibilities
and the issue has generated a substantial literature.
Criticisms
One line of criticism of moral utilitarianism has
always been ‘technical’, i.e. it has referred to the
impossibility of inter-personal comparisons of
utility. In 1879 a now-forgotten professor of jurisprudence argued:
There is an illusive semblance of simplicity in the
Utilitarian formula . . . it assumes an unreal concord
about the constituents of happiness and an unreal
homogeneity of human minds in point of sensibility
to different pains and pleasures . . . Nor is it possible
to weigh bodily and mental pleasures and pains one
against the other; no single man can pronounce with
certainty about their relative intensity even for himself, far less for all his fellows (T.E. Cliffe Leslie
1879, 45–6).
The idea that utility is cardinally measurable
was basic to Bentham’s enterprise, and has always
been criticized on the grounds that pleasures are
incommensurable. Far from resolving these problems, the economic theory of social choice has
merely transposed them into different terms.
Many versions of the theory depend heavily on a
system of cardinalization derived from the work
of von Neumann and Morgenstern on decisions
taken under uncertainty. Yet these arguments have
always encountered great scepticism (GeorgescuRoegen 1954). At issue is the notion of the substitutability of satisfactions. Many would argue
that altruistic preferences, or preferences that are
‘public’ cannot be translated into preference
schedules. And a persistent problem is the inability to deal in a satisfactory way with equity in
distribution.
A related but more fundamental line of criticism asserts that utilitarians radically misconstrue
the moral experience. If sociologists are
Utilitarianism
concerned with the alleged poverty of social
insight that a theory of utility-maximizing individuals offers, moral philosophers have been
haunted by the unnecessary impoverishment of
those individuals, and by the narrowing and
distorting of individual moral judgement. When
Themistocles proposed to burn the ships of Athens’ allies in order to secure Athenian supremacy,
Aristides is supposed to have answered, ‘The project would be expedient but it is unjust.’ The
fundamental insight that expedience and justice
are at some level qualitatively distinct forms the
essence of this critical perspective. 19thcentury
critics focused on the inability of utilitarians to
comprehend duties to God and country, and hence
emphasized the virtues of ‘excellence’, ‘reverence’, ‘nobility’ and ‘honour’. 20thcentury critics
focus on the lack of understanding of the moral
person and of duties to oneself (hence their
emphasis on ‘integrity’, ‘commitment’, and
‘self-respect’). Implicit in both these views is the
judgement that the psychological assumptions
that utilitarianism must make are so narrow and
implausible as to render the theory either inadequate, or positively pernicious.
Finally, there is the problem of the cultural and
institutional correlates that might accompany the
adoption of utilitarianism as the criterion of social
justice. Utilitarianism as a practical movement
was wedded to a particular theory of politics. Yet
this connection between utilitarianism and liberal
democracy was largely historical and fortuitous
rather than logical. The institutional implications
of preference utilitarianism have not been extensively discussed, but they have aroused numerous
fears and doubts among its critics. One approach
to the problem is to consider again the ambiguity
present in Bentham’s use of the concept of interests. On the one hand, he takes interests ‘as they
are’. On the other, he distinguishes between
existing interests, and interests that are ‘wellunderstood’. Both conceptions have led to misgivings about the institutional implications of
utilitarianism.
The idea of giving people what they happen
to desire, or what they ‘prefer’, has much to
recommend it; it seems both benevolent and
non-intrusive. Yet, as social theorists have long
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pointed out, what grounds do we have for
accepting the ‘givenness of wants’? Within
debates over social choice this issue has
reemerged in the form of the question ‘why should
individual want satisfaction be the criterion of
justice and social choice when individual wants
themselves may be shaped by a process that preempts the choice?’ (Elster 1982, p. 219). The use
of existing preferences – especially given the
severe restrictions on the types of preferences
that can usefully be considered – may be a
way of predetermining certain outcomes, of
reinforcing what people regard as likely or possible in their present situation. Or so argue many
critics who have seen in utilitarianism a complacent one-dimensional defense of the status quo.
Yet the concept of ‘well-understood interests’
(or the analogous ‘true preferences’) raises the
question of the conditions under which these
interests and preferences are revealed to be
rational or true. One image that has
reappeared – especially in the literature on private
ethics – is the notion of the rational utilitarian
floating in a sea of traditional moralists. Because
the notion of a social utility function seems
to imply the need for a central directing
agency – an assumption itself often challenged
from a pluralist perspective – the elitism implicit
in the preceding image has often suggested the
idea of a manipulating elite, or at best of a benevolent despotism.
Conclusion
Utilitarianism began and continues to be developed on the premise that intuitions of the divine,
of tradition, or of natural law and rights have been
discredited beyond rehabilitation as criterions of
moral choice in a secular world shorn of metaphysics. Yet this view has always been challenged, and is today sharply contested by a
resurgence of ‘discredited’ views. Insights into
the underlying structure of social life are again
sought in ‘contract’, ‘rights’ or ‘community’ by
thinkers (one might mention such different theorists as Rawls, Nozick, McIntyre and Walzer) who
argue that other traditions of thought correspond
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better to the articulation of the dilemmas of moral
and public life. These same theorists, however,
share a preoccupation with disposing of the claims
of utilitarianism as a necessary prelude to developing their own positions. Indeed, utilitarianism
apparently has a special status in the evolution of
modern social inquiry, not just because well-being
is the modern obsession, or because the model of
the ‘science’ of economics is seductive in an age
of science, but because utilitarians claim to offer a
criterion of neutrality among competing conceptions of the good life in a pluralistic and antagonistic world. Thus, to many, some version of the
theory of utility has a compelling claim on our
intellectual attention. If it is ultimately rejected,
the imagery is nevertheless that of a ‘journey
away from’ or ‘beyond’ utilitarianism (see Sen
and Williams 1982). Utilitarianism has achieved a
paradoxical status; it dominates the landscape of
contemporary thought in the social sciences not
due to its own commanding presence, but because
it has been necessary to create and recreate it in
order to map out the relevant terrain. Its critics
claim to look forward to the day when ‘we hear
no more of it’ (Williams, in Smart and Williams
1973, p. 150), yet it continues to figure as the alterego of much modern moral and social inquiry.
See Also
▶ Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832)
▶ Chadwick, Edwin (1800–1890)
▶ Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro (1845–1926)
▶ Hedonism
▶ Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873)
▶ Pleasure and Pain
▶ Sidgwick, Henry (1838–1900)
Bibliography
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morals and legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart.
London: Athlone Press, 1970.
Bentham, J. 1802. Principles of the civil code, vol. 1. In
The complete works of Jeremy Bentham,
Utilitarianism
11 vols, ed. J. Bowring. New York: Russel & Russel,
1962.
Cliffe Leslie, T.E. 1879. Essays in political and moral
philosophy. London: Longmans, Green.
Durkheim, E. 1893. The division of labour in society, 1964.
New York: Free Press.
Elster, J. 1982. Sour grapes – utilitarianism and the genesis
of wants. In Sen and Williams (1982).
Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1954. Choice, expectations, and
measurability. Quarterly Journal of Economics 68:
503–534. Reprinted in N. Georgescu-Rogen, Analytical economics: Issues and problems. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1966.
Halévy, E. 1903. The growth of philosophical radicalism.
Trans. M. Morris. Boston: Beacon, 1960.
Hamburger, J. 1965. Intellectuals in politics: John Stuart
Mill and the philosophical radicals. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Harrod, R.F. 1936. Utilitarianism revised. Mind 45:
137–156.
Harsanyi, J.C. 1977. Morality and the theory of rational
behaviour. Social Research, Winter. Reprinted in Sen
and Williams (1982).
Hart, H.L.A. 1982. Essays on Bentham: Studies in jurisprudence and political theory. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Lyons, D. 1965. Forms and limits of utilitarianism.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McCloskey, H.J. 1963. A note on utilitarian punishment.
Mind 72: 599.
Mill, J.S. 1861. Utilitarianism. New York: Bobbs-Merrill,
1957.
Mill, J.S. 1873. Autobiography. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944.
Moore, G.E. 1903. Principia ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parsons, T. 1937. The structure of social action: A study in
social theory with special reference to a group of recent
European writers. Glencoe: Free Press.
Plamenatz, J. 1970. The english utilitarians. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Ryan, A. 1974. J.S. Mill.. London: Routledge.
Sen, A.K. 1970. Collective choice and social welfare. San
Francisco: Holden-Day.
Sen, A.K., and B. Williams (eds.). 1982. Utilitarianism
and beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sidgwick, H. 1874. The methods of ethics, 7th ed. London:
Macmillan, 1907.
Smart, J.J.C., and B. Williams. 1973. Utilitarianism: For
and against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stephen, L. 1900. The english utilitarians. New York:
Peter Smith, 1950.
Welch, C. 1984. Liberty and utility: The french ideologues
and the transformation of liberalism. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
Jonathan Riley
Abstract
Utilitarianism is a family of moral and political philosophies according to which general
utility or social welfare is ultimately the sole
ethical value or good to be maximized. Normative economics endorsed a hedonistic version of utilitarianism from the latter part of the
18th century well into the 20th century.
Despite the ordinalist revolution, some version of utilitarianism continues implicitly to
serve as the ethical basis for economic policy
judgements. While there are signs that this
may be changing, economic theory has not
yet moved decisively beyond utilitarianism,
nor is it clear that it should.
Keywords
Abundance; Bargaining; Bentham, J.;
Binmore, K.; Cardinal utility; Checks and balances; Classical economics; Consequentialism;
Contract
curve;
Contractualism;
Distributive justice; Edgeworth, F. Y.; Enlightened self-interest; Equality; Ethical pluralism;
Harsanyi, J. C.; Hedonistic utilitarianism;
Helvetius, C. A.; Hume, D.; Individuality;
Interpersonal utility comparisons; Jevons,
W. S.; Leximin; Liberal democracy; Majority
rule; Marshall, A.; Maximin; Mill, J. S.; Mirrlees, J.; Moore, G. E.; Natural justice; Naturalistic fallacy; Normative economics; Optimal
taxation; Ordinal utility; Outcome utilitarianism; Proportional bargaining; Rational choice
utilitarianism; Rawls, J.; Representative
democracy; Revealed preference theory; Security; Sen, A.; Sidgwick, H.; Social contract;
Spencer, H.; Subsistence; Utilitarianism; Utilitarianism and economic theory; Utility; Value;
Veil of ignorance; Von Neumann and
Morgenstern; Welfarism
14205
JEL Classifications
D7
Utilitarianism is a family of moral and political
philosophies according to which general utility or
social welfare is ultimately the sole ethical value
or good to be maximized.
Amartya Sen (1979) suggests that members of
the family typically combine ‘outcome utilitarianism’, which, at least if population is not a variable,
identifies the goodness of an outcome with
the sum of individual utilities at that outcome,
and some version of ‘consequentialism’, which
focuses on selected means of achieving outcomes,
such as acts, rules, dispositions, or some combination of these, and identifies the right means in
any situation as those which result in an optimal
feasible outcome according to outcome utilitarianism. (For analysis of the issues raised
when population is a variable, see Blackorby
et al. 2005). Outcomes can be defined to include
the acts, rules, or other means that lead to them.
Thus, for any set of possible outcomes, a typical
version of utilitarianism calculates social welfare
W(x) at any outcome by adding together the
individual utilities at x:
for all x : W ðxÞ ¼
X
ui ðxÞ:
(1)
The doctrine then prescribes as best an outcome x* at which the sum of utilities is maximized, that is, W (x*) = maxui(x).
As Sen also points out, outcome utilitarianism
can be factorized into ‘sum-ranking’, the claim
that the proper way to aggregate individual utilities is to add them, and ‘welfarism’, the principle
that the goodness of an outcome is an increasing
function of the set of individual utilities so that
non-utility information relating to any outcome
is of no ethical import. Welfarism implies
‘Paretianism’, the claim that one outcome is better
than another if (but not only if) at least somebody
has more utility whereas nobody has less utility in
the one outcome than in the other. Full axiomatizations of outcome utilitarianism have been
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provided by d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) and
Maskin (1978).
Different versions of utilitarianism may vary
not only in terms of their consequentialist structures but also in terms of their conceptions of
utility. Hedonistic utilitarianism conceives of utility as pleasure including freedom from pain, for
example, whereas rational choice utilitarianism
conceives of utility as a numerical representation
of a preference revealed by consistent choice
behaviour which is in principle observable. Sen
himself arguably takes a quite restricted view of
the utilitarian family because he seems to take for
granted that utility, although capable of bearing
plural interpretations, can be seen only as a simple
phenomenon that remains the same whatever its
sources and intended objects. As a result, welfarism and Paretianism cannot accommodate the
idea of different aspects or kinds of utility, some
of which may be intrinsically more valuable than
others, where each kind is inseparably associated
with a distinctive mix of human capacities,
resources and/or institutional activities. Thus, as
an alternative to utilitarianism, Sen (1980) introduces the family of ‘utility-supported moralities’,
in which the goodness of an outcome still depends
on utility but non-utility information is needed to
distinguish among different kinds of utility and
assign them distinct intrinsic values. Sen’s move,
although reflecting conventional wisdom, appears
to be unnecessary and to that extent encourages an
overly hasty dismissal of utilitarianism’s potential
normative appeal (Edwards 1979; Riley 1988,
2001, 2006a, 2007b, c, 2009).
Normative economics, or that portion of economic theory that evaluates institutions such as
markets and policies such as tax proposals with a
view to offering prescriptions for society, is not
necessarily linked to any version of utilitarianism.
Nevertheless, as an historical matter, economists
generally endorsed hedonistic utilitarianism from
the latter part of the 18th century, when both
classical economics (or political economy) and
classical hedonistic utilitarianism first began to
emerge as systematic bodies of thought, well
into the 20th century, long after the marginalist
revolution of the 1870s when classical economics
evolved into neoclassical economics. Even today,
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
economists typically appeal to some version of
utilitarianism, although utility is rarely defined in
hedonistic terms. As Kenneth Arrow says: ‘The
implicit ethical basis of economic policy judgement is some version of utilitarianism’ (1973,
p. 246).
Jeremy Bentham (1789) and his followers,
including, among others, James Mill, David
Ricardo, and, for a time in his youth, John Stuart
Mill, constituted the original school whose hedonistic version of utilitarianism remained dominant
for so long within economics, although the doctrine was modified to some extent and combined
with other ingredients largely as a result of Henry
Sidgwick’s influence on the early neoclassical
economists such as W. Stanley Jevons, Alfred
Marshall and, especially, Francis Y. Edgeworth.
But the Benthamites were certainly not the first to
preach a doctrine of general utility. Sidgwick
traced the doctrine to Richard Cumberland’s De
Legibus Naturae (1672), for example, although
Cumberland was not a hedonist. Bentham admitted that his hedonistic utilitarianism owed much to
the writings of Claude Adrien Helvétius and
David Hume.
Hume, like his contemporaries Francis
Hutcheson and Adam Smith, asserted that
human sentiments are approved of as prudent,
virtuous or just only if they are seen as useful or
agreeable either to the individual or to others. To
be sure, none of these thinkers claimed that moral
sentiments such as the sentiment of justice originate in the individual’s idea of general utility.
Despite various differences in their accounts,
they seem to agree that an innate moral sense
immediately feels a peculiar pleasure at the propriety of virtuous acts and dispositions towards
other people, and that this pleasure can be made a
powerful motive by suitably encouraging and
educating the individual’s natural sympathy for
other human beings. But Bentham and Mill did
not claim that moral sentiments originated in the
individual’s conception of general welfare either,
although they rejected the notion of an innate
moral sense. Bentham seems to have believed
that people are predominantly motivated by selflove but that self-interest can be made to harmonize with the general welfare by giving the egoist
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
incentives to comply with a utilitarian legal code.
The sentiment of justice reduces to cooperating
with others in terms of the code, which any
rational egoist will do provided he is threatened
with sufficient punishment by others for
non-compliance. Mill did not rely exclusively on
enlightened self-interest and external punishment
but instead argued (rather as Hume did, especially
in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals, 1751) that natural sympathy for fellow
human beings can be raised to such a pitch
through moral education that the individual
comes to feel far more pleasure when he sacrifices
his self-love to the extent required for conscientious mutual cooperation in terms of utilitarian
laws and customs that distribute reciprocal rights
and duties.
Smith, Hume and Hutcheson may not have
been fully fledged hedonistic utilitarians like Bentham and Mill, who were prepared to assert that
general welfare can demand the radical reform of
rules commonly alleged to be dictates of an innate
moral sense. But they may be fairly depicted as
what Sidgwick called ‘conservative’ utilitarians,
who sought to explain that common sense morality is generally compatible with public utility. In
any case, Hume and Hutcheson appear to have
supplied crucial ingredients for Mill’s utilitarianism, the one through his account of the moral
sentiment of justice, the other through his distinction among different kinds of pleasure, some of
which are more intrinsically valuable than others.
Benthamite Utilitarianism
Bentham’s assumption that individuals are primarily self-interested fits well with economic theory. He took for granted that pleasure, including
freedom from pain, is a single kind of agreeable
feeling whose properties are invariant across different sentient beings. Any competent person can
estimate the amount of pleasure which he or she
experiences in any situation, he argued, by considering factors such as intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity and purity. Yet he
apparently did not intend to claim that much precision is possible. Indeed, as Mitchell (1918)
14207
documents, Bentham frankly admitted at times
that intensity of pleasure cannot be measured
and that interpersonal comparisons of pleasure
cannot be based on the facts. Nevertheless, he
insisted that alternative institutions and policies
must be evaluated in terms of their consequences
for each and every sentient being’s pleasure and
pain. Thus, rough estimates of aggregate net pleasure must be constructed before moral and political reasoning can even get started.
To obtain such estimates, Bentham seems to
have assumed that everyone shares certain vital
concerns, including security of expectations, subsistence, abundance and equality, and that different persons ought to be counted as if they are the
same person when society chooses how to distribute the means of attaining these vital ingredients
of anyone’s happiness. The upshot is that the
maximization of aggregate net pleasure becomes
inseparably associated with a legal code that distributes equal rights and correlative duties for the
purpose of providing the greatest total amount of
security (in effect, equal marginal security) for
every individual’s vital concerns (Rosen 1983;
Kelly 1990). These legal rights must include,
among others, a right to subsistence and, consistently with that, rights to keep or trade the fruits of
one’s own labour and saving so as to foster abundance. Bentham’s implicit premise, apparently, is
that such legal rights are any rational egoist’s
source of his greatest amount of net pleasure,
especially when duration and fecundity are taken
into account, and that, to ensure universal compliance with the law, the egoist will endorse external
punishment for violations of the correlative
duties. Other animals can also be afforded some
rights to protect their vital interests to some
degree, although the power to exercise such
claims must rest with humans.
At the same time, Bentham argued that the
laws of property should be designed to promote
an egalitarian distribution of income and wealth
so far as is consistent with maximizing general
security under an optimal code of equal rights. He
gave priority to security, including a guarantee of
subsistence as well as rights to own the means of
production, over perfect equality of income and
wealth as a source of pleasure for any rational
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individual. But he also endorsed the assumption
that any individual experiences declining increments of pleasure from additional units of money
or other material assets after subsistence is
assured.
According to Benthamite utilitarianism, rational hedonistic egoists must be given incentives to
act as they would act if they were aiming to
maximize the general good conceived in terms
of security, subsistence, abundance and equality.
Admittedly, egoists will not face the threat of legal
penalties with respect to private conduct that is left
unregulated by the public authorities. Even so, as
Sidgwick (1877, 1886) concluded, Bentham
seems to have maintained that enlightened selfinterest is always in harmony with virtue, not only
in an ideal world but also in the world of actual
experience, so that vicious conduct always
involves a miscalculation. If Sidgwick’s reading
is correct, then Bentham prescribed external sanctions to discourage miscalculations of genuine
self-interest, apparently on the assumption that
such mistakes are likely to be observed to any
considerable degree only when the egoist holds
power over others, inadequate checks exist
against the abuse of power, and the unchecked
power corrupts the egoist’s judgement.
J.S. Mill’s Qualitative Utilitarianism
Although he said that he found much of permanent value in Bentham’s doctrine, Mill made clear
that he wished to ‘enlarge’ Benthamite utilitarianism by making room for higher moral and aesthetic sentiments which Bentham had largely
ignored as a result of his focus on self-interest.
Unlike Bentham, Mill argued that human nature is
highly plastic and that many people in civil societies are observed to have developed characters in
which sympathy for others and a conscientious
desire to do right are powerful motives that
would restrain self-interest even in the absence
of any threat of external punishment. He agreed
that pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value but
maintained that there are plural kinds such that
higher kinds are intrinsically more valuable than
lower kinds, with the implication that competent
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
people who experience both will not give up even
a bit of the higher for any amount of the lower
‘which their nature is capable of ’ (1861a, p. 211).
Mill apparently classified among the highest
kinds of pleasurable feeling the complex moral
sentiment of justice as he understood it. As he
explains in the final chapter of Utilitarianism
(1861a), this complex feeling of security
(or what others might call the feeling of freedom)
can be fully experienced only by cooperating with
others in terms of an optimal code that distributes
equal rights and correlative duties to all individuals. In his view, this higher kind of pleasure can
become such a powerful motive that the just individual rarely if ever even considers pursuing his
self-interest to the point of violating others’ rights.
If so, Mill’s pluralistic utilitarian doctrine is able
to provide a more stable foundation than
Bentham’s purely quantitative doctrine can provide for a liberal system of weighty rights and
duties. At the same time, individuals can still be
permitted to freely pursue their selfish concerns in
competitive markets, provided they comply with
the code of justice.
Despite his qualitative gloss, which was probably suggested to him by Hutcheson’s discussion
of different kinds of pleasure in A System of Moral
Philosophy (1755), Mill’s doctrine remains rather
similar to Bentham’s, at least in broad outline. To
be sure, there are important differences. In On
Liberty (1859), Mill emphasized the importance
of individuality as an ingredient of happiness, for
instance, and he argued that a right to complete
liberty of ‘purely self-regarding’ conduct is essential to promote individuality. He also went beyond
Bentham by taking seriously the possibility of a
decentralized socialism. Yet they agree on the
need to maximize security by giving suitable priority to an optimal code of equal rights, and they
also agree that institutions and policies should
promote an egalitarian distribution of income
and wealth so far as is consistent with the rights
distributed by the code.
Moreover, like Bentham, Mill seems to have
despaired of the possibility of ever acquiring data
sufficiently precise to permit factual calculations
of aggregate net pleasure. Rather, Mill argued that
the test of quantity as well as quality of any two
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
14209
pleasures or pains was the unanimous judgement
of competent persons who had experienced both,
or, in case of disagreement, the majority judgement of such persons, where judgements are
apparently assumed to be nothing more than preference orderings defined over the relevant net
pleasures. By implication, for any pair of possible
outcomes x and y, any competent individual i who
estimates that the quantity of net pleasure ui(x)
which he will experience at x is at least as great
as the quantity of the same kind of net pleasure
ui(y) which he can expect at y, forms a weak
judgement or preference Ri defined over pleasures
which then, by virtue of hedonism, determines his
preference over outcomes:
for all x, y : ui ðxÞRi ui ðyÞ ! x Ri y,
(2)
where Ri includes an asymmetric factor Pi
denoting that i forms a strict preference if he
estimates that ui(x) > ui(y), and a symmetric factor
Ii denoting that he is indifferent when he estimates
that ui(x) = ui(y).
The information about quantities of pleasure is
no more precise than that contained in the fallible
individuals’ estimates, even if any competent person makes use of Bentham’s guidelines to consider intensity, duration and so forth, and also
accepts such common psychological generalizations as declining marginal pleasure of income
beyond some threshold of subsistence. Given the
Benthamite dictum that ‘everybody is to count for
one’, aggregating over the individual judgements
largely boils down to majority rule, which is consistent with the strongly majoritarian forms of
representative democracy defended by Bentham
in his Constitutional Code (1830) and by James
Mill in his Essay on Government (1820). Yet
majority rule does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of pleasure. Strictly speaking, each person’s judgement might be counted as one by being
represented by the same interpersonally comparable ordinal utility function as everyone else’s in
the modern economic sense of utility. In this case,
even though any positive monotonic transformation of the single utility function used to represent
each person’s estimates of pleasure is permissible,
adding the utility numbers to form hedonistic
utilitarian judgements will usually (but not
always) select majority winners if such outcomes
exist and always resolve majority preference
cycles when they occur (Riley 2007c).
J.S. Mill also argued that any competent individual who judges that the kind of pleasure which
he will experience at x is higher in quality than the
kind of pleasure which he can expect at y, would
never sacrifice even a bit of ui (x) for any amount of
ui (y). In effect, the two kinds are incommensurable
and cannot be traded off against one another in
terms of the same scale of value. If the pleasure of
the moral sentiment of justice is higher in quality
than the enjoyable feelings of ordinary expediency,
for instance, then a competent individual refuses to
trade off even a little of his or anyone else’s security
of equal rights for, say, any quantity of enjoyment
associated with ill-gotten income. The kind of painful insecurity associated with violating rights
always outweighs the amount of merely expedient
pleasure that might be gained by means of the
violation. Because he feared that the popular
majority might not be sufficiently educated to be
competently acquainted with the pleasures of equal
justice, Mill was less inclined than James Mill, his
father, and Bentham were to support majoritarian
democracy. Indeed, he seems to have been
impressed by Thomas Macauley’s objections that
the Benthamites’ methodology was flawed in so far
as they attempted to deduce political conclusions
on the assumption that individuals are rational selfinterested agents without emotional ties to existing
institutions (Lively and Rees 1978). A more historical approach was needed, one that recognized
the danger of majority tyranny and did not ignore
as irrational those traditional institutions, attitudes
and practices that might help to combat it. Thus, in
Considerations on Representative Government
(1861b), Mill argued for a limited form of representative democracy in which a distinctive system
of checks and balances is designed to give more
power to highly educated minorities, whose special
expertise is generally acquired in traditional ways
outside the democratic political system, to promote
competent government and security of equal rights
(Riley 2007a).
Nevertheless, Mill’s qualitative hedonism
was generally dismissed as incoherent, and his
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model of liberal democracy was rejected as
undemocratic. Under the influence of leading philosophers and economists, utilitarianism took a
turn towards false quantitative precision, and the
links with democracy were obscured.
Sidgwick and the Early Neoclassical
Economists
Sidgwick (1874), who billed himself as a hedonistic utilitarian, played a central role in all of this.
He was in fact a rational intuitionist who argued
that utilitarianism presupposed certain rational
intuitions such as the axiom that an ethical agent
must be impartial between one person’s pleasures
and another’s. His argument muddied the hedonistic utilitarian tradition, which held with Hume
that intrinsic value is not a function of a priori
reason but rather of feelings of pleasure wherever
located, whose origins and properties can in principle be inferred by reason only on the basis of
experience. Moreover, although he claimed to be
a strong admirer of J.S. Mill, Sidgwick asserted
that a consistent hedonism must be purely quantitative because qualitative hedonism implicitly
relies on some intrinsic value besides pleasure to
distinguish among different qualities of pleasure.
His assertion was apparently accepted as gospel
by his friends Jevons (1874), Edgeworth (1877,
1881) and Marshall (1884). His student Moore
later repeated it in the course of accusing Mill of
spreading ‘contemptible nonsense’ (1903, p. 72).
Yet Sidgwick and his followers merely beg the
question against Mill because they assume that
pleasure is a simple agreeable feeling that always
exhibits the same properties. They never consider
the possibility that pleasure is a term that covers a
family of agreeable feelings, some of which are
intrinsically more valuable than others.
Sidgwick also raised serious doubts about the
rationality of a purely quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism by arguing that practical reason is
‘divided against itself’ because it cannot resolve
basic conflicts between rational egoism and rational benevolence in some situations. This ‘dualism
of practical reason’ is said to be manifested when
a reasonable wish to preserve one’s own life or
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
other vital interests that ought to be protected by
rights apparently collides with reasonable utilitarian duties to promote others’ welfare by sacrificing one’s own life and enjoyments. Some such
ethical dualism or pluralism is now a staple of
the philosophical literature. Many argue that genuine maximizing utilitarianism conflicts with individual rights so fundamentally that an impartial
rational resolution of the conflict is impossible.
Moore went even further than Sidgwick and
insisted that a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ is committed if
intrinsic goodness is defined to be synonymous
with pleasure or desire-satisfaction or any other
natural property. Rather, goodness is said to be an
indefinable non-natural quality that emanates in
mysterious fashion from certain complex ‘organic
wholes’ consisting of plural natural ingredients
including, perhaps, pleasure as an essential ingredient, although Moore struggled to make up on his
mind on this point (see, for example, Edwards
1979). But Sidgwick rejected Moore’s antihedonistic view that ideals of goodness are
directly intuited by anyone capable of appreciating the relevant ‘organic unities’. Indeed, without
defining goodness to mean pleasure, Sidgwick
accepted that pleasure including freedom from
pain might ultimately be found to be the only
thing of intrinsic value. He endorsed Bentham’s
‘empirical method’ of ascertaining quantities of
pleasure and pain, albeit reluctantly given the
difficulties which he saw in applying that method.
He also argued that quantitative hedonistic utilitarian reasoning accords with the bulk of common
moral intuitions, upon which it can thus legitimately rely as rules for calculating right and
wrong actions, and called for formal models of a
utilitarian calculus under ideal conditions to help
clarify its implications.
Early neoclassical economists, especially Edgeworth, answered the call and used the tools of
mathematical calculus to formulate ideal versions
of quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism. Unlike
Bentham or Mill, Edgeworth assumed that natural
units (‘just perceivable increments’) of pleasure
and pain can in principle be ascertained and aggregated over varying populations and time horizons.
Rather than consider individuals’ judgements of
the quantities of net pleasure to be expected from
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
14211
feasible options as in Eq. (2) above, he imagined an
ideal situation in which the quantities are definitely
known such that, for any individual i, a unique
natural utility function can be specified which, by
virtue of hedonism, determines what i’s preferences over outcomes ought to be:
for all x, y : ui ðxÞ ui ðyÞ ! x Ri y:
(3)
There is no longer any need for i’s estimates of
pleasure because the utility numbers are assumed
to be already known with fantastic precision. There
is not even any need for i to form or express his
preferences over outcomes. Person i’s natural utility function indicates the exact amount of interpersonally comparable natural pleasure which i can
reasonably expect to experience at any given
option, whether or not i appreciates this fact. Any
competent ‘impersonal observer’ with the requisite
individual utility information can then determine a
best option by adding up the unique individual
utility numbers at each option to see which option
has the greatest sum total of pleasure net of pain.
A utilitarian calculus is thus no longer necessarily
linked to majoritarian aggregation procedures as it
was with Bentham and Mill. Indeed, an authoritarian elite might perform and enforce the utilitarian
calculations. Sidgwick and Edgeworth seem to
have been surprisingly open to the possibility of
some such utilitarian elite.
The marginalists also found more or less ingenious ways to overcome Sidgwick’s ‘dualism of
practical reason’. They imported the idea of an
evolutionary process as they understood it,
whereby ignorant and selfish individuals might
eventually evolve into intelligent and virtuous
ones through cultural and (as Herbert Spencer
suggested) even biological transmission of the
relevant concepts and dispositions. Jevons went
so far as to endorse the Hegelian notion that this
evolutionary solution was under divine direction.
Edgeworth did not go so far. Yet, like Jevons, he
took for granted that the more highly evolved
members of a refined minority have greater capacities than the masses do for pleasure (the minority
can enjoy ‘higher pleasures’ in the sense of larger
quantities of pleasure viewed as a single kind of
agreeable feeling), and he emphasized that
utilitarianism does not necessarily imply equal
distribution of the ‘means of pleasure’ or of the
work required to produce the means.
Moreover, Edgeworth was specific about the
way in which Sidgwick’s ‘dualism of practical
reason’ could be overcome in the economic
arena. After calculating the ‘contract curve’ of
Pareto-efficient allocations that self-interested
traders could willingly negotiate and enforce as
contracts, and showing that the contract curve
converges on a perfectly competitive equilibrium
only as the number of bargainers goes to infinity,
he stressed the indeterminacy faced by any finite
number of bargainers in selecting among efficient
contracts. He then suggested that under certain
conditions, including equal prior probabilities of
any particular efficient contract being selected, the
selfish bargainers would agree to accept a utilitarian contract as a just compromise because it is one
of the efficient options on the contract curve,
ignoring instances where the utilitarian bargain
might make an individual worse off than his initial
endowment (Creedy 1986, pp. 79–92; Newman
2003, pp. xxxvii–xlvii). This contractualist argument for utilitarianism is interesting not only
because it anticipates John Harsanyi (1977,
1992) but also because Edgeworth was well
aware that a utilitarian bargain is typically distinct
from a competitive equilibrium and thus calls for
redistributive measures.
The Ordinalist Revolution
By the turn of the 20th century, hedonism was
under siege in both psychology and philosophy as
evolutionary psychology and behaviourism came
to the fore along with philosophical idealism,
pragmatism and ethical pluralism. Hedonism
was largely abandoned within economics during
the ordinalist revolution of the 1930s and 1940s,
whose leading figures included Lionel Robbins,
John Hicks, R.G.D. Allen, Abram Bergson and
Paul Samuelson. The ordinalists, who registered
doubts about meaningful interpersonal comparability as well as cardinal measurability of utility,
recognized that the analysis of efficient allocations does not require either a hedonistic theory
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Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
of motivation or rich interpersonally comparable
cardinal utility information. They redefined the
concept of utility to denote not pleasure but rather
a formal numerical representation of any preference ordering revealed by consistent choice
behaviour, without reference to the motivations
or reasons underlying the revealed preference. In
effect, utility merely represents what the agent is
disposed to choose, independently of any psychological explanation or ethical justification for the
given dispositions. Thus, in contrast to Eqs. (2) or
(3) above, any individual i’s utility function is
independent of hedonism and simply recapitulates
the information which is contained in i’s revealed
preference ordering over outcomes:
for all x, y : ui ðxÞ ui ðyÞ $ x Ri y:
(4)
Moreover, any positive monotonic transformation of the utility function is also an admissible
utility function because such transformations preserve the information in the preference ordering
which is being represented.
Given the restriction to such impoverished individual utility information, purely ordinal and bereft
of any ethical standards, it is hardly surprising that
there was an impulse to push aside issues of distributive justice, relegating them to other disciplines such as political philosophy. Normative
economics could then concentrate on relatively
uncontroversial Pareto efficiency considerations,
including clarification of the conditions under
which a general competitive equilibrium is efficient, for instance, and of the different conditions
under which an efficient allocation can be achieved
as a competitive equilibrium (cf. the ‘fundamental
theorems’ of welfare economics).
Arrow’s (1951) ‘general impossibility theorem’ may initially have reinforced the impulse to
sidestep distributive issues because the theorem
shows in effect that a social welfare function must
reflect the preferences of a dictator if it is required
to rely exclusively on purely ordinal utility information to generate rational social or moral choices
from any set of distinct individual preferences. Yet
normative economics cannot plausibly ignore distributive justice and the consequent need for interpersonal comparisons. In this regard, Arrow’s
negative result has also stimulated a large literature in which social choice theorists and game
theorists have clarified many different forms of
social decision functions and games, including
their various informational requirements, and
thereby clarified alternative theories of justice
and morality which might be employed within
normative economics. In addition to Arrow himself, Amartya Sen (1970, 1982, 2002, 2007) has
played a leading role in this literature. But numerous others, including John C. Harsanyi (1955,
1977, 1992) and Kenneth Binmore (1994, 1998,
2005), have made noteworthy contributions.
It remains unclear what impact this ongoing
literature will ultimately have on normative economics. Perhaps, as has been suggested (Mongin
2006; see also Mongin and d’Aspremont 1998),
another revolution is under way, what might be
called a non-utility revolution in so far as the
thrust of it is to argue that a social welfare procedure ought to rely at least in part on information
about the outcomes which is not reflected in individual preferences. Yet economists continue to
defend and employ versions of utilitarianism.
Indeed, Ng (1975, 1985) has made a case for
redeploying within normative economics a
so-called Benthamite doctrine that brings back
Edgeworth’s notion of ‘just perceivable units’ of
pleasurable feeling. But economists have tended
to adopt rational choice versions of utilitarianism
which, unlike the forms of utilitarianism typically
discussed by modern philosophers such as Hare
(1981), Ng and Singer (1981), Gibbard (1987,
1990) and Brandt (1992), do not tie the idea of
utility to pleasure, desire-satisfaction, normexpression, or any other motivation. Harsanyi’s
doctrine is a leading example (for a cogent summary of its main features, see Hammond 1987).
Harsanyi’s Rational Choice Utilitarianism
Harsanyi defines utility as merely a numerical
indicator of any preference revealed by rational
choice behaviour but he also argues that utility
functions can be viewed as cardinal and interpersonally comparable rather than purely ordinal. He
builds various conditions into his idea of what
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
constitutes fully rational and moral behaviour so
that meaningful interpersonal comparisons can be
made of the gains or losses of utility that represent
relative intensities of revealed preferences, that is,
how much one outcome is preferred or opposed
relative to another. Technically, this implies that a
person’s utility function can be subjected to any
positive linear (but not nonlinear) transformations
but, if any person’s utility function is transformed,
then every other person’s must also be transformed in the same way. Such interpersonally
comparable cardinal utility information is needed
to operate a rational choice utilitarian calculus in
anything like the manner imagined by neoclassical economists such as Edgeworth.
Like John Rawls (1971, 1993), Harsanyi
assumes that rational moral agents will imagine
themselves in an original position under a veil of
uncertainty about their particular social circumstances in order to calculate a fair social contract,
that is, a conception of justice in terms of which
they mutually agree to cooperate despite their
different personal preferences. Unlike Rawls,
however, Harsanyi assumes that rational choice
behaviour under risk and uncertainty conforms to
standard expected utility theory. He argues that
individual attitudes towards risk should be used to
infer personal preference intensities over outcomes, in which case the von Neumann–Morgenstern method of cardinalization becomes
appropriate and a cardinal expected utility function represents an individual’s revealed preferences under risk and uncertainty. Also, a moral
agent must become an impersonal observer by
forgetting his actual circumstances and imagining
that he has an equal chance of occupying any
person’s social position with that person’s preference intensities over outcomes. To avoid double
counting, any impersonal observer must also
ignore what Ronald Dworkin (1977, p. 234)
calls ‘other-oriented’ preferences defined over
other persons’ positions. All impersonal observers
are guaranteed to make identical interpersonal
comparisons and moral choices because human
beings supposedly share a fundamentally similar
psychology, which is left unspecified, though
hedonism is rejected as naive. Finally, impersonal
observers will jointly choose to constrain
14213
themselves, Harsanyi claims, by making a binding
commitment to the same optimal code of moral
rules. A person whose revealed preferences satisfy all these conditions is behaving as if he were a
rule utilitarian, whatever his desires, feelings or
other motivations might be.
Harsanyi’s theory is vulnerable to various serious objections. It is not clear that revealed attitudes towards risk measure intensity of subjective
feelings or that they would have much normative
significance even if they did, for instance, even
when individuals can be assumed to be concerned
exclusively with outcomes and to ignore the process of assigning probabilities (‘gambling’) per
se. Also, as Diamond (1967) has pointed out,
Harsanyi’s claim that moral and social utility
must be a linear function of the individual utilities
seems overly rigid because it ignores the distribution of the utilities. Rather than define morality so
that it always demands the simple addition or
averaging of individual utilities, a more appealing
approach would insist that the process of moral
and social decision-making should give everyone
a ‘fair shake’. Fairness might be thought, for
instance, to require a quasi-Rawlsian concern to
maximize the utility of those individuals or groups
with the worst utility levels in comparison to
others. (For further discussion of this quasiRawlsian approach known in the literature as
‘leximin’, see, for example, Hammond 1976,
1977; and Deschamps and Gevers 1978. Unlike
Rawls’s maximin theory, which works in terms of
‘primary goods’ that every rational person is presumed to want, the leximin theory works in terms
of utility levels.)
Doubts about the von Neumann–Morgenstern
method of cardinalization and the fairness of
sum-ranking have prompted some leading economists, including Arrow, Diamond and James
Mirrlees, to take seriously an ordinalist variant
of rational choice utilitarianism.
Ordinalist Utilitarianism
Ordinalist utilitarianism presupposes that interpersonally comparable ordinal utility information
is available. In other words, it must be assumed
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14214
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
that meaningful interpersonal comparisons can be
made of the levels of utility which represent
revealed preference orderings. Technically, this
implies that a person’s utility function can be
subjected to any positive monotonic transformations, but if any person’s utility function is transformed, then every other person’s must be
similarly transformed.
An ordinalist utilitarian calculus is quite flexible in terms of its functional form. In contrast to
Eq. (1) above, social welfare is calculated as the
sum of utilities with a particular concave transformation f {.} applied to each person’s utility
function:
X
for all x : W ðxÞ ¼
f fui ð x Þ g
nX
o
¼f
ui ð x Þ :
(5)
But f {.} may be subjected to any positive
monotonic transformations without affecting
W because the aggregation process is meaningful
only for ordinal (rather than cardinal) comparable
utility information. Arrow (1973) has shown that
this ordinalist utilitarian approach subsumes the
quasi-Rawlsian leximin theory of distributive justice as a special case, namely, the case in which the
concavity of f (.) is extreme because each person is
assumed to be highly risk-averse. Another important application is in the modern theory of optimal
taxation (Mirrlees 1971, 1982; Diamond and
Mirrlees 1974; Stiglitz 1987). Indeed, optimal
tax theory can be viewed as the further development and refinement of a body of thought that
includes Edgeworth (1897) as well as Mill’s and
even Bentham’s recommendation that a tax system ought to satisfy a principle of equal marginal
sacrifice above some threshold of subsistence
guaranteed for all.
Nevertheless, ordinalist utilitarianism also
seems vulnerable to serious objections. Arrow
remains reluctant to accept interpersonal comparisons of ordinal utility, for example, because he
fears that they imply a denial of individuality: ‘the
autonomy of individuals, an element of mutual
incommensurability among people seems denied
by the possibility of interpersonal comparisons’
(1977, p. 225). Individual rights to freely pursue
one’s own good in one’s own way, of the sort
defended by Mill, seem to be of peculiar moral
importance, and should not be overridden by considerations of general utility based on putative
interpersonal comparisons. Moreover, as Arrow
also remarks, it is disappointing that, even if meaningful ordinalist comparisons are assumed possible, seemingly mild conditions (including a weak
equity axiom) confine us to the quasi-Rawlsian
‘leximin’ theory of justice. But leximin is arguably
too extreme because it absolutely forbids institutions and policies that fail to maximize the utility
level of the worst-off, even if those measures result
in massive utility gains for everyone else. Finally,
as Gibbard (1987) suggests, ordinalist utilitarianism, like any other version of rational choice utilitarianism, needs an ‘empirically adequate’
psychology as well as a convincing theory of ethical deliberation, even if hedonism continues to be
rejected as both a psychology and an ethical theory.
Grounds for right action cannot simply be equated
with what people are disposed to choose. Rather,
utility, and thus welfarism and Paretianism, must
be tied to a normative theory that identifies any
individual’s morally significant interests in any
given social context and also justifies which choice
dispositions ought to be formed to achieve the
relevant interests in this or that situation. Such a
normative theory must in turn be tied to a psychology that supplies empirically adequate psychic
concepts and explains how dispositions to choose
are formed in terms of the concepts.
In light of such objections to utilitarianism
even in its ordinalist guise, some leading economists and philosophers see the need for a nonwelfarist theory that makes use of non-utility
information to evaluate possible outcomes.
Although there are many different ways to go
beyond utilitarianism and welfarism, two of the
most interesting ways have been proposed by
Binmore and Sen, respectively.
Beyond Utilitarianism?
Binmore, inspired by his reading of Hume, presents a provocative proportional bargaining theory of ‘natural justice’, which, like Harsanyi’s
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
utilitarian theory, relies on cardinal comparable
utility functions to represent the preferences
revealed by moral choices. Unlike Harsanyi,
though, Binmore assumes that moral agents
remain predominantly selfish and are inclined to
cheat on bargains unless they are threatened with
sufficient punishment by others for noncompliance. He builds inequalities of bargaining
power into his theory of moral behaviour by
assuming that even bargainers who place themselves in an original position under a veil of
ignorance will rely on cultural standards of interpersonal comparison which are associated with a
given Nash bargaining equilibrium. His theory
thus relies in part on non-utility information. The
relevant Nash bargaining outcome supplies the
cultural norms which agents in the original position use to calculate a proportional bargaining
equilibrium, for instance, and it has a privileged
status as a fallback position if these agents fail to
agree to coordinate on the proportional bargaining
solution. As a result, Binmore concludes that, in
general, utilitarian bargains would not be willingly enforced by rational expected utility maximizers seeking justice.
Binmore apparently assumes that people are
predominantly selfish because human behaviour
is ultimately constrained in accord with the selfish
gene paradigm. But there is no compelling scientific evidence for that paradigm. Rather, human
nature appears to be highly plastic. If so, rational
agents might eventually be moulded by cultural
forces into social and moral actors who effectively
believe that they are the same person – no different from anyone else – when it comes to certain
vital personal interests that ought to be treated as
rights. In this context, a utilitarian bargain, involving some code of justice that distributes equal
rights and correlative duties whose content is
held by the culture to be extremely valuable for
every person’s well-being, is an efficient and fair
Nash equilibrium point. Even in the absence of
any threat of punishment by others, compliance
with the rules is enforced by the actor’s own
conscience, a powerful internal ‘judicious spectator’ which threatens to inflict harsh punishment in
the form of intense feelings of guilt for cheating.
Indeed, there is textual evidence that Hume
14215
himself took seriously this possibility of utilitarian
justice (Riley 2006b).
Sen also advocates the use of non-utility information in the course of proposing a pluralistic
theory of ethical evaluation and distributive justice that involves protecting a list of basic human
functionings and capabilities or ‘freedoms’ for
each member of society (Sen 1985, 2002, 2007).
Moreover, his Paretian liberal impossibility result
(Sen 1970) shows that a social welfare function
cannot in general simultaneously satisfy utilitybased Paretian values and non-utility-based liberal rights as he conceives them. His work contains deep insights into the sort of moral and
political philosophy which normative economics
seems to require, and it also casts serious doubt on
whether any version of welfarism can accommodate such insights.
Nevertheless, it is not entirely obvious that a
move beyond utilitarianism is required, especially
if the utilitarian family is defined (as it arguably
should be) to include what Sen calls ‘utilitysupported moralities’. A case can be made, for
example, that genuine maximizing utilitarianism
involves an optimal code that distributes weighty
equal rights and correlative duties, as many leading utilitarians, including Bentham and Mill as
well as Brandt, Hare, and Harsanyi, have insisted
(Riley 2006a). Moreover, it may even be possible
to combine welfarism with a normative theory
that interprets any individual’s morally significant
interests in terms of functionings and capabilities,
the most vital of which ought to be protected by
strong rights. A moral individual is presumably
able to form dispositions to make the relevant
moral choices, at least after engaging in a process
of impartial deliberation about the functionings
and capabilities of the different people implicated
in any choice situation. Consistent ethical behaviour may reveal preference orderings that can be
represented by utility functions. If so, an ethical
version of welfarism could perhaps subsume
Sen’s ethical theory. The more general point is
that, by itself, rational choice welfarism is essentially a formal shell that needs to be filled in with a
substantive psychology and ethical theory. It can
be filled in with various theories besides hedonism, to which it has no essential tie (Riley 2001).
U
14216
Normative economists evidently face numerous
competing candidates when attempting to select a
‘reasonable’ social welfare procedure that is both
efficient and fair. Yet ordinalist utilitarianism perhaps has more appeal than has so far appeared.
Objections similar to Arrow’s are often voiced
against any version of utilitarianism (see, for example, Smart and Williams 1977; Sen and Williams
1982; Scheffler 1982). Yet the objection that even
ordinalist utilitarianism cannot accommodate reasonable principles of distributive justice arguably
turns on an improper formulation of interpersonal
comparisons of utility. As usually formulated in
terms of extended sympathy, where one person
places himself in another’s position and imagines
that he experiences the same psychic phenomena
as the other experiences in that position, interpersonal comparisons involve the sort of double
counting against which Harsanyi and Dworkin
caution (see also Gibbard 1987, p. 144).
Reformulating interpersonal comparisons so that
they do not involve double counting of any person’s utility can liberate ordinalist utilitarianism
from being chained to ‘leximin’. Arrow’s other
worry – that the possibility of interpersonal comparisons seems to deny individuality and personal
integrity – might also be met by limiting the permissible scope of interpersonal comparisons so as
to preserve weighty rights of individuality or selfdevelopment. Such an ethical limitation may be
endorsed by utilitarians if a code that distributes
such rights and correlative duties is deemed essential to the maximization of general utility.
Gibbard rightly objects that ordinalist utilitarianism by itself can hardly provide an acceptable
ethical theory if utility merely represents given
dispositions to choose, independently of any ethical justification for the dispositions. He advises that
ethical thinking must rely on ‘rough quantitative’
estimates of which outcomes are ‘more worth
wanting’ than others: ‘we should settle for some
vagueness and indecision, epistemological and
normative’ (1987, p. 148). This is wise advice,
although it may be possible to combine ordinalist
utilitarianism with an appealing ethical theory such
that ‘some vagueness and indecision’ surrounds the
‘psychic magnitudes’ used in ethical thinking
Utilitarianism and Economic Theory
whereas utility functions represent revealed preferences that reflect the relevant ethical thinking.
Indeed, a form of qualitative ordinalist utilitarianism along Millian lines deserves further study
(Edwards 1979; Riley 1988, 2007b, c, 2009).
Such a qualitative ordinalist utilitarianism might
incorporate what is taken to be Mill’s theory of
ethical thinking, including his suggested order of
priority among intrinsically different kinds of ethical judgements, without making any commitment
to psychological or ethical hedonism. Eventually,
though, the time may come when some version of
hedonism is again taken seriously (see, for example, Kahneman et al. 1999; Feldman 2004).
See Also
▶ Arrow, Kenneth Joseph (Born 1921)
▶ Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832)
▶ Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro (1845–1926)
▶ Final Utility
▶ Happiness, Economics of
▶ Harsanyi, John C. (1920–2000)
▶ Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
▶ Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873)
▶ Mirrlees, James (Born 1936)
▶ Optimal Taxation
▶ Sen, Amartya (Born 1933)
▶ Sidgwick, Henry (1838–1900)
▶ Welfare Economics
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Utility
R. D. Collison Black
Keywords
Cardinal utility; Classical theory of value;
Consumer surplus; Cost of production;
Demand; Diminishing marginal utility;
Dupuit, A.-J.-E.J.; Edgeworth, F. Y.;
Exchange; Exchange value; Gossen, H. H.;
Hicks, J. R.; Interpersonal utility comparisons;
Jevons, W. S.; Marginal revolution; Marginal
utility; Market price; Marshall, A.; Menger, C.;
Natural price; Ordinal utility; Pareto, V.; Pigou,
A. C.; Price theory; Revealed preference theory; Use value; Utility; Value; Walras, L.
JEL Classifications
A1
Utility is a term which has a long history in connection with the attempts of philosophers and
Utility
political economists to explain the phenomenon
of value. It has most frequently been given the
connotation of ‘desiredness’, or the capacity of a
good or service to satisfy a want, of whatever
kind. Its use with that meaning can be traced
back at least to Gershom Carmichael’s 1724 edition of Pufendorf’s De Officio Hominis et Civis
Iuxta Legam Naturalem, and arguably came down
to him through the medieval schoolmen from
Aristotle’s Politics.
Utility in the sense of desiredness is a purely
subjective concept, clearly distinct from usefulness or fitness for a purpose – the more normal
everyday sense of the word and the first meaning
given for it by the Oxford English Dictionary.
While most political economists of the 18th
and 19th centuries used the term in this subjective
sense, the distinction was not always kept clear,
most notably in the writings of Adam Smith. In a
famous passage in the Wealth of Nations Smith
wrote:
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two
different meanings, and sometimes expresses the
utility of some particular object, and sometimes
the power of purchasing other goods which the
possession of that object conveys. The one may be
called ‘value in use’; the other, ‘value in exchange’.
The things which have the greatest value in use
have frequently little or no value in exchange; and,
on the contrary, those which have the greatest value
in exchange have frequently little or no value in use.
Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had
in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has
scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of
other goods may frequently be had in exchange for
it. (1776, Book I, ch. IV)
Smith has sometimes been accused, because of
the wording of this passage, of falling into the
error of claiming that things which have no
value in use can have value in exchange, which
is tantamount to saying that utility is not a necessary condition for a good to have value. It would
appear, however, that Smith was not here using
the theme ‘value in use’, or utility, in the subjective sense of desiredness but in the normal objective sense of usefulness (cf. Bowley 1973, p. 137;
O’Brien 1975, pp. 80 and 97). Most other classical
economists and even Smith himself in his Lectures on Jurisprudence used the term in its
14219
subjective sense, but the passage in the Wealth of
Nations gave rise to considerable confusion and
misinterpretation. Nor was this the only source of
confusion in the early writing on the subject: even
those who used the term utility in its subjective
sense were not always clear as to whether it should
be considered a feeling in the mind of the user or a
property of the good or service used. Thomas De
Quincey, for example, referred to the ‘intrinsic
utility’ of commodities (Logic of Political Economy, 1844, p. 14).
Most classical economists, however, were not
greatly concerned with the subtleties of meaning
which the term utility might contain. Generally
they used it in the broad sense of desiredness, and
Ricardo employed it in a typically classical way
when he wrote
Utility then is not the measure of exchangeable
value, although it is absolutely essential to it. If a
commodity were in no way useful – in other words,
if it could in no way contribute to our gratification –
it would be destitute of exchangeable value, however scarce it might be, or whatever quantity of
labour might be necessary to procure
it. (Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,
1817, ch. 1, sect. I)
‘Useful’ here is interpreted as ‘contributing to
gratification’ but the very word carries an echo of
Smith’s confusion.
For Ricardo and others in the mainstream classical tradition down to J.S. Mill and Cairnes utility
became a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for a good to possess value. In this context, the
utility referred to was generally the total utility of
the good to the purchaser, or the utility of a specific quantity which is all that is available in the
circumstances of the example – for example, the
utility of a single item of food to a starving person.
As a result of this approach it followed, in the
words of J.S. Mill, that ‘the utility of a thing in the
estimation of the purchaser is the extreme limit of
its exchange value: higher the value cannot
ascend; peculiar circumstances are required to
raise it so high’ (Principles of Political Economy,
1848, Book III, ch. II, §. 1). Classical economists
like Mill accepted the view put forward by
J.B. Say that ‘labour is not creative of objects,
but of utilities’ but could see the weakness in
U
14220
Say’s contention that price measured utility.
Clearly in the case of competitively produced
commodities it did not and it was cost of production and not utility (in the total sense) which
determined value.
Since the classical economists were mainly
interested in ‘natural’ rather than ‘market’ price,
that is, in long-run normal values which were
mainly determined by supply and cost, the fact
that they had no theory to explain fully the relationships between utility, demand and market
price was not a matter of concern to most of
them. Nevertheless in the period from about
1830 to 1870 a number of attempts were made to
work out these relationships more fully or to clarify aspects of them. Some of these attempts took
place in Britain, within the framework of the
classical system, but not surprisingly some of the
best work was done at this time in France, where
the tradition of demand analysis was stronger.
The full explanation of the relation between
utility and demand requires the distinction
between total utility and increments of utility,
and the recognition of the principle that consumption of successive increments of a commodity
yields not equal but diminishing increments of
satisfaction or utility to the consumer. A number
of writers in the mid-19th century showed an
understanding of this point, but only a few stated
it explicitly and correctly. Among those in Britain
who did so were William Foster Lloyd (A Lecture
on the Notion of Value, delivered before the University of Oxford in Michaelmas Term, 1833) and
Nassau Senior (Outline of the Science of Political
Economy, 1836), but neither proceeded to develop
his insights into a complete theory of the relationship between utility, demand and market values.
The French engineer A.J. Dupuit was the first
to present an analysis which clearly explained the
concept of marginal utility and related it to a
demand curve, in his paper ‘On the Measurement
of the Utility of Public Works’ (Annales des Ponts
et Chaussées, vol. 8, 1844; English translation in
International Economic Papers, No. 2, 1952,
pp. 83–110). Dupuit also extended his analysis
to show that the total area under the demand
curve represents the total utility derived from the
commodity; deducting from this the total receipts
Utility
of the producer he arrived at the ‘utility remaining
to consumers’ or what was later to be termed
‘consumers’ surplus’.
The significance of Dupuit’s contribution is
now well recognized, but at the time of appearance it had little impact. The same is even more
true of the work of Hermann Heinrich Gossen,
one of the few German contributors to utility
theory in this period. His book Entwicklung der
Gesetze des Menschlichen Verkehrs, published in
1854, contained not only a statement of the ‘law of
satiable wants’, or diminishing marginal utility,
but also of the proposition that to maximize satisfaction from any good capable of satisfying various wants it must be allocated between those uses
so as to equalize its marginal utilities in all
of them.
Gossen’s analysis of the principles of utility
maximization was thus more complete than any
which had preceded it. Yet his one book, which
foreshadowed many features of general equilibrium as well as utility theory, received virtually no
attention until 1878, 20 years after the author’s
death, when Robert Adamson, W.S. Jevons’s successor as Professor of Philosophy and Political
Economy at Manchester, obtained a copy of it
and drew it to the attention of Jevons himself.
By that time the whole character of utility
analysis and its place in economic theory had
begun to change significantly. This change is usually dated from the very nearly simultaneous publication of Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy
in England and Menger’s Grundsätze der
Volkswirtschaftslehre Austria, both in 1871, and
Walras’s Eléments d’économie politique pure in
Switzerland in 1874. All these work contained a
treatment of the theory of value in which the
analysis of diminishing marginal utility (under a
variety of other names) played a considerable part,
but each of the three authors seems to have arrived
independently at the main ideas of his theory
without indebtedness to the others or to the predecessors already mentioned above.
This remarkable example of multiple discovery in the history of ideas has come to be known as
‘the Marginal Revolution’. Discussion of its
causes and character lies outside the scope of
this article, but it is generally accepted that, as
Utility
Sir John Hicks has said, ‘the essential novelty in
the work of these economists was that instead of
basing their economics on production and distribution, they based it on exchange’ (Hicks 1976,
p. 212).
A major element in this ‘shift in attention’
undoubtedly was a change from the classical concept of value in use, or total utility, as a necessary
but not sufficient condition to explain the normal
values of freely reproducible commodities, to the
concept of what Jevons called ‘the degree of utility’ and of adjustments in it, through exchange of
quantities of goods held or consumed, in order to
maximize satisfaction. Marginal analysis can,
however, be applied to questions of production
and distribution as well as consumption, and
hence the ‘Marginal Revolution’ involved more
than a new stage in the development of utility
theory.
Although all three pioneers of the Marginal
Revolution did contribute to that development
they also contributed in other ways to the theory
of pricing and exchange. Perhaps only for Jevons
was the theory of utility genuinely central to the
structure of his economic work. On the opening
page of his Theory of Political Economy he
emphatically asserted that ‘value depends entirely
upon utility’ and he went on to say that ‘Political
Economy must be founded upon a full and accurate investigation of the conditions of utility’
(1871 p. 46). Jevons indeed appears to have
shared with his classical predecessors the view
that a theory of value must go beyond the phenomena of demand and supply to some more
fundamental explanation which for him was to
be found in utility rather than in labour. ‘Labour
is found often to determine value, but only in an
indirect manner, by varying the degree of utility of
the commodity through an increase or limitation
of supply’ (Jevons 1871, p. 2).
Apart from differences of terminology,
Walras’s treatment of utility in relation to the
problem of exchange had substantial similarities
with that of Jevons; but Walras saw the problem in
a different context.
His whole attention was focused on market phenomena and not on consumption . . . while the driving force in the theory of exchange is, as Walras saw
14221
it, the endeavour of all traders to maximise their
several satisfactions, it is marketplace satisfactions
rather than dining-room satisfactions which Walras
had in mind. (Jaffé 1973, pp. 118–19)
For Menger, as for Walras, the concepts of
utility theory formed only a part of a much large
analytical structure (concerned in his case not so
much with equilibrium as with development), but
unlike both Walras and Jevons he refused to state
his theories in mathematical terms.
Menger developed a theory of economizing
behaviour showing how the individual would
seek to satisfy his subjectively felt needs in the
most efficient manner. In the process he elaborated the essential propositions of a theory of
maximizing behaviour for the consumer, but he
expressed them in terms of the satisfaction of
needs by the consumption of successive units of
goods. In his discussion of this process Menger
used the same phrases – use-value and exchangevalue – which Smith had used almost a century
earlier, and with similar connotations. Use-value
he defined as ‘the importance that goods acquire
for us because they directly assure us the satisfaction of needs that would not be provided for if we
did not have the goods at our command. Exchange
value is the importance that goods acquire for us
because their possession assures the same result
indirectly’ (Menger 1871, p. 228). Menger did use
the term ‘utility’, but not as a synonym for usevalue; he viewed it as an abstract relation between
a species of goods and a human need, akin to the
general term ‘usefulness’. As such it constituted a
prerequisite for a good to have economic character, but had no quantitative relationship to value.
The three pioneers of the Marginal Revolution
thus saw the problem of the relationship of utility
to exchange value in different contexts and
expressed their solutions to it in different ways.
Inevitably also their first solutions were incomplete in various respects. For example, the precise
relationships between the individual’s utility function and demand function, the market demand
function and the market price were not clearly
specified in some of the earlier formulations; it
remained for later contributors such as Marshall,
Wicksteed and Edgeworth to deal with these
points.
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14222
Nevertheless, despite their differences of terminology and approach, the writings of the pioneers did contain a common core which gradually
gained wider acceptance, and by 1890 with the
appearance of Marshall’s Principles of Economics
it seemed that the new analysis of market values
had been effectively integrated with an analysis of
supply and cost which served to explain long-run
‘normal’ values. It did provide some things which
the classical system had not contained, among
them a consistent theory of consumer behaviour,
expressed in terms of utility.
So in 1899 it was possible for Edgeworth to
write that:
the relation of utility to value, which exercised the
older economists, is thus simply explained by the
mathematical school. The value in use of a certain
quantity of commodity corresponds to its total utility; the value in exchange to its marginal utility
(multiplied by the quantity). The former is greater
than the latter, since the utility of the final increment
of commodity is less than that of every other increment. (Edgeworth 1899, p. 602)
At this stage utility analysis appeared to have
evolved to something approaching finality, and in
1925 Jacob Viner could still say:
In its developed form it is to be found sympathetically treated and playing a prominent role in the
exposition of value theory in most of the current
authoritative treatises on economic theory by American, English, Austrian, and Italian writers.
Yet Viner immediately went on to add:
In the scientific periodicals, however, in contrast
with the standard treatises, sympathetic expositions
of the utility theory of value have become somewhat rare. In their stead are found an unintermittent
series of slashing criticisms of the utility economics. (Viner 1925, p. 179)
The principal criticisms which Viner noted
were the apparent involvement of utility theory
with hedonistic psychology and the problems of
measuring welfare in terms of utility. In later years
questions of the measurement and summation of
utility came to trouble economists more and more.
The two basic problems involved here are
whether utility can be measured cardinally or simply ordinally, and whether interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible. The pioneers of the
Marginal Revolution were not unaware of these
Utility
problems; Jevons nowhere attempted to define a
unit of utility, and indeed said that ‘a unit of
pleasure or pain is difficult even to conceive’,
but he went on to say that ‘it is from the quantitative effects of the feelings that we must estimate
their comparative amounts’ (Jevons 1871, p. 14).
However they may be estimated, Jevons did not
hesitate to refer to ‘quantity of utility’, and his
whole analysis proceeds by treating utility as if it
could be measured. The question was not examined in detail by Walras or Menger, but both their
analyses treat utility as cardinally measurable.
On the question of interpersonal comparisons
of utility, Menger and Walras seemed to find no
difficulty, and Walras was prepared to speak of a
‘maximum of utility’ for society (Walras 1874,
p. 256). Jevons on the other hand declared that
‘every mind is . . . inscrutable to every other mind,
and no common denominator of feeling seems
possible’ (Jevons 1871, p. 211) – but this did not
always prevent him from comparing and aggregating utilities.
In the early editions of his Principles of Economics Marshall fully accepted the idea of utility
as cardinally measurable and allowed the possibility if not of interpersonal certainly of intergroup comparisons of utility (1890, pp. 151 and
152). In later years he became more reticent and
defensive on these points, and he was always
more concerned than Jevons with the effects of
feelings rather than the feelings themselves; yet
cardinal utility always remained the basis of Marshall’s demand theory.
Now, as Sir John Hicks said:
if one starts from a theory of demand like that of
Marshall and his contemporaries, it is exceedingly
natural to look for a welfare application. If the
general aim of the economic system is the satisfaction of consumer wants, and if the satisfaction of
individual wants is to be conceived of as a
maximising of utility, cannot the aim of the system
be itself conceived of as a maximising of utility –
universal utility, as Edgeworth called it? If this
could be done and some measure of universal utility
could be found, the economist’s function could be
widened out, from the understanding of cause and
effect to the judgement of the effects – whether,
from the point of view of want- satisfaction, they
are to be judged as successful or unsuccessful, good
or bad. (Hicks 1956, p. 6)
Utility
This was, in effect, the task which was undertaken by Marshall’s successor, A.C. Pigou, in his
Economics of Welfare (1920; earlier version
published under the title Wealth and Welfare,
1912). Pigou made no attempt to establish a measure of universal utility; instead he took what
Marshall had called ‘the national dividend’,
aggregate real income, as the ‘objective counterpart’ of economic welfare. Pigou argued that economic welfare would be greater when aggregate
real income increased, when fluctuations in its
amount were reduced, and when it was more
equally distributed among persons. It was in
the context of this last point that interpersonal
utility comparisons were most evident; Pigou
argued that
the old ‘law of diminishing utility’ thus leads
securely to the proposition: Any cause which
increases the absolute share of real income in the
hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a
contraction in the size of the national dividend . . .
will in general, increase economic welfare. (1920,
p. 89)
In the 1930s most economists became increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of measurement and interpersonal or intergroup comparisons
of utility. In 1934, in a famous article entitled ‘A
Reconsideration of the Theory of Value’, Hicks
and Allen used the technique of indifference
curves originated by Edgeworth and developed
by Walras’s successor at Lausanne, Vilfredo
Pareto, in presenting a theory of consumer behaviour involving only ordinal comparisons of satisfaction. A few years later a further step towards
eliminating what were now considered dubious
psychological assumptions from that theory was
taken by treating consumer behaviour solely on
the basis of revealed preference.
Accompanying these changes there was a
movement away from the type of welfare economics developed on the basis of utility theory
by Marshall and Pigou towards that based on
Pareto’s concept of an economic optimum as a
position from which it is impossible to improve
anyone’s welfare without damaging that of
another.
Indifference analysis and revealed preference theory are now standard features of
14223
microeconomic theory; but the utility concept
has not disappeared; the most widely used introductory economics texts still tend to begin their
treatments of household behaviour with an
account of utility theory.
See Also
▶ Gossen, Hermann Heinrich (1810–1858)
Bibliography
Bowley, M. 1973. Utility, the paradox of value and ‘all
that’ and classical economics. In Studies in the history
of economic theory before 1870, ed. M. Bowley.
London: Macmillan.
De Quincey, T. 1844. The logic of political economy.
Edinburgh: Blackwood.
Dupuit, A.J. 1844. On the measurement of the utility of
public works. Annales des Ponts et Chaussées, 2nd
Series, vol. 8. Trans. in International economic papers,
No. 2, London: Macmillan, 1952.
Edgeworth, F.Y. 1899. Utility. In Dictionary of political
economy, ed. R.H.I. Palgrave, vol. 3. London:
Macmillan.
Gossen, H.H. 1854. Entwicklung der Gesetze des
menschlichen Verkehrs und der daraus Fliessenden
Regeln für menschliches Handeln. Brunswick: Viewig.
Translated as The laws of human relations and the rules
of human action derived therefrom. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1983.
Hicks, J.R. 1956. A revision of demand theory. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Hicks, J.R. 1976. ‘Revolutions’ in economics. In Method
and appraisal in economics, ed. S.J. Latsis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hicks, J.R., and R.G.D. Allen. 1934. A reconsideration of
the theory of value. Economica 1 (52–76): 196–219.
Howey, R.S. 1960. The rise of the marginal utility school,
1870–1889. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
Jaffé, W. 1973. Léon Walras’s role in the ‘marginal revolution’ of the 1870s. In The marginal revolution in
economics, ed. R.D. Collison Black, A.W. Coats, and
C.D. Goodwin. Durham: Duke University Press.
Jevons, W.S. 1871. The theory of political economy.
London: Macmillan.
Kauder, E. 1965. A history of marginal utility theory.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lloyd, W.F. 1833. A lecture on the notion of value, delivered before the University of Oxford in Michaelmas
Term 1833. Reprinted in Economic history, supplement
to the Economic Journal, No. 2 (1927), 168–183.
Marshall, A. 1890. Principles of economics, 9th
(variorum) ed, ed. C.W. Guillebaud. London: Macmillan, 1961.
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Menger, C. 1871. Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre.
Trans. J. Dingwall and B.F. Hoselitz as Principles of
economics. Glencoe: Free Press, 1951.
Mill, J.S. 1848. Principles of political economy, ed. W. J.
Ashley. London: Longmans, 1909.
O’Brien, D.P. 1975. The classical economists. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Pigou, A.C. 1912. Wealth and welfare. Expanded and
republished as The economics of welfare. London:
Macmillan, 1920.
Ricardo, D. 1817. The principles of political economy and
taxation, vol. 1 of The works and correspondence of
David Ricardo, ed. P. Sraffa. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1951.
Senior, N.W. 1836. An outline of the science of political
economy. London: W. Clowes. Reprinted, London:
Allen & Unwin, 1938.
Smith, A. 1776. An inquiry into the nature and causes of
the wealth of nations, ed. R.H. Campbell and
A.S. Skinner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
Stigler, G.J. 1950. The development of utility theory. Pts.
I and II. Journal of Political Economy 58: 307–327;
373–396. Reprinted in G.J. Stigler, Essays in the history of economics. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965.
Viner, J. 1925. The utility concept in value theory and its
critics. Journal of Political Economy 33: 369–387.
Reprinted in J. Viner, The long view and the short.
Glencoe: Free Press, 1958.
Walras, L. 1874. Eléments d’économie politique pure.
Lausanne: Corbaz et Cie. Trans. W. Jaffé as Elements
of pure economics. London: Allen & Unwin, 1954.
Utility Theory and Decision Theory
Peter C. Fishburn
The conjunction of utility theory and decision
theory involves formulations of decision making
in which the criteria for choice among competing
alternatives are based on numerical representations of the decision agent’s preferences and
values. Utility theory as such refers to these representations and to assumptions about preferences
that correspond to various numerical representations. Although it is a child of decision theory,
utility theory has emerged as a subject in its own
right as seen, for example, in the contemporary
review by Fishburn (See ▶ Representation of
Preferences). Readers interested in more detail
Utility Theory and Decision Theory
on representations of preferences should consult
that entry.
Our discussion of utility theory and decision
theory will follow the useful three-part classification popularized by Luce and Raiffa (1957),
namely decision making under certainty, risk,
and uncertainty. I give slightly different descriptions than theirs.
Certainty refers to formulations that exclude
explicit consideration of chance or uncertainty,
including situations in which the outcome of
each decision is known beforehand. Most of consumer demand theory falls within this category.
Risk refers to formulations that involve chance
in the form of known probabilities or odds, but
excludes unquantified uncertainty. Games of
chance and insurance decisions with known probabilities for possible outcomes fall within the risk
category. Note that ‘risk’ as used here is only
tangentially associated with the common notion
that equates risk with the possibility of something
bad happening.
Uncertainty refers to formulations in which
decision outcomes depend explicitly on events
that are not controlled by the decision agent and
whose resolutions are known to the agent only
after the decision is made. Probabilities of the
events are regarded either as meaningless,
unknowable, or assessable only with reference to
personal judgement. Situations addressed by the
theory of noncooperative games and statistical
decision theory typically fall under this heading.
A brief history of the subject will provide perspective for our ensuing discussion of the three
categories.
Historical Remarks
The first important paper on the subject was written by Daniel Bernoulli (1738) who, in conjunction with Gabriel Cramer, sought to explain why
prudent agents often choose among risky options
in a manner contrary to expected profit maximization. One example is the choice of a sure
$10,000 profit over a risky venture that loses
$5000 or gains $30,000, each with probability
1/2. Bernoulli argued that many such choices
Utility Theory and Decision Theory
could be explained by maximization of the
expected utility (‘moral worth’) of risky options,
wherein the utility of wealth increases at a
decreasing rate. He thus introduced the idea of
decreasing marginal utility of wealth as well as
the maximization of expected utility.
Although Bernoulli’s ideas were endorsed by
Laplace and others, they had little effect on the
economics of decision making under risk until
quite recently. On the other hand, his notion of
decreasing marginal utility became central in consumer economics during the latter part of the 19th
century (Stigler 1950), especially in the works of
Gossen, Jevons, Menger, Walras and Marshall.
During this early period, utility was often
viewed as a measurable psychological magnitude.
This notion of intensive measurable utility, which
was sometimes represented by the additive form
u1(x1) + u2(x2) + + un(xn) for commodity
bundles (x1,x2,. . .,xn), was subsequently replaced
in the ordinalist revolution of Edgeworth, Fisher,
Pareto, and Slutsky by the view that utility
represents nothing more than the agent’s preference ordering over consumption bundles.
A revival of intensive measurable utility
occurred after 1920 when Frisch, Lange and Alt
axiomatized the notion of comparable preference
differences, but it did not regain the prominence
it once held.
Bernoulli’s long-dormant principle of the maximization of expected utility reappeared with
force in the expected utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947). Unlike
Bernoulli and Cramer, who favoured an intensive
measurable view of utility, von Neumann and
Morgenstern showed how the expected-utility
form can arise solely from simple preference comparisons between risky options. They thus accomplished for decision making under risk what the
ordinalists accomplished for demand theory a
generation earlier.
Although little noted at the time, Ramsey
(1931), in an essay written in 1926 and published
posthumously, attempted something more ambitious than the utility theory for risky decisions of
von Neumann and Morgenstern. Ramsey’s aim
was to show how assumptions about preferences
between uncertain decisions imply not only a
14225
utility function for outcomes but also a subjective
or personal probability distribution over uncertain
events such that one uncertain decision is preferred to another precisely when the former has
greater subjective (probability) expected utility.
Ramsey’s outline of a theory of decision making
under uncertainty greatly influenced the first complete theory of subjective expected utility, due to
Savage (1954). Savage also drew heavily on
Bruno de Finetti’s seminal ideas on subjective
probability, which are similar in ways to views
espoused much earlier by Bayes and Laplace.
During the historical period, several unsuccessful proposals were made to replace ‘utility’
by a term better suited to the concepts it represents. Despite these failures, the terms ordinal
utility and cardinal utility, introduced by Hicks
and Allen (1934) to distinguish between the
ordinalist viewpoint and the older measurability
view of utility as a ‘cardinal magnitude’, caught
on. Present usage adheres to the following measurement theoretic definitions.
Let denote the relation is preferred to on a set
X of decision alternatives, outcomes, commodity
bundles, or whatever. Suppose preferences are
ordered and can be represented by a real valued
function u on X as
x y , uðxÞ > uðyÞ;
(1)
for all x and y in X. We then say that u is an ordinal
utility function if it satisfies (1) but is subject to no
further restrictions. Then any other real function
v that preserves the order of , or satisfies (1) in
place of u, is also an ordinal utility function, and
all such functions for the given are equivalent in
the ordinal context. A different preference ordering on X will have a different equivalence class of
order-preserving functions. If u is also required to
be continuous, we may speak of continuous ordinal utility.
If u satisfies (1) and is restricted by subsidiary
conditions in such a way that v also satisfies (1)
and the subsidiary conditions if and only if there
are numbers a > 0 and b such that
uðxÞ ¼ auðxÞ þ b,
for all x in X;
(2)
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Utility Theory and Decision Theory
then u is a cardinal utility function and is said to
be unique up to a positive (a > 0) liner transformation. Subsidiary conditions that force (2)
under appropriate structure for X include additivity u(x1,. . .,xn) = u1(x1) + . . . + un (xn) with
n 2, the linearity property u[lp + (1 l)q] =
lu(p) + (1 l)u(q) of expected utility, and the
ordered preference-difference representation (x, y)
*(z, w) , u(x) u(y) > u(z) u(w). Only the
last of these, where (x, y) *(z, w) says that the
intensity of preference for x over y exceeds the
intensity of preference for z over w, involves a
view of preference that goes beyond the basic
relation .
Economics is often concerned with situations
in which any one of a number of subsets of
X might arise as the feasible set from which a
choice is required. For example, if X is a commodity space {(x1,. . .,xn):xi 0 for i = 1,. . .,n},
then the feasible set at price vector p = (p1,. . .,
pn) > (0,. . .,0) and disposable income m 0 is
the opportunity set {(x1,. . .,xn):p1x1 + . . . + pnxn
m} of commodity bundles that can be purchased at p and m. The allure of (1) in such
situations is that the same u can be used for choice
by maximization of utility for each non-empty
feasible set Y so long as the set
max Y ¼ fx in Y : uðxÞ uðyÞ for all y in Y g
u
Decisions Under Certainty
Representation (1) is the preeminent utility representation for decision making under certainty. It
presumes that the preference relation is
asymmetric:if x y then not ðy xÞ,
negatively transitive: if x z then x y or y z;
and, when X is uncountably infinite, that there is a
countable subset C0 in X such that, whenever x y,
there is a z in C0 such that x ≳ z ≳ y, where x ≳ z
means not (z x). An asymmetric and negatively
transitive relation is often referred to as a weak
order, and in this case both and its induced
indifference relation ~, defined by
x y if neither x y nor y x;
are transitive, that is (x y, y z) ) x z and
(x ~ y, y ~ z) ) x ~ z. If X is a connected and
separable topological space, the countable C0 condition can be replaced by the assumption that the
preferred-to-x set {y:y x} and the less-preferredthan-x set {y:x y} are open sets in X’s topology
for every x in X. When this holds, u can be taken to
be continuous. If the countable C0 condition fails
when is a weak order, (1) cannot hold and
instead we could represent by vectorvalued
utilities ordered lexicographically. For details
and further references, see Fishburn (1970, 1974).
is not empty. The existence of non-empty maxu
Y is assured if Y is finite or if it is a compact subset
of a connected and separable topological space on
which u is upper semicontinuous.
When (1) holds, the set
max Y ¼ fx in Y : y x for no y in Y g
of maximally-preferred elements in Y is identical
to maxu Y. On the other hand, max Y can be
non-empty when no utility function satisfies (1).
For example, if X is finite, then max Y is
non-empty for every non-empty subset Y of X if,
and only if, X contains no preference cycle, that is
no x1,. . .,xm such that x1 x2 . . . xm x1. In
this case it is always possible to define u on X so
that, for all x and y in X,
x y ) uðxÞ uðyÞ:
(3)
Then choices can still be made by maximization of utility since maxu Y will be a non-empty
subset of max Y. However, if has cycles, then
the principle of choice by maximization
breaks down.
The situation for infinite X and suitably
constrained feasible sets is somewhat different.
Sonnenschein (1971) shows for the commodity
space setting that can have cycles while every
opportunity set Y has a non-empty max Y. His
key assumptions are a semicontinuity condition
Utility Theory and Decision Theory
on ≳ and the assumption that every preferred-to-x
set is convex. Thus, choice by maximal preference
may obtain when can be characterized by
neither (1) nor (3).
Max Y for opportunity sets Y in commodity
space is the agent’s demand correspondence
(which depends on p and m) or, if each max Y
is a singleton, his demand function. The revealed
preference approach of Samuelson and others represents an attempt to base the theory of consumer
demand directly on demand functions without
invoking preference as an undefined primitive. If
f (p, m) denotes the consumer’s unique choice at
(p, m) from the opportunity set there, we say that
commodity bundle x is revealed to be preferred to
commodity bundle y if y 6¼ x and there is a (p, m)
at which x = f(p, m) and p1y1 + + pnyn m.
Conditions can then be stated (Uzawa 1960;
Houthakker 1961; Hurwicz and Richter 1971)
for the revealed preference relation such that
there exists a utility function u on X for which
maxu Y = {f(p, m)} when Y is the opportunity set
at (p, m), for every such Y.
The revealed preference approach in demand
theory has stimulated a more general theory of
choice functions. A choice function C is a mapping from a family of non-empty feasible subsets
of X into subsets of X such that, for each feasible Y,
C(Y) is a non-empty subset of Y. The choice set C
(Y) describes the ‘best’ things in Y. Research in
this area has identified conditions on C that allow
it to be represented in interesting ways. Examples
appear in Fishburn (1973, chapter 15) and Sen
(1977). One is the condition.
if Y Z and Y \ CðZÞ is non empty,
then CðY Þ ¼ Y \ CðZÞ:
When every two-element and three-element
subset of X is feasible, this implies that the
revealed preference relation r , defined by xr
y if x 6¼ y and C({x, y}) = {x}, is a weak order.
The weaker condition
if Y z then Y \ CðZÞ CðY Þ
implies that r has no cycles when every
non-empty finite subset of X is feasible.
14227
Decisions Under Risk
Let P be a convex set of probability measures on
an algebra A of subsets of an outcome set X. Thus,
for every p in P , p(A) 0 for all A in A ,
p(A) = 1, and p(AUB) = p(A) + p(AUB) whenever A and B are disjoint sets in A . Convexity
means that lp + (1 l)q is in P whenever p and
q are in P and 0 l 1. We assume that each
{x} is in A and each measure that has p({x}) = 1
for some x in X is in. P
The basic expected utility representation is, for
all p and q in P,
pq,
ð
X
uðxÞdpðxÞ >
ð
X
uðxÞdqðxÞ;
(4)
where u is a real valued function on X. When
u satisfies (4), it is unique up to a positive linear
transformation. The expected utility representation follows from the preference axioms of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) when each p in
P has p(A) = 1 for a finite A in A . Other cases
are axiomatized in Fishburn (1970, 1982a). The
most important axiom besides weak order is the
independence condition which says that, for all p,
q and r in P and all 0 < l < 1,
p q ) lp þ ð1 lÞr lq þ ð1 lÞr: (5)
If $5000 with certainty is preferred to a 50–50
gamble for $12,000 or $0, then (5) says that a
50–50 gamble for $5000 or – $20,000 will be
preferred to a gamble that returns $12,000 or
$0 or – $20,000 with probabilities 1/4, 1/4 and
1/2 respectively: r ($20,000) = 1 and l = 1/2.
The principle of choice for expected utility
says to choose an expected-utility maximizing
decision or measure in the feasible subset L of
P when much a measure exists. Since convex
combinations of measures in L can be formed
at little or no cost with the use of random devices,
feasible sets are often assumed to be convex.
Although this will not create a maximizing
combination when none existed prior to
convexification under the usual expected utility
model, it can create maximally-preferred measures in more general theories that allow cyclic
U
14228
preferences. Convex feasible sets are also important in the minimax theory of noncooperative
games (Nash 1951) and economic equilibrium
without ordered preferences (Mas-Colell 1974;
Shafer and Sonnenschein 1975).
Expected utility for the special case of monetary outcomes has sired extensive literatures on
risk attitudes (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1974) and stochastic dominance (Whitmore and Findlay 1978;
Bawa 1982). Risk attitudes involve curvature
properties of an increasing utility function
(u00 < 0 for risk aversion) and their economic
consequences for expected-utility maximizing
agents. Stochastic dominance relates shape features of u to distribution
Ð
Ð function comparisons.
For example, udp udq for all increasing
u if and only if p({x:x c}) q({x:x c}) for
every real c.
Alternatives to expected utility maximization
with monetary outcomes base criteria for choice
on distribution function parameters such as the
mean, variance, below-target semivariance, and
loss probability (Markowitz 1959; Libby and
Fishburn 1977). The best known of these are
mean (more is better)/variance (more is worse)
models developed by Markowitz (1959), Tobin
(1965) and others. Whether congruent with
expected utility or not (Chipman 1973), such
models assume that preferences between distributions depend only on the parameters used.
Recent research in utility/decision theory of
risky decisions has been motivated by empirical
results (Allais and Hagen 1979; Kahneman and
Tversky 1979; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983)
which reveal systematic and persistent violations
of the expected utility axioms, including (5) and
transitivity. Alternative utility models that weaken
(5) but retain weak order have been proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Machina (1982),
and others. A representation which presumes neither (5) nor transitivity is axiomatized by Fishburn
(1982b).
Decisions Under Uncertanity
We adopt Savage’s (1954) formulation in which
each potential decision is characterized by a
Utility Theory and Decision Theory
function f, called an act, from a set S of states
into a set X of consequences. The consequence
that occurs if f is taken and state s obtains is f(s).
Exactly one state will obtain, the agent does not
know which it is, and the act chosen will not affect
its realization. Examples of states are possible
temperatures in central London at 12 noon next
14 July and possible closing prices of a company’s
stock next Thursday.
Suppose S and the set F of available acts are
finite, and that there is a utility function u on X that
satisfies (1) and perhaps other conditions. Choice
criteria that avoid the question of subjective probabilities on S (Luce and Raiffa 1957, chapter 13)
include
maximum utility : choose f to maximize min u½f ðsÞ ;
s
minimaxloss : choose f to minimize
max max u½ f ðsÞ u½ f ðsÞ
F
S
Hurwicza : given 0
a
;
1, choose f to maximize
a max u½ f ðsÞ þ ð1 aÞ min u½ f ðsÞ :
S
S
Maximin, which maximizes the worst that can
happen, is very conservative. Minimax loss
(or regret), which is less conservative than maximin, minimizes the maximum difference between
the best that could happen and what actually happens. Hurwicz a ranges from maximin (a = 0) to
‘maximax’ (a = 1).
Another criterion maximizes the average value
of u[f(s)] over s. This is tantamount to the subjective expected utility model with equal probability
for each state.
Subjective probability as developed by Ramsey, de Finetti and Savage quantifies partial beliefs
by the extent to which we are prepared to act on
them. If you would rather bet £100 on horse
A than on horse B then, for you, A has the higher
probability of winning. If your beliefs adhere to
appropriate axioms for a comparative probability
relation
on the algebra of S subsets of
S (Fishburn 1986) then there is a probability measure r on S such that, for all A and B in S, A *B
, r(A) > r (B).
Savage’s axioms for on F (Savage 1954;
Fishburn 1970, chapter 14) imply the existence of
Utility Theory and Decision Theory
14229
a bounded utility function u on X and a probability
measure C on S such that, for all f and g in F
f g,
ð
S
u½f ðsÞ drðsÞ >
ð
S
u½gðsÞ drðsÞ; (6)
with u unique up to a positive linear transformation and r unique. His axioms include weak order,
independence axioms that in part yield the
preceding representation of , and a continuity
condition. Many other people (Fishburn 1981)
have developed alternative axiomatizations of
(6) and closely-related representations.
Recent alternatives to Savage’s subjective
expected utility theory have been motivated by
the empirical results cited in the preceding section
and by Ellsberg’s (1961) challenges to the traditional subjective probability model. Suppose an
urn contains 30 red balls and 60 others that are
black and yellow in an unknown proportion. One
ball is to be drawn at random. Many people are
observed to prefer a bet on red rather than black,
and a bet on black or yellow rather than red or
yellow. By the traditional model, the first preference gives r(red) > r(black) and the second
gives r(black) > r(red).
Schmeidler (1984) axiomatizes a utility model
that replaces the additive probability measure r in
(6) by a monotone [A B ) r(A) r(B)] but
not necessarily additive measure and argues that
his model can accommodate Ellsberg’s phenomena. A different model (Loomes and Sugden 1982)
uses additive p but accommodates other violations
of independence and cyclic preferences.
Maximization of subjective expected utility is
the core principle of Bayesian decision theory
(Savage 1954; Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961; Winkler
1972). This name, used in distinction to classical
methods of statistical analysis pioneered by
R.A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, Egon Pearson, and
Abraham Wald, recognizes the unabashed use of
subjective probability and the revision of probabilities in light of new evidence by the basic
formula of conditional probability known as
Bayes’s Theorem.
A typical problem is statistical decision theory
is to decide which of several possible experiments, if any, to perform for the purpose of
gathering additional information that will be
used in a subsequent decision. In the Bayesian
approach, the primary states that occasion the
need for further information can be enriched to
incorporate potential experimental outcomes in
such a way that (6) refers to the entire decision
process. The problem can then be decomposed, as
is usually done in practice, to compute optimal
subsequent decisions based on particular experiments and their possible outcomes. Decision functions for each experiment that map outcomes into
best subsequent acts can then be compared to
determine a best experiment. Various methods of
analysis in the Bayesian mode are described and
illustrated in Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961).
See Also
▶ Decision Theory
▶ Expected Utility and Mathematical Expectation
▶ Expected Utility Hypothesis
Bibliography
Allais, M., and O. Hagen (eds.). 1979. Expected utility
hypotheses and the Allais paradox. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Arrow, K.J. 1974. Essays in the theory of risk bearing.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Bawa, V.S. 1982. Stochastic dominance: A research bibliography. Management Science 28: 698–712.
Bernoulli, D. 1738. Specimen theoriae novae de mensura
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Petropolitanae 5: 175–192. Trans. L. Sommer,
Econometrica 22: 23–36, (1954).
Chipman, J.S. 1973. The ordering of portfolios in terms of
mean and variance. Review of Economic Studies 40:
167–190.
Ellsberg, D. 1961. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage
axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 75: 643–669.
Fishburn, P.C. 1970. Utility theory for decision making.
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Fishburn, P.C. 1973. The theory for social choice.
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Fishburn, P.C. 1974. Lexicographic orders, utilities, and
decision rules: A survey. Management Science 20:
1442–1471.
Fishburn, P.C. 1981. Subjective expected utility: A review
of normative theories. Theory and Decision 13:
139–199.
Fishburn, P.C. 1982a. The foundations of expected utility.
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Fishburn, P.C. 1982b. Nontransitive measurable utility.
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Fishburn, P.C. 1986. The axioms of subjective probability.
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Hurwicz, L., and M.K. Richter. 1971. Revealed preference
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Loomes, G., and R. Sugden. 1982. Regret theory: An
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without the independence axiom. Econometrica 50:
277–323.
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Wiley, 1964.
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Utopias
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Utopias
Gregory Claeys
The word ‘utopia’ is derived from a Greek term
meaning ‘no place’. A utopia is a fictional account
of a perfect or ideal society which in its economic
aspect is usually stationary and often includes
community of goods. Many proposals for social
reform have included elements inspired by utopias, and most utopias at least tacitly plead for
social change. There is no single utopian tradition
and thus no unilinear relationship between ‘utopia’ and the history of economic thought. Insofar
as the provision of a subsistence for mankind has
been the aim of all forms of normative economic
thought, however, the mode of thinking about
perfect or harmonious societies termed ‘utopian’
has usually presented itself as the most comprehensive answer to the riddles offered by economic
writers. Particularly in the modern period this has
involved the use of science and technology to
solve economic problems. In turn, the most
Utopias
ambitious plans to settle all economic difficulties
have themselves often verged upon the utopian
(in the sense of being particularly fanciful or
unachievable). A clarification of this relationship
requires distinguishing utopian thought from at
least four related modes of speculation. In millenarianism, all social problems are disposed of
through divine intervention, often in the form of
the Second Coming of Christ, at which time a
perfect society is founded. In the medieval
English poetic vision described in the ‘Land of
Cockaygne’ and similar works, all forms of scarcity are dissolved in a fantasy of satiety, where
desires remain fixed while their means of satisfaction increase without labour and are consumed
without effort. In arcadias, a greater stress is
given to the satisfaction of ‘natural’ desires alone
and to the equal importance of a spiritual and
aesthetic existence. In what has been termed the
‘perfect moral community’ the necessity for a
prior change in human nature and especially in
human wants is also assumed and more attention
is given to spiritual regeneration as the basis of
social harmony.
In all forms of ideal societies the problem of
wants or needs is central. The utopian tradition
has tended to accept the central tension between
limited resources and insatiable appetites, neither
ignoring the problem nor assuming any essential
change in human nature (Fuz (1952) has termed
‘utopias of escape’ those which begin with the
assumption of plenty, ‘utopias of realization’
those which presume scarcity as a startingpoint). Most utopias attempt instead to control
the key forms of social malaise (crime, poverty,
vice, war, etc.) which result from human frailty,
giving greater stress to the best organization of
social institutions rather than idealizing either
nature (as in the Land of Cockaygne) or man
(as does the perfect moral commonwealth), and
relying upon designs fostered by human ingenuity
rather than those derived from divine foresight. In
economic as well as other aspects, utopias seek
the perfection of a completely ordered and
detailed social model rather than an interim solution to or partial reform of present disorders. In the
imaginative grasp of possibility and presumptive
omniscience of exactitude lies the charm and
14231
utility as well as the overperfectionist dangers of
utopian schemes. Seeking at once to preserve the
best of the past and to design an ideal future,
utopias have themselves often served as models
for judging the adequacy of the present as well
as – particularly in the areas of science and
technology – its logical development.
As a general rule the economic aspect of the
utopian tradition can be understood as moving
from a central concern with the maintenance of
limited wants and (very often) a community of
goods to solve problems of production and distribution, to a greater reliance upon the productive
powers provided by science, technology and new
forms of economic organization, with less strenuous demands being made for a denial of ‘artificial’
needs. In this sense the history of utopias mirrors
both economic history and the history of economic thought insofar as the latter has legitimized
that potential for satisfying greater needs for
which scientific and technological development
have provided the chief basis. As mainstream
liberal political economy came to relinquish the
ideal of economic regulation in the eighteenth
century, relying instead upon the development of
the market to overcome scarcity, utopianism also
shifted its emphasis away from the creation of
virtue and towards that of organized superfluity
and affluence, often in combination with centralized economic planning and organization. Technology has been presumed to have brought a
diminution in the amount of socially necessary
labour without the necessity for a concomitant
reduction in wants. The inevitability of an extreme
division of labour has also been supplanted by the
vision of alternating forms of more interesting and
creative employment in many modern utopias.
Contemporary utopianism both builds upon the
promises of technology, and remains critical of
forms of social organization which fail to develop
this potential or to curb its harmful excesses. No
longer content to offer a transcendent image of
possibility, modern utopianism is moreover committed to the problem of actualizing planned and
ideal societies.
Though the utopian genre is usually dated from
the publication of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516),
the proposal of a community of goods as a major
U
14232
element in the solution to economic disorder is
much older. An important antecedent was Plato’s
Republic (c360 BC), in which the ruling Guardians alone shared their goods in common as a
means of ensuring the least conflict between private and public interest. At the end of the second
century AD Plutarch wrote his life of the mythical
Spartan legislator Lycurgus, who ended avarice,
luxury and inequality by an equal division of
lands, the replacement of gold and silver by iron
coinage, and various sumptuary laws. Though
Aristotle was an early and influential critic of
Plato’s communism, the idea that a community
of goods was the ideal state of property survived
in various forms in the early Christian era. The
very ancient image of a mythical Golden Age of
flowing milk and honey which appeared in Hesiod
(c750 BC), Ovid, and the Stoic-influenced
account of the Isles of the Blessed here found a
counterpart in the imagery of Paradise and the
Garden of Eden, and it was universally assumed
that the institution of private property could only
have resulted from the Fall and the expulsion of
Adam and Eve from Paradise. Some community
of goods existed among the Jewish sect of the
Essenes, in the early Christian Church as well as
later monastic movements, and there was later
considerable debate as to whether the Apostles
had intended this to hold amongst themselves or
for all mankind. But early on the Church offered a
robust defence of the naturalness of private property on the grounds that it produced greater peace,
order and economic efficiency. Charity, however,
and especially the support of the poor in times of
necessity, was regarded as the duty accompanying
the private ownership of goods on an earth
intended by God to be sufficient for the sustenance of all.
This was the tradition which Thomas More,
with one eye on Plato and another, perhaps, on
the potential of the New World, was to overthrow.
In More the possibility of secular, social improvement was revived and now recrafted in a new
image of fantasy. Both at this time and later,
rapid economic change in Britain was a key reason for the Anglo-centric character of much of the
utopian tradition. No doubt angered by the effects
of land enclosures on the poor, More gave to the
Utopias
Utopians not only equality but also plenty, six
hours’ daily work (and more dignity to their activity than had done the ancient utopias), and a
rotation of homes every 10 years and of town
and country inhabitants more frequently. Public
markets made all goods freely available, while
public hospitals cared for the sick. National plenty
and scarcity were to be balanced by compensatory
distribution, while the surplus was in part given
away to the poor of other countries and in part sold
at moderate rates. Iron was to be esteemed higher
than silver or gold, while jewels and pearls were
treated as mere baubles fit only for children.
Needs were clearly fixed and limited to the level
of comforts. With the conquest of the fear of want,
greed was largely eliminated, while pomp and
excess derived from pride alone were prohibited
by law.
The mid-sixteenth century saw a variety of
radical Protestant attempts and plans to emulate
the purported communism of the early Church
(e.g. in the Hutterite Anabaptism of Peter
Rideman), and a considerable augmentation to
anti-luxury sentiments within a few of the Protestant sects. A preference for agriculture and hostility to luxury typifies most Renaissance utopias,
for instance Johann Günzberg’s Wolfaria (1621),
Andreae’s Christianopolis (1619) (in which
a guild model was of some importance),
Campanella’s City of the Sun (1623) (in which
slave labour was first abolished in a utopia), and
Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy
(1621) which included a powerful attack upon
avarice as well as a national plan for land utilization, the management of economic resources by a
bureaucracy, communal granaries, and the public
employment of doctors and lawyers. Francis
Bacon’s New Atlantis (1627) was less concerned
with the details of economic organization than
with the justification of the rule of scientists, and
established a paradigmatic attitude towards technology often repeated in later utopias. Bacon also
paid some heed to the dangers posed by novelties
generally to social order, while Samuel Gott’s
Nova Solyma (1648) was more severe in its condemnation of luxury and intolerance of waste. Of
the utopias of the English civil war period, two are
particularly worthy of note. Gerrard Winstanley’s
Utopias
The Law of Freedom in a Platform (1652) developed the Diggers’ efforts to reclaim common land
for the poor into a scheme for the communal
ownership of all land which included universal
agricultural labour to age 40. Public storehouses
were to make all necessary goods freely available
as needed, while domestic buying and selling and
working for hire were prohibited. Gold and silver
were to be used for external trade alone. Better
known was James Harrington’s Oceana (1656),
which popularized the proposal for agrarian laws
in order to prevent the predominance of the aristocracy and urged a limit upon dowries and inheritance for similar reasons.
The late seventeenth century occasioned a profusion of welfare or full employment utopias in
Britain (only in the following century would
France see as rich a development of the genre).
At this time schemes for practical, immediate
social reform and utopias proper were often not
far removed. It is in this period, too, that we begin
to find a shift away from a concern with a limited
demand and the satisfaction of only natural wants
towards a conception of maximized production
with the full employment of people and resources
and a minimization of waste (goals to some extent
shared by mainstream Mercantilism). Such aims
are evident in, for example, A Description of the
Famous Kingdom of Macaria (1641), where most
legislation is concerned with regulating the production of wealth, Peter Chamberlen’s The Poore
Man’s Advocate (1946), which included a detailed
scheme for the joint-stock employment of the
poor to be supervised by public officials, Peter
Plockhoy’s A Way Propounded to Make the Poor
in These and Other Nations Happy (1659), which
proposed the resettlement into communities of an
elite of artisans, husbandmen and traders, and
John Bellers’ Proposals for Raising a Colledge
of Industry (1695), in which the wealthy would
help to found communities where the poor were to
support them while also providing a decent subsistence for themselves. In such plans, solutions to
economic distress tended to focus increasingly
upon isolated communities rather than the
nation-state, and upon segments of the population
rather than, for example, all the poor. It has been
suggested (by J.C. Davis 1981) that this implied a
14233
waning confidence in the ability of the state to
tackle the problem of poverty, and certainly it
seems evident that the Act of Settlement of 1662
transferred this burden to individual parishes and
away from central government.
The period between 1700 and 1900 marks not
only the great age of utopian speculation, but also
the period in which economic practice and utopian
precept become increasingly intertwined. In addition, it was here that a community of goods ceased
to be the sine qua non of utopian ideas of property,
and that the liberal view of the benefits of private
property ownership itself was expressed in utopian form. This entailed a combination of utopian
thought and the theory of progress, though in the
genre as a whole the two are usually understood as
contradictory. In both modern socialism and classical political economy, then, needs are perceived
as virtually unlimited, and social harmony is contingent largely upon their fulfilment. The homage
to homo oeconomicus is usually understood to
have begun in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe
(1719), and was at its most exalted in Richard
Cobden and John Bright’s mid-nineteenthcentury claims about the universal peace which
would be incumbent upon the global extension of
free trade. One of its first serious challenges was in
John Stuart Mill’s acceptance after 1850 of the
desirability of a steady-state economy in which
further economic development was avoided.
Many eighteenth-century utopias were devoted
to the notion of progress (e.g. Mercier’s L’An
2440 (1770) and Condorcet’s L’Esquisse d’un
Tableau historique des progrès de l’ésprit humain
(1794)). In others the critique of commercial society took various forms, such as Swift’s gentle
satire in Gulliver’s Travels (1726), where the Houyhnhnms showed great disdain for shining stones
and distributed their produce according to need, or
Rousseau’s more biting castigation of civilization
in his Discours sur l’orgine de l’inégalité (1755).
Similar criticisms were developed into the foundations of modern communism in the writings of
Raynal, Mercier, Mably, Morelly, Babeuf and in
Britain, Spence and Godwin. In many of these the
Spartan model was of some importance, and luxury seen as a principal source of working class
oppression as well as general moral corruption.
U
14234
Though the entire utopian edifice was severely
shaken by the pessimistic prognosis of Malthus’
Essay on Population (1798), the first half of the
nineteenth century witnessed the widespread
foundation of small ‘utopian socialist’ ideal
communities which aimed to bring utopian goals
into practice, and which could be essentially
communistical (Robert Owen, Etienne Cabet) or
semi-capitalist (Charles Fourier). Other plans concentrated upon the nation-state and the beneficial
development of large-scale industry (SaintSimon), a pattern which was to become increasingly dominant as the potential role of machinery
in creating a new cornucopia became evident.
(Some disenchantment with this view occurred
later, however, for example in William Morris’s
News from Nowhere (1890), with its preference
for rustic and artisanal virtues.) Considerably
more attention came to be paid in the early nineteenth century (by Owen and Fourier, e.g.) to the
disadvantages of too narrow a division of labour
and the benefits of task rotation. At mid-century
began the most compelling radical vision of the
age in the works of Marx and Engels, whose plans
qualify as utopian in the degree to which they
inherited overly optimistic assumptions about
human nature, technology and social organization
in a future society in which private property and
alienation were to be superseded. The last
20 years of the century found at least in Britain
and America a virtually continuous outpouring of
planned economy utopias, of which the best
known are Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward
(1887), which included provisions for the abolition of money, equal wages and credit for all, and
an industrial army, W.D. Howells’s A Traveller
from Altruria (1894), and H.G. Wells’s A Modern
Utopia (1905), which made some effort to incorporate a conception of progress into the ideal
image of the future, and included a mixed rather
than wholly publicly owned economy.
In the twentieth century utopianism has faltered in face of some of the consequences of
modernity, and speculation has often taken the
form of the negative utopia or dystopia. In the
most famous of these, George Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four (1949), both capitalist aggression
Utopias
and inequality and communist despotism were
criticized, with a central thesis of the work being
the prevention of the majority enjoying the benefits of mass production via the deliberate destruction of commodities in war. More satirical of the
hedonist utopia is Aldous Huxley’s Brave New
World (1932), though Huxley’s later Island
(1962) is a positive utopia which criticises the spiritual impoverishment of an overly-materialistic civilization. Late twentieth century popular utopianism
has included some works of science fiction, the
libertarian speculation of Murray Rothbard and
Robert Nozick (Anarchy, State, and Utopia,
1974), and the steady-state environmentalism of
Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1975). With the progressive extension of both machinery and the welfare state, utopias developing such themes
optimistically have declined. To those sated with
goods some of the attractions of the consumerist
paradise have faded. Technological determinism
has often seemingly rendered forms of economic
organization unimportant. Two world wars and the
spectre of nuclear catastrophe have dented confidence in human perfectibility, while half a century’s
experimentation with centrally planned communism has lent little credence to the view that this
provides the surest path to moral and economic
improvement. Nor is ‘growth’ any longer an uncritically accepted ideal even amongst those who
have not yet experienced its effects. Nonetheless
the utility of utopias to economic thought is
undiminished, for they offer both illumination into
important aspects of the history of economic ideas
(especially in the areas of welfare and planning), as
well as an imaginative leap into possible futures
into which more positivist and empirically based
thinking fears to wander. If ‘progress’ can be realized without ‘growth’, it will likely first persuasively appear in utopian form.
See Also
▶ Anarchism
▶ Full Communism
▶ Individualism
▶ Socialism
Utopias
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