Art Supposes Justice: Reflections on "Das Tribunal

  ART  SUPPOSES  JUSTICE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  “DAS  TRIBUNAL“   INTERVIEW  WITH  JOSEPH  COHEN  AND  RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN   For   the   opening   weekend   of   the   “Globale”   Exhibition   at   the   ZKM,   in   Karlsruhe,   Peter   Weibel   planned   a   two   day   event   entitled   “das   Tribunal”.   Numerous   thinkers,   philosophers,   historians,   jurists,  economists,  artists  and  activists,  were  brought  together  in  the  staging  of  a  ‘Tribunal’  to   “judge”  the  crimes  against  humanity  and  the  genocides  of  the  20th  century.  At  the  entrance  hall  of   the   ZKM,   a   type   of   trial   was   performed.   Dr.   Joseph   Cohen   and   Dr.   Raphael   Zagury-­‐‑Orly,   two   contemporary  philosophers  lecturing  in  Ireland,  Israel,  France  and  Germany,  participated  in  its   elaboration  and  moderated  the  event.  A  few  days  after,  they  very  kindly  agreed  to  this  interview   on  “das  Tribunal”.  Both  thinkers  describe  the  event  as  a  rich  and  meaningful  experience,  one  that   definitely  remains  open  to  different  readings  and  interpretations.  With  both,  a  conversation  took   place  allowing  for  an  attentive  look  at  the  lesser  thought  aspects  of  “das  Tribunal”.     Fig.  1  The  presenters  of  the  “Tribunal”:  Raphael  Zagury-­‐Orly  (left),  and  Joseph  Cohen  (right).   Screenshot  of  the  livestream  –  ©  19.06.2015  Angelika  Schoder   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  The  “Globale”  exhibition  at  the  ZKM  in  Karlsruhe  opened  with  “das   Tribunal”  and  you,  Dr.  Joseph  Cohen  and  Dr.  Raphael  Zagury-­‐‑Orly,  were  asked  to  moderate  the   event  which  was  both  performative  art  and  theoretical  discourse.  As  philosophers,  what  were  the   central  ideas  regarding  the  possibilities  of  such  a  performative  format  and  which  orientation  did   you  put  forth  during  its  planning?     RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:    We  are  both,  as  you  say,  philosophers.  I  would  say,  in  many  ways,  we   remain  traditional  philosophers;  meaning,  we  are  very  attached  to  tradition,  to  thinking  through   tradition,   to   reinterpreting   tradition.   In   this   sense,   we   believe   that   philosophy,   philosophical   thinking,   occurs   through   an   incessant   re-­‐‑elaboration,   which   is   never   dissociable   from   a   requestioning,  of  our  tradition.     But  we  have  been  trying  to  rethink,  for  at  least  five  years,  the  question  of  possible  formats  for   philosophy  and  other  platforms  for  philosophical  discourse.  That  is,  we  have  been  struggling  with   the  very  idea  of  format  and  more  generally  of  the  “form”  in  and  for  philosophy  and  its  discourse.   In  many  ways,  I  believe  we  have  been  struggling  with  the  “form”  of  format  and  the  staging  for   philosophical   discourse.   Why?   Mainly   because,   just   like   every   other   philosopher   taking   philosophy   seriously,   we   have   noticed   a   certain   type   of   fatigue   in   regards   to   the   conventional   Nkf       46   2/2016   ART  SUPPOSES  JUSTICE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  “DAS  TRIBUNAL“   format   of   conferences,   a   certain   type   of   wearing   down   of   the   traditional   manner   in   which   philosophy  and  philosophical  discourse  are  expounded.  Certainly,  this  does  not  mean  that  we  are   abandoning  the  traditional  academic  format  which,  as  you  know,  is  never  far  from  some  kind  of   performance.  I  think  we  still  keep  the  faith  in  the  traditional  format  of  philosophical  discourse,   but  faced  with  this  fatigue,  this  exhaustion,  also  the  crisis  of  the  book  to  which  we  must  add  the   tiredness  affecting  both  the  writing  as  well  as  the  listening  to  a  “conference  paper”,  well,  faced   with  this  wearing  down  of  philosophical  discourse  at  work  in  contemporary  Western  thought,  the   idea  to  rethink,  to  reinvent  different  formats  has,  for  us,  been  something  of  an  urgency,  something   of  a  necessity  –  if  I  may  say  so.   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA   HERRMANN:   I   see.   Is   there   something   to   interrogate   in   the   relation   between   philosophy  and  format,  that  is,  to  question  the  role  or  status  of  format  for  philosophy?       RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:  Yes,  indeed.  Format,  just  as  “style”,  are  never  secondary.  The  format   is   never   simply   secondary   to   content   and   this   separation,   in   truth,   this   hierarchy   between   the   ephemeral,   exterior,   superfluous   and   the   interior,   hidden   meaning   and   signification,   is,   if   not   simply  obsolete,  entirely  untenable.  For,  when  there  is  format  it  never  ceases  to  disturb  the  simple   and  continuous  transmission  of  a  content  by  introducing  a  dimension  of  unpredictability.  And  thus   what   form,   format,   is   searching   for   is   precisely   to   see   something   other   arise.   To   what   extent   this   “Tribunal”   led   to   another   type   of   format   for   philosophy,   for   philosophical   discourse,   that   is   another  question  –  I  am  sure  we  will  get  to  that  eventually  in  our  discussion.  But  what  I  can  say   now   is   that   there   was   something   we   were   searching   to   displace,   to   shift,   to   dislocate   in   the   traditional   format   of   philosophical   discourse,   and   more   generally   in   the   form   of   academic   conferences,   colloquiums,   meetings   and   Symposiums.   Again,   not   to   abandon   these   traditional   formats,   but   rather   to   reengage   them   in   other   contexts.   That   is,   rethink   entirely   what   occurs   through  public  speech.  Re-­‐‑question  and  find  a  novel  form  for  the  relationship  between  philosophy   and  public  speech,  between  the  philosophical  and  the  public  spheres;  perhaps  to  give  a  chance  to   another,  even  other  modalities  of  communicating.     You  see,  and  I  can  say  this  for  both  Joseph  Cohen  and  myself,  we  remain  very  suspicious  of  the   frames,   patterns,   templates   and   models   of   communicative   discourse.   But   never   do   we   refuse   simply  both  the  necessity  and  the  exigency  of  communicating.  There  is,  undoubtedly,  a  necessity   for   philosophy   to   communicate,   to   offer   the   ground   from   where   a   rigorous,   rational,   transparent   communication  can  be  had  and  deploy  itself  according  to  universal  categories,  understandable,   recognizable,   analysable   by   all,   but   there   is   also   the   necessity   for   philosophy   to   leave,   to   step   outside   this   reasoned   horizon   of   communication,   to   escape   beyond   the   eternal   expectancy   of   simplification  and  invent  other  modes  of  discourses,  performatives,  acts.  And  I  think  we  saw  in   this  “Tribunal”  at  least  the  chance  of  such  an  invention,  of  such  a  new  platform,  another  platform   capable  perhaps  of  allowing  for  other  unpredictable  encounters.   JOSEPH  COHEN:  Just  to  rebound:  obviously  your  question  deals  with  the  relationship  between   philosophy   and   performance.   You   are   quite   right   to   ask   this   question,   and   I   thank   you   for   asking   it,   because   in   many   ways   philosophy   has   always   been   a   type   of   performance,   philosophy   undoubtedly   embodies   itself   in   a   voice,   in   a   gesture,   in   a   style,   and   consequently   demands,   requires,   even   searches   for   its   mise   en   scène.   Philosophy   indeed   has   always   entailed   an   art   of   manifestation.  Since  the  beginning,  it  sought,  not  only  to  be  a  discourse  demonstrating  what  really   is,  but  also  of  showing  itself  to  be  that  discourse,  of  demonstrating  itself  as  that  which  explicates   and  can  justly,  truthfully,  faithfully  show  to  all  “what  really  is”,  “what  really  is  not”,  “why  such  is”,   “why  such  is  not”,  etc.  Certainly,  this  does  not  mean  that  philosophy  is  reducible  to  being  just  a   show  or  just  a  performance  –  and  indeed  in  the  history  of  philosophy  there  subsisted  a  very  long   Nkf       47   2/2016   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN   and  powerful  denial,  even  a  certain  disdain  of  the  “show”,  of  the  “scene”,  which  is  not  far  from  the   denegation,  in  this  very  history,  of  the  “body”.  But  this  has  profoundly  changed.  And  today,  we   must  acknowledge  this  change  and  act  in  accordance.     LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Socrates’s  speech,  for  example.   JOSEPH  COHEN:  Yes,  exactly,  Socrates,  and  from  Socrates  onwards.  I  can  say,  and  Raphael  Zagury-­‐‑ Orly  also,  that  Jacques  Derrida’s  lectures  and  conferences,  Jean-­‐‑François  Lyotard’s  seminars,  Jean-­‐‑ Luc   Marion’s   classes,   just   to   name   here   a   few,   were   great   performances   of   philosophy.     In   this   sense,  and  this  was  interesting  for  us,  the  staging  of  “das  Tribunal”  inscribed  itself  in  the  history   of   philosophy.   As   we   know   and   as   you   just   said,   in   many   ways   philosophy   begins   with   the   scene   of   a   tribunal:   Socrates’   trial.   In   that   tribunal   Socrates   puts   on   a   performance.   He   is   subjective,   objective,  speaks  from  a  singular  point  of  view  as  well  as  argues  from  a  universal  idea  of  justice   and   Good;   he   is   sarcastic,   ironic,   he   plays   with   the   accusation,   reverses   the   accusation,   places   himself  above  the  Law  and  yet  at  the  same  time  under  the  Law,  both  in  the  Law  and  outside  the   Law.   –   There   is   an   incredible   performative   element   at   work   in   Socrates’   “Apology”.   So   the   “Tribunal”  is  to  be  inscribed  within  a  tradition  of  performance  in  philosophy.  It  is  not  an  unedited   form,  and  yet,  what  was  interesting  for  us,  was  the  possibility  to  rekindle  that  form  –  but  otherwise   and  differently.       One  of  the  reasons  why  we  needed  to  reinvent  this  form,  reinvent  this  performance  was  that  the   “Tribunal”   we   were   seeking   to   put   on   dealt,   not   so   much   with   philosophy,   but   with   the   crimes   of   the  20th  century,  the  genocides  of  the  20th  century  and  wanted  to  address  the  question:  what  is  left   of  justice  in  the  global,  technological,  economical  becoming  of  our  humanity?  So  it  sought  more,   so  to  speak,  than  to  just  perform  the  trial  of  philosophy.  It  wanted  to  put  on  trial  how  humanity   has  dealt  with  its  own  history  and  furthermore  how  humanity  enacts  itself  throughout  its  history.     Another   idea   that   is   important   here   which   we   discovered   in   the   course   of   not   only   of   the   preparation,  but  most  explicitly  in  the  performance,  of  the  “Tribunal”  itself,  is  that  in  every  type  of   renewal  of  a  philosophical  performance  lies  the  question  of  the  Law.  It  was  present  in  Socrates’   performance  and  it  was  present  in  our  performance.   There   is   the   question   of   the   law,   and   of   course:   who   says   law,   says   form.   The   law   is   a   form,   a   formalisation.   What   we   were   seeking   to   undo   is   a   traditional   form,   is   a   traditional   form   of   law   in   order  to  orient  towards  –  perhaps  –  the  possibility  of  thinking  no  longer  in  this  law,  but  differently   this  law,  and  thus  to  think  another  idea  of  justice.     LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  And  you  saw  a  chance  in  this  format,  that  of  “the  Tribunal”?     RAPHAEL   ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:   We   have   to   be   very   careful   here.   Cautious   with   the   very   idea   of   chances,   of   giving   chances,   of   opening   up   to   chances,   to   novelty,   to   new   possibilities.   We   were   looking   into   risking   something,   but   we   recognized,   almost   immediately,   that   to   transform   the   form,  to  affect  the  form  in  such  a  manner  as  to  engage  into  something  other,  is  bordering  on  the   impossible.   And   thus,   very   quickly,   we   were   caught   up   with   the   conventional   parameters   of   discourse,  of  historicism,  of  academism,  and  the  logic  of  judgment,  of  right  and  of  the  law.  And   retrospectively,  this  was  very  interesting  for  us.  And  here  we  must  explain  very  succinctly  what   we  were  seeking  to  bring  forth.  Our  idea,  so  to  say,  was  to  instigate,  through  this  “Tribunal”,  a   heterogeneity  between  Right  and  Justice,  that  is  between  the  logic  which  is  predominant  in  what   we  call  the  “court  of  justice”  and  the  philosophical  idea  of  justice.     For  many  reasons,  we  did  not  succeed  in  introducing  this  tension,  between  Right  and  Justice,  and   failed  in  displaying  this  somewhat  fragile  and  delicate  idea  of  a  Justice  beyond  Right.  And  there  is   a   philosophical   issue   here   as   well   as   an   explanation   to  be   had   for   this   failure.   For,   and   it   became   Nkf       48   2/2016   ART  SUPPOSES  JUSTICE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  “DAS  TRIBUNAL“   all   the   more   palpable   in   the   preparatory   stages   as   well   as   in   the   event   itself,   where   it   became   patently   obvious,   there   is   a   radical   misunderstanding,   perhaps   a   fundamental   impossibility,   at   work   in   institutions,   in   this   very   institution   here   –   which   is,   of   course,   a   great   institution   –   to   understand,  to  put  on,  to  enact  this  heterogeneous  tension.  And  yet,  a  performance  which  would   not  be  subjected  to  the  patterns,  nor  restrained  by  the  institutional  structures,  the  modes  of  the   classical  or  traditional  “Tribunal”  could  have,  perhaps,  allowed  us  to  approach  this  heterogeneous   tension  between  Right  and  Justice.   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Following  on  your  answers,  would  you  say  that  this  very  tension,   between   Right   and   Justice,   was   simply   eclipsed   in   the   “Tribunal”?   Would   it   be   right   to   say   that   what   you   sought   to   bring   forth   in   the   “Tribunal”   was,   in   a   certain   manner,   shunned   by   the   normative  structure,  institutional  context  in  which  it  was  held,  exhibited  and  presented?           RAPHAEL   ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:   Perhaps,   I   ought   to   say   this   firstly:   we   all   attempted   to   bring   forth   something  other  than  the  usual,  procedural,  pre-­‐‑determined  structure  of  our  courts  of  law  and   legal  institutions  in  this  project.  The  specificity  which  was  ours  and  that  we  sought  to  engage  –   and  which  perhaps  was  not  shared  by  all  the  organizers  of  this  “Tribunal”  (but  such  is  also  the  law   of  putting  on  events  such  as  these)  –  was  to  show  this  heterogeneous  tension  between  Right  and   Justice.  Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  we  were  seeking  to  do  away  with  Right  in  order  to  plunge   entirely   into   a   hyperbolical   idea   of   Justice,   entirely   rebellious   to   all   institutionalization   and   irreducible   to   all   or   any   exercise   of   Right.   In   order,   for   this   other   idea   of   Justice   to   surge,   the   exercise  of  Right  must  also  be  affirmed,  confirmed,  established.  A  certain  idea  of  Justice  supposes   such   an   exercise   of   Right.   However,   the   idea   of   Justice   must   always   remain   heterogeneous,   irreducible  to  Right.     And  to  return  to  how  the  “Tribunal”  was  put  on  here  at  the  ZKM,  a  quote  comes  to  mind.  It  is  a   quote   from   Heidegger,   when   he   speaks   of   Schelling’s   Freiheitschrift.   He   says:   Schelling’s   philosophical  system  and  project  is  a  “grandiose  failure”.  Do  you  know  this  quote?   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  I  did  not  know  that  quote.     RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:  Well,  I  am  not  saying:  what  we  did  is  a  grandiose  failure,  but  it  is,  at   least,   a   significant   failure,   a   thought-­‐‑provoking   failure.     And   this   is   also   something   we   heard   from   both  participants  and  spectators.  Indeed,  the  simple  fact  that  many  people  came  to  us  and  said,   “You  should  try  this  elsewhere”,  as  if  they  felt  something  other  was  sought  after,  other  than  what   was  being  displayed,  is  quite  telling.  And  it  is  true,  we  were  looking  for  something   other,  a  place   where  the  difference,  the  irreducibility,  the  heterogeneity  between  justice  and  right  could  present   itself.  Certainly,  this  difference  did  not  appear  at  the  “Tribunal”  as  radically  as  we  were  hoping.   There   was   something   there,   at   the   tip   of   everyone’s   tongue,   the   desire   for   some,   the   need   for   others,  the  urgency  I  would  say,  for  another  idea  of  Justice  capable  of  questioning  Right,  capable   also  of  suspecting  the  procedural,  institutional,  technical  praxis  of  Right  as  well  as  its  unthought   metaphysical   presuppositions:   subject,   judgment,   comparison,   recognition,   repetition,   etc.   There   was   an   urgency   to   see   the   possibility   of   thinking   towards   this   idea   of   justice   working   through,   always  suspecting  Right  and  Law,  tenuously  standing  at  its  limits.  And  although  this  idea  of  Justice   was  not  deployed  or  wholly  presented,  it  was  nonetheless  manifesting  its  potential,  its  potentiality.   Perhaps  it  was  doing  so  in  a  certain  absence,  or  retraction,  from  what  was  actually  presented.  But   it   was   manifesting   its   possibility,   at   least   in   that   it   refrained   to   reduce   itself   to   conventions,   to   universalisation,  to  the  homogenisation  of  discourse:  crimes  against  humanity  were  supposedly   judged  and  would  be  thus  de  facto  “behind  us”  and  according  to  the  same  conventional  rationality,   we  will  now  judge  the  crimes  against  the  environment,  against  animality,  the  crimes  of  capitalism,   etc.     Nkf       49   2/2016   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN   To  go  straight  to  the  point:  Justice  ought  never  to  simply  conform  to  our  faculty  of  justification,  to   finding   and   stating   a   justification   for   everything,   and   thus   to   banalize,   trivialize,   simply   reduce   everything  under  a  general  statement  as  “it  is  all  for  the  better.”    Justice,  this  other  idea  of  justice   persistently   seeks   to   remain   distinct   from   justification.   Certainly,   we   are   attached   to   the   universality   of   judgment,   however   we   are   searching   for   the   possibility   to   think   towards   a   universality  which  is  closely  tied  to  singularity,  to  the  singularity  of  each  and  every  crime,  and  to   the  necessity  of  a  justice  which  remains  irreducibly  attentive  to  the  singularity  of  crimes  without   ever  claiming  to  put,  so  to  say,  these  on  the  same  plane.  Is  the  singularity  of  this  justice  feasible,   possible.  I  do  not  yet  know.  However,  I  cling  to  this  idea.   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  But  how  is  this  singularity  thinkable  in  relation  to  performance?     JOSEPH  COHEN:  If  we  return  to  the  Socrates  trial,  what  is  radically  different  from  what  occurred   here,  in  the  “Tribunal”,  is  that  in  the  Apology,  the  philosophical  intention,  the  idea  of  the  “Good   beyond  Being”,  the  incapacity  for  a  human  court  of  Law  to  grasp  its  own  essence,  foundation  or   ground,   and   its   enactment,   its   performance,   its   staging   are   wholly   and   entirely   in   tune.   The   intention   verses   into   its   performance   and   the   performance   mirrors   perfectly   the   intention   through   the   very   figure   of   the   orator,   Socrates.   Indeed,   Socrates   performs   the   Apology   of   philosophy  as  his  own  defence.  And  inversely,  Socrate’s  defence  against  the  charges  laid  on  him   by  the  court  of  Athens  is  the  Apology  of  philosophy  itself.  Both  the  performance  of  the  philosopher   and  the  essence  of  philosophy  are  conjoined,  both  are  ultimately  the  same.  And  hence,  there  is  no   distance,  no  hiddenness,  no  concealment  in  Socrate’s  Apology:  it  is  the  presentation,  direct  and   unswerving,  of  the  philosophical  ideal  of  truth,  justice,  good.  Here,  however,  and  in  following  what   Raphael  Zagury-­‐‑Orly   has   just   said,   the   performance   of   the   “Tribunal”   showed   something,   but   the   mode  of  this  performance  was  oblique,  indirect,  veiled.  Through  another  modality  of  complexity,   the  “Tribunal”  showed  without  showing  the  irreducibility  of  another  idea  of  justice.  It  showed  its   impossibility  to  show  a  radically  heterogeneous  idea  of  justice,  irreducible  and  heterogeneous  to   Right.  In  this  sense,  the  “Tribunal”  presented  its  own  incapacity  of  displaying  the  otherness  of  the   idea  of  justice.  It  presented  that  other  to  the  determined  structure  of  judgment,  of  justification,  of   legal  discourse  and  convention,  occurred  the  necessity  and  the  urgency  of  another  idea  of  justice.   Here   is   thus   the   difference   with   Socrates’   trial:   the   performance   of   the   “Tribunal”   showed   how   it   is   showing   the   other   than   that   which   is   actually   being   presented.   It   shows   a   type  of   absence,   and   says   something   like:   “what   is   shown   is   in   fact   pointing   to   that   which   is   not   yet   shown;   what   is   performed  is  not  yet  what  urgently  desires  and  needs  to  be  performed”.  Or  again:  “there  is  not  yet   a  true,  good  or  faithful  performance  of  the  idea  of  justice”.   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  It  showed  what  it  cannot  show?   JOSEPH  COHEN:  In  a  certain  manner,  yes,  it  showed  –  if  it  showed  anything  –  that  something  has   yet   to   be   shown,   that   something   needs   or   desires   yet   to   be   performed.   Perhaps   the   “Tribunal”   showed   this   other   idea   of   justice   as   unpresentable   in   the   scope   of   representation.   And   thus,   perhaps   it   showed   the   idea   of   justice   occurring   through   its   irrepresentability.   What   does   this   mean?   Perhaps,   we   are   here   close   to   what   the   late   Levinas   marks   in   Otherwise   than   Being,   as   the   act  of  the  other  in  the  structure  of  the  same,  dislocating,  disturbing,  deranging  the  configuration   of  identity.  To  give  justice  its  chance,  we  ought  incessantly  to  tear  it  away  from  its  association  with   Right   and   dissociate   it   from   its   fixation   in   the   juridical   determination.   As   if,   without   release,   without  end,   without   complacency,  one   must   think  the   idea   of  justice   in   a  confrontation   to   the   impossibility  of  determination,  through  the  reiterated  experience  of  its  inadequation  to  Right  and   from  which  the  possibility  of  just  questions  can  be  posed  in  regards  to  the  exercise  of  Right,  in   rapport  to  the  concrete  and  determined  practise  of  law.     Nkf       50   2/2016   ART  SUPPOSES  JUSTICE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  “DAS  TRIBUNAL“   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Could  you  elaborate  further  on  the  “not  yet”  of  this  idea  of  justice,   the  “not  yet”  of  its  “just”  presentation  or  performance?     RAPHAEL   ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:   This   morning   someone   came   up   to   me   and   said:   “I   was   at   the   ‘Tribunal’”.  Perhaps  you  should  consider  putting  it  on  in  the  Avignon  Festival  or  another  art  space,   like  the  Centre  G.  Pompidou  in  Paris.”  I  am  not  going  into  “Should  we  do  it?/Should  we  not  do  it?”   One   point   however:   there   remains   much   to   explore   as   to   the   performative   platform   for   philosophy,  as  to  how  philosophy  gives  itself  in  performance  and  in  which  manner  to  invent  other   performative   gestures   for   philosophical   discourse,   questions,   etc.   And   there   remains   much   to   further  in  regards  to  the  relationship  between  Justice  and  Art.     If  people,  after  the  “Tribunal”,  approached  us,  I  believe  it  was  for  at  least  two  reasons.  Firstly,  I   suppose  people  saw  or  understood  something  was,  in  some  way,  missing  or  missed,  something   remained   to   be   exploited,   deployed,   and   attempted.   And   secondly,   somehow,   people   felt   that,   through   our   participation   in   this   project,   another   idea   of   justice   was   seeking   to   come   through.   Another  idea  of  justice  which  works  far  from  moralization,  “lesson-­‐‑giving”,  another  idea  of  justice   which  does  not  fit  or  fixate  itself  in  a  “good  conscience”,  which  does  not  revel  in  self-­‐‑righteous   discourses   all   claiming   to   have   “settled”   or   “resolved”   once   and   for   all   historical   questions   of   justice  and  injustice.  Such  discourses  quickly  fall  into  a  spiral  of  justification,  which  transforms   itself  into  nothing  less  than  an  unjust  relativism  of  cases:  the  Rwandan  genocide  is  comparable  to   Mao’s  atrocious  auto-­‐‑genocide  through  famine,  the  Shoah  is  akin  and  understandable  through  a   comparison  to  Stalin’s  gulags  or  as  an  reaction  to  Stalinism,  etc.  What  we  ought  to  say  here,  in   regard  to  this  logic,  is  that  there  always  comes  a  moment  in  the  scope  or  the  sphere  of  Right  where   one  can  claim  that  we  have,  as  a  community,  performed  the  necessary  work  of  recognition  which   we  assume  and  take  on  ourselves,  and,  in  regards  to  historical  crimes,  affirm  having  conducted   the  right  repairing,  mending,  restoring  of  our  rapport  to  these  and  therefore  can  be  justified  in   reengaging,  beyond  the  catastrophe  of  our  past  historical  actions,  our  very  history.  However,  and   we   must   stress   this   here,   this   moment   of   “mending”,   “comprehension”,   “moving   on”   ought   never   be  affirmed  as  such,  so  to  say,  and  resolved.  Certainly,  we  are  not  simply  stating  that  historical   catastrophes   are   as   such   incomprehensible,   not   to   be   understood,   compared   between   them   or   subjected  to  historical  analysis.  We  are  rather  marking  that  there  remains  something  problematic   in   the   will   to   comprehend   and   resolve   through   historical   analysis   or   comparison   all   historical   catastrophes.  There  is  something  terrible  in  this  will  to  comprehension  which  means  that  there   ought  to  be  more  than  this  will,    we  ought  to  constantly  search  for  other  modalities  of  thinking   historical   catastrophes,   of   thinking   thus   beyond   the   will   to   comprehend   them.   We   must   rather   incessantly   mark   –   and   such   is   the   work   of   this   other   idea   of   justice,   insubordinate   and   heterogeneous  to  Right  –  the  unsatisfied,  unaccomplished,  unresolved  relation  to  our  own  history,   its   catastrophes   and   our   consciousness   of   our   historical   becoming.   The   worst   enemy   of   justice   is   always   “auto-­‐‑satisfaction”,   this   pretention   that   “enough   has   been   done,   and   we   can   move   on,   we   can  leave  the  past  behind  and  look  into  the  future  unscathed”.  Indeed,  the  worst  enemy  of  this   idea  of  justice  is  to  relate  to  it  by  already  claiming  that  “the  wounds  of  Spirit  heal  without  leaving   any  scars”,  to  paraphrase  Hegel.             JOSEPH  COHEN:  Another  element  we  need  to  question  is  the  idea  of  globality.  The  “Tribunal”  was   the  opening  performance  of  the  Globale  exhibition.  Globale,  the  title  thus,  is  a  clear  reference  to  a   process  which  is  always  surpassing  our  own  subjective  freedoms,  a  process  to  which  we  belong   before  belonging  to  ourselves.  This  process  is,  of  course,  known  as  globalization.  Our  first  question   needs   thus   to   be:   what   is   the   “logic”   of   this   juxtaposition?   What   does   it   mean   to   begin   with   a   “Tribunal”  which  evolves  into  and  opens  towards  a  “globalizing  process”?  What  does  it  mean  to   open  an  exhibition  entitled  “Globale”  with  a  “Tribunal”  of  the  20th  Century,  of  the  crimes  of  the  20th   Nkf       51   2/2016   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN   Century  and  which  furthermore  addresses  also  the  crimes  we  are  already  committing  at  the  turn   of  the  21st  Century?     LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA   HERRMANN:   Would   you   say   that   the   term   Globale,   the   concept   of   globality,   globalization,  ought  to  have  been  discussed  further?   JOSEPH   COHEN:   What   we   are   saying   is   that   this   juxtaposition   conceals   a   “logic”   which   is,   for   us,   highly  problematic.  Why?  Because  it  maintains  that  since  we  have  elaborated  the  laws  and  the   norms,   the   “right”   judgment   through   which   we   can   evaluate   and   judge   the   crimes   of   the   20th   Century  and  now  that  these  norms  or  laws  have  been  recognized  as  “effective”,  all  is  left  for  us  to   do  is  apply  these  same  laws  and  norms  to  the  21st  Century  and  to  the  crimes  we  are  in  the  process   of  committing:  crimes  against  the  environment,  against  animality,  the  crimes  of  capitalism  and   wealth   distribution   in   our   “globalized”   world,   etc.   Everything   happens   as   if   there   was   one   single   movement  stretching  from  the  20th  to  the  21st  Century  and  that,  through  this  movement,  through   the  recognition  of  the  proper,  adequate,  appropriate  laws  and  norms  to  judge  the  events  of  our   past   history,   we   simply   cast   these   on   the   historical   occurences   of   the   21st   Century.   The   question,   however,   is:   who   may   claim   we   possess,   for   the   20th   and   a   fortiori   for   the   21st   Century,   the   “effective”   laws   or   norms   to   judge   the   crimes   committed?   What   idea   of   “justice”   is   at   work   when   the   laws,   the   norms   are   already   predetermined,   already   pre-­‐‑thought   as   adequate   and   suitable   to   judge  and,  consequently,  resolve  the  historical  catastrophes  we  have  caused  and  the  ones  we  are   prompting,  inciting,  initiating?     RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:  Our  idea  of  justice  marks  –  and  to  say  it  pointedly  –  that  we  have  not   yet   the   proper   laws,   the   norms   in   order   to   judge   the   20th   Century,   nor   are   these   to   be   thought   as   “effective”,  “adequate”,  “suitable”  for  the  21st  Century.  Our  idea  of  justice  is  always  to  be  searched,   requires   to   be   incessantly   reformulated,   re-­‐‑evaluated,   according   to   the   singularity   of   historical   and  political  contexts,  according  to  the  singular  histories  and  languages  of  each  situation.  Never   does  this  idea  of  justice  impose  itself  in  a  determining  manner.  It  rather  calls  onto  the  singular.  In   this   sense,   for   both   Joseph   Cohen   and   I,   the   idea   of   justice   we   are   seeking   to   engage   with   re-­‐‑ examines  incessantly  its  relation  to  universality.  Thus  also,  and  at  the  same  time,  always  retracts,   refrains   from   being   perceived   or   inscribed   in   the   “global”,   in   a   type   of   “global   justice”   –   for   it   constantly  seeks  to  suspend  its  globalization  in  order  to  concentrate  on  the  singular,  and  from  the   singular  redefine,  each  time,  the  universal,  that  is  the  law  to  apply  and  put  into  effect.  Certainly,  as   Levinas  says,  this  is  a  “difficult  universal”  to  think,  but  such  is  the  risk  and  the  chance  of  this  idea   of  justice,  and  thus  of  an  idea  of  justice  which  suspends  the  pre-­‐‑determination  of  a  simple  technical   applicability   of   laws   and   norms   to   situations   which   are   each   time   singular   and   always   require   further  complexification.         LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA   HERRMANN:   This   semester,   at   the   HfG  –   Karlsruhe,   you   are   holding   a   seminar   entitled   “Truth   supposes   Art   supposes   Justice”.   You   deploy   this   idea   of   justice   and   art   in   their   relation  to  truth.  This  seminar,  as  you  state  it,  owes  a  great  deal  to  Jacques  Derrida’s  own  work  on   truth,  art  and  justice.  Can  we  see  in  the  performative  act  of  the  “Tribunal”  –  which  of  course  took   on  a  form  close  to  scenic  art  in  order  to  present  theoretical  questions  and  problems  –  an  opening   to  your  idea  of  justice?   JOSEPH  COHEN:  That  is  really  the  heart  of  the  matter.  Firstly,  yes,  we  conducted  at  the  HfG  this   semester   a   seminar   on   the   relationship   between   art,   justice   and   truth.   The   title   “Truth   supposes   Art   supposes   Justice”   was   also   the   title   we   gave   to   the   project   and   proposal   we   had   submitted   to   the  ZKM  for  the  Globale  exhibition.         LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  That  was  the  name?   Nkf       52   2/2016   ART  SUPPOSES  JUSTICE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  “DAS  TRIBUNAL“   JOSEPH  COHEN:  Yes,  that  was  the  name  of  the  original  project  for  Globale,  which  was  sensibly   different  from  the  “Tribunal”.   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Why  did  you  choose  to  entitle  your  Seminar  as  well  as  the  original   project  you  had  submitted  to  the  ZKM  “Truth  supposes  Art  supposes  Justice”?       JOSEPH  COHEN:  There  would  be  a  lot  to  say  about  the  idea  developed  in  the  seminar;  much  to   say  on  the  relationship  between  truth,  art  and  justice,  as  well  as  on  the  “logic”  of  supposition  which   is  involved  in  this  relationship.  We  spoke  extensively  about  this  in  our  seminar  beginning  with  the   question:  what  does  this  supposition  mean?  What  does  this  supposition,  at  work  here  between   truth,  art  and  justice,  entail  when  it  is  not  reducible  to  a  structure  of  conditionality,  when  it  is  not   only   signifying   a   cause-­‐‑effect   relationship?     The   question   however   is:   Did   “the   Tribunal”,   the   performance   that   happened   at   the   ZKM   at   the   opening   of   this   “Globale”   exhibition,   somehow   reflect  this  “Truth  supposes  Art  supposes  Justice”  idea?     We  said,  in  the  beginning,  that  the  “Tribunal”  showed  without  showing,  showed  that  it  was  not  yet   thinking  this  other  idea  of  justice.  And  to  add  to  this  idea,  I  think  we  should  say  the  following:  we   need  in  order  to  think  this  relationship  of  “Truth  supposes  Art  supposes  Justice”  a  language  which   is  capable  of  faithfully  translating  what  occurs  in  the  supposition  here  at  work  between  Truth,  Art   and  Justice.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  idea  of  justice,  we  are  here  seeking  to  think,  cannot  simply  be   understood   as   emanating   solely   from   a   faculty   of   judgment.   Why   not?   Because   it   calls   onto,   as   Raphael  Zagury-­‐‑Orly  was  just  saying,  the  singularity  of  the  event,  of  the  case,  of  the  situation  and   refuses  any  type  of  pre-­‐‑determination  or  pre-­‐‑vision  on  the  given  singularity.  And  furthermore,  it   persistently  calls  into  question,  and  thus  suspends,  interrupts  the  constitution  and  the  institution   of  a  judgment  through  the  structure  of  a  tribunal.       And  here  in  the  “Tribunal”  it  was  about  judging.  We  were  judging.  The  whole  setup  was  in  fact  one   allowing,  permitting  and  engaging  a  judgment,  a  judgment  of  “right”  and  a  “right”  judgment.  And   we  were  troubled  by  this  set-­‐‑up  and  indeed  had  a  difficult  time  fitting  into  it.  However  this  trouble,   this  difficulty  plunged  us  back  into  the  philosophical  question  which  was  at  the  very  origin  of  our   idea   and   project:     What   is   a   justice   without   judgement?   What   is   a   justice   that   does   not   verse   into   judgement  or  into  the  faculty  of  judgement?   RAPHAEL   ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:   I   would   add   to   this   another   point.   The   idea   of   a   justice   without   judgement,  which  is  probably  one  of  the  most  important  ideas  in  our  project,  does  not  mean  that   we  were  then  or  are  now  or  will  be  tomorrow  against  the  institution,  the  rule  of  Law,  the  court  of   justice,   or,   for   that   matter,   judgment   itself.   It   would   not   be   very   serious   and   ultimately   counterproductive.  What  we  were  hoping  for  was  to  bring  the  conventional  court,  the  institution   and   the   rule   of   law,   to   a   confrontation   with   its   limits,   and,   through   this   confrontation,   let   its   own   “inoperativity”   appear,   transpire   and   manifest   itself,   whilst   bringing   it   to,   making   it,   itself,   inoperative.     We   are   very   attached   to   the   curious   expression   by   Diderot,   “to   stand   at   the   limits   of   truth…”:   Art   and  justice,  although  differently,  both  have  a  certain  manner  of  performing,  acting,  standing  at  the   limits  of  truth…  What  we  were  attempting  to  show,  in  this  class,  is  that  art  and  justice  entertain   an  unresolved  relation  to  truth  and  consequently  that  they  cannot  be  subjected  to  truth,  but  rather   must   maintain   with   truth   a   type   of   interval,   a   space,   a   hiatus   thrusting   truth   outside   of   itself   and   forcing  it  to  think  otherwise  than  according  to  its  own  modality.  Needless  to  say  that  truth  here  is,   for  us,  on  the  side  of  Right.  When  one  speaks  of  the  “limits  of  truth”  certain  passage  beyond  these   limits  is  disclosed  and  revealed.     LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Are  you  seeking  to  make  art  out  of  justice?   Nkf       53   2/2016   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN   RAPHAEL   ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:   To   bring   out   art,   more   than   to   make   it   art   –   or,   and   to   follow   here   Nietzsche,  to  think  justice  as  an  artist.   JOSEPH  COHEN:  What  is  interesting  for  us  are  these  instants  where  justice  overflows,  surpasses,   undermines  also  the  rule  of  law,  to  the  point  where  –  perhaps  here  occurs  the  “bringing  out  of  Art”   –   justice   intervenes,   interrupts,   suspends   and   renders   the   very   process   of   law,   of   the   rule   of   law,   the   very   work   of   the   “Tribunal”   inoperative   and   through   this   inoperativity   opens   it   to   another   process,  one  perhaps  more  just  than  judgment.   RAPHAEL   ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:   At   the   very   moment   which   Joseph   Cohen   just   marked,   have   we   abandoned  judgement  or  have  we  redefined  judgement  beyond  its  traditional  presuppositions?   We  do  not  want  to  decide.  We  do  not  wish  here  to  simplistically  state:  “judgment  is  condemnable   and  we  must  abandon  it”,  or:  “judgement  has  to  be  redefined  outside  of  its  traditional  definition.”   We  wanted  to  leave  this  open  and  let  a  certain  indecision  hover  over  this  moment.   JOSEPH   COHEN:   And   one   more   word   about   judgement   and   non-­‐‑judgement,   abandoning   judgement  or  redefining  judgement.  This  indecision  is  not  driven  by  the  intent  to  open  the  scene   of  a  reconciliatory  form  of  grace  or  forgiveness.  I  think  that  the  word  is  well  chosen  here  –  to  render   the   entire   process   inoperative,   ineffective,   and   to   the   point   where   the   process   recognizes   its   own   inoperativity   in   its   very   operation,   its   own   manner   of   being   inoperative   due   to   its   perfect,   determined  operativity,  and  consequently  of  being  submerged  by  that  which  it  cannot  cope  with…   Kant  certainly  saw  something  of  this  auto-­‐‑limitation,  this  “auto-­‐‑destruction”  of  judgment  through   its  very  capacity  and  faculty  to  determine  itself.  This  is  why  he  introduced  and  formulated  in  the   Critique  of  Judgment  the  “reflexive  judgment”.   RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:  And  this  is  why  we  find  need  to  supplement  the  great  insight  of  the   third  Critique  by  the  further  readings  of  Nietzsche,  Lyotard,  and  Derrida.     LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA   HERRMANN:   If   I   understand   you   correctly,   there   is   a   strong,   meaningful,   profound  alliance  between  inoperativity,  a  certain  form  of  “ineffectivity”,  and  art  and  justice?   JOSEPH   COHEN:   Indeed,   there   is   a   strong   alliance   between   the   “inoperativity”,   the   “ineffectivty”   of   the   rule   of   law,   where,   when   the   law   experiments   its   own   limits,   the   necessity   of   invention   becomes  urgent,  palpable.  This  is  the  “place”  from  which  could,  may-­‐‑be  –  and  we  should  always   say   “may-­‐‑be”   when   speaking   of   justice,   as   Derrida   often   said   –   occur   this   other   idea   of   justice.   Other  than  Right,  piercing  and  forcing  Right  to  be  other  than  itself,  worked  by  that  other  idea  of   Justice   which   insists   on   the   “deconstruction”   of   Right,   its   pretension,   its   sovereignty   and   its   predominance.  A  certain  promise  inherent  to  the  dismantling  turn  Right  could  perhaps  take  –  a   turn  which  would  have  to  respond,  no  longer  to  “truth”,  but  rather  to  an  irreconcilable  idea  of   justice.       LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  As  you  mentioned  forgiveness,  I  will  move  to  another  question.  In   the   summer   of   2013,   Joseph   Cohen,   you   lectured   at   the   HfG   on   forgiveness.   I   also   know   that   Raphael  Zagury-­‐‑Orly  has  lectured  on  this  topic  before  and  furthermore  that  you  are  both  writing   on   this   question.   You   have   thematised   and   explicated   the   question   of   forgiveness   as   always   vacillating   between   impossibility   and   possibility.   How   does   a   performance   like   the   “Tribunal”   reflect  or  display  the  impossibility  of  forgiveness?   JOSEPH   COHEN:   The   “Tribunal”   –   but   perhaps   this   was   inevitable   –   operated   a   certain   generalisation,  a  certain  “relativization”  by  levelling  and  ultimately  flattening  all  the  crimes  of  the   20th  Century  to  their  being  accountable  and  answerable  in  the  same  manner  and  within  the  same   horizon  of  comprehension.  It  paved  the  way  for  a  type  of  philosophical,  conceptual  generality,  and   in  this  manner  did  not  confront  the  radical  singularity  of  each  crime.  As  intellectuals,  we  have  the   Nkf       54   2/2016   ART  SUPPOSES  JUSTICE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  “DAS  TRIBUNAL“   duty  to  address  and  confront  singularity,  the  singularity  of  each  crisis,  catastrophe,  crime  we  face   in  history.   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Why  is  the  question  of  singularity  so  important  for  the  question  of   forgiveness?  How  are  both  these  questions  related?     JOSEPH  COHEN:  Firstly,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  pose,  in  a  radical  manner,  the  question   of   singularity   and   through   this   question   open   to   the   possibility/impossibility   of   forgiveness.   The   “Tribunal”  did  not,  not  enough  anyhow,  pose  the  question  of  singularity  and  hence  served  a  very   simplistic  idea  of  forgiveness  as  “moving  on”,  interiorizing,  evolving,  reconciling  one’s  self  with  the   past,  restoring  the  wrong  and  the  possibility  of  going  beyond  it.  In  other  words,  the  “Tribunal”   reduced  the  question  of  forgiveness  to  that  of  self-­‐‑forgiveness.  A  “Tribunal”  which  already  forgives   itself,   which   always   grants   itself   its   own   forgiveness   through   the   acting   of   its   judgment,   which   is   always  assured  of  its  purpose  and  already  determining  the  conditions  through  which  forgiveness   can   effectively   be   given,   who   could   still   call   this   a   “tribunal”,   a   court   of   justice?     In   this   sense,   the   idea  of  forgiveness  in  the  “Tribunal”  was  never  radically  posed  as  a  question,  but  was  almost  –   which  is  highly  problematic  –  taken  as  an  obvious  given.       RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:  True.  We  never  talked  about  this  in  detail,  or  in  these  exact  words  or   phrases.  We  never  spoke  of  the  role  of  forgiveness,  pardon,  grace,  in  this  “Tribunal”.  And  it  is  true,   one  of  the  consternations  that  we  had  about  this  is  -­‐‑  even  though  it  was  a  “Tribunal”,  even  though   it  had  all  the  pretentions  of  judgment  –,  in  a  certain  manner,  the  “Tribunal”  had  already  given  its   grace  before  there  was  an  actual  judgment.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  judgment  and  forgiveness  are   not   concomitant,   they   are   indeed,   and   in   many   ways,   opposed.   However,   in   this   “Tribunal”   –   and   perhaps   in   others   also   –   they   were   never   too   far   apart,   almost   as   if   they   were   engaged   with   each   other  to  play  the  role  of  a  pacification  of  History.  And  thus  we  were  just  going  through  the  motions   of  rendering  operative  this  grace,  and  consequently  this  “putting  to  the  past”,  this  forgiveness  and   reconciliation  with  History.  Here,  the  question  of  forgiveness  was  never  radically  posed.  That  is,   we  never  confronted  forgiveness,  grace,  pardon,  to  the  unforgivable.  We  never  challenged  the  very   logic  of  this  curious  and  ambiguous  alliance  between  judgment  and  forgiveness.  One  must  always   think  that  there  lies  a  dimension  of  obscenity  of  a  certain  forgiveness.   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Because  forgiveness  was  never  seen  as  impossible?   RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:  Because  it  was  never  confronted  to  the  impossible.  This  also  means,   paradoxically,   that   forgiveness   was   never   questioned   as   a   possibility   worthy   of   that   name.   Forgiveness   was   already   taken   for   granted.   And   this   was   a   very   disturbing,   troubling   realization   for   us   in   this   performance,   in   this   “Tribunal”.   For,   thinking   from   this   other   idea   of   justice,   the   question   of   forgiveness   necessarily   must   be   reposed,   rethought,   re-­‐‑elaborated   in   a   strictly   and   wholly  different  manner  than  how  the  law,  the  rule  of  law,  the  courts  of  law  put  into  effect,  or   embody   it.   In   these   forgiveness,   is   always   thought   through   different   modalities   of   reconciliation,   which   are   never   too   far   from   of   “grace”,   “mercy”   or   “pardon”.   It   is   as   if   we   ought   now   to   unleash   forgiveness  from  its  metaphysical  or  theological  correlates  of  expiation.     JOSEPH  COHEN:  The  question  of  forgiveness  must  take  on  another  type  of  vocabulary,  another   type  of  logic,  new  performatives  and  significations.  And  must  thereby  be  rigorously  dissociated   from  all  work  of  time  supposed  by  penal  judgment.  How  are  we  to  rethink  forgiveness  otherwise   than  as  the  truth  of  judgment?  Remember  what  Hegel  said  of  “forgiveness”,  that  it  was  the  idea   from  which  judgement  could  be  thought  and  in  which  the  judge  found  its  ground  –  is  there  not   another  idea  of  forgiveness  which  would  be  linked  to  another  idea  of  justice?  Perhaps  ought  we   to  think  of  another  idea  of  forgiveness  which  will  not  appear  as  the  reconciling  truth  of  judgement,   Nkf       55   2/2016   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN   but  which  would  also  –  without  simply  fixing  itself  in  the  negative  –  confront  forgiveness  to  its   other,  the  unforgivable.  Perhaps,  I  say  perhaps  as  I  don’t  believe  in  wholly  or  entirely  fixing  justice   in  either  stance,  justice  sometimes  calls  for  non-­‐‑forgiveness,  and  the  unforgivable,  perhaps  justice   requires  that  it  not  accomplish  itself  in  the  forgiving  determination  of  justice  and  but  rather  to   interrupt   forgiveness,   to   suspend   the   act   of   forgiveness.   Something   in   forgiveness,   in   that   forgiveness  worthy  of  its  name  need  be  uncomfortable  with  publicity,  with  the  public  scene,  need   keep  in  itself  an  impossibility  to  give  itself,  that  is  need  be  attracted  to  silence.     LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Would  that  mean  a  justice  that  would  not  forgive?   RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:  Not  exactly…  I  think  we  spoke  of  a  certain  discomfort  that  was  ours   after   the   “Tribunal”.   It   is   obviously   an   embarrassment   with   the   therapeutical,   eco-­‐‑biological,   sanitary   language   of   the   reconciliatory   horizon   of   the   court   of   Law,   of   the   “Tribunal”.   But   it   is   an   even  bigger  discomfort  with  the  fact  that  if  you  pertain  to  question  this  horizon  of  justice,  you  are   perceived  as  refusing,  as  resentful,  as  vengeful.  You  are  seen  as  trapped,  fixed  in  the  negation  of   the  process  by  which  can  be  restored  a  pacification  of  History.  It  is  terrible  to  be  placed  in  the   situation  of  the  one  who  always  seeks  to  interrupt,  break,  and  disrupt  the  effective  and  proper   functioning  of  the  social  body.     And  I  want  to  add  that  one  of  strongest  tonalities  of  the  “Tribunal”,  a  reiterated  discourse  as  well   as  a  silent,  almost  inaudible  and  yet  tenacious  presupposition,  was:  “we  are  over  this  untenable   idea   of   singularity”.   We   are   no   longer   willing   to   think   the  singularity  of  a  catastrophe,  of  a  crime,   of   an   event   and   we   certainly   are   done   with   expounding   all   the   concealed   aporias   of   thinking   “singularity”.     And  I  am  not  necessarily  referring  to  the  Shoah.  This  is  always  a  very  difficult  situation.  For  as   soon   as   you   raise   the   idea   of   singularity,   we   immediately   associate   it   to   the   Shoah,   the   extermination  of  Jews  in  Europe,  and  consequently  one  is  always  suspected  either  of  hierarchizing   between   crimes,   between   genocides,   or   then   (but   often   one   does   not   go   without   the   other)   of   simply   negating   the   “importance”,   and   thus   the   suffering   in   other   crimes,   of   other   genocidal   experiences.  In  this  sense,  and  to  answer  your  question  more  clearly,  we  are  not  seeking  to  fixate   justice  in  either  form:  its  resolution  in  forgiveness  or  its  stubbornness  in  an  unforgiving  position.   Just   as   we   often,   too   often,   confound   forgiveness   with   all   the   terms   which   revolve   around   it,   “excuse”,  “regret”,  “amnesty”,  “prescription”,  etc.,  we  also  confuse  justice  with  the  penal  code,  the   law…   Forgiveness   and   justice   ought   to   stay   heterogeneous   and   irreducible   to   these   concepts.   Derrida’s  analyses  are  here  central.     JOSEPH   COHEN:   Indeed,   nothing   could   be   further   away   from   thinking   “singularity”   than   this   process   by   which   singular   crimes,   singular   genocidal   experiences   or   histories   are   either   hierarchized,  relativized  or  negated.  What  is  engaged  here  is  thinking  the  “singularity”  of  each  and   every  crime  in  terms  of  singularity.  And  thus  a  redefinition  of  universality  through  singularity.  I   will   mark   here   almost   a   preliminary   remark:   let’s   not   hurry   into   the   different   healing   processes,   therapies,  “work  of  mourning”  strategies;  let’s  not  be  so  quick  in  adopting  the  same  remedies  for   historical  traumas,  catastrophes,  past,  present  or  future;  let’s  not  fall  into  the  perfectly  operative   machine  of  “declaring  one’s  fault”  and  “being  forgiven”  in  order  to  assure  the  peacefulness  of  our   historical  consciousness.  The  “economy”  of  forgiveness,  the  modalities  of  avowing,  of  pleading  for   forgiveness,  the  giving  and  the  receiving  of  forgiveness,  are  never  devoid  of  ruses  and  can  always   conceal   more   than   one   ploy   or   hoax.   As   Derrida   would   say,   and   this   holds   for   both   justice   and   forgiveness,  as  soon  as  forgiveness  or  justice  are  called  on  to  serve  a  given  finality  or  a  telos,  be  it   spiritual  or  religious,  be  it  to  engage  a  redemption,  a  salvation,  a  reconciliation,  each  time  that   justice   and   forgiveness   seek   to   restore   a   normality,   be   it   socio-­‐‑political,   psychological,   historical,   Nkf       56   2/2016   ART  SUPPOSES  JUSTICE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  “DAS  TRIBUNAL“   then  we  can  be  sure,  and  assured,  that  neither  forgiveness  nor  justice  is  worthy  of  their  names,  of   what  they  name.  What  does  this  mean  for  justice?  What  does  this  mean  for  the  law?   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  This  makes  me  think  of  another  passage  from  Derrida  where  is   evoked  the  idea  of  calling  onto  the  ghosts  of  the  20th  Century.  Derrida  wrote  in  “Spectres  of  Marx”   about   the   necessity   of   learning   to   live   with   ghosts   as:   “learning   to   live,   a   time   without   tutelary   present   […].   To   live   otherwise,   and   better.   No,   not   better,   but   more   justly.”   In   this   quote,   and   furthermore   in   Spectres   of   Marx,   Derrida   deploys   the   idea   of   “responsibility   towards   ghosts”.   Perhaps,   through   this   responsibility   –   indeed,   in   this   quote,   Derrida   also   speaks   of   justice   and   following  what  you  say  justice  here  ought  not  to  necessarily  call  onto  forgiveness  as  reconciliation   –  these  questions  could  have  been  approached  differently.  What  is  at  work  between  responsibility,   justice  and  what  Derrida  here  calls  “spectres”?   JOSEPH  COHEN:  We  were  seeking  to  firstly  redefine  our  traditional  and  conventional  logics  of   mourning,  the  ontology  of  memory  in  history.  In  other  words,  we  were  seeking  to  redefine  the   traditional   relation   between   ontology   and   history.   Of   course,   through   this   question   is   revealed   –   and  Heidegger  here  is  determinate  –  the  predominance  of  presence.  The  History  of  Being  is  the   deployment  of  presence.  However  for  us,  each  time  History  confounds  itself  with  presence,  the   question   of   the   spectre   appears   immediately.   That   is,   appears   that   which   is   at   once   and   simultaneously   neither   absent   nor   present,   and   thus   interrupts,   suspends,   exceeds   the   predominance  and  the  logic  of  presence   –  the   spectre.  How  are  we  to  relate  to  History,  no  longer   as   the   deployment   of   presence,   but   as   the   incessant   occurrences   of   spectres?   Here   is   reposed   radically   the   question   of   mourning   and   is   engaged   a   redefinition   of   our   traditional   and   conventional   logics   of   mourning.   In   other   words,   here   lies   the   possibility   to   think   another   “work   of  mourning”  than  that  which  culminates  in  the  “incorporation”,  “interiorization”,  “integration”  of   the  dead  or  of  death,  of  the  historical  traumas  or  catastrophes.  In  this  manner,  we  are  seeking  a   certain  re-­‐‑elaboration  of  the  Freudian  concept  of  mourning  too  close  to  a  therapeutic  goal  and  to   the   metaphysical,   juridical,   medical   notion   of   crisis,   which   is   always   momentary   and   called   to   be   surpassed  in  the  History  of  Being.  What  must  be  said  here  -­‐‑  and  again  to  return  to  the  urgency  and   necessity  of  this  other  idea  of  justice,  in  view  of  human  history  and  the  manner  in  which  humans   relate  to  their  history  –  is  that,  the  historical  traumas  and  singularly  the  victims  of  our  history   incessantly  reappear  as  ghosts,  as  singular  spectres  in  that  history.       LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Are  you  engaging  in  the  idea  that  humans  are  to  respond  and  be   responsible  for  ghosts,  for  spectres?     RAPHAEL   ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:   A   certain   phenomena   of   spectrality   ought   to   bring   us   to   redefine,   rethink,   and   entirely   reconsider   our   traditional   notions   of   history,   memory,   responsibility,   forgiveness,  justice.  We  have,  indeed,  never  finished,  never  accomplished  our  engagement  with   History  –  That  is  we  never  cease  to  engage  our  responsibility  towards  what  has  passed  as  well  as   towards   that   which   is   to   come.   The   spectre   marks   this   exigency.   The   spectre   commands   that   we   commit  to  that  which  exceeds  presence,  that  which  excesses  what  is  present,  and  thus  engages  us   in  a  responsibility  without  end  towards  the  fragile,  the  one  who  is  not  living,  and  thus  who  does   not  resist  the  process  of  history  constantly  re-­‐‑asserting  itself,  re-­‐‑shaping,  rebuilding  and  repairing   itself.  The  call  of  responsibility  and  of  justice  reverberates  here  unmistakably  in  the  face  of  this   fragility.  We  are  called  to  responsibility  in  the  face  of  these  beings  without  defence,  dead  or  not   yet  born  which  we  carry  in  us  and  with  us.       LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  So  it  is  also  a  question  about  the  future,  about  the  “to  come”?   Nkf       57   2/2016   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN   JOSEPH   COHEN:   The   necessity   here   is   to   redefine   responsibility   otherwise   than   according   to   the   rationale   of   presence,   of   “being-­‐‑present”   to   one’s   self   as   well   as   being   equally   assured   of   the   presence  of  the  other.  Contrarily  to  a  conventional  position  or  idea,  where  one  responds  to  that   which  is  immediately  present,  we  are  here  advancing  that  the  call  to  responsibility  occurs  from  an   irreducible  excess  to  what  is  immediately  present.  In  this  sense,  the  spectre,  the  ghost,  calls  us  and   recalls  us  to  a  situation  of  essential  dissymmetry.  We  are  solicited,  concerned,  called,  more  than   ever,  by  the  one  who  was  there  before  us,  by  the  one  who  never  presents  one’s  self  as  our  simple   equal  (the  one  who  is  deprived,  powerless)  and  by  the  one  who  is  to  come.  Each  time  the  question   of  responsibility  and  justice  is  posed  there  is  a  certain  “spectralisation”  of  the  other  which  occurs.   And   this   “spectralisation”   of   the   other   marks   the   irreducibility   of   the   other,   its   irreducibility   to   presence.  And  to  which  justice  must  firstly  respond.     RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:    This  is  an  important  point.  I  want  to  add  the  following  on  what  Joseph   Cohen  called,  after  Derrida,  “essential  dissymmetry”.  For  indeed,  this  “essential  dissymmetry”  –   and  we  refer  here  back  to  what  Derrida  writes  on  the  rapport  between  time,  temporality  and  the   spectre,   spectrality   –   is   the   work   of   two   dissymmetries:   that   which   has   passed   and   that   which   is   to   come.   Between   these   two   dissymmetries,   the   “present”   is   dis-­‐‑joined,   out   of   joint,   and   only   appears  in  this  disjunction,  in  this  being  “out  of  sync”.  In  other  words,  we  are  not  claiming  here  a   simple   eradication   of   the   authority   of   the   present.   Rather,   we   are   invoking   that   the   present   is   always  and  already  worked  by  its  disjunction  which  occurs  to  it  because  of  its  past  and  its  future   to  come.  Justice  must  remain  this  heterogeneous  “weak  force”  constantly  questioning,  redefining,   transforming,   in   the   present,   the   structure   of   law   and   right.   We   can   understand   perfectly   well,   here,  there,  and  everywhere,  the  need  for  each  to  reconcile  themselves  with  their  past,  that  is,  in   philosophical   terms,   to   represent   to   one’s   self   the   past   and   inscribe   this   representation   in   a   horizon   of   signification.   However,   one   must   also   know   that   each   time   this   reconciliatory   gesture   operates,  justice  bears  the  blow,  that  is  justice,  in  some  manner,  suffers  from  this  reconciliatory   essentialization  of  history.  Let  me  add  one  more  point  here:  what  remains  of  art,  literature,  cinema   when   it   employs   itself   to   serve   the   common   and   current   economy   of   social,   historical,   psychological   reconciliation?   And   in   this   sense,   do   they   not   join   justice   as   they,   art,   literature,   cinema,  revolt  against  this  reconciliatory  temporalization  and  expose  themselves  to  that  which  is   intractable,  untreatable,  and  irreducible  to  all  strategies  or  economies  of  the  continuity  of  history.   LENA-­‐‑JOHANNA  HERRMANN:  Being  in  the  audience  of  the  “Tribunal”,  I  felt  there  was  a  latent   ambiguity  which  can  be  formulated  as  such:  “who  is  judged  and  who  is  the  judge?”  Somehow,  it   seemed   as   if   we,   inheriting   Europe’s   historical   debt,   were   reinstated   in   our   traditional,   conventional,  classical  status  of  judges,  whereas  the  victim  appeared  only  as  an  abstract  other,  as   an   exterior   entity   to   the   entire   process   of   judgment.   Certainly,   the   victim   is   defined,   classed,   categorized  as  a  victim  –  but  this  definitional  characterization  is  almost  the  most  certain  manner   of  excluding  it,  the  other,  from  the  very  possibility  to  speak  in  the  process,  and  thereby  command   a  redefinition  of  judgment  according  to  the  singularity  of  its  calling.  Can  this  vagueness,  regarding   the  status  of  the  other,  be  understood  as  a  possibility  to  re-­‐‑problematize  justice,  judgment,  and   rethink  what  we  mean  by  “other”  and  “victim”?     JOSEPH  COHEN:  It  is  true  that  in  this  “Tribunal”  -­‐‑  and  this  links  back  to  the  idea  that  forgiveness   was   taken   for   granted   -­‐‑   the   victim   never   really   appeared.   We   were   always   talking   about   victims,   certainly,  but  the  call  of  the  victim  was  unheard.  There  was  never  the  singular  call  of  the  victim,   the  singular  outrage  of  the  victim.  Only  a  general  discourse  about  the  victim.  But  the  victim  –  in  its   singularity  –  was  never  heard  and  never  spoke.  But  also,  and  it  should  be  said,  the  judges  never   appeared,  the  prosecution,  the  jury  were  never  seen,  nor  heard.  And  this  is  just  as  grave.  We  were   seeking  to  reveal  the  limits,  the  strategies,  the  economies  of  the  “Tribunal”,  but  in  order  to  perform   Nkf       58   2/2016   ART  SUPPOSES  JUSTICE:  REFLECTIONS  ON  “DAS  TRIBUNAL“   such   a   questioning   and   confrontation   between   law   and   justice,   it   would   have   been   necessary   for   the  entire  structure  of  law  to  be  present,  to  be  working  and  deploying  itself  through  its  language,   its  legitimacy,  its  force  and  power.  It  would  have  been  necessary  that  the  “Tribunal”  be  in  place   and  be  put  in  place.  We  did  not  have  this.  We  had  what  we  can  only  call  a  type  of  simulacra  of  the   “Tribunal”.  Why?  There  are  undoubtedly  profound  reasons  for  the  performance  of  this  simulacra.   We  don’t  however  believe  it  is  due  to  the  “performance”  element  –  for  who  says  “performance”   cannot  mean  a  simple  platform…     RAPHAEL  ZAGURY-­‐‑ORLY:  Perhaps   a   last   word,   even  if  there  could  never  be  here  a  last  word,   would  be,  and  we  ought  to  insist  on  the  concrete  urgency,  actuality,  practicality  of  this  exigency  of   justice:  we  ought  never  to  let  Right  operate  solely  by  itself,  and  therefore  must  never  allow  Right   to  give  itself  a  clear  conscience,  a  good  conscience.     JOSEPH  COHEN:  Never  let  Right  settle  with  itself,  incessantly  opening  it  to  that  which  remains   other,  radically  irreducible:  an  idea  of  justice  as  impracticable  as  just  and  as  just  as  impossible  to   yet  translate  as  Right.       Nkf       59   2/2016