No More Secrets
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No More Secrets
Open Source Information and the
Reshaping of U.S. Intelligence
HAMILTON BEAN
Foreword by
Senator Gary Hart
Praeger Security International
Copyright 2011 by Hamilton Bean
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief
quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bean, Hamilton.
No more secrets : open source information and the reshaping of U.S.
intelligence / Hamilton Bean ; foreword by Senator Gary Hart.
p. cm. — (Praeger security international)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-313-39155-2 (alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-313-39156-9 (ebook)
1. Open source intelligence—United States. I. Title. II. Series.
JK468.I6B396 2011
327.1273—dc22
2011008505
ISBN: 978-0-313-39155-2
EISBN: 978-0-313-39156-9
15
14
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12
11
1
2
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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.
Visit www.abc-clio.com for details.
Praeger
An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC
ABC-CLIO, LLC
130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911
Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911
This book is printed on acid-free paper
Manufactured in the United States of America
Contents
Foreword by Senator Gary Hart
vii
Preface
xi
Acknowledgments
xv
Abbreviations
Chapter 1: The Coming of Age of Open Source
xvii
1
Chapter 2: The Origins of the Open Source Debate
23
Chapter 3: A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open
Source Developments
41
Chapter 4: “The Source of First Resort”: The Intelligence
Community
59
Chapter 5: Bridging a Cultural Divide: Homeland Security
85
Chapter 6: Open Source as a Resource for Citizen Participation
in National Security Affairs
107
Chapter 7: Open Source, Democracy, and the Future
of U.S. Intelligence
129
Appendix: Open Source Contexts and Practices
147
Notes
163
Bibliography
195
Index
211
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Foreword
“There are no secrets,” a friend said some years ago. Though he was forecasting the disappearance of personal privacy, he might well have been
predicting the tsunami building off the shores of those peculiar islands of
secrecy known as intelligence agencies that emerged in the post–World
War II Cold War years.
Efforts by governments to collect and hoard secrets—regarding both the
intentions of their enemies and possible treachery by their own citizens—
surely date to the Greek city-states if not also to a variety of oligarchies
before them.
Elizabeth I’s principal secretary, Sir Francis Walsingham, is generally considered 16th-century England’s charter member of the Western
world’s intelligence services and is credited with recruiting the dramatist Christopher Marlowe into the enterprise. Whether Marlowe’s violent
death in 1593 was directly traceable to his spying sideline is still a matter
of conjecture, but it certainly started a trail leading more or less directly to
his fellow countryman David Cornwell (a.k.a., John Le Carré) some four
centuries later.
What few in this long, complex, and murky history could have foreseen,
however, was an age in which there were few, if any, secrets. Technology,
the hallmark of the early 21st century, is credited with cracking the vault
of mystery and concealment. The silicon chip, digital compression, wireless intercepts, wall-penetrating listening devices, ultra-long-range camera lenses, and so on have all combined to ensure that Wikipedia would
inevitably become WikiLeaks.
viii
Foreword
It was by no means accidental that those deputized to plug the many
leaks mounting to a virtual river of secrets during the Nixon era were
given the colorful designator “plumbers.” This would prompt Norman
Mailer to compare plumbers to rocket scientists in that both were tasked
with the prevention of treachery in closed systems.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan commented extensively in the late Cold War
years on bureaucracy’s predictable response to the erosion of secrecy—
create more secrets. Thus, an increasing army of security bureaucrats, in
and out of uniform, armed itself with the most dangerous of weapons—
rubber stamps, in this case marked “Secret.” But, if everything is secret, as
Senator Moynihan shrewdly observed, then nothing is secret.
At the turn of this century, technology, the engine of “open sources,”
swept away burgeoning warehouses of secrets faster than they could be
built and filled. And this fact is central to Hamilton Bean’s remarkable
and critically important pioneering work. What happens to the mysterious world of intelligence, he asks, when the content of its hidden vaults
shrinks and melts before our very eyes? What happens when there are
few, if any, secrets?
An image of this intelligence revolution comes to mind: a small crew
tunneling diligently to come up under an epic vault of secrets only to discover upon surfacing that they are in the New York Public Library. But this
transformation did not arrive without warning. As early as 1969, a Central
Intelligence Agency study said, “A virtual tidal wave of publicly printed
paper threatens to swamp almost all enterprises of intellectual research.”
And by 1975, the movie Three Days of the Condor featured a CIA researcher,
Joe Turner (Robert Redford), who, by simply reading books, uncovers a
complex CIA plot to dominate Middle Eastern oil fields.
Interestingly, and importantly, in between these dates the so-called secret
bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War made it clear that secrecy
was a two-edged sword. The Cambodians surely knew they were being
bombed. The secret was being kept from the American people. The pattern of using instruments of intelligence to collect secrets from the American people and to prevent them from discovering the perfidies their own
government was carrying out would lead to congressional investigations
requiring substantial reforms in the vast U.S. intelligence community.
Though the Cold War has been over for two decades, today that community is much more vast.
If one were to date the dramatic shift from too little intelligence to too
much, documented here in Dr. Bean’s groundbreaking work, one might
arbitrarily select the inauguration of the World Wide Web in 1990. Ironically, this was within months of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before
that, the intelligence world dramatized by John Le Carré was tedious,
dreary, and mundane. Now that world approximates the political image
of drinking from a fire hose.
Foreword
ix
Dr. Bean recognizes that a democracy must protect its citizens and that
the collection of information and the conversion of it to intelligence are
crucial to that duty. But he also knows that a democracy that violates the
rights and privacy of its citizens and conceals its activities from them
edges dangerously near something other than a democracy.
The most radical of our founders, Thomas Jefferson, held that the best
guarantor of the American republic was the good judgment and common
sense of the American people, a people fully informed of the activities of
its government on their behalf. Thanks to the advent of open sources converting intelligence to information, we may be restoring that ideal.
Gary Hart
Scholar in residence, University of Colorado; charter member
of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee; co-chair
of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
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Preface
I arrived for my first day of work at Intellibridge Corporation on May 21,
2001. Intellibridge was located in Washington, DC, in a modern, red brick
building at the corner of 33rd and M streets near Georgetown University. When I arrived, the wall between Intellibridge’s second-floor office
and an adjoining apartment had been hastily torn down to make room
for more desks. Even that did not provide enough space, however, so analysts were soon working from computers perched atop the apartment’s
kitchen counter. When walking into Intellibridge during the months before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, one encountered a series of
small, dimly lit rooms filled with more than two dozen analysts gazing intensely into their desktop computer screens. These analysts—in their 20s,
30s, and 40s—possessed government work experience, foreign language
skills, and advanced degrees from prestigious colleges and universities.
Typically working 10-hour shifts (spread across the day), these analysts
scoured the Internet, looking for information in nearly a dozen languages
that responded to the defined needs of Intellibridge’s clients.
My image of intelligence up to that point had been mostly informed by
Hollywood movies, so I was shocked to see analysts supporting U.S. naval
intelligence crammed into a darkened, debris-strewn Georgetown apartment. Intellibridge provided what it called “open source intelligence and
analytical services” to its clients. This meant that Intellibridge employed
policy, security, and business experts to search and analyze online sources
of information about geopolitical trends and events deemed of interest to
Fortune 500 corporations and U.S. government agencies. Promising insight and advantage to clients, Intellibridge’s motto claimed to provide
xii
Preface
“Not Just What You Need to Know, But What It Means.” Intellibridge was
an early purveyor of what has come to be known as outsourced or private
intelligence.
In the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, I strode the corridors
of power in Washington, DC, attempting to persuade national security
officials to purchase the open source information and analytical support services of Intellibridge. In the process, I became fascinated by how
people talked about open source. Some argued that open source was in
no way new, unique, or important. Others, however, argued that open
source would be the catalyst for a radical reshaping of U.S. intelligence
and national security. It became clear that if I wanted to understand the
dynamics of open source, I needed to analyze processes of institutional
communication, organizational culture, and organizational change. Thus,
in 2005, I left the business of U.S. intelligence in order to investigate the
reshaping of this institution. This book represents the culmination of that
investigation.
By investigating the institutionalization of open source, this book exposes the inner workings of the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy: its organizational assumptions, imperatives, and turf wars. This book provides
case studies of institutional change within settings where the stakes for
officials, policy makers, and citizens are extraordinarily high. Intelligence
stakeholders confront a complex environment characterized by risk, urgency, competing priorities, changing assumptions, and new and unfamiliar open source technologies and practices, yet there has been little
discussion of how these conditions influence the production of intelligence or relate to the deliberative principles of a democratic society. By
investigating how open source laws, policies, and practices are developed,
maintained, or transformed, this book enhances public understanding of
contemporary U.S. intelligence and national security affairs. I have written
it for students and researchers in the fields of communication, intelligence
studies, public administration, political science, and security studies. The
book provides an example of scholarship conducted at the intersection of
communication, organization, and intelligence studies.
My professional background and ongoing interaction with members of
the U.S. intelligence community require that I reflect on the claims, selection of evidence, and interpretations I present herein. Specifically, in
2008, anonymous Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials determined that my exploration of the relationships among organizational
culture, discourse, and homeland security information sharing were
worth supporting through a research grant. As a researcher, however, I
do not analyze an objective world for government officials; rather, I am
responsible for representing a particular view of that world—one that is
always a selective and partial attempt to shape meaning. I am committed
to the principle that the voices of the marginalized should be explored in
organizational studies. In this book, I attempt to enact that principle by
Preface
xiii
representing not only managerial voices but also the often-muted voices
of intelligence analysts and citizens.
In undertaking this research, I have been gripped by simultaneous impulses to defend and criticize U.S. intelligence community officials. The
impulse to defend comes from recognizing that we ask much of the men
and women who serve within intelligence and national security organizations and who work under intensely stressful conditions dealing with
life and death. I have witnessed firsthand how this work can take its toll
on one’s health, well-being, and relationships. By contrast, the impulse to
criticize comes from my impulse to see democratic principles of transparency, accountability, and participation extended to the national security
arena in order to ameliorate some of the error, waste, and abuse that often
characterize this sector. Because intelligence institutions possess immense
power to control and extinguish human lives, I believe officials have an
obligation to use open sources to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions, engage a wide array of stakeholders, improve planning and decision making, and adequately assess the actual and potential consequences
of policy decisions. We can and should do better.
I also believe that to the extent possible, open source products (translations, reports, databases, and analyses) should be widely shared with
citizens so interested parties can be more aware of national security issues
and better equipped to deliberate about them. It has long been argued
that a strong democracy requires an informed and influential citizenry;
however, determining what the U.S. intelligence community’s role should
be in supporting the development of that citizenry is no easy task. Intelligence agencies generally have no direct responsibility to support the public; agencies do so indirectly through the support of the executive branch.
The advent of whistleblower websites, such as WikiLeaks, places some
secret information directly into citizens’ hands. How these events will influence the trajectory of intelligence reform or relate to the development
of informed and influential citizens remains to be seen. Nevertheless, if
open source is, as many have argued, a means of both avoiding national
security disasters and strengthening institutional transparency and accountability, then stakeholders ought to better understand how language
promotes or impedes competing visions of open source’s development
and use. In short, this book is intended to spur critical discussion of the
institutional and public dimensions of open source discourse in order to
explore its democratic potential.
Hamilton Bean
Denver, Colorado
January 2011
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Acknowledgments
I am indebted to the people who have assisted me in this effort, especially
Steve Catalano at Praeger for his guidance during the publication of this
project. I am grateful for the members of various 9/11 family organizations and other citizen groups who agreed to participate in this research.
I am also grateful for the participation of dozens of current and former
government officials, analysts, and contractors, at federal, state, and local
levels, whom I interviewed. These men and women spoke to me on the
condition that neither their names nor their specific organizational affiliations would be disclosed.
Special thanks go to the Department of Communication at the University of Colorado Denver (where I am employed), the Department of Communication at the University of Colorado at Boulder (where I earned my
Ph.D.), the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. These organizations directly or indirectly
supported this research through generous financial assistance.
Drs. Stephen Hartnett, Lisa Keränen, Timothy Kuhn, and Karen Tracy
provided essential guidance during this project. I want to especially
thank Bryan Taylor for his influence and expertise. I am also thankful for
the work of other scholars in the fields of communication, organization
studies, and intelligence studies, including Drs. Joshua Barbour, Stanley
Deetz, H. L. Goodall Jr., Cynthia Hardy, Arthur Hulnick, Robert Ivie, John
Lammers, Gordon Mitchell, Robert Newman, Nelson Phillips, and Amy
Zegart. These scholars’ work has served as both a model and resource,
especially in how I have conceptualized the institution of intelligence,
xvi
Acknowledgments
processes of organizational change, the shifting meanings of open source,
and the role of citizens in national security affairs. Additionally, thanks are
due to colleagues in the Department of Communication at the University
of Colorado Denver. Special thanks are due to Senator Gary Hart, whose
participation in this project kept me attuned to how my theoretical concerns could be translated into practical guidance for national security officials and policy makers.
This book would not have been possible without the support of Brooke
Evans. I wish to acknowledge my former colleagues at Intellibridge, as
well as dozens of Washington, DC, and Colorado friends and acquaintances whose identities and useful contributions on open source issues
will, paradoxically, be kept secret in these acknowledgments. I can acknowledge, however, the support of Matt Sanders, Krista Belanger, Margaret Durfy, John McClellan, Erica Delgadillo, Mary Gray, Susan Brink,
and Lauren Strand. I am forever indebted to my parents, Halimah Ashley
and Reynold Bean, who have always been my most trusted sources of information and advice. Thank you to Max for being the motivation for this
project. Finally, a portion of the proceeds from the sale of this book will be
given to veterans’ charities in honor of their service.
Abbreviations
ADDNI/OS
assistant deputy director of national intelligence for
open source
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CIRA
Central Intelligence Retirees Association
COSPO
Community Open Source Program Office
DCI
director of central intelligence
DDNI/A
deputy director of national intelligence for analysis
DDNI/C
deputy director of national intelligence for collection
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI
director of national intelligence
DoD
Department of Defense
EO
Executive Order
FAS
Federation of American Scientists
FBIS
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FBMS
Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service
FMA
foreign media analysis
FMSO
Foreign Military Studies Office
FSC
Family Steering Committee
xviii
Abbreviations
GWOT
Global War on Terror
HUMINT
human intelligence
IAFIE
International Association for Intelligence Education
IC
intelligence community
ICD
Intelligence Community Directive
IMINT
imagery intelligence
INT
intelligence discipline
IO
information operations
IP
internet protocol
IRTPA
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004
ISE
Information Sharing Environment
JICPAC
Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific
JMIC
Joint Military Intelligence College
JTTF
Joint Terrorism Task Force
NASA
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO
nongovernmental organization
NIB
National Intelligence Board
NIC
National Intelligence Council
NIE
National Intelligence Estimate
NIO
national intelligence officer
ODNI
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
ONI
Office of Naval Intelligence
OSC
Open Source Center
OSS
Office of Strategic Services
OSIF
open source information
OSINT
open source intelligence
PDB
President’s Daily Brief
SARS
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCI
Sensitive Compartmented Information
SIGINT
signals intelligence
SIPRNet
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SOUTHCOM
U.S. Southern Command
Abbreviations
xix
TQM
Total Quality Management
UAV
USG
WMD
unmanned aerial vehicle
United States government
weapons of mass destruction
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CHAPTER 1
The Coming of Age
of Open Source
The need for a centralized agency to administer the growing exploitation of
all foreign open sources of information is . . . already evident to rationalize
the numerous efforts, all with similar objectives, going on simultaneously
within and outside of the intelligence community.
—Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Studies in Intelligence article, 19691
I have seen an unprecedented increase in open-source awareness and in capabilities across the enterprise, and perhaps, most importantly, open source
is starting to be institutionalized with formal plans, explicit budgets, and
policy guidance across the various enterprises.
—Senior Director of National Intelligence (DNI) official, 20082
The U.S. intelligence community has long acknowledged the need to institutionalize the collection, analysis, and dissemination of open source
information derived from “newspapers, journals, radio and television,”
and, more recently, the Internet.3 However, it was only in 2007 that U.S.
officials formally declared the “coming of age” of open source at the inaugural DNI Open Source Conference, held July 16 –17 at the Ronald Regan
Building and International Trade Center in Washington, DC.4 According
to organizers, the conference was the first ever open to the public in the
U.S. intelligence community’s 60-year history.5 Even Eliot Jardines, who
became America’s first assistant deputy director of national intelligence
for open source (ADDNI/OS) in 2005, seemed surprised to be speaking at
the conference, telling the audience, “Over the past years . . . I frequently
felt like Kevin Costner in the movie ‘Field of Dreams.’ Believe me, proposing to the intelligence community that we have a free conference open
2
No More Secrets
to the general public and the media was something just as strange for
my colleagues as building a baseball diamond in the middle of an Iowa
cornfield.”6 The conference brought together more than 1,000 members
of the U.S. intelligence community, academia, think tanks, media organizations, commercial firms, and governmental and nongovernmental
organizations from the United States and abroad. These stakeholders
came together to discuss the opportunities and challenges of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information in a world saturated with
communication technologies, 24/7 global media, and whistleblower websites—conditions that bolster the assertion of the CIA’s Don Burke, who
claimed in 2008 that “in 15 years, there will be no more secrets.”7
There are, of course, plenty of secrets left for governments to uncover
or conceal; the massive growth of classified U.S. intelligence programs
in the wake of 9/11 demonstrates that secret intelligence endures.8 Additionally, websites such as WikiLeaks have attracted public attention
because they reveal information governments, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations would rather keep secret. The 2007 Open
Source conference nevertheless underscored an identity crisis facing
the U.S. intelligence community. Specifically, there has been an unprecedented increase in the amount and quality of publicly-available open
source information, yet the U.S. intelligence community’s response to
this development has been characterized, alternately, by engagement,
ambivalence, and outright conflict among government agencies and between those agencies and their private sector contractors. For intelligence
contractor and commentator Ronald Marks, the reasons are clear: “The
U.S. Intelligence Community is a first generation business lost in a new
market; like the old IBM hanging on to mainframes in a PC world. Information was the Intelligence Community’s game. Control of information
was its business. And unique access to others’ secrets was its advantage.
Sadly, the Soviet Union is gone and the information technology explosion
of the 1990’s happened. Twitter has replaced teletypes.”9 These dynamics
have led to new challenges.
For example, four months after the inaugural DNI Open Source Conference, in November 2007, the U.S. DNI released declassified portions
of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The NIE judged “with high confidence that in fall
2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.”10 Some of the evidence supporting that conclusion came from open sources. According to
an MSNBC report, two pieces of publicly available video played a role:
One piece showed former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami visiting the Iranian uranium enrichment facility in Natanz in March 2005; the
other piece of video, from the same time frame, described the Iranian
nuclear power program.11 Both pieces of video helped officials gauge the
progress of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The 2007 NIE’s controversial findings sent shockwaves through the U.S. national security arena
The Coming of Age of Open Source
3
and continue to complicate U.S. policy toward Iran. Intelligence analysts
use newspapers, journals, and radio and television broadcasts, as well
as databases, commercial satellite imagery, blogs, and academic studies,
to track states’ nuclear activities.12 This information helps analysts understand a state’s energy needs, political and economic conditions, the
perceptions of elites, and how these factors might influence a state’s nuclear ambitions. Occasionally, technical information about specific facilities, materials, and research programs surfaces in open source reporting
as well. For example, an analyst could determine from public records, reports, and subject matter experts the properties and specifications of the
materials used during the construction process for a particular facility,
the companies that helped build the facility, and the personnel involved.
Challenges include open source’s limited availability within closed societies and technical domains, its overwhelming abundance in other areas,
its diversity in terms of language, and its uneven quality, reliability, and
credibility.13
Despite these challenges, former assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, Frances Fragos Townsend, has noted,
“Much of what is known about our enemies is derived from their own
statements, blogs, videos, and chat sessions on the Internet.”14 Similarly,
then CIA director Michael Hayden bluntly stated in 2008, “Secret information isn’t always the brass ring in our profession. In fact, there’s real
satisfaction in solving a problem or answering a tough question with information that someone was dumb enough to leave out in the open.”15
Accordingly, much of what adversaries know about the United States is
also derived from open source material. For example, in planning the 9/11
terrorist attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed relied on information from
“Western aviation magazines, telephone directories for U.S. cities, airline
timetables, and . . . Internet searches on U.S. flight schools . . . supplemented by flight simulator software and information gleaned from movies depicting hijackings.”16 While open source contributions were not the
deciding factor in the conclusions reached in the 2007 NIE on Iran’s nuclear program, nor the success of the 9/11 attacks, these cases illustrate
how open source information has become a critical resource for intelligence in the 21st century.
Prominent 9/11 and 2003 Iraq War inquiries have come to similar conclusions. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission asserted in 2005, for example, “The Intelligence Community does not have
an entity that collects, processes, and makes available to analysts the
mass of open source information that is available in the world today.”17
According to a 2007 Congressional Research Service report, “Intelligence
analysts have long used [open source] information to supplement classified data, but systematically collecting open source information has
not been a priority of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”18 Writing about
post-9/11 changes within Canada’s intelligence sector, the former head
4
No More Secrets
of intelligence analysis noted in 2009, “The use by analysts of unclassified, freely available information from the internet or other open sources
was not just desirable but essential. . . . However, getting access to open
sources from within ‘secret organizations’ required a range of changes
in longstanding methods, attitudes, rules, structures and processes and
these took time.”19 Responding to similar conditions within the United
States, officials established the DNI Open Source Center (OSC) in 2005
and simultaneously created the position of ADDNI/OS to coordinate
and oversee the institutionalization of open source across the intelligence community.
The OSC built upon the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which was established in 1947. The OSC currently defines
itself as the U.S. government’s “premier provider of foreign open source
intelligence.”20 The password-protected website supplies authorized
government and contractor personnel with information on “foreign political, military, economic, and technical issues beyond the usual media
from . . . more than 160 countries in more than 80 languages.”21 This information is derived from websites, press, broadcasts, television, radio,
maps, databases, gray literature, photos, and commercial satellite imagery. A 2008 brochure stated that the OSC covers 2,000 periodical publications, 300 radio stations, and 235 television stations. In 2008, the OSC
had more than 13,000 active customers—ranging from the president’s
national security team to municipal police officers. A 2009 DNI report
stated, “OSC produces over 2,300 products daily, including translations,
transcriptions, analyses, reports, video compilations, and geospatial intelligence, to address short-term needs and longer-term issues. Its products cover issues that range from foreign political, military, economic,
science, and technology topics, to counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and other homeland security topics. OSC also collects ‘gray literature,’ which is material with very limited distribution,
such as academic papers, brochures, leaflets, and other publicly distributed materials.”22 The immense output from the OSC raises the question
of whether any intelligence agency—or group of agencies—can effectively analyze it.
Nevertheless, in 2010, the stated vision of the OSC was the following:
“We are the nucleus of a global information enterprise serving U.S. national security interests.” Its stated mission was, “We apply our expertise
in searching, acquiring and analyzing the world’s publicly available information to inform and enable those who make US policy and defend our
nation.”23 Given its mission, only some of the OSC’s translations are made
available to the general public through the subscription service World
News Connection; the majority of its analytical products are available
only to authorized government and contractor personnel.24 The Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) Steven Aftergood notes, “Open source
intelligence products . . . are often withheld from public disclosure, for
The Coming of Age of Open Source
5
various reasons. These include habit, the cultivation of the mystique of secret intelligence, the protection of copyrighted information, and the preservation of ‘decision advantage,’ i.e. the policy-relevant insight that open
source intelligence at its best may offer.”25 Thus, a key theme explored in
this book is the extent to which open source reports are and/or should be
openly available.
Much of the information and analysis available to the OSC’s users
comes from private sector information providers and experts. In 2008,
the OSC hosted material and analysis from 95 external organizations.26
These information suppliers included the Economist Intelligence Unit,
LexisNexis, Jane’s industry publications, ProQuest, STRATFOR, Thomson Reuters, and Oxford Analytica, among others. In its effort to “build
a global state-of-the-art technical infrastructure to acquire, filter, process,
deliver, and protect the intelligence advantage [of the United States],”
the OSC also delivers an “extended community workforce of experts and
professionals.”27 While OSC experts and professionals are not spies—they
conduct their work mostly from behind their desks using the Internet—
their objectives are more-or-less similar to their clandestine counterparts.
Specifically, the job of these experts and professionals is to obtain information that might yield the U.S. government some strategic advantage or
protect its interests.28
For example, in early 2003, prior to the establishment of the OSC, Dan
Silver, a China analyst working for the open source contractor Intellibridge Corporation, was scanning Hong Kong’s Ming Pao newspaper
online when he noticed an unusual story about an outbreak of atypical
pneumonia in the region.29 Silver believed there was something odd about
the way the story was reported, so he immediately notified his client, the
U.S. Navy’s Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific ( JICPAC), as well as a handful of U.S. health officials. Silver was later given an award by the medical
information provider ProMED-mail for his reporting, which contributed,
in part, to the successful containment of what would later become known
as the global health epidemic SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome).30
Numerous anecdotes like this one have helped mark the coming of age
of open source. This book explains why and how that coming of age occurred and explores the implications of these developments for national
security stakeholders, including officials, policy makers, contractors, and
citizens. I argue that the coming of age of open source is the result of post–
Cold War political, economic, and technological transformations and the
use of national security and commercial discourses by a handful of policy makers, officials, and executives who have worked to institutionalize
open source in ways that align with their strategic interests. Analyzing
how these policy makers, officials, and executives have used speech and
writing to promote and/or impede competing visions of institutional
change offers a unique way of understanding the post-9/11 reshaping of
U.S. intelligence.
6
No More Secrets
WHO DRIVES OPEN SOURCE DEVELOPMENTS:
GOVERNMENT OR INDUSTRY?
To understand how open source has risen to become a key plank within
U.S. intelligence strategy, it is necessary to understand three converging
events: the end of the Cold War; the innovation and global diffusion of
information and communication technologies—especially the Internet;
and the rise of private intelligence contractors at the end of the 1990s.
Most commentators trace the U.S. government’s first effort to formally
collect and analyze open source information to World War II and the creation of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS). Under the National Security Act of 1947, the FBMS was renamed the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service and placed within the CIA. Since that time, open
source information has been known by many names, including “nonsecret information,” “open information,” “overt information,” “overt intelligence,” “public information,” “unclassified information,” and “white
intelligence.”31 For most of the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence community
was unable to analyze the bulk of real-time foreign news reporting and
open source information because immediate access to those sources was
limited. This situation changed dramatically toward the end of the 20th
century.32
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 called into question established beliefs about U.S. national security. In a series of New York Times articles published in February 1992, for example, commentators questioned
whether the demise of the Soviet Union undermined the need for the continued existence and expense of the CIA. One reporter noted that then director of central intelligence Robert Gates stated during his confirmation
hearings that the CIA had been so narrowly focused on the Kremlin that
the agency relied on travelers for information about other Soviet republics besides Russia.33 In 1996, the Aspin-Brown Commission emphasized
the need for improved open source collection and analysis in response to
the post-Soviet geopolitical environment.34 In 1998, the chairman of the
National Intelligence Council (NIC), John Gannon, elaborated the consequences of the post-Soviet environment and the need for improved
open source capabilities during a speech before the World Affairs Council: “Critical expertise we need to inform our analysis will increasingly
be found outside the Intelligence Community, and our professionals will
need to be out there to engage it. Technology will challenge us in every
area of our business to be smarter, more agile, more customer focused,
and more collaborative with experts, wherever they may be found. In a
nutshell, we face some big challenges.”35 In this speech, Gannon linked
the post-Soviet geopolitical environment with the rapid diffusion of information and communication technology, a development that created
both problems and prospects for the U.S. intelligence community. Technology posed a problem for the intelligence community by intensifying
The Coming of Age of Open Source
7
the requisite speed of intelligence production, as well as increasing—to
nearly unmanageable levels—the amount of available, and potentially useful, information for analysts to consider. This problem occurred as U.S. intelligence agencies experienced personnel cuts of 30 percent as a result of
the initial post–Cold War “peace dividend.”36 As Gannon indicated, however, technology also offered the prospect of efficiently tapping sources of
information and expertise outside the intelligence community, as well as
potentially managing the surge of information entering the analytical process. Contracting with and/or outsourcing to private sector corporations
possessing specialized expertise in information collection, analysis, and
management thus became a way for the intelligence community to keep
pace with rapid political, economic, and technological transformations.
The private sector has long been at the forefront of open source developments. For example, G. M. McGill, then vice president of government information services for LexisNexis, wrote this statement in the foreword to a
1994 volume concerning open source: “At the same time that intelligence
communities were relying more and more on expensive compartmented
technical collection systems with narrow focus . . . the private sector in
general and the information industry in particular has literally exploded
with an almost incomprehensible plethora of open sources, systems, and
services.”37 Nearly 20 years later, the private sector has deepened its integration with the intelligence community. For example, Jardines, then
owner of Open Source Publishing, Inc., in testimony before Congress in
2005, responded to one representative’s question about why intelligence
analysts did not simply conduct their own open source collection and analysis activities: “The reality is,” Jardines stated, “if all-source analysts [had]
the time and the expertise to do effective open source exploitation, I would
be standing in the unemployment line right now.”38 Nine months after this
hearing, Jardines would be named America’s first assistant deputy director
of national intelligence for open source and assume responsibility for the
institutionalization of open source collection and analysis across the entire
intelligence community. Jardines, of course, knew much about the private
sector’s open source activities within the intelligence community, having
directly participated in them himself.
According to intelligence scholar William Lahneman, outsourcing within the intelligence community “refers to the practice of . . . turning over
entire business functions to an outside vendor that ostensibly can perform
the specialized tasks in question better and less expensively than [the intelligence community] can.”39 In the case of open source, a company may
take over day-to-day responsibility for collecting, analyzing, and perhaps
disseminating information on behalf of a government agency. These services are often provided through a combination of specialized analysts,
experts, and technologies. The decision to outsource is based on the assumption that a given agency does not possess equivalent resources or expertise. Officials may assume that an open source contractor can provide
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No More Secrets
services more cost-effectively than were the agency to try to re-create the
contractor’s analytical or technological capabilities in-house. The reality
is more often that outsourcing open source can lead to exorbitant costs
as providers rack up managerial fees and assign high-paid staff members to conduct mundane tasks in order to increase the overall bill to the
government.
There are dozens of North American and European companies claiming to support U.S. government clients; consider just a handful of the exhibitors at the 2008 DNI Open Source Conference: AT&T Government
Solutions, Google Enterprise, LexisNexis, Oracle USA, Inc., SAIC, and
Sun Microsystems. Add to these some of the open source data mining
and visual analytics companies exhibiting at a 2010 conference: Abraxas,
Bivio Networks, BrightPlanet, Cray, DMC Worldwide, EON, Ercom, ExecutiveAction, iJet, Intelligence Rose Systems, Infosphere AB, Institute for
Intelligence Studies, IPBank, MarkLogic, Narus, NICE Systems, OSINT
Solutions, Oxford Analytica, Packet Forensics, Qosmos, SAIL Labs Technology, Sandstone, Silobreaker, TradeBytes Data Corporation, Verint Systems, Visual Analytics, and Xerobank/IPBank. Many of these companies
offer specialized search engines and discovery tools designed to separate
the open source wheat from the chaff—in other words, the policy-relevant
information about people, events, and objects from the immense noise
found within the online public sphere.40
There are no publicly available statistics regarding the level of outsourcing in the open source arena.41 Depending on how open source is defined,
the multimillion-dollar industry employs thousands of analysts, experts,
technicians, and marketers worldwide.42 The OSC’s budget was estimated at around $100 million in 2005—still just a fraction of the more than
$40 billion U.S. intelligence community budget.43 According to investigative journalist Tim Shorrock, the rise of open source can be linked to the
late 1990’s growth of the intelligence-industrial complex—a distinct-yetrelated counterpart to the military-industrial complex. Shorrock defines
the intelligence-industrial complex as a secretive army of private sector
intelligence collectors, analysts, and operators serving both government
agencies and international corporations.44 Prior to 9/11, this army consisted of major defense contractors including Booz Allen Hamilton, BAE
Systems, CACI, ManTech, Northrop Grumman, SAIC, and many others.
Intellibridge Corporation belonged to a subset of this group of companies known colloquially as “boutique intelligence shops.”45 Such shops
tended to rely on open source information from the Internet, television,
publications, archives, and experts as the foundation of their various intelligence services. The value-added content provided by these intelligence
shops was, ostensibly, access to proprietary ( but nonetheless unclassified)
sources of information, translation services, and the customized analysis
their in-house analysts and outside (subcontracted) experts provided to
clients.
The Coming of Age of Open Source
9
Today, such companies include Control Risks, Eurasia Group (which acquired the assets of Intellibridge in 2005), iJET, Jane’s Information Group,
Kroll, Oxford Analytica, STRATFOR, SITE Intelligence Group, and Total
Intelligence Solutions, among others. One of these companies, SITE
(Search for International Terrorist Entities), gained public attention in October 2007 when it was widely reported in mainstream news media that
the company had provided U.S. intelligence agencies with exclusive access to a newly obtained videotape of Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately
for SITE, Bush administration officials leaked the videotape with attribution to SITE to cable television news networks, thereby destroying SITE’s
surveillance operation, which had been used to intercept and pass along
messages, videotapes, and warnings of suicide bombings to its clients.46
SITE’s experience demonstrates how open source often strikes a precarious balance with secrecy. Total Intelligence Solutions, in contrast to SITE,
bills itself as a company that “brings the intelligence gathering methodology and analytical skills traditionally honed by CIA operatives directly to
the board room.”47 Led by the former director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Cofer Black, and executives formerly affiliated with the private
military contractor Blackwater USA, Total Intelligence Solutions claims to
“fuse” information from thousands of open and proprietary sources to
create “predictive intelligence” for its clients.48 Thus, the end of the Cold
War and the diffusion of information and communication technologies
contributed to the rise of a group of companies that most Americans have
never heard of, but that nonetheless influence official decision-making
processes within U.S. national security organizations and the world’s elite
corporations.
The intelligence community has acknowledged that contract employees populate roughly one-third of its ranks.49 In its 2010 “Key Facts about
Contractors,” the DNI states, “Core contract personnel may perform activities such as collection and analysis; however, it is what you do with
that analysis, who makes that decision, and who oversees the work that
constitute the ‘inherently governmental’ functions.”50 The fact sheet is silent, of course, concerning how the revolving door between government
agencies and private sector contractors actually works. At Intellibridge, I
became familiar with this process. Intellibridge was established in 2000 by
three former Clinton administration officials: National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch, and a deputy
undersecretary at the Department of Commerce, David Rothkopf. In 2001,
the current U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, along
with Gayle Smith, currently special assistant to the president and senior
director for development on the U.S. National Security Council, worked
to sell Intellibridge services to African government clients. John Gannon
(former NIC chairman) joined the company in 2002. When I joined Intellibridge in May 2001, I was immediately assigned to support the company’s newest and largest client, Enron—the Houston-based, global energy
10
No More Secrets
and commodity-trading firm. Intellibridge had been hired to provide
open source intelligence and public relations services to executives of the
corporation that Fortune magazine named six times as “America’s Most
Innovative Company.” When I arrived, however, Intellibridge was struggling to meet the exhausting demands of Enron’s top managers. In a twist
of fate, within six months, several of those managers would be under investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and Enron
would be well on its way to bankruptcy. Intellibridge, by contrast, would
be positioning itself to profit from changes within the U.S. national security arena resulting from the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Following 9/11, Intellibridge began hiring retired military officers who
maintained ties with their former colleagues inside government agencies.
These officers suggested to their former colleagues that it would be in their
best interest to arrange a meeting with Intellibridge managers in order to
receive a briefing on the capabilities of the company. Contractors, of course,
hire former government and military officials precisely because those officials possess extensive connections across a range of the company’s potential clients. At Intellibridge, government personnel usually agreed to a
meeting, if only out of respect for their former colleagues. At these meetings, Intellibridge representatives attempted to persuade officials that the
company possessed unique sources of information and unmatched analytical capabilities in support of their agency’s mission. Occasionally, officials agreed to a test phase of Intellibridge’s services, with the enticement
of a larger contract pending a successful trial run.
Unnoticed by most commentators is a mechanism by which a preferred
corporation can be steered a government contract. To comply with the
Federal Acquisition Regulation, a government agency must generally distribute a contract solicitation for competitive proposals among qualified
firms. These solicitations are distributed through public websites such
as Federal Business Opportunities or via selected contracting vehicles,
whereby only a handful of preapproved contractors are able to view and
respond to the government’s solicitation. By the time a solicitation appears on Federal Business Opportunities or another solicitation website,
it has often been so narrowly tailored to a particular company’s capabilities that other firms are effectively eliminated from consideration because
those firms cannot adequately meet the government’s specialized requirements. The goal of contractors is to shape the solicitation process itself
so that it is difficult for competitors to meet the government’s tailored
requirements.
One example of how this process occurs is illustrated using the case of
the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). In 2004, Intellibridge personnel made repeated visits to command headquarters in Tampa, Florida,
to showcase Intellibridge’s analytical reports concerning geopolitical, economic, technological, and social trends and events within the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility. Impressed, SOUTHCOM officials agreed to
The Coming of Age of Open Source
11
develop and issue a solicitation for open source support. In practice, there
is nothing that prevents a government agency from simply dropping a
company’s marketing materials or sample statement of work wholesale
into its own solicitation, thereby ensuring that a preferred company will
be the most likely winner of the competitive selection process. Pinpointing such soft abuses of power is difficult for intelligence stakeholders because it requires having access to the marketing materials used by a given
corporation to woo potential government clients. Only by tracing the degree of overlap between a given statement of work and a corporation’s
tailored sales pitch is it possible to determine whether work had been
steered to a preferred company via an inappropriately skewed contracting process.
These dynamics raise the following questions: How have competing
national security and commercial imperatives influenced the development of open source plans, policies, and practices? How have these developments contributed to the reshaping of U.S. intelligence? What are the
actual and potential consequences of this reshaping for officials, policy
makers, and citizens? These are among the core questions explored in this
book; their answers hinge on the way stakeholders construct the meaning
of open source.
“INFORMATION TO INTELLIGENCE” AND THE
MEANING OF OPEN SOURCE
In 1992, the CIA’s open source coordinator asked a question in an article published in the American Intelligence Review: “But what, precisely,
is the meaning of open source?”51 Who is permitted to answer that question and how it is answered are critical for understanding the reshaping
of U.S. intelligence. Edward Schiappa argues that shaping the meaning of
a concept is a political act. Such a perspective turns attention away from
the “is” of a concept toward the “ought” of its rhetorical constitution.52 For
example, the OSC’s tagline is “Information to Intelligence,” and among its
objectives is to “redefine ‘open source’ as one of the 21st Century’s most
important sources of intelligence.”53 In the chapters that follow, I examine
the specific ways officials and commentators have promoted that redefinition in different contexts, the impediments these individuals have faced
in doing so, and the opportunities such a redefinition may offer citizens
seeking to participate in national security deliberations through a variety of means and methods. Studying the post-9/11 institutionalization of
open source provides a window into a paradoxically secretive and closely
defended world, offering researchers a chance to scrutinize its dynamics
without unduly exacerbating those traits. Illustrating the paradox of open
source, then ADDNI/OS Jardines stated in 2006, “The number of open
source items provided in the President’s Daily Brief have increased . . . I
would say we’re scoring some wins with our most important customer.”54
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Jardines later stated, however, “I can’t get into detail of what [open source
reporting goes into the President’s Daily Brief ].”55 Certainly, there are limits to the openness of open source.
It is important to clearly explain that this book investigates open source
not to assert a preferred definition of the term, nor to explain how open
sources can best be gathered and used to support U.S. government interests (i.e., whether open source could improve prediction- and/or threatbased intelligence analysis). Readers interested in these questions should
consult this book’s bibliography for practitioner-oriented literature. This
book instead explores the struggle over the meaning of open source and the
implications of that struggle for officials, policy makers, and citizens. For
example, if open source is the “bread and butter of analysis,” as one commentator asserts, then slighting it as an intelligence resource makes little
sense.56 Likewise, if open source is defined as material that any member
of the public can lawfully obtain, how does that complicate the relationship between intelligence agencies and citizens? Due to these ambiguities,
the concept of open source has become contested within institutional reform. As the Congressional Research Service states, “In recent years, given
changes in the international environment, there have been calls, from Congress and the 9/11 Commission among others, for a more intense and focused investment in open source collection and analysis. However, some
still emphasize that the primary business of intelligence continues to be
obtaining and analyzing secrets.”57 How various meanings of open source
are constructed, disseminated, and interpreted will determine whether
and how this situation will change.
In the aftermath of 9/11 and Iraq, U.S. intelligence and national security organizations have grappled with numerous reforms aimed at preventing terrorist attacks and avoiding intelligence failures. Among the
most high profile of these reforms are the institutionalization of open
source collection and analysis within the intelligence community and
the sharing of intelligence and information with new international and
domestic partners. Former DNI official William Nolte argues that these
changes, along with the broad definition of intelligence contained within
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),
“may provide a significant opportunity to rethink intelligence: what it is,
what we want its instrumental role in American society to be, and how
we as citizens want to operate within the broader framework of American laws and values.”58 Responding to Nolte, this book engages three
specific open source developments: (1) the influence of open source vis-àvis the trajectory of post-9/11 institutional reform; (2) the relationship between open source and organizational culture within the context of U.S.
homeland security; and (3) the democratic dimensions of open source;
specifically, the relationships among open source, institutional reform,
and deliberation of U.S. national security affairs. Each of these themes is
The Coming of Age of Open Source
13
introduced in the following, returning to my work with Intellibridge as
a guide.
Open Source and U.S. Intelligence Community Reform
The U.S. intelligence community is nominally a federation of executive
branch agencies and organizations that conduct activities necessary for
the performance of U.S. foreign affairs and national security. These activities include intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, as well as
“such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to
time” and “special activities”—in other words, clandestine operations.59
By formal standards, the U.S. intelligence community is relatively small,
comprising just 16 agencies. The official members of the U.S. intelligence
community include Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department
of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and Navy Intelligence. Congress created the position of the
director of national intelligence in 2004 to serve as the head of the intelligence community; oversee and direct the implementation of the National
Intelligence Program; integrate foreign, military, and domestic intelligence; and act as the principal advisor to the president and the National
Security Council. The intelligence community would be ranked roughly
50th in the Fortune 500 if its annual budget were analogous to revenue.
However, hundreds of commercial organizations provide the intelligence
community with technology, information, and management systems; analysts; and support staff among other goods, services, and personnel. It is
thus more useful and accurate to view the U.S. intelligence community as
a significant economic sector comprising both government agencies and
their private sector partners.
My work for Intellibridge from 2001 to 2005 brought me into contact with numerous national security officials within the CIA, the White
House, the Pentagon, and intelligence organizations. I witnessed firsthand how institutional imperatives—the “constraints, organizational
premises, plans, expectations, acceptable justifications, and traditions inherited from predecessors”—shaped the actions of national security officials.60 For example, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officials routinely
sought specialized open source information (on issues, for example, surrounding adversaries’ military facilities, personnel, and weapons systems
and programs) from private sector organizations in order to increase the
contributions that DIA’s subunits made to the War on Terror. It is reasonable to assume that DIA officials sought such outside support, in part,
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because their successful demonstration of innovative intelligence contributions to national security planning and decision making increased the
likelihood of larger annual budget appropriations for their respective subunits. These dynamics may help explain why, in one meeting I attended,
a DIA official agreed to a million-dollar contract with Intellibridge on the
basis of a colleague’s recommendation and the evaluation of only one of
Intellibridge’s written reports. As a result of similar experiences during
my interactions with other officials, I became concerned with how open
source advocates were influencing—for better and worse—the unfolding
of post-9/11 intelligence reform.
Let me be clear here: open source can certainly make useful contributions to national security planning and decision making. The language
surrounding open source, with its emphasis on “openness,” “competing
perspectives,” “cost-effectiveness,” and “public-private collaboration,”
seems to challenge some of the secretiveness and insularity of the U.S.
intelligence community. As a result, I have become interested in how national security institutions change, the role of communication and culture within these processes, and the prospects of increased democratic
deliberation of U.S. national security policy. These issues have directed
my attention to institutional discourse—the constellations of talk and text
that constitute particular understandings and practices as “popular, important, and widely applicable” within U.S. intelligence and national security affairs.61 During my work for Intellibridge, I observed the critical
importance of official and unofficial documents—such as reports, plans,
directives, and correspondence—for developments within the intelligence
sector. For example, from 2002 to 2005, a handful of open source contractors were locked in fierce competition for intelligence officials’ patronage.
The strategic production and distribution by these contractors of numerous and diverse texts—emails, letters, presentations, reports, and marketing materials—became the principal method for them to gain clients’
attention, influence their thinking about the value of open source, and
persuade them to procure open source services. Communication uniquely
shapes the open source arena.
By 2005, Intellibridge’s market had shifted almost exclusively to the
government sector. The company had supported clients such as the
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Chief of Naval Operations,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Missile Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Pacific Air
Forces, Air Force Intelligence and Analysis Agency, Commander Naval
Forces Europe, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JICPAC, Naval War College, Office of Naval Intelligence, and
SOUTHCOM. During this period, overall intelligence contracting and outsourcing for personnel, equipment, and services climbed and by 2007 accounted for roughly 70 percent of the $44 billion U.S. intelligence budget.62
The rapid growth of open source contracting and outsourcing activities
The Coming of Age of Open Source
15
throughout the intelligence community prompted, in part, the creation of
the ADDNI/OS in 2005. The ADDNI/OS was established to oversee and
manage the institutionalization of open source throughout the intelligence
community. The ADDNI/OS reports to the deputy director of national intelligence for collection (DDNI/C), who, in turn, reports to the DNI. The
first case study in this book, in chapter 4, centers mainly on the activities
of the ADDNI/OS and the various officials across the intelligence community involved in the ADDNI/OS’s initiatives. I have obtained copies of
key texts produced and disseminated by the ADDNI/OS, as well as various speeches and media reports. Additionally, since 2007, there have been
two major open source conferences sponsored by the DNI, both of which
I attended.
Open Source, Cultural Change, and U.S. Homeland Security
In early 2002, recognizing that the Internet could be leveraged to spur
tighter integration and collaboration among organizations possessing
a newfound homeland security mandate, Intellibridge was among the
first companies to market a daily electronic newsletter—Homeland Security Monitor—to officials who suddenly found themselves responsible for
preparing for a new array of perceived security threats. Dozens of governmental and commercial organizations distribute homeland security
newsletters and other information services to officials.63 Chapter 5 examines how the meanings of open source are reconfigured within the context
of homeland security information sharing. Information sharing between
federal, state, and local agencies is a key element of the U.S. government’s
post-9/11 homeland security strategy. Recently created fusion centers operated by state agencies integrate, analyze, and disseminate federal, state,
local, tribal, and private sector homeland security information. These fusion centers have been established in most U.S. states in order to “provide a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure,
and communities [that] can be developed and translated into protective
action.”64 The collection, analysis, and dissemination of open source information are central fusion center tasks. However, questions remain concerning the effects of lingering negative attitudes toward open source. As
Frank Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute, stated
in testimony before Congress in 2008, “I think some of the better [homeland security intelligence] products are actually open source. . . . If [an intelligence product] has that marking with a code word on it [meaning that
the information is classified], we think it is better. That doesn’t mean it is
better.”65 During the same hearing, however, Matthew Bettenhausen, executive director of California’s Office of Homeland Security, stated, “Open
source is very important because you can pull a lot of this [information]
together. Sometimes we get more timely information from reading the
news reports than we do in getting the [official intelligence] products.
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No More Secrets
I mean, you know, the National Intelligence Estimate—we were reading
about what was in there in the paper for a week before we ever even got
a briefing from DHS on it. That is frustrating, and that has to change.”66
These comments illustrate the ambiguity surrounding how open source
information sharing is actually understood and conducted by those responsible for preventing and managing homeland security emergencies.
One reason for this condition is that commentators have largely overlooked the institutional dynamics that shape the meanings of open source.
After 9/11, these institutional dynamics have involved cultural change
initiatives. For example, the DNI has called for a shift from a “need to
know” culture of secrecy to a “responsibility to provide” culture of sharing.67 Therefore, a second theme explored in this book is the relationship
between institutional discourse and organizational culture. As intelligence
scholar Gregory Treverton says, there is perhaps no greater truism within
reform discourse than that effective collaboration and “real” reforms require changing not just institutional structures, but the cultures of intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency management organizations.68 In
the aftermath of 9/11, cultural change has been repeatedly asserted and
codified as an institutional reform strategy—recently appearing as a central plank of the White House’s National Strategy for Information Sharing
in 2007 and the Information Sharing Environment’s (ISE) Annual Report
to the Congress in 2010. While top-down prescriptions for cultural change
are politically appealing, the actuality of cultural change remains theoretically contentious and empirically complex.69 This book thus scrutinizes
how language mediates cultural change in organizations relying on open
source collection and analysis to support homeland security informationsharing activities.
Open Source and Citizen Participation
in National Security Affairs
Nolte argues that the institutionalization of open source, improved information sharing among agencies, and the review of security practices
represent the “iron triangle” (i.e., the three most important components)
of U.S. intelligence reform.70 This book modifies that triangle by revising
the component of security practices as “the public dimensions of intelligence.” By public dimensions, I mean questions concerning what information ought to be shared with the public. I was largely unaware of such
concerns while working at Intellibridge; I assumed, like most Americans,
that intelligence was the business of national security elites. Nevertheless,
while I marketed Intellibridge’s open source services to organizations
within the U.S. intelligence community throughout 2002 and 2003, four
9/11 widows from New Jersey were simultaneously conducting their own
open source collection activities. These widows, who later joined with others to become known collectively as the “9/11 families,” used the Internet
The Coming of Age of Open Source
17
to collect detailed information about the 9/11 attacks and institutional responses, helping them achieve what appeared to be an unprecedented
level of participation in U.S. national security affairs.71
The 9/11 Commission was established on November 27, 2002, and
ceased operations on August 21, 2004. Americans followed the 9/11 Commission hearings as witnesses, the 10 commissioners, and the commission’s staff attempted to uncover the facts surrounding the attacks. The
commission’s work culminated in its Final Report. Through the subsequent
reorganization of U.S. intelligence based on the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations as codified in IRTPA and the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the 9/11 Commission’s work endures.
Most commentators agree that the 9/11 Commission would not have been
formed without the efforts of the Family Steering Committee (FSC) for the
9/11 Independent Commission.72 The FSC organized 9/11 victims who
were lobbying Congress to create an independent commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks. A leader of the FSC, Kristen Breitweiser, recounts
in her memoir, “As the battle for a 9/11 commission began, we gathered
mountains of information while patched together on the phone each night.
In the midst of conversation, one of us would shout out some new tidbit of
information, which would then lead to all of us researching that particular
topic over the Internet for hours, sometimes days, at a time.”73 Despite opposition from the Bush administration, the FSC successfully worked with
lawmakers to establish a commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks. In the
process, the 9/11 families appeared to achieve a remarkable level of direct
(although temporary) participation in national security affairs.
More recently, the controversial whistleblower website WikiLeaks rocketed to headlines in 2010 when it released the Afghan War Diary, the Iraq
War Logs, and U.S. Embassy Cables, respectively. These unauthorized disclosures of secret information prompted myriad responses from officials,
commentators, and citizens concerned with their influence within national
security affairs. Thus, the cases of the 9/11 families and websites such as
WikiLeaks provide opportunities to speculate, in chapters 6 and 7, how
open source developments could contribute to opportunities for more citizens to actively participate in U.S. national security dilberations.74
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
The WMD Commission asserted in 2005 that “many open source materials may provide the critical and perhaps only window into activities
that threaten the United States.”75 This book, therefore, engages open
source and the reshaping of U.S. intelligence in order to assess the institutionalization of open source within three areas: (1) the U.S. intelligence
community, (2) the homeland security sector, and (3) the citizen activism
arena. I continue this discussion in chapter 2 by highlighting the U.S. government’s effort to formally collect and analyze open source information
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during World War II and the subsequent Cold War and immediate post–
Cold War periods. This chapter sets the stage for post-9/11 open source
developments discussed later in the book. Chapter 3 develops the interconnections among institutions, organizational discourse, and national
security rhetoric. This chapter advances a discourse-oriented perspective
to interpret the case studies of open source that follow. This perspective
is used, in part, because institutional secrecy generally prevents scholars from immersing themselves within intelligence and national security
agencies. However, the sites chosen for this research yielded accessible
materials of sufficient quantity and variety to permit an examination of
the complex dynamics of institutional change.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide three case studies of the post-9/11 reshaping
of U.S. intelligence and national security. Specifically, chapter 4 examines
the development of open source within the U.S. intelligence community
in order to explore the relationships among institutions, discourse, and
change. Chapter 5 sustains discussion of these issues by investigating how
open source is reconfigured in the context of homeland security. Chapter 6
engages the normative dimensions of open source through exploring how
its development could potentially bolster citizen participation in national
security affairs. Chapter 7, the final chapter, describes public intelligence
websites and the challenges of developing a more democratic intelligence
sector, as well as summarizes the contributions of this book for stakeholders such as institutional members, policy makers, scholars, and citizens.
An appendix discusses specific open source contexts and practices in
order to provide readers an overview of what open source–related work
can include.
SOURCES, METHODOLOGIES, AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Intelligence scholar James Wirtz notes that “compared to other nations . . . Americans appear to be remarkably open about discussing policies, procedure, failure and even tradecraft employed by their intelligence
organizations.”76 Although securing interviews with institutional members remains challenging, the public archive of relevant information and
reasonably accessible research sites and stakeholders creates adequate opportunity for scholarly work. In conducting this work, I relied on publicly available documents, the remarks of officials concerning internal
government documents, and interview data. Materials obtained for this
book include transcripts of speeches, directives, strategic plans, policy
memoranda, congressional hearing transcripts, commercial documents,
conference materials, memoirs, books, articles, documentaries, archival
material, news coverage, and interviews with current and former government officials, corporate executives, law enforcement officials and analysts, scholars, and citizen activists. Therefore, the reader should have
The Coming of Age of Open Source
19
confidence that the research presented herein adequately accounts for key
institutional documents under existing constraints.
My direct engagement with open source issues spans from 2001 to
2010—the four-year period prior to the establishment of new open source
organizational structures in 2005 and (subsequently, as a scholar) through
the first five years of open source’s formal institutionalization under the
guidance of the ADDNI/OS. Open source as a concept has existed in one
form or another since the formation of the U.S. intelligence community.
Nevertheless, my professional background and training in communication studies provides me with a unique perspective on open source at a
critical juncture in its development. From 2007 to 2009, I conducted semistructured interviews with more than 50 current and former national
security and homeland security officials, analysts, contractors, citizen activists, and other stakeholders in order to understand their perspectives
concerning the institutionalization of open source. All these figures were
in some way central to the questions explored in this book and/or possessed specialized knowledge of intelligence, national or homeland security, and open source issues. I identified participants based on my prior
work experience, books, articles, and websites, and the “Participant Contact Information” booklet distributed during the 2008 DNI Open Source
Conference. The methodologies used in conducting this research included
discourse analysis, rhetorical criticism, interviews, and observations.77
By critically contrasting institutional members’ understandings with officials’ intentions, discourse analysis, rhetorical criticism, and interviews
complement one another.78 While I conducted participant observation at
two public open source conferences during the course of this study, I used
field notes primarily to supplement my interpretations of document and
interview data.
As a communication scholar, I am generally concerned in this book with
three overlapping dimensions of discourse: (1) textual practice, (2) discursive practice, and (3) social practice.79 Textual practice involves the study
of the production of texts. Here, I examine how open source documents
and speeches draw on other texts and discourses to establish the legitimacy of open source, as well as the authority of the actors responsible
for its institutionalization. Discursive practice involves the study of how
language and images are used to reproduce or transform the identities, relationships, and belief systems of institutional members. Here, my focus
is on how representations across texts work to establish officials’ preferred understandings of open source and national security more broadly.
I study how official open source texts draw on powerful national security themes and neoliberal assumptions to construct the concept of open
source in specific ways. Finally, social practice, as the term is used here
and in other studies, involves an assessment of how institutional members
actually respond to texts.80 Here, I assess how stakeholders make sense of
open source developments within their everyday organizational routines
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and practices. I gauge to what extent official open source texts appear to
influence the thoughts and behaviors of institutional members.
These three levels of practice should be viewed as interrelated and mutually influential. The authors of texts, as well as audiences, bring different backgrounds and perspectives to the production and reception of
discourse, thereby rendering clear-cut or stable claims about cause and
effect awkward. A person may passively accept—in whole or in part—a
text’s preferred representation of open source; however, that same person
may also challenge or resist aspects of that representation, thereby potentially influencing subsequent textual, discursive, and social practices.
Given the context, scope, and objectives of this book, it is neither possible
nor desirable to fully examine all three dimensions of discourse within
each case study. By focusing primarily on textual and discursive levels of
practice in the first case study in chapter 4 and social practice in the second and third case studies in chapters 5 and 6, I am able to offer a richer
assessment of open source developments. Additionally, the examples of
textual practice explored in the second case study are similar to those analyzed in the first. In other words, the official texts involved in open source
discourse within the homeland security sector are generally the ones that
influence open source’s diffusion across the broader U.S. national security
apparatus. Additionally, there are no official open source texts within the
citizen activism arena; therefore, my understanding of these groups’ discourse is derived from archival material and interview data.
The discourse-analytic scheme advanced herein follows studies that
have investigated the connections between discourse and institutional
change.81 Discussion of the texts that I have selected for analysis is provided in the associated case studies. Institutional texts were selected based
on their importance as identified by statute, directive, or strategic plan;
the frequency of their appearance within the discursive milieu; and institutional members’ statements concerning their influence. During the past
nine years, I have collected hundreds of fragments of open source discourse in digital and material form. My analysis centers on inductive and
deductive categorization of the multiple depictions of open source circulating within the field; identifying vocabularies, logics, and underlying
theories of change; pinpointing key processes of textual production and
dissemination; and, finally, assessing the influence of these processes on
the beliefs and practices of institutional members at multiple levels.
Finally, my aim in this book is to provide an example of communication
scholarship that combines a concern for the internal, institutional dynamics of intelligence with the broader, public dimensions of national security
discourse. I do this by developing what I term an institutional discourse
perspective (elaborated in chapter 3), which combines insights primarily
from the fields of organizational discourse and rhetoric. Organizational
discourse scholars investigate patterns in the production, distribution,
and consumption of texts to understand processes of stability and change
The Coming of Age of Open Source
21
within organizations and institutions. These texts may take a variety of
forms but are generally symbolic expressions that are meaningful to the
people who make and interpret them, rule in and/or rule out ways of
thinking about phenomena, are accessible to others, and construct—rather
than simply reflect—social reality.82 In this way, organizational discourse
scholarship complements rhetoric’s traditional focus on public statements,
the actual or potential effects of these statements, processes of identification and persuasion, and how these phenomena enhance or degrade possibilities for ethical communication.83 By pursuing this combination, I am
able to more effectively trace open source discourse across institutional
and public spheres and assess the implications of its development for officials, policy makers, and citizens.
Despite the popularity of discourse-centered research, the study of intelligence remains largely overlooked by organizational theorists and
organizational communication scholars. Christopher Grey writes: “Agencies relating to intelligence, counter-terrorism, warfare, defence procurement, policing and so on can be understood as organizational apparatuses
which could be studied in similar ways to any other organization. In fact,
such studies are rare when compared to almost any other sector . . . Security agencies, with perhaps the exception of the police, are notably absent
from the [organization studies] repertoire.”84 Responding to Grey, this
book places intelligence studies and organization studies in conversation
in order to invigorate both. I agree with Grey when he writes, “The issues of human security, broadly conceived, are pressing and complex . . .
They are also in no small measure organizational. An organization studies that matters should have something to say about them.”85 This book’s
approach enables me to simultaneously explain how language organizes
the institutional complexities of post-9/11 intelligence reform and explore
what these developments could portend for the future of U.S. national
security.
This book also brings the fields of organizational discourse and rhetoric together to explore the interrelationships between internal/organizational and external/public communication. In doing so, I respond to calls
from scholars to develop interdisciplinary perspectives in order to study
institutions that cut across the domains of science, national security, public policy, and citizen activism.86 The case of open source provides a useful example of how texts are imbued with organizing properties, become
distributed and interpreted by actors, and both influence and are influenced by broader public discourses.87 In studying open source discourse
across institutional and public spheres, this book is similar to the work
of communication scholars including H. L. Goodall Jr., Gordon Mitchell,
Robert Newman, and Bryan Taylor. These scholars’ body of work displays an exemplary mobility in shifting between the contexts of organizational/institutional communication and public/cultural rhetoric. Scholars
who work at the boundaries of established fields face the challenge of
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maintaining fidelity to each field while simultaneously integrating their
perspectives to generate new knowledge. Despite the challenge of integration, boundary-spanning studies are increasingly needed within the
field of communication in order to account for complex sites of meaning
making—where the influence of political forces, managerial discourses,
citizen activism, and cultural values cannot be easily bracketed. This book
thus illustrates one boundary-spanning approach for scholars working at
the intersection of communication, organization, and security.
CHAPTER 2
The Origins of the
Open Source Debate
The Defense Communications Board recommends a substantial expansion
in monitoring activities of the Federal Communications Commission to
include continuous recordings of foreign press and propaganda broadcasts
which can he heard within the United States.
—U.S. Defense Communications Board, 19401
Everyone is by now aware that a virtual tidal wave of publicly printed paper
threatens to swamp almost all enterprises of intellectual research.
—CIA Studies in Intelligence article, 19692
In CIA alone, the amount of open source information has grown by a factor
of ten over the past four years.
—Aspin-Brown Commission, 19963
Espionage has been called the world’s second-oldest profession.4 In biblical times, spies gathered both secrets and openly available information.5
Elizabethan England spymasters treated “news” and “secret information”
as synonyms.6 Commentators, however, generally identify World War II
as the catalyst of contemporary open source developments.7 Specifically,
in the United States, the onset of World War II spurred the creation of the
Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service.8 Figure 2.1 is a timeline of open
source history provided by the OSC on its public website.
As both the timeline and the chapter epigraphs make clear, officials
have long acknowledged the necessity of gathering and analyzing open
source information in support of U.S. national security interests. For just
as long, commentators have questioned the adequacy of the government’s
Figure 2.1:
History of the Open Source Center
Source: Open Source Center.
The Origins of the Open Source Debate
25
open source plans, policies, and practices. The aim of this chapter is not
to provide a comprehensive history of open source but instead to identify key themes and developments in order to place post-9/11 events in
context. Other commentators have written about the history of FBMS/
FBIS; that material is only summarized here.9 This chapter instead examines World War II–era challenges using the case of the U.S. Navy’s chief
public information officer from 1941 to 1943, William W. Drake. Drake’s
wartime experiences evoke questions that any contemporary open source
stakeholder would recognize: What should be the role of the press in U.S.
intelligence affairs? What are the dangers of open source’s availability to
U.S. adversaries? How can stakeholders pinpoint the specific contributions that open source makes to national security planning and decision
making? Answers to these questions suggest that although open source
technologies have radically changed since World War II, associated ambiguities and dilemmas have remained remarkably stable.
Cold War open source developments were characterized by a steady
increase in the amount of publicly available information and the government’s struggle to effectively obtain and analyze it. However, geopolitical and technological conditions limited the scope and scale of formal
open source initiatives. As former NIC chairman, John Gannon, recalled
in 2005, “[Prior to the mid-1980s, it] used to take me . . . about 14 days to
get a newspaper from the Caribbean and Latin America where I was covering, and policymakers were quite willing to wait for me to finish my
analysis and fill the very large information gaps with my judgments and
my expertise.”10 As a result of these conditions, the drumbeat for a more
deliberate approach to open source exploitation became much louder in
the post–Cold War period, when the diffusion of global media and information technology rapidly accelerated.
Several figures have uniquely influenced post–Cold War open source
developments: among the most notable are open source advocate Robert David Steele; former Connecticut congressman Rob Simmons; the first
ADDNI/OS, Eliot Jardines; and the director of the OSC, Doug Naquin.
Perhaps more than any other figure, Steele has done more in the past two
decades to advance public awareness of open source issues. Yet Steele’s vision of open source organizational structure has remained largely outside
of official policy. This chapter explains some of the reasons for this situation and sets the stage for the post-9/11 institutionalization of open source
described in the remainder of this book.
THE CATALYST OF WORLD WAR II
The events of December 7, 1941, drew the United States into the war
and forever changed the global political order. William W. Drake covered
that story and participated in its unfolding. As maritime reporter and editor for the Los Angeles Times, Drake chronicled the rise of Japan’s power
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throughout the 1930s by closely following the movements of the Japanese
fishing fleet and merchant ships from Southern California. His articles
described ship movements and cargo and tracked Japan’s rush to stockpile oil, chemicals, cotton, and scrap metal. With his extensive knowledge
of the world’s naval and commercial vessels, plus his connections with
naval, press, and civilian officials, the Intelligence Office of the 11th Naval
District and members of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) inevitably
approached Drake as a source of information.11
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—the precursor to the CIA—also
gathered public and secret information to support U.S. intelligence activities during World War II. Historian Kathy Peiss notes, “Despite its reputation for glamorous exploits, much of its work, perhaps a majority of it,
involved prosaic tasks of gathering and analyzing published materials.
Its founder, William ‘ Wild Bill’ Donovan, believed that intelligence could
be learned from open sources, and he sought broad-based, contextualizing information about, for example, industrial production, transportation
patterns, and the psychology of the enemy.”12 Along these lines, Drake
was the ideal contact for ONI: a respected maritime editor who had carte
blanche access to ships coming in and out of Southern California’s ports.
As an officer in the U.S. Naval Reserve, Drake knew most of the officers in
the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and he knew many of the captains of the commercial
ships that regularly visited the port of San Pedro.13
The 11th Naval District was headquartered in San Diego but covered
the area from above Los Angeles to Baja, California. U.S. Navy officials
had become increasingly suspicious of the first- and second-generation
Japanese living and working near military installations and defense plants
in Southern California. In his capacity as maritime editor, Drake likely
passed any rumors of Japanese espionage activities along to ONI.14 In
1940, ONI stepped up its counterintelligence operations against the Japanese, and Drake, who had served 19 years with the Los Angeles Times, took
a leave of absence in order to take charge of the Los Angeles District Naval
Intelligence Office.15 Thus Drake, who had gained his vast knowledge of
maritime issues through open sources, became a key player in attempts to
thwart alleged Japanese espionage in Southern California.
In May 1941, Drake was called to active duty. He received orders to report to Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, director of naval public relations in
Washington, DC.16 Drake spent several weeks in Washington attending
meetings and briefings and was told that he would assume the title of
press relations officer for the entire Pacific Fleet, which in 1939 had been
moved from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Drake found himself
in Pearl Harbor on the eve of the Japanese attack consolidating Navy public relations and serving as the link between the American people and the
Pacific Fleet. Drake censored and released stories to the press and planned
pictures and articles to humanize the Navy. In other words, Drake generated favorable press so that officials in Washington would allocate funds
to supply the Navy with needed materials for its buildup in the Pacific.
The Origins of the Open Source Debate
27
On the morning of December 6, 1941, at 8:00 A.M., Drake met Joseph C.
Harsch, a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, in the reception
area of Pacific Fleet’s headquarters.17 Admiral Kimmel, the commander of
the Pacific Fleet, had agreed to an interview with Harsch, and Drake was
there, as usual, to oversee press matters. Harsch was somewhat puzzled
by the relaxed atmosphere: there was no hint of an impending crisis. Once
he was able to, Harsch wasted no time in asking Kimmel the question
that was on everyone’s mind: “Admiral, is there going to be a war out
here?” “No,” Kimmel replied confidently, “the Japanese cannot attack us
in the Pacific without running the risk of a two-front war. The Japanese
are too smart to run that risk. No, young man, I don’t think they’d be
such damned fools!” Following the interview, Kimmel called Drake into
his office and asked him to show Harsch “around Wheeler Field and the
Army area over the hill.”18 While Drake showed Harsch around the military areas of Oahu, open source developments reached a milestone.
Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service
Specifically, on this day, the newly established FBMS, headquartered
in Washington, DC, issued its first analytical report based on the previous week’s monitoring of Japanese radio transmissions conducted from
its bureau in Portland, Oregon. FBMS’s December 6 report warned readers: “Japanese radio intensifies still further its defiant, hostile tone; in contrast to its behavior during earlier periods of Pacific tension, Radio Tokyo
makes no peace appeals. Comment on the United States is bitter and increased; it is broadcast not only to this country, but to Latin America and
Southeastern Asia.”19 The FBMS report was the culmination of two years of
organizational changes within the U.S. government. A declassified Studies
in Intelligence article describes how the United States, following the United
Kingdom’s growing concern over German propaganda beamed via shortwave radio, began efforts to monitor foreign transmissions.20 The first
organized effort to analyze the content of foreign radio broadcasts was established at Princeton University (the “Princeton Listening Post”) in 1939,
followed by Stanford University’s monitoring of Asia-based broadcasts.21
Government officials within the State Department, increasingly concerned
about foreign propaganda, began pushing for a more formal monitoring
organization. President Roosevelt allotted $150,000 from an emergency
fund to support the effort, and, on February 26, 1941, FBMS commenced
operations.22 By September 1941, numerous publications were being produced, including a daily digest of broadcasts to North America and Latin
America and special reports published as events dictated.23
In some ways, the work of FBMS analysts would be familiar to anyone involved in open source exploitation in the 21st century. Like their
contemporary counterparts, FBMS analysts were well educated and multilingual; possessed knowledge of foreign affairs, social psychology, and
political science; and had the ability to write well. Also similar to today’s
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obstacles in the open source contracting sector, FBMS officials were more
or less dissuaded from hiring foreign nationals possessing extensive language skills and deep cultural understanding and background due to
counterintelligence concerns.24 FBMS officials also confronted the need to
conceal open source reporting and analysis from the public while simultaneously expanding FBMS’s utility among key government stakeholders.
FBMS generally did not provide its information to persons or organizations outside the government.25
Concealing the Success of the Pearl Harbor Attack
from the Open Press
Drake likely did not see the December 6 FBMS report, having chaperoned Harsch around Oahu that day. The following morning, Sunday,
December 7, Drake’s two young sons, who had heard on the radio that the
Japanese were attacking Pearl Harbor, awakened him. He rushed to the
scene; he would not see his wife and children again for 10 days.26 From
the window of his office on the third floor of the Navy’s headquarters,
Drake could see the devastation: the battleships Oklahoma and Arizona had
been badly hit, the Pennsylvania and Tennessee were also damaged, and the
California rested on the shallow harbor bottom. Drake also learned that
the Nevada, the West Virginia, and 18 other ships had also been damaged;
many hangars and other buildings had been hit; nearly 200 planes had
been destroyed; and thousands of Americans has been killed or injured.27
In his role as public information officer, Drake had to conceal the full
extent of the damage from the Japanese. Officers believed that if the Japanese military learned how successful their attack had been, they might
consider an invasion of the island.28 Therefore, immediately following the
attack, Drake issued a communiqué to the press describing how the Oklahoma and a few other ships had been damaged. The Japanese, of course,
knew this already; anyone looking down on Pearl Harbor from the surrounding heights could see this clearly. In other words, Drake’s communiqué gave only information that was openly available to someone viewing
the scene. The next day’s headlines in the major U.S. newspapers made
no mention of the heavy fleet losses. It would be several weeks before the
American public knew the full extent of the damage.29 Drake successfully
prevented the Japanese from learning, via open source reporting from the
American press, just how successful their attack had been.
Turning the Tables: Open Source’s
Availability to Adversaries
In the early days of the war, FBMS monitored foreign radio broadcasts
for items of interest to officials and policy makers, while Drake, through
censorship activities, worked to limit the dissemination of U.S. military
The Origins of the Open Source Debate
29
information that could find its way into open sources. Despite Drake’s
efforts, this situation occurred following the Battle of Midway, when,
on June 7, 1942, the Chicago Tribune ran the headline “Navy Had Word
of Jap Plan to Strike at Sea.”30 Navy officials feared that readers of the
story would be able to deduce that U.S. ciphers had cracked Japan’s naval
codes, thus alerting the Japanese to stop using them. Officials considered
prosecuting the Tribune’s editor under the Espionage Act of 1917 but soon
reconsidered, assuming that associated news coverage would ensure that
Japan stopped using the codes. However, Japanese officials either ignored
or discounted the Tribune’s reporting and continued to use a version of the
codes throughout the war.31
In the Tribune case, Drake was unable to prevent the disclosure of critical information via the open press. The dilemmas that Drake faced in
his roles as a reporter and the Navy’s chief PIO therefore demonstrate
that the “downsides” of open source have a long history.32 Specifically,
Drake’s need to conceal both the success of the Pearl Harbor attack and
U.S. code-breaking capabilities underscores that one’s own leaked secrets
can become an adversary’s open source nuggets. Additionally, it is unclear whether Drake received FBMS reports or found them useful. The
difficulty of discerning what open source material is valuable and what
is simply inane chatter persists. Specifically, intelligence scholar Stephen
Mercado notes FBMS’s many successes during the war, including more
timely reporting than commercial news providers, real-time monitoring
of foreign leaders’ speeches, in-depth analysis of trends, coverage of farflung locales, and the occasional gleaning of technical details from foreign
broadcasts.33 Yet, speaking of OSS’s open source activities during World
War II, Peiss notes that officials “began to supplement microfilmed publications with their own observations and reports on conversations and
rumors. Some [officials] became downright skeptical of the value of what
is now termed ‘open-source intelligence,’ arguing that publications had to
be actively combined with agents’ assessments of people and events.”34
Peiss explains that OSS field representative George Kates wrote this statement from China in 1944: “Much of this general plan for omnivorous and
utopian book gathering . . . has no great bearing on the winning of the
war.”35 Kates argued, “Some of the most vital information that this organization can gather is not in printed form, nor does it seem likely that it will
become so.”36 We thus find in Kates’s assertion the seeds of some intelligence community members’ ambivalent attitudes toward open sources—
attitudes that would be in place more than 60 years later.
A “PUBLICATIONS EXPLOSION”
DURING THE COLD WAR
A declassified Studies in Intelligence article written by Herman Croom in
1969 entitled “The Exploitation of Foreign Open Sources” describes Cold
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War–era institutional responses to open source challenges.37 Croom notes
that an internal CIA study from 1957 found that 75 to 90 percent of the
agency’s “total economic, scientific, and geographical knowledge of the Soviet Bloc was based on analysis of open source material.”38 In 1961, the
State Department and the CIA were designated as the primary collectors
of foreign publications, press, radio, and television broadcasts. During this
time, FBIS produced 80 periodicals including its daily report for the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, communist China, Asia and the Pacific, the Middle
East and Africa, Latin America, and Western Europe.39
In language eerily similar to contemporary open source commentary,
Croom likens “publicly printed paper” to a “tidal wave” threatening to
swamp the U.S. intelligence community. He offers readers guidance for
dealing with the volume of and means of obtaining and processing open
source material from the foreign press. Croom notes, however, that the
“reliability” of open source is an ever-present concern, and he reminds
readers that useful analysis involves multiple, high-quality sources. In addition to concerns about reliability, Croom identifies problems such as the
inability of analysts to find and retrieve open source material; no uniform
filing and indexing system had yet been established. Croom therefore asserts, “The use of machine records methods will be mandatory in the future.”40 Interestingly, Croom suggests, in ways all-too familiar to some
contemporary open source advocates, the need for an open source agency.
For Croom, such an agency would “allow more efficient disposition of
intelligence talent and budget.”41 Nearly 40 years later, stakeholders are
still debating this issue.42 FBIS, of course, was not the sole provider of
open source material during the Cold War. Other providers included the
Foreign Military Studies Office, State Department, Library of Congress,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).43
Although open source providers within the government expanded
their operations during the Cold War, it remains difficult to pinpoint exactly how such material contributed to U.S. planning and decision making during that era. For example, intelligence scholar Glen Hastedt has
examined whether NIEs produced during the 1958 China Straits Crisis
provided decision makers with significantly different or better information than could be obtained from open sources.44 Hastedt found that both
NIEs and the public press accurately assessed the Chinese government’s
goals: “In each, repeated reference is made to concerns of prestige, influence, enhanced regional standing, and testing U.S. intentions, rather than
Peiping’s desire for war.”45 However, Hastedt found significant differences in how each source depicted the underlying dynamics of the situation. Open sources considered a wider array of possible underlying
causes of the crisis—for example, domestic politics and military balance of
power—while NIEs relied almost exclusively on a rational actor model
of deterrence. As a result, Hastedt argues that NIEs advanced a more
The Origins of the Open Source Debate
31
“constricted” image of the Chinese government’s decision-making process. Yet the broader perspective found in open sources did not necessarily
provide U.S. decision makers with a clearer course of action. Both sources,
Hastedt implied, are vulnerable to “cherry picking” by officials, whose
biases lead them to ignore repeated caveats about the uncertainty of the
information presented. The most consequential difference between open
sources and NIEs related to the issue of transparency. While the open press
generally identified sources of information, according to Hastedt, “[NIEs]
did not identify either the source of the analysis presented to policymakers or the source of the information used for analysis. Neither dissenting
footnotes nor in-text dissents were included. True to the notion of NIEs as
the considered conclusion of the entire Intelligence Community, information was presented in summary, although detailed, fashion.”46 Hastedt acknowledges that presenting summarized analysis saves decision makers
time, yet it potentially “leaves analysts vulnerable to the charges of tilting
evidence or acting on the basis of bureaucratic imperatives rather than the
best interest of policymakers.”47
Intelligence scholar Robert Pringle is even more cautious about the role
of open sources during the late Cold War.48 Analysts of the Soviet Union,
referred to as Kremlinologists, often relied on Soviet media and speeches to
understand power dynamics within the Politburo and the likely course of
Soviet policy. When Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary in 1985,
his private statements to Soviet and foreign leaders occasionally contradicted public accounts of his positions on issues, such as the pullout of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Multiple and conflicting public accounts of the
USSR’s intentions created challenges for open source analysts in making predictions. Indeed, Pringle (a recipient of the CIA’s Distinguished Intelligence
Medal) asserts, “Not one government or academic observer of the Soviet
Union foresaw the collapse of the Soviet government.”49 Pringle therefore
concludes, “Open source intelligence is a double-edge sword for the government analyst. During the Cold War it was of tremendous value to those
doing ‘Kremlinology.’ . . . But reassessing the use of OSINT in the Gorbachev
years suggests that open source information can be more ambiguous than
analysts, historians, and diplomats are willing to admit.”50
Ambiguity surrounding the use and effectiveness of open source information during the Cold War may have spurred Jan Herring and George
Marling to begin to survey and enhance the intelligence community’s access
to open sources in the 1970s. According to Robert David Steele, Herring,
the first national intelligence officer for science and technology, and Marling, then a member of the intelligence community staff, pioneered institutional open source reforms.51 Steele claims, “Generally, the S&T analysts
rather than the managers, collectors, or covert operators, have understood
the extreme importance of access to open sources in all languages.”52 Yet
according to Steele, “Herring and Marling failed [to adequately institutionalize open source] for the same reason that later reformists failed: the
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management mindset is closed, narrow, and completely unwitting of the
dereliction of duty attendant to ignoring open sources in all languages.”53
Nevertheless, Herring and Marling would soon be joined by other advocates whose efforts to improve open source exploitation gathered momentum in the post–Cold War period.
POST–COLD WAR OPEN SOURCE ADVOCACY
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 accelerated the development of new open source plans, policies, and practices. According to a
1993 article written by Paul Wallner, then the CIA’s open source coordinator, “3,000 new newspapers in the former Soviet Bloc [had emerged] that
were not on the market only three years ago.”54 Rapid geopolitical and
technological changes prompted Wallner to declare, “The hard, cold reality . . . is that the Intelligence Community is facing a fundamental restructuring of the way we go about our business.”55 These conditions set the
stage for open source advocates to audition their preferred approaches to
open source collection and analysis, and no single figure is more associated with open source advocacy than Robert David Steele.56
A former Marine Corps infantry and intelligence officer and CIA clandestine case officer, Steele organized and conducted numerous international open source conferences throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.
Steele has written several books, dozens of academic articles, and hundreds of commentaries on open source. He has produced open source
handbooks for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
U.S. Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, and he maintains the most
comprehensive archive of open source–related material available at his
website, OSS.net. For more than 20 years, Steele has both shaped and critiqued institutional responses to open source developments. According to
Steele, from 1988 to 1992, he unsuccessfully “made the rounds within the
government attempting to secure interest in both redirecting half of the
National Intelligence Topics (NIT) away from the Soviet Union and toward the Third World; and in creating the open source exploitation capabilities that the Marine Corps Intelligence Command demonstrated were
so lacking at the national level.”57 However, Steele would soon gain more
visibility and allies.
Both Steele and the OSC note that, in 1992, Senator David Boren (D-OK)
and Congressman Dave McCurdy (D-OK) proposed national security reform legislation; the House version described an “Office of Open Source
Information” to be placed under a newly created deputy director for national intelligence for estimates and analysis. The proposed legislation
stated, “This office, headed by a director, will coordinate the collection
of openly available information of potential intelligence value within the
intelligence community. It is anticipated that this office will serve as the
sole agent within the intelligence community for the procurement of open
The Origins of the Open Source Debate
33
source material. All existing intelligence community open source entities
will be consolidated in this office upon implementation of this act.”58 Although the proposal did not come to fruition, that year the DCI did establish an open source coordinator within the CIA that, two years later, was
superseded by the Community Open Source Program Office (COSPO).
The objectives of COSPO were to oversee a process for users to receive
open source information, engage in advocacy, ensure funding for open
source activities, and oversee a process for establishing open source requirements.59 COSPO’s 1995 Strategic Plan stated the following:
The Community Open Source Program will enable users and customers to have
timely access to all open source information pertinent to their needs in their work
environments. The Program will improve in a cost-effective manner, the use, usefulness, and usability of open source information. It will improve acquiring, accessing, processing, distributing, disseminating, and exploiting open sources and
make it easier to use more focused open source information. The Community will
thereby be able to make more effective and efficient use of its unique, classified assets in support of its customers by ensuring that we “do not send a spy where a
schoolboy can go.”60
During the 1990s, COSPO was one of several interconnected open source
forums that formed, merged, and disbanded in the wake of the Cold War.
These forums included the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee’s Open Source Subcommittee, the Open Source Steering Committee,
numerous agency-specific task forces on open source, and technical efforts such as the Open Source Information System (OSIS) portal. These
groups generally performed advocacy functions to focus officials’ attentions on open source issues and opportunities. According to Wallner, “My
job as the DCI’s Open-Source Coordinator was brought about by the realization among the Community’s leadership and political masters that the
information explosion, and the profusion of automated tools and systems
to handle it, must be more effectively incorporated into the intelligence
process.”61 These were largely the same challenges that confronted Joseph
Markowitz, who headed COSPO in the 1990s.
During this time frame, two events appear especially important for understanding how Steele emerged as a key figure within open source debates. First, the National Intelligence Council’s Open Source Task Force: A
Vision for the Future, written in 1992, became a central focus of Steele’s
commentary.62 A Vision for the Future was intended to be “something more
concrete than a simple vision statement” and, therefore, “leans closer to a
system description . . . to lend some credibility to the reality of a vision.”63
The report noted that the intelligence community’s systems were “designed to function most efficiently against the closed Soviet Union” and
that “there are significant shortfalls for this new world.”64 These shortfalls
included the quantity of open source data that analysts were able to access,
an awareness among analysts of what kinds of materials were available,
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timeliness, poor presentation of materials, and an inability to incorporate
value added (presumably notes and commentary from other analysts).
The report indicated that, in 1992, “There [was] no way to get printed material scanned and entered into the electronic holdings” and “there [were]
no . . . capabilities to store and make available to the user images, graphs,
or voice materials.”65 Nearly simultaneously to the release of the NIC’s
A Vision for the Future, Steele issued a 52-page commentary.66 Significantly,
Steele asserted that the NIC report did not “integrate the perspectives of
a very broad community of military, non-military, and private sector consumers,” and he urged the creation of a new taskforce under the guidance
of the Defense Technical Information Service, rather than the NIC.67
Three years later, in 1995, Steele testified before the Aspin-Brown Commission about the value of open source. The commission directed Steele
to go head-to-head against the intelligence community in what has come
to be known, colloquially, as “the battle-of-the-INTs [intelligence discipline].”68 According to Wired magazine’s Noah Shachtman:
The subject would be the tiny and generally dismal nation of Burundi. The battle
was engaged at 17:00 on a Thursday and the delivery deadline was 10:00 the next
Monday. On Monday morning Steele showed up with: The names of the top 10
journalists covering Burundi (ripe for debriefing); The names of the top 10 academics covering Burundi (ripe for debriefing); 20 two-page executive-level politicalmilitary summaries on Burundi; Burundi order-of-battle information down to the
tribal level; 1:50 maps of the country; 1:50 cloud-free imagery of the country that
was less than 3 years old.69
The CIA, by contrast, provided “a PowerPoint chart of nominal value
and a regional—not country-specific—economic study.”70 The Burundi
case sparked controversy among intelligence stakeholders, with some
accusing Steele of exaggerating his company’s performance and misrepresenting the conditions surrounding the event.71 The Aspin-Brown Commission concluded, however, that “Given the amount of open source
information that is readily available to the public over computer networks, the effort of the Intelligence Community to structure and make
available to analysts pertinent open source data bases seems inexplicably slow.”72 Regarding the battle-of-the-INTs, the commission concluded,
“Information obtained from open sources was substantial and on some
points more detailed than that provided by the Intelligence Community.
On the other hand, the information that came from open sources took longer to produce, required validation, and failed to cover many key aspects
of the situation important to policymakers.”73 Echoing Croom’s observation written in 1969, the commission stated, “An adequate computer infrastructure to tie intelligence analysts into open source information does
not appear to exist. In the view of the Commission, the creation of such
an infrastructure should be a top priority of the DCI and a top priority for
funding.”74
The Origins of the Open Source Debate
35
Following the Aspin-Brown Commission, Steele’s increasingly blunt
critique of the intelligence community, along with his idealistic vision of
reform, led one official to assert that he belonged on the “lunatic fringe”—
a label that Steele later embraced as evidence of his reformist credentials.75
Commentators have also argued that Steele’s claims would benefit from
more detailed evidence. For example, reviewing Steele’s The New Craft of
Intelligence, Frederick Wettering wrote, “Mr. Steele makes conclusion after
conclusion without developing his arguments for each or showing proofs.
Rather he directs readers to his earlier work, On Intelligence, or to the many
authors in his magnificent annotated bibliography for more detailed exposition and reasoning. This methodology is unsatisfactory and frustrating.”76 According to intelligence scholar Arthur Hulnick, “[Steele’s] zeal
in support of OSINT is so overwhelming, it is much like being confronted
with a relentless used-car salesman. Conversations with him tend to be
very one-sided, in that he leaves few openings for rejoinders to his rather
intense presentations.”77 Despite the tone of Steele’s rhetoric, he is among
the most knowledgeable commentators—if not the most—regarding the
intelligence community’s attempts to institutionalize open source.
Steele shares the commitments of private sector open source contractors, including these elements: (1) establishing open source as a legitimate
intelligence discipline, (2) perpetuating the belief that open source can
meet the bulk of intelligence requirements cost-effectively and without
the need for secret collection systems, (3) establishing new organizational
structures within the government to facilitate the expanded and improved
use of open source, and (4) ensuring that the private sector plays a central
role in the open source arena. Yet, since 2005, Steele has largely shifted his
attention away from institutional efforts and toward public or collective
intelligence concerns. For example, in 2008, Steele published Collective Intelligence: Creating a Prosperous World at Peace, edited by Mark Tovey. In that
volume, Steele signaled his abandonment of institutional reform, stating,
“In the USA, the recent issuance of [a] disappointingly incomplete and
misleading Congressional Research Service (CRS) report . . . [is] the final
nail in OSINT’s coffin.”78 As a result of his stance, institutional open source
developments have moved forward largely without Steele’s influence.
Steele is undoubtedly at the center of post–Cold War open source advocacy, yet former congressman Rob Simmons (R-CT) joins him there.
Simmons served in Congress from 2001 to 2007, during which he helped
vault open source to the forefront of U.S. national security reform debates.
According to a biographical sketch, Simmons is a former U.S. Army Reserve military intelligence officer with more than 37 years of active and
reserve service; he also worked for the CIA, serving as an operations
officer for a decade.79 In the 1990s, Simmons was a commander of the
434th Military Intelligence Detachment in New Haven, Connecticut,
where he led the writing of the “Open Source Intelligence Guide for the
Military Intelligence Officer.”80 In 1995, Simmons completed a master’s
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degree from the Joint Military Intelligence College ( JMIC), where he wrote
a thesis entitled, “Open Source Intelligence: An Examination of Its Exploitation in the Defense Intelligence Community.”81 In that thesis, Simmons
declared, “At the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the analytical components are ill-prepared and ill-supported to make full use of any information outside of the small, restrictive and limited domain of classified
intelligence sources.”82 Through surveys and interviews conducted with
nearly 400 analysts, Simmons determined that “DIA analysts spend only
a small fraction of their time and resources on the open sources that can
potentially provide the vast majority of their final intelligence product.”83
Simmons did not specify what time and resources should be devoted to
open source efforts, however.
Simmons’s thesis included five citations of Steele’s writings, along with
interview material. Simmons, in turn, has written forewords for Steele’s
books, including Information Operations: All Information, All Languages, All
the Time and The Smart Nation Act: Public Intelligence in the Public Interest.
In the foreword to Information Operations in 2006, Simmons wrote, “It is no
longer enough to have spies and diplomats—we are engaged in a 100-year
six-front Global War, and nothing less than universal information coverage will meet our needs”84 Simmons echoed Steele’s idealism when he asserted, “As we develop our IO [information operations] capabilities, we
must focus on the ethics of openness, not the manipulation of opinion. We
must strive to deliver the tools for truth to all peoples everywhere, and
nurture democratic elements from the bottom up as well as the national
level.”85 Whether senior intelligence community officials shared this idealism is unclear.
In his role as chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Simmons was instrumental
in raising the visibility of open source. Specifically, Simmons claims that
he was successful in inserting language into the 2006 National Defense
Authorization Act that legally defined open source intelligence and required the Department of Defense to establish a formal open source program.86 Simmons has also advocated for an open source agency outside
the CIA. In 2006, Simmons remarked, “Every discipline needs a home and
the current open source center . . . is still part of the CIA, so it’s still the
ugly stepchild of the intelligence community.”87 Furthermore, Simmons
explained, “I think the time is right for open source. I think we know the
benefits. We still know it’s the ugly stepchild but at least the ugly stepchild
is getting a chance to go to the dance.”88 We can interpret “the dance” as
meaning open source budgets, inclusion in high-profile intelligence products, and increased acknowledgment from senior officials of open source’s
contribution to intelligence.
Simmons shares the commitments of policy makers concerned with
intelligence reform. These commitments include cultivating public trust
by demonstrating leadership in the intelligence arena and ensuring that
The Origins of the Open Source Debate
37
taxpayers receive value for money from government agencies. His third
commitment perhaps distinguishes Simmons from other policy makers;
he promotes an antisecrecy ethic in order to increase information sharing
between the intelligence community and members of Congress and the
public. Simmons supports the development of open source in ways that
private sector contractors, like Steele, cannot. Specifically, through legislative acts, public statements, and interactions with senior government officials, Simmons was able to directly press stakeholders to formally address
open source issues. A statement that Simmons made at one of Steele’s open
source conferences in 2006 sums up his perspective: “In my assessment,
the Intelligence Community is afraid of open source. . . . It seems to me
[that open source is] the ‘ugly stepchild’ of the Intelligence Community,
getting the least money, getting the least recognition, always pushed aside
for secret products. I think it is time to change that paradigm.”89 Simmons
enlisted a long-time colleague to help do just that.
Eliot Jardines, a former open source contractor, became the first ADDNI/
OS in 2005. Both Simmons and Jardines attended Fairfield High School in
Connecticut. Jardines was also a member of the Army’s 434th Military Intelligence Detachment, then commanded by Simmons. One may speculate
what role this relationship played in Jardines being named to the position
of ADDNI/OS. Then CIA director Hayden stated, “We brought in Eliot Jardines from the private sector. . . . Using a community open source steering
committee, Eliot will foster collaboration, drive strategy and policy development and enhance our ability to leverage capabilities that exist outside
the community.”90 Jardines was previously the president of Open Source
Publishing, Inc., an open source contracting firm he founded in 1996. In
his role as ADDNI/OS from 2005 to 2008, Jardines balanced the commitments of various stakeholders within the intelligence community. These
commitments included securing resources for open source exploitation
by acknowledging the importance of open source while simultaneously
maintaining facets of the bureaucratic status quo. In 2006, Jardines stated,
“Getting the [intelligence community] to accept open source as the source
of first resort is my number one goal. . . . In the past we tended to value
information in proportion to how hard it was to get.”91 At a June 21, 2005,
congressional hearing, when Jardines was still a contractor, he stated, “We
must establish OSINT as an equal partner with human intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence and measurement and signatures
intelligence. For too long, open source exploitation has been delegated as
merely an additional duty for intelligence analysts. This is simply a ridiculous notion. No one would seriously propose that intelligence analysts
be required to collect their own signals or imagery intelligence. However,
that is precisely what we do with open source intelligence.”92
Jardines thus echoed Wallner, who wrote in 1993, “We will have to convince a lot of people that just because a piece of information is unclassified
and publicly available . . . does not mean that it is inherently useless.”93
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Getting the intelligence community to use open source as a source of first
resort required funding for programs. To persuade decision makers to
provide larger open source budget allocations, Jardines had to identify
the level of funding for open activities across the intelligence community.
At Steele’s 2006 conference, Jardines stated that he was working to identify all open source programs and the level of funding for each. He stated
that the information would help officials decide “whether [budgets] need
to be right-sized or adjusted.”94 Statements such as this may have caused
concern among contactors who feared consolidation of their market. For
example, Steele recommended in 2005 that “all funds that might be confused with OSINT missions should immediately be labeled, more accurately, Information Operations in order to prevent the DNI from trying
to confiscate funds earmarked for OSINT within other elements of the IC
[intelligence community].”95 Steele’s recommendation illustrates the critical importance of control over the meaning of open source: Jardines had
to not only manage open source programs but also successfully track and
shape the shifting meanings of the term.
Jardines was also placed in the awkward position of having to publicly
champion open source while downplaying Simmons’s antisecrecy ethic
within the intelligence community—where such an ethic is at best quixotic and at worst abhorrent. Jardines’s support of Simmons’s antisecrecy
ethic seems to have shifted somewhat when he moved from the private
sector to the intelligence community. Prior to being appointed ADDNI/
OS, Jardines was a vocal advocate of information sharing. At a 2005 congressional hearing, he stated, “In my hope, we would be disseminating
[open source] down to a very diffuse level, down to local police departments. . . . That’s the thing about open source . . . we can’t hide it; it’s
unclassified.”96 At Steele’s 2006 conference, however, journalist Kent Bye
questioned Jardines about whether the government’s open source products would be made available to the public. Jardines responded, “The
issue of whether we are going to be able to push information out to the
general public is one that I think that we will be able to expand, a bit. . . .
The bottom line is that even though it is open source, in some instances,
we still need to be able to protect sources and methods. . . . We have to be
careful.”97
At FBIS, Steele, Simmons, and Jardines confronted another powerful open source advocate, Doug Naquin, who joined FBIS in 1979
and became its director in 2002; he subsequently became the head of
the OSC in 2005 and chairman of the National Open Source Committee in 2008. Naquin’s long tenure with FBIS positioned him to be at the
forefront of open source developments. Yet as interest in private sector
open source capabilities grew during the 1990s, FBIS saw its fortunes
decline. In remarks before the Central Intelligence Retirees Association
(CIRA) in 2007, Naquin recalled, “The 1990s was not a good decade for
FBIS.”98 Between 1993 and 2002, FBIS staff shrunk by 50 percent. Naquin
The Origins of the Open Source Debate
39
characterized this time frame as “marked by downsizing, serious morale
problems, and general lack of appreciation.”99 The events of 9/11 changed
all that. Naquin noted, “9/11 was a sort of watershed for us.”100 Citing the importance of the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission’s recommendations, Naquin explained how open source advocacy
reached its zenith when, in 2005, FBIS was “rebranded” the OSC and
given additional capabilities and authorities. Rebranding has been
among Naquin’s main concerns: “We quickly went to work to build an
organization around what we wanted our ‘brand’ to be: our identity.”101
This rebranding involved changing perceptions about open source that
have persisted since World War II; namely, FBIS needed to communicate that it could do much more than simply translate foreign language
broadcasts and information. Among Naquin’s goals were to ensure that
audiences valued the OSC for its analytical and technological capabilities and for providing information beyond what one could read in a
newspaper.
During his CIRA presentation, Naquin noted, “My biggest challenge . . .
has not been resources as much as it’s been awareness of what we can do
with open sources and how open source exploitation contributes to the intelligence mission. I encounter a lot of unproved assumptions about what
open sources can and cannot do.”102 Naquin lamented, “On the one hand,
we have what I call the Open Source zealots. I don’t mean that pejoratively,
because it’s nice to have cheerleaders.” Naquin characterized the zealots
as believing that “Open Sources can solve all our problems.”103 Naquin
explained how over two decades, he has confronted many armchair quarterbacks who believe that they can manage open sources more effectively
than FBIS/OSC: “It’s as if they say: ‘Well I got an “A” on a term paper once
in college, so I know how you guys can run Open Source better.’ ”104 On the
other hand, Naquin acknowledged that many institutional members still
ignore open sources, which Naquin has tried to overcome through educating his colleagues about what open sources can contribute to the intelligence mission. Naquin’s Facebook profile in 2010 indicated that among
his favorite movies was Last of the Mohicans. That is an apt analogy given
that Steele’s influence has faded, Simmons recently failed to win a Senate
primary for Connecticut and remains on the sidelines, and Jardines has returned to the private sector. In many ways, Naquin is the only post–Cold
War open source advocate whose influence continues to grow.
In summary, the history of open source reveals consistent dilemmas in
its acquisition and analysis, long stretches of institutional stability, periods characterized by urgent transformations, and ambiguity surrounding
its use and effectiveness. Throughout this history, an underlying question has remained: what is the meaning of open source? The remainder
of this book focuses on that question primarily in the post-9/11 period
of open source’s development. Chapters 4 through 6 take up where this
chapter leaves off. Specifically, the public remarks of these figures—Steele,
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Simmons, Jardines, and Naquin—are a central focus for understanding
the post-9/11 reshaping of U.S. intelligence. To understand why these
remarks are important to processes of institutional change, the next chapter advances a discourse-centered perspective.
CHAPTER 3
A Discourse-Centered Perspective
on Open Source Developments
Now, only the intelligence community could come up with [that] sort of a
name and call [publicly available information] “open source intelligence”
as opposed to “information.” If you call it “information,” you don’t get any
money. If you call it “open source,” somebody will want to fund that.
—Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis (DDNI/A)
Thomas Fingar, 20071
Scholars and commentators have attempted to explain why U.S. intelligence agencies are slow to change in response to shifting political and technological conditions.2 However, explanations of how such
changes occur (or not) remain rare.3 As the chapter epigraph suggests,
a discourse-centered perspective views conflicting meanings of open
source as a driver of institutional change. Consider, for example, the influential book Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11, written by political scientist Amy Zegart.4 In this book, Zegart argues that
flawed organizational routines, structures, and cultures led to U.S. intelligence agency “adaptation failure” in the post–Cold War period—
culminating in the tragedy of 9/11. Zegart found that between 1991 and
2001, 12 different blue-ribbon commissions, think tank task forces, and
governmental initiatives recommended 340 reforms for U.S. intelligence
agencies. Only 10 percent of these recommendations, however, were implemented before 9/11.5
The Aspin-Brown Commission’s recommendations in 1996 regarding
open source were similarly overlooked.6 According to Zegart, the post9/11 institutional environment appears equally hostile to reform: “Future
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prospects for reforming the U.S. intelligence community are not promising. Although there is consensus about what problems need to be fixed
and a greater sense of urgency since September 11, intelligence reform
has only begun. The road ahead will be long. And it will be filled with the
same obstacles—internal resistance, entrenched interests, and institutional
barriers—that have blocked reform efforts for years.”7 Along these lines,
at the 2007 DNI Open Source Conference, DDNI/A Fingar lamented, “We
have some [analysts who] say it’s good to use open sources, but don’t cite
them. People won’t believe [the analysts who use open sources]. If we
haven’t paid for it or stolen it, it’s not the same credible information.”8 Fingar’s observation drew knowing laughter from the audience, prompting
him to add, “I think that is kind of silly, and yet it’s part of the reality.”9 If
Zegart and Fingar are correct, then a perspective that conceptualizes reform as a discursive phenomenon would help identify the specific ways
stakeholders use speech and writing to promote or impede competing visions of reform.
For organizational communication scholar Timothy Kuhn, conflict and
contradiction within speech and writing is “a site for observing battles for
control and an important source of change.”10 A discursive perspective examines the taken-for-granted statements that construct the meanings and
relationships among concepts such as open source and intelligence, objects
such as intelligence reports, and roles such as intelligence analyst or contractor. For example, if intelligence is conceptualized as secret information, then it makes sense that analysts would be reluctant to cite open
source contributions in their reports. This narrow conceptualization of intelligence may subtly undermine outreach efforts to media, law enforcement, and academic communities, thereby reducing that range of useful
perspectives that ultimately reach decision makers. In this way, discourse
is important because it constitutes “the substrate for organizing by providing sets of representations, statements, narratives, images, and codes
that produce ways of seeing objects and events.”11 Rarely, however, do intelligence scholars and commentators acknowledge the complex relationship between communication and reform.
To the extent that communication is discussed at all, political science
and public administration scholars tend to treat communication as a variable within intelligence organizations rather than productive of them and
the broader institutions of which they are a part.12 This chapter explains
why a discursive perspective is useful for understanding possibilities for
institutional change vis-à-vis open source. To do this, I integrate resources
from institutional theory, organizational discourse, and rhetoric to develop a discourse-centered perspective on institutional change. This chapter briefly outlines the features and illustrates the value of this perspective
before applying it to the case studies of open source in the chapters that
follow.
A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open Source Developments
43
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The U.S. intelligence and national security sector can be understood
as an institutional field, one constituted by intelligence consumers (e.g.,
the president, the NIC, intelligence officials, military commanders, and
other policy makers), suppliers (e.g., intelligence agencies and associated
vendors/contractors comprising the intelligence-industrial complex),
regulatory agencies (e.g., congressional oversight committees, special
courts, and inspectors general), competitors (e.g., sources of information
outside the intelligence community that vie for officials’ and policy makers’ attention), and other stakeholders associated with civil society (e.g.,
media and nongovernmental organizations).13 Conceptualizing the U.S.
intelligence and national security sector as an institutional field draws
attention to the influence of stakeholders well beyond the 16 official
members of the U.S. intelligence community.
The term institution is also a sociological concept, one possessing a long
and complex history within the fields of economics, political science, and
organizational studies. Institutional scholars share a concern for the ways
in which cultural forces—social mores, constitutions, or informal systems
of control—influence human behavior.14 “Neo-institutional theory” generally focuses on meaning systems and the ways that institutions are constructed and perpetuated in human interaction.15 For example, in their
landmark essay, sociologists John Meyer and Brian Rowan sought to explain why convergence toward organizational similarity within a field
could occur even in the absence of shared problems of coordination and
control.16 The authors found that certain organizational structures, such
as a human resources unit, could serve as a “rational myth.” By rational
myth, the authors meant that the primary purpose of certain structures is
to “signal” an organization’s legitimacy to other institutional members and
stakeholders. In other words, organizations may adopt formal structures
that possess little relevance and value for performance (“myth”) simply
in order to secure and/or maintain institutional legitimacy (a “rational”
goal). For example, in the context of U.S. national security, the OSC may
not necessarily require its current level of secrecy to operate effectively,
but that secrecy encourages intelligence stakeholders to view the OSC as
legitimate. As intelligence scholar Stevyn Gibson observes, “Regrettably,
‘need to know’ has become a debate complicated more by issues of organizational culture and personal vested interest than operational security.”17
Recognizing the interconnections between communication and institutions, organizational communication scholars John Lammers and Joshua
Barbour have recently advanced an “institutional theory of organizational
communication” designed to assist scholars in understanding interorganizational phenomena.18 For Lammers and Barbour, the defining features of
institutions are their endurance, formal (written) knowledge, rationality,
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and independence. U.S. intelligence evinces each of these features. First,
intelligence involves shared and well-established practices based on formalized beliefs. U.S. intelligence has existed in its modern form since
1947. Second, written rules, laws, regulations, directives, guidelines, and
contracts are a defining characteristic of this institution. Third, intelligence
exhibits a rational, means-ends orientation. This does not mean that rational behaviors always obtain; nevertheless, rules are developed and asserted as practical guides for members in their decision making. Finally,
intelligence is independent of and larger than any single organization. The
formal relationships among members of different organizations within the
U.S. intelligence community are often as important as interactions among
members within a given organization.
Additionally, Lammers and Barbour view institutions as manifested in
practices. Practices are observable routines and behaviors that are consistent across a range of settings—for example, monitoring jihadist websites and chat rooms may occur across intelligence agencies and private
sector firms. Institutions are also manifested in beliefs—cognitive and
emotional elements—that influence their members’ decision-making processes. For example, intelligence agency members are generally socialized
to believe that secrecy is necessary to protect sources and methods of intelligence. Institutions enroll their individual members as carriers of preferred beliefs. Institutions are also characterized by low rates of change.
Institutional practices relevant to organizational communication are often
formalized—that is, written, stored, and used as precedents and guides
for action. Lammers and Barbour’s theory suggests that to understand
the institutionalization of open source, scholars and commentators should
examine stakeholders’ beliefs, practices, and production and dissemination of formal texts. The role of talk and text in establishing, maintaining, or transforming institutions points to the concept of organizational
discourse.
ORGANIZATIONAL DISCOURSE
Organizational discourse can be defined as “the collection of texts,
produced through the practices of talking and writing, that bring organizationally-related objects into being as these texts are produced, disseminated, and consumed.”19 This definition implies that what open source
“is” is uniquely shaped by how stakeholders write and talk about it;
open source is not a phenomenon with fixed attributes and expressions.
In other words, without the global infrastructure that sustains the Internet, contemporary open source discourse would sound very different—
but it (or something like it) would nevertheless exist as a consequence of
stakeholders’ persistent bifurcation of “secret” and “open” information in
deliberating U.S. intelligence policy and conducting operations. While Internet search engines, social networking sites, email alerts, web crawlers,
A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open Source Developments
45
semantic algorithms, and innumerable new and evolving technologies
make many versions of open source practice possible, these practices can,
alternately, be kept behind the veil of institutional secrecy, occur within established and/or new organizational structures and configurations, support the executive branch exclusively, inform congressional and/or public
debate more broadly, remain within the federal arena, be diffused to the
state and local level, involve ordinary citizens, and so forth. Open source
is thus an ambivalent socio-technical apparatus that is capable of being
configured in multiple ( but not infinite) forms.20
There are numerous and diverse texts that describe open source within
the institution of U.S. intelligence. As noted earlier, “textual contradiction” can be “a site for observing battles for control and an important
source of change.”21 Studying this battle helps identify “the key organizational discourses by which ideas are formulated and articulated and to
show how, via the variety of discursive interactions and practices, these
go on to shape and influence the attitudes and behavior of an organization’s members.”22 Official plans, policies, and directives “bear down” on
institutional members, circumscribing their thoughts and actions in ways
that define and perpetuate institutional norms.23 A discourse-centered
perspective, however, also considers the role of human agency in the processes of institutional creation, maintenance, and transformation. The
term “institutional entrepreneurship” captures the friction created when
institutional forces collide with human agency.24 This friction centers on
the question of how new institutional forms and practices can emerge if
members are already embedded within institutions that structure their
thoughts, actions, and identities. One answer to this question lies in conceptualizing human agency as distributed within structures that actors
themselves create, maintain, and transform.25 In this way, organizational
structures both constrain and facilitate action. Drawing on these structural
resources, some officials work to defend the institutional status quo from
others seeking to change it. As a result, “institutional entrepreneurs must
be skilled actors . . . who can draw on existing cultural and linguistic materials to narrate and theorize change in ways that give other social groups
reason to cooperate.”26 In the vocabulary of neo-institutional theory, institutional entrepreneurs must be skilled at performing institutional work—
fostering institutional change through the processes of advocacy, defining,
vesting, constructing identities, changing normative associations, constructing normative networks, mimicry, theorizing, and educating.27
These nine types of institutional work can be grouped in terms of three
broad categories: political work, technical work, and cultural work.28
These categories are illustrated in an extended example later in this chapter, but briefly, political work involves influencing the development of institutional rules, property rights, and boundaries in the attempt to anchor an
institution within a social system. This work includes advocating, defining, and vesting. Technical work, by contrast, involves mimicry, theorizing,
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and educating in order to develop diffuse mental models of how an institution functions. In order for political and technical work to endure, however, institutional entrepreneurs must also engage the normative pillar of
institutions through cultural work. Cultural work involves presenting an
institution in a way that appeals to a broad audience, shapes identities,
and grounds practices within normative frameworks. These categories
help us understand how a popular management fashion—for instance,
Total Quality Management, Knowledge Management, or, indeed, open
source—becomes institutionalized within a field rather than simply fades
away.
Management scholars Markus Perkmann and André Spicer have advanced three propositions concerning institutional work: (1) “a management fashion is more likely to be institutionalized if it is propagated via a
combination of political, technical and cultural work compared to a single
type of institutional work”; (2) “a management fashion is more likely to
be institutionalized if it is propagated by actors bringing together several
types of institutional skills compared to a reduced range of such skills”;
and (3) “a management fashion is more likely to become an institution
through the cumulative results of different kinds of institutional work
over time, compared to conjoint expenditure of institutional work at specific points in time.”29 Testing these propositions requires examining the
talk and text that stakeholders use to perform institutional work. Here,
the concept of rhetoric helps us anticipate the persuasiveness of particular
forms of institutional talk and text and how these relate to cultural discourses and public debates.
RHETORIC
Some scholars treat the terms discourse and rhetoric as synonyms.30 For
others, rhetoric is specifically concerned with the actual or potential effects of messages, social situations beyond the interpersonal arena, the use
of symbols, inductive reasoning, formal and public texts, identification,
and persuasion.31 Rhetorical critics have scrutinized U.S. national security
speeches and documents in order to spur more democratic intelligence
practices. For example, 36 years ago, Robert Newman argued, “When one
looks at the American intelligence apparatus as a series of communication
systems, three pathological conditions become apparent. Our intelligence
suffers inexorably from mission involvement [politicization], it carries secrecy to risible extremes, and it overloads both the capacity of communication channels to carry it and the ability of decision makers to digest it.”32
Newman’s observations seem prophetic in light of public disclosures surrounding the intelligence failures preceding 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War.
For example, Gordon Mitchell has shown how the institutionalized practice of “competitive intelligence”—which is ideally based on cooperative
argumentation between intelligence professionals—becomes distorted
A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open Source Developments
47
through a phenomenon Mitchell terms “Team B intelligence coups.”33 This
phenomenon involves funneling “alternative” (read “preferred”) intelligence analysis by interested parties directly to policy makers, thus bypassing intelligence community peer review. In his analysis of the controversy
surrounding intelligence preceding the Iraq War in 2003, Mitchell demonstrated how a “boutique intelligence shop” residing in the Pentagon, yet
outside the formal U.S. intelligence community, was able to circumvent
institutional norms by “stovepiping”—or selectively funneling—dubious
intelligence assessments to senior administration officials. Administration
officials then used those assessments to justify public pronouncements on
the need for military action in Iraq. Similarly, Stephen Hartnett and Laura
Stengrim analyzed declassified intelligence documents in their rhetorical
critique of how the Bush administration fabricated evidence of national
security threats in its run-up to the Iraq War.34
While not focusing on intelligence issues per se, scholars associated with
Arizona State University’s Consortium for Strategic Communication have
highlighted the role of communication and open source information in
fighting terrorism, strengthening national security, and engaging in public
diplomacy. One of these scholars, H. L. Goodall Jr., argues that fundamentalism is the antithesis of democracy in that it closes down productive debate, dehumanizes and disregards the Other, and treats dissent as a form
of treason. Winning the War on Terror, Goodall argues, entails countering
fundamentalism through the creation of meaningful debate and dialogue
both within the United States and abroad. Goodall argues that the real
battleground in the War on Terror is not the Middle East; rather, it is the
rhetoric of fundamentalism, wherever it is manifested. Thus, Goodall underscores rhetoric’s traditional concern for humanistic ideals and deliberative democracy in the context of sustaining adequate national security.35
The study of national security rhetoric complements neo-institutional
theory and organizational discourse perspectives in attending to the role
of texts in processes of change. For example, Thomas Goodnight’s essay,
“Strategic Doctrine, Public Debate and the Terror War,” demonstrates
how rhetorical scholars and critics traditionally emphasize and critique
the influence of public texts vis-à-vis the development of national security policy. For example, a key instrument of national security policy is the
U.S. National Security Strategy, a document created and distributed by the
executive branch. The National Security Strategy articulates strategic doctrine, which sets in place the overall guidelines for an administration and
informs U.S. publics of the costs and sacrifices that they should be prepared to bear for the sake of national security. For Goodnight, presidential
address enacts strategic doctrine and results in ideographs (such as “the
cause of freedom”) that are powerful motivators and shapers of public
opinion. Goodnight analyzes a set of public speeches and texts in order
to track the unfolding of the G. W. Bush administration’s preemptive military doctrine.36
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However, Goodnight generally does not address how institutional
and organizational dynamics enable and constrain the influence of texts
such as the National Security Strategy within the intelligence bureaucracy.
There is an implicit assumption in Goodnight’s argument that strategic
doctrine, once articulated, can be rapidly, uniformly, and successfully diffused throughout the national security apparatus. Organizational discourse scholarship compels scholars to reconsider this assumption and
assess the relative influence of both people and texts. As we have seen in
controversy surrounding the release of declassified portions of the 2007
NIE concerning Iran’s nuclear weapons intentions and capabilities, institutional actors can and do present challenges to unfettered presidential
rhetoric. Additionally, Zegart notes that in 1999 then DCI George Tenet
issued a memorandum declaring war on al Qaeda and requiring all agencies to make fighting terrorism their top priority.37 By Zegart’s account,
Tenet’s memo was all but ignored by institutional members. Therefore, a
tension surrounding modernist rhetorical approaches to the study of national security is the impulse to cast the institution of intelligence as overly
coherent and controllable, thereby discounting its members’ abilities to resist and/or reshape elite rhetoric. In other words, this book departs from
traditional criticism of national security rhetoric by examining the “suasory” features of texts, as well as their actual circulation, reception, and
enactment among institutional audiences.
Moving closer to the perspective on rhetoric used in this book, Bryan
Taylor and his collaborators have focused on the overlapping spheres
of organizational and public communication produced in and around
the nation’s pre- and post-9/11 nuclear-weapons production complex.38
Taylor and colleagues argue that public deliberation concerning nuclear
weapons should ideally lead not only to the shaping of public opinion, but
should also influence official decision making. The authors’ approach to
the public sphere emphasizes the ethics and politics surrounding the framing of issues, the selection of speakers, and the interpretation of evidence
in controversies. In studying and critiquing the history of U.S. nuclear
weapons production, the authors reveal a public sphere “constricted and
degraded by technocratic domination.”39 Crucial here, the authors note,
are “institutional dynamics that function pragmatically to shape the terms
of discussion, the scope of actors’ involvement, the legitimacy of particular speakers and speech acts, the rate, sequence, and duration of decision
making, and the ways in which technical and nontechnical discourses are
articulated.”40 Rhetorical scholar Robert Ivie similarly demonstrates how
the rhetoric of national security elites is often developed in direct opposition to democratic ideals and practices.41 The fragility of democracy imagined by these speakers underlies their anxiety about the vulnerability of
democratic institutions to threats both foreign and domestic. Elites draw
on these threats to promote their policy objectives, which usually involve
the suppression of democratic deliberation (“demophobia”).
A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open Source Developments
49
In summary, intelligence and national security can be viewed as deeply
rhetorical phenomena. Contemporary cultural and critical theory establishes that language organizes meaningful configurations of material and
symbolic resources used by citizens and officials in their conceptualization and defense of core, cherished elements of their shared (imaginary)
national existence. In other words, statements about national security
phenomena influence how people act (both materially and symbolically)
toward those phenomena. “National security” also evokes relational practices as identities are constituted through the deployment of oppositionalyet-interdependent terms (e.g., self/other, native/foreigner, patriot/traitor,
and, in the case of open source—open/secret, U.S-person/non-U.S.-person,
institutional member/citizen, and decision maker/analyst).42 “National
security” is therefore not an objective, universal, or stable phenomenon
with fixed assumptions or expressions; rather, “national security” serves
as a site of discursive struggle over the meanings and consequences of ambiguous events.43 Both the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2003 Iraq WMD
intelligence failure created situations in which key symbolic elements of
traditional “national security” and “intelligence” became—at least partly
and temporarily—unstable. This instability created the conditions for the
rise of open source that were unavailable during the reform attempts of
the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, rhetoric, as the term is used here, directs our attention to interconnecting cultural and organizational codes, stories, and
scripts that organize and reproduce values, attitudes, and beliefs about intelligence, national security, and democracy.
SUMMARY
Scholars traditionally depict the institution of intelligence as built
upon the strictures of secrecy and a preference for classified information.44 Neo-institutional theory encourages scholars to examine the extent to which members’ adherence to these strictures and preferences is
the result of calculated reflection, the forces of inertia, or simply the inability to conceive of alternatives.45 A neo-institutional perspective also
asks to what extent the institutionalization of open source serves as a “rational myth” to bolster the legitimacy of U.S. intelligence in the wake of
failures related to 9/11 and Iraq. Whether or not new open source organizational structures serve this purpose, open source advocates have performed institutional work to establish, maintain, and/or advance open
source’s legitimacy.
Scholars and commentators interested in open source phenomena have
largely overlooked these dynamics, preferring to focus instead on open
source as an input within the intelligence cycle. Such a perspective is unable to account for the ways stakeholders construct preferred meanings
of open source in order to promote or impede competing visions of reform. In other words, my investigation of open source follows studies
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of government reform that are concerned “less about how things are
done than about how things are to be thought of, a much more potent
prospect.”46 This perspective focuses attention on how the practice of intelligence variously reflects the pursuit of rational interests, the exercise of
conscious choice, or conventions, routines, and habits.
One objective of this research is to determine whether various open
source stakeholders “feed from the same discursive sources.”47 Do open
source stakeholders use the same codes, stories, and scripts to advance
their interests? This is important to assess because open source discourse
at operational levels within some organizations appears to differ significantly from its official representation within U.S. intelligence community strategy documents. In other words, within the upper echelons of
the U.S. intelligence community, open source discourse appears relatively
consistent, yet contested. Within and across operational levels of some
homeland security organizations, by contrast, open source discourse appears relatively inconsistent, yet still contested. Thus, the overall system
of statements that forms open source objects, concepts, roles, and the relationships among these may vary in terms of their meaningful, rule-like,
and constitutive qualities. This is partially a result of the specific organizational context in which a system of statements circulates. The case
studies in this book are thus presented in a sequence that illustrates the
diminishing strength of open source discourse across three interrelated
contexts. As a result, chapters 4 and 5 emphasize processes of institutional discourse, while chapters 6 and 7 move toward discussions of open
source within the realm of citizenship. The appearance of incongruity
among the case studies, however, usefully illustrates the benefits of a discursive perspective on institutional change: it underscores how communication produces the qualities of standardization and coherence across
internal/public spheres that are often required for successful institutional
transformation.
INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE: AN ILLUSTRATION
Having brought the concepts of institutions, organizational discourse,
and national security rhetoric together, I briefly illustrate the benefits of
this perspective. Organizational theory suggests that open source is more
likely to be institutionalized if it is propagated via a combination of political, technical, and cultural work.48 Perkmann and Spicer argue that “institutional change is not brought about by design but emerges as the result
of the collective yet uncoordinated actions of distributed actors.”49 Institutionalization occurs when actors consistently reproduce preferred beliefs and practices in settings removed from the control of the institutional
entrepreneurs who originally articulated those beliefs and practices.50
However, viewing institutionalization as a largely uncoordinated activity
risks underestimating the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to amplify
A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open Source Developments
51
discourse-centered forms of institutional work within a tight time frame
in order to achieve their objectives.
Specifically, in 2005, open source advocates faced the formidable challenge of rapidly increasing awareness, appreciation, and use of open
source within an historically insular and secretive institution. As one official remarked, “[The ADDNI/OS] was told, ‘Go out and make open
source something important.’ There wasn’t a whole lot of vision in terms
of what [senior DNI officials] wanted to do with open source. . . . [The
ADDNI/OS] was pretty much left to his own devices to figure out what
he was going to do. There was no explicit, ‘Here are your marching orders.
Go out and do this.’ ”51 Given the absence of a roadmap for open source’s
institutionalization, one way officials amplified their efforts was through
the strategic use of genre. Specifically, in the case of open source, the genre
of annual conference served a critical role. Organizational scholars Nelson Phillips, Thomas Lawrence, and Cynthia Hardy argue that “texts that
take the form of genres, which are recognizable, interpretable, and usable
in other organizations, are more likely to become embedded in discourse
than texts that do not.”52 Genres are defined here as “recognized types
of communication characterized by particular conventions invoked in response to a recurrent set of circumstances, such as letters, memos, meetings, training seminars, resumes, and announcements.”53 According to
Phillips and colleagues, texts associated with relevant and recognizable
genres are more likely to be incorporated into institutional members’ own
actions, texts, and discourses. To be effective, a genre must be appropriate
to an institutional setting.
Conferences and genre interrelate on two levels. First, conferences enable institutional entrepreneurs to write and disseminate texts with various characteristics, thereby increasing the likelihood that at least some of
those texts will be relevant, recognizable, and consumed by participants
gathered at the conference. At the DNI Open Source conferences in 2007
and 2008, such texts included brochures; copies of Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 301, which established the ADDNI/OS; information
packets; panel presentations; websites; blogs; multimedia presentations;
vendor promotional materials; training sessions; and transcripts. The distribution of these texts accompanied the ceremonial and symbolic functions of the conferences. Second, the conference form itself constitutes a
genre of organizational communication within the U.S. intelligence community. For example, then DDNI/A Fingar stated during his speech at the
2007 DNI Open Source Conference, “We hold a lot of conferences. . . . We
do hundreds of conferences, thousands of outside experts every year. Admonition at every one of these that I attend is, make sure that the connections live on after the session. Exchange email addresses. Exchange phone
numbers. Be in contact. Give as well as receive.”54
The organizing principle of the inaugural 2007 DNI Open Source Conference was the legitimation of open source, which involved the articulation
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and embedding of preferred meanings of open source throughout the intelligence and homeland security sectors.55 The requirement of the conference reflected the need for the U.S. intelligence community to publicly
demonstrate adequate response to legislation and directives calling for
the increased and effective use of open source. The stylistic characteristics of the conference included the regional site location, high-tech venue,
theatrical lighting, audiovisual effects, vivid presentations, speeches
given by institutional celebrities, interactive training sessions, eyepopping vendor booths, promotional materials, and demonstrations—all
of which created a spectacle that reinforced the authority, credibility, and
legitimacy of the ADDNI/OS and his preferred vision of open source.
Between featured speakers, for example, a PowerPoint presentation displayed on the large overhead screen scrolled through slides alternating
between official photos of the speakers and quotations concerning the
value of open source.
The 2007 and 2008 DNI Open Source conferences demonstrate how conferences can both signal the emergence of a new institution, as well as advance that institution to a sturdier position within an organizational field.
Of course, not every conference (inaugural or otherwise) marks the emergence of a new institution or successfully ensures its viability. Moreover,
conferences in mature fields can certainly facilitate the creation of new
institutional arrangements. However, the relevant question here is how
conferences, as a genre of organizational communication, have shaped
the institutionalization of open source within the U.S. intelligence community. My argument is that conferences are uniquely suited for amplifying discourse-centered forms of institutional work in that they allow
actors to efficiently perform—simultaneously and within a tight time
frame—nearly all nine types of institutional work identified by organizational theorists, thereby encouraging the rapid diffusion of new values,
attitudes, beliefs, and practices. I indicate in the following how institutional work was performed during the 2007 and 2008 DNI Open Source
conferences.
Open Source Political Work
Political work—advocating, defining, and vesting—was prominent
during the conferences. Advocacy involves the mobilization of political
support, agenda setting, and lobbying for resources through deliberate
and persuasive messages. It is not surprising, then, that the conferences
were open to the media, as this helped facilitate the dissemination of key
messages to influential audiences. In order to spur the reallocation of institutional resources in 2007, ADDNI/OS Jardines asserted, “It is time for
open source to be the source of first resort, and that time is now.”56 Other
speakers during the conferences echoed Jardines’s advocacy and sense of
A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open Source Developments
53
urgency. For example, referencing the U.S. intelligence community’s Vision 2015 document, the ADDNI/OS in 2008, Dan Butler, stated, “No aspect of collection requires greater consideration or holds more promise
than open source information. Transformation of our approach to open
sources is critical to the future success of adaptive collection.”57 Here, Butler illustrated the official strategy of relying on authoritative institutional
documents to justify new structures, funding, and practices. However,
then DDNI/A Fingar stated, “For me, the use of open source is not one of
those things that the WMD Commission or IRTPA or others told us to do.
It’s not in the nice-to-do category. It’s absolutely essential.”58 Interestingly,
Fingar’s advocacy of open source simultaneously acknowledged and diminished the importance of official documents. In other words, Fingar’s
statement revealed his assumption that official texts are, in fact, generally
critical for reform, yet insufficient for generating adequate commitment to
new open source practices.
While open source advocacy was prominent during the conferences, it
was certainly not confined to that setting: officials have incorporated advocacy as a permanent function of the OSC. For example, the director of
the CIA commented in 2008, “The Open Source Center was designed to
be a production line in terms of creation of knowledge of use to American policymakers. But it was also designed to be an advocate, a spokesperson, a facilitator for the open source enterprise, for the open source
discipline beyond the fence line, beyond the confines of the Open Source
Center itself.”59
In contrast to advocacy, definitional work involves “constructing rule
systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of membership or
create status hierarchies within a field.”60 In 2007, then DDNI/A Fingar attempted to define the parameters of open source: “[Open source]’s more,
though, than going out and Googling the Internet. It’s a lot more than digesting what dribbles into an electronic inbox because of a profile that has
been set up to capture information on a particular range of subjects. It’s a
lot more than checking a Wiki entry.”61 Fingar defined open source as involving sophisticated data collection and analysis tools and outreach to
experts beyond the confines of the intelligence community. In attempting
to define open source, then DDNI/C Mary Margaret Graham recounted
a meeting she attended during which officials crafted the organizational
structure of the newly formed ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence). Graham stated, “And we had quite a discussion about where
we should site it (open source) in the DNI. And at the end of the day, for
me, the most persuasive argument was that at its essence, [open source]
is a discipline of collection.”62 Graham, however, acknowledged ongoing
debates when she stated the following: “Some of my colleagues in the
open source world, I know, don’t agree with my characterization. . . . To
me, open source—and maybe my view is a product of where I grew up
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[in the secret intelligence arena]. . . . For me, open source is not an INT,
but is, more importantly, an enabler of intelligence.”63 Graham’s position
allowed her to define open source in ways that maintained its inferior
status compared to other INTs (e.g., signals intelligence or human intelligence). This definitional move has created considerable problems for open
source’s institutionalization in that insufficient material resources appear
to have been dedicated to its diffusion within the Department of Defense
(DoD) and DHS. For example, a senior DoD official stated, “I would be
remiss today if I told you that everything is working well, because it is
not. We still face a number of challenges in the open source arena, not the
least of which is moving open source out of the closet as an afterthought
and making it an integral ‘INT’ discipline. . . . I ask all of you this morning, is open source a standalone discipline or not? Are we treating it as a
source of first resort or are we still turning to, and more importantly, funding other INTs first before investing in open source?”64 Another official
further stated, “While open source is not a new discipline within defense,
our biggest challenge is defining the programmatic structure to make it
coequal with the other collection disciplines, intelligence disciplines.”65
Still another stakeholder interviewed for this study observed, “Every discipline has its own patron agency except for [open source].”66 Although
the conferences did not resolve debates surrounding the disciplinary status of open source, they allowed DNI officials to assert a preferred definition and advocate for its widespread adoption.
In contrast to defining, vesting involves the creation of rule structures
that confer property rights. The size of an agency’s budget is often interpreted by institutional members as a concrete sign of that agency’s prowess. A DNI official stated during the 2007 conference that it was a result of
“vast funding” that “we have formal recognition” of open source.67 Additionally, ADDNI/OS Butler stated in 2008, “In 2007, I would say if you had
to capture in one word what we started to do it would be invest.”68 Material support thus functions symbolically to put open source on equal footing with other types of intelligence collection and analysis. In response to
one participant’s question concerning how equal footing for open source
would be achieved within the CIA, then Director Hayden stated, “It’s a
challenge, you know, truth in lending among friends, these are not easy
budget decisions.”69
Open Source Technical Work
Technical work—mimicry, theorizing, and educating—were also prevalent during both conferences. Mimicry involves leveraging existing assumptions, practices, and rules to support the adoption of new forms
and practices. The OSC’s products are provided on classified intelligence
networks and apparently mimic traditional classified resources in their
A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open Source Developments
55
presentation. Then DDNI/C Graham stated during her 2007 speech, “The
perfect world is when . . . open source data resides on the same space at
the same time [as secret information], with the information protected on
both sides of that line, so that [analysts] can look at the classified information and the open source information at the same time.”70 Additionally,
the Open Source 101 and Accessing Open Sources training sessions offered to conference participants mimicked the intelligence community’s
well-established Analysis 101 program. In mimicking secret intelligence,
however, open source is less able to preserve those attributes that make
it open. As CIA director Hayden stated, “One irony of working the open
source side of the intelligence business, not unlike every other part of the
intelligence business, is that the better we do, the less we can talk about
it.”71 Nevertheless, for most stakeholders, open source’s mimicry of secret
intelligence is desirable in that it facilitates institutionalization.
Theorization involves naming “new concepts and practices so that they
might become a part of the cognitive map of the field.”72 Officials attempted
to define open source concepts under the monikers of “source of first resort,” “open source discipline,” “decision advantage,” and others.73 Educating, by contrast, involves conveying to members a set of institutional
skills and knowledge. During the conferences, the Open Source 101 and
Accessing Open Sources training sessions served this purpose. The conferences’ emphasis on mimicry and educating is unsurprising in light of
the finding that “creating institutions through work that changes abstract
categories of meaning (i.e., mimicry, theorizing and educating) . . . hold[s]
the greatest potential for institutional entrepreneurship on the part of relatively small, peripheral, or isolated actors.”74 Indeed, in 2010, ADDNI/OS
Butler announced that his office would begin implementing a certification
program for open source practitioners. Butler said, “We want to be able to
certify a subset of the intelligence community as true open-source intelligence professionals.”75
Open Source Cultural Work
Conference participants’ communication often focused on identities, associations, and networks—in other words, “the roles, values, and
norms that underpin institutions.”76 Constructing identities involves describing the relationship between actor and field. For example, one official stated, “Look all around you because you are making history. . . . This
is our community, our open source community, and you are part of that
community, and the experts who are sitting in this audience, you, too,
those that reside outside the traditional intelligence community, you, too,
are part of our community.”77 Changing normative associations involves
“re-making the connections between sets of practices and the moral and
cultural foundations of those practices,” while constructing normative
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networks involves building “interorganizational connections through
which practices become normatively sanctioned.”78 Conference sessions,
including Media as the Open Source, Academic Outreach, Private Sector Partnerships, International Partnerships, and Outreach to State, Local,
and Tribal Partners, focused on creating new associations and interconnections between institutional insiders and outsiders. The endorsement
of key institutional leaders also supported normative changes. For example, CIA director Hayden declared, “In fact, we saw the establishment
of this center, the Open Source Center, as one of the three most important
objectives of the ODNI in its first year.”79 Officials also claimed that the
president was regularly receiving intelligence branded with the OSC’s
logo, as well as that 15,000 federal, state, and local officials and policy
makers regularly used opensource.gov.80
In summary, the DNI Open Source conferences (especially the inaugural conference) served as a genre of organizational communication that
enabled officials to perform the types of discourse-centered institutional
work needed to create a new institution. These forms of work do not, of
course, ensure that the institutionalization of open source will be adequate
or endure. One stakeholder made the following comment:
I think Doug Naquin [director of the OSC] has done the most that he can, in the
sense that he has put people down range in these organizations; he has made sure
that he is gathering as much information as he can in a usable fashion. I don’t
think that Doug is the problem here. The problem here lies outside of Doug in the
sense that Doug needs top cover for [open source’s institutionalization], which
means that you need to have a DNI who fundamentally acknowledges that in analytical transformation, and collection transformation, that open source is not just
an INT, but in a way, it is the place to start.81
The hypothesis that conferences serve as a genre of organizational communication that facilitates institutionalization would appear to be supported if DNI officials no longer host conferences once they determine that
a sufficient level of institutionalization has been achieved. As one stakeholder observed, “You can only put [open source] ‘information sharing’
into everybody’s heads so many times. I think, for the most part, people
‘get’ open source. I mean, they will by now, and if they are not getting it,
that’s on them.”82 Indeed, there has not been a DNI Open Source Conference since 2008, indicating that perhaps the two conferences fulfilled their
institutionalization objectives.
Finally, this illustration underscores that institutionalization occurs
not primarily through action ( behavior not widely written or talked
about), but through the production, circulation, and consumption of talk
and text that describe and communicate those actions.83 A discoursecentered perspective on open source focuses attention on the takenfor-granted assumptions that undergird the concept of intelligence, the
A Discourse-Centered Perspective on Open Source Developments
57
ways stakeholders attempt to maintain or transform those assumptions,
and the persuasive arguments, stories, and images designed to achieve
strategic objectives. The next chapter provides an expanded and more
detailed example of this process and how it underlies the reshaping of
intelligence.
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CHAPTER 4
“The Source of First Resort”:
The Intelligence Community
I work for the CIA. I am not a spy. I just read books!
—Joe Turner in Three Days of the Condor
In the 1975 film Three Days of the Condor, Robert Redford plays the role
of CIA open source analyst Joe Turner (code name “Condor”), who inadvertently uncovers—through publicly available sources—a rogue CIA
operation designed to ensure U.S. control of Middle Eastern oil fields.1
Turner’s job is to analyze foreign books, newspapers, and journals to develop insights for his CIA bosses. A few days after filing a particularly
intriguing report with CIA headquarters, Turner returns to his New York
City office to find that his colleagues have all been murdered. The film
centers on Turner’s quest to solve the mystery while avoiding being killed
by CIA operatives who are involved in the plot. During one scene, CIA
mandarins question Turner’s handler (“Higgins”) about him during a
meeting at headquarters:
CIA official:
“This Condor isn’t the man his file says he is.” [Another official
asks] “So where did he learn evasive moves?”
Higgins:
“He reads.”
CIA official:
“What the hell does that mean?”
Higgins:
“It means, Sir, that he reads everything.”
Turner is an unlikely hero who uses open sources and his superior reasoning and creativity to uncover—and later foil—a CIA conspiracy. Decades later, far from Hollywood, a handful of officials, policy makers, and
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corporate executives have endeavored to craft a rather different depiction
of the ideal open source practitioner. This practitioner is an intelligence
agency analyst, contractor, or even an ordinary citizen who uses open
sources and overcomes bureaucratic obstacles to help thwart defined external threats to U.S. national security. How this depiction of the ideal open
source practitioner is produced and disseminated, and why it matters for
the reshaping of U.S. intelligence, is the focus of this chapter.
In the years following 9/11, the U.S. Senate and Congress’s Joint Inquiry (2002), the 9/11 Commission (2004), and the WMD Commission
(2005) all concluded that the intelligence community needed to increase
its collection and analysis of open source information in order to improve national security planning and decision making. As a result, the
ADDNI/OS and a handful of officials, policy makers, and executives
have subsequently attempted to make open source “the source of first
resort.”2 Using the theoretical perspective developed in chapter 3, this
chapter analyzes the open source discourse circulating within the U.S.
intelligence community in order to investigate the connection between
that discourse and the institutionalization of open source. Institutionalization involves conflict over the words, or vocabularies, that stakeholders use to describe open source, the underlying logics that give rise
to those words, and overarching ideas about how institutional change
should unfold. At root, this conflict occurs because officials define open
source in ways that attempt to simultaneously hold the ideals of secrecy
and openness in tension.
To better understand the implications of this tension, I explain in this
chapter how officials author, circulate, and invoke documents in order to
establish the legitimacy of open source across the U.S. intelligence community. I assess how these documents are intended to reproduce or transform certain beliefs, practices, and the identities of institutional members.
I elaborate the competing logics of open source, and I describe how a
dominant, institutional logic of open source has thus far been constructed
using the neoliberal language of enterprise. Framing intelligence as a business enterprise hinders alternative paths to open source’s development
that may better respond to the idealized principles of a democratic society.
Understanding the reasons for this situation first requires examining the
competing logics of open source.
THE LOGICS OF OPEN SOURCE
Within open source discourse, stakeholders hold two conflicting logics in tension.3 The first logic relates to secrecy, while the second logic
relates to openness. This finding is unsurprising given that, etymologically, the term “open source intelligence” literally fuses together openness
and secrecy to the extent that intelligence is synonymous with secrets. By
the logic of secrecy, I refer to the assumption that governments must hide
“The Source of First Resort”: The Intelligence Community
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some information from other governments (and citizens) if they are to
adequately conduct affairs of state. Commentators’ assertions that open
source can provide decision advantage for policy makers evokes this logic
of secrecy. This logic maintains that intelligence is in no way a public good
because secrecy is, in fact, what makes intelligence a special category of
information. As intelligence scholar and former CIA official Mark Lowenthal states, “Secrecy does make intelligence unique. That others would
keep important information from you, that you need certain types of information and wish to keep your needs secret, and that you have the means
to obtain information that you also wish to keep secret are major reasons
for having intelligence agencies.”4
Open source stakeholders who agree with these premises, however,
rarely acknowledge (at least publicly) how secrecy sustains difference
and hierarchy among national security stakeholders in ways that are contrary to democratic ideals. For example, economist Joseph Stiglitz argues
that “secrecy is corrosive: it is antithetical to democratic values, and it undermines democratic processes. It is based on a mistrust between those
governing and those governed; and at the same time, it exacerbates that
mistrust.”5 Possession of intelligence reinforces the image of the possessor
as elite, knowledgeable, and advantaged. It is therefore natural that national security strategizing and decision making be confined to this group
of actors. To ensure these privileges, the production, dissemination, and
revelation of intelligence must be tightly policed.
The logic of openness, by contrast, assumes that governance is improved by the free flow of information among policy makers, officials, and
citizens. As President Barack Obama stated, “Openness means more than
simply informing the American people about how decisions are made. It
means recognizing that government does not have all the answers, and
that public officials need to draw on what citizens know.”6 The logic of
openness evokes images of transparency, accountability, exchange, and
trust. Thus, “open source” may not generate the same allure among intelligence professionals as “classified information” because open source
is symbolically tainted by its association with open, free, or public materials. Intelligence analysts have historically discounted the inaccurate or
unsubstantiated reporting thought to characterize the great bulk of open
source information.7 In the post-9/11 era, however, officials and commentators often liken this material to a vast “goldmine” filled with potential
“nuggets” of intelligence.8 Officials readily acknowledge, though, that the
symbolic dimensions of open source are a primary obstacle to its institutionalization within the U.S. intelligence community. For example, in a January 10, 2006, interview with David Martin of CBS News, then ADDNI/
OS Jardines stated, “One of the challenges that I have is to change the culture to value open sources more.” Martin replied, “So the old attitude [is]:
If it wasn’t stolen, how can it be valuable?” Jardines retorted, “Correct.
That’s very much the old attitude”9
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CHANGING AN “OLD ATTITUDE”
In order to change the intelligence community’s organizational culture
to value open sources, Jardines organized the inaugural DNI Open Source
Conference in 2007. During his remarks at the 2007 conference, Jardines
underscored the need for a new attitude: “Let’s keep in mind that we in
the intelligence community take pride in knowing things or having the
ability to know things that others don’t, and so there’s just the natural tendency that if the document’s got a fancy cover sheet that says Top Secret
and all sorts of fancy code words on it, that we tend to view that as more
important than, say, something that’s taken just from open sources.”10 Another stakeholder interviewed for this project asserted the following:
The biggest barrier to open source [its institutionalization] is the closed source
intelligence community. The closed source intelligence community is very jealous of its prerogatives. It’s very jealous of its financial or budgetary resources,
and over the years it . . . has interfered with the full and complete development of
open source capabilities. I say that having worked for the CIA. . . . I don’t have a
problem with the secret side, but I will tell you that there is no question that the
secret side has interfered with the development of a full and complete open source
capability.
Holding competing logics of secrecy and openness in tension is challenging for intelligence officials: as an institution, U.S. intelligence and
national security require the production of secrets—intelligence—to preserve its privileged status and authority. Open source, however, evokes
egalitarian ideals that potentially undermine that status and authority.
Officials have attempted to address this paradox by asserting that for
open source information to become intelligence, the information in question must be formally vetted by an intelligence analyst. ICD (Intelligence
Community Directive) 301 states specifically that “open source information” is “publicly available information that anyone can lawfully obtain
by request, purchase, or observation.”11 “Open source intelligence,” by
contrast, is defined as being “produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to
an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement.”12 Here, the producer of intelligence is presumably
an analyst (either an agency employee or contractor) who is both aware
of a “specific intelligence requirement” and able to communicate with an
“appropriate audience” (i.e., policy makers or decision makers). However,
this symbolic transformation of information into intelligence is not without irony. As one senior defense official explained, “Analysts sometimes
act as though I can’t read the New York Times.”13 This official meant to underscore how widespread access to open source information complicates
the relationship between intelligence analysts and policy makers. As one
insider commented, “[Intelligence analysts] look upon their world as one
“The Source of First Resort”: The Intelligence Community
63
of secrets and classification. And that’s fine. They should. But they don’t
know what the hell is in the outside world, or they have a bare grasp on
it. . . . Policymakers do not listen [to analysts] because they believe that
they can get more information on their own—correctly or incorrectly. So,
everybody has become their own analyst.”14
Open source discourse thus serves as a site of struggle over the meaning
of intelligence. This struggle occurs at a textual level, where stakeholders compete to author official documents that advance preferred concepts
that constitute open source as a specific type of intelligence. For example,
Simmons included the following language in the 2006 Defense Authorization Act:
(1) Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence that is produced from publicly
available information collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner
to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence
requirement. (2) With the Information Revolution, the amount, significance, and
accessibility of open-source information has exploded, but the Intelligence Community has not expanded its exploitation efforts and systems to produce opensource intelligence. (3) The production of open-source intelligence is a valuable
intelligence discipline that must be integrated in the intelligence cycle to ensure
that United States policymakers are fully and completely informed. (4) The dissemination and use of validated open-source intelligence inherently enables information sharing as it is produced without the use of sensitive sources and methods.
Open-source intelligence products can be shared with the American public and
foreign allies because of its unclassified nature.15
A slightly different meaning of open source is apparent in a NATO definition, authored by Steele and published in 2001: “Open Source Intelligence, or OSINT, is unclassified information that has been deliberately
discovered, discriminated, distilled, and disseminated to a select audience
in order to address a specific question. It provides a very robust foundation for other intelligence disciplines. When applied in a systematic fashion, OSINT products can reduce the demands on classified intelligence
collection resources by limiting requests for information only to those
questions that cannot be answered by open sources.”16 NATO and Steele
define open source, not as an intelligence discipline in its own right, but
as a foundation for other disciplines such as imagery intelligence (IMINT),
signals intelligence (SIGINT), or human intelligence (HUMINT). In Congress’s definition, open source achieves the status of an intelligence discipline, yet is undifferentiated from the others. Whereas Congress states
that open source products can be shared with the American public, NATO
makes no such assertion. As will be illustrated in the following, ambiguity
surrounding the legitimacy of open source as a specific type of intelligence
creates problems for its institutionalization. Legitimate intelligence disciplines are worthy of special attention and funding. Open source, however,
is an ambiguous symbol, constructed from competing logics of secrecy
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and openness, whose meanings and uses are struggled over by government officials, policy makers, executives, scholars, and the public.
Those who construct open source primarily in accordance with the logic
of secrecy tend to emphasize the need to protect the sources and methods
of intelligence, as well as the interests of intelligence agencies. For example, then CIA director Hayden stated during the 2008 DNI Open Source
Conference, “We are often addressing requirements or questions that are
sensitive by nature. The information is unclassified. Our interest in it is
not.”17 Nevertheless, the countervailing logic of openness maintains that
organizations and individuals outside the formal boundaries of the U.S.
intelligence community can, do, and should make contributions—albeit
indirectly—to national security. For example, ADDNI/OS Jardines declared during the 2007 DNI Open Source Conference, “We must come
to terms with the fact that the font of human knowledge resides largely
outside the intelligence community and [is] available principally through
open sources.”18 This logic permitted the conference organizers to invite
participants from commercial, nonprofit, academic, and media sectors to
contribute to the discussion.
Post-9/11 open source discourse is therefore characterized by a break
from an institutional logic that has traditionally maintained secrecy as “an
absolute way of life” within intelligence agencies.19 Nevertheless, official
open source discourse still privileges the logic of secrecy—a logic that undergirds the U.S. intelligence community’s coherence and exceptionalism.
Privileging the logic of secrecy, while simultaneously declaring the desirability of openness, manifests itself in a number of blatant and subtle
contradictions within open source discourse. As one open source stakeholder explained, “[The 2008 DNI Open Source Conference] is a bit peculiar because the leaders of the government open source enterprise do
not otherwise have much use for public input or participation. In other
words, there was something anomalous about the conference. I can go
to the conference, but I cannot easily get most open source products.”20
These contradictions are richly evident at the level of open source policy
documents.
OPEN SOURCE LOGICS AND POLICY
For decades, commentators and the authors of official reports have asserted that open source should be treated as an equal contributor to national security in comparison to traditional, secret intelligence disciplines
such IMINT or HUMINT. The widespread and sustained attention to contemporary open source reforms, however, can be traced to three investigatory commissions. Two of these commissions—the Joint Inquiry (2002)
and the 9/11 Commission (2002–2004)—were created in the aftermath of
9/11, while the third—the WMD Commission (2004 –2005)—was established in response to the 2003 Iraq WMD intelligence failure. In analyzing
“The Source of First Resort”: The Intelligence Community
65
the connections among the final reports of these commissions, as well as
the speech and writing of open source stakeholders more broadly, we are
able to track how stakeholders have attempted to establish open source as
a distinct and legitimate form of intelligence in order to spur its institutionalization within the U.S. intelligence community.
Specifically, following the 9/11 catastrophe, the Joint Inquiry of the
House and Senate Intelligence Committees issued its Report (2002). In the
“Additional Views” section of the Report, Senator Mike Dewine (R-OH)
stated, “The Intelligence Community needs to pay more attention to the
collection and analysis of open-source information. This type of information needs to be examined and needs to be taken more seriously. We must
remember that open-source information was used to warn investigators
in 1999 that al-Qaeda terrorists might fly a hijacked airliner into American
buildings.”21 Dewine continued, “The Intelligence Community is simply
not accustomed to assessing the value of open sources nor is it used to
integrating them into their work. In fact, the Intelligence Community is
more inclined to use open-source material as a last resort, not as a primary
source, no matter how compelling the information. This attitude needs to
change.”22
The 9/11 Commission’s Final Report issued in 2004 echoed many of the
Joint Inquiry’s conclusions. Significantly, however, the Final Report contained a chart depicting a proposed reorganization of the U.S. intelligence
community. This chart contained a reference to an “Open Source Agency”
residing outside the CIA yet reporting to the CIA director.23 A copy of this
chart is provided in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1:
Open Source Agency referenced in the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report
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A 9/11 Commission staff member involved in the writing of the Final
Report claims to not recall where the recommendation for an Open Source
Agency originated.24 However, a stakeholder familiar with the 9/11
Commission claims that Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton was responsible
for raising the idea among the commissioners and securing their support
for the recommendation.25 The 9/11 Commission’s unattributed and unelaborated reference to an Open Source Agency has subsequently been
used by open source stakeholders to assert the legitimacy of open source
initiatives and to justify new organizational structures, leadership, and
funding. For example, in welcoming participants to the 2007 DNI Open
Source Conference, one DNI official declared, “With the recognition of
open source in the 9/11 report and the WMD report, with the creation
of the position of Assistant Deputy Director for National Intelligence of
Open Source . . . we have formal recognition of the importance of open
source.”26
Management scholars have argued that institutionalization is predicated
on practices of textual production, dissemination, and consumption; from
this perspective, the influence of the 9/11 Commission’s fleeting reference
to an Open Source Agency is nonetheless profound.27 Only documents
that endure and leave traces of their influence in other settings are relevant
to institutionalization.28 In other words, “texts must be distributed and interpreted by other actors if they are to have organizing properties and the
potential to affect discourse.”29 The principal way the open source–related
recommendations of the Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission were distributed and interpreted by institutional members was by their codification
into law as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004. IRTPA was based extensively on the findings of the two inquiries.
Section 1052 of IRTPA states the following:
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—(1) the Director of
National Intelligence should establish an intelligence center for the purpose of coordinating the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of open-source
intelligence to elements of the intelligence community; (2) open-source intelligence is a valuable source that must be integrated into the intelligence cycle to
ensure that United States policymakers are fully and completely informed; and
(3) the intelligence center should ensure that each element of the intelligence community uses open-source intelligence consistent with the mission of such element. . . .
The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the intelligence community makes efficient and effective use of open-source information and analysis.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than June 30, 2005, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
decision of the Director as to whether an open-source intelligence center will be established. If the Director decides not to establish an open-source intelligence center, such report shall also contain a description of how the intelligence community
will use open-source intelligence and effectively integrate open-source intelligence
into the national intelligence cycle.30
“The Source of First Resort”: The Intelligence Community
67
While new laws such as this provide stakeholders a powerful resource
for affecting change, other texts may be even more consequential. For example, the WMD Commission’s Report to the President in 2005 appears to
have influenced the shape of open source reforms even more than IRTPA.
Specifically, the WMD Commission’s Report to the President stated the
following:
Open Source information has long been viewed by many outside the Intelligence
Community as essential to understanding foreign political, economic, social, and
even military developments. . . . The Community does not have any broader program [other than the Foreign Broadcast Information Service] to gather and organize
the wealth of global information generated each day and increasingly available, if
only temporarily, over the Internet. We also believe that the need for exploiting
open source material is greater now than ever before. Today, the spread of information technology—and the ever increasing pace at which it advances—is immune to many traditional, clandestine methods of intelligence collection. Whereas
advanced technological research once occurred only in large facilities and within
enormous government bureaucratic institutions, today it can (and does) occur in
nondescript office parks or garages, and with very small clusters of people.31
After assessing the lack of institutional support for open source, the Report to the President’s authors concluded, “We therefore recommend the
creation of an Open Source Directorate at the CIA.”32 The WMD Commission was staffed by institutional insiders who have dominated the U.S.
national security establishment since the Cold War—elites including John
McCain, Walter Slocombe, and Admiral William O. Studeman. Significantly, the words “Intelligence Professional” were written before many of
the biographies of WMD Commission staff members listed on the commission’s website. Designation as an “Intelligence Professional” potentially signaled to other national security elites that the WMD Commission
abided by traditional institutional norms and values—one being the logic
of secrecy. It is unsurprising, then, that the WMD Commission recommended the establishment of an Open Source Center within the CIA (which
occurred on November 8, 2005). This recommendation contradicted the
9/11 Commission’s call for an Open Source Agency residing outside the
CIA (IRTPA did not indicate where an “open-source intelligence center”
should be established). Although the majority of the 9/11 commissioners
were clearly long-time Beltway insiders, staff members had fewer public
markers of their institutional status. Thus, while the Bush administration
endorsed and implemented nearly all 74 recommendations of the WMD
Commission, only half of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations had
been enacted by 2007—a true measure of relative textual effectiveness.33
The lack of open congressional or public debate concerning where to situate an open source agency underscores the dominance of the institutional
logic of secrecy vis-à-vis open source. The decision to establish the Open
Source Center within the CIA appears to have been based not only on
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maintaining continuity with the agency’s existing FBIS, but also on the
taken-for-granted premise that persistent institutional secrecy is both necessary and desirable—even for managing an ostensibly public, sharable,
and unclassified resource.
Because the final reports of these investigatory commissions do not
stand in isolation from earlier documents and wider discussions and
debates about open source, it is useful to briefly compare their findings
with Steele’s writings. As mentioned in chapter 2, from the early 1990s
until the establishment of the ADDNI/OS in 2005, Steele’s vision of open
source dominated the discourse. Specifically, throughout the 1990s and
early 2000s, Steele’s ideas concerning open source were promoted during
annual conferences he hosted in northern Virginia and elsewhere. These
conferences brought hundreds of open source stakeholders from government, industry, academe, and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]
together each year to discuss the meanings, uses, and benefits of open
source, as well as obstacles to its institutionalization within the U.S. intelligence community. During Steele’s open source conference in 2005, journalist Kent Bye summarized Steele’s vision of open source:
Steele is advocating for a system that he calls ‘Open Source Information System—
External’ (OSIS-X) that would have educational institutions, NGOs, other governments and possibly even US citizens (i.e. bloggers and citizen journalists) contributing information to this network. He envisions forming symbiotic relationships
with these groups making access to this OSIS-X publicly available to the academic
institutions and NGOs—and potentially to anyone via the Internet.34
After being appointed ADDNI/OS in 2005, Jardines gave a speech at
Steele’s annual conference and arranged for dozens of intelligence community members to attend. Jardines was initially interested in leveraging Steele’s conference, finding it complementary to his own efforts to
institutionalize open source. However, it soon became clear that Jardines
and Steele held differing assumptions about which logic—openness or
secrecy—ought to guide open source’s development. Eventually the relationship soured between the two men. For example, in an April 16, 2006,
interview with Military Review, Steele made these comments:
Young Mr. Jardines, a former Sergeant now working on his PhD, is the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source (ADDNI/OS).
He has no program authority, no money, and no staff. While I am the virtual
‘hub’ for 25,000 truly professional individuals worldwide, I am in the same position as Jardines: no program authority, no money, and no staff. While I have
the web site and the conference, and the nuclear powered rolodex in this area,
what is missing is a serious commitment from the US Government to create a
globally-relevant Open Source Agency and a truly global version of the Open
Source Information System (OSIS) which is NOT part of the . . . Open Source
Center at CIA.35
“The Source of First Resort”: The Intelligence Community
69
Steele is not alone in calling for an Open Source Agency to be established outside the CIA. Simmons advocated for such an agency during
the 2007 and 2008 DNI Open Source conferences.36 Additionally, in February 2009, Ron Marks, intelligence commentator and senior vice president
for Oxford Analytica, Inc. (a prominent open source firm), circulated an
op-ed, “Twittering Intelligence,” to members of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE). Marks wrote, “The gathering, provision and analyzing of our new world of total information may need to
be moved outside the intelligence community. . . . This could even mean
setting up a separate agency based on the Open Source Center to deal with
the new information world. . . . An intelligence community wedded to a
classified past and encumbered with ancient security rules will only do
its level best to strangle open source exploitation.”37 Marks was quickly
challenged, however, by IAFIE members who warned him not to view
open source as replacing classified materials. Others were brusque and
argued that open source is not intelligence. Marks’s commentary demonstrates the delicate weaving of the logics of secrecy and openness that
open source stakeholders must accomplish in order to avoid inciting reactionary attacks.
It appears that ADDNI/OS Jardines sought to institutionalize the collection and analysis of open source within the U.S. intelligence community in ways that did not overtly challenge the dominant institutional
logic of secrecy. Specifically, in July 2006, the ADDNI/OS’s office authored “ICD 301: National Open Source Enterprise.” This document formally established, through applicable laws and directives, the ADDNI/
OS’s authority to promulgate preferred descriptions of open source objects, concepts, and roles. In bureaucratic and technical language, ICD
301 described the “roles and responsibilities” of new open source organizations within the intelligence community. For example, ICD 301 stated
the following:
The ADDNI/OS shall have the following authorities and responsibilities for the
National Open Source Enterprise: (1) Ensuring integrated IC open source collection management strategy and implementation are reflective of Presidential priorities. (2) Oversight, evaluation, policy direction, and tasking of IC open source
exploitation organizations. (3) Advisory tasking regarding acquisition of open
source information by agencies and departments not within the National Intelligence Program. (4) Development and oversight of the national open source enterprise. (5) Working with the ADDNI/Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for Customer Outcomes (DDNI/CO) to establish
program guidance in accordance with Presidential priorities. (6) Oversight of Program Managers’ compliance with program guidance in concert with the ADDNI/
CFO. (7) Coordination of open source requirements of common concern. (8) Oversight of the procurement of tools and services to support open source exploitation. (9) Oversight of interagency sharing of open source information. (10) Overall
guidance, on behalf of the DNI and the DDNI for Collection (DDNI/C) to the
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Director, Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA), in the role as Executive Agent for
the DNI.38
Significantly, ICD 301 omitted the public and sharable dimensions of
open source conceptualizations found within legislation and the final
reports of the aforementioned commissions. This omission foreclosed
opportunities to bolster these potential dimensions of open source. Management scholars Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy argue that “texts that
are produced by actors who are understood to have a legitimate right
to speak, who have resource power or formal authority, or who are centrally located in a field are more likely to become embedded in discourse
than texts that are not.”39 By “embedded,” the authors mean the extent to
which another organization’s members incorporate a given text as part of
their routine meaning-making processes. As a result of the ADDNI/OS’s
resource power, formal authority, and a central position in the intelligence
community, the ADDNI/OS’s preferred depiction of open source has
dominated official discourse. Consequently, Steele’s influence on the trajectory of open source reforms has waned. Steele has not hosted an open
source conference in several years, and he did not attend either the 2007
or 2008 DNI Open Source conferences. Those who share Steele’s vision
of an independent open source agency find their ability to affect change
similarly constrained.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION DEPENDS ON CONTROL
OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
The previous discussion described how documents serve as a site of
struggle within institutional reform efforts. Intelligence stakeholders use
official documents as platforms to advance preferred depictions of open
source concepts, objects, roles, and the relationships among these. Once
these depictions are established within authoritative documents, stakeholders then point to these documents in their speech and writing as evidence of official sanction. During a roundtable entitled “OSINT 2020: The
Future of Open Source Intelligence” held at the National Press Club on
July 17, 2010, ADDNI/OS Butler told the audience the following:
I’ve always found that it’s good, if we’re going to have a panel and discuss something like OSINT, that we should define right from the outset what we’re talking
about. So let me offer to you the official definition of OSINT, at least the official IC
definition. “Open source intelligence is intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited and disseminated in a timely manner
to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence
requirement.” That comes from the Intelligence Community Directive 301 entitled
‘National Open Source Enterprise.’ And we didn’t make it up. It was cribbed, actually, from law—the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006.40
“The Source of First Resort”: The Intelligence Community
71
As noted in chapter 2, it was Simmons who was responsible for the definition of open source contained in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. This example illustrates the importance of control over official
texts as a key mechanism of institutionalization. In other words, successful institutionalization hinges on the production, circulation, and consumption (embedding) of official texts.41 It is important to recognize how
the trajectory of open source’s institutionalization relies on this solipsistic
use of language: stakeholders point to official documents to bolster their
own authority, credibility, and legitimacy—omitting, of course, discussion
of whose voice is represented in these official documents. These documents
are also ascribed an ability to reconfigure institutional arrangements.
Consider the statement of ADDNI/OS Butler during the 2008 DNI Open
Source Conference: “In 2006, we published an open source vision for the
Intelligence Community. This little red book, which I’d like to call it the
little red book to tease my former boss, Eliot Jardines, our first Assistant
Deputy DNI for Open Source. And yet, it’s had a profound effect on our
community. Just 12 pages have driven an awful lot of reform, change, innovation within the Intelligence Community and beyond.”42
These textual practices are key to transforming the routines, structures, and cultures that characterize the intelligence sector. Specifically,
communication scholar François Cooren suggests that the association between humans and texts serves as the origin of institutionalization. Cooren states, “By developing textual agents, organizational members create
ways for [organizational] forms to [emerge] and remain stable throughout space and time. . . . By remaining, these textual agents fabricate relatively fixed spaces and times; they define objectives; they forbid specific
behaviors; and they invite or enforce humans to follow specific organizational pathways.”43 Texts are integral to processes of institutionalization
in that they perform a function that humans alone cannot. In the case of
open source, this function is legitimation. Intelligence officials may speak
in ways that legitimate open source within interpersonal settings; however, it is only in tandem with enduring laws, directives, and other widely
circulated documents that the legitimacy of open source becomes firmly
established within the intelligence community. One official observed the
following:
The more paperwork there is on something, the more the bureaucracy will respond. In a bureaucracy, the way you create change, reinforce legitimacy and the
notion of change, is to restate and restate and restate your central points. Having one
document that says, “I’m in charge of X,” is not as good as having ten documents
that say, “This individual now has this responsibility,” because, typically, someone
else will pull out another piece of paper and say, “Well, but you know, my piece of
paper says X.” So . . . my focus is getting paper out there.44
As another participant in this study observed, “What these documents, I
think, are doing is saying, ‘Hey, you know that open source stuff? That’s
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kinda good. We are going to put more emphasis on it. We are going to put
more bodies into it. . . .’ If you have the direction saying open source is
important, then that sets the whole ball rolling.”45
While official open source discourse attempts to hold the logics of secrecy and openness in tension, it nevertheless tilts toward the logic of secrecy. Senator Dewine (R-OH) asserted in the 2002 Joint Inquiry Report that
institutional preferences for secrecy have resulted in analysts and officials’
poor attitude toward the use of open source. Jardines also argued that this
attitude needed to change, yet a 2008 Defense Science Board report suggests that it endures. The report states, “The Defense Science Board, every
commission, and every observer and critic of the Intelligence Community
have pointed out the value of open source materials and the relatively efficient, low-risk acquisition attendant on these materials. Notwithstanding, the Intelligence Community retains a propensity to undervalue and
shortchange this intelligence collection discipline. . . . Much of what we
do not now know and need to know is to be found in open sources. Notwithstanding, acquisition and analysis today is insufficient.”46 Stakeholders have been advancing this argument since World War II; it thus appears
that institutional attitudes are indeed slow to change. To help reverse this
situation, reformers have engaged in specific practices that aim to rapidly
reshape the values, attitudes, and beliefs of institutional members. These
practices involve depicting intelligence as a business enterprise.
OPEN SOURCE ADVOCACY: LEVERAGING THE
DISCOURSE OF ENTERPRISE
Officials use language and images to create, reproduce, or transform the
identities, relationships, and belief systems of institutional members and
stakeholders. Management scholars Hardy, Palmer, and Phillips argue
that discourses supported by broader discourses (and are not highly contested by competing discourses) are more likely to produce institutions
than discourses that are not. Yet “strategic actors cannot simply produce
a discourse to suit their immediate needs and, instead, must locate their
discursive activities within a meaningful context if they are to shape and
construct action. . . . Consequently, if we want to explain how discourses
operate, we must examine the broader context in order to ascertain the
scope that it provides for action, as well as limits it places on action.”47 To
explain how open source stakeholders engage in advocacy, it is necessary
to examine how these stakeholders draw on the post-9/11 context and
wider cultural discourses to establish preferred (rather than consensual)
meanings of open source. For example, the National Open Source Enterprise
brochure (referred to earlier by ADDNI/OS Butler as the “little red book”)
states, “Increasingly, the answer is out there; we need only be up for the
challenge of uncovering it. The task before us is to develop the expertise, tools, and culture of sharing to best harvest the knowledge we need.
“The Source of First Resort”: The Intelligence Community
73
Ignoring open sources is no longer an option; they must be viewed as the
source of first resort.”48
Persuading institutional members to be “up for the challenge” of institutionalizing open source as “the source of first resort” involves officials’ repeated invocation of what sociologist Paul du Gay calls the
neo-liberal discourse of “enterprise.”49 For du Gay, enterprise constitutes
a “new rationality of organizational governance” that “blurs traditional
distinctions” between government and commercial spheres.50 Specifically,
enterprise discourse asserts that the commercial firm, with its associated
qualities of employee “initiative, risk-taking, self-reliance and personal responsibility,” is the preferred model of organization—whether public, private, or voluntary.51 Du Gay has studied the forms of knowledge, identity,
and agency that enterprise discourse circumscribes within the context of
U.K. civil service reform. Similar to the British case, U.S. intelligence officials have attempted to persuade stakeholders of the desirability of their
preferred constructions of open source by weaving together at least four
distinct-yet-complementary discourses that resemble enterprise; these include culture, entrepreneurialism, evangelism, and Total Quality Management (TQM).
Due to its prominence within post-9/11 reform—especially within the
homeland security sector—I describe and critique the discourse of culture
separately in chapter 5. The themes of entrepreneurialism, evangelism,
and TQM, however, are reflected in the National Open Source Enterprise
brochure’s five goals: (1) make open source the “source of first resort”;
(2) establish a “guild of experts who champion the use of open source”;
(3) ensure “global input” of sources; (4) develop a “single [technological]
architecture” that provides “optimum access to information”; and (5) create an “open source works” capability to capitalize on emerging “tradecraft, analysis, and technology.”52
In asserting the need for a guild of experts to champion the use of
open source, goal #2 invokes the discourse of evangelism, goals #3 and
#4 address technical issues yet also link those issues to egalitarian ideals associated with the logic of openness. Goal #5 invokes the discourse
of entrepreneurialism. Specifically, in referencing “open source works,”
goal #5 draws on the image of the famous Lockheed Martin “Skunk
Works”—a research and development facility that helped produce innovative Cold War and post–Cold War spy planes and stealth aircraft. Officials strategically deploy these two discourses—entrepreneurialism and
evangelism—in conjunction with the vocabulary of TQM, which is characterized by “customer satisfaction,” “mission,” and “vision,” in order to
influence the way stakeholders conceptualize open source.53
In terms of entrepreneurialism, the 9/11 Commission portrayed the catastrophe as stemming from an institution-wide “failure of imagination.”54
As a result, fostering imagination within the U.S. intelligence community
has become a way of ameliorating the perceived effects of bureaucratic
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stagnation. A principal way officials promote imagination is through the
activities of reaching out, collaborating with new partners, and innovating. For example, during the 2008 DNI Open Source Conference, ADDNI/
OS Butler stated, “I call your attention to the visionaries, leaders, and talented practitioners who imagined what is possible and challenged us to
defy convention, embrace innovation, and fully exploit open sources to
achieve decision advantage, and they’re all around you in this room today,
and they’ll be all around you over the next two days during our conference. Please take advantage of that opportunity.”55
One participant asked DDNI/C Glenn Gaffney, however, “Given how
many open source practitioners are out there, how do you determine best
of breed?” Gaffney responded, “I’m not a good judge. So what I’m interested in is how do you determine best of breed? How will you, in working together, right, discover new avenues, because right now there’s a lot
of different pockets of open source work going on. . . . It’s not a top-down
thing. It can’t be. It’s got to be by the practitioners themselves.”56 Here, responsibility for innovating open source is delegated to practitioners, who,
ideally, cultivate entrepreneurial values. These values were vividly illustrated by two stories officials shared with the audience during the 2007
DNI Open Source Conference. Stories interest organizational scholars because they “function ideologically so as to represent the interests of a particular group” and are “integral to sense-making.”57 First, in his opening
remarks, ADDNI/OS Jardines featured the story of Bertoldt Jakov:
Seventy-two years ago, Bertoldt Jakov was a German-born journalist who was
alarmed by the growing power of the Nazi regime. Mr. Jakov decided to bring his
investigative journalist skills to bear to expose the fascist regime’s goal of world
domination. Bertoldt had uncovered from his sources telltale signs that the Nazis
were rearming their military, which obviously was a direct violation of the World
War I peace accords. He began by scouring open sources and found a treasure trove
of information on Germany’s efforts to rebuild its military. This treasure trove resided in a very unlikely place, the social segment of German regional newspapers.
By painstakingly cataloging what at first blush appeared to be incidental details
regarding name, rank, and unit of assignment, Bertoldt began to construct an exceedingly detailed order of battle for the new German military. . . . Bertoldt set
about writing a book to expose Nazi intentions and capabilities to the world. . . .
The Gestapo was alerted to his activities, and they became convinced Bertoldt
had recruited a highly placed source within the new German military. On March
9, 1935, the Gestapo, posing as literary agents, lured him away from his home in
France to Switzerland, where he was drugged and kidnapped. . . . His Gestapo
handlers finally conceded to Bertoldt’s requests to prove his assertions. They provided him with newspapers from across Germany and much to their amazement,
he proved his point.58
Second, then DDNI/C Mary Margaret Graham told a similar story during
her remarks at the conference:
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The story I’d like to tell you, I stole it from somebody who really is passionate
about open source, a former ADDI [Assistant Deputy Director of Intelligence] at
CIA, Carmen Medina. She came down and sat down with me one day for what
was supposed to be a half an hour, and it ended up being two hours. She is completely passionate about the use of open source in the intelligence community and
she told me a story that I think captures the breadth of what we can do with what
we call open sources. There is a book called The Hitler Myth. The author of the
myth, of the book, was trying to, in his book, pinpoint when the German people
began to turn away from Hitler. And so, the period that he was looking at was
1941 to 1945. The creativity of this way of looking at it struck me and has always
stayed with me as a way to use open source. What he did is he went to the obituaries in the two newspapers that at that time served Munich and Bavaria. In 1941,
the obituaries of the soldiers who were killed talked about the solders having died
for the Fuhrer, the fatherland, and the Volk, the German people. And [from this
list] he was able to plot this. By the time 1945 came, the Fuhrer had disappeared,
and the German soldiers that were killed, for the most part, died [only] for the
Volk. But think about it for a minute. Think about the creativity of understanding
that piece of the puzzle. That, for me, describes what we’re looking for in the open
source arena.59
Graham’s comment suggested that this story circulates in interpersonal
settings where passionate advocates attempt to persuade officials of open
source’s utility. Both stories constructed open source practitioners as skillful and inventive entrepreneurs.
For Jardines and Graham, the moral of both stories was that conference attendees should use open sources to creatively identify “modern
day threats, be [they] terrorism, pandemic flu, or proliferation.”60 Given
the context in which they were communicated, both stories seemed to
imply that jihadists are analogous to Nazis—an association that has been
perpetuated across the federal government.61 Both stories associated the
collection and analysis of open source information with World War II–era
national unity, patriotism, excitement, and danger in U.S. society. In other
words, the stories created a sense of “organizational drama” whereby the
mundane task of analyzing open, free, and public information is elevated
to an almost heroic activity.62 It is worth remembering, however, that “all
historical analogies are fallible in one sense or another because they emphasize some aspects of the past while suppressing others to achieve the
right fit.”63 In searching for the right representation of the contemporary
open source practitioner, for example, Jardines did not emphasize that
Bertoldt Jakov—like Joe Turner in Three Days of the Condor—used open
sources to uncover the objectionable activities of his own government and,
moreover, was severely punished for doing so.
Jardines’s and Graham’s use of World War II–era analogies helped foster a patriotic commitment to officials’ preferred vision of open source by
implying that those who work in academe, the nonprofit sector, and the
media could produce vital national intelligence. The stories conveyed the
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principle, however, that it is still an individual’s responsibility to recognize
the value of open source and adjust his or her beliefs to accommodate
this value. Nevertheless, officials also implied that letting individuals decide if and when to embrace entrepreneurial values and practices may be
too slow and uneven a process to ensure the timely institutionalization of
open source. As a result, officials linked the vocabulary of entrepreneurialism with the vocabulary of evangelism. By evangelism, I mean advocacy
characterized by zealousness, based largely on appeals to self-evident
moral imperatives rather than evidence. For example, DDNI/C Gaffney
evoked evangelism in this statement:
We’re not bound to our individual program. We’re not bound to this agency, this
enterprise, this university, this piece. It doesn’t matter. We are bound to truth. Ladies and gentlemen, the name of the game today is the same that it has always
been. It is the pursuit of truth. We refer to it as intelligence inside this community
circle, but that’s why we do it. It is about discovering, discerning truth, and using
that truth for its best for our citizenry.64
Audience members noted the evangelical tone of officials’ open source
advocacy. One conference participant asked Gaffney, “Your staff has been
quite zealous in promoting the value of open source. Why?” Gaffney responded, “Because they work for a zealot. No, they’re zealous in the pursuit because they believe this. It’s not just another job in the train of jobs
that they have. They’re zealous in its pursuit because I sit with them everyday and we talk about what they’re doing, and they are excited about
what they see going on out there and are looking for how can we use that
to improve this intelligence enterprise. And they get more excited by it
by the moment.”65 Officials’ evangelical vocabulary was presaged by the
WMD Commission, which stated, “Because we believe that part of the
problem [of the insufficient use of open source] is analyst resistance, not
lack of collection, we recommend that some of the new analysts allocated
to CIA be specially trained to use open sources and then to act as open
source ‘evange-analysts’ who can jumpstart the open source initiative by
showing its value in addressing particular analytic problems. [This] will
help improve the Intelligence Community’s surprisingly poor ‘feel’ for
cultural and political issues.”66
The WMD Commission’s Final Report continued:
In the near term, we believe that without an institutional “champion” and home,
open source will never be effectively used by the Intelligence Community. It is our
hope that open source will become an integral part of all intelligence activities and
that, at some point in the future, there may no longer be a need for a separate directorate. We acknowledge that our recommendation could create one more collection specialty. But, for now, open source is inadequately used and appreciated
and is in need of the high-level, focused attention that only a separate directorate
can provide.67
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Both the WMD Commission’s recommendation to create an institutional champion for open source and Gaffney’s half-joking commitment
to zealousness can be interpreted as reflecting the idea that securing legitimacy for open source is less a matter of management than of evangelism.68
In other words, as management scholar Mark Suchman states, “[Officials]
may exert major pressures on the normative order by joining together to
actively proselytize for a morality in which their outputs, procedures,
structures, and personnel occupy positions of honor and respect. . . . Over
time, such collective evangelism helps to build a winning coalition of believers, whose conceptions of socially desirable activity set the terms for
subsequent moral debate.”69 Suchman explains that for evangelists to be
successful in their efforts to institutionalize new organizational forms and
practices, they must eventually build a clear record of success for those
forms and practices. This approach is challenging for intelligence officials
given that the record of open source’s effectiveness remains obscure. For
example, during the press conference announcing the establishment of the
OSC, DDNI/C Graham “couldn’t think of a question that’s been answered
with open-source information alone, but said she’s watched the government’s dependence on it increase.”70 Although the number of anecdotes
concerning open source’s utility are increasing, their actual incidence may
still be unknown to many institutional members because secrecy prevents
such anecdotes from circulating widely. One official explained, “Part of
our effort was to compile the mother listing of all open source success stories; the difficulty is the vast majority of those [stories] are classified.”71
Suchman explains that in absence of a widely known record of success,
institutional evangelists can attempt to associate new vocabulary and
practices with past vocabulary and practices that institutional members
already consider legitimate. In the case of open source, this process occurs, in part, by articulating open source concepts using the vocabulary
of TQM.
TQM is characterized by cultivation of customer satisfaction and perceived improvements in employees’ well-being. Marcus notes that the
CIA’s Office of Information Technology adopted TQM in 1991, and by
1994, nearly 90 percent of the staff had received TQM training. Importantly for this discussion, Marcus claims that “no single federal agency
has embraced the new managerial ethos [TQM] more passionately than
the Defense Department.”72 TQM naturalizes open source evangelism
through the use of institutionally sanctioned vocabulary. There are several
resemblances between TQM and enterprise discourse. The most prominent of these is a shared emphasis on the customer—a term contained in
nearly all the speeches and official documents discussed in this chapter.
A clear example of open source officials’ customer-centric focus is OSC
director Doug Naquin’s 2008 speech outlining the revamped open source
“community action plan.” In describing this plan, Naquin stated that his
goal was to “tee up and witness a serious conversation among those who
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make the actual decisions for the intelligence community about exactly
how open sources could and should play into the overall . . . intelligence
strategy.”73 Attempting to move beyond what he called the “perhaps clichéd” characterizations of open source, Naquin argued for “a serious conversation” to occur among open source “customers” within the areas of
“national policy,” “Congress,” “intelligence ops,” “diplomacy,” “military
support,” and “law enforcement” (these customers were indicated on
Naquin’s presentation slide). Naquin appeared to mock stakeholders who
have argued for an open source agency residing outside the CIA: “I’m
often asked why would an open-source center be in the intelligence community. Well, it’s really a question of what do you want to support. If you
wanted to support corn production, you might put it in the Department
of Agriculture.”74
Naquin claimed, “You’ll see that [OSC’s] value in the intelligence context gets greater as we move toward the right.”75 On the presentation slide
Naquin was referring to, “the right” was defined by intelligence and its
traditional disciplines (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.). “The further we can push
that arrow to the right, the more value we have,” Naquin stated.76 In other
words, Naquin implied that the more open source meets customer demands, resembles traditional intelligence disciplines, and conforms to the
institutional logic of secrecy, its value and legitimacy as a form of intelligence increase.
Omitted from Naquin’s slide, significantly, was the public—independent
of its elected representatives in Congress—as a customer of open source
intelligence. This omission was in contrast to the National Open Source Enterprise brochure’s fourth goal, which included sharing open source products “with international partners and the public whenever practical.”77
One official explained the challenge of including the public as a customer
of intelligence within this text:
The [DNI] leadership was like, “What? With the general public? Are you crazy?”
[The ADDNI/OS’s] argument was that there are many incidences like avian flu,
floods, and whatnot that they should be communicating directly with the general
public. The general public is [a] customer. So, [the ADDNI/OS] was able to keep
that mention of making [open source] available to the general public in the document. As far as I know, that’s the only intelligence document that says anything
about making intelligence available to the general public.78
While there is apparent ambivalence regarding how citizens should be
depicted within open source discourse, the logic of secrecy, wedded to enterprise’s managerial vocabulary, excludes citizens from consideration in
the development of open source policy. Here, open source concepts are,
somewhat ironically, constructed within the dominant institutional logic
of secrecy—even as officials nominally declare the importance of public
participation, celebrate open source–related reforms at public conferences,
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and assert the desirability of sharing open source products with the public
and international partners. Communication scholar Stanley Deetz characterizes this type of communication as mildly duplicitous and paternalistic
in that it leads to expression, discussion, and commitment, but generally not to transformation and innovative decisions.79 For Deetz, the DNI
Open Source conferences are a forum for the exchange of viewpoints, but
they do little to increase voice. By voice, Deetz means expressions that
genuinely influence decisions. While an official at the 2007 conference declared that “it is our hope that you leave here inspired and encouraged to
contribute in whatever way each of you can in supporting open source,”
contributions and support that differed from the ADDNI/OS’s preferred
vision were never realistically on the table.
SUMMARY
For some stakeholders, the government’s TQM-oriented strategy for institutionalizing open source makes sense. One stakeholder remarked, “I
think Doug Naquin has done a hell of a job retooling FBIS into an Open
Source Center. . . . He’s really tried to get people involved throughout
the community so that they understand what is available openly.”80 However, others suggest that TQM’s culture of the customer potentially complicates the idealized objectivity of intelligence agencies. CIA director
Hayden stated in 2008, “Now, given that importance to this discipline,
Doug [Naquin, OSC director] sits at my staff meetings each time they
occur, and that’s three days a week. Open source has a seat at the table, a
seat at the table with every other core discipline that comprises the Central Intelligence Agency.”81 Customer-centric discourse may inadvertently
encourage the politicization of intelligence in that the value of intelligence
becomes derived not necessarily from its fidelity to an underlying material reality, but from its ability to satisfy customers’ demands. Enterprise
discourse conceptualizes intelligence as a commodity, thus promoting the
intense commercialization of this sector. Although the commercialization
of intelligence has its advocates,82 it is worth considering the influence of
commercial imperatives in light of rhetorical scholar Robert Newman’s
observation: “To the extent that an ‘intelligence’ system is run by an organization whose mission is being evaluated, we no longer have an intelligence system, but a rhetorical system, which functions to reassure,
exonerate, and glorify its parent. Its product is inevitably self-serving.”83 Similarly, one stakeholder reacted to the stated connection between CIA director Hayden and OSC director Naquin:
[Doug] Naquin, and Charlie Allen [then the head of Intelligence and Analysis for
DHS], and the Director of the CIA at the Open Source Conference—pardon my
French—they’re all kissing each other’s ass. Naquin is saying what a great relationship he has with the Director of the CIA. Why, he’s up to his office everyday.
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Well, isn’t that great? No wonder the academic community, the business community, and others are skeptical [of the OSC]. Who’s running whom? Who’s the big
dog? Naquin’s running up to the Director’s office everyday. He’s having a great
time learning all those wonderful secrets, but you won’t see the Director running
over to Naquin’s office, will you? Not likely.84
This chapter has explained how officials have constituted post-9/11 open
source discourse using the vocabulary of entrepreneurialism, evangelism,
and TQM in order to facilitate open source’s institutionalization throughout the U.S. intelligence community. In repeatedly describing open source
as “the enterprise of enterprises,” officials illustrate neo-liberalism’s “shift
toward a new model of government less involved in direct service provision, and more focused on managing and organizing devolved centers
and resources.”85 It remains unclear, however, whether aligning conceptions of open source with dominant institutional logics and vocabularies
will ultimately diminish open source’s potency as a symbol of institutional
reform. One stakeholder explained the issue:
I think Jennifer Sims [an intelligence expert who spoke at the 2008 DNI Open
Source Conference] made a very interesting—if not disturbing—argument that
more, rather than less, secrecy is actually what is called for [vis-à-vis open source].
It was a remarkable statement to make, because to me, it called into question the
whole basis of the conference at which she was speaking. If open source needs to
establish itself as an intelligence discipline that is providing confidential “decision
advantage,” to use her term, then what sense does it make to be hosting a public
conference about it?86
It is doubtful that such contradictions will become catalysts for wider
public debate concerning open source vis-à-vis the reshaping of U.S. intelligence and national security. This is because 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq
WMD intelligence failure produced an “epochal” moment, a “periodizing schema in which a logic of dichotomization establishe[d] the available terms of debate in advance, either for or against.”87 In this case, to be
against officials’ preferred conceptualizations of open source risks being
perceived as for bureaucracy and the failure of imagination that bureaucracy ostensibly induces.
2009–2010: THE “ENTERPRISE OF ENTERPRISES”
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL
In 2008, open source organizational structures were revised, with
Naquin gaining increased authority as the chairman of the National Open
Source Committee, which, along with the ADDNI/OS, oversees the institutionalization of open source. In 2009, Naquin and his staff produced the
National Open Source Strategic Action Plan.88 In its publicly available form,
this plan asserted that open source developments were entering a “new
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phase,” one that required a narrowed “aperture” to focus on maximizing
the benefits of the open source enterprise while facilitating other agencies’
development of their own open source capabilities. The 2009 plan articulated a different set of mission, vision, and values statements from those
specified in the 2006 National Open Source Enterprise brochure. In 2006, the
goals were to make open source “the source of first resort,” develop a
guild of open source experts, ensure global input, create a single architecture, and establish an “open source works” capability. In 2009, those goals
had slightly shifted to include “universal, cross-domain access” to open
source material, integrated mission management, proliferation of open
source expertise, and enterprise governance.
Yet, according to the 2009 Plan, open source’s status as an afterthought
persists. For Naquin and his staff, the key to overcoming this challenge is
integration while demonstrating impact through decision advantage. The
2009 Plan raises the prospect of integration to new heights, the goal being
to focus on the “sweet spot” among the overlapping enterprises of homeland, foreign, diplomatic, and defense, while also aligning “with unique
mission requirements and policies” of specific organizations.89 Officials
refer to this vision of open source as an “enterprise of enterprises.”90 For
Christine McKeown, associate deputy undersecretary of defense for analytic concepts and strategies within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, “DNI efforts increasingly are focused on areas
where these four different domains [homeland, foreign, diplomatic, and
defense] intersect and expand through collaboration and the sharing of
people, tradecraft, and technology.”91
Defining the relationships among people, tradecraft, and technology has
been central to recent open source debates. In 2005, testifying before Congress, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, John Gannon,
remarked, “Technology is a major part of the answer to the magnitude of
the open source challenge, but it is no substitute for the other essential component: skilled people. The IC must provide the analytic tools needed to assess and exploit the vast amount of information available, and it must invest
more in people, whose expertise is crucial for prioritizing, interpreting, and
analyzing this information.”92 For Gannon, prioritizing, interpreting, and
analyzing open source material involves tradecraft. Tradecraft is a term intelligence analysts themselves use to define their work and identity. For example, in his 2005 ethnography of analytical culture within the intelligence
community, Rob Johnston notes the widespread use of the term among the
hundreds of analysts he interviewed and observed. In using tradecraft to describe their work, analysts reproduce their beliefs about the exclusivity and
nonscientific nature of their analysis. As one government analyst stated,
“What we do is more art and experience than anything else.”93
Johnston argued that tradecraft corresponded more to analysts’ selfperception and professional identity than to the reality of their work.
He asserted, “The notion that intelligence operations involve tradecraft,
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which I define as practiced skill in a trade or art, may be appropriate,
but the analytic community’s adoption of the concept to describe analysis
and analytic methods is not.”94 Instead of exploring tradecraft as a useful
metaphor for intelligence analysis, Johnston rejected the term, proposing
instead a scientific approach to intelligence analysis. The WMD Commission advocated a similar approach in 2005, stating, “The Intelligence Community has only begun to explore and exploit the power of these emerging
technologies. . . . Therefore, we suggest that the DNI establish a program
office that can lead the Community effort to obtain advanced information
technology for purposes of machine translation, advanced search, knowledge extraction, and similar automated support to analysis.”95
One potential result of this technological approach is that open source
analysts themselves are made to resemble machines. For example, analysts
at Intellibridge were paid individual incentive wages as a way to promote
output. Management established strict formats, timetables, and minimum
word counts for open source products. There was pressure among analysts to not exceed word count standards for fear that the standards would
be raised. Production processes were organized along factory lines; often
analysts were given narrow, repetitive tasks to complete without understanding the wider context of their work. Analysts used technology to simply keep pace with the unrelenting demands of their job. The pressure to
meet strict deadlines for multiple clients required analysts to keep a close
eye on the clock and avoid analytical detours and dead ends. It will never
be known how many underdeveloped but potentially novel assessments
at Intellibridge were jettisoned at the expense of client deadlines. It was
simply too time-consuming to explore lines of inquiry that could not be
easily included in the day’s production in order to make an explicit quota.
Such extreme forms of systematization may diminish analysts’ commitment to broader organizational goals and values.
To be an open source craftsman implies that analysts themselves shape
knowledge, execution, and control over the analytical process. While
tradecraft may be fraught with idiosyncrasies, it also promotes novelty—a
quality necessary for innovative intelligence assessments. Johnston’s assertion that analytical tradecraft is problematic while scientific analysis
is ideal demonstrates the familiar pattern of attempting to control organizational processes through improved systematization.96 Under conditions of uneven and uncertain analytical capabilities, minimal standards
of efficiency and effectiveness must be met within intelligence agencies.
Johnston’s call for a scientific approach is a predictable step in an effort
to achieve such standards. My observations at Intellibridge correspond to
Johnston’s finding that the vast majority of agency analysts have shifted
their focus to current production—short-term issues and problem solving.
Analytical technologies hold the promise of easing the monotonous grind
of current reporting. With technologies to do translation, web search,
pattern recognition, and knowledge extraction, analysts may be able to
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83
devote more time to strategic assessments. This is still difficult, however,
in an environment shot through with commercial imperatives.
At Intellibridge, market pressures often required the adoption of lowcost approaches to collection and analysis. Since most agencies are unable
to directly monitor outsourced work processes, they exert control through
contract requirements that may similarly compel organizations to adopt
automation-like processes. These economic realities force a tradeoff between low-cost tradecraft and high-cost technology. This tradeoff seems
counterintuitive—human labor is usually perceived as high cost. But especially in Washington, DC, where master’s- and PhD-level analysts are
abundant, contractors may find it more economical to hire analysts to
mimic automated processes rather than invest in technology that may
quickly become obsolete. Information processing speed and access to
communication technology create an environment where intelligence analysts have vastly more information more quickly than ever before. Such
conditions should be a boon for analysts, but, instead, those conditions
create pressures to produce insights at a much faster rate to satisfy intelligence consumers. Outsourcing open source collection and analysis does
not solve the problem. The pace of production merely compels private sector organizations to mimic the agencies they support. Without more transparency and oversight, officials will have difficulty discerning the relative
value of a particular contractor’s open source contributions. Commercial
imperatives may stymie officials’ attempts to develop open source as an innovative, collaborative, and entrepreneurial intelligence discipline. From
this perspective, it is unsurprising that on August 24, 2010, the Department of Defense issued Instruction No. 3115.12, which directed officials to
“identify OSINT activities and programs within their organizations and
unify and streamline OSINT activities by coordinating and collaborating
on OSINT collection, acquisition, analysis, operations, production, and
dissemination.”97 However, unification and streamlining will not solve
the fundamental tension that open source outsourcing creates.
CONCLUSION
At the end of Three Days of the Condor, Joe Turner unravels the CIA’s
Middle Eastern oil plot, disclosing it to the New York Times before evading his pursuers and disappearing into the city. Since 9/11, intelligence
officials have authored and leveraged a similar image of the entrepreneurial open source practitioner—omitting, of course, any discussion of
anti-institutional activities. Officials’ ideal open source practitioner is an
institutional member (an agency analyst or contractor), or even an ordinary citizen, who overcomes persistent bureaucratic obstacles and secrecy
to contribute to defined external threats to U.S. national security. This
image is invoked in official documents, celebrated at public conferences,
and naturalized through institutionally sanctioned vocabulary.
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Officials have constructed the concept of open source in ways that protect the authority of the U.S. intelligence community from those who seek
to undermine it by extending the moniker of intelligence to the informational activities of noninstitutional actors. Officials’ constructions rely on
entrepreneurial, evangelical, and TQM-laden vocabulary. However, the
perspective used herein suggests that these constructions may be based,
at least to some degree, on taken-for-granted assumptions regarding the
necessity of secrecy, rather than on calculated reflection. In other words,
open source is constructed in accordance with a dominant institutional
logic, in part, because few stakeholders are motivated to conceive of viable
alternatives.
The events of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq WMD intelligence failure undermined the legitimacy of the U.S. intelligence community, requiring an unusual level of organizational sense making. This sense making was aided,
in part, by the official investigations and final reports of the Joint Inquiry,
the 9/11 Commission, and the WMD Commission. The final reports of
these investigatory bodies were widely disseminated and incorporated
across the U.S. national security apparatus, as subsequent laws, directives,
and policies based on their recommendations indicate. Stakeholders have
used these recommendations to legitimate preferred open source organizational structures, roles, and practices.
To help rapidly institutionalize preferred meanings of open source,
the ADDNI/OS organized and conducted the inaugural 2007 DNI Open
Source Conference and a second DNI Open Source Conference in 2008.
ICD 301, the National Open Source Enterprise brochure, and the keynote
and plenary speeches delivered by officials during the conferences drew
on authoritative texts and well-established neo-liberal discourses in order
to persuade institutional members to adopt preferred beliefs and practices
related to open source. However, commercial imperatives may constrain
the widespread adoption of these beliefs and practices. The next chapter
uses the context of homeland security to further explore the ways officials’
vision of open source runs up against persistent institutional obstacles.
CHAPTER 5
Bridging a Cultural Divide:
Homeland Security
Goal 1: Effect cultural and business process change throughout the Department to make open source the source of first resort.
—U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Open Source
Enterprise Strategic Vision, 20081
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was established on March 1,
2003. DHS’s mission is to “lead the unified national effort to secure the
country and preserve our freedoms.”2 In performing this mission, DHS
must ensure “that timely, actionable, and complete intelligence and
incident-related information reaches the right individuals at the right time
to best mitigate threats and risk, while creating a culture of awareness for
privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights.”3 Geographers Lauren Martin and
Stephanie Simon interpret DHS’s mission as involving the “translation of
virtual, potential threat[s] into specific, possible outcomes and concrete,
material actions.”4 In other words, “homeland security” is constructed
from both discourses and practices that describe and enact (via training
and simulation) threats and responses. A primary activity of DHS is thus
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about potential threats to customers (in the lexicon of DHS), including policy makers;
federal, state, and local officials in law enforcement; emergency management, public heath, other first-responder communities; private sector personnel; and, at times, the general public. Open source information is vital
to homeland security in that it helps officials continuously identify and
respond to threats—both actual and potential.
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Open source discourse takes on a different vernacular within the context of homeland security, with “open source information sharing” being
officials’ preferred label for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
open source information. Speakers may also omit the term “open source”
from this phrase because the bulk of homeland security–related information sharing occurs at an unclassified or law enforcement sensitive level.
Some speakers distinguish between law enforcement sensitive and open
source information, while others do not. This chapter indicates that as
open source discourse moves toward operational levels within homeland
security organizations, the perceived utility of its official depiction within
U.S. intelligence community documents tends to diminish—a situation
that senior officials attempt to address, in part, through organizing and
conducting conferences, training, and education programs. This chapter
also indicates that within operational levels of at least some homeland
security organizations, open source information sharing appears, at least
for now, to be relatively inconsistent, incoherent, and contested. This situation illuminates important theoretical and practical issues regarding the
reshaping of intelligence.
DISCOURSE AND OPEN SOURCE CULTURE
Before turning to evidence of open source’s uneven and contested institutionalization within the homeland security sector, it is useful to address the distinction between discourse and culture as this distinction has
direct bearing on the claims made in this chapter. “Organizational culture” is an overarching term that both organizational members and scholars use to describe a range of organizational phenomena associated with
human symbol use. According to organizational theorist Joanne Martin,
these phenomena include, but are not limited to, cultural forms (organizational rituals, stories, jargon, humor, architecture, décor, and dress), formal practices (structure, tasks and technology, rules, and controls), and
informal practices (unwritten social rules).5 Martin argues that cultural
forms and practices reveal deeper organizational meanings and shared,
basic assumptions.
Organizational members may invoke culture in order to further goals
related to improved organizational efficiency and effectiveness. This dominant functionalist, or problem-solving, perspective views culture as something the organization has, rather than something the organization is.6
Depicting culture as something the organization has—a variable, resource,
or tool—allows managers to act as though culture can be successfully
and consistently shaped and controlled through incentives (or disincentives). Those who study culture as something the organization is instead
seek to understand how artifacts, practices, values, and beliefs shape and
emerge from the communicative interactions of organizational members.7
This interpretive perspective does not necessarily—or completely—reject
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87
the control-oriented impulses of functionalist research; it does, however,
offer organizational members and scholars the opportunity to develop a
deeper understanding of how people interpret their organizational environments, identities, and work practices.8
As the chapter epigraph indicates, DHS officials invoke “cultural
change” to encourage members of homeland security–related organizations to make open source “the source of first resort” and perform associated practices efficiently and effectively. These cultural change initiatives
are bound up with images of intelligence as a business enterprise and are
a primary way officials attempt to institutionalize new forms and practices. Du Gay states that “culture is accorded a privileged positioning in
this endeavor because it is seen to structure the way people think, feel and
act in organizations.”9 The institutional discourse perspective on culture
taken here maintains that “discourses . . . are ordered and integrated by
cultures, but also represent a (perhaps even the most important) medium
in which cultures are constructed, reproduced, contested and changed.”10
Officials assert that cultural change is needed to ensure that intelligence
community personnel become attuned to state and local information sharing processes, while simultaneously, state and local personnel become familiar with the conventions of intelligence. As one analyst interviewed for
this project explained, “I think it takes a certain type of individual to work
at a [homeland security] fusion center. They have to understand the intelligence cycle and information sharing—the importance of both. And they
can’t have that historical mindset of ‘I own the information, and only me
and my agency is going to see it.’ ”11
The discourse of cultural change blurs distinctions between “homeland” and “national” security in order to spur cross-agency information
sharing and collaboration. In a related example, a 2009 Congressional Research Service report on “Homeland Security Intelligence” stated, “Prior
to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between ‘domestic intelligence’—primarily law enforcement information collected within the
United States—and ‘foreign intelligence’—primarily military, political,
and economic intelligence collected outside the country. Today, threats to
the homeland posed by terrorist groups are now [also] national security
threats. Intelligence collected outside the United States is often very relevant to the threat environment inside the United States and vice versa.”12
In the homeland security context, however, officials confront a countervailing discourse of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights. This discourse is characterized by concerns for constitutional law and the legality
of search, seizure, and racial profiling. For example, in establishing the
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in 2004, DHS officials claimed
that the office intended to offer DHS employees courses such as: “ ‘Civil
Liberties 101,’ a basic introduction to the Department’s commitment to the
protection of civil rights and civil liberties as described in the new Strategic Plan; an introduction to the Department’s policy prohibiting unlawful
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racial profiling; training on the Fourth Amendment requirements governing searches and seizures; and, various topics to develop awareness of the
cultural issues facing the Department’s law enforcement and intelligence
officers, such as an introduction to the Arab and Muslim communities in
the United States.”13 As a context for the activities of contemporary institutional activists, privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights discourse can
be traced to populist reaction to institutional abuses of power performed
during the 1970s. For DHS officials, this discourse must be carefully managed in order to ensure continued mobilization of congressional and public support for preferred open source information sharing policies and
practices. As a result, the discourse of open source information sharing
generates critical tensions that shape its institutionalization.
The government’s open source information sharing initiatives will admittedly take time to develop; some might argue, therefore, that evaluating the efficacy of the government’s cultural change strategy vis-à-vis
open source is premature. However, the goal of this chapter is to explore,
at a basic level, how stakeholders currently make sense of the interconnections among open source, cultural change, and homeland security.
This case study considers social practice—in other words, the process of
textual interpretation. Social practice engages questions regarding the extent to which audiences accept and respond to a text’s preferred reading.14
In the following sections, I first address the logic of open source information sharing within U.S. homeland security affairs. I subsequently discuss
the vocabulary of cultural change produced by intelligence community officials for audiences within intelligence and homeland security–related organizations. Drawing on interview data, I then discuss how institutional
members respond to the interrelated discourses of open source and cultural change and what these responses indicate about the limits of officials’ efforts to institutionalize open source.
THE LOGIC OF OPEN SOURCE
INFORMATION SHARING
Intelligence scholar Calvert Jones states that “the logic of information
sharing” is based on the assumption that “the free flow of information
[will] stimulate a robust marketplace of ideas, encouraging diverse, innovative analysis appropriate for dealing with more complex, rapidly
evolving threats.”15 Jones notes that this logic developed in the aftermath
of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the U.S. military’s need
to prevent future surprise attacks. For government officials, the post-9/11
institutional environment requires a “trusted partnership” among federal, state, and local agencies to make information sharing integrated,
interconnected, effective, and automatic.16 As a result, information sharing initiatives have been a key plank of post-9/11 U.S. intelligence reform
strategy. Hundreds of governmental, commercial, and nongovernmental
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organizations provide officials with open source alerts, updates, and databases to support preparedness efforts.17 Recently created fusion centers operated by state agencies—the linchpins of U.S. homeland security
strategy—integrate, analyze, and disseminate federal, state, local, and
private sector open source information.
Within the homeland security sector, it is axiomatic that increased information sharing improves emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. As a result, few researchers have attempted to critically assess
this premise. However, studies have found an ambiguous relationship
between information sharing and preparedness.18 In the wake of these
findings, it is unsurprising that a September 2008 report prepared by the
majority staff of the House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee entitled “Giving a Voice to Open Source Stakeholders: A Survey of
State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement” declared, “DHS has not effectively exploited [open source] information to provide essential analytical
products. In fact, DHS’ efforts have lagged behind the rest of the Federal government. While the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have each established robust open source programs, DHS . . . has yet to articulate a vision for how
it will collect, analyze and disseminate open source information.”19 The
report explained that only 50 percent of 350 officials surveyed reported
that DHS open source “products” met their needs for situational awareness of “all hazards” threats. Additionally, 60 percent of those surveyed
reported that “in order to improve matters, DHS needs to establish a robust training program in addition to producing open source intelligence
products with actionable recommendations.”20
I argue that the committee’s findings stem, in part, from the relative
“incoherence” of open source discourse and the influence of “competing” discourses at the operational levels of homeland security organizations.21 As one participant in this project argued, “Domestic intelligence is
a wide-open frontier. We don’t know what it is yet. . . . Everyone is going
to be feeling [his or her] way on this. So, anyone who rejects [open source]
out of hand at this point is asking for trouble, and anybody who embraces it wholeheartedly and says, ‘Ah, here’s our answer,’ they’re also in
trouble.”22 Despite officials’ attempts to shape the development of open
source logics and vocabularies in ways amenable to homeland security
practice, a lack of shared meanings among federal, state, and local organizations may inhibit open source’s institutionalization in this sector. Here,
it is worth returning to theory: organizational theorist Mats Alvesson argues that “the same discourse (language use) in different cultures (meaning contexts) may lead to different reception and thus meanings.”23 In
other words, while officials consistently use cultural change vocabulary
to spur uniform information sharing and collaboration process across the
intelligence community, the ensuing discussion highlights differences that
arise within the homeland security sector.
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OPEN SOURCE AND THE VOCABULARIES
OF CULTURAL CHANGE
One participant captured a common sentiment when he declared,
“I think we have a real problem, which is there’s a generation of people
who have an old paradigm [a ‘need-to-know culture’] that needs to be
broken. I don’t know how you do that.”24 A prominent way officials have
thus far attempted to break this old paradigm is through promoting cultural change. Importantly for this discussion, the Information Sharing Environment was established in 2006 in order to create a trusted information
network and promote the sharing of information and intelligence among
government agencies at all levels. Central to the ISE’s Implementation Plan
was the development of what it called a “culture of information sharing.”
While the ISE’s Implementation Plan did not specify this culture’s characteristics, they may be partly inferred from the description of ways that officials might develop this culture, including the following: (1) monetary
and nonmonetary awards; (2) agency-wide recognition for those who develop an improved information sharing practice; (3) inclusion in internal
newsletters of information sharing accomplishments and the tangible end
benefits that resulted; (4) development of awareness materials; (5) establishment of an annual federal award for fostering information sharing;
and (6) sharing of best practices regarding effective ways to educate and
motivate personnel.25 Similar to other organizations within the U.S. intelligence community, the ISE depicts culture as a concrete and objective
phenomenon that senior officials can control through incentives in order
to reduce the likelihood of intelligence failures stemming from insufficient
information sharing.
Similarly, the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing was based,
in part, on “foster[ing] a culture of awareness in which people at all levels of government remain cognizant of the functions and needs of others
and use knowledge and information from all sources to support counterterrorism efforts.”26 DHS’s Strategic Plan declared the need to develop a
“culture of preparedness,” “leverage culture to implement best practices
that benefit from component commonalities and differences,” and create “a culture of awareness for privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights.”27
DHS stated in its Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan the need to “promote
a culture that supports and rewards initiative, creativity, diversity, and
professionalism.”28 These themes were echoed in the DHS Open Source
Enterprise Strategic Vision. As noted in the chapter epigraph, the Strategic Vision brochure stated that DHS’s top goal was to “effect cultural and
business process change throughout the Department to make open source
‘the source of first resort.’ ”
References to culture thus pervade institutional discourse concerning
open source information sharing. This discourse constructs culture as a
variable, distinct from other organizational phenomena—a variable that
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91
can be isolated, measured, manipulated, and assessed. Along with this
conception of culture is the premise that senior officials can directly, uniformly, and successfully shape organizational culture in order to improve
the effectiveness of intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency management agencies. Officials understandably would like to believe that culture can be used as a tool for generating employee commitment to open
source initiatives.29 However, the notion that there exists a stable, causal,
and law-like relationship between an abstraction called “organizational
culture” and organizational outcomes has been repeatedly called into
question.30 Despite culture’s indeterminacy, the appeal of cultural explanations for organizational performance endures.31
The documents discussed here provide official representations of both
existing and preferred organizational cultures. A discourse-centered perspective maintains that we cannot assume that the overall influence of
these documents is significant. In other words, we cannot conflate official
representations of culture with how stakeholders actually make sense of
and use the term—we have to turn to the stakeholders themselves.
OPEN SOURCE AND CULTURAL CHANGE:
AN ASSESSMENT
In assessing officials’ efforts to spur cultural change, participants provided an array of interpretations concerning the relationships among open
source information sharing and homeland security. Using an institutional
discourse perspective as a guide, I assembled these interpretations into
two overarching categories with several subcategories to help describe
and explain them. The first overarching category relates to tensions stemming from incoherence and a lack of structure within the open source information sharing discourse. The second overarching category relates to
tensions among open source privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights and
commercial discourses that appear to hinder enactment of officials’ cultural change initiatives.
Incoherence and lack of structure within the open source information
sharing discourse appears to be the result of the following conditions:
(1) the phrase “open source information sharing” lacks a widely shared
definition; (2) open source products may contain vague, untimely, or excessive information; and (3) open source information sharing discourse
both intensifies and ameliorates subcultural divisions among personnel
within a given organization, as well as between members of different
organizations.
Ambiguous Definition
Participants offered an array of definitions for open source information
sharing. For example, one contractor stated, “To me, open source means
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largely the Internet, which is the largest database of human information
and knowledge that we’ve ever acquired in history.”32 An analyst stated,
“Open source gives you a wealth of information on attitudes, perceptions, just general demographic information such as languages, what people like, what people don’t like.”33 Another analyst explained that open
source collection involved using tools “like Google, Google Maps, [and]
Google Earth. . . . We use a lot of social networking sites like MySpace or
Facebook, and we use . . . LexisNexis, public records databases, things like
that.”34 Similarly, participants’ understandings of “information sharing”
varied. One analyst stated, “Information sharing means a centralized area
where you can grab stuff.”35 A manager stated, however, “I don’t know
[what ‘information sharing’ means], and that’s one of the problems I think
we have right now.”36 Several participants also defined information sharing as a task state and local officials are expected to do without much in
return from the federal level. One manager stated, “Information sharing
means a two-way street, but more often it’s a one-way street.” Another
claimed, “It means information going to the JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task
Force] and very little coming back.”37
One analyst speculated about why shared meaning of open source information sharing was difficult to obtain: “I think part of the issue is that
because [information] is open source, nobody considers that sharing. [Analysts and officials] just think it’s out there, and they can access it anytime
they want.”38 This analyst further explained, “In our particular organization, at the fusion center here, I don’t think there are criteria, or any kind
of outline, on how [analysts and officials] think they’re going to use open
source material. . . . It seems like most fusion centers use open source, but
there’s no official protocol as to how it’s supposed to be used.”39 Another
analyst stated, however, “Open source has been a critical part of what we
do on a daily basis—and it has been. Any intelligence unit will tell you
that. Especially [when] trying to get current information about people,
it’s really the only source to get that kind of stuff. . . . I know there’s a lot
of rhetoric, and a lot of companies are trying to sell open source stuff, and
they’re trying to make it like open source is so brand new . . . but come on!
It’s been going on for 20 years. This stuff is a regular part of the job.”40
Wide-ranging understandings of what constitutes open source information sharing raise the question of what, exactly, stakeholders gain by
delimiting certain practices as open source–related. As indicated earlier,
one could argue that open source information sharing has, in one sense,
always been practiced within the homeland security sector, given that access to classified information has traditionally been rare among law enforcement and emergency management personnel. It therefore appears
that homeland security officials use the term “open source” mainly to demarcate enhanced exploitation of the Internet through various techniques
and technological tools. The term also signals a more structured or systematic approach to information collection, analysis, and dissemination
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than might otherwise be the norm for homeland security–related organizations. Finally, the term evokes the logic of information sharing and
officials’ desire to see collaboration institutionalized within and across
homeland security and national security organizations.
Nevertheless, blurring distinctions between information and intelligence create problems of interpretation and response ( just as in the case of
the broader intelligence community). As one analyst observed, “I think it
boils down to how do you use [information]. . . . How do you make ‘open
source information’ intelligence? I think that is where the rub comes in for
a lot of intelligence analysts. . . . I think it’s a safe argument to make that
information is not in-and-of-itself intelligence. But you certainly can’t exclude information if it doesn’t come from classified means. And I think
that although it’s inaccurate, classified has become synonymous with intelligence. So, in other words, classified data is intelligence, and that is not
always the case.”41
Varying definitions of open source information sharing suggest that
institutional members may be reacting to official open source discourse
primarily because new rules require a demonstrated organizational response. Invoking open source is a way to sustain institutional legitimacy
in an environment where a great deal of homeland security information
is available to noninstitutional actors. However, the lack of perceived effectiveness of DHS open source initiatives—as indicated in the House
Homeland Security Committee’s 2008 report—may also relate to vague,
untimely, and excessive information received via homeland security information sharing systems.
Vague, Untimely, and Excessive Information
Participants in this project commented on the poor quality of the homeland security information that they received from federal-level information sharing systems. One said, “It’s all after the fact. There’s little value
added.”42 Another stated, “When it first came out, I was pretty active on
LLIS [Lessons Learned Information Sharing, an open source information
sharing system], but then I thought, ‘Why am I doing this?’ ”43 A third law
enforcement officer declared of the information, “It’s mostly useless.”44
One analyst elaborated how vague information constrains organizational
effectiveness: “We’ll get a vague warning about threats to water treatment
facilities, and there are several water treatment facilities in this area. The
warning will be based on ‘unconfirmed information.’ So, I’m left wondering whether I should go speak with the water treatment operators. I’ll call
the FBI to get more information and they’ll say, ‘We don’t have any more
information.’ I can’t get any specifics. There is just not enough detail for
me to go to the city and request the money to harden those facilities. If I go
to my chief with that information, he’s going to laugh at me.”45
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Timeliness is also an issue. One analyst explained, “I’ll tell you, I’m an
analyst, and the most valuable resources are the ones that have up-to-date
information. There’s a lot of people [who] try to sell you databases, try to
get you to use certain things, but if the information is not up-to-date, then
I’m not going to use it, and I’m not going to report it.”46 Participants explained that the types of information useful for them in conducting their
work include the following: “Geographically specific information and intelligence would be helpful instead of broad, general statements about
threats”;47 “Specific information about suspects and bad guys”;48 “Actionable intelligence. This is something I need to know because it’s something
I could or should react to.”49 These responses underscore that officials and
analysts face a dilemma in determining an appropriate level of vagueness,
or equivocality, in the messages they disseminate via open source information sharing systems. Crisis communication scholars have argued that
“unequivocal statements [made by organizational representatives] during
a crisis might be less valuable than probabilistic statements, [which reflect]
more realistically the lack of precise predictability in many crisis situations
and [allow] stakeholders to make their own qualitative assessments.”50
These comments suggest, however, that an overabundance of equivocal
information in pre-event emergency contexts can lead information sharing systems users to devalue those systems. This finding affirms the claim
that, in the context of open source, “the question of appropriate levels of
equivocality in crisis messages remains largely unanswered.”51
However, participants universally valued interpersonal communication
with their colleagues, finding it the most useful source of relevant information for their operations. One participant explained, “The best source
for information I get is from my contemporaries in other jurisdictions
close by that I work with on a regular basis. We meet frequently and email
frequently. [My colleagues provide] information that has been vetted and
is of value.”52 The value officials placed on interpersonal communication
likely stemmed, at least in part, from the opportunity it provided for officials to hold each other accountable, construct shared interpretations, and
immediately demonstrate their knowledge and expertise.53 Nevertheless,
the government’s open source information sharing strategy emphasizes
technological systems rather than interpersonal communication.
Information glut is also a persistent problem within intelligence organizations.54 Even with the establishment of official homeland security information sharing services and portals, the volume of information analysts
receive is potentially debilitating. One stakeholder explained, “One of the
biggest issues is that there is so much information there, so much being
pushed to the fusion centers to try and digest and find value in, it really
becomes a challenge.”55 Another analyst explained, “I have 85 accounts
now [with] different log-ins for those kinds of sources. . . . [It is a] major
pain in the butt. It’s just part of my job, I guess, to keep my accounts up
to date. You use them because you have to use them, or lose them.”56 One
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manager explained, “There are so many different databases that it makes
it very difficult for the people who are actually doing the investigations to
get useful information in a timely manner.”57 The volume of open source
information inundating analysts and officials is likely leading many to delete or ignore much of it. Vague and untimely information, as well as information glut, may make homeland security officials and analysts weary of
institutionalizing open source practices that exacerbate those conditions.
Cultural Divisions
Institutional members promote culture when it is in their interest to do
so. For example, one analyst explained, “I’m definitely all for information
sharing. I like the cultural shift that I’ve seen at the federal government
level from ‘need to know’ . . . to ‘responsibility to share.’ I think that’s
a long time coming, but there definitely is value for law enforcement at
times to be segregated from the private [and] public sector because the
law enforcement–sensitive world that we deal with in law enforcement is
what we need. We need law enforcement–sensitive information to help us
go about our day-to-day activities.”58 Yet this analyst interpreted culture
as a phenomenon that can be discursively engineered by federal officials,
as well as a property of occupational groups that develops as a result of
a particular world a group deals with. The question thus arises whether
top-down cultural change initiatives are able to overcome entrenched subcultural norms.
Stakeholders generally argued that officials’ cultural change initiatives
would probably be too weak to overcome subcultural divisions. For example, one contractor explained, “I think culturally, institutionally, and
traditionally each division of the community . . . has their own process
and protocols, and in my experience, none of them like to share with the
others. Now, I understand the rhetorical approach that ‘information sharing is good and great, and let’s all do it,’ but quite frankly, that’s still a
major obstacle in the people I’m running around with: ‘What’s mine is
mine and what’s theirs is theirs’ kind of thing . . . even though the rhetoric is ‘let’s all be one big happy family.’ ”59 Other officials indicated a more
positive relationship between institutional subcultures. One local official
stated, “We’ve always had excellent working relationships with [federal
officials].”60 Stakeholders nevertheless tended to invoke culture to explain
occupational differences, criticize and/or praise top-down change initiatives, and note generational tensions surrounding the use of open source–
related technologies. One analyst explained, “I hate to say this because
this is probably not going to sound very positive: when DHS tries to promote something, in many cases, it’s almost like a lot of people view that
as [DHS] telling you what to do. And in some cases, that [produces] a
negative reaction, and it doesn’t matter that the thing might be great, or
the project might be great, or the tool might be wonderful; sometimes it’s
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presented as: ‘You have to use it because DHS says so,’ and I think that’s
a problem.”61
Others noted subcultural differences between sworn law enforcement
personnel and civilians: “If you are a sworn law enforcement person, there
is a different viewpoint than if you are a civilian, and I think that is part
of the cultural [difference]. There’s basically two cultures right there, right
from the beginning, and I think that’s part of why certain things are seen
with different eyes. . . . I think that’s also going to change because you’re
going to get both cultures to kind of see the value in the other culture, and
then, when we finally figure out how to merge and everybody’s on the
same page, I think that’s going to change the view towards open source as
well.”62 One analyst further distinguished between subcultures based on
generational differences: “[With older analysts], their degree of expertise
with technology is usually far below younger people, and I think older
analysts or investigators, in general, aren’t used to collecting. Analysts
especially—they’re not used to collecting information. Usually, information is given to them, you know, I mean, from a collector. So, when you’re
dealing with open sources, you’re the person who is actually collecting
the information. So, you know, that’s another step in the intelligence cycle
that you have to be involved with. That’s the difference.”63
Finally, stakeholders invoked culture or mind-set in order to distinguish
between open source advocates and those who continue to privilege classified sources:
The irony of the open source today is that a person like Charlie Allen [the former
head of DHS Intelligence and Analysis] . . . his mind-set is to stay on the dark side.
His mind-set is not to develop open source assets or capabilities to any great extent. And if you come up with an analytical product? Classify it. There is so much
information available that can be transferred, here and there, to regional centers
to inform and educate police, emergency services, and others who are engaged in
homeland security activities—but as soon as you classify it, you shut them out.
You can’t give a clearance to everybody, every cop on the street. Every police officer, every fireman can’t get a clearance; but if you have a developing threat to the
Brooklyn Bridge, you want to be able to get the information out to as many people
as possible—even citizens.64
These examples suggest that the meanings of open source information
sharing are constructed in relation to varying institutional/subcultural
identities, organizational contexts, and strategic interests. While many
participants acknowledged that in principle information sharing is vital
to homeland security, several comments suggest that current information sharing initiatives are also interpreted as a way for federal officials to
bridge the government’s post-9/11 (and Iraq and Katrina) credibility gap
with Congress and the public. The open source information sharing issues
identified here are certainly well-known to many government officials.65
Yet officials have responded to these challenges by simply asserting the
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need for a culture of information sharing within and among federal, state,
and local agencies. This strategy potentially glosses over critical differences that influence stakeholders’ perceptions and practices. We see in
this case that subcultures are likely to perpetuate contrary views from
the overall top-down push from DHS officials. Clearly, “different [subcultural] members may interpret the same information from different frames
of mind.”66 The comments presented here indicate likely friction points
as the government attempts to align members’ beliefs about institutional
subcultures in efforts to diffuse open source information sharing concepts
and practices.
OPEN SOURCE AND CULTURAL CHANGE DISCOURSE
CONFRONTS COMPETING DISCOURSES
In addition to problems stemming from incoherence, homeland security
officials seeking to institutionalize open source confront the challenge of
competing discourses. Two of these discourses include, specifically, privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights and commercial imperatives. The former is relatively well established, while the second is, admittedly, loosely
knit; I describe commercial imperatives here as a discourse for its heuristic
value in demarcating a set of concerns that may impede the institutionalization of open source in this sector.
Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights Discourse
In response to a question about how DHS’s stated concern for privacy,
civil liberties, and civil rights could influence the institutionalization of
open source within the homeland security sector, one participant stated
the following:
We’ve had those discussions, and I said, “Listen, I’m just as sensitive to that issue
as anybody else.” But, there are a couple of things to put it in perspective. Number
one, the alternative is to have the Open Source Center do it. So, I think if we ask
the general public, “Would you prefer DHS or CIA to handle domestic open source
exploitation?” I think it would be fairly unanimous, you know? So, that’s kind of
one part of it, and the other part of it is, you know, we really need to articulate that
[the] protection of civil liberties is paramount, and so we’ve done that in a number
of ways. . . . You‘ll see that that’s woven into . . . one of the four major goals . . . and
then heaped in things like our training that we’re doing. We’re going to have specific sections on civil liberties, and implications, and what not. And in many ways,
the domestic side is more restricted than the foreign side in terms of what you can
do with open source.67
One analyst explained, however, that privacy, civil liberties, and civil
rights concerns were already well integrated within open source practices:
“Everything that we put out that has anything to do with a U.S. person, or
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anything that can be construed as a privacy issue, is vetted, like, six ways
to Sunday. In fact, I doubt very much if there is an issue or question [that]
something would go out. I think they are very, very cognizant here, and
probably because of the state police history. . . . You have to be very, very
careful what you say about whom and who you put this out to. So, I think
they deal with that very well already.”68
Within DoD-related organizations that possess a homeland security
mandate, however, U.S.-persons issues appear unresolved. One analyst
explained it this way: “DoD is prohibited from contacting folks outside
of the [intelligence] community and outside of DoD. . . . [DoD’s open
source information sharing policy] conflicts with other regulations and
laws . . . about activities that intelligence officers [are] allowed to participate in. These obviously were prior to the DNI push for collaboration,
and before the congressional push for open source use within the [intelligence] community as well. Those regulations are still there and haven’t
been changed.”69 This analyst elaborated further:
Say we were responsible for protecting defense critical infrastructure, which is,
of course, attached to civilian infrastructure—they are intertwined. . . . Current interpretation would be you wouldn’t even be able to have [civilian infrastructure]
information because it is owned by private companies and private U.S. citizens.
And even in that case, where you have a mission to do so, there have been rulings
against [collecting open source information]. It becomes difficult to defend military bases in the United States. In the way the Department of Defense does planning, for example, you can’t defend a base against a threat that’s outside your base
because you can’t collect on that threat outside your base.70
This comment suggests that anxiety and frustration remain within areas of
DoD that are involved in configuring open source and privacy discourses
and practices. Another open source practitioner stated his frustration:
I believe, in general, that the USG [U.S. government] is adopting a “head in the
sand” approach—unduly limiting the use of open source material by USG agencies for fear of accusations of Big Brother–type schemes. . . . While working for the
USG, I was limited, due to my position, into following EO [Executive Order] 12333
and DoD Directive 5240.1. . . . Bottom line, I could not use open source information to report on any threat that was considered a “U.S. person” by the guiding
directives unless [a U.S. person] posed a clear and direct threat to my organization.
While I was free to read or watch anything I chose on my own time, I could not include that information in official papers or briefings on those topics.71
Another DoD employee countered, however, with the following:
That’s a sham of an excuse. When was the last time you’ve ever seen any public figure ever, ever prosecuted for making a bad call on a U.S. person? Name
one prosecution, name one time the DoD has ever been investigated about that,
just one. Never, to my knowledge, or anyone else I know, has anyone ever been
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investigated for making the wrong call regarding information on the Internet
about a U.S. citizen/U.S. person. This is an excuse. This is a reason that these people . . . use time and time again to not do anything about actually making use of
the [open source] information out there. It’s an excuse.72
One stakeholder thus concluded it this way:
I think there are a lot of eager lawyers who like to look for problems in this area.
I think that should not be a problem because, you know, if it’s open source, it’s
open source. There are all kinds of privacy issues that come up in every day’s copy
of the New York Times, and that’s just the way life is. . . . I realize that the lawyers
have a different perspective. I realize that they have to respect the provisions of the
National Security Acts and other codes that do not want the foreign intelligence
agencies like the CIA and DIA getting involved in anything that focuses on U.S.
persons.73
This stakeholder’s comment, “if it’s open source, it’s open source,” captures officials’ desire to institutionalize open source practices without
adequately addressing what open source is vis-à-vis the competing discourse of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights. This situation endures:
DHS under secretary Caryn Wagner testified before the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security in 2010, “DHS Open Source collection efforts resulted in reporting on a number of specific terrorist and individual
behaviors by organizations and individuals, such as Anwar al Awlaki;
this kind of reporting provides advice on potential changes to operational
and security procedures that keep communities and the nation safer.”74
Wagner noted that DHS “used mobile training teams to conduct Open
Source methodologies and capabilities training at 24 fusion centers and
component facilities,” but she assured members of congress that training
included “a formal block . . . on understanding and respecting the privacy
of individual citizens.”75
Commerce Trumps Culture
Interviews with government employees and contractors suggest that
commercial imperatives are perhaps the most significant issue complicating officials’ cultural change initiatives. Specifically, several contractors
interviewed for this project do not yet see the institutionalization of open
source occurring. While ICD 301 requires that intelligence agencies include
open source contributions within their intelligence products, one contractor claimed that some agencies are using open source contractors in order
to simply “check the box.”76 In other words, this contractor explained that
agencies use contractors to minimally fulfill their obligations under ICD
301. ICD 301 obligates agencies to demonstrate their use of open source,
but the document can do little to ensure that members do the following:
(1) deeply inculcate open source values as cultural elements; (2) usefully
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integrate open source and classified intelligence in their operations; or
(3) assess the overall worth of their open source activities. This contractor
suspects—but has no concrete evidence—that his company’s open source
products are being cited within classified intelligence assessments merely
in order to meet obligations under ICD 301—the actual contribution of
these products being more-or-less irrelevant. This contractor was not unduly concerned with this situation, however. Another contractor used an
analogy to explain why he, too, was mostly unconcerned with the end
result of his company’s open source contributions: “We grow grapes, we
collect grapes, and we sell them off. So, whoever wants to buy our grapes,
they are welcome to it. For the right price, we’ll share or not.”77
Officials’ remarks concerning open source information sharing generally omit consideration of commercial imperatives. Contractors, however, consistently note two critical issues. First, commercial firms may
be reluctant or unwilling to provide certain open source analytical products to the OSC or other government organizations that might distribute
those products broadly. This is due to fears that competitors will be able
to mimic that firm’s analytical approach, attempt to seize the firm’s contracts, or lure away its personnel. Second, government solicitations calling for substantial open source collection and/or analysis activities are
often bundled with sensitive/classified requirements. This situation prevents anyone lacking the requisite security clearance from being aware
of the open source requirements, thereby limiting the number and range
of approaches that might be brought to bear on the problem. Thus, here
is where the dominant institutional logic of secrecy directly contradicts
espoused values of openness and participation. However, one contractor dismissed this contradiction, arguing that it was understandable that
U.S. agencies would not want adversaries to learn the government’s open
source requirements.
Nevertheless, for some stakeholders, the gulf between officials’ espoused and enacted values is abundantly clear in terms of budget allocations. As one participant noted, “You can give all the guidance you want
to. . . . It doesn’t do a lot of good to put out policy and direction and
guidance when you’re not going to fund [open source initiatives]. And if
they’re going to tell somebody they have to pull [funding for open source
initiatives] out of hide, well guess what, they’re not going to do it; it’s not
a priority to do that unless Congress makes it a priority.”78 This participant elaborated, “There’s a lot of good ideas out there [on how to use open
source effectively], things to do and ways to implement those, and there
are a lot of them . . . but they don’t go anywhere. They’re just voiced. It’s
kind of like, ‘Okay, we are meeting the minimum standard [DNI] said we
have to [in order] to improve OSINT.’ So, we’ll put some lip service to it,
and, you know, put something on paper that is not necessarily fully implemented or fully resourced—or even minimally resourced.”79
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These comments suggest that commercial and budgetary imperatives
may significantly complicate officials’ cultural change initiatives. In other
words, developing a culture of information sharing is based on the unstated premise that open source vendors will supply agencies with information products—despite knowing that these products may be widely
shared across federal, state, and local levels. This situation potentially
undermines vendors’ opportunities to maximize revenue. A significant
portion of intelligence work is now contracted or outsourced to Fortune
500 corporations and boutique intelligence shops.80 There is little public
discussion, however, of how commercial imperatives may impede open
source information sharing.
This discussion potentially casts the institutionalization of open source
within the homeland security sector in an overly negative light. It must
be emphasized that several stakeholders asserted that the institutionalization of open source is proceeding apace. However, most people with
whom I spoke emphasized the challenges confronting open source’s institutionalization. This may have been a result of my questions, as well as
the types of institutional members who agreed to answer my questions:
those with concerns about open source’s institutionalization may have
been more likely to speak with me than those who were satisfied with current arrangements. While not generalizable in a traditional sense, these
findings nevertheless point to important issues for homeland security
officials and stakeholders to consider as the institutionalization of open
source unfolds.
THE LIMITS OF CULTURAL CHANGE TEXTS
Organizational scholar Tim Kuhn argues that while “there are cases in
which people explicitly draw upon a given policy document in talk, it is far
more common, both within firms and in conversations with stakeholder
groups, to treat structuring resources as ‘background’ enablements and
constraints rendered invisible by routine practice.”81 Supporting Kuhn’s
argument, one contractor stated, “[Institutional documents are] a focus of
our public relations within the community and customers. . . . ICD 200 or
ICD 301 is what we base our relationship with [the customer] on, but we
don’t really market it, it’s more part of the personal dialogue, rather than
a focused marketing tool. It’s more of an inferred given when we are talking to our folks . . . we use it strictly as subliminal public relations.”82 An
analyst similarly stated it this way:
We definitely look at the guidelines . . . the recommendations that are provided by
the federal government for our participation in an information sharing environment—in how we can participate—taking into consideration any state-level laws
or procedures/processes/policies that may preclude certain things. But I think
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more often than not, there aren’t any state-level policies/laws/procedures that
prohibit our participation. . . . The National Strategy for Information Sharing . . . may
result in us changing our business processes. It may result in us sharing the information that we probably felt no one cared about because intelligence requirements
haven’t been shared with us.83
These issues can also be interpreted as tension between coercive and
normative elements within open source discourse. One stakeholder captured this dynamic when he stated, “There are only so many directives
[officials] can put out regarding information sharing, so I think they’re
doing the best that they can do. Whether the industry and the community
accept [open source] and utilize it, at the end of the day, is up to them.”84
This theme was echoed by other participants who noted that vision documents are unhelpful in establishing what open source practices should actually entail. For example, one participant observed, “I don’t think there
is [a policy] on how to do open source intelligence collection, analysis,
and research. . . . There is some vision and guidance that has come down
though the chain of command. . . . But the only thing it says is that ‘the intelligence centers will have an OSINT capability’—not further defined. So,
commanders can say, ‘Yes, I have an OSINT capability; I have all source
analysts who can do research on the unclassified Internet.’ ”85 Another
analyst stated, “I’m not sure that anybody who really reads [ICD 301] is
going to understand how that relates to open source—I think that agencies like the CIA and the FBI and other agencies realize the value of open
source much more than local and state, or fusion centers.”86 One analyst
concluded the following:
I think the bottom line is that Congress must press [homeland security–related
organizations] to [institutionalize open source]. And [organizations] must have
congressional oversight, and they must report back to Congress, and Congress
is going to have to make them do it. I truly don’t think they’ll do it on their own.
They will to some extent, but it’s that minimal thing. Congress tells them minimally, ‘You have to do this,’ and that’s what [organizations] are going to do. So,
if Congress raises those stakes and makes them higher, and makes them more
specific, then [organizations] will have to raise their standard, and they’ll have to
comply. I’m worried that Congress is the only one that holds that power. The [DNI
open source] leadership doesn’t have it—it has to come from Congress.87
In terms of this tension between top-down coercion and more normative, bottom-up approaches, one analyst remarked, “I think it takes both.
I don’t think you can have policy makers forcing things on people because that rarely works, and I think that you can’t just have people from
below trying to push it up. [Open source] might be recognized as valuable [or] it might not. I think it’s a combination of the two.”88 This tension
concerning the coercive and normative elements of cultural change was
widespread. One analyst stated it this way:
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This fusion center is run by a state police organization, which many of them are,
and in the police or the law enforcement atmosphere, [analysts] don’t really use
open source or they never have before. . . . I think a lot of agencies—to them intelligence is information that is either sacred, or “law enforcement–sensitive,” or not
available through other channels. And they don’t necessarily believe that open
source is a valuable resource, which is funny because they do use it.89
These comments underscore the difficulty of pursuing a change strategy that emphasizes a normative commitment to the value of open source
within an institution that has historically relied on regulative, top-down
guidance. One official explained how this tension between normative
and coercive elements is key to understanding the current state of open
source’s institutionalization:
I’d make a distinction between “operationalized” and “institutionalized.” “Institutionalize” is very easy. Every agency has received a number of open source positions and resources. So, from an institutional standpoint, you can now identify
open source officers in every agency in the intelligence community. . . . In terms of
structure, I would say that this is the first time in the history of the United States
intelligence community that there are dedicated open source positions across the
board. . . . But in terms of operationalizing [open source], that’s very different. We
are still a long way from people looking at their business processes and saying,
“Okay, how do we inject open source in here?”90
As indicated across the speeches and documents discussed in this book,
officials have thus far emphasized training as the best mechanism for developing awareness and appreciation of open source—in other words, for
influencing normative practices. However, organizational scholars Alex
Kondra and Deborah Hurst offer a warning: “[The] likely success of training and development activities is questionable for altering behaviour governed at the normative level. Perhaps training and development activities
should be coupled with coercive forces for success or introduced with
enough uncertainty so that new rewarded and mimicked behaviours take
root.”91 This case study thus suggests that as a result of discursive incoherence and competing discourses, normative and coercive forces may be
pulling in different directions across textual, discursive, and social levels
of practice. In other words, while senior intelligence officials and policy
makers have stressed the need for normative changes, at least some institutional members involved in operations see coercion as necessary and
desirable in spurring the adequate institutionalization of open source.
This situation creates a paradox, however, in that from one perspective
monitoring and enforcement are not required for practices that are institutionalized.92 From this perspective, open source is far from being
institutionalized within the homeland security sector. Indeed, many of
the comments in this chapter underscore that officials’ vision of open
source is not widely shared. As organizational scholars Nelson Phillips
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and Namrata Malhotra state, “If an institution is enduring and stable then
it does not need regulatory sanctions or other social controls to support
it—it is simply taken-for-granted.”93 This has clearly not yet occurred for
open source within the homeland security sector.
CONCLUSION: THE SYMBOLISM OF
OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION SHARING
This case study explained how officials leverage the logic of information
sharing and cultural change vocabulary in order to spur open source’s
institutionalization within the homeland security sector. This case study
has also described how institutional members in this sector respond to
cultural change initiatives. These responses evoked images of progress,
technological sophistication, and collaboration, but also images of confusion, turf war, and bureaucratic ineptitude. These responses also demonstrated how institutional members construct culture as an organizational
phenomenon that is both shaped by and resistant to officials’ textual practices. Thus, the task of relating the use of open source information sharing
systems to tangible improvements in preparedness is complex. One stakeholder noted the following:
The prevention business is something that is difficult to measure. There are threat
assessments or threat advisories . . . that come out from DHS . . . regarding a potential threat—a potential act of terrorism. . . . It could be a threat to subways, could
be a threat to trains, you know, whatever. So, the natural reaction at our state and
local level, and our law enforcement level, is to increase presence at whatever critical infrastructure or whatever transportation mechanism that is the subject of the
threat. . . . I don’t know that we could pull into a singular instance where we said
as a result of [open source] we prevented a terrorist attack, but certainly, I can’t sit
here and say it didn’t have a positive impact on preventing one—only because the
mere presence alone of a uniformed officer on a train maybe/probably/certainly
is, I would assume, a deterrent for a terrorist action.94
Given the challenges of assessing open source’s tangible influence on
homeland security preparedness, as well as the dearth of such assessments, this study suggests the need for comparative and longitudinal
research of open source information sharing. Open source information
sharing is an ambiguous concept, yet its associated meanings and practices can be pinpointed within different organizational contexts and across
time using both qualitative and quantitative methods. A longitudinal approach would help assess how official and stakeholder conceptions of
open source information sharing and associated practices are changing
over time. Such studies could assist policy makers and practitioners pinpoint the utility of various open source information sharing strategies, as
well as the impact of associated organizational change initiatives. Attempting to create a trusted partnership and a culture of information sharing in
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105
a discursive environment characterized by considerable incoherence and
competing discourses may undermine the government’s open source initiatives. Officials need to address these challenges, as well as conduct their
own investigations of social practice, in order to assess the results of the
institutionalization of their preferred vision of open source.
While this case study has focused on institutional open source discourse
and the responses of institutional members, future research could explore
the interconnections between institutions and citizens in the context of
homeland security. As one stakeholder declared, “The first line of defense
in homeland security is an informed citizen.”95 However, the majority of
those interviewed for this study agreed with the sentiment of one analyst,
who said, “I don’t think [open source intelligence] should be put on the
front page of the Star-Ledger, you know what I mean? There’s a difference
between sharing with the general public and sharing with people who
are, for example, with the power company or the electric company, or,
you know, some other private industry like a pharmaceutical company.”96
Nevertheless, possibilities exist for exploring how open source discourse
could facilitate broader citizen participation in homeland security affairs.
In 2010, the DNI acknowledged these possibilities in a report to Congress
on the status of the ISE. The report stated, “We recognize that to support
the Administration’s commitment to openness and transparency, we must
extend those efforts to include the American public as well.”97 Demonstrating the discursive flexibility of culture as a tool for spurring organizational change, the report asserted that the Obama administration’s Open
Government objectives could be met, in part, through “creating and institutionalizing a culture of open government.”98 Yet this impulse appears to
only extend only so far: “Most federal, state, local, and tribal ISE participants maintain public websites that provide the public with useful information and include directions about where the public can send comments
and suggestions.”99 Comments and suggestions do not generally equate to
substantive influence.
One area where citizens are, in fact, able to access DHS open source
products is through DHS’s OSINT branch. Available products include the
following: Daily Infectious Diseases Report; Daily Drug Trafficking and Smuggling Report; Daily Cyber Report; Daily Human Trafficking and Smuggling;
Daily Illicit Commercial Trafficking and Smuggling; and Homeland Security
Central Digest. However, these daily reports are largely assembled from
press clips from BBC News, Reuters, and the Associated Press. One day’s
headlines for Homeland Security Central Digest on November 18, 2010,
included the following: “US Bans Kenyan Officials, Businessman over
Drugs;” “Super Bowl: ‘Magnet for Sex Trafficking;’ ” “Woman Returns to
Florida from Haiti with Cholera;” “Food Safety Bill Clears Key Hurdle in
Senate;” and “U.S. Mounted Border Cop Shoots Entrant from Mexico.”
All these reports are prefaced with the following information: “Redistribution is encouraged. Please feel free to forward this email w/ attachment
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to your co-workers and colleagues that might be interested in this product.” Notably, DHS appears to have overcome copyright worries by including this disclaimer:
Full article text and may contain copyrighted material whose use has not been
specifically authorized by the copyright owner. This information is available to
DHS, in the interest of illuminating incidents and events that may have an impact
on national security and critical infrastructure protection. We believe that this constitutes a “fair use” of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of
the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes
of your own that go beyond ‘fair use,’ you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.100
Acknowledging the countervailing discourse of privacy, civil liberties,
and civil rights, the reports state, “This product may contain U.S. person
information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to
understand, assess, or act on the information provided. It should be handled in accordance with the recipient’s intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures.”101 Nevertheless, support for DHS open
source initiatives appears uncertain. Subscribers to these reports were told
in 2010, “Due to non-appropriation of fiscal year 2011 funding, the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, will be required to discontinue production and distribution of the DHS Daily Illicit
Commercial Trafficking and Smuggling Report along with DHS Daily Infectious Diseases Report effective November 1, 2010. We will resume production and distribution as funding becomes available.”102
The next chapter explores whether and how more robust attention to
open source discourse could serve as a site of struggle among citizens and
officials in the development of national security.
CHAPTER 6
Open Source as a Resource
for Citizen Participation in
National Security Affairs
About eighty percent—eight zero—of the information that one needs is
available in open source materials.
—Former CIA analyst Ray McGovern in the 2006 documentary
9/11: Press for Truth1
The most personally satisfying accomplishment for me . . . would be to raise
the level of discussion around open source, to get beyond the “open source
is good” stipulation and the accurate, perhaps clichéd, characterizations like
“source of first resort,” or quotes like Allen Dulles once said, “Eighty percent
of what I need to know comes from open source.”
—Doug Naquin, director, Open Source Center, 20082
Chapters 4 and 5 explored the institutionalization of open source within
the U.S. intelligence community and the homeland security sector. These
chapters illustrated how open source’s institutionalization involves contestation over words, logics, and theories of how institutions change. These
words, logics, and theories are displayed within documents, speeches,
daily conversations, and organizational practices. Officials work to institutionalize preferred meanings of open source through the production,
circulation, and embedding of authoritative and influential texts; however, contradictions arise from officials’ attempts to hold the logics of secrecy and openness in tension within open source plans and policies. The
coherence of open source discourse and the prevalence of competing discourses influence how institutional members—especially within organizations possessing a homeland security mandate—interpret and respond
to top-down cultural change initiatives.
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This chapter differs from the previous two by exploring open source as
a potential resource for citizens seeking to influence U.S. national security
deliberations. An institutional discourse perspective suggests that a low
level of textual production, dissemination, and consumption has so far
impeded the institutionalization of open source vocabulary within the citizen activism arena. Nevertheless, the first chapter epigraph by former CIA
analyst Ray McGovern suggests possibilities for reducing the metric distance between U.S. citizens and national security experts and elites. Then
DHS under secretary for intelligence and analysis, Charles Allen, noted in
2008 that George Kennan, “the father of our containment policy against
the expansionism of the Soviet Union, [once] said that he believed that
95 percent of the information needed for national policy decision-making
could be found in the open.”3 Such assertions—perhaps unintentionally—
raise questions regarding the appropriate role of citizens in U.S. national
security affairs given the ubiquity of open source information. The second
epigraph by Doug Naquin, however, underscores how institutional members tend to downplay discussion of open source’s democratic potential.
This chapter explores these tensions in order to speculate whether and
how citizens could develop what I term an open source discourse community. Using the case of the 9/11 families, I explain how such a community
could potentially overcome persistent barriers to more direct participation
in U.S. national security affairs.
COMPETING IMAGES OF THE CITIZEN OPEN
SOURCE PRACTITIONER
A citizens’ open source discourse community could take a variety of
forms. For example, some officials might consider Shannen Rossmiller an
ideal citizen open source practitioner. According to her website, “[Rossmiller] is the West’s premiere ‘cyber-hunter,’ trolling for terrorists on the
blogosphere. Her daring online stings and subsequent captures have
brought international accolades, headlines—and the ire of the world’s
worst. But to millions of fellow Americans, this Montana mom of three has
simply become the home-front face of 9/11 courage.”4 A former municipal judge, Rossmiller gained notoriety for using the Internet to ensnare
would-be jihadists, aiding intelligence, law enforcement, and military officials in their efforts to thwart terrorism. For example, based largely on
Rossmiller’s testimony, Army Specialist Ryan G. Anderson was found
guilty in 2004 of five counts of seeking to aid al Qaeda and attempted espionage. Anderson was sentenced to five concurrent life terms in prison.
A reporter said of Anderson’s trial, “[Rossmiller] identified herself as a
member of 7-Seas.net, a global organization that tracks terrorist activity
and provides the information to government and military officials. After
she saw the posting from ‘Rashid,’ she posted a phony call to jihad against
the United States. Rashid wrote back. ‘He was curious if a brother fighting
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109
on the wrong side could join or defect,’ she said. After a series of e-mails,
Rossmiller contacted the Homeland Security Department, which put her
in touch with the FBI. Anderson, 26, was arrested . . . after he allegedly
tried to pass information to undercover Army investigators.”5 Rossmiller
appears to embody officials’ preferred image of an entrepreneurial and
evangelical open source practitioner: an innovator who uses open sources
to confront defined threats to U.S. national security. Evangelical may here
be interpreted literally: Rossmiller’s husband cites the couples’ Christian
faith as their “ultimate protection” against vengeful adversaries.6 Rossmiller’s website is filled with World War II–era iconography, demonstrating the relevance of open source officials’ narratives about World War II
open source practitioners described in chapter 4.
Another version of a citizens’ open source discourse community might
envision citizens as active participants in the broader deliberation of U.S.
national security policy. For example, between 2001 and 2004, the 9/11
families gleaned information from the Internet and other sources to help
them achieve a remarkable level of direct—albeit temporary—participation
in U.S. national security affairs via their work with the 9/11 Commission.
While the term “9/11 families” generally refers to the relatives of all those
who died during the 9/11 attacks, it increasingly demarcates a select group
of victims who pressed government leaders for investigations into the catastrophe and continue to advocate for policy reforms.7 A 2006 documentary about six 9/11 families, 9/11: Press for Truth, contains a scene where
open source is explicitly mentioned. In this scene, quoted in the chapter
epigraph, former CIA analyst and national security activist Ray McGovern
states that about 80 percent of the information that one needs is available
in open source materials.8 Here, “one” presumably means an intelligence
analyst or citizen. 9/11: Press for Truth describes these families’ informationseeking activities using the vocabulary of open source. This reference to
open source works to legitimate the families’ participation in U.S. national
security affairs. This participation included testifying before Congress; participating in closed-door meetings with lawmakers, White House personnel, and agency officials; and holding routine meetings and conference calls
with 9/11 Commission leaders and staff members. The 9/11 families also
submitted dozens of questions based on their research to the 9/11 Commission during the course of its 18-month investigation, and representatives of
some of the families’ groups testified during the commission’s first public
hearing. The case of the 9/11 families thus warrants reconsideration of the
role that citizens might play within U.S. national security affairs in light of
open source developments.
My analysis is based on interviews I conducted with members of 9/11
families’ groups, 9/11 Commission staff members, and other stakeholders involved in open source advocacy and citizen participation in national
security affairs. Again, the objective of this chapter is to pinpoint opportunities and challenges that open source discourse potentially creates for
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citizens seeking to influence U.S. national security deliberations. The case
is intended as a tentative, future-looking possibility for open source discourse rather than a definitive example of how citizens can use publicly
available information to transform national security policy. I focus on how
open source discourse could potentially counter depictions of citizen participation in national security affairs as inappropriate, naive, or dangerous.
This case thus follows others that have explored the role of citizens within
national security affairs: Bernard Lown and the International Physicians for
the Prevention of Nuclear War; Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Jody Williams’
campaign to end landmines; Bryan Taylor and colleagues’ work on the legacies of the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex; as well as the examples contained in Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s Activists Beyond
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics.9 Similar to these examples, the case of the 9/11 families points to persistent difficulties confronting
citizen participation within national security affairs as well as to possibilities for leveraging discursive resources to partially overcome them.
THE CASE OF THE 9/11 FAMILIES
On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 men associated with the al
Qaeda Islamist movement hijacked four commercial airliners and crashed
them into the World Trade Center in New York City; the Pentagon in
Washington, DC; and a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing 2,974
people. It was the deadliest attack against the United States since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Commentators have argued that
because the terrorists attacked both military and civilian targets, the tragedy provided the victims’ families with the “moral authority” necessary
to challenge institutional norms that have obstructed citizen participation
in U.S. national security deliberations.10 One group of family members
became known as the “9/11 Widows,” or “Jersey Girls,” as Kristen Breitweiser, Patty Casazza, Lorie Van Auken, and Mindy Kleinberg called
themselves. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, these women began “manic major
midnight Google cramming sessions that went on for hours, days, and
weeks at a time” in order to learn about the events.11 These women cited
this information during their repeated media appearances and visits to
Washington to urge congressional leaders to establish a commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks. During meetings with lawmakers, Breitweiser
would plunk down five two-inch binders brimming with pages of information related to 9/11 and lawmakers’ stated positions on national security issues. She would then use this information in advocating for the
establishment of a commission: “When we met with an elected official
or staffer who disagreed with our position, we simply went to the binders and pointed out that particular congressman’s statement in the press,
or that particular agency’s public admission that proved our point. . . .
Frankly, I think we were able to disarm them so easily because they had
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such low expectations of us; we were underestimated by all of them.”12
The women’s confidence and effectiveness was thus bolstered, in part, by
the information they gleaned from the Internet.
One source appears to have been especially influential, according to the
9/11: Press for Truth website: “The families eventually found an ally in Paul
Thompson. Dissatisfied with the incomplete picture of September 11th
presented in most news reports, Thompson became a citizen journalist of
sorts. He stitched together thousands of rare overlooked news clips, buried stories, and government press conferences into a definitive Complete
9/11 Timeline.”13 Thompson’s timeline aggregated more than 7,000 pieces
of online information in order to catalog the events surrounding 9/11. The
9/11 families discovered the timeline in 2002, and it became a valuable
tool for research by the Family Steering Committee. As Kleinberg states in
9/11: Press for Truth: “It was all our binders . . . but laid out beautifully online. And you had the ability to connect the dots.” The remainder of 9/11:
Press for Truth explores questions raised by Thompson’s timeline—the implication being that, as an example of open source, the timeline represents
much more than mere information.
However, interviews I conducted with 9/11 family members suggest
that the term “open source” did not circulate widely among this group.
Therefore, director Ray Nowosielski may have included the reference to
open source in 9/11: Press for Truth in order to help legitimate the 9/11 families’ participation in national security affairs, as well as reinforce the credibility of Thompson’s timeline. By associating the 9/11 families’ online
research efforts with a former CIA analyst (McGovern) and open source
discourse, Nowosielski resembles officials who have similarly worked to
elevate the status of public information to something much more important, worthwhile, and consequential—intelligence.
A second vignette further illustrates how the 9/11 families appear to
have used open source information to influence events. Following the establishment of the 9/11 Commission, President Bush appointed former
secretary of state Henry Kissinger as chairman. Kissinger’s appointment
prompted cries of disbelief from commentators who noted that Kissinger
had a record of deceiving Congress and had himself been accused of war
crimes.14 Members of the FSC arranged to meet Kissinger at his New York
City office to discuss the commission a few days after his appointment.
Breitweiser conducted an investigation of Kissinger prior to the meeting, uncovering potential conflicts of interest stemming from Kissinger
Associates’ roster of international clients.15 According to family members
who were present for this meeting, Kissinger became visibly uncomfortable when Van Auken asked him this question: “Would you have any
Saudi-American clients that you would like to tell us about?”16 According
to the New York Times, Kissinger stepped down from his chairman position within hours of this meeting. However, Kissinger later asserted that
he “decided to step down because resolving potential conflicts of interest
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would have meant liquidating his consulting firm . . . a step that he said
would have unduly delayed the commission’s work. He did not say he
stepped down to avoid releasing a list of clients of his firm.”17
Concerning this example, one participant in this project argued, “You’re
sort of mixing categories [open source and public information]. [The 9/11
families] could have found [information about Kissinger] by going to the
index of the New York Times, which has been around for a hundred years.”18
This comment speaks to a perceived need to demarcate open source from
other types of information—a need discussed in the previous two case
studies. These two examples of the families’ efforts nevertheless raise two
interrelated questions. First, what role did information gleaned from the
Internet and other open sources play in helping the 9/11 families influence the deliberation and development of U.S. national security policy?
Second, what opportunities and challenges does associating the 9/11 families’ activities with open source vocabulary—as occurred in 9/11: Press for
Truth—create for citizens more broadly? To help answer these questions, it
is useful to assess the 9/11 families’ activities across three distinct time periods: (1) pre–9/11 Commission, (2) the commission’s investigation, and
(3) post–9/11 Commission.
Pre–9/11 Commission Activities
Most participants and commentators agree that the 9/11 Commission
would not have been established in the absence of the 9/11 families’ efforts. One 9/11 staff member agreed: “[The families] were the force that
actually compelled Congress to set up the Commission.”19 In this effort, some 9/11 families were assisted by members of Victims of Pan Am
Flight 103. As one participant explained, “In many ways, the success of
the 9/11 families can be directly derived from the success of the Pan Am
103 families. [The 9/11 families] learned from the Pan Am 103 families
in that the families were in touch with one another and helping out one
another—Pan Am 103 was really the one incident that set everything off
that enabled a lobbying movement from victims.”20 Indeed, one member
of Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 recalled, “The widows, in particular, just
kept saying ‘somebody ought to be doing something. We ought to have
an investigation. We could do this. Somebody ought to be doing that.’ I
finally explained to her that the only person who is going to get anything
done will be her. . . . [If] the 9/11 families didn’t do it, nobody was going
to do it. About a month later, we had a rally in a park in Washington, and
it was the start of the Jersey Girls’ visits to Washington.”21 Key to the 9/11
families’ success was their moral authority, derived from their status as
victims.
National security commentators can assess how the category of “victim” works to both legitimate and delegitimate citizen participation in
policy deliberations and decision making. The label of “victim” is a moral
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and political category, and it is developed and attributed to individuals
and groups in complex—and often contradictory—ways.22 Victims of violence may skillfully use their symbolic status to assert the legitimacy of
their subsequent participation in policy making, yet the connotations surrounding their status as victims may simultaneously mark their speech for
audiences as inappropriately subjective and emotional. For example, the
9/11 Commission’s leadership generally believed that the families’ moral
authority was to be acknowledged, but only if the families remained outside arenas of official deliberation. As one staff member explained, “Victims and their families have a stake in learning what happened and seeing
that justice is done. Whichever agency has the responsibility for the investigations or judgments also has a responsibility to discharge those duties
to the victims or their surviving family members.”23 Here, victims have
no responsibility for actually participating in investigations or rendering judgments. Another 9/11 Commission staff member observed that
the principle benefit of the families’ participation was their advocacy, not
their substantive input: “The thing that made these guys successful is because [9/11] was like a Pearl Harbor. . . . It was life changing, and because
of the impact that event had, I think they were able to garner a lot of support and understanding and move things that otherwise might not have
been able to be moved.”24
Regarding the importance of the Internet to the families’ research efforts during this time period, one family member claimed, “[The Internet]
was critical, I think. Because not only were there groups like the [9/11
families] listserv [which provided a considerable volume of news and information on a daily basis] . . . there were other things: we e-mailed each
other constantly and got information from individuals much more than
organizations.”25 A 9/11 Commission staff member was more cautious,
however: “I think the collection of information—and again, I don’t even
know how much they collected, when, or why—but the collection of information probably played—and I am speculating here—probably played
a significant role in bringing these people—who were laypeople and not
experts—into the policy process and arguing for, perhaps, what the scope
of the Commission would be, but again, I would just be speculating.”26
The 9/11 Commission’s Investigation
The 9/11 families worked closely with certain lawmakers to establish a
commission to investigate the attacks despite nearly 14 months of opposition from the Bush administration. The administration finally yielded after
a 90–8 Senate vote in favor of a commission, and President Bush signed
the law establishing the 9/11 Commission on November 27, 2002. Following the resignation of Kissinger, a former Republican governor of New
Jersey, Thomas Kean, was appointed chair. Lee Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana, was appointed vice chair. The 9/11
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Commission was composed of five Republican members and five Democratic members, each appointed by his or her party leadership. Thomas
Kean, Fred Fielding, Slade Gorton, John Lehman, and James Thompson
were the Republican members of the commission. Lee Hamilton, Richard
Ben-Veniste, Jamie Gorelick, Timothy Roemer, and Max Cleland (later replaced by Bob Kerrey) were the Democratic members. Kean and Hamilton
appointed Philip Zelikow as executive director. Zelikow was a historian
from the University of Virginia and was well-known to Washington insiders. Investigative journalist Philip Shenon describes how Zelikow quickly
became a controversial figure due to his various connections with Bush administration officials, especially Condoleezza Rice.27 Shenon also explains
that the commission’s staff members were recruited mostly from academic
institutions, think tanks, and institutional sites, including the CIA.
The 9/11 families’ organizations, by contrast, were comprised of members who did not consider themselves national security experts. Regarding the goals of one 9/11 families’ organization, a member recalled, “When
we put down our original objectives, one of us raised that we don’t want
to do much—we just want to change the world. And everybody kind of
laughed and said, ‘Yeah, we do.’ So, you know, we knew that was a tall
order, and we were all in a kind of deep depression at that point. But I
think in retrospect . . . the moral authority that we somehow acquired . . .
helped us stand up and make decisions on things that probably we had
no business talking about.”28 This leader of a families group claimed that
in addition to national security, the 9/11 families also influenced the commission and other organizations’ consideration of policy areas, including
airline safety and security; high-rise building design; emergency response
planning and resources (including communication between emergency
services); organization and oversight of national intelligence services; organization of homeland security and disaster relief services; victims’ and
emergency respondents’ compensation programs; immigration policy;
foreign support of charitable causes that may be linked to terrorist organizations; and bank transaction security.
It also appears, however, that during this time period, officials, 9/11
Commission staff members, and some 9/11 family members felt ambivalent about their direct participation in national security deliberations. One
9/11 family member recalled it this way: “In the beginning, there were
very few doors that were shut to 9/11 families when they wanted to talk
to someone, which was amazing. . . . But at some point when [creating the
9/11 Commission] was done, the 9/11 families continued to want to have
those doors opened on every issue they felt like they wanted to have a say
about. . . . There are some issues that I don’t know that 9/11 families had
all that much right to feel like they had to be completely in charge of.”29 It
is therefore unsurprising that when asked whether the 9/11 families were
meaningfully involved in the 9/11 Commission’s deliberations, one staff
member asserted, “They were not. The commission’s recommendations
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were basically—they were based on fact, and on what [the staff] discovered. The families were instrumental in getting the commission up and
running and finding the truth. The recommendations that the commission
made were totally based on what [commissioners and staff] saw through
the research that they did. The families didn’t really push. I won’t say
that they had no influence, but not that I saw. The deliberations for the
recommendations came from the commissioners looking at what was figured out by the facts. . . . There were no family members in that proceeding. . . . [The commissioners] didn’t even offer that option.”30 Another staff
member agreed with this assessment, but also noted the families’ indirect
influence:
The various family groups were very important to the creation of the commission.
Their questions also influenced our work, providing a kind of added checklist of
issues we wanted to be sure we had examined. Once one gets into the substantive
work, it was more difficult to help or influence unless the groups had something to
contribute. Steve Push and his group were, for example, quite helpful to us in our
understanding of the Hamburg story and the German investigations because they
shared their insight into those proceedings and obtained copies for us of some
valuable records. Also, some other victims’ families were helpful in the investigation of [New York City’s] emergency response and suggesting some witnesses
for the hearing we held in [New York City]. Unfortunately, by 2003, a number of
group members had become deeply and understandably embittered by the Bush
administration’s opposition to the creation of the commission. This process thus
hardened suspicions and beliefs that had already been forming in the weeks after
the trauma they suffered.31
Another staff member suggested that the families’ questions may have
played a significant role: “Most of their influence was [in] the questions
that they asked us that they wanted answers for. So, in the very beginning,
we solicited from the families their list of questions, and every time they
called us with another angle, or another thing to investigate, we kept [a
list], and we made sure all those questions were answered in the commission’s report, and we gave them an annotated version of where to find their
answers, so they didn’t have to go searching.”32 Another 9/11 Commission
staff member stated, however, “But it was not like [the families] were asking questions that hadn’t dawned on a lot of people, and at the same time,
they asked a lot of questions that really bordered on conspiratorial.”33 Another participant underscored the uncertainty surrounding the families’
influence: “I don’t know if the questions from the families had anything
to do with [the Commission’s recommendations]. . . . I just don’t know
the answer to that. I tend to think not. I don’t know.”34 This staff member
added, however, the following:
It’s not clear to anyone [that] [the families] have any special standing as investigators because they lost anyone that day—or grounding in intelligence work. They
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had great concern, and that concern was addressed, [and it] should [have been]
dealt with. We spent more time with the families than we spent with anybody else.
They were part of our day from morning ‘till dusk.35
It thus appears that the 9/11 families moral authority provided only
temporary sanction for their partial involvement, but not necessarily their
substantive influence, in arenas dominated by technocratic national security discourse. Regarding the 9/11 families’ Internet research activities
during this time period, one 9/11 Commission staff member speculated,
“The only instance where their collection of information may have made
a difference was getting Kissinger . . . to resign. That anecdote works. But
that’s different, right? You should also think about the type of information they collected. On the one hand, they collected personal information
about people in the investigation: Kissinger mostly, not Mitchell as much,
and Philip [Zelikow]. That is different than information about the investigation. They were much more effective at bringing to light so-called conflicts of interest than policy.”36
Post–9/11 Commission Activities
For some 9/11 families, the commission’s Final Report marked a turning point in their struggle, which now centered on getting the commission’s recommendations codified into law. Following the disbandment of
the 9/11 Commission, all 10 commissioners formed a 501(c)(3) organization, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, to “educate the public on the issue
of terrorism and what can be done to make the country safer.”37 According
to the 9/11 Public Discourse Project’s website, the organization undertook
“a year-long, nationwide public education campaign . . . in an effort to accomplish the following objectives: [enhance] the understanding of American citizens of the nature of the terrorist threat; [and examine] key policy
issues contained in the 9-11 Commission’s final report.”38 This effort included organizing “commissioner representation at town hall meetings—
providing a public forum for citizens to evaluate how best to safeguard
America.”39 The 9/11 Public Discourse Project’s final report in December
2005 declared, “Change and reform doesn’t happen in this country unless the American people demand it. . . . The 9/11 families are an example
for every student of government: Citizen involvement makes a huge and
positive difference.”40 The 9/11 Public Discourse Project was eventually
successful in meeting its goals in that many of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations were included as part of reform legislation in 2004. The
implementation of those recommendations, however, remained uneven as
the Project’s final report and subsequent legislation makes clear.
Although many families were glad to see some of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations codified into law, others were upset by the lack
of concrete, specific accountability assigned to national security officials.
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For some families, this disappointment endures. For example, on March
3, 2009, the group September 11 Advocates released the following statement in response to Senator Patrick Leahy’s proposal to establish a truth
commission to investigate Bush-era abuses of power related to the War
on Terror: “A ‘Truth Commission’ will not fix the real problems that our
country faces, nor will it guarantee that we will get to the truth. The 9/11
Commission, which you want to model your commission after, is a perfect example of that flawed process. The 9/11 Commission was mandated
to follow the facts surrounding the events of September 11, 2001 to wherever they might lead and make national security recommendations based
upon those facts. Sadly, prior to even beginning their investigation . . . the
9/11 Commissioners agreed amongst themselves that their role was to
fact find, not fault find. This decision resulted in individuals not being
held accountable for their specific failures.”41
Given their differing perspectives and interests, it is important to remember that the 9/11 families were not a monolithic group. As a one 9/11
Commission staff member observed, “What are we suppose to do, have a
primary and ascertain [that] you’re a family member, and have a vote as to
what accountability means and how it should be implemented? And I said
this before—there are different levels of coping with grief.”42 This staff
member also stated, however, “These are individuals that turned family grief and personal tragedy into a tremendous public service to the extent that we’re safer today because of the pressure they put on [Congress]
to set up the commission and to enact the reforms. That would not have
happened without them. It is a tremendous example of citizen activism at
its best.”43 Activism continues for the members of several 9/11 families’
groups. One member of Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 warned, however,
“It’s an exhausting process. A lot of our changes are taking 20 years to
happen, and not all of it has been enacted yet, even though they were written into law years ago. I think that it’s a very exhausting and painstaking
process, but if you have the support to go at it with people—like I’m sure
the 9/11 victims can tell you and Pan Am family members can tell you—
that’s what it takes.”44 The nature and extent of 9/11 families’ influence
on national security policy thus remains an open question—the answer to
which may change in the future.
Clearly, the families can be said to have influenced policy to the extent that the 9/11 Commission was created—at least in part—as a result
of their organizing, lobbying, and media efforts. Additionally, as a 9/11
Commission staff member observed, “The role they played in pressuring
government agencies to cooperate with us was appropriate and helpful . . .
especially looking back and realizing how much time we wasted negotiating, which was such a huge part of what we had to do.”45 Regarding this
public relations role, one 9/11 family member stated, “As a family member, you become a pawn for a cause. There are politicians and staff and
everybody who would prefer to stay 50 miles away from you because you
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represent something that they’re fighting against. [But] for politicians and
industry leaders who you represent . . . you’re an amazing tool for them to
kind of advance the cause.”46
Taylor and colleagues argue that citizen advocacy should ideally lead
not only to the shaping of public opinion, but should also influence official decision making.47 Yet 9/11 Commission staff members generally indicated that the families’ influence did not extend to the commission’s
investigation or deliberations. One staff member stated, “Although the
families were instrumental in obtaining the creation of the commission, I
don’t think their contributions were decisive, one way or another, in determining whether the commission would successfully accomplish its
mission.”48 Another staff member stated bluntly, “[The families] would
probably like to think they had a significant impact on the recommendations, but I’m not so sure, in fact, you can link being a political activist to
being substantively and intellectually knowledgeable on a topic. So, you
know, it’s a little bit of a leap.”49
These comments suggest that expertise served as a boundary between
the inner and outer spheres of the metaphorical container of national security. While 9/11 Commission staff members were generally quicker to
invoke this boundary, some 9/11 family members were equally ambivalent about the extent and appropriateness of their influence. One family
member concluded, “I’m not so sure in terms of making policy [the families were influential]. I think that what we did more was we made our
voices—we spoke in a loud voice, and we spoke in unison.”50 Another
family member stated it this way: “I think the trying to influence policy
to avoid these things happening again—that’s questionable, because you
don’t know. I mean, it hasn’t happened again. . . . Could you attribute that
to our efforts? Probably not. . . . Who’s to know? From the outside, you
just don’t know.”51 Another family member argued, however, “There is
no way of proving that some of the legislation that was introduced into
Congress by a legislator was not, in fact, the result of something that the
families did or said. So, while it cannot be directly attributed or attributable to family members’ direct effort . . . it can be indirectly attributed to
family efforts. . . . I think that it is really difficult to come to a black and
white answer.”52 Most participants agree that the Internet was a vital tool
for organizing the 9/11 families and contributing to their research efforts.
Commentators have argued that the Internet allowed group leaders to
mobilize members, disseminate relevant information, and organize.53
LINKING OPEN SOURCE AND CITIZEN ACTIVISM
In their efforts to institutionalize open source, homeland security officials draw on similar discursive resources as officials within the intelligence community. Specifically, we find similarities in officials’ referencing
of key institutional documents, declarations of the need for cultural change,
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and use of customer-centric TQM vocabulary. These similarities are unsurprising given that the officials involved in the institutionalization of
open source within the intelligence community are often the same officials
involved in its institutionalization within the homeland security sector.
However, links between institutional open source discourse and citizen
activism are exceedingly thin. Nevertheless, one example of the interplay
between these discourse communities is the controversy surrounding the
Pentagon’s Able Danger initiative.
Able Danger was a classified Pentagon program conducted prior to
2001 in which intelligence analysts mined open source information in
order to contribute to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a former official associated with Able Danger, claims that the program
identified Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 attack’s perpetrators, as well as
other hijackers.54 These claims were refuted in a 2006 DoD inspector general report, yet they remain intriguing for some 9/11 family members and
other national security activists. Breitweiser recounts in her memoir that
an official associated with Able Danger briefed some of the families about
the initiative, raising provocative questions. Able Danger is often associated with 9/11 conspiracy theories and the 9/11 Truth movement. According to media scholar Jack Bratich, the 9/11 Truth movement contains
many variations and is not easily summarized but generally maintains
that Bush administration officials were somehow complicit in the attacks
or purposefully did not prevent them.55 The case of the 9/11 families is
not entirely different from the 9/11 Truth movement in that both cases involve the following questions: “Who counts as a researcher or investigator? What body is invested with the powers of articulation? How does a
noninstitutional or amateur investigation accrue cultural authority?”56
9/11: Press for Truth linked the 9/11 families’ research activities to open
source vocabulary. Clearly, however, “no single text is sufficiently powerful to bring an object into being.”57 Here, then, I conclude that a sufficient
number of texts have yet to be produced, disseminated, and consumed
to constitute a citizens’ open source discourse community. Nevertheless,
the case of the 9/11 families hints at possibilities for developing that envisioned community by linking citizen discourse and institutional texts.
Through the use of open sources, motivated citizens could become more
aware of national security issues. The concept of open source reduces the
distance between lay and expert authority, thereby subtly enhancing the
legitimacy of citizen participation in national security affairs. Stakeholders
in the private, academic, and nonprofit sectors potentially increase their
credibility and authority as contributors to national security deliberations
by describing their activities using institutional open source vocabulary.
However, intelligence officials have successfully marginalized an open
source discourse that potentially undermines the overwhelming authority of U.S. intelligence organizations to delineate the nature of national
security threats. By maintaining entrenched institutional logics, official
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open source discourse increasingly appears inadequate for critically rethinking intelligence—that is, “what [intelligence] is, what we want its
instrumental role in American society to be, and how we as citizens want
to operate within the broader framework of American laws and values.”58
Such calls for rethinking intelligence are not new. For example, former director of central intelligence (DCI) William Colby wrote in 1978, “It is essential that the relationship of the people to our intelligence apparatus
be redefined and made appropriate to modern America; the American
people must not be expected to continue to follow an intelligence tradition built for other times, realms and establishments. . . . Intelligence
must accept the end of its special status in the American government, and
take on the task of informing the public of its nature and its activities as
any other department or agency. . . . By far the most effective manner of
accomplishing the task of public education is by letting the public benefit directly from the products of intelligence, its information and assessments, and thus building an appreciation for their excellence and their
importance to decisions about American policy.”59 Nevertheless, the case
studies presented in this book collectively suggest that the possibilities
for letting the public benefit directly from the products of intelligence,
in many ways, remain as remote today as they did in 1978. As a former
senior intelligence official interviewed for this project asserted, “[The intelligence community] does not have any direct obligation to inform the
public. It has a tremendous responsibility to the electorate, to the American citizenry, in what it does for the president, and I think the American
people have to believe and have confidence in their intelligence services
as being competent to serve the president on international security issues, but that doesn’t mean you are producing products and services for
that public.”60
Another official stated, “The difficulty, of course, in terms of making
open source intelligence products available [to the public] is we’ll lose access [to sources], many times, if [the intelligence community] highlight[s]
what we’re doing. We get a lot of data because people don’t know—our
adversaries don’t know that they’re putting this data out there, or that
we’ve been able to piece it all together.”61 Similarly, another stakeholder
argued, “If [intelligence] analysts understand the intricacies of U.S. policy, and they focus on [open source] articles and come up with an analysis that really sort of reflects U.S. policy interests, I can understand why
the government might not want to see that spread far and wide. It might
give somebody a better understanding of what our interests are.”62 These
statements underscore the challenges involved in persuading the intelligence community to share open source products with the general public.
Indeed, a report titled “Moving Toward a 21st Century Right-to-Know
Agenda: Recommendations to President-Elect Obama and Congress,” by
the Right to Know Community—although addressing numerous intelligence issues—contained no discussion of open source.63
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The phrase “what our interests are” in the quotation above, however,
provides an opportunity for conceptualizing open source discourse as
a citizen resource. Specifically, I argue that open source discourse could
assist citizens in either resisting or compelling official “securitization.”
By securitization, I mean the process whereby a given phenomenon
is constructed—in other words, selected, nominated, and elected—as
an existential and widely perceived security threat.64 Securitization is
generally considered to be the prerogative of elites within the executive branch, Congress, and the intelligence community. For example, the
intelligence community is responsible for submitting to Congress each
year an “Annual Threat Assessment,” which authoritatively defines
threats to our nation. Security consultants Alex Martin and Peter Wilson
note, however, “Much of the commentary [on open source] has been on
how Governments can collate and process information that is available
in the public sphere, rather than arguing that non-Governmental bodies
and individuals can play a role in the process of setting requirements
and priorities for the collection of secret intelligence. Effectively the debate about OSINT has been largely restricted to the question of intelligence collection, rather than assessing the potential non-Governmental
contribution to the intelligence cycle as a whole.”65
A potential nongovernmental contribution to the intelligence cycle can
be broadly associated with the concept of grassroots statecraft. Political
scientist Pearl-Alice Marsh defines grassroots statecraft as “the organized
actions of citizens who are directly challenging the foreign policy of their
government through contending discourses and ‘speech acts.’ ”66 Grassroots statecraft differs from traditional forms of citizen participation such
as lobbying or interest group politics in that “practitioners of grassroots
statecraft seek to alter the very premises of national security discourse.
[Citizen practitioners] do not ask ‘whom should we support?’ but rather
‘is there a threat?’ They do not accept as given the adversarial and conflictual nature of international politics but rather ask ‘What is in the best
interests of the people involved?’ ”67
If institutional members agree that open source is superior to mere information, then open source discourse could contribute to the legitimacy,
credibility, and effectiveness of citizens groups who contest official representations of national security threats. This is because open source increasingly connotes intelligence within institutional discourse (even if many
officials do not treat the terms as exact synonyms). This connotation potentially challenges the state’s ability to unilaterally define security threats
based on official intelligence. As Marsh notes, a key element of grassroots
statecraft is the generation and dissemination of “counter-intelligence.”
Here, a “grassroots intelligentsia” offers alternative, plausible, and persuasive interpretations of ambiguous evidence auditioning for the status
of existential threat. Marsh alludes to how this process was accomplished
in the case of citizen involvement in shaping official U.S. policy toward
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apartheid South Africa in the 1980s. Rhetorical scholar Robert Ivie states
in a similar vein, “any prevailing perspective is necessarily delimited in
its account or interpretation of reality and therefore is rendered more serviceable in a divided world by spirited critique from various points of
view.”68 Grassroots statecraft may shift issues deemed by national security officials as existential threats into problems that might be addressed
by nonmilitary means. As Marsh states: “What governments deem a security ‘problem’ is, more often than not, defined intersubjectively, and not by
any objectively defined indicators. We must ask not only ‘who threatens?’
but also ‘who is threatened?’ ”69 In this way, grassroots statecraft is linked
to Critical Security Studies’ emancipatory project of explaining how most
threats to human security arise not from external enemies, but from the
projections generated by one’s own state.70
One 9/11 family member, however, was skeptical of citizens’ ability to successfully generate counter-intelligence: “When you . . . say, ‘Well, okay, the
intelligence agencies aren’t going to talk to one another. You have to make
that information available to us—or some of this information—and we’ll
connect the dots.’ That, to me, is a reach. I don’t think that’s ever going to
happen. I mean unclassified information, sure, but to have citizens in a position where we’re analyzing intelligence? I don’t ever see that happening.”71
Nevertheless, the case studies in this book collectively suggest that open
source discourse blurs (but does not eliminate) distinctions between lay and
institutional expertise. As a result, it may be increasingly difficult for officials to persuade stakeholders that information becomes intelligence only
when it is gathered, analyzed, and disseminated by institutional personnel.
As I have argued throughout this book, the distinction between information
and intelligence is rhetorically constructed in ways that often have little to
do with the intrinsic qualities of the information itself.
The suggestion to leverage open source in the production of counterintelligence is not intended to stymie official decision making. Rather, the
suggestion is based on Ivie’s argument that, “in a condition of uncertainty
and ambiguity, a decision to terminate the adversary must be based on a
strong and thoroughly vetted case that establishes a clear and imminent
threat that cannot be contained, deterred, or otherwise ameliorated by
peaceful means.”72 Similarly, Martin and Wilson state, “In the case where
fear of an enemy is firmly entrenched in Government and public opinion, it might be particularly valuable to involve external subject matter
experts who can generate hypotheses that peace is possible. Indeed an
open process which asked the question ‘what would each side need to
know about the other to confidently seek peace?’ would generate a list of
‘requirements’ which could lead to confidence-building measures, open
source research and a re-direction of intelligence collection which could
contribute to conflict resolution.”73
This discussion suggests that the recommendation for an open source
agency residing outside the intelligence community might be worth
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reconsidering. As one stakeholder observed, “[The OSC] has made a lot
of progress, but they’re still considered a part of the intelligence community. And there are people in our academic community, there are people
in our business community, who simply will not talk with them openly
about information they have that they’ve acquired through their academic
research and their business activities. [These people] will not touch them
with a 10-foot pole because they are affiliated with the CIA. As long as
that’s the case, the Open Source Center will never be successful.”74 Additionally, a 9/11 family member stated, “Congress or somebody should
have a citizen’s commission that they maintain which is able to make—
they can take things and bounce them off of them. And I think that’d be
a useful function. You’d get some of the people who’ve been affected by
security policy decisions—personally affected—and then kind of get a
wide spread representation of the people. . . . I think there’s a useful dialogue that occurs if you have a sort of forum versus just taking it from the
normal channel through your congressman, the media, or waiting until
something happens and then focusing in on one or two individuals.”75
A citizens’ open source discourse community, whether formed through
a government agency or an ad hoc commission, would immediately confront two challenging problems: vetting and voice.
THE PROBLEMS OF VETTING AND VOICE
In response to a question about whether the Internet and associated
technologies enhanced the ability of citizens to directly participate in national security affairs, one 9/11 Commission staff member stated, “You
seem to have more confidence than I do in the quality of information
available from the Internet. The Internet’s limitations are especially acute
in cases calling for ‘thick description,’ where close examination and comparison of primary source material is indispensable to judgment.”76 Similarly, a former intelligence official explained, “The difficulty there, of
course, is whether what [information] the general public has is accurate,
because there’s certainly plenty of open source information; the question
is, is it valid.”77 Access to quality information is not a problem confined
to citizens, however. As one CIA veteran observed, “[Citizens] have more
power in your analytical capability right now—your ability to talk to people, and maneuver through conferences, etc.—than almost any analyst in
the [intelligence] community, with the exception of maybe a few national
intelligence officers—and even they get hassled by the security guys.”78
Regarding voice, participants’ comments similarly display a distinction between the principle and practice of participation. As one 9/11 Commission staff member stated, “I think [participation] was in [the families’]
right as citizens, given what they’d gone through. [It’s] anybody’s right
to basically make a difference and put their two cents in. . . . That’s why
our country is who we are.”79 Another staff member similarly stated,
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“Just because I didn’t agree with the way everyone pursued [participation] doesn’t mean I don’t think it was their right to do it.”80 In principle,
then, staff members supported the right of citizen participation. In practice, however, participation is difficult due to perceived problems of representing diverse voices. A 9/11 Commission staff member asked a question
that highlighted this issue: “What are ‘the families?’ It’s a good question.
Some got more press than others. Some were more vocal and organized
than others. Some became confident media sources, and some did not.
And no one elected a leadership for the families; there were several ad
hoc organizations formed.”81 Another stakeholder observed, “There were
too many [9/11 families groups], so their objectives are all over the lot.
There’s probably 12 or 14 different 9/11 organizations. . . . There are different groups with different objectives, so it’s really difficult to say if they
accomplished their objectives. . . . The more people you have, the more
complicated it gets.”82
Thus, we find in this comment support for the claim that opponents
of direct democracy depict that form of governance as too complex and
unwieldy for effective policy making. The challenge of expertise also surfaced in this context. Several participants agreed with the sentiment of one
stakeholder who stated, “It’s always hard to make citizens focus on intelligence matters. It just is. Clearly, they would like to see the ‘experts’ deal
with it.”83 A 9/11 Commission staff member explained, “You know, the
people who did the research on this thing, for the most part, were leading
world experts on their topic. . . . So, from a substantive standpoint, I mean,
these ladies and men who were involved got up to speed on certain topics to a certain extent, but competition was pretty strong from the people
on the Commission staff who were literally leading world experts on the
topics.”84 Another staff member stated, “It’s fantastic to see citizens get
involved and learn more about the world . . . and be less ignorant about
what’s going on. At the same time, there is something to be said for people who do this for a living and have made this their life’s work. And that
doesn’t mean that experts aren’t wrong—I mean, I disagree with more
than my share of ‘experts.’ But, when citizens get involved, there needs to
be a back and forth to understand that there are people who do this for a
living, and they have something to contribute to the process, too. You can’t
become, necessarily, an expert overnight.”85
Regarding the institutional sine qua non of expertise, a member of Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 responded tersely, “National security, aviation
safety, international relations, all those things should be handled by the
‘experts,’ and look at the wonderful job they’ve done so far.”86 One 9/11
family member nevertheless stated, “I think there’s a lot that we, as citizens, don’t know, or need to know, and that’s probably not appropriate
for us to know. So maybe I would have a different view than some family members. . . . I have opinions about things, but I recognize [that] I’m
not likely fully informed, and I think that there is a danger of . . . putting
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pressure that may limit options, and that’s not something I want to see.
I feel like we have some really smart people running our government
now that I have confidence in, and they certainly could probably benefit
from input from citizens, but I’m not sure that I have the in-depth kind
of foreign policy experience or security experience that would be of any
assistance.”87
Some citizens, of course, would be eager to make their voices heard—
whether or not they perceived themselves to be well informed. Regarding this situation, one stakeholder wryly remarked, “Clearly, if you allow
every kook on the face of the Earth to be emailing and interacting with an
open source agency, they’re not going to get anything done.”88 Similarly, a
9/11 family member observed the following:
Many 9/11 families had good, constructive efforts. After 9/11 there were also an
awful lot of people who were shooting from the hip on stuff, and they were reacting emotionally, or they were reacting because they had bad information and just
didn’t have a sense of—I think you can create a lot of noise by creating too open a
forum of people who just want to bitch about stuff. . . . If you can create a forum
where you have well-meaning people who are going to do their own work and try
to be as responsive as possible and still represent, hopefully, the public view . . .
then I think it can be helpful. But a lot of these public forums just degenerate into
[shouting]. If the public officials—who are hopefully trying to put in a lot of time
and do their best—if you’re subjecting them to this on a regular basis, they are just
going to clam up, and they’re really not going to share information because they
don’t want to hear these people’s opinions. . . . I got a real education in public discourse through this whole process [the 9/11 Commission]: it doesn’t always work
as well as you think it should.89
POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE
Some participants in this project suggested that the impulse toward
democratic deliberation in the national security arena may not be suppressed; rather, it may simply be absent. As a 9/11 Commission staff
member explained, “The real issue is who cares? What people do you
think care about [deliberating national security policy]? The general public doesn’t even know where . . . Afghanistan is, let alone want to get involved with national security issues. I wish they would, but I could tell
you . . . you’re not going to find a whole slew of Americans who don’t
have a passport caring about national security issues.”90 This staff member continued, “Now, could they? Should they? Would they? Maybe. But
most of the people who have studied it and been abroad are involved. I
mean, the rest of the people are going about regular life. So, you kind of
have to think ‘yes, it could be good and maybe it should be good’ . . . but
who would it be? You have the Public Discourse [Project], and that model
worked because those people actually cared. They were interested in the
topic. They were educated on it. They weren’t just your average Joe.”91
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9/11 Commission staff members tended to argue that citizens (the 9/11
families aside) are generally uninterested in participating directly in national security affairs. We must ask, however, whether it is reasonable for
elites to maintain policies and practices that promote citizen apathy and
then treat that outcome as if it was not contingent on those policies and
practices. In contrast, one member of Victims of Pam Am Flight 103 stated,
“I think people in this country, unfortunately, have this ‘Well, what can I
do?’ attitude, and [they] don’t think they can affect change in our national
security and policy when that couldn’t be farther from the truth. I think
that they need to be kept informed and pay attention, not just by what the
media tells them, [but] by going online and reading what’s actually going
on in Washington, and keeping abreast of it, and actually being an active
participant . . . actually writing [to] and meeting with their congressional
leaders.”92
This comment suggests an opportunity to increase citizen authority and
legitimacy by integrating open source discourse within three public “dialogue strategies” advanced by security studies and communication scholars William Keller and Gordon Mitchell.93 These strategies, the authors
argue, should be used by journalists in response to an administration’s
characterization of intelligence. The authors dub these three strategies
(1) “shake the tree for unpicked cherries,” (2) “cast a pebble into the pond,”
and (3) “only fools rush in.”94 The first strategy aims to assess the actual
strength of analysis underlying an administration’s public characterization
of intelligence. For example, a journalist might have asked Vice President
Cheney the following question concerning his oft-repeated claim that U.S.
forces would be “greeted as liberators” in Iraq: “Have agencies of the US
IC conducted any official analyses that assess the strength of intelligence
data backing your claim that US forces will be ‘greeted as liberators?’ ”95
The second strategy aims to determine the level of consensus across the
intelligence community on a given issue. For example, in the case of Iraq’s
purchase of aluminum tubes as an alleged indicator of their nuclear proliferation, a question might have been the following: “Which intelligence
agency has the most technical expertise to analyze whether the aluminum
tubes are suitable for uranium enrichment, and what is its position on the
issue?”96 The third strategy aims to uncover the level of uncertainty regarding intelligence assessments in order to create more time to consider
the risks of certain courses of action. For example, in the case of Iraq’s alleged possession of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a comment might
have been, “Before committing to preventative war, we should be sure
that Iraqi UAVs pose a grave threat to US security. The greater our uncertainly about this judgment, the more likely our use of force will constitute
unprovoked aggression.”97
To these, I argue for the inclusion of a fourth strategy, which I call “open
the lid,” that includes three uniquely open source–related questions. The
first is this: Will the intelligence community share open source analysis (on a
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given issue) with the public? Assuming that such analysis omits sensitive
information on sources and methods, if the answer is no, a follow-up
question is, “Why not?” Currently, officials assert copyright issues and
the need to keep adversaries from knowing the intelligence community’s
interests in arguing against public disclosure of open source analysis. It is
highly dubious, however, to argue that such issues should preclude public
disclosure of this information if the situation in question involves the potential use of military force. The government’s open source analysis may
or may not contradict its classified assessments. Public disclosure of open
source analysis, however, could spur officials to further scrutinize classified assessments in order to avoid embarrassing recriminations should
those classified assessment later prove faulty. A challenge here is that
open source material is often integrated with classified material in official reporting. Redacting classified information from a mostly open source
report may be one option in promoting transparency. A more straightforward approach is to have the government release only those reports based
entirely on open source material, such as those occasionally produced by
the Open Source Works.
A second and related question might be this: Does the intelligence community possess credible open source reporting that contradicts its official position on this issue? This question is motivated by the WMD Commission’s
finding that available open source information occasionally challenged or
contradicted the intelligence community’s classified assessments on Iraq.
This question, like the first, aims to ensure that agencies have adequately
accounted for open source information that could influence classified
judgments. The question also implicitly asks officials to reflect on what
constitutes credible open source reporting. If open source reporting has
been dismissed, it should, at some point, be clear to the public why it has
been dismissed.
Finally, an admittedly radical question would be the following: If someone has credible information that supports or contradicts the intelligence community’s position, how can that person provide that information to the intelligence
community? Although such information can currently be provided to the
CIA though its website, this question tests officials’ level of public commitment to open source exploitation. Of course, challenges here include
managing counterintelligence, vetting, and voice concerns. Some mechanism for vetting information, discouraging false reporting, and managing
information volume would need to be created. Nevertheless, these challenges could be viewed not as insurmountable obstacles, but as difficult
problems to be solved in the service of developing and sustaining adequate national security. Of course, such radical change assumes that debate among officials and citizens over the form, content, and role of open
source information is both possible and desirable. It is likely that such a
conception of democracy “currently exists only on the horizon of America’s political imagination.”98
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CITIZENS’ OPEN SOURCE:
A COMPLICATED PROSPECT
This chapter has indicated that developing open source discourse as a
resource for citizens seeking to influence U.S. national security policy deliberations is a complicated proposition. One could argue that the 9/11
families’ binders filled with open source information contributed to their
confidence and success in establishing the 9/11 Commission. Yet the establishment of the commission appears to be where the families’ substantive influence ended. Above all, however, this case reveals stakeholders’
deep ambivalence regarding such participation. During the 9/11 Commission’s first public hearing, family members Push, Fetchet, Kleinberg, and
Vadhan repeatedly called for accountability yet consistently reinforced the
distance between the families and the commission. The families’ ambivalence regarding their participation in the commission’s proceedings suggests they may have accepted the depiction of themselves as unqualified
to participate in national security deliberations.
Along these lines, I speculate that the 9/11 Public Discourse Project represents a missed opportunity to develop a citizens’ open source discourse
community and a forum for citizen participation in national security affairs. One participant countered, however, “There was no way to institutionalize [the Public Discourse Project] unless the people that were there
were going to give up their jobs and do it for free. So that was the problem—people couldn’t work for nothing. The only way they could have
institutionalized it [is] if someone in the government had picked up on it
and paid for it.”99 Additionally, another participant stated, “I think a lot of
[people involved in the Project] got burned out. Honestly speaking, knowing the people that could have tried to see it institutionalized, they would
have said, ‘You know . . . I ’m done. I can’t do it anymore.’ ”100
It may be worth considering, however, that “democracy asks not
for people’s unlimited energy and knowledge, but for their creative
participation.”101 For rhetorical scholar Robert Asen, the value of citizen
participation lies in its qualitative contributions in bolstering public agendas, raising issues and questions, and enhancing the democratic process.
Asen states, “Democracy requires a leap of faith. Belief in democracy is
like belief in God; either one has faith or one does not. Radical skepticism
cannot be met with irrefutable, empirical proof. Democracy . . . constitutes
a moral project.”102 The question of how an environment saturated with
open source information could facilitate more democratic deliberation
of U.S. national security affairs thus remains unanswered. The next and
final chapter further explores the challenges of developing a more democratic U.S. intelligence sector based on open source developments, as well
as summarizes the contributions of this book for officials, policy makers,
scholars, and citizens.
CHAPTER 7
Open Source, Democracy, and
the Future of U.S. Intelligence
And god knows what happens now . . . hopefully worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms . . . [I] want people to see the truth . . . regardless of who
they are . . . because without information, you cannot make informed decisions as a public . . . or maybe [I’m] just young, naive, and stupid.
—U.S. Army intelligence officer Bradley Manning on why he allegedly
provided classified information to WikiLeaks in 20101
“In 15 years, there will be no more secrets.” The CIA’s Don Burke made
that assertion in 2008.2 Burke’s provocative claim informed the title of this
book. That title, No More Secrets, can be interpreted as a declaration that soon
there will indeed be no more secrets—websites such as WikiLeaks appear
to portend that future. Another interpretation views the title as a question:
is it really the case that there are—or soon will be—no more secrets? The
massive growth in classified intelligence programs in the wake of 9/11,
and the government’s enduring pursuit of decision advantage, makes that
scenario unlikely. Finally, the title can be interpreted as a normative question: should there be no more secrets? That is the question that WikiLeak’s
editor-in-chief, Julian Assange, and other activists want audiences to consider; it is also the question that leaders of the U.S. government’s open
source enterprise would rather ignore. This book has illustrated how open
source is generally packaged and sold internally within the intelligence
community as a commodity—with producers hawking products to customers. This entrepreneurial frame partially accounts for the reticence of
officials to widely disseminate open source reports to citizens.
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Whether the U.S. government’s open source enterprise should, in some
way, be more open, one thing is clear: its institutionalization within the
U.S. intelligence community and among homeland security organizations has been challenging. In Spying Blind, Zegart argues that intelligence
agency “adaptation is not impossible, but it is close [to impossible].”3 The
history of open source suggests that U.S. intelligence agencies have long
struggled to adapt to the challenges and opportunities wrought by everexpanding sources of information and new technologies. Despite the government’s recent accomplishments in developing open source structures,
policies, and practices, it remains to be seen whether stakeholders will ultimately deem the post-9/11 institutionalization of open source a success.
Whether or not they do, open source’s institutional moorings shape its
development in ways that tend to diminish its democratic potential: there
have been no major DNI Open Source conferences since 2008, and public
discussion of open source’s broader role within national security affairs
appears to be limited.
Richard Best and Alfred Cumming of the Congressional Research Service note a slim possibility, however, for reconsidering the current path
of open source’s institutionalization along the lines proposed by Steele:
“A more radical approach [to reform] would be to establish an Open
Source Agency completely outside the Intelligence Community. . . . The
goal would be to provide open source information not just to intelligence
analysts but to all elements of the Federal Government including congressional committees. . . . The goal would be to establish a center of expertise
for the entire Federal Government and to make available to the public
free universal access to all unclassified information acquired through this
initiative.”4 Best and Cumming note that this approach “would have to
be justified on the basis of a widely perceived need and pervasive support throughout the Federal Government. This support, it seems, is not
yet apparent.”5 This book has explained how officials and executives have
constructed official open source discourse in ways that suppress support
for—much less awareness of—more radical approaches. These dominant
constructions are based on 3,000-year-old assumptions concerning the role
of citizens within national security affairs. Using examples from the field
of rhetoric and so-called public intelligence websites, this chapter explains
why those assumptions are unlikely to soon change.
Because of its publicly available dimensions, open source will nevertheless continue to evoke the idealized principles of a democratic society.
And the competing logics of secrecy and openness will continue to generate oscillation within the speech and writing of open source commentators. As Hulnick wrote in 2008, “The [Obama] administration ought to be
more open about intelligence, rather than more secretive. . . . The American people will never trust a system they learn about only from spy fiction,
adventure movies, or distorted histories.”6 Nevertheless, Hulnick simultaneously argued, “The judgments rendered by the intelligence system
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131
ought to be kept secret so that they do not become a subject of political
debate. . . . [Public] releases have hurt the IC’s ability to do what it was
designed for—to provide unbiased and honest judgments, based on the
best data that can be obtained.”7 Chapters 4 and 6 explained how the competing logics of secrecy and openness are paradoxically configured within
institutional discourse. Building on chapter 6, this final chapter explains
how public intelligence efforts cannot escape generating similar tensions.
PUBLIC INTELLIGENCE
Established in 2006, WikiLeaks garnered widespread public attention
in 2010 when it first released classified video footage of a controversial
U.S. Apache helicopter strike in Iraq in 2007 in which two Reuters journalists were killed. Within months, the website had subsequently posted
76,900 documents about the war in Afghanistan (the Afghan War Diary)
and nearly 400,000 documents concerning the war in Iraq (the Iraq War
Logs). Commentators referred to the Iraq War Logs as “the largest security
breach of its kind in U.S. military history.”8 In November 2010, WikiLeaks
began releasing more than 250,000 U.S. State Department documents,
many containing secret information about political events, figures, and
policies. Predictably, some commentators praised WikiLeaks for making
the information publicly available, while other commentators denounced
the leaks—with some even calling for the execution of Assange.9
In contrast to the OSC’s tagline, “Information to Intelligence,”
WikiLeaks’ tagline could be “Intelligence to Information.” WikiLeaks obtains secret material from anonymous sources, organizes it (but does not
typically analyze it), and then offers public access to that material via its
website. This process symbolically transforms intelligence into publicly
available information. WikiLeaks’ motive for doing this is to promote a
“stronger democracy.” According to its website, “Publishing improves
transparency, and this transparency creates a better society for all people.
Better scrutiny leads to reduced corruption and stronger democracies in
all society’s institutions, including government, corporations and other
organisations. A healthy, vibrant and inquisitive journalistic media plays
a vital role in achieving these goals. We are part of that media. Scrutiny
requires information.”10
Most commentators have accused U.S. Army intelligence officer Bradley
Manning of being the source of the 2010 WikiLeaks disclosures. Manning
was charged on May 29, 2010, with unlawfully downloading classified information onto a personal computer. The chapter epigraph is drawn from
online chat logs that purport to contain conversations between Manning
and hacker/journalist Adrian Lamo.11 In these conversations, Manning explains to Lamo that he felt motivated to leak classified information following an investigation he conducted as part of his intelligence duties in Iraq.
According to Manning, 15 Iraqis had been detained by the Iraqi Federal
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Police for printing “anti-Iraqi literature.” Through an interpreter, Manning
learned that the literature in question was a “benign political critique titled ‘Where did the money go?’ ” that exposed corruption within the Iraqi
prime minster’s cabinet. When Manning explained the situation to a senior officer, that officer “told me to shut up and explain how we could assist the [Iraqi Federal Police] in finding *MORE* detainees.” For Manning,
“Everything started slipping after that . . . I saw things differently.”12
Manning’s statements are drawn from the only source of the online
chat excerpts available in 2010: Wired magazine’s June 10, 2010, report.13
Despite their partiality, the excerpts suggest that Manning’s rationalizations for his actions parallel the arguments of some open source advocates
discussed in this book. Specifically, Manning writes, “Without information, you cannot make informed decisions as a public.” Just what information the pubic needs, exactly, as well as how that public can make those
decisions—and with what effect—are left unexplained. As the previous
chapters suggest, these ambiguities complicate the development of democratic open source initiatives more broadly. Indeed, even Manning acknowledges the unstable foundations of his idealism when he speculates
to Lamo, “Maybe [I’m] just young, naive, and stupid.”
Despite similarities, the WikiLeaks case also differs from open source
debates. In contrast to Paul Thompson’s 9/11 timeline or the OSC’s analytical reports, the Afghan War Diary, Iraq War Logs, and U.S. Embassy
Cables were not assembled from open sources of information; rather, they
were produced from mostly classified material. ICD 301 defines open
source as information that anyone can lawfully obtain. In 2010, no court
had yet determined whether WikiLeaks obtained the information posted
on its website unlawfully. In his comments, Manning appears to struggle
with the distinctions between information and intelligence. He states to
Lamo, “It’s [the downloaded classified material] public information . . . it’s
public data . . . it belongs in the public domain . . . information should be
free . . . if [it’s] out in the open . . . it should be a public good.”14 Manning, of course, does not acknowledge his role in making that information
public, and he seems to ignore that the military’s Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRNet) is not synonymous with open sources. Just because information is accessible does not mean it is ipso facto open source.
Manning asserts that “information should be free,” thereby conflating
pubic information and classified intelligence. As illustrated in the proceeding chapters, arguments for and against that conflation are at the core
of open source debates.15 Just as some institutional personnel continue to
view open sources as inferior to secrets, the status of WikiLeaks’ material marks it as symbolically tainted for some audiences. For example, in
November 2010 the journal Science reported that Harvard University was
restricting student researchers from using the material.16 The Library of
Congress also blocked staff and patrons from accessing the site.17 However,
for Lieutenant Colonel Tony Pfaff, “[Open source] intelligence gathering
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133
is no more objectionable than someone reading a newspaper. . . . Once [information] is ‘out there’ there is nothing wrong with obtaining it.”18 For
Pfaff, once another state’s classified information appears in open sources,
it is fair game for collection and analysis. Pfaff argues, “Intelligence professionals do nothing wrong by accepting and drawing conclusions based
on information gained from open sources.”19 However, the same logic
does not appear to hold true for U.S. citizens who are denied access to
WikiLeaks. The U.S. government can make the case that classified information should not be accessed even when it appears in the public domain,
but WikiLeaks demonstrates the unlikelihood of ever closing that case.
It is too early to tell whether and how WikiLeaks’ disclosures will influence the reshaping of U.S. intelligence. According to the DNI, James
Clapper, WikiLeaks is “a big yellow flag. And I think it’s going to have a
very chilling effect on the need to share.”20 In other words, WikiLeaks’ disclosures may spark a reversal of post-9/11 cultural change initiatives that
have sought to institutionalize open source information sharing among
federal, state, and local officials, as well as with international partners.
Along these lines, CIA director Leon Panetta stated on November 8, 2010,
“When information about our intelligence, our people, or our operations
appears in the media, it does incredible damage to our nation’s security
and our ability to do our job of protecting the nation. More importantly, it
could jeopardize lives. For this reason, such leaks cannot be tolerated.”21
As a result, Panetta declared, “Sharing cannot extend beyond the limits set
by law and the ‘need to know’ principle. The media, the public, even former colleagues, are not entitled to details of our work.”22
WikiLeaks is the most visible of a group of organizations that seek to advance public intelligence. An anonymous group of activists calling themselves Public Intelligence claims to compile information already available
in the public domain but that is often buried in obscure locations on the
Internet. Like a game of cat-and-mouse, Public Intelligence administrators
claim, “We have already received takedown requests from NATO and the
U.S. Army for publishing documents discovered via open source methods
available to any member of the public.”23 Examples of posted documents
include the following: “FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate Nuclear/Radiological Outreach Briefing,” “U.S. Air Force SKL Wireless & Black
Data Distribution System Overview;” and “CIA Report: Lessons of the Soviet War in Afghanistan,” the latter prepared by the Open Source Works.
Administrators of Public Intelligence state, “It is our hope that by making
such information available and demonstrating the power of a public resolved to inform itself, we may engender a more informed and proactive
populace.”24 The website Cryptome similarly invites users to send “documents for publication that are prohibited by governments worldwide, in
particular material on freedom of expression, privacy, cryptology, dual-use
technologies, national security, intelligence, and secret governance—open,
secret and classified documents—but not limited to those.”25
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While not as audacious as WikiLeaks, Public Intelligence, or Cryptome
in disclosing secret or sensitive information, the Federation of American
Scientists’ Steven Aftergood and the Project on Government Secrecy have
worked since 1989 to make U.S. national security institutions subject to
more public scrutiny. According to the FAS website, “The FAS Project
on Government Secrecy works to promote public access to government
information and to illuminate the apparatus of government secrecy, including national security classification and declassification policies. The
Project also publishes previously undisclosed or hard-to-find government
documents of public policy interest, as well as resources on intelligence
policy.”26 Through its Secrecy News service, FAS occasionally obtains and
disseminates OSC analytical reports that have not been cleared for public release. Recently obtained reports illustrate the breadth of the OSC’s
efforts: “Subtitled Clips of China’s Declassified Underground Nuclear
Facility in Chongqing,” “German Left-Wing Crime Increase Adds to Public Security Concerns,” “Kremlin Allies’ Expanding Control of Runet
Provokes Only Limited Opposition,” “Cuba—Military’s Profile in State
Media Limited, Positive,” “Venezuela—Chavez Moves to Silence Opposition Media.”27
Importantly for this discussion, Aftergood reported on February 12,
2009, “In a recent meeting with the Director of CIA Information Management Services, we reiterated our view that all unclassified, noncopyrighted publications of the Open Source Center . . . should be made
freely available to the public.”28 Similarly, a stakeholder interviewed for
this study was frank regarding the OSC’s withholding of its analytical
products from the public: “I think it’s completely absurd that an open
source agency is going to be acquiring publicly available information,
producing an analytical product, and then classifying it. That, to me,
just beggars belief. That reminds me of . . . the CIA, when phone books
were stamped [classified]. I mean, these are phone books produced by
the telephone company!”29 Aftergood, however, is quick to distinguish
FAS’s Secrecy News from WikiLeaks, writing the following on November
29, 2010: “Disabling secrecy in the name of transparency would be a sensible goal—if it were true that all secrecy is wrong. But if there is a legitimate role for secrecy in military operations, in intelligence gathering or in
diplomatic negotiations, as seems self-evident, then a different approach
is called for.”30
Other public intelligence organizations focus on using open source materials to empower citizens. Since largely abandoning institutional reform
efforts in 2007, Steele has turned to public intelligence concerns, spearheading the Earth Intelligence Network. This group defines itself as “a
501(c3) public charity that strives to create public intelligence in the public interest.”31 According to an organizational brochure, the group’s mission is to “help any collective define their public intelligence requirements
and then to find volunteers, or tax-deductible funding for commercial
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solutions, such that we can provide public intelligence to those who need
it, at no cost to them. This is how we serve the public interest and contribute to saving the Earth.”32 Much of the information available to Earth
Intelligence Network’s website visitors is derived from Steele’s OSS.
net website. Additionally, the Center for Empowered Living and Learning (the CELL) in Denver, Colorado, describes itself as “a non-profit institution dedicated to addressing the most important global issue of our
time—terrorism. . . . The CELL exists to educate citizens on the realities of
today’s global terrorism threats, and seeks to empower both individuals
and organizations with the knowledge and the tools to proactively effect
change.”33 The CELL “intends to facilitate knowledge-sharing, learning
and self-reflection as our society takes on terrorism as the most challenging threat to our way of life today.”34 Finally, the NEFA (Nine Eleven Finding Answers) Foundation “strives to help prevent future tragedies in the
U.S. and abroad by exposing those responsible for planning, funding, and
executing terrorist activities.”35 The group “plays a role in the fight against
terror through cohesive and comprehensive efforts to research, analyze,
and disseminate information pertaining to past and current terrorist activities. The Foundation shares its findings with law enforcement agencies
and the intelligence community where appropriate, and works with other
research organizations to educate the public on the threat of terrorism.”36
The popularity of these and dozens of other public intelligence organizations suggests citizen appetite for detailed national security information.
Other open source groups, however, back exclusively institutional interests. For example, the Open Source Intelligence Forum (OSIF ) in Washington, DC, is composed of stakeholders in the government and private
sector who come together to discuss “the latest information, trends, and
events in the area of Open Source intelligence. All of it is informal and offthe-record. Past guests have included the Director of the DNI Open Source
Center, the DNI Open Source Coordinator and other users and ‘owners’
of open source within the US Government.”37 OSIF ’s goals in no way resemble the antisecrecy ethic promoted by WikiLeaks, Public Intelligence,
Cryptome, or FAS. OSIF states, “Open Source is a crucial intelligence that
must be well captured to empower today’s analysts and policymaker. . . .
Both the IC analyst and the collector must be taught to use and collect
this information using today’s best practices; Any collection systems must
be tailored to the unique needs of the IC focusing on a complete definition of requirements, industry best-practices input, and architectural
competition.”38
Similarly, an open source intelligence round table hosted by LexisNexis
on April 26, 2010, underscored the clear separation between institutional
open source and public intelligence developments. Attending the round
table were Naquin, Lowenthal, and Marks. According to an announcement, “The OSINT Round Table was created to make a public space for
discussion about the government’s needs for Open Source Intelligence
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and to facilitate relationships between government officials and private
sector leaders; in order to foster an increasingly responsive open source
intelligence infrastructure that meets the needs of national security decision makers.”39 Here, open source developments are for national security
decision makers—not citizens. To protect elite authority, citizens must remain spectators on the outside of open source deliberations.
OPEN SOURCE RUPTURES THE “CONTAINER”
OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
A principal reason that WikiLeaks, Public Intelligence, Cryptome, and
FAS are controversial is because they threaten to rupture distinctions between open and secret information and destabilize conventional notions
of authority, expertise, and control. Within Western democracies, elite
control of national security policy making is legitimated on the following
grounds: through elections, citizens cede authority and control to their
representatives; national security decision making requires secrecy and
must therefore remain outside the public sphere; and national security
policy should not be influenced by shifting domestic political winds.40
The origins of these assumptions can be traced to the governance of ancient Greece. In Athens, the people were significantly “consubstantial”
with the government—citizen participation was direct rather than representative.41 Although citizens were not formally separated from their government, the Athenians did, in fact, distinguish between elites and the
common people. Athenian elites were those members of society who possessed specialized knowledge of warfare, economics, or political rhetoric;
however, the role of the elite was not to rule, but instead it was to address
and advise citizens—the “demos.”42 A tension within the Athenian model
was that it empowered citizens to make decisions, yet also cast citizens
as both vulnerable to elite manipulation and prone to irrationality. For
Robert Ivie, the “orator as political expert” had to learn to “compensate
for the disabilities of the demos . . . the limitations of mass deliberation in
which prudence and understanding might succumb to flattery and emotional manipulation.”43 Although Ivie argues that such “disabilities” are
overblown, we nevertheless find in ancient Greece the origins of the eliteinsider/citizen-outsider dichotomy endemic to contemporary national security rhetoric and institutional structure.
This insider/outsider dichotomy was reproduced within U.S. political institutions at the moment of the nation’s founding. For example, Ivie
demonstrates how in repeatedly invoking the metaphor of disease, James
Madison and his supporters helped firmly establish the myth of the “demented demos” within U.S. political culture during the Constitutional
Convention of 1787.44 Rhetorical scholars Stephen Hartnett and Jennifer
Mercieca similarly explain how the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debates in
the postrevolutionary period from 1798 to 1801 reinforced the notion that
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“average citizens were particularly susceptible to . . . corruption and that
the cure could only be found in controlling who participated in the political process.”45 More recently, President Harry Truman’s signing of the
National Security Act of 1947, which established the modern U.S. national
security apparatus, helped ensure that citizens would remain structurally/
officially excluded from national security deliberations. However, Ivie argues that elite control of national security institutions based on the fear of
the demented demos represents a myth. Its persistence is not inevitable.
For example, some of Madison’s contemporaries did not share his view
that the “distempered” hands of ordinary citizens needed to be removed
from the reins of government. Indeed, Ivie speculates that if Thomas Jefferson had been present at the Constitutional Convention, “a somewhat
different story of the people might have been told”; Jefferson, according to
Ivie, consistently evoked a “positive image” of democracy, “a faith in the
resilience of the people and the perpetuity of the nation.”46
Within representative democracies, it is generally understood that citizens exercise their right to participate (indirectly) in the formation of national security policy through voting. This assumption was underscored
by former vice president Dick Cheney when he declared that the extent
of public participation in national security affairs should be “to go vote
every four years on who gets to be president.”47 Given the strength of this
assumption within U.S. political discourse, the influence of ordinary citizens on the formation of national security policy has historically stemmed
from “protest rhetoric,” rather than direct participation.48 Such rhetoric,
however, tends to reinforce the insider/outsider dichotomy that constitutes, in part, the metaphorical basis of national security.49 Specifically,
the famous “container schema,” which has dominated U.S. foreign relations since at least the end of World War II, is based on the conceptual
opposition of inner and outer spheres. Elites have historically succeeded
in appropriating the symbolism of the cherished “inside” of the nation,
prescribing the form of the nation’s defense and security.50 This rhetorical
formulation has allowed elites to represent the nation, yet also divide it.
From the nation’s founding, national security has served as a site where
rational knowledge and divine virtue has required a muscular defense
against the ignorant demands of a peripheral, underinformed, passionprone, and irrational citizenry. Such “domestic containment” has been a
consistent theme throughout American history, beginning with the Constitutional Convention, proceeding though the Jacksonian period from
1824 to 1854, and reaching its zenith during the “Red scares” of the interwar and Cold War periods.51 The juxtaposition of 9/11 commissioner Fred
Fielding’s statement that “[The 9/11 families] can’t be objective because
they’re just too full of angst and anxiety and resentment” and 9/11 family
member Kristen Breitweiser’s statement that “we were random and passionate. . . . And that scared [official] Washington—a lot . . . we were neither containable nor controllable” suggests that both the container schema
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and “demophobia” remain relevant constructs for interpreting contemporary national security developments.52
While this insider/outsider dichotomy may appear remarkably stable
throughout American history, another perspective emphasizes consistent
ruptures, transformations, and deteriorations in the rhetorical relationship between national security elites and common citizens. For example,
Mercieca and James Aune describe ‘‘vernacular republicanism’’ as a response to “the rift between the promise of a republicanism in which the
people held power and the reality of a republicanism in which the people
held very little power.”53 This postrevolutionary rhetoric was characterized by critique, demands for transparency, rejection of elite leadership,
and promotion of the common good. The authors argue that “vernacular
republicanism is not restricted . . . to early American republican rhetoric,
but that the logic of vernacular republicanism is the cornerstone of American reform rhetoric.”54
However, for activist Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the infamous Pentagon Papers in 1971, if vernacular republicanism is to undermine elite
authority and control, it must be accompanied by the development of
“counterpower.” Ellsberg states it this way:
During the Vietnam War a major theme of a Quaker activist group I knew of was
telling truth to power, which was exemplified by literally going into the Pentagon
or White House and speaking frankly in a dialogue with them. I don’t at all want
to say that is worthless, but there is a difference in values and priorities there. [National security elites] are not going to be reached by that. There is an expression in
Congress—that “They may not see the light, but they’ll feel the heat.” What people in power need is to have their own power undermined by exposure of their
wrongly held secrets and their pretensions to legitimacy and their concealment
of what their real politics are. They need to be confronted by generating counterpower through Congress, the courts, the Unions, the universities, and the press.55
Can open source help generate counterpower? Marsh explains that in
the contemporary era, “theories of international relations and foreign policy do not have much to say about the role of the citizenry in foreign policy:
From realism to interdependence, we find either silence or outright hostility to citizen involvement.”56 The relative dearth of academic literature on
citizen participation in national security affairs is accompanied by a lack of
structural opportunities for that participation. It is therefore unsurprising
that when asked to consider what the role of citizens should be in the development of open source and/or U.S. national security policy, most institutional members interviewed for this project demurred. For example, one
analyst stated, “I really don’t have a good answer to that question, because
that’s not really associated with my job. So, I’m going to pass.”57
When citizens encroach on institutional turf, however, the situation may
become tense. On December 21, 1988, a bomb destroyed Pan American
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139
World Airways flight 103 shortly after it departed London’s Heathrow
Airport en route to New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport. All 243 passengers and 16 crew members were killed, as well as 11 people on the ground
in Lockerbie, Scotland. A former Libyan intelligence officer, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, was convicted of 207 counts of murder on January 31,
2001, and was sentenced to life in prison for his role in the attack (he was
released on humanitarian grounds and returned to Libya in 2010). Family
members of the victims have been actively involved in the investigation
and the development of U.S. policy toward Libya. Evidence of this group’s
likely influence on U.S. policy is found in a December 10, 2007, letter to
then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice from senators Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Hillary
Clinton (D-NY), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Norm
Coleman (R-MN), and Chris Dodd (D-CT) urging Rice to use an upcoming diplomatic visit to Libya to compel the government of that country to
fulfill its obligations to American victims of Libyan terrorism—including
the Pan Am 103 families.58 Additionally, a 2007 RAND report concluded
that the families’ proposals led to the reinforcement of sanctions on Libya
in 1996.59
One stakeholder described the hostile response of institutional members to the Pan Am 103 families’ participation in national security affairs
in the aftermath of the tragedy: “That was the type of attitude [hostility]
we were given all the time by the State Department, in that, you know,
‘Look, leave foreign policy to us. You don’t deal with punishing terrorist
states. That’s our job.’ You know? But they weren’t doing it.”60 Indeed, a
member of Victims of Pam Am Flight 103 explained their process:
We went in the system. We didn’t stay outside and hold up a sign. We actually
went in and worked with them, which was different [than other forms of citizen
participation]. . . . Early on, the agencies were hospitable to us until they realized
we were having some effect. . . . Government agencies are incredibly interesting:
As long as they don’t think you’re a threat to them, they are very nice to you. But
if you’re influencing what Congress makes them do, or doesn’t make them do, or
how much money they get, they get really hostile.61
Another member of Victims of Pam Am Flight 103 explained, “For the
last . . . several years we’ve had a very contentious relationship with the
State Department. We’ve also worked with the Justice Department, National Security Council; we’ve had meetings with presidents. And during
the Clinton administration, there was much more of a dialogue, and a conversation, and an opportunity to meet face-to-face. A lot of that changed
with the Bush administration.”62 Some institutional members who participated in this study, however, expressed support for citizen involvement—at least in principle. One analyst declared, “The end result [of
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keeping open source information secret] is not greater security, the result
is greater fear and distrust of what should be a participatory, democratic
form of government.”63 Thus, similar to other stakeholder groups, we cannot characterize institutional members as having consistent perspectives
on the role of citizens in national security affairs. Generally, however, citizens are depicted as subordinate to national security elites and experts. In
this way, the echoes of the Constitutional Convention are heard in commentators’ anxieties regarding how WikiLeaks’ disclosures could undermine elite control of national security decision making. Across the arc of
history, citizens are typically described as prone to emotion and/or lacking the expertise and motivation needed to usefully shape the national
security policies of their nation. This depiction of citizens is generally
treated as an objective fact, rather than a historical construction reproduced through social practices.
Thus, public intelligence destabilizes the container metaphor in that it
potentially levels the playing field between technocratic elites and ordinary citizens. These sites potentially represent a source of counterpower
that Ellsberg describes. However, WikiLeaks and similar whistle-blower
websites may prove unsustainable in this regard because their allure is
based on disclosure of secret information that is difficult to come by. Additionally, unlike the Pentagon Papers, which provided context, high-level
sources, and indicated outright deception on the part of senior U.S. officials, WikiLeaks’ disclosures are, as of 2010, mostly comprised of low-level,
after-action reports and cables from military and diplomatic personnel. In
this way, the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks are rhetorically dissimilar.
WikiLeaks or other public intelligence groups will need to disclose information on par with the Pentagon Papers in order to adequately undermine the general assumption that citizen challenges to national security
elites must be contained, suppressed, or circumvented.
On one hand, constraints on the development of public intelligence appear fixed and unlikely to change. On the other hand, this book points
to communication as the mechanism though which indeterminacy is recovered, enabling stakeholders with different-yet-relevant perspectives
on open source and public intelligence to collaborate in the service of
national security. Stanley Deetz implies that instead of fine-tuning open
source practices to better respond to “customer” demands, a more creative
line of development may be “the building of processes that develop alternative perspectives, fosters their expression, and gives them equal opportunity to influence decisions.”64 This stronger form of democratic practice
would meet the different needs and values of a wider number of intelligence stakeholders. The end result of open source and public intelligence
developments should not merely be increased agency budgets, more
lucrative open source contracts, or the disclosure of secrets for their own
sake—the end result should be better decisions.
Open Source, Democracy, and the Future of U.S. Intelligence
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CONCLUSION: “WHEN I POINT TO THE MOON,
DO NOT STARE AT MY FINGER”
In 2006 the annual meeting of the International Association for Intelligence Education was held in McLean, Virginia. Participants considered
whether they, as intelligence teachers, researchers, and practitioners, were
pursuing a legitimate profession with associated standards and credentials. At one point during the conference, IAFIE’s executive director, Mark
Lowenthal, invoked the Buddha’s adage: “When I point to the moon, do
not stare at my finger.” Lowenthal urged the audience to avoid staring at
the finger: intelligence education, Lowenthal claimed, was indeed a professional endeavor, and it was necessary to move beyond that question.
The Buddha’s adage uniquely captures the complexity of the development of post-9/11 open source plans, policies, and practices. Using this
adage as an interpretive guide, this final section summarizes the benefits
of examining the open source–related reshaping of U.S. intelligence from
2001 to 2010 through the lens of an institutional discourse perspective.
First, one can interpret the adage as a warning to commentators: Do not
stare at the Buddha’s finger lest you miss the beauty of the moon. From this perspective, some readers might argue that this book has narrowly focused
on the discourse about open source (i.e., “the finger”) to the exclusion
of its practical national security applications. Indeed, this investigation
was concerned “less about how things are done than about how things
are to be thought of.”65 This book followed earlier studies of institutions
that have examined “the ways that particular statements come to have
truth value; the constraints on the production of discourse about objects
of knowledge; the effects of discursive practices on social action; and the
uses of discourse to exercise power.”66 By focusing on the production, circulation, and reception of open source discourse, I have explained why
certain open source knowledge, structures, cultures, and practices—and
not others—have ascended to prominence in the post-9/11 era.
Specifically, I explained in chapter 4 how stakeholders strategically included references to open source within the final reports of three highprofile investigatory commissions that followed the 9/11 and Iraq WMD
intelligence failures. It is reasonable to assume that these stakeholders were
motivated by improvements in the quality and availability of open source
information coinciding with the exponential growth of the Internet in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. During this time frame, Robert David Steele
was a visible and vocal advocate for the contributions that open source
collection and analysis activities could make to the quality, timeliness, and
efficiency of intelligence. Influential officials within the U.S. intelligence
community, business executives, academics, and members of Congress
supported Steele’s advocacy for open source. Steele’s underlying logic of
open source evoked images of egalitarianism, transparency, and public
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accountability. Despite Steele’s efforts, however, officials have tended to
privilege a traditional institutional logic that favors secrecy. Whether or
not these officials, at some level, share Steele’s commitments, those who
found themselves responsible for institutionalizing open source collection
and analysis determined that post-9/11 initiatives would need to be developed in ways that did not spark reactionary attacks from institutional
members quick to assert that “open source” is not “intelligence.” Thus, the
recommendations of the Joint Inquiry, 9/11 Commission, and WMD Commission resulted in the establishment of open source organizational structures, leadership positions, and funding priorities within the intelligence
community that largely perpetuated institutional norms of secrecy.
To support their efforts, these officials produced policy documents and
public relations materials that consistently referenced the findings of the
Joint Inquiry, 9/11 Commission, and WMD Commission. Additionally,
these officials drew upon other institutionally acceptable discourses, including entrepreneurialism, evangelism, TQM, and organizational culture, in order to encourage stakeholders to consent to a preferred vision
of open source. To spur the rapid diffusion of this vision and associated
practices, these officials organized two open source conferences in 2007
and 2008. During these conferences, officials were able to perform numerous forms of institutional work simultaneously and within a tight time
frame. As a result of their institutional legitimacy, formal authority and
power, resources, and central position within the intelligence sector, these
officials were able to marginalize alternative perspectives on open source
that potentially undermined the overwhelming authority, exceptionalism,
and elitism of the intelligence community. Thus, contrary to Lowenthal’s
warning, by tracking the production, circulation, and consumption of discourse about open source, I have demonstrated the benefits of “staring at
the finger.” Specifically, attached to that finger is an individual whose personal, parochial, and bureaucratic interests are not above critical scrutiny.
Nevertheless, one can also conceptualize these interests themselves as
being produced by the contexts in which open source stakeholders find
themselves. Thus, another interpretation of the Buddha’s adage might be
this: Do not stare at the Buddha’s finger because the self represented by that finger is only an illusion.67 This perspective aligns with assumptions about
how language “bears down” on people, shapes overall societal and institutional conditions, and influences what can and cannot be said about
open source phenomena.68 Here, “knowledge emerges from discourse”
because “the authority of the speaker, the authorizing powers, and the
mode of expression are mutually defining, and all are part of the larger
discursive formation that makes it possible to speak of certain objects at
all.”69 I thus explained in chapter 4 the origin and logic of institutional secrecy, as well as how associated norms have shaped the trajectory of open
source reforms. Discourses operate at both strategic and unconscious levels, and most intelligence officials do not reflect on their taken-for-granted
Open Source, Democracy, and the Future of U.S. Intelligence
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assumptions that render images of open source as a democratic, public resource more-or-less “meaningless, impracticable, inadequate or otherwise
disqualified.”70
Another interpretation of the Buddha’s adage could be the following:
Staring at the Buddha’s finger will not help one achieve enlightenment. One must
actually walk the path. In other words, the Buddha’s power is related, in
part, to whether his teachings compel the action of others. In the same
way, some open source documents may be “trivial” or “localized” in their
effects, while others are more consequential in terms of their broader, institutional impact.71 Specifically, I explained in chapter 5 how open source
discourse intersects the logic of information sharing and cultural change
efforts in the context of U.S. homeland security. Here, I examined open
source texts in relation to the actions of managers and analysts who are required to demonstrate adequate responsiveness to open source initiatives.
The coherence and influence of official open source discourse (i.e., “the
moon”) appear to weaken as this object moves from the upper echelons of
the U.S. intelligence community to operational levels within homeland security organizations. In other words, possibilities for the deferral of what
open source is are eliminated as this object is enacted through specific organizational practices. According to many of the participants interviewed
for this study, these practices remain largely ad hoc, uneven, and uncoordinated. Again, as one official concluded, “In terms of operationalizing
[open source] . . . we are still a long way from people looking at their business processes and saying: ‘Ok, how do we inject open source in here?’ ”72
The case studies demonstrated that open source discourse takes on a different character in each site: the intelligence community, the homeland security sector, and the citizen activism arena.
A critical interpretation of the Buddha’s adage might be this: Do not
stare at the Buddha’s finger because you might see that the Buddha is not divine—he is human just like you. This perspective underscores that the officials responsible for the development of open source policy identified in
this volume are no more, or less, enlightened than other citizens (this does
not mean that expertise is unimportant; rather, it means that expertise is
always circumscribed by social and institutional assumptions). Although
some of the documents authored by these speakers may carry the force of
law, the vision, or path, they have chosen for open source’s development
and institutionalization represents only one possibility. It is worth remembering that motivated stakeholders might someday choose an alternative
path—should they find sufficient reason to do so. In chapter 6, I outlined
some of the criteria stakeholders could use in seeking to develop a citizen
open source discourse community. I envisioned a situation where citizens
could leverage institutional open source concepts and vocabulary in order
to legitimate their own organized, active, and effective participation in
U.S. national security affairs. This participation could be accomplished,
in part, by generating counter-intelligence and counterpower in order to
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blunt elites’ demophobic impulses, which history has shown can all too
easily lead to dubious national security decision making.
The goal of this book is both simple and complex: spur intelligence
stakeholders to question their taken-for-granted assumptions regarding
the nature of open source phenomena, communication, culture, and institutional change. To the extent that open source policies are developed in
accordance with the persistent institutional logic of secrecy, open source’s
ability to foster democratic practices within the national security arena
is limited. Such concern is, admittedly, not widely shared among institutional members. It is telling that participants in this study were generally
unable to articulate a response to the question: How can citizens know—if
at all—whether recent investments in open source have paid off? Indeed,
it is still unclear whether new open source structures and practices have
meaningfully enhanced national security, blunted analytical misjudgments, or reined in policy makers’ mischaracterization or misuse of intelligence. Citizens, journalists, and scholars cannot know with any certainty
whether these changes are worthwhile. Obtaining and assessing information that would illuminate this situation is generally the task of those who
have access to classified reports—namely, members of intelligence oversight committees in Congress. Some stakeholders, however, remain skeptical of the effectiveness of congressional oversight. One participant in this
study declared the following:
Those committees have failed completely in their role, in my opinion. So if the intelligence committees are not succeeding in their role to oversee, well, maybe then
a robust open source capability will allow the American people to see where their
dollars are going. That’s what [Robert] Steele says. . . . He has a vision of what is
needed, and it’s not as far off as what you might think. And when he talks about
these [envisioned] billion dollar [open source] structures—Well? What do we have
on the dark side? Tens of billions of dollars? For what? To fail us on 9/11 and to
fail us again on [Iraq] WMD?73
This stakeholder suggested that open source could, ideally, become a
resource for citizens seeking to hold their government accountable and
influence the development of national security policy. So far, however, institutional open source remains overwhelmingly insular despite the two
major public conferences officials have conducted. This public discourse
has not yet created substantive opportunities for citizen participation.
This situation stems, in part, from the persistent legacy of the “elite, expert, insider”/“citizen, layperson, outsider” dichotomy endemic to national security discourse. Changing this situation will be difficult because
it requires officials to revise assumptions that have long undergirded U.S.
intelligence. These conditions help explain why, in one sense, Wallner’s
question, “But what, precisely, is the meaning of open source?” can never
be unequivocally answered—the answer is contingent upon meanings
that can never be totally fixed.74
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THE FUTURE OF OPEN SOURCE
As with any project, this one is marked by limitations. Institutional secrecy likely hindered the willingness of current intelligence officials to be
interviewed for this project. I may have formed different interpretations
of events if key intelligence officials involved in the institutionalization of
open source during 2009–2010 had agreed to participate. I have tried to account for the perspectives of these officials, however, by examining their
public comments during the DNI Open Source conferences, within congressional testimony, and in media reports. News reports have also cast
suspicion over the legality and ethicality of the operations of homeland
security intelligence fusion centers. This situation may have contributed
to officials’ refusal to grant me access to those facilities in order to interview personnel on-site. Certainly, immersion within organizational sites
where open source activities are practiced at the operational level would
have enhanced this study.
Another challenge involved determining the appropriate level of detail
needed to adequately animate my critical claims. If anything, I have erred
on the side of including too many examples of the discourse under investigation. My goal in doing so, however, was to indicate to readers that the
themes and tensions that I identified in each case study were prominent.
I attempted to maintain open source discourse as an emergent and dynamic phenomenon; however, my descriptions and explanations, at times,
may have inadvertently contributed to naturalizing certain assumptions
or perspectives. This tension may have stemmed, in part, from trying to
maintain multiple orientations to language within the same study, as well
as trying to make the research readable for the groups under investigation. The findings of this book are thus not generalizable in the traditional
sense of being predictive and widely applicable irrespective of organizational context. I believe that the findings are reasonable and persuasive,
however, when considered in light of governmental and nongovernmental reports that have reached similar conclusions regarding the challenges
of open source’s institutionalization and associated post-9/11 reforms.
Finally, it is challenging to bring any large project to a close, and this
one is no exception. The institutional events and processes depicted in
this book display both evolution and repetition. As a result, it is perhaps
less useful to create the impression of definitive closure than to assess the
character of an ongoing struggle. From 2001 to 2005, I participated in efforts to institutionalize open source within the U.S. intelligence community while working for a private intelligence contractor in Washington,
DC. I did this by selling open source collection and analysis services to
intelligence organizations within the U.S. government. I have described
how efforts to institutionalize open source developed gravity and momentum following the formal establishment of both the ADDNI/OS and
the OSC in 2005. A 2008 article in U.S. News & World Report notes that Kim
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Robson, a senior open source official, claims that “open source is starting
to be institutionalized.”75 This endorsement of my claims indicates how,
for some stakeholders, the widespread institutionalization of open source
is inevitable given the political, economic, and technological changes of a
post–Cold War world.
The U.S. News & World Report article notes, “Open-source information
is both a curse and a blessing to intelligence professionals. On the one
hand, it makes information far more accessible, sometimes more timely,
and easier to disseminate. . . . On the other hand, it means a loss of power
for . . . intelligence agencies.”76 This theme of tradeoffs and paradoxes is
by now familiar, and this book has depicted how stakeholders have conceptualized and managed them. As a result, we know more about how
the institutionalization of open source has thus far unfolded, the implications of these developments for various groups, and the challenges and
opportunities these developments offer citizens seeking to advance the
principles of a democratic society. Many of the stakeholders with whom
I interacted in Washington, DC, from 2001 to 2005 are still, to this day,
actively struggling to institutionalize their preferred meanings of open
source via the bruising politics of government bureaucracy and corporate
contracting. This book reminds us of the essential, potent role of discourse
as both the source and medium of that struggle. Ideally, it will be the implications of this condition—as much as any international or technological developments—that contribute to the reshaping of U.S. intelligence in
the 21st century.
APPENDIX
Open Source Contexts
and Practices
This appendix describes open source contexts and practices in order to
provide a more vivid picture of what open source work often entails. This
description is based on my experience working for an open source contractor, supplemented by examples from press reports, government and
commercial websites, job boards, and open source vendors’ and OSC’s
promotional materials.1 The contexts and practices described herein relate
mainly to private sector contractors working on behalf of U.S. government
clients. I use this perspective because many of the U.S. government’s open
source initiatives (outside the OSC’s efforts and agencies’ in-house intelligence units) rely on a growing number of commercial providers whose
primary goal is to earn a profit. As a result, insight into the work these
providers undertake in pursuit of revenue and market share is useful for
understanding the opportunities and challenges of open source exploitation and the future of U.S. intelligence.
The rise of open source contracting parallels the growth of secret intelligence contracting. Shorrock notes that the aggregate value of intelligence contracts rose from $18 billion in 1995 to $42 billion in 2005, with
the bulk of that increase occurring after the 9/11 attacks.2 Institutional secrecy prevents the American public from knowing how these contracts
are awarded and performed. By comparison, open source appears to be
a good candidate for more transparency. Indeed, companies such as BAE
Systems, Eurasia Group, iJET, Jane’s Strategic Advisory Services, Oxford
Analytica, Radiance Technologies, SILObreaker and Infosphere AB, SOSi,
and STRATFOR openly promote their work within the U.S. national security sector. These and other corporations provide their clients with a vast
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number of information tools, techniques, products, and services. However, similar to the commercialization of secret intelligence, there are no
publicly available figures for the overall level of open source contracting
and outsourcing.
The expansion of intelligence contracting throughout the 1990s created
fertile ground for open source advocates to leverage corporate discourses
to institutionalize open source in ways that advanced their interests. During an October 6, 2000, speech before the Washington College of Law,
then NIC chairman John Gannon declared, “We . . . need to have close
and enduring partnerships in the commercial world to benefit from the
private sector’s continuing pursuit of new technology and from its best
practices in dealing with the open-source challenge.”3 The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War momentarily destabilized
institutional assumptions, permitting stakeholders to struggle over new
arrangements and practices. Commercial open source advocates seized
the moment, using corporate-inflected speech and writing to vault open
source to the forefront of intelligence reform debates. Open source advocates brought together taken-for-granted institutional and commercial logics in ways that profoundly shaped the course of open source’s
development.
Mercado wrote in a 2005 Studies in Intelligence article, “Policymakers and
intelligence executives would . . . do well to resist the siren call of those
who argue that we should simply privatize OSINT. Private corporations
are an excellent source of dictionaries, software, and contractors for our
government. But private companies alone are no substitute for accountable, dedicated OSINT professionals in government offices.”4 The profit
motive is a primary reason stakeholders should be concerned with how
these developments relate to changing conceptualizations of open source.
For example, the open source sector is characterized by an overwhelming emphasis on threat, risk, and uncertainty. As Gibson writes, “Where
policy and decision-makers . . . must manage the complexity, uncertainty
and ambiguity of the global, postmodern, risk society, OSINT offers a lifeline to intelligence.”5 However, open source providers must both respond
to and sustain a sense of anxiety within their clients in order to continually demonstrate value and relevance. As former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer said of the open source provider SITE, “An Arabic word can have
four or five different meanings in translation.”6 SITE, said Scheuer, always
chooses the “most warlike translation.”7
I am not arguing that threats, risks, and uncertainties are constructed by
open source providers in the sense of being made-up fictions; I am suggesting, however, that phenomena that rise to a given level of threat do
so, in part, through processes of human communication.8 In other words,
sociologist Lynn Eden argues that “our knowledge of . . . reality is always,
and profoundly, mediated by the social: what actors already know, what
they want to know, how they think they can go about learning more, and
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the criteria by which they judge and make new knowledge.”9 For example, every year the U.S. intelligence community presents to Congress an
assessment of the major threats to U.S. national security.10 The intelligence
community uses this assessment to persuade Congress and citizens that
defense of certain national values is warranted. Similarly, if we want to
better understand the reshaping of U.S. intelligence, it is necessary to scrutinize the social realities of open source stakeholders—especially private
sector actors who have much to gain or lose in the contestation over the
meanings of open source. This appendix provides that scrutiny in a way
that is accessible to audiences who may be unfamiliar with open source
issues. Open source discourse is characterized by a dizzying array of acronyms, jargon, and buzzwords; therefore, this discussion focuses plainly
on who is permitted to become an open source analyst, how organizations
secure open source contracts, what work analysts typically perform, where
they disseminate that work, and why organizations typically fail to critically assess the worth of these activities.
BECOMING AN OPEN SOURCE ANALYST
Former CIA assistant DCI for analysis and production Mark Lowenthal
states that the basic purpose of intelligence is to “reduce uncertainty.”11
This view of intelligence is intuitive, widespread, and involves at least
three related activities: (1) the gathering of information; (2) the application of knowledge and reasoning to that information in order to make
judgments concerning its quality, significance, and consequence; and
(3) the communicating of those judgments to selected officials in the form
of finished intelligence products. Whether one is an open source analyst
for a commercial firm or a government agency, the basic purpose of intelligence remains the same. As a result, there are several similarities between
commercial open source analysts and their government counterparts.
For example, in his article “Intelligence Shop,” Harris notes that Eurasia
Group’s analysts “typically hail from top training grounds, such as the
School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University or
the Fletcher School at Tufts University.”12 Just like some of their institutional cousins, Eurasia Group analysts “assess the likelihood that foreign
governments will collapse, whether from coup, natural disaster, economic
catastrophe or any other circumstance.”13 However, in contrast to government agencies that focus narrowly on “current intelligence” (short-range
issues), Eurasia Group specializes in “things that ought to be on [the client’s] radar, but aren’t yet.”14
Becoming a Eurasia Group analyst typically requires “a minimum of
five years of relevant professional experience, one year of field experience
in [a] region and an advanced degree in political science or other relevant discipline (economics or international relations with an emphasis on
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economics).”15 In contrast to Eurasia Group, Jardines, as owner of Open
Source Publishing, Inc., told one reporter, “Our employees have no single degree or type of training.”16 Jardines stated, “We prefer candidates to
have an advanced degree and speak at least one foreign language. I look
for tenacity and creative thinking in a potential employee.”17 A difference
between institutional and private sector analysts relates to the issue of U.S.
citizenship and the ability to obtain security clearance. Eurasia Group’s
Maureen Miskovich explained in 2005 that she did not “worry about the
government poaching her employees. Many of them aren’t U.S. citizens,
which reduces their chances of landing a government job.”18 Similarly, the
open source provider STRATFOR encourages applicants possessing diverse educational and professional backgrounds in “world affairs, global
trade, economics, technological innovation, engineering, military strategy
and/or tactical analysis.”19 The company states, “In addition to U.S. applicants, we are also accepting non-U.S. recruits, especially those who would
be interested in continuing their relationship with STRATFOR from their
country of residence.”20 Successful applicants undertake an unpaid, fourmonth-long analyst development program at STRATFOR in Austin, Texas.
Also in 2010, the open source provider iJET sought intelligence analysts to
“support the company’s 24/7 mission from its North America Intelligence
Operations Center in Annapolis, MD.”21 The company stated, “As an analyst, you will engage in thorough daily monitoring and reporting, handle
hotline calls, and write time-sensitive alerts and situation reports. You will
liaise with clients, respond to specific inquiries and advise staff deployed
abroad under diverse circumstances.”22 A security clearance and U.S. citizenship were not required.
To work for the OSC requires applicants to “successfully complete a
thorough medical and psychological exam, a polygraph interview and
an extensive background investigation. U.S. citizenship is required.”23
Some open source providers also require analysts to be U.S. citizens and
possess an active security clearance. For example, Chenega Federal Systems posted a job announcement in 2010 for an “Open Source Intelligence
Analyst.” The responsibilities of the position included reading foreignlanguage newspapers, providing summaries of articles, translations of
documents and electronic media, and creating reports. A secret clearance was required in order to “operate directly with Special Operations
Forces conducting operations in Hostile Areas and support Sensitive Site
Exploitation.”24 Similarly, in 2010, Radiance Technologies was seeking a
candidate with “an active Top Secret/SCI [Sensitive Compartmented Information] clearance” to conduct open source searches, collect and analyze information, access databases and libraries, write technical reports,
and develop summaries for analysts.25
A 2010 interview conducted with a former intern at Jane’s Strategic Advisory Services underscored the pressures found in open source work.
In response to the question, “What were you working on?” this intern
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stated, “Well a lot of it is highly confidential. It’s really niche. For example
detailing the companies who deal in arms and entering them on a database. These are companies who like to keep a low profile—even the big
companies. All the information is available through open source research
but it takes some digging out.”26 This intern explained, “At times it’s repetitive and frustrating. The defence industry isn’t very open. Even big
companies don’t have a lot of material readily available. So it can be tough
for example, when you are getting nowhere with your research. This can
be compensated by those moments of breakthrough when you suddenly
access a layer of information you need.”27
While many open source analysts focus on international security issues,
some examine more multidisciplinary areas. For instance, the Global Intelligence and Forecasting (GIF ) Team at the U.S. Department of Agriculture uses open source reporting to identify “emerging animal health issues
and animal agriculture issues that have the potential to significantly impact the United States.”28 The multidisciplinary team of 14 analysts maintains expertise in epidemiology, veterinary medicine, policy and industry
analysis, agricultural economics, public health, wildlife biology, molecular cell biology, and statistics. The GIF Team scans open source media
for animal disease events and other potential hazards to animal health,
as well as for “social, technological, environmental, economic, and political factors that may have a significant impact on United States animal
agriculture.”29 When the GIF Team finds information of value, it produces
a range of alerts, advisories, reports, briefings, and scenarios in order to
notify stakeholders.
Internationally, so-called “peacekeeping intelligence”—which is based
principally on open source information—has also emerged as a resource
for organizations engaged in pre-, active, and post-conflict missions in
the Middle East, Sudan, Uganda, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Columbia, and
other conflict zones.30 Security studies scholars David Carment and Martin Rudner define peacekeeping intelligence as “a new form of intelligence
that emphasizes open sources of information, multilateral sharing of intelligence at all levels, the use of intelligence to ensure force protection,
and interoperability and commonality with coalition partners and nongovernmental organizations.”31 The UN force commander for the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Major-General Patrick Cammaert,
explained his advocacy for the increased use of peacekeeping intelligence
using the case of the Rwandan genocide in 1994: “Had there been a more
detailed intelligence assessment considering historical tendencies, the political will and military capability of the belligerents, and looking at all the
escalation scenarios, we could have [been given a stronger mandate] and
prevented the genocide and atrocities that followed.”32 In addition to the
UN, ministries of defense and foreign affairs in the Netherlands, Canada,
and Switzerland have been at the forefront of developing peacekeeping
intelligence approaches.33
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Even companies established long before the rise of open source discourse in the 2000s have jumped on the open source bandwagon, reframing their services to tap into the growing market. For example, Dun &
Bradstreet (D&B) has positioned itself as an open source provider offering
“worldwide intelligence to help counteract terrorism and fraud.”34 Analysts are encouraged to sift through the D&B database to find information
on businesses, executives, corporate linkages, foreign ownership, and financial information. Some open source work is focused entirely on the
private sector under the moniker of “competitive intelligence.”35
Whether one is engaged in foreign, homeland security, peacekeeping, or
competitive intelligence, the physical environment in which open source
work occurs is generally similar. When I worked for Intellibridge from
2001 to 2005, analysts spent long hours in front of their desktop computers, scouring the Internet, looking for information that responded to the
defined needs of their clients. This on-site work was supplemented by visits to libraries, research in archives, and interviews conducted with subject matter experts. Some commercial open source providers, such as iJET,
configure their analysts’ desks into a sleek, high-tech “watch-floor” or
“trading-floor” layout; private offices are eschewed for rows of desks positioned in sight of large television screens tuned to global news channels
such as CNN. However, other providers offer less glamorous surroundings. In a 2006 article for the New Yorker, Benjamin Wallace-Wells described
his visit to SITE’s offices on the seventh floor of a building in an unnamed
northeastern city. Wallace-Wells explained, “I half expected to walk into
a center full of high-tech equipment, with flashing maps and screens.”36
He discovered instead that the office “looked like a college newspaper’s,”
with a room for SITE’s owner, Rita Katz; a room for two translators; and
an area called “the pit, where several researchers and interns . . . sat under
a long, eye-level row of mug shots of wanted terrorists.”37
SECURING CONTRACTS
Maintaining gainful employment as an open source analyst requires
that one’s company secure contracts with government, nongovernmental, or corporate clients. Supporting U.S. government agencies generally
requires participating in a formalized procurement process. But before
procurement activities can take place, an open source provider’s managers must convince an agency’s administrators to purchase their products and services. For U.S. intelligence agencies, the problem is usually
not a lack of information; rather, it is making sense of what is collected in
ways that support that agency’s mission. The challenge for contractors is
to distinguish the value of their organization’s open source information
and analysis from other sources that a government agency receives. Convincing administrators to purchase products and services is usually accomplished by providing compelling examples, divulging the names of
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other potentially impressive clients (and asserting that these clients pay
a far greater amount for similar types of information services), and appealing to administrators’ fears that their agency is overlooking valuable
material.
Illustrating the latter tactic, D&B Government Solutions wrote the following in a 2008 open source intelligence marketing flier: “All 15 Cabinetlevel departments, most federal agencies and over 60% of state agencies
rely on D&B as a trusted partner to make confident decisions.”38 By comparison, SOSi focuses on the value provided by its personnel, stating on
its website, “Whether they are supporting you as integrated staff or program managers, our senior team—your senior team—comes from both the
private sector and the United States government, with backgrounds ranging from former senior officers to FORTUNE 500/NYSE corporate consultants. The diverse qualifications of the SOSi staff combine to become a
single, trusted entity for your most important initiatives.”39
If sales efforts are successful, a government contract may follow. Publicly available solicitations posted on the Federal Business Opportunities
website, as well as information from vendors’ websites, reveal a range of
desired open source activities. For example, agencies look to open sources
to construct biographical sketches for high-level officials, executives, and
commentators within a given country in order to assess their relative influence on that country’s foreign policies.40 On the homeland security front,
tasks can include creating databases from openly available information
on gangs, drug cartels, and organized crime syndicates.41 Media monitoring can involve examining how media organizations within a country are
framing issues and developments; as OSC director Naquin stated in 2005,
“There’s a lot of interest in ‘Is Osama bin Laden losing market share?’ if you
will. How is he playing vis-a-vis Zarqawi?”42 Naquin added, “Osama bin
Laden hasn’t said anything for months and so Zarqawi seems to be really
taking up the mantle” (Zarqawi was killed in a U.S airstrike in 2006).43
Solicitation # MDA908–02-Q-0055 outlined the DIA’s need for “Global
Coverage Knowledge Baselines.”44 The solicitation states that “the contractor shall use appropriate data-mining software and acquisition strategies to search the world-wide web (Internet) and other open sources for
the best and most useful unclassified information pertaining to the governments of one-hundred-and-fifty-three (153) countries. . . . Each Government Overview shall consist of quickly digested, summarily formatted,
factual data, map-overlays, images, charts, and statistics that provide in
general detail a description of the government in each Global Coverage
country.”45 Another solicitation, W74V8H-05-T-0253, explained that the
Office of the Secretary of Defense sought “to develop a repeatable capability for capturing relevant Open Source information about hard-target adversary elite structure and elite decision-making processes, and exploiting
such information for the purpose of increasing Combatant Commanders
unambiguous warning, as well as positively affecting their operational
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options.”46 In 2010, solicitation # GS05T11BMC0002RFP outlined a proposal to develop “Open Source Research Centers” in Ohio.47 These centers
were to “provide a trained open source intelligence (OSINT) workforce
skilled in supporting both state and federal government agencies already
over-burdened with classified research requirements with the resources
they need to meet their open source intelligence requirements.”48 The
proposal was originally a legislative earmark sponsored by Rep. Michael
Turner (R-OH). As a result of new earmark guidelines, the solicitation was
made available under full and open competition rules.49
Solicitation # FA4600–05-R-0013 outlined support to the “joint/combined operational planning related to intelligence, DoD Information Operations (IO), Global Strike, and Strategic Communications in support of
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), STRATCOM missions and assigned
tasks.”50 The solicitation stated the following:
The objective of this effort is to access, analyze, coordinate, and disseminate FMA
[foreign media analysis] in a multi-layered approach to media analysis for joint/
combined operational planning and command/services/agencies (C/S/A) decision-maker situational awareness. FMA is particularly critical to achieving and
measuring the effects of assurance, deterrence, and dissuasion in the modern battlespace. . . . The contractor must have demonstrated experience in foreign media
analysis, open source media collection and processing, robust statistical pattern/
trend analysis, foreign language translation, international public information,
DoD joint/combined planning, strategic communications planning, research and
database development, designing/constructing/and hosting web sites and email
list activities. Contractor must have planning and implementation experience with
respect to asymmetric threats, as well as an understanding of the international
non-English language media. Contractor must have the ability to assess all media
sources, including broadcast, print, and electronic providers. Contractor must
have detailed experience in translating content from and into Arabic, Urdu, Pashtu, and additional languages that do not use Latin character sets, and the ability to draw analytical conclusions based on statistical trends/patterns and content
analyses. The contractor must also have cultural knowledge of major countries in
each area of responsibility (AOR) involved in the GWOT.51
SOSi elaborates the details of this contract on its website: “The Foreign
Media Analysis (FMA) program is one of SOSi’s most critical and challenging endeavors. It provides ongoing critical analysis of real-time events and
major stories as reported by media sources around the world. These analysis products are delivered to leaders, decision-makers, and action officers, as well as Information Operations (IO) and Strategic Communication
(SC) planners worldwide.”52 SOSi lists the products it provides in support
of the FMA program, including these publications: News Alerts, Overnight
News Report, Core Analysis Reports, Daily Media Synthesis Reports, Weekly
Foreign Print Media Summary, Global Weekly / Monthly Topical Reports, Influential Communicators Report, Al Qaida Brutality Report, STRATCOM Focus
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155
Calendar Briefing (a four-month view of significant upcoming dates related
to national holidays, anniversaries, elections and events), Detainee Analysis Report, CENTCOM Broadcast Media, Daily Briefs, Special Reports, and
AdHoc Reporting.
Similarly to STRATCOM, organizations across the U.S. government
both generate and consume open source products and services to support
their missions. Private sector analysts could find themselves working on
behalf of these organizations: (1) the branches of the U.S. armed services:
Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, as well as specialized intelligence centers within and across these services; (2) Unified
Combatant Commands, including Africa Command, Central Command,
European Command, Joint Forces Command, Northern Command, Pacific
Command, Southern Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic,
and Transportation Command; and (3) U.S. government departments,
including Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Energy, Homeland Security, State, and Treasury. Additionally, governmental and quasigovernmental think tanks such as RAND and the Foreign Military Studies
Office (FMSO) bring together military specialists and civilian academics
to “focus on military and security topics derived from unclassified, foreign media.”53
The cost of open source support varies widely, and for outsiders, the
price tag for open source products and services can seem staggering. The
five-year contract awarded to SOSi in 2006 for media monitoring was estimated at nearly $68 million.54 At Intellibridge, one specialized report on a
country’s defense sector could have cost $15,000 or more. The open source
provider IntelCenter lists the prices of some of its services on its website.
IntelCenter describes itself as “studying terrorist groups and other threat
actors and disseminating that information in a timely manner to those
who can act on it. We look at capabilities and intentions, warnings and
indicators, operational characteristics and a wide variety of other points
in order to better understand how to interdict terrorist operations and reduce the likelihood of future attacks.”55 IntelCenter services range from
a $195 per year subscription to the FlashNet-Terrorism Alert Service that
provides “near instant notification to your pager, cell phone or personal
digital assistant (PDA) of significant terrorist incidents and developments
around the world” to a $150,000–$500,000+ per year Hostage/Kidnapping
Profiling and Incident Monitor that includes “24/7 monitoring and support
during ongoing hostage incidents with heavy focus on release of statements and video materials from group holding hostages. Focus on developing analysis to assist in identifying identity of kidnappers, location
of hostage(s) and other actionable intelligence to support operations.”56
IntelCenter’s descriptions underscore how open source tends to be understood and marketed as a commodity. The challenge for open source
providers is to gain clients while not entering into agreements to produce
specialized products and services that cannot be reconfigured and sold to
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other clients. An open source–as-commodity strategy enables providers to
leverage work for multiple clients in order to recoup costs.
CONDUCTING OPEN SOURCE EXPLOITATION
Once open source providers have secured contracts and hired, trained,
and assigned analysts, the process of conducting open source exploitation
begins. James Major notes in Communicating with Intelligence that, traditionally, the steps involved in exploitation are often distributed among
different personnel: “Collectors of information—whether it is human intelligence, signals intelligence, or imagery intelligence—rely on their ability to capture and transform information into intelligence for the analysts.
It is the analysts who rely on their ability to communicate effectively, to
translate ideas and actions into ‘finished’ intelligence products for the
commander or policy maker.”57 Within the open source sector, the line between collection and analysis blurs.58 Nevertheless, the government establishes the topics for open source collection (“requirements” in the lexicon
of the intelligence community) within the OSC’s collection plans, which
are reviewed and approved annually, according to an OSC pamphlet.59
OSC urges customers to “familiarize themselves with the collection plans
and standing requirements related to their areas of interest in order to
gain maximum benefit from their participation in the collection tasking
process.”60 However, this may be difficult for many OSC users because
viewing the plans requires having access to a Top Secret intelligence community intranet.
Once topics and requirements for open source exploitation are established, analysts identify their collection and analysis strategies and tactics. Open source providers generally assert that their work is “not the
cut and paste and Googlification that we see in so many places.”61 For example, the OSC’s Open Source Academy (OSA) offers training to analysts
on topics including “basic tradecraft, Internet exploitation, and reviewing
finished intelligence products.”62 OSA Provost Dave Kraus commented,
“Our analytic tradecraft courses teach how to analyze the media, including ownership of media organizations and their political leanings. The
courses on Internet exploitation go beyond the casual search skills that
we’ve developed at home and in school. There are very precise search and
research strategies, that are not intuitive, to cull valuable information from
the Internet.”63
Companies also offer specialized training in open source exploitation
methods and tools.64 Handbooks such as Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet and the U.S. Army’s Field Manual for Open Source Intelligence are freely
available online (the latter is marked “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”).65
Training seminars and handbooks provide extensive technical information regarding how to plan for open source exploitation, conduct that exploitation via online and offline search strategies and techniques, assess
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the quality of sources, and disseminate finished intelligence products. Increasingly, this work involves obtaining information called “gray literature,” which is “comprised of research and technical reports, trip reports,
working or discussion papers, market surveys, newsletters and other unclassified sources,” along with “maps, building diagrams, biographies,
ship manifests and commercial imagery.”66 Sources of information can
include government, commercial, nonprofit, and activist websites; email
lists; videos; blogs; chat rooms; and social media sites such as Facebook,
Myspace, and YouTube, as well as statements, news stories, online imagery, résumé services, libraries, and subject matter experts. Speaking of
the need to tap experts outside the intelligence community, then DDNI/
A Fingar stated the following during a 2008 conference:
We have to make [outreach to experts] a part of the way we do our business because
I would hazard to say it is a part of the way every person in this room does their
job now. You are in contact with colleagues and competitors, foreign folk working
a problem at all stages of the process. We have to do the same because when we
need that expertise—I mean, really need it—it is too late to begin the search. You
have to have developed the ties, the relationship, the evaluative criteria. And my
vision on this is to have a chunk of the vetting located in the [OSC]. . . . We are on
the way there. But this is a change of culture for the community, where if it ain’t
secret, it ain’t real. If somebody is not cleared, they are not worthy. That is yesterday’s thinking. We have got to get to tomorrow, where not just our own people,
but our customers live.67
In addition to offering rosters of subject matter experts, some open source
providers market tools and techniques to access information found in the
“deep web”—an immense trove of unindexed online material unavailable
via standard search engines (some analysts, both inside and outside U.S.
intelligence agencies, have access to highly specialized open source tools
that I am not privy to because those tools are protected by both government and commercial secrecy). Tools and techniques for searching online
resources are diverse: single search engines, meta search engines, vertical
search engines, federated search engines, social search engines, and multimedia search engines are all used to locate nuggets of information otherwise buried online. However, analysts who spend their days searching
websites for their clients must be careful to protect their anonymity. Administrators of websites can review the IP (internet protocol) addresses of
computers visiting their sites, potentially revealing the organizations associated with those IP addresses—for instance, defense and intelligence
agencies or their contractors.68 Software such as Tor prevents “somebody
watching your Internet connection from learning what sites you visit, and
it prevents the sites you visit from learning your physical location.”69 The
company notes, “A branch of the U.S. Navy uses Tor for open source intelligence gathering, and one of its teams used Tor while deployed in the
Middle East recently. Law enforcement uses Tor for visiting or surveilling
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web sites without leaving government IP addresses in their web logs, and
for security during sting operations.”70
Once online anonymity has been established, collection can proceed.
For example, Wallace-Wells’ article on SITE notes, “Each day, Katz finds
about a half-dozen items on Arabic message boards that are worth distributing. Her researchers, who monitor English-language jihadist Web
sites, often find a few more. Some are propaganda: videos taking responsibility for attacks, statements of intent to attack, announcements of allegiances or splits. Others involve tactics and weapons.”71 Wallace-Wells
explains, “SITE tries to have the items translated and sent to subscribers within an hour and a half of their first appearance online.”72 Open
source practitioners may falsely pose as members of nefarious groups or
their sympathizers to gain access to additional information. For example,
the Washington Post reported that in 2008, “U.S. military officials had become convinced that extremists planning attacks on American forces in
Iraq were making use of a Web site set up by the Saudi government and
the CIA to uncover terrorist plots in the kingdom.”73 The article noted,
“Elite U.S. military computer specialists, over the objections of the CIA,
mounted a cyberattack that dismantled the online forum.”74 This forum
was a “honey pot”—in other words, “an online forum covertly monitored
by intelligence agencies to identify attackers and gain information.”75
The analytical techniques that can be applied to open source material
are as varied as the types of material that can be collected. Processing may
precede analysis: “Processing may include tasks such as spoken language
or machine language translation, running data visualization software, or
employing image-processing algorithms before analysis can start.”76 The
level of formalization of these techniques differs across open source providers. Within the intelligence community, new analysts are exposed to a
range of techniques, especially the “structured analytical techniques” outlined in Richards J. Heuer Jr.’s Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.77 These
techniques are designed to overcome cognitive limitations and pitfalls by
helping analysts externalize their thinking in ways that can be reviewed
and assessed by others. Such formalized analytical approaches were rare
at Intellibridge, which typically relied on the reputation and track record
of its analysts during the exploitation process.
Once open source information has been collected and analyzed, it must
be assembled and disseminated to an audience. Lowenthal states, “The
intelligence community has a set product line to cover the types of reports
and customers with which it must deal.”78 The “generic format” of intelligence products within the intelligence community is straightforward:
a beginning, middle, and end.79 The beginning usually contains a standalone summary of the document. The middle elaborates the author’s use
of sources and his or her judgments, supporting evidence, and assumptions. The end provides the author’s conclusions and a discussion of implications for the future. Annexes and appendixes may include detailed
Appendix: Open Source Contexts and Practices
159
facts, figures, charts, and explanations of methodologies.80 The generic
format is more or less followed in the two gems of the U.S. intelligence
community: the PDB ( President’s Daily Brief ) and the National Intelligence Estimate.81 Of the hundreds of intelligence products that the intelligence community generates and distributes to policy makers each year,
the PDB and NIE are consistently cited as the most consequential.82 Intelligence analysts strive to have their analytical judgments included as part
of these products; Zegart states, “Your career as an analyst is determined
by . . . how many items you have in the PDB.”83 Indeed, officials cite open
source contributions to the PDB as evidence of open source’s utility.84
Intelligence scholar Loch Johnson explains that PDBs provide current intelligence (similar to a newspaper, but one containing classified material),
while NIEs provide comprehensive, long-range research intelligence.85
PDBs are assembled primarily by the CIA and distributed to perhaps no
more than a dozen senior officials. During the Ford administration, PDBs
were nearly 20 pages in length. The length has consistently shrunk, and
during the second Bush administration the document was only 1–2 pages
long.86 NIEs, by contrast, are extensively researched by relevant agencies
throughout the intelligence community, coordinated by the NIC, and distributed more widely than PDBs. NIEs are considered the most authoritative analytical product produced by the intelligence community, and since
1950, the intelligence community has produced an average of 23 NIEs per
year.87
Private open source providers, of course, have more flexibility in the
types of information products they produce. DHS’s Open Source Enterprise
Daily Cyber Report organizes its content topically and contains sections on
“Critical Infrastructure Protection,” “Information Systems Breaches,” “Cyberterrorism & Cyberwarfare,” “Vulnerabilities,” and “General Cyber/
Electronic Crime.” iJET offers a Daily Intelligence Briefing, Monthly Intelligence Forecast, and a World Pandemic Monitor, among other services. Each
business morning, subscribers to the iJET’s Daily Intelligence Briefing receive a report on terrorist activities, political developments, social unrest,
labor strikes, disease outbreaks, crime trends, and other threats. Products
may also be organized geographically, by country or region. The presentation of material may be in the form of short summaries that include media
reports, official statements, or commentary. Longer analyses may speculate on behind-the-scenes developments in explaining public events. For
example, a meeting between world leaders may be abruptly cancelled,
and an analysis might discuss media speculation, political and economic
drivers, the likely consequences, and future courses of action.
ASSESSING OPEN SOURCE
The OSC’s Naquin has acknowledged that in the open source arena,
“Rarely is there the ‘aha!’ The ‘oh-you-solved-this or you-prevented-this’
160
Appendix: Open Source Contexts and Practices
moment.”88 This situation is due, in part, to the probabilistic nature of intelligence assessments and the use of equivocal statements—likely, probably, maybe, possibly, and so on—within analysts’ reports. While equivocal
statements are needed to ensure that ambiguity is adequately acknowledged, they make the overall accuracy of open source intelligence products difficult to assess. This situation creates a double-edged sword for
open source providers. On one hand, providers demonstrate their value
through timely, accurate, and actionable information. On the other hand,
measuring one’s accuracy potentially undermines claims of expertise
should that level of accuracy be less than exceptional. When open source
providers that market predictive intelligence fail in that effort, it can create
the need for damage control with clients. SITE’s Katz acknowledged that
her group “doesn’t check the scientific accuracy of each manual, or the legitimacy of every threat.”89
However, there is no agreed-upon threshold for determining an appropriate level of accuracy of intelligence. In a 2008 speech before the New
America Foundation, it was DDNI/A Fingar’s “guesstimate” that the intelligence community is “right” roughly 85 percent of the time.90 Fingar,
however, wanted to see that percentage shrink to 35 percent. The reason,
Fingar said, is that a high percentage of accurate assessments indicates
that the intelligence community is answering questions that “are too
damn easy.”91 For Fingar, the goal of the intelligence community should
be to answer extremely difficult questions, as well as to be allowed to answer those questions incorrectly. I am aware of no studies or guesstimates
regarding the degree of accuracy of commercial open source providers’
predictions, forecasts, or analysis.
In addition to accuracy, use is another area of underassessment. For example, a 2008 CENTRA Technology report submitted to the DHS’s chief
intelligence officer (posted on California’s Office of Homeland Security
website) supports the findings presented in chapter 5 regarding the use
of open source within the homeland security sector.92 Specifically, CENTRA conducted interviews with members of six state and local homeland
security fusion centers. According the report, five of those fusion centers
reported having received no open source training from federal agencies:
“Most analysts learned open source techniques by doing and utilized
commercial search engines and online databases.”93 Additionally, each of
the fusion centers “struggles with the large number of open source products it receives from DHS, other state and local sources, and the private
sector” because these largely contained “redundant information and little
analysis.”94 CENTRA found, “In at least one case, this glut of open source
products has caused local analysts to ignore such products.”95 The report
indicated ways to improve this situation through increased training and
tailored support but noted that some of these would take time and be
contingent on funding. CENTRA’s report, along with the findings of this
book, suggests that open source stakeholders at all levels would do well
Appendix: Open Source Contexts and Practices
161
to critically assess how analysts and officials actually use the open source
products they receive. These assessments, however, are less likely in an
environment dominated by profit-seeking companies that benefit from a
fragmented and competitive market—a market where agency administrators remain unaware of their colleagues’ open source inputs and outputs
and purchase duplicative products and services.
To its credit, the OSC undertook self-assessment in 2009. Specifically,
OSC officials sent a survey to a random sample of subscribers.96 Participants were asked to rank on a scale whether the OSC provided users trustworthy sources, credible content, and unique information, among other
variables. Participants were also asked how often they used various types
of government-provided open source information services from their own
agencies and the OSC, the value of these services, and how they learned
of them. Questions asked whether participants believed that the OSC had
become their “one-stop shop” for open source products and services, as
well as what participants thought the OSC needed to do the enhance its
ability to become this one-stop shop. Participants were also asked whether
they were aware of and valued a partnership program whereby OSC personnel were available for on-site support.
Finally, participants were asked to rank their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement that “the effective use of open source information is essential in supporting US national security interests.” That
the OSC even asked that question undercuts the strength of its assertion
that open source is “one of the 21st Century’s most important sources of
intelligence.”97 Given the sensitive nature of the questions asked, as well
as the increasing level of secrecy surrounding open source, it is unlikely
that stakeholders outside the intelligence community will ever learn the
results of the OSC’s survey. Nevertheless, we see from the OSC’s survey
that institutional insecurity regarding the worth of open source and its status as a legitimate form of intelligence endures.
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Notes
CHAPTER 1
1. Herman L. Croom, “The Exploitation of Foreign Open Sources,” Studies in
Intelligence 13 (Summer 1969): 135.
2. Alex Kingsbury, “Spy Agencies Turn to Newspapers, NPR, and Wikipedia
for Information: The Intelligence Community is Learning to Value ‘Open-Source’
Information,” U.S. News & World Report, September 12, 2008, http://www.usnews.
com/articles/news/national/2008/09/12/spy-agencies-turn-to-newspapersnpr-and-wikipedia-for-information.html (accessed April 23, 2009).
3. “Open source,” “open source information,” “open source intelligence,” and
“OSINT” are often treated as synonyms. See Richard A. Best Jr. and Alfred Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service, December 5, 2007, 2, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34270.pdf
(accessed November 21, 2010). Additionally, this definition should not be confused
with “open source software,” which refers to freely accessible source code. However, Creative Commons licensing relates to open source information in that both
encourage transparency.
4. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director of national intelligence
for open source, Eliot A. Jardines (DNI Open Source Conference, Washington,
DC, July 16, 2007), 1, http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20070716_speech_3.pdf (accessed August 15, 2007); for photos and presentations from this conference, and
a second DNI Open Source Conference held in 2008, see Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, “Open Source Conference Blog,” http://dniopensource
blog2007.wordpress.com, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “DNI
Open Source Conference 2008,” http://www.dniopensource.org, and Cryptome,
“DNI Open Source Conference,” http://cryptome.org/eyeball/dni-openeye/
dni-openeye.htm.
164
Notes
5. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director of national intelligence
for open source, Eliot A. Jardines (DNI Open Source Conference, Washington, DC,
July 16, 2007), 1, http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20070716_speech_3.pdf (accessed
August 15, 2007);
6. Ibid., 2–3.
7. Burke is an originator of Intellipedia, the intelligence community’s version
of the online, collaborative encyclopedia Wikipedia. See Suzanne E. Spaulding,
“No More Secrets: Then What?” Huffington Post, June 24, 2010, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/suzanne-e-spaulding/no-more-secrets-then-what_b_623997.
html (accessed November 21, 2010); Bob Brewin, “No More Secrets?” Government Executive, September 15, 2008, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0908/091508wb.
htm (accessed November 21, 2010).
8. Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “Top Secret America,” Washington Post,
July 19, 2010, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/ (accessed
November 21, 2010).
9. Ronald Marks, “Twittering Intelligence,” Open Source Intelligence Forum,
February 2009, http://www.osif.us/articlesofinterest.html (accessed November
21, 2010).
10. National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, 2007, 6, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_
release.pdf.
11. “Inside the Iran NIE,” MSNBC, December 6, 2007, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/22117095 (accessed November 21, 2010).
12. Wyn Q. Bowen, “Open Source Intelligence and Nuclear Safeguards,” in
Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence, ed. Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 91–104.
13. Ibid.
14. Remarks by the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, Frances Fragos Townsend (DNI Open Source Conference, Washington, DC, July 16, 2007), 2, www.dni.gov/speeches/20070716_speech_2.pdf
(accessed August 3, 2008).
15. Remarks and Q&A by the director of the CIA, Michael V. Hayden (DNI
Open Source Conference, Washington, DC, September 12, 2008), 1, http://
cryptome.org/cia-openspy.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009).
16. Gaetano Joe Ilardia, “The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 3 (2009): 176.
17. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President, March 31, 2005, 23, http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html (accessed November 21, 2010).
18. Best and Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence,” 2.
19. Tony Campbell, “Bedmates or Sparring Partners? Canadian Perspectives
on the Media-Intelligence Relationship in ‘The New Propaganda Age,’ ” in Dover
and Goodman, Spinning Intelligence, 175.
20. Open Source Center, https://www.opensource.gov (accessed November
21, 2010).
21. Ibid.
22. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide, 2009, 29, http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Consumers_Guide_2009.
pdf (accessed November 21, 2010).
Notes
165
23. Open Source Center, https://www.opensource.gov (accessed November 21,
2010).
24. A representative from World News Connection stated in 2008 that only
“about half” of the OSC’s content is publicly released (copyright laws often prevent disclosure). Additionally, the information provided to the public generally
excludes OSC’s analytical products. The World News Connection website states,
“The information is obtained from full text and summaries of newspaper articles,
conference proceedings, television and radio broadcasts, periodicals, and nonclassified technical reports.” See National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, “About World News Connection,” http://wnc.fedworld.
gov/description.html (accessed November 21, 2010).
25. Steven Aftergood, “Secrecy and Error Correction in Open Source
Intel,” Secrecy News, August 31, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2009/08/083109.html (accessed November 21, 2010).
26. Open Source Center, Briefing for the UCGIS Winter Meeting 2008, February 7,
2008, http://www.ucgis.org/winter2008/presentations/Robson.pdf (accessed November 21, 2010).
27. Open Source Center, https://www.opensource.gov (accessed November
21, 2010).
28. Consider a job announcement for an intelligence community Open Source
Officer listed on the CIA website in 2010: “Open Source Officers (OSOs) are the
Intelligence Community’s foreign media experts. They use foreign language and
area knowledge to review and assess foreign open media sources, including Internet sites, newspapers, press agencies, television, radio and specialized publications, collecting intelligence from these media to deliver high-impact products to
the US foreign affairs community. OSOs develop and apply in-depth knowledge of
a broad range of foreign media to identify trends and patterns, and to write analytical products. They may also translate text, audio and video information and select
materials from the media for translation by independent contract translators. OSOs
research and analyze the media environment in a particular country or region and
prepare media analyses that inform customers of subtle relationships and trends
in the media. The candidates we seek are creative, with a keen interest in foreign
affairs, strong writing and analytical skills, a well-developed facility for reading
and translating one or more of a broad range of foreign languages, and working
knowledge of the Internet. Many OSOs have lived in their region of interest and/
or have formally studied the politics and history of a particular country or region.
Positions are in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area, with limited opportunities for overseas travel and assignments. In addition to salary and benefits, these
Officers are eligible to earn annual language ‘bonus’ pay based on in-house language proficiency testing. OSOs may also have the opportunity to take courses in
additional languages and area studies as well as other relevant training. As a part
of the screening process, selected applicants will be sent a language proficiency test
and asked to provide an analytic writing sample. The following languages, or language combinations, with relevant area knowledge are sought: Arabic; Bulgarian;
Central Asian and Russian; Chinese; Czech; Dari/Pashtu; Farsi/Persian; French
and Arabic; French or Portuguese and African Studies; Greek; Hebrew and Arabic;
Hindi; Hungarian and Romanian; Indonesian; Korean; Polish; Russian and Ukrainian; Serbo-Croatian; Turkish; and Urdu.” See CIA, “Open Source Officer (Foreign
Media Analyst),” https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/analytical/opensource-officer-foreign-media-analyst.html (accessed November 21, 2010).
166
Notes
29. The author worked for Intellibridge Corporation from 2001 to 2005; see
Preface.
30. ProMED, The 2003 ProMED-Mail Award for Excellence in Outbreak Reporting
on the Internet, http://apex.oracle.com/pls/otn/wwv_flow.accept (accessed August 3, 2008).
31. Kimberly Saunders, “Open Source Information: A True Collection Discipline” (master’s thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 2000).
32. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Using Open-Source Information Effectively, 109th Cong., 1st sess., June 21, 2005, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/opensource.pdf (accessed November 21, 2010).
33. Elaine Sciolino, “C.I.A. Casting About for New Missions,” New York Times,
February 4, 1992, A1.
34. For a review of officials’ tentative steps toward improving open source capabilities throughout the Cold War and pre-9/11 period, see Robert David Steele,
“The Open Source Program: Missing in Action,” International Journal of Intelligence
and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 3 (2008): 609–19.
35. John C. Gannon, “Intelligence Challenges for the Next Generation” (remarks,
World Affairs Council, Washington, DC, June 4, 1998), http://www.fas.org/irp/
cia/product/ddi_speech_060598.html (accessed November 26, 2010).
36. Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2008).
37. J. F. Holden-Rhodes, Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and
the War on Drugs (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Printing Services,
1994), v.
38. House Committee on Homeland Security, Using Open-Source Information Effectively, 31.
39. See William J. Lahneman, “Outsourcing the IC’s Stovepipes,” International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 4 (2003): 573.
40. A technical discussion of open source discovery tools is beyond the scope
of this book. These tools have relevance for multiple fields struggling to overcome
the problems of information glut and are a needed focus for future communication research.
41. Quarterback Consulting provided an overview of the private intelligence
market in their 2003 Private Intelligence Industry Report.
42. The scope and scale of the open source sector relates to how associated
practices are defined. For example, commentator Benjamin Wallace-Wells asserts, “The world of private, open-source counterterrorism operations is tiny—
a few dozen people, if you’re counting liberally.” Open source provider SOSi,
however, states on its website (http://www.sosiltd.com/about_us/default.
htm), “Through careful cultivation, our strategic partnerships with a number
of private-sector companies, government-services providers, academic institutions and think tanks keep us well ahead of the curve, regardless of the task or
challenge. Our team of more than 1,200 professionals supports operations on
nearly every continent and spans the widest spectrum of professional, linguistic
and cultural backgrounds.” See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad: How
Rita Katz Got into the Spying Business,” New Yorker, May 29, 2006, http://www.
newyorker.com/archive/2006/05/29/060529fa_fact (accessed December 9,
2010).
Notes
167
43. Timothy J. Burger, “Opening Up the CIA,” Time, August 7, 2005, http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1090889,00.html (accessed February 23, 2011).
44. Shorrock, Spies For Hire, 13.
45. Shane Harris, “Intelligence Incorporated,” Government Executive, May 15,
2005, 40–47; Shane Harris, “Intelligence Shop,” Government Executive, May 1, 2005,
http://www.govexec.com/features/0505-01/0505-01na3.htm (accessed August 4,
2008).
46. Joby Warrick, “Leak Severed a Link to Al-Qaeda’s Secrets: Firm Says Administration’s Handling of Video Ruined its Spying Efforts,” Washington Post, October 9, 2007, A1.
47. Total Intelligence Solutions, “Former CIA and Counterterrorism Experts
Respond to Security and Intelligence Demands of the Private Sector,” news release,
February 20, 2006, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/former-cia-andcounterterrorism-experts-respond-to-security-and-intelligence-demands-of-theprivate-sector-58023627.html (accessed August 4, 2008).
48. Ibid.
49. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Key Facts about Contractors,” 2010, http://www.dni.gov/content/Truth_About_Contractors.pdf (accessed
November 21, 2010).
50. Ibid.
51. Paul F. Wallner, “Open Sources and the Intelligence Community: Myths
and Realities,” American Intelligence Journal (Spring/Summer 1993): 19.
52. Edward Schiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003), 3.
53. Open Source Center, https://www.opensource.gov (accessed November 21,
2010).
54. Patience Wait, “Intelligence Units Mine the Benefits of Public Sources: Open
Source Center Draws, Analyzes Info from a Variety of Public Databases,” Government Computer News, March 20, 2006, http://www.gcn.com/print/25_6/40152-1.
html (accessed November 21, 2010).
55. “CIA Mines ‘Rich’ Content from Blogs,” Washington Times, April 18, 2006,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/apr/18/20060418-110124-3694r/
(accessed November 21, 2010).
56. Arthur S. Hulnick, “The Downside of Open Source Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 15, no. 4 (2002): 565.
57. Best and Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence,” 2.
58. William Nolte, “Thinking about Rethinking: Reform in Other Professions,”
Studies in Intelligence 52, no. 2 (2008): 19.
59. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, December 4, 1981,
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12333.htm (accessed November 21, 2010).
60. Karl E. Weick, Kathleen E. Sutcliffe, and David Obstfeld, “Organizing and
the Process of Sensemaking,” Organization Science 16, no. 4 (2005): 409.
61. Markus Perkmann and André Spicer, “How Are Management Fashions Institutionalized? The Role of Institutional Work,” Human Relations 61, no. 6 (2008):
812.
62. This figure does not include many intelligence-related activities conducted
by the U.S. Department of Defense, whose budget totaled $515.4 billion in FY
2009.
168
Notes
63. Hamilton Bean and Lisa B. Keränen, “The Role of Homeland Security Information Bulletins within Emergency Management Organizations: A Case Study of
Enactment,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 4, no. 2 (2007):
Article 6.
64. John Rollins, “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2008, 2, http://www.csmweb.com/
Library%20Documents/RL34070.pdf (accessed August 4, 2008).
65. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Moving Beyond the First Five
Years: Evolving the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to Better Serve State, Local, and
Tribal Needs, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 24, 2008, 48.
66. Ibid.
67. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States Intelligence Community 500 Day Plan Integration and Collaboration, 2007, http://www.dni.gov/500day-plan.pdf (accessed November 26, 2010).
68. Gregory F. Treverton, The Next Steps in Reshaping Intelligence (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2005).
69. Joanne Martin, Peter Frost, and Olivia O’Neill, “Organizational Culture:
Beyond Struggles for Intellectual Dominance,” in The Sage Handbook of Organization Studies, 2nd ed., ed. Stewart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, Thomas B. Lawrence,
and Walter R. Nord (London: Sage, 2006), 725–53.
70. Nolte, “Thinking about Rethinking,” 22.
71. Kristen Breitweiser, Wake-Up Call: The Political Education of a 9/ 11 Widow
(New York: Warner Books, 2006); Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/ 11 Commission (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006);
Philip Shenon, The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation
(New York: Twelve, 2008).
72. Kean and Hamilton, Without Precedent.
73. Breitweiser, Wake-Up Call, 87.
74. Pearl-Alice Marsh, “Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens’ Challenges to U.S.
National Security Policy,” in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 124–48.
75. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, Report to
the President, 378.
76. James J. Wirtz, “The American Approach to Intelligence Studies,” in
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Loch. K. Johnson (New York: Routledge,
2007 ), 29.
77. The process of institutionalization involves the contextualized production and reception of meaning. I therefore used interpretive methods to explore
the complexities of post-9/11 open source discourses, their enactment, and the
responses of institutional members and stakeholders. I introduced a critical element to this analysis by exploring the implications of open source in relation to
democratic deliberation of U.S. national security policy.
78. Mary Simpson and George Cheney, “Marketization, Participation, and
Communication within New Zealand Retirement Villages: A Critical-Rhetorical
and Discursive Analysis,” Discourse and Communication 1, no. 2 (2007): 191–
222.
79. Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1992).
Notes
169
80. Simpson and Cheney, “Marketization, Participation, and Communication.”
On the need for rhetorical scholars to investigate their claims regarding audience
conjectures, see Jennifer Stromer-Galley and Edward Schiappa, “The Argumentative Burdens of Audience Conjectures: Audience Research in Popular Culture
Criticism,” Communication Theory 8, no. 1 (1998): 27–62.
81. Cynthia Hardy, Ian Palmer, and Nelson Phillips, “Discourse as a Strategic
Resource,” Human Relations 53, no. 9 (2000): 1227–48; Nelson Phillips and Cynthia
Hardy, Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage, 2002); Nelson Phillips, Thomas B. Lawrence, and Cynthia Hardy, “Discourse and Institutions,” Academy of Management Review 29, no. 4 (2004): 635–52.
82. Cynthia Hardy, “How Institutions Communicate; or How Does Communicating Institutionalize?” Management Communication Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2011): 191–99.
83. George Cheney, Lars Thøger Christensen, Charles Conrad, and Daniel J.
Lair, “Corporate Rhetoric as Organizational Discourse,” in The Sage Handbook of
Organizational Discourse, ed. David Grant, Cynthia Hardy, Cliff Oswick, and Linda
Putnam (London: Sage, 2004): 79–104.
84. Christopher Grey, “Security Studies and Organization Studies: Parallels
and Possibilities,” Organization 16, no. 2 (2009): 311.
85. Ibid., 314.
86. Bryan C. Taylor, Book review of The Boundaries of the New Frontier: Rhetoric
and Communication at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, by Joanna S. Ploeger.
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 41, no. 1 (2011): 14–16.
87. Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy, “Discourse and Institutions.”
CHAPTER 2
1. Joseph E. Roop, “Foreign Broadcast Information Service History Part 1:
1941–1947,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 1969, 9, http://www.foia.cia.gov/
txt/FBIS_history_part1.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010).
2. Croom, “The Exploitation of Foreign Open Sources,” 129.
3. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence
Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, March 1,
1996, 88, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/int/index.html (accessed November 30,
2010) ( hereafter “Aspin-Brown Commission”).
4. Michael Andregg, “Intelligence Ethics: Laying the Foundation for the Second Oldest Profession,” in Johnson, Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 52–63.
5. Charles E. Lathrop, The Literary Spy: The Ultimate Source for Quotations on
Espionage and Intelligence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
6. Michael Goodman, “British Intelligence and the British Broadcasting Corporation: A Snapshot of a Happy Marriage,” in Dover and Goodman, Spinning
Intelligence, 118.
7. Stephen C. Mercado, “FBIS against the Axis, 1941–1945: Open-Source Intelligence from the Airwaves,” Studies in Intelligence 11 (Fall/Winter 2001), https://
www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/sci-publications/csistudies/fall_winter-2001/article04.html (accessed November 29, 2010).
8. FBMS was renamed the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in 1947, and
in 2005, FBIS, in turn, was renamed the OSC and given expanded capabilities and
authorities.
170
Notes
9. See Mercado, “FBIS against the Axis”; Kalev Leetaru, “The Scope of FBIS
and BBC Open-Source Media Coverage, 1979–2008,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 1
(2010): 17–37.
10. House Committee on Homeland Security, Using Open-Source Information Effectively, 6.
11. Waldo Drake, “Times’ Man, Gets Assignment with Fleet,” Los Angeles Times,
August 1941.
12. Kathy Peiss, “Cultural Policy in a Time of War: The American Response to
Endangered Books in World War II,” Library Trends 55, no. 3 (2007): 377.
13. Patsy Wagstaff, interview with the author, Sun Sites, Arizona, September 2,
1995.
14. Pedro A. Loureiro, “U.S. Counterintelligence against Japan in Southern California, 1933–1941” (PhD dissertation, San Diego State University,
1987).
15. Drake, “Times’ Man, Gets Assignment.”
16. Lee Van Atta, “L.A. Ship News Reporter Now Official Eyes, Ears of U.S.
Fleet,” Los Angeles Times, August 1, 1941.
17. Joseph C. Harsch, At the Hinge of History: A Reporter’s Story (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993).
18. William W. Drake, “I Don’t Think They’d Be Such Damned Fools,” in Air
Raid, Pearl Harbor! Recollections of a Day of Infamy, ed. Paul Stillwell (Annapolis,
MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1981), 269–70.
19. Quoted in Mercado, “FBIS against the Axis.”
20. Roop, “Foreign Broadcast Information Service History.”
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 23.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Patsy Wagstaff, interview.
27. E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1976).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Larry J. Frank, “The United States Navy v. the Chicago Tribune,” Historian
42, no. 2 (1980): 284–303.
31. Ibid.
32. Hulnick, “The Downside of Open Source Intelligence.”
33. Mercado, “FBIS against the Axis.”
34. Peiss, “Cultural Policy in a Time of War,” 378–79.
35. Ibid., 379.
36. Ibid.
37. Croom, “The Exploitation of Foreign Open Sources.”
38. Ibid., 131.
39. Ibid., 133.
40. Ibid., 135.
41. Ibid., 136.
42. Best and Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence.”
43. Croom, “The Exploitation of Foreign Open Sources.”
Notes
171
44. Glenn Hastedt, “Intelligence Estimates: NIEs vs. the Open Press in the 1958
China Straits Crisis,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23,
no. 1 (2010): 104–32.
45. Ibid., 126.
46. Ibid., 127.
47. Ibid.
48. Robert W. Pringle, “The Limits of OSINT: Diagnosing the Soviet Media,
1985–1989,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 2
(2003): 280–89.
49. Ibid., 287.
50. Ibid., 288.
51. Steele, “The Open Source Program.”
52. Ibid., 611.
53. Ibid.
54. Wallner, “Open Sources and the Intelligence Community,” 19.
55. Ibid., 20.
56. A note about my interactions with Steele is warranted. My article, “The
DNI’s Open Source Center: An Organizational Communication Perspective,” was
published in 2007 in the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence.
In 2008, Steele wrote a rejoinder, “The Open Source Program: Missing in Action,”
that praised, critiqued, and extended the article. I had never met nor corresponded
with Steele. On June 6, 2008, Steele contacted me via email to ask whether he could
send me a box of files. He stated, “I am closing down the OSS office as we are
absorbed in a much larger enterprise (Fortune 100) where I will be the director of
collection, processing, and analysis. I have a box of original OSS materials that I
would like to give you exclusive access to and ownership of.” My review of the
materials (seven boxes total) indicated that they were OSS business records, briefing materials for potential clients, conference materials and attendee lists, videos,
books, and commentary—all unclassified. Due to their proprietary nature, business records have not been directly cited in the development of this book. I have
instead relied on publicly available materials in my description of Steele’s advocacy efforts. This material includes archival documents publicly available from
the OSS.net website. For these, I am deeply indebted to Steele. Readers interested
in the 1990s and early 2000s period of open source should consult the extensive
archive of materials found at Steele’s OSS.net website.
57. Steele, “The Open Source Program,” 611.
58. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, H.R. 4165, National
Security Act of 1992, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 4 and 11, 1992, 12.
59. Director of Central Intelligence, Directive 2/12, Community Open Source Program, March 1, 1994, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid212.htm (accessed
November 30, 2010).
60. Community Open Source Program Office, Community Open Source Strategic
Plan, February 1995, 3, http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/040320/
bc201247d9056a4f07e6f5e720be9823/OSS1997-02-34.pdf (accessed December 9,
2010).
61. Wallner, “Open Sources and the Intelligence Community,” 19.
62. National Intelligence Council, Open Source Task Force: A Vision for the Future, January 13, 1992, http://www.phibetaiota.net/1992/01/1992-national-intelli
172
Notes
gence-council-open-source-task-force-a-vision-for-the-future/ (accessed November 30, 2010).
63. Ibid., 1.
64. Ibid., 3.
65. Ibid., 4.
66. Robert David Steele, “United States Marine Corps Comments on Joint
Open Source Task Force Report and Recommendations,” January 6, 1992, http://
www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/060324/9906ba66ee5fe750bb8fe5712b1e2
0e7/92 Jan 11 Steele on IC OSINT.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010).
67. Ibid., 1.
68. Noah Shachtman, “How to Restore Spies Credibility: Go Open Source,”
Wired, December 14, 2007, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/12/howto-restore/ (accessed November 30, 2010).
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. See “Open Source Burundi Exercise,” September 20, 2000, http://lists101.
his.com/pipermail/intelforum/2000-September/002802.html (accessed December 2, 2010).
72. Aspin-Brown Commission, 88.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 89.
75. Robert David Steele, “Fixing the White House and National Intelligence,”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 2 (2010): 353–73.
76. Frederick L. Wettering, “OSINT’s Primary Advocate,” review of The New
Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public and Political, by Robert David Steele, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 3 (2003): 507.
77. Arthur S. Hulnick, “OSINT: Is It Really Intelligence?” (paper presented at
the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA,
August 2008), http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/8/1/2/1/pages281211/p281211-1.php (accessed November 30, 2010).
78. Mark Tovey, ed., Collective Intelligence: Creating a Prosperous World at Peace
(Oakton, VA: Earth Intelligence Network, 2008): iii.
79. NNDB, “Rob Simmons,” http://www.nndb.com/people/462/000040342
(accessed November 30, 2010).
80. Republican Leadership Council, “Bio—Congressman Rob Simmons,”
http://www.republican-leadership.com/bios/rob-simmons (accessed November 30, 2010).
81. Robert M. Simmons, “Open Source Intelligence: An Examination of Its Exploitation in the Defense Intelligence Community” (master’s thesis, Joint Military
Intelligence College, 1995), http://www.phibetaiota.net/1995/08/history-1995simmons-open-source-intelligence-an-examination-of-its-exploitation-in-thedefense-intelligence-community/ (accessed December 1, 2010).
82. Ibid., 3.
83. Ibid., 4.
84. Robert David Steele, Information Operations: All Information, All Languages,
All the Time (Oakton, VA: OSS International Press, 2006): 3.
85. Ibid., 5.
86. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109–
163, http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/PL109-163.pdf (accessed December 2,
Notes
173
2010). Simmons had attempted to include this language in earlier reform legislation. See, for example, Simmons’s statements regarding open source during
hearings regarding the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act (House
of Representatives, October 7, 2004), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
F?r108:1:./temp/~r108hzdTlb:e1320829 (accessed February 25, 2011).
87. Chris Strohm, “Lawmaker Calls for CIA Center to Become Independent Agency,” Government Executive, June 7, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/
dailyfed/0606/060706tdpm1.htm (accessed December 1, 2010).
88. Ibid.
89. Kent Bye, “Interview Audio: Congressman Rob Simmons, Chairman of
Homeland Security Intelligence & Information Sharing Subcommittee,” January 25, 2006, http://www.echochamberproject.com/simmons (accessed December 2, 2010).
90. Geospatial Intelligence Forum, U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation,
“Q&A: General Michael V. Hayden,” http://www.geospatial-intelligence-forum.
com/mgt-home/133-mgt-2006-volume-4-issue-1/1195-qaa-general-michael-vhayden.html (accessed December 1, 2010).
91. Wait, “Intelligence Units Mine the Benefits.”
92. Eliot A. Jardines, Written Testimony, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Using Open-Source Information Effectively, 109th Cong., 1st sess., June 21,
2005, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/062105jardines.pdf, 2 (accessed
December 2, 2010).
93. Wallner, “Open Sources and the Intelligence Community,” 23.
94. Kent Bye, “Interview Audio: Eliot Jardines, Assistant Deputy Director of
National Intelligence for Open Source,” January 25, 2006, http://www.echocham
berproject.com/jardines (accessed December 2, 2010).
95. Robert David Steele, “PORTAL: OSINT, ADDNI/OS, BI/CI Etc.,” http://
www.oss.net (accessed March 8, 2006).
96. House Committee on Homeland Security, Using Open-Source Information
Effectively, 32–33.
97. Kent Bye, “Interview Audio: Elliot Jardines.”
98. Doug Naquin, “Remarks by Doug Naquin, CIRA Luncheon, 3 October
2007,” CIRA Newsletter 32, no. 4 (2007), http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/naquin.
pdf, 3 (accessed December 2, 2010).
99. Ibid., 5.
100. Ibid., 3.
101. Ibid., 5.
102. Ibid., 3.
103. Ibid., 6.
104. Ibid.
CHAPTER 3
1. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director of national intelligence for
analysis, Thomas Fingar (DNI Open Source Conference, Washington, DC, July 16,
2007), http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20070717_speech_3.pdf (accessed August 1,
2008).
174
Notes
2. Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9 / 11 ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Johnson, Handbook of Intelligence Studies.
3. See, however, Michael Warner, “Reading the Riot Act: The Schlesinger
Report, 1971,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 3 (2009): 387–417.
4. Zegart, Spying Blind.
5. Ibid.
6. Steele, “The Open Source Program.”
7. Zegart, Spying Blind, 60.
8. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director, 8.
9. Ibid.
10. Timothy Kuhn, “A Communicative Theory of the Firm: Developing an
Alternative Perspective on Intra-Organizational Power and Stakeholder Relationships,” Organization Studies 29, no. 8–9 (2008): 1235.
11. Timothy Kuhn, “A ‘Demented Work Ethic’ and a ‘Lifestyle Firm’: Discourse,
Identity, and Workplace Time Commitments,” Organization Studies 27, no. 9 (2006):
1342.
12. Hamilton Bean, “Communication and Intelligence: Allies or Enemies?,”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 22, no. 2 (2009): 360–65;
Stanley Deetz, Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization: Developments in Communication and the Politics of Everyday Life (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1992).
13. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American
Sociological Review 48, no. 2 (1983): 147–60.
14. W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,
1995).
15. Ibid.
16. John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutional Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977).
340–63.
17. Stevyn Gibson, “Open Source Intelligence: An Intelligence Lifeline,” RUSI
Journal 149, no. 1 (2004): 19.
18. John C. Lammers and Joshua B. Barbour, “An Institutional Theory of Organizational Communication,” Communication Theory 16, no. 3 (2006): 1–22.
19. David Grant, Cynthia Hardy, Cliff Oswick, and Linda Putnam, ed., The Sage
Handbook of Organizational Discourse (London: Sage, 2004), 3.
20. Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
21. Kuhn, “A ‘Demented Work Ethic,’ ” 1235.
22. Grant et al., The Sage Handbook of Organizational Discourse, 25.
23. Hardy, “Scaling Up and Bearing Down.”
24. Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, for example, define institutional entrepreneurship as the “activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or transform
existing ones.” Similarly, Lawrence and Suddaby define institutional entrepreneurship as the “purposeful action of individuals and organizations aimed at
creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions.” See Steve Maguire, Cynthia
Hardy, and Thomas B. Lawrence, “Institutional Entrepreneurship in Emerging
Fields: HIV/AIDS Treatment Advocacy in Canada,” Academy of Management Jour-
Notes
175
nal 47, no. 5 (2004): 657; Thomas B. Lawrence and Roy Suddaby, “Institutions and
Institutional Work,” in Clegg et al., The Sage Handbook of Organization Studies, 2nd
ed., 215.
25. Raghu Garud, Cynthia Hardy, and Steve Maguire, “Institutional Entrepreneurship as Embedded Agency: An Introduction to the Special Issue,” Organization Studies 28, no. 7 (2007): 957–70.
26. Ibid., 962.
27. Lawrence and Suddaby, “Institutions and Institutional Work.”
28. Perkmann and Spicer, “How Are Management Fashions Institutionalized?”
29. Ibid., 834–37.
30. Gillian Symon states, “rhetorical analysis is … a kind of discourse analysis
that concentrates on analyzing linguistic strategies of argumentation as individuals seek to convince an audience of a construction of reality congruent with their
interests (through justification) yet undermining of others (through criticism)”
(78). See Gillian Symon, “Developing the Political Perspective on Technological
Change through Rhetorical Analysis,” Management Communication Quarterly 22,
no. 1 (2008): 74–98. George Cheney and colleagues note many similarities between
rhetoric and discourse but also contrast the terms by referencing each concept’s
specific intellectual history, associated vocabulary, and lines of inquiry. See George
Cheney, Lars Thøger Christensen, Charles Conrad, and Daniel J. Lair, “Corporate
Rhetoric as Organizational Discourse,” in Grant et al., The Sage Handbook of Organizational Discourse, 79–104.
31. Cheney, Christensen, Conrad, and Lair, “Corporate Rhetoric as Organizational Discourse.”
32. Robert P. Newman, “Communication Pathologies of Intelligence Systems,”
Speech Monographs 42, (November 1975): 273.
33. Gordon R. Mitchell, “Team B Intelligence Coups,” Quarterly Journal of Speech
92, no. 2 (2006): 144–73.
34. Stephen J. Hartnett and Laura A. Stengrim, Globalization and Empire: The
U.S. Invasion of Iraq, Free Markets, and the Twilight of Democracy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005).
35. H. L. Goodall, Jr., “Why We Must Win the War on Terror: Communication,
Narrative, and the Future of National Security,” Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 1 (2006):
30–59.
36. G. Thomas Goodnight, “Strategic Doctrine, Public Debate and the Terror
War,” in Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy, ed. W. W. Keller and
G. R. Mitchell, 93–114. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006.
37. Zegart, Spying Blind.
38. Bryan C. Taylor, William J. Kinsella, Stephen P. Depoe, and Maribeth S. Metzler, ed., Nuclear Legacies: Communication, Controversy, and the U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Complex (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007).
39. Ibid., 381.
40. Ibid., 382.
41. Robert L. Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005).
42. Bryan C. Taylor, “COMM 6360: The Rhetoric and Culture of U.S. National
Security” (lecture, January 23, 2008, University of Colorado at Boulder).
43. Chris Barker, Making Sense of Cultural Studies: Central Problems and Critical
Debates (London: Sage, 2002).
176
Notes
44. Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2006).
45. Eirik G. Furubotn, “The New Institutional Economics and the Theory of the
Firm,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 45, no. 2 (2001): 133–53.
46. Alan I. Marcus, “ ‘Would You Like Fries with That, Sir?’ The Evolution of
Management Theories and the Rise and Fall of Total Quality Management within
the American Federal Government,” Management & Organizational History 3,
no. 3–4 (2008): 319.
47. Perkmann and Spicer, “How Are Management Fashions Institutionalized?,” 839.
48. Perkmann and Spicer, “How Are Management Fashions Institutionalized?”
49. Ibid., 836.
50. This is a process that Perkmann and Spicer refer to as “partaking.”
51. Interview, intelligence official, 2008.
52. Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy, “Discourse and Institutions,” 644.
53. Ibid., 643.
54. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director, 3.
55. Kuhn explains that conferences constitute a genre of organizational communication because they can be grouped by similar “situational requirements,”
“substantive characteristics,” and “stylistic characteristics,” all of which are coordinated by an “organizing principle.” Situational requirements relate to a matter that
must be managed or resolved—in other words, a crisis, issue, or need. Substantive
characteristics relate to the “social motives, themes, and topics being expressed in
the communication,” while stylistic characteristics involve the methods by which
organizations convey their messages. See Timothy Kuhn, “The Discourse of Issues
Management: A Genre of Organizational Communication,” Communication Quarterly 45, no. 3 (1997): 188–210.
56. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director, 2.
57. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Transcripts from the DNI
Open Source Conference 2008” (Washington, DC, September 11 and 12, 2008),
http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20080912_speech.pdf, 6 (accessed March 6, 2009)
(hereafter “Transcripts”).
58. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director, 1.
59. Remarks and Q&A by the director, 4.
60. Lawrence and Suddaby, “Institutions and Institutional Work,” 222.
61. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director, 2.
62. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director of national intelligence for collection, Mary Margaret Graham (DNI Open Source Conference, Washington, DC,
July 17, 2007), http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20070717_speech_2.pdf, 2 (accessed
August 3, 2008).
63. Ibid.
64. “Transcripts,” 34.
65. Ibid., 42.
66. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
67. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director, 2.
68. “Transcripts,” 5.
69. Ibid., 27.
70. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director of national intelligence for
collection, 3.
Notes
177
71. “Transcripts,” 23–24.
72. Lawrence and Suddaby, “Institutions and Institutional Work,” 226.
73. “Transcripts.”
74. Lawrence and Suddaby, “Institutions and Institutional Work,” 229.
75. Ben Bain, “Officers to Get Guidelines for Open-Source Intell,” Federal
Computer Week, June 18, 2010, http://fcw.com/Articles/2010/06/18/Web-opensource-intell.aspx (accessed December 2, 2010).
77. Lawrence and Suddaby, “Institutions and Institutional Work,” 225.
78. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director, 1.
79. Lawrence and Suddaby, “Institutions and Institutional Work,” 224–25.
80. “Transcripts,” 22.
81. Ibid., 25.
82. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2009.
83. Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy, “Discourse and Institutions.”
CHAPTER 4
1. Lorenzo Semple Jr., Three Days of the Condor, directed by Sydney Pollack
(United States: Paramount Pictures, 1975).
2. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director of national intelligence
for open source, Eliot A. Jardines (DNI Open Source Conference, Washington, DC,
July 16, 2007), http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20070716_speech_3.pdf (accessed
August 15, 2007).
3. Management scholars Roy Suddaby and Royston Greenwood explain that
institutional logics are unstated assumptions that guide members’ sense making
by prescribing and proscribing actions. These logics influence ways of interpreting the world, constraining and enabling action. Scholars interested in institutional change examine the strategic use of language in order to understand how
shifts in institutional logics occur. See Roy Suddaby and Royston Greenwood,
“Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimacy,” Administrative Science Quarterly 50, no. 1
(2005): 35–67.
4. Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington,
DC: CQ Press, 2006): 4–5.
5. Joseph E. Stiglitz, “On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse:
The Role of Transparency in Public Life,” in Government Secrecy: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Susan L. Maret and Jan Goldman (Westport, CT: Libraries
Unlimited, 2009), 697.
6. U.S. News and World Report, “In Obama White House, New Rules on Day
One,” January 22, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/washington-whispers/2009/01/22/in-obama-white-house-new-rules-on-day-one.html
(accessed
March 2, 2009).
7. For a discussion of this issue, see Sources and Methods, “Determining
Source Reliability on the Internet,” October 30, 2008, http://sourcesandmethods.
blogspot.com/2008/10/how-to-determining-source-reliability.html (accessed December 2, 2010).
8. Susan B. Glasser, “Probing Galaxies of Data for Nuggets,” Washington Post,
November 25, 2005, A35.
9. David Martin, “Secret Information in Plain Sight,” CBS News, January 10, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/01/10/eveningnews/
main1198667.shtml (accessed May 8, 2009).
178
Notes
10. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director, 7.
11. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive 301, National Open Source Enterprise, July 11, 2006, 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/
dni/icd/icd-301.pdf (accessed December 2, 2010).
12. Ibid.
13. This quote comes from Intellibridge managers who were speaking with a
U.S. Navy admiral about open source issues in 2004.
14. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2009.
15. National Defense Authorization Act, 3411–2.
16. NATO, Open Source Intelligence Handbook, November 2001, V, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Open_Source_Intelligence_Handbook (accessed
December 2, 2010).
17. Remarks and Q&A by the director, 6.
18. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director, 4.
19. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New
York: Dell Publishing, 1974), 273.
20. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
21. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the Joint Inquiry,
GPO Access, “Congressional Reports: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” http://www.
gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html, 636 (accessed December 3, 2010).
22. Ibid.
23. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report, July 22, 2004, 413, http://www.9-11commission.gov (accessed
December 2, 2010).
24. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2008.
25. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
26. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director, 1–2.
27. Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy, “Discourse and Institutions.”
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 640.
30. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law
108–458, 3693, http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf (accessed December 3,
2010).
31. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities, Report to the President, 377–78.
32. Ibid., 23.
33. Dan Eggen and Spencer S. Hsu, “House Bill Backs Additional Reforms from
9/11 Report,” Washington Post, January 9, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/08/AR2007010801623.html (accessed December 3, 2010).
34. Kent Bye, “Can Open Source Intelligence Be a Non-Violent Alternative to
War?” December 3, 2005, http://www.echochamberproject.com/node/718 (accessed December 3, 2010).
35. Robert David Steele, “Steele Interview for Military Review,” April 16,
2006, 2–3, http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/060417/d0a6e5b9746
c0c07eddbde662982b66c/Interview on Academics et al with intelligence 1.1.doc
(accessed December 3, 2010).
36. Importantly, Simmons was a featured speaker during the 2007 Open Source
Conference. In 2008, however, his role was downgraded to panel member. This
suggests that officials may have sought to downplay Simmons’s perspective.
Notes
179
37. Marks, “Twittering Intelligence.”
38. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive 301, 3.
39. Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy, “Discourse and Institutions,” 643.
40. LexisNexis Open Source Intelligence Roundtable, “OSINT 2020: The Future
of Open Source Intelligence,” June 17, 2010, 4, http://www.dni.gov/speeches/
Speech_OSINT_Roundtable_20100617.pdf (accessed December 3, 2010).
41. Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy, “Discourse and Institutions.”
42. “Transcripts,” 4.
43. François Cooren, “Textual Agency: How Texts Do Things in Organizational
Settings,” Organization 11, no. 3 (2004): 388.
44. Interview, intelligence official, 2009.
45. Interview, intelligence analyst, 2009.
46. Defense Science Board, Defense Imperatives for the New Administration, August 2008, 38–39, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA489102.pdf (accessed December 3, 2010).
47. Hardy, Palmer, and Phillips, “Discourse as a Strategic Resource,” 1228.
48. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Open Source Enterprise, 2006, 3, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Open_Source_Enterprise
(accessed December 10, 2007).
49. Paul du Gay, “Against ‘Enterprise’ (But Not Against ‘Enterprise,’ for That
Would Make No Sense),” Organization 11, no. 1 (2004): 37–58.
50. Paul du Gay, Production of Culture/Cultures of Production (London: Sage,
1997): 299–307.
51. Ibid., 299–300.
52. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Open Source Enterprise, 7–12.
53. Marcus, “ ‘Would You Like Fries with That, Sir?’ ”
54. Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, “Failure of ‘Imagination’ Led to 9/11,” Christian Science Monitor, July 23, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0723/p01s03uspo.html (accessed December 3, 2010).
55. “Transcripts,” 7.
56. Ibid., 13 (emphasis added).
57. Grant et al., The Sage Handbook of Organizational Discourse, 6.
58. Jardines explained, “Thankfully for Bertoldt, the Nazis had publicly announced his arrest, which resulted in vehement protests by Swiss authorities, who
turned up numerous witnesses to the kidnapping and who objected to the Gestapo
having almost struck a Swiss border guard as they rammed their way through the
border crossing. As a result, diplomatic and public pressure on the German government, Bertoldt was finally released six months later.” Remarks and Q&A by the
assistant deputy director, 3–4.
59. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director of national intelligence for collection, 3–4.
60. Remarks and Q&A by the assistant deputy director, 4.
61. David H. Noon, “Operation Enduring Analogy: World War II, the War on
Terror, and the Uses of Historical Memory,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 7, no. 3 (2004)
339–64.
62. Nick Trujillo and George Dionisopoulos, “Cop Talk, Police Stories, and the
Social Construction of Organizational Drama,” Central States Speech Journal 38,
no. 3–4 (1987): 196–209.
180
Notes
63. Noon, “Operation Enduring Analogy,” 340.
64. “Transcripts,” 12.
65. Ibid., 14.
66. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities, Report to the President, 23.
67. Ibid., 379–80.
68. Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” Academy of Management Review 20, no. 3 (1995): 591.
69. Ibid., 592.
70. “CIA Launching ‘Open Source’ Intel Center,” Fox News, November 8, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,174997,00.html (accessed January 13,
2009).
71. Interview, intelligence official, 2009.
72. Marcus, “ ‘Would You Like Fries with That, Sir?’ ” 314.
73. “Transcripts,” 83.
74. Ibid., 38.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Open Source Enterprise, 11.
78. Interview, intelligence official, 2009.
79. Stanley Deetz, “Reclaiming Indeterminacy and the Deliberative Process”
(paper presented at the Practical Theory, Public Participation, and Community
Workshop, Baylor University, January 27–30, 2000), http://www3.baylor.edu/
communication_conference/deetz.pdf (accessed December 8, 2010).
80. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
81. “Transcripts,” 23.
82. See Harris, “Intelligence Incorporated.”
83. Newman, “Communication Pathologies,” 274.
84. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
85. Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, “Security beyond the State:
Global Security Assemblages in International Politics,” International Political Sociology 3, no. 1 (2009): 5.
86. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
87. Paul du Gay, “The Tyranny of the Epochal: Change, Epochalism, and Organizational Reform,” Organization 10, no. 4 (2003): 664.
88. National Open Source Committee, National Open Source Strategic Action
Plan, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/nossap.pdf (accessed December 3,
2010).
89. Ibid., 5.
90. “Transcripts,” 5, 31, 39, 44, 48, 49, 50.
91. Ibid., 31.
92. John C. Gannon, Written Statement, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Using Open-Source Information Effectively, 109th Cong., 1st sess., June 21,
2005, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/062105gannon.pdf (accessed
December 2, 2010).
93. Rob Johnston, Analytical Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2004), 20.
94. Ibid., 17.
Notes
181
95. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities, Report to the President, 397.
96. Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and
Power (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
97. Department of Defense, Instruction 3115.12, August 24, 2010, http://www.
dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/311512p.pdf (accessed December 3, 2010).
CHAPTER 5
1. Copies of the Open Source Enterprise Strategic Vision brochure were distributed to participants at the 2008 DNI Open Source Conference. As of December 3,
2010, no digital copies were publicly available online (it is available to authorized
personnel via government information sharing systems).
2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008 Strategic Plan, http://www.
dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/ (accessed December 3, 2010).
3. Ibid.
4. Lauren Martin and Stephanie Simon, “A Formula for Disaster: The Department of Homeland Security’s Virtual Ontology,” Space and Polity 12, no. 3
(2008): 286.
5. Joanne Martin, Organizational Culture: Mapping the Terrain (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage. 2002).
6. Linda Smircich, “Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis,” Administrative Science Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1983): 339–58.
7. Martin, Organizational Culture.
8. Linda L. Putnam and Michael E. Pacanowsky, ed., Communication and Organizations: An Interpretive Approach (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983).
9. Du Gay, Production of Culture, 286.
10. Mats Alvesson, “Organizational Culture and Discourse,” in Grant et al., The
Sage Handbook of Organizational Discourse, 331.
11. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
12. Mark A. Randol, “Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory
Definitions, and Approaches,” January 14, 2009, 2, Congressional Research Service,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33616.pdf (accessed December 3, 2010).
13. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Report to Congress on Implementation
of Section 705 of the Homeland Security Act and the Establishment of the Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties, 2004, 17, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CRCLReportJun04.pdf (accessed December 3, 2010).
14. Simpson and Cheney, “Marketization, Participation, and Communication.”
15. Calvert Jones, “Intelligence Reform: The Logic of Information Sharing,” Intelligence & National Security 22, no. 3 (2007): 396.
16. See the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) at http://www.ise.gov/
default.aspx.
17. Bean and Keränen, “The Role of Homeland Security Information
Bulletins.”
18. See Brian J. Gerber et al., “On the Front Line: American Cities and the Challenge of Homeland Security Preparedness,” Urban Affairs Review 41, no. 2 (2005):
182–210; Martin J. Zaworski, “Automated Information Sharing: Does It Help
Law Enforcement Officers Work Better?” National Institute of Justice Journal 253
(2006): 25–26.
182
Notes
19. U.S. House of Representatives, Homeland Security Committee, Giving a
Voice to Open Source Stakeholders: A Survey of State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement,
September 2008, 2, http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/OpenSourceRe
port.pdf (accessed December 3, 2010).
20. Ibid.
21. Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy, “Discourse and Institutions.”
22. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
23. Alvesson, “Organizational Culture and Discourse,” 331.
24. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
25. Information Sharing Environment, ISE Implementation Plan, 2006, http://
www.ise.gov (accessed November 12, 2008).
26. The White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 2007, 3, http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/NSIS_book.pdf (accessed
December 5, 2010).
27. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008 Strategic Plan, 4, 23–24.
28. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan,
January 2006, 14, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/stratplan.pdf (accessed
December 5, 2010).
29. Martin, Frost, and O’Neill, “Organizational Culture.”
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.; Joann Keyton, Communication and Organizational Culture: A Key to Understanding Work Experiences (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005).
32. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2008.
33. Interview, intelligence analyst, 2008.
34. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
35. Interview, law enforcement analyst, 2007.
36. Interview, emergency management official, 2007.
37. Interview, emergency management official, 2007.
38. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2008.
39. Ibid.
40. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2008.
41. Interview, homeland security analyst, 2009.
42. Interview, emergency management official, 2007.
43. Interview, emergency management official, 2007.
44. Interview, law enforcement official, 2007.
45. Interview, law enforcement official, 2007.
46. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2008.
47. Interview, emergency management official, 2007.
48. Interview, law enforcement official, 2007.
49. Interview, emergency management official, 2007.
50. Timothy L. Sellnow, Mathew W. Seeger, and Robert R. Ulmer, “Chaos Theory, Informational Needs, and Natural Disasters,” Journal of Applied Communication
Research 30, no. 4 (2002): 288.
51. Ibid., 290.
52. Interview, emergency management official, 2007.
53. David Constant, Sara Kiesler, and Lee Sproull, “What’s Mine Is Ours, or Is
It? A Study of Attitudes about Information Sharing,” Information Systems Research
5, no. 4 (1994): 400–21.
54. Johnston, Analytical Culture.
55. Interview, intelligence analyst, 2008.
Notes
183
56. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2008.
57. Interview, law enforcement official, 2007.
58. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
59. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2008.
60. Interview, law enforcement official, 2007.
61. Interview, homeland security analyst, 2009.
62. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
63. Interview, intelligence analyst, 2009.
64. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
65. Additional issues noted by participants that are not discussed in-depth here
include these concerns: (1) the lack of a shared approach to open source collection
and analysis; (2) the absence of shared quality assurance and counterintelligence
protocols; and (3) turnover in open source personnel who are simply waiting for
security clearances in order to work with classified materials.
66. Alex Z. Kondra and Deborah C. Hurst, “Institutional Processes of Organizational Culture,” Culture and Organization 15, no. 1 (2009): 42.
67. Interview, intelligence official, 2009.
68. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
69. Interview, homeland security analyst, 2009.
70. Ibid.
71. Interview, intelligence analyst, 2008.
72. Interview, intelligence analyst, 2009.
73. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2008
74. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Testimony of Under Secretary
Caryn Wagner before the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security on the
President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for the Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis,” March 4, 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/
testimony_1267716038879.shtm (accessed December 5, 2010).
75. Ibid.
76. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2008.
77. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2008.
78. Interview, homeland security analyst, 2009.
79. Ibid.
80. Shorrock, Spies for Hire.
81. Kuhn, “A Communicative Theory of the Firm,” 1233.
82. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2008.
83. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
84. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2008.
85. Interview, homeland security analyst, 2009.
86. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
87. Interview, homeland security analyst, 2009.
88. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
89. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
90. Interview, intelligence official, 2008.
91. Kondra and Hurst, “Institutional Processes,” 53.
92. Nelson Phillips and Namrata Malhotra, “Taking Social Construction Seriously: Extending the Discursive Approach in Institutional Theory,” in The Sage
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, ed. Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin, and Roy Suddaby (London: Sage, 2008), 702–20.
93. Ibid., 710.
184
Notes
94. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
95. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
96. Interview, fusion center analyst, 2009.
97. Information Sharing Environment, Annual Report to the Congress, July
2010, 57, http://www.ise.gov/docs/ISE_AR-2010_Final_2010-07-29.pdf (accessed
December 5, 2010).
98. Ibid., 58.
99. Ibid., 60.
100. Open Source Content Management, Department of Homeland Security,
“DHS-OSE Homeland Security Central Digest—2010-11-17.”
101. Ibid.
102. Open Source Content Management, Department of Homeland Security,
“Your DHS-OSE Subscription Request,” November 5, 2010.
CHAPTER 6
1. 9/11: Press for Truth, directed by Ray Nowosielski (Los Angeles, CA:
Banded Artists, 2006), DVD.
2. “Transcripts,” 37.
3. Ibid., 60.
4. Shannen Rossmiller, “Shannen Rossmiller,” http://www.shannenross
miller.com (accessed December 4, 2010).
5. Melanthia Mitchell, “ ‘Net Sleuth’ Tells Court of Hunt That Snared Guardsman,” USA Today, May 15, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/
internetlife/2004-05-13-netsleuth_x.htm (accessed December 4, 2010).
6. Robert C. Yeager, “To Catch a Terrorist: One Mother’s Crusade,” Family
Circle, July 15, 2005, http://www.shannenrossmiller.com/media/hpsc2168.pdf
(accessed December 4, 2010).
7. See “9/11 Families for a Secure America,” http://www.911fsa.org; “The
September 11th Families’ Association,” http://www.911families.org; and “Families of September 11,” http://www.familiesofseptember11.org.
8. 9/11: Press for Truth.
9. See Bernard Lown, Prescription for Survival: A Doctor’s Journey to End Nuclear Madness (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2008); Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose, and Mary
Wareham, Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Taylor, Kinsella, Depoe, and Metzler,
Nuclear Legacies; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders:
Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1998).
10. Jonathan Simon, “Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive Power in an Age of Terror,” Yale Law Journal 14 (2005):
1419–57.
11. Breitweiser, Wake-Up Call, 89.
12. Ibid., 87–88.
13. See “9/11: Press for Truth,” http://www.911pressfortruth.com.
14. Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger (London: Verso, 2001).
15. 9/11: Press for Truth; Shenon, The Commission.
Notes
185
16. 9/11: Press for Truth.
17. David Firestone, “Kissinger Pulls Out as Chief of Inquiry into 9/11 Attacks,”
New York Times, December 14, 2002, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9C01E4D91E3AF937A25751C1A9649C8B63 (accessed December 4, 2010).
18. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
19. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
20. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
21. Interview, Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 member, 2009.
22. Bryan C. Taylor, “ ‘Our Bruised Arms Hung Up as Monuments’: Nuclear
Iconography in Post–Cold War Culture,” Critical Studies in Media Communication
20, no. 1 (2003): 1–34.
23. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
24. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
25. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
26. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
27. Shenon, The Commission.
28. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
29. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
30. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
31. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
32. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
33. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
34. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
35. Ibid.
36. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
37. 9/11 Public Discourse Project, http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/index.htm.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. 9/11 Public Discourse Project, “Final Report of the 9/11 Public Discourse
Project,” December 12, 2005, 7, http://www.9/11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_
report.pdf (accessed December 4, 2010).
41. September 11th Advocates, “An Open Letter,” news release, March 5, 2009,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0903/S00072.htm (accessed December 4, 2010).
42. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
43. Ibid.
44. Interview, Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 member, 2009.
45. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
46. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
47. Taylor et al., Nuclear Legacies.
48. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
49. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
50. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
51. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
52. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
53. Bruce Hoffman and Anna-Brit Kasupski, The Victims of Terrorism: An Assessment of Their Influence and Growing Role in Policy, Legislation, and the Private Sector
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).
54. Anthony Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan—and the Path to Victory (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010).
186
Notes
55. I did not speak with members of 9/11 families’ groups who associate themselves with this movement. The connections between 9/11 Truth and open source
advocacy lie outside the scope of this study. See Jack Z. Bratich, Conspiracy Panics: Political Rationality and Popular Culture (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2008).
56. Ibid., 152.
57. Phillips and Malhotra, “Taking Social Construction Seriously,” 713.
58. Nolte, “Thinking about Rethinking,” 19.
59. William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1978): 459–60.
60. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2009.
61. Interview, intelligence official, 2008.
62. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
63. Right to Know Community, Moving Toward a 21st Century Right-to-Know
Agenda: Recommendations to President-Elect Obama and Congress, November 2008,
http://freegovinfo.info/node/2119 (accessed December 4, 2010).
64. Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War
(New York: Routledge, 2006).
65. Alex Martin and Peter Wilson, “The Value of Non-Governmental Intelligence: Widening the Field,” Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 6 (2008):
771.
66. Marsh, “Grassroots Statecraft,” 126.
67. Ibid., 128.
68. Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, 186.
69. Marsh, “Grassroots Statecraft,” 144–45.
70. Ken Booth, ed., Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).
71. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
72. Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, 178.
73. Martin and Wilson, “The Value of Non-Governmental Intelligence,” 774.
74. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
75. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
76. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
77. Interview, intelligence official, 2008.
78. Interview, intelligence contractor, 2008.
79. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
80. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
81. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
82. Interview, Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 member, 2009.
83. Interview, intelligence commentator, 2009.
84. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
85. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
86. Interview, Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 member, 2009.
87. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
88. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
89. Interview, 9/11 families member, 2009.
90. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
91. Ibid.
92. Interview, Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 member, 2009.
Notes
187
93. William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell, ed., Hitting First: Preventative
Force in U.S. Security Strategy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).
94. Ibid., 251–59.
95. Ibid., 251.
96. Ibid., 254.
97. Ibid., 257.
98. Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, 149.
99. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
100. Interview, 9/11 Commission staff member, 2009.
101. Robert Asen, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” Quarterly Journal of
Speech 90, no. 2 (2004): 196.
102. Ibid., 198.
CHAPTER 7
1. Kevin Poulsen and Kim Zetter, “ ‘I Can’t Believe What I’m Confessing
to You’: The Wikileaks Chats,” Wired, June 10, 2010, http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2010/06/wikileaks-chat/ (accessed December 4, 2010).
2. Spaulding, “No More Secrets”; Brewin, “No More Secrets?”
3. Zegart, Spying Blind, 170.
4. Best and Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence,” 20–21.
5. Ibid., 21.
6. Arthur S. Hulnick, “Intelligence Reform 2008: Where to from Here?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 4 (2008): 631.
7. Ibid., 632.
8. “Pentagon Prepares for Largest Security Breach in U.S Military History as
Wikileaks Set to Release 500,000 Iraq Documents,” Mail Online, October 18, 2010,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1321398/WikiLeaks-release-500kIraq-documents-US-militarys-largest-security-breach.html (accessed December 4,
2010).
9. Nate Anderson, “Meet the People Who Want Julian Assange ‘Whacked,’ ” ars
technica, December 3, 2010, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/
meet-the-people-who-want-julian-assange-whacked.ars (accessed December 4,
2010).
10. WikiLeaks, “About,” http://wikileaks.org/about.html (accessed December 1, 2010).
11. Poulsen and Zetter, “ ‘I Can’t Believe What I’m Confessing to You.’ ”
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See also Stephen C. Mercado, “Reexamining the Distinction between Open
Information and Secrets, Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 2 (2005), https://www.cia.
gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/
studies/Vol49no2/reexamining_the_distinction_3.htm (accessed December 8,
2010); Stephen C. Mercado, “Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age,”
Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-thestudy-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no3/article05.
html (accessed December 8, 2010).
188
Notes
16. John Bohannon, “Leaked Documents Provide Bonanza for Researchers,”
Science 330, no. 6004 (2010): 575.
17. Matt Raymond, “Why the Library of Congress Is Blocking WikiLeaks,” December 3, 2010, http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2010/12/why-the-library-of-congressis-blocking-wikileaks/ (accessed December 4, 2010).
18. Tony Pfaff, “Bungee Jumping Off the Moral Highground: Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age,” in Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional, ed. Jan Goldman (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 77.
19. Ibid., 78.
20. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Remarks and Q&A by
Director of National Intelligence Mr. James Clapper, Bipartisan Policy Center
(BPC)—The State of Domestic Intelligence Reform,” October 6, 2010, http://
www.dni.gov/speeches/20101006_speech_clapper.pdf (accessed December 4,
2010).
21. Central Intelligence Agency, “Message from the Director: Recent Media
Leaks,” November 8, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releasesstatements/press-release-2010/message-from-the-director-recent-media-leaks.html
(accessed December 4, 2010).
22. Ibid.
23. Public Intelligence, “About,” http://publicintelligence.net/about (accessed December 4, 2010).
24. Ibid.
25. Cryptome, http://cryptome.org (accessed December 4, 2010).
26. Federation of American Scientists, FAS Project on Government Secrecy,
“About,” http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/govsec/index.html (accessed December 4, 2010).
27. For these and others, consult FAS’s website: http://www.fas.org.
28. Steven Aftergood, “Open Source Center Views Iraqi Election,” Secrecy News,
February 12, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2009/02/021209.
html (accessed December 4, 2010).
29. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
30. Steven Aftergood, “The Race to Fix the Classification System,” Secrecy News,
November 29, 2010, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/11/race_to_fix.html
(accessed December 4, 2010).
31. Earth Intelligence Network, http://www.earth-intelligence.net (accessed
December 4, 2010).
32. See WiserEarth, “Earth Intelligence Network,” http://www.wiserearth.
org/organization/view/1cc3f8c7f1a8c0e971731f6d70ed56d4 (accessed December 4, 2010).
33. See the CELL, “About,” http://thecell.org/wp/aboutus (accessed December 4, 2010).
34. Ibid.
35. See NEFA Foundation, http://www.nefafoundation.org (accessed December 4, 2010).
36. Ibid.
37. Open Source Intelligence Forum, http://www.osif.us (accessed December 4, 2010).
38. Ibid.
Notes
189
39. LexisNexis, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Round Table Hosted by LexisNexis,” http://www.lexisnexis.com/trial/uslm136242.asp?access=JCM141077
(accessed December 4, 2010).
40. Marsh, “Grassroots Statecraft.”
41. Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror.
42. Ivie concludes that “this dynamic between a decision-making demos and
policy-advocating rhetors was key to the success of the Athenian experience with
direct democracy.” Ibid., 51–52.
43. Ibid., 58.
44. Ibid., 63.
45. Stephen J. Hartnett and Jennifer R. Mercieca, “ ‘Has Your Courage Rusted?’:
National Security and the Contested Rhetorical Norms of Republicanism in PostRevolutionary America, 1798–1801,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 9, no. 1 (2006): 83.
46. Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror, 116.
47. Amanda Terkel, “Cheney Offers False Excuse for His ‘So?’ Comment: I
Meant, ‘What’s the Question, Martha?’ ” Think Progress, June 2, 2008, http://think
progress.org/2008/06/02/cheney-so-revise (accessed December 4, 2010).
48. Ivie, Democracy and America’s War on Terror.
49. Paul A. Chilton, “The Meaning of Security,” in Post-Realism: The Rhetorical
Turn in International Relations, ed. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 193–216.
50. Arnold Wolfers, “ ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political
Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (1952): 481–502.
51. Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and
the Atomic Age (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); Andrew Ross, “Containing Culture in the Cold War,” Cultural Studies 1, no. 3 (1987): 328–48.
52. Kristen Lundberg, “Piloting a Bi-Partisan Ship: Strategies and Tactics of
the 9/11 Commission” (Kennedy School of Government Case Program, C15–05–
1813.0, President and Fellows of Harvard College, Cambridge, MA, 2005), 27; Breitweiser, Wake-Up Call, 131.
53. Jennifer R. Mercieca and James A. Aune, “A Vernacular Republican Rhetoric: William Manning’s Key of Liberty,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 91, no. 2 (2005):
120.
54. Ibid., 136.
55. Kurt Jacobsen, “Interview with Daniel Ellsberg,” Logos 1, no. 4 (2002): 97.
Ellsberg has added WikiLeaks to this list of sources of counterpower; he has been
a vocal advocate for Assange and Manning.
56. Marsh, “Grassroots Statecraft,” 126.
57. Interview, intelligence analyst, 2009.
58. See Victims of Pan Am Flight 103, http://www.victimsofpanamflight103.
org.
59. Hoffman and Kasupski, The Victims of Terrorism, 19.
60. Interview, Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 member, 2009.
61. Interview, Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 member, 2009.
62. Interview, Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 member, 2009.
63. Interview, intelligence analyst, 2008.
64. Deetz, “Reclaiming Indeterminacy,” 10.
65. Marcus, “ ‘Would You Like Fries with That, Sir?,’ ” 319.
190
Notes
66. Bizzell and Herzberg, The Rhetorical Tradition, 1433.
67. Angelina Burch, “When I Point to the Moon, Don’t Stare at My Finger,”
Axis Mundi, February 15, 2001, http://library.byzantine-antiquities.org/axismundi05/2000/when_i_point.html (accessed April 5, 2008).
68. Hardy, “Scaling Up and Bearing Down.”
69. Bizzell and Herzberg, The Rhetorical Tradition, 1433.
70. Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2
(1999): 229.
71. Hardy, “Scaling Up and Bearing Down.”
72. Interview, intelligence official, 2008.
73. Interview, policy maker, 2009.
74. Wallner, “Open Sources and the Intelligence Community,” 19.
75. Kingsbury, “Spy Agencies Turn to Newspapers.”
76. Ibid.
APPENDIX
1. Material is cited for research, scholarship, teaching, and education purposes and is intended for “fair use” as permitted under Title 17, Section 107 of the
United States Code.
2. Shorrock, Spies for Hire.
3. John C. Gannon, “NIC Chairman Address to Washington College of Law”
(remarks, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC, October 6, 2000), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/
gannon_speech_10062000.html (accessed December 10, 2010).
4. Mercado, “Reexamining the Distinction.”
5. Gibson, “Open Source Intelligence,” 21.
6. Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad.”
7. Ibid.
8. This claim is more-or-less congruent with the Copenhagen School of International Relations’ conception of “securitization.” See Booth, Critical Security
Studies and World Politics.
9. Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 50.
10. For example, on February 7, 2008, then DNI J. Michael McConnell articulated the following threats during a hearing before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence: (1) the continuing “global terrorist threat,” (2) “the
persistent threat of WMD-related proliferation,” (3) “vulnerabilities of the U.S.
information infrastructure,” (4) “growing foreign interest in counterspace programs,” (5) “political stability and national and regional conflict in Europe, the
Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia,” (6) “humanitarian concerns stemming from the rise in food and energy prices for poorer states,” and (7) “concerns
about the financial capabilities of Russia, China, and OPEC countries.” See Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence
Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7,
2008, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080207_testimony.pdf (accessed December 10, 2010).
Notes
191
11. Mark M. Lowenthal, “Towards a Reasonable Standard for Analysis: How
Right, How Often on Which Issues?” Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3
(2008): 313.
12. Harris, “Intelligence Shop.”
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See Eurasia Group, “Careers at Eurasia Group,” http://www.eurasiagroup.
net/careers (accessed December 10, 2010).
16. Randolph Fillmore, “Integrating Open Source Intelligence,” August 23, 2005,
http://drnatsecmgt.blogspot.com/2005/08/mr-eliot-jardines-of-open-source.
html (accessed December 10, 2010).
17. Ibid.
18. Harris, “Intelligence Shop.”
19. See STRATFOR, “Career Opportunities,” http://www.stratfor.com/careers
(accessed December 10, 2010).
20. Ibid.
21. See iJET, “Careers,” http://www.ijet.com/about/careers/index.asp (accessed December 10, 2010).
22. Ibid.
23. See CIA, “Career Opportunities,” https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportu
nities/analytical/open-source-officer-foreign-media-analyst.html (accessed December 10, 2010).
24. See Chenega Corporation, “Job Board,” https://jobs.chenega.com (accessed
December 10, 2010).
25. See Radiance Technologies, “Careers Index,” http://www.radiancetech.
com/careers/hr7142.shtm (accessed December 10, 2010).
26. See “Getting into Development,” “Interning at IHS Jane’s Strategic Advisory Services,” September 24, 2010, http://thecareersgroupgid.wordpress.
com/2010/09/24/interning-at-ihs-jane%E2%80%99s-strategic-advisory-services
(accessed December 10, 2010).
27. Ibid.
28. See U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, “Animal Health,” http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergin
gissues/teams/factsheets/GIF_aboutus.pdf (accessed December 10, 2010).
29. Ibid.
30. David Carment and Martin Rudner, ed., Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2006).
31. Ibid., 1.
32. Ibid., xx.
33. Wies Platje, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Ben de Jong, and Robert David
Steele, Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future (Oakton, VA: OSS
International Press, 2003).
34. Dun & Bradstreet, flier distributed at the 2008 DNI Open Source
Conference.
35. Craig S. Fleisher, “Using Open Source Data in Developing Competitive and
Marketing Intelligence,” European Journal of Marketing 42, no. 7–8 (2008): 852–66.
36. Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad.”
37. Ibid.
38. Dun & Bradstreet, flier distributed at the 2008 DNI Open Source Conference.
192
Notes
39. See SOS International, Ltd., “Brief Profile,” http://www.sosiltd.com/
about_us/default.htm (accessed December 10, 2010).
40. See SOS International, Ltd., “Foreign Media Analysis,” http://fma.sosiltd.
com/secure/ProductServices.aspx (accessed December 10, 2010).
41. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “ICEGangs Database,” http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ice_icegangs.pdf (accessed
December 10, 2010).
42. Martin, “Secret Information in Plain Sight.”
43. Ibid.
44. See “Open Source Research” (Solicitation Number MDA908–02-Q-0055,
Virginia Contracting Activity, March 11, 2002), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=
opportunity&mode=form&id=6443b3e3c853099f699c3cf114b01ded&tab=core&_
cview=1 (accessed December 10, 2010).
45. Ibid.
46. “Open Source Intelligence Support to IO” (Solicitation Number W74V8H05-T-0253, July 16, 2005), http://www.fbodaily.com/archive/2005/07-July/18Jul-2005/FBO-00848893.htm (accessed December 10, 2010).
47. “Open Source Research Center” (Solicitation Number GS05T11BMC0002RFP, October 19, 2010), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mod
e=form&id=32545079d3881c9628b0d6f3d518deba&tab=core&_cview=1 (accessed
December 10, 2010).
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. “Foreign Media Analysis/Strategic Information Operations Support” (Solicitation Number FA4600–05-R-0013, April 19, 2005), https://www.fbo.gov/ind
ex?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=67d4a8f31d44ebfde767bec23ad6c6fd&tab=co
re&_cview=1 (accessed December 10, 2010).
51. Ibid.
52. See SOS International, Ltd., “Foreign Media Analysis,” http://fma.sosiltd.
com/secure/ProductServices.aspx (accessed December 10, 2010).
53. See Foreign Military Studies Office, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil
(accessed December 10, 2010).
54. “Foreign Media Analysis/Strategic Information Operations Support” (Solicitation Number FA4600–05-R-0013).
55. See IntelCenter, “About Us,” http://www.intelcenter.com/aboutus.html
(accessed December 10, 2010).
56. See IntelCenter, “Catalog,” http://www.intelcenter.com/IntelCenter-Catalog.
pdf (accessed December 10, 2010).
57. James S. Major, Communicating with Intelligence: Writing and Briefing in the Intelligence and National Security Communities (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008), xxiii.
58. “Transcripts.”
59. OSC, pamphlet obtained at the 2008 DNI Open Source Conference.
60. Ibid.
61. Infosphere AB, “Restricted OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) Collection Makes What?,” http://www.infosphere.se/extra/pod/?id=177&module_
instance=1&action=pod_show (accessed December 11, 2010).
62. Douglas Peak, “The Open Source Academy Helps the Intelligence Community Make the Most of Open Sources,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,
Notes
193
October–December 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_4_31/
ai_n16419802/ (accessed December 11, 2010).
63. Ibid.
64. See, for example, Open Source Intelligence Training (UK) Ltd., “OSINT,”
http://www.opensourceintelligencetraining.com/index.htm; ISS World, “Intelligence Support Systems for Lawful Interception, Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Gathering,” http://www.issworldtraining.com/ISS_WASH/register.cfm
(accessed December 10, 2010).
65. See OSS.net, “Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet,” http://www.oss.
net/dynamaster/file_archive/030201/1c0160cde7302e1c718edb08884ca7d7/
Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet FINAL 18NOV02.pdf; http://www.fas.
org/irp/doddir/army/fmi2-22-9.pdf (accessed December 10, 2010).
66. Fillmore, “Integrating Open Source Intelligence.”
67. Remarks and Q&A by the deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and chairman, National Intelligence Council, Thomas Fingar (2008 INSA Analytic Transformation Conference, Orlando, FL, September 4, 2008), 17, http://
www.dni.gov/speeches/20080904_speech.pdf (accessed December 11, 2010).
68. See, for example, United American Freedom Foundation, “Military And
Government IPS Addresses,” http://www.uaff.info/militarytracking.htm (accessed December 10, 2010).
69. See Tor, “Home,” http://www.torproject.org (accessed December 10,
2010).
70. See Tor, “Tor Overview,” http://www.torproject.org/about/overview (accessed December 10, 2010).
71. Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad.”
72. Ibid.
73. Ellen Nakashima, “Dismantling of Saudi-CIA Web Site Illustrates Need
for Clearer Cyberwar Policies,” Washington Post, March 19, 2010, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805464.
html (accessed December 11, 2010).
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Fillmore, “Integrating Open Source Intelligence.”
77. Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 1999, https://www.
cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/index.html (accessed December 11, 2010).
78. Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 62.
79. Major, Communicating with Intelligence, 2008.
80. Ibid.
81. Loch K. Johnson, “Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The
President’s Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate,” Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (2008): 333–70.
82. Johnson, Handbook of Intelligence Studies.
83. Zegart, Spying Blind, 68.
84. Wait, “Intelligence Units Mine the Benefits.”
85. Johnson, “Glimpses into the Gems.”
86. Ibid.
194
Notes
87. In 2008, then DDNI/A Fingar described the process of producing NIEs. The
national intelligence officer (NIO) in charge of assembling the NIE selects two to
five drafters. These drafters are, ostensibly, the most knowledgeable members of
the intelligence community concerning the topic under investigation. After a draft
of the NIE has been assembled based on the most current reporting and analysis
available, it is sent to senior NIC officials for an initial approval. Upon receiving
approval (usually after extensive revisions to the draft have been made), the document is sent to other agencies within the intelligence community along with a list
of the sources used so that the representatives of these agencies can make their
own assessments. The representatives usually respond first with written comments. Later, analysts from these agencies hold “coordination sessions” (dubbed by
analysts as “struggle sessions”—borrowing a term from the Chinese Communist
Party) wherein the analysts debate alternative interpretations. Third, after holding
sufficient coordination sessions, the document returns to NIC officials who, upon
approval, then distribute it to members of the National Intelligence Board (NIB)—
the heads of the analytical organizations throughout the intelligence community.
The members of the NIB discuss the document with their respective staffs before
convening a meeting to deliberate and modify its contents and format. At this
meeting, according to Fingar, there is an ombudsman who observes whether political considerations are being inappropriately used to interpret intelligence or draft
the NIE. Finally, once the NIB approves the NIE, the document is printed, briefed
to the president and cabinet members, and later disseminated and/or briefed to
members of Congress and other policy makers. According to Fingar, this process
usually takes between three months and one year. See Thomas Fingar, National
Intelligence Estimates: A Discussion of Process, Analytics, and Structure (speech before the New America Foundation, June 5, 2008), http://www.newamerica.net/
events/2008/national_intelligence_estimates (accessed December 11, 2010).
88. Glasser, “Probing Galaxies.”
89. Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad.”
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. CENTRA Technology, Inc., Enhancing DHS Information Support to State and
Local Fusion Centers: Results of the Chief Intelligence Officer’s Pilot Project and Next
Steps, February 20, 2008, http://www.ohs.ca.gov/pdf/fed_reports/DHSInfoSupporttoStateandLocalFusionCenters_02-20-08.pdf (accessed December 11, 2010).
93. Ibid., 21.
94. Ibid., 22.
95. Ibid.
96. The author obtained a copy of the survey.
97. See Open Source Center, https://www.opensource.gov.
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Index
Able Danger, 119
ADDNI/OS: apportionment, 54;
authority and responsibility,
69 – 70; creation of, 14 – 15; Jardines, Eliot, as first, 37 – 38; open
source as challenge to, 51; public
as customer, 78
Advocacy, 52 – 53
Aftergood, Steven, 134
Agriculture Department, 151
Alvesson, Mats, 89
Anderson, Ryan G., 108 – 9
Anonymity, on Internet, 157 – 58
Apportionment, 54
Asen, Robert, 128
Aspin-Brown Commission, 23,
34 – 35
Assessing open source, 159 – 61
Assistant deputy director of
national intelligence for open
source. See ADDNI/OS
Associations, normative, 56
Athens, ancient, 136
Aune, James, 138
Barbour, Joshua, 43 – 44
Battle-of-the-INTs, 34 – 35
Best, Richard, 130
Bettenhausen, Matthew, 15 – 16
Boutique intelligence shops, 8 – 9
Breitweiser, Kristen, 110 – 11, 119,
137
Buddha’s adage, 141, 142, 143
Burke, Don, 129
Burundi, 34
Bush administration (George W.):
commission recommendations
and, 67; Iraq War, run-up to, 47;
9/11 Commission and, 17, 113;
SITE and, 9; Victims of Pan Am
Flight 103 and, 139
Butler, Dan, 52 – 53, 55, 70, 71, 74
Canada, 3 – 4
Center for Empowered Living and
Learning (CELL), 135
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
30, 33, 34 – 35
Central Intelligence Retirees Association (CIRA), 38 – 39
CENTRA Technology, 160 – 61
Certification for open source practitioners, 55
Chenega Federal Systems, 150
212
Chicago Tribune, 29
China Straits Crisis, 30 – 31
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 30,
33, 34 – 35
Cilluffo, Frank, 15
CIRA (Central Intelligence Retirees
Association), 38 – 39
Citizen activism, 107 – 28; change, possibilities for, 125 – 27; competing
images of, 108 – 10; as complicated
prospect, 128; linking open source
and, 118 – 23; overview, 16 – 17; vetting and voice, problems of, 123 – 25.
See also 9/11 families
Citizens: as customer, 77 – 79; DHS
open source products available to,
105 – 6
Colby, William, 120
Cold War, 6, 7, 29 – 32
Colleagues, interpersonal communication with, 95
Collective intelligence, 35
Communication: interpersonal, 95;
organizational, 43 – 44, 51 – 56
Community action plan, 77 – 78
Community Open Source Program
Office (COSPO), 33
Competitive intelligence, 46 – 47, 152
Conferences, 51 – 56. See also DNI
Open Source conferences
Congress, 102
Congressional Research Service, 87
Container schema, 137 – 38
Contractors: clients, government, 155;
cost of reports and services, 155; examples of companies, 8, 9 – 10, 147;
former government and military officials as, 10; ICD 301 and, 99 – 100;
reasons for using, 7 – 8; solicitations
for, 10 – 11, 153 – 54. See also Open
source practitioners
Contracts, securing, 152 – 55
Cooren, François, 71
Copyright, 106
COSPO (Community Open Source
Program Office), 33
Counterpower, 138
Croom, Herman, 29 – 30, 34
Cryptome, 133, 135, 136
Index
Cultural change: assessment of, 91 – 97;
coercive versus normative elements
of, 102 – 3; discourses, competing,
97 – 101; Jardines, Eliot, on, 61 – 62;
overview, 16; texts, limits of, 101 – 4;
vocabularies of, 90 – 91
Cultural divisions, 95 – 97
Cultural work, 46, 55 – 56
Culture: functionalist perspective on,
86; interpretive perspective on,
86 – 87
Cumming, Alfred, 130
Customer-centric focus, 77 – 79
Daily Illicit Commercial Trafficking and
Smuggling Report (Department of
Homeland Security), 105, 106
Daily Infectious Diseases Report (Department of Homeland Security),
105, 106
D&B (Dun & Bradstreet), 152, 153
Deetz, Stanley, 79, 140
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
13 – 14, 36, 153 – 54
Defense Science Board, 72
Definitional work, 53 – 54
Demophobia, 48, 137 – 38
Department of Agriculture, 151
Department of Defense (DoD): Able
Danger, 119; Instruction No. 3115.12,
83; open source challenges, 54 – 55;
Pentagon Papers, 138, 140; TQM in,
77; U.S.-persons issues, 98 – 99
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS): as authority, 95 – 96; cultural
change, 85, 87; Daily Illicit Commercial Trafficking and Smuggling Report,
105, 106; Daily Infectious Diseases
Report, 105, 106; Homeland Security
Central Digest, 105; Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, 90; mission,
85; Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, 87 – 88; Open Source Enterprise Strategic Vision, 85, 90; open
source intelligence, 89; open source
products available to citizens,
105 – 6; Strategic Plan, 90. See also
Homeland security
Department of State, 30, 139
Index
Dewine, Mike, 65, 72
DHS. See Department of Homeland
Security
DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency),
13 – 14, 36, 153 – 54
Dialogue strategies, 126 – 27
Discourse-centered perspective on
open source developments, 41 – 57;
illustration of, 50 – 57; institutional
theory, 43 – 44; open source cultural
work, 55 – 56; open source political work, 52 – 54; open source technical work, 54 – 55; organizational
discourse, 44 – 46; overview, 19, 20,
41 – 42; rhetoric, 46 – 49
DNI Open Source Center (OSC). See
Open Source Center
DNI Open Source conferences: cultural work, 55 – 56; described,
1 – 2; entrepreneurialism, 74 – 75;
exchange of viewpoints versus
voice, 79; institutionalization and,
52 – 56; organizing principle, 51 – 52;
political work, 52 – 54; technical
work, 54 – 55; texts, 51
Documents, official, 70 – 72
DoD. See Department of Defense
Domestic intelligence, 87, 89
Drake, William W., 25 – 27, 28 – 29
Du Gay, Paul, 73, 87
Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), 152, 153
Earth Intelligence Network, 134 – 35
Educating, 55
11th Naval District, Intelligence Office
of the, 26
Ellsberg, Daniel, 138
Enron, 9 – 10
Enterprise discourse, 72 – 79
Entrepreneurialism, 73 – 76, 109
Entrepreneurship, institutional, 45, 55
Eurasia Group, 149 – 50
Evangelism, 73, 76 – 77, 109
“Exploitation of Foreign Open
Sources, The” (Croom), 29 – 30
Fair use provisions (copyright), 106
Family Steering Committee (FSC), 17,
111
213
FAS (Federation of American Scientists), 134, 135 on 136
FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service), 4, 6, 30, 38 – 39, 79
FBMS (Foreign Broadcast Monitoring
Service), 6, 23, 27 – 28, 29
Federation of American Scientists
(FAS), 134, 135, 136
Fingar, Thomas: accuracy of intelligence community, 160; conferences,
51; experts, outreach to, 157; open
source advocacy, 53; open source
definition, 53; open source funding, 41; open sources, lack of citing
of, 42
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS), 4, 6, 30, 38 – 39, 79
Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service
(FBMS), 6, 23, 27 – 28, 29
Foreign intelligence, 87
FSC (Family Steering Committee), 17,
111
Functionalist perspective, on culture,
86
Fundamentalism, 47
Funding for open source, 8, 38, 41,
100, 106
Fusion centers, 15, 89, 92, 94, 103, 160
Future of open source, 145 – 46
Gaffney, Glenn, 74, 76, 77
Gannon, John, 6 – 7, 9, 25, 81, 148
Genres, 51 – 56
Germany, 54 – 55, 74 – 75
GIF (Global Intelligence and Forecasting) Team, 151
“Giving a Voice to Open Source Stakeholders” (House of Representatives
Homeland Security Committee),
89, 93
Global Intelligence and Forecasting
(GIF) Team, 151
Goodall, H. L., Jr., 47
Goodnight, Thomas, 47 – 48
Government officials, former, as contractors, 10
Graham, Mary Margaret, 53, 55,
74 – 76, 77
Grassroots statecraft, 121 – 21
214
Gray literature, 4, 157
Greece, ancient, 136
Grey, Christopher, 21
Hardy, Cynthia, 51
Harsch, Joseph C., 27, 28
Hastedt, Glen, 30 – 31
Hayden, Michael: Jardines, Eliot,
and, 37; Naquin, Doug, and, 79 – 80;
open source, 3; open source cultural work, 56; open source political work, 54; open source technical
work, 55; secrecy, logic of, 64
Herring, Jan, 31 – 32
Hitler, Adolf, 75
Homeland security, 85 – 106; commercial imperatives, 99 – 101; cultural
change texts, limits of, 101 – 4; cultural divisions, 95 – 97; discourse
and open source culture, 86 – 88;
discourses, competing, 97 – 101; information, vague, untimely, and
excessive, 93 – 95; open source and
cultural change, assessing, 91 – 97;
open source and vocabularies of
cultural change, 90 – 91; open source
information sharing, ambiguous
definition of, 91 – 93; open source information sharing, logic of, 88 – 89;
open source information sharing,
symbolism of, 104 – 6; overview,
15 – 16; privacy, civil liberties, and
civil rights discourse, 97 – 99; research needs, future, 104 – 5. See also
Department of Homeland Security
Homeland Security Central Digest (Department of Homeland Security),
105
“Homeland Security Intelligence,” 87
House of Representatives Homeland
Security Committee, 89, 93
Human agency, role of, 45
Hurst, Deborah, 103
IAFIE (International Association for
Intelligence Education), 69, 141
ICD (Intelligence Community Directive) 301, 62, 69 – 70, 99 – 100
Identities, constructing, 55 – 56
Index
iJet, 150, 152, 159
Information: excessive, 94 – 95; open
source, 62; untimely, 94; vague, 93
Information Sharing Environment
(ISE), 90, 105
Insider/outsider dichotomy, 136 – 38
Institutional discourse, 20 – 21, 50 – 57
Institutional entrepreneurship, 45, 55
Institutionalization: conferences as facilitation of, 51 – 56; of official documents, 70 – 72; operationalization
versus, 103; as rational myth, 43, 49;
textual practice and, 70 – 72
Institutional theory, 43 – 44
Institutional work categories, 45 – 46
Instruction No. 3115.12 (Department of
Defense), 83
IntelCenter, 155
Intellibridge: clients, government, 14;
cost of reports, 155; Defense Intelligence Agency as client, 14; Enron
as client, 9 – 10; newsletter, 15; open
source analysts, 82, 83; personnel,
key, 9; working environment, 152
Intelligence: collective, 35; competitive, 46 – 47, 152; conceptualization
of, 42; domestic, 87, 89; foreign, 87;
meaning of, 63; peacekeeping, 151;
public, 131 – 36
Intelligence community, 59 – 84; accuracy of, 160; attitudes, changing,
62 – 64; control, problem of, 80 – 83;
logics of open source, 60 – 62; official documents, institutionalization and control of, 70 – 72; official
members, 13; open source advocacy, 72 – 79; open source logics and
policy, 64 – 70
Intelligence Community Directive
(ICD) 301, 62, 69 – 70, 99 – 100
Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan
(Department of Homeland Security), 90
Intelligence-industrial complex, 8
Intelligence Office of the 11th Naval
District, 26
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), 12,
66 – 67
Index
International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), 69, 141
Internet: anonymity on, 157 – 58; as
source for 9/11 families, 113, 116,
123
Interpersonal communication with
colleagues, 95
Interpretive perspective, on culture,
86 – 87
Iran, 2 – 3
Iraq War, 47
IRTPA (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004), 12,
66 – 67
ISE (Information Sharing Environment), 90, 105
Ivie, Robert, 48, 122, 136, 137
Jakov, Bertoldt, 74
Jane’s Strategic Advisory Services,
150 – 51
Japan, 26, 27, 28 – 29
Jardines, Eliot: cultural change, 61 – 62;
DNI Open Source Conference, 1 – 2;
employee qualifications, 150; entrepreneurialism, 74, 75 – 76; as first
ADDNI/OS, 37 – 38; open source
advocacy, 37 – 38, 52, 64; open
source technical work, 54 – 55; President’s Daily Brief, 11 – 12; private
sector, return to, 39; private sector’s
open source activities, 7; secrecy,
logic of, 69; Steele, Robert David,
and, 68
Jersey Girls. See 9/11 families
Johnston, Rob, 81 – 82
Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees: creation
of, 64; open source recommendations, 60, 65, 66, 142; organizational
sense making, 84; secrecy, institutional preferences for, 72
Jones, Calvert, 88
Kates, George, 29
Katz, Rita, 152, 158, 160
Keller, William, 126
Kimmel, Husband, 27
Kissinger, Henry, 111 – 12, 116
215
Kleinberg, Mindy, 110, 111, 128
Kondra, Alex, 103
Kreminologists, 31
Kuhn, Tim, 42, 101
Lammers, John, 43 – 44
Lawrence, Thomas, 51
LexisNexis open source intelligence
round table, 135 – 36
Logics: of openness, 61, 64; of open
source, 60 – 61, 64 – 70; of secrecy,
60 – 61, 64, 67 – 68, 69
Lowenthal, Mark, 61, 141
Malhotra, Namrata, 104
Management fashions, 46
Manning, Bradley, 129, 131 – 32
Marks, Ronald, 2, 69
Marling, George, 31 – 32
Marsh, Pearl-Alice, 121 – 22
Martin, Joanne, 86
Martin, Lauren, 85
McCurdy, Dave, 32 – 33
McGovern, Ray, 107, 108, 109, 111
Medina, Carmen, 75
Mercieca, Jennifer R., 138
Meyer, John, 43
Midway, Battle of, 29
Military officials, former, as contractors, 10
Mimicry, 54 – 55
Mitchell, Gordon, 46 – 47, 126
Moral authority, of victims, 112 – 13
Naquin, Doug: community action
plan, 77 – 78; FBIS, rebranding as
OSC, 79; Hayden, Michael, and,
79 – 80; institutionalization of open
source, 56; National Open Source
Strategic Action Plan, 80 – 81; open
source advocacy, 38 – 39; open
source discussion, raising level
of, 107, 108. See also Open Source
Center
National Defense Authorization Act
(FY 2006), 36, 63, 70 – 71
National Intelligence Council, 33 – 34
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),
2 – 3, 30 – 31, 159
216
National Open Source Committee,
80 – 81
National Open Source Enterprise brochure, 71, 72 – 73, 78, 81
National Open Source Strategic Action
Plan (National Open Source Committee), 80 – 81
National security: reform legislation,
proposed, 32 – 33; rhetoric about, 49
National Security Strategy, 47 – 48
National Strategy for Information Sharing, 90, 102
NATO, 63
Nazi regime, 74 – 75
NEFA (Nine Eleven Finding Answers)
Foundation, 135
Neo-institutional theory, 43, 45, 47, 49
Networks, normative, 56
New Craft of Intelligence, The (Steele),
35
Newman, Robert, 46, 79
NIE (National Intelligence Estimate),
2 – 3, 30 – 31, 159
9/11: Press for Truth (documentary),
107, 109, 111, 112, 119
9/11 Commission: creation of, 64; entrepreneurialism, 73; Family Steering Committee, 17, 111; Kissinger,
Henry, as proposed chairman,
111 – 12; members, 113 – 14; 9/11
families and investigation, 113 – 16;
open source recommendations, 60,
67, 142; organizational sense making, 84; recommendations, 65 – 66,
67; as watershed event, 39; work, 17
9/11 families, 110 – 18; 9/11 Commission investigation, 113 – 16; moral
authority of, 112 – 13; overview, 109;
post-9/11 Commission activities,
116 – 18; pre-9/11 Commission activities, 112 – 13; vetting, problem of,
123; as victims, 112 – 13; voice, problem of, 123 – 25
Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA)
Foundation, 135
9/11 Public Discourse Project, 116,
125, 128
9/11 terrorist attacks: adaptation
failure leading to, 41; citizen
Index
participation in investigation of,
16 – 17; FBIS and, 39; open source
material used for planning, 3; timeline, 111. See also Joint Inquiry of
the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees
9/11 Widows. See 9/11 families
Nowosielski, Ray, 111
Nuclear weapons, 2 – 3, 48. See also
Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Commission
Obama, Barack, 61, 105
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 26
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 26,
29
ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence), 26
Openness, logic of, 61, 64
Open source: assessing, 159 – 61; concept of, 11 – 12; funding for, 8, 38, 41,
100, 106; future of, 145 – 46; logics of,
60 – 61, 64 – 70
Open Source Academy, 156
Open source agency recommendations, 65 – 66, 67 – 69, 78, 122 – 23,
130
Open Source Center (OSC): advocacy
as permanent function of, 53; analytical reports not cleared for public
release, 134; application procedures, 150; budget estimate, 8; collection plans, 156; FBIS rebranded
as, 39, 79; history, 24; legitimacy
of, 43; obstacles facing, 123; Open
Source Academy, 156; private sector
information providers/experts and,
5; self-assessment, 161; sources covered by, 4; vision and mission, 4 – 5
Open Source conferences. See DNI
Open Source conferences
Open Source Enterprise Strategic Vision
(Department of Homeland Security), 85, 90
Open source exploitation, conducting,
156 – 59
Open source information, 62
Open source information sharing: ambiguous definition of, 91 – 93; logic
of, 88 – 89; symbolism of, 104 – 6
Index
“Open Source Intelligence” (Simmons), 36
Open source intelligence definitions,
62, 63, 70, 71
Open Source Intelligence Forum
(OSIF), 135
Open source practitioners: certification for, 55; as occupation, 149 – 52;
training for, 156 – 57. See also
Contractors
Open Source Publishing, Inc., 150
Open Source Task Force: A Vision for the
Future (National Intelligence Council), 33 – 34
Operationalization, 103
Organizational communication,
43 – 44, 51 – 56
Organizational culture, 86
Organizational discourse, 20 – 21,
44 – 46
OSC. See Open Source Center
OSIF (Open Source Intelligence
Forum), 135
OSS (Office of Strategic Services), 26,
29
Outsourcing. See Contractors
Pan Am Flight 103, 112, 138 – 39. See
also Victims of Pan Am Flight 103
Panetta, Leon, 133
PDB (President’s Daily Brief), 11 – 12,
159
Peacekeeping intelligence, 151
Pearl Harbor attack, 28
Pentagon Papers, 138, 140. See also Department of Defense
Perkmann, Markus, 46, 50
Pfaff, Tony, 132 – 33
Phillips, Nelson, 51, 103 – 4
Political work, 45, 52 – 54
Practices, 44. See also specific practices
President’s Daily Brief (PDB), 11 – 12,
159
Pringle, Robert, 31
Private intelligence contractors. See
Contractors
Project on Government Secrecy, 134,
135, 136
Public as customer, 77 – 79
217
Public dialogue strategies, 126 – 27
Public intelligence, 131 – 36
Public Intelligence (group), 133, 135,
136
Radiance Technologies, 150
Rational myth, 43, 49
Reports, format of, 158 – 59
Research needs, future, 104 – 5
Rhetoric, 21, 46 – 49
Rossmiller, Shannen, 108 – 9
Rowan, Brian, 43
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), 5
Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE), 9, 148, 152, 158, 160
Secrecy, logic of, 60 – 61, 64, 67 – 68, 69
Secrecy News, 134
Securitization, 121
September 11 Advocates, 117
Severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), 5
Shachtman, Noah, 34
Shorrock, Tim, 8
Silver, Dan, 5
Simmons, Rob: influence, 39; National
Defense Authorization Act, 36, 63,
71; open source advocacy, 35 – 37,
38; Open Source Agency recommendation, 69; “Open Source Intelligence,” 36; Steele, Robert David,
and, 36
Simon, Stephanie, 85
Sims, Jennifer, 80
SITE (Search for International Terrorist Entities), 9, 148, 152, 158, 160
Social practice, 19 – 20, 88. See also
Homeland security
Solicitations for contractors, 10 – 11,
153 – 54
SOSi, 153, 154 – 55
SOUTHCOM, 10 – 11
Spicer, André, 46, 50
Spying Blind (Zegart), 41 – 42
State Department, 30, 139
Steele, Robert David: Aspin-Brown
Commission, 34 – 35; Cold War
open sources, 31 – 32; collective
218
intelligence, 35; Earth Intelligence
Network, 134 – 35; influence, 39, 70;
intelligence community critique, 35;
Jardines, Eliot, and, 68; New Craft
of Intelligence, 35; open source advocacy, 25, 32, 141 – 42; open source
funding, 38; open source intelligence definition, 63; open source
vision, 68, 144; rhetoric, 35; Simmons, Rob, and, 36; Vision for the
Future commentary, 33 – 34
Stiglitz, Joseph, 61
“Strategic Doctrine, Public Debate
and the Terror War” (Goodnight),
47 – 48
Strategic Plan (Department of Homeland Security), 90
STRATFOR, 150
Studies in Intelligence, 29 – 30
Subcultural divisions, 95 – 97
Suchman, Mark, 77
Taylor, Bryan, 48
Technical work, 45 – 46, 54 – 55
Technology, 6 – 7, 83
Tenet, George, 48
Textual practice, 19, 20, 70 – 72
Theorizing, 55
Thompson, Paul, 111
Three Days of the Condor (film), 59, 75,
83
Tor (software), 157 – 58
Total Intelligence Solutions, 9
Total Quality Management (TQM), 73,
77 – 79
Tradecraft, 81 – 82, 83
Truth commission on War of Terror,
117
Index
United Nations (UN), 151
U.S.-persons issues, 97 – 99
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 10 – 11
Van Auken, Lorie, 110, 111
Vernacular republicanism, 138
Vesting, 54
Vetting, 123
Victims, moral authority of, 112 – 13
Victims of Pan Am Flight 103, 112, 117,
124, 126, 139
Vision for the Future (National Intelligence Council), 33 – 34
Voice: exchange of viewpoints versus,
79; problem of, 123 – 25
Wagner, Caryn, 99
Wallace-Wells, Benjamin, 152, 158
Wallner, Paul, 32, 33, 38
War on Terror, 47, 117
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Commission: creation of, 64; evangelism, 76 – 77; open source recommendations, 60, 66, 67 – 68, 76 – 77;
open source reporting versus official
position, 127; organizational sense
making, 84; scientific approach to
intelligence analysis, 82
Wettering, Frederick, 35
WikiLeaks, 17, 129, 131–33, 134, 135, 136
WMD Commission. See Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Commission
World War II, 25 – 29, 54 – 55
Zegart, Amy, 41 – 42, 48
Zelikow, Philip, 114, 116
About the Author
HAMILTON BEAN is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Colorado Denver. From 2001 to 2005, he
served in management positions for a Washington, DC–based open source
contractor that supported organizations within the U.S. intelligence community. Since 2005, he has been affiliated with the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Center
of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. His research
intersects the fields of communication and national security and appears
in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Intelligence and National Security, and International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence.