Boston University
OpenBU
http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations
Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2015
Reason turned into sense: John
Smith on spiritual sensation
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/15615
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Dissertation
REASON TURNED INTO SENSE:
JOHN SMITH ON SPIRITUAL SENSATION
by
DEREK ANTHONY MICHAUD
B.A., University of Maine, 1999
M.A., Bangor Theological Seminary, 2001
S.T.M., Boston University School of Theology, 2003
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2015
© Copyright by
DEREK ANTHONY MICHAUD
2015
ȱ
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Like every other dissertation, this one simply could not have come about
without the help, support, and inspiration of many people. I have been blessed to
have the sort of advisors that allow one the freedom to explore an idea wherever
it may lead. John H. Berthrong has steered me through the maze of paperwork
and offered consistent good counsel as I apprenticed in the guild of academe. My
first reader, Ray Hart, stepped in to the project when Garth Green had the good
fortune to move to McGill University. Boyd Coolman’s expertise in the history of
theology, and the systematic approaches to the spiritual senses in particular, has
served as a constant example. Douglas Hedley has been as gracious and
generous as our mutual heroes from seventeenth century Cambridge. Those who
would speak of “Cambridge Platonism” in the past tense are sorely mistaken. I
have benefited from each and all of them immensely.
When I first came to Boston University for graduate study in theology I
was primarily interested in constructive and comparative theology. At Bangor
Theological Seminary under the guidance of the late Oscar E. Remick, I learned
the Tillichian “correlational” approach to such matters and fully expected to
make my mark in that capacity for the Ph.D. While preparing for the broadly
iv
historical comprehensive exams in the doctoral program however I happened to
find a course on the “History of Christian Thought” led by Garth Green. In this
course, texts I had known as disparately “philosophical,” “church historical,” or
“theological” came into focus as constituting a single world of thought. In short, I
was exposed to the “Christian Tradition” in the truest sense of that phrase.
Origen, Augustine, and Bonaventure especially spoke clearly of the attempt to
unify the worlds of faith and reason that contemporary Protestant theology too
often rejoices to see divorced. Above all I was delighted to see that they and
many others in the Christian past had done so in ways that give justice to the
way it feels to be a practicing Christian. It feels like we can “taste and see” the
divine, and there were figures of obvious genius, fully aware of the scandal of
the mere notion of “spiritual senses” saying that not only do the pious think and
feel this way, they are (or can be) justified in so doing. Fides quaerens intellectum.
While I came to the academic study of the spiritual senses under the
guidance of Garth Green during a course in the history of Christian thought at
Boston University, the reason this neglected notion immediately resonated with
me stems from other, earlier, influences. My fraternal grandfather, Wilbert
Michaud, was an example of the sort of Franciscan spirituality that so nurtured
v
the spiritual senses tradition in the medieval period. My great-grand-mother,
Alice McDougal, too lived a spirituality that was deeply indebted to this
tradition, although for her it was simply “mere Christianity.” My maternal
grandmother, Dawn Butler, was less overtly “religious” in the contemporary
sense but so obviously “spiritual” that it makes perfect sense, in light of my
research now, that she saw the Divine in and through the natural world. My first
mentor in theology and philosophy, Oscar E. Remick, displayed this
supersensible piety too, but to it he added the realization that one can – must –
come to understand what one believes as well. Finally, the great beauty and the
wealth of metaphor offered in the language of the Book of Common Prayer and the
classic Anglican hymns of the Episcopal Church have helped open my eyes to
see the spiritual senses in theological discourse. In fact, the piety of my tradition
makes me expect the spiritual senses in any authentic theology.
I came to know the Cambridge Platonists largely by chance. While I was
vaguely aware of them as a “minor” movement in early modern British
philosophy and theology I did not come to appreciate them until, quite by
accident, I picked up a newly published anthology of their writings at the Paulist
Press stand in the publishers exhibit hall at the annual meeting of the American
vi
Academy of Religion in 2005. I immediately gravitated toward the selections
from John Smith, for in his writing I saw clearly the stamp of the spiritual senses
tradition that I was then just coming to know and love. The deeply rational,
tolerant, very Anglican, moderation I found in the Cambridge Platonists became
something of an obsession. My interest in these seventeenth century figures only
increased when I met one of the editors of Cambridge Platonist Spirituality,
Charles Taliaferro when he came to speak at Boston University.
As I began to do formal research on the Cambridge Platonists I kept
coming across the name of Douglas Hedley, the mentor of the other editor of my
by then well-worn copy of Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, Alison Teply. In the
fall of 2008 I was off to Cambridge for the first of two research trips during which
I wrote a paper on Smith and Origen that I read at the AAR in Chicago in 2008
just before Barack Obama was first elected President. It was at that annual
meeting that I met Dr. Hedley who agreed to be an outside reader for this
project.
Many others have offered helpful guidance for my research, sometimes in
the form of information, but more often in the form of encouragement. I wish to
thank Ingrid Anderson, James Bryson, Sarah Coakley, Norman Faramelli, Sarah
vii
Fredericks, Paul Gavrilyuk, Torrance Kirby, Catherine Hudak Klancer, Marla
Marcum, Mark McInroy, Michelle Michaud, Robert Neville, Jessica Sargent,
David Trobrisch, Wesley Wildman, the Society and Fellowship of Saint John the
Evangelist. My students at Boston University, Middlesex Community College,
and the University of Southern Maine have been important dialogue partners
too, though they probably do not realize it. A miniature poodle named Buddy
helped in his own way too, though he definitely does not realize it.
I was fortunate to earn two short-term travel grants from the Humanities
Foundation as well as a grant from the Office of the Dean of the School of
Theology at Boston University to fund research trips to Cambridge University in
2008 and 2009. Without this support my project would simply not have been
possible.
I gratefully acknowledge the permission of Dr. John Saveson to cite from,
and make a research copy of, his unpublished “Some Aspects of the Thought and
Style of John Smith the Cambridge Platonist,” (PhD thesis, Fitzwilliam House,
Cambridge University, 1956).
Portions of chapter four were presented at the “Eastern Orthodoxy and
the Spiritual Senses,” joint session of the Mysticism and Eastern Orthodox
viii
Studies Groups at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion,
Chicago, 3 November 2008. That paper was later revised and published in
Thomas Cattoi and June McDaniel, eds., Perceiving the Divine through the Human
Body: Mystical Sensuality (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 141-58, and it is reproduced
with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. The full published version is available
from: http://us.macmillan.com/perceivingthedivinethroughthehumanbody/.
Much of chapter seven was originally presented as “John Smith's Lasting
Influence: The Transatlantic Reception of a 'Living Library',” at the Revisioning
Cambridge Platonism: Workshop 3: Reception and Influence, symposium held at
Clare College, Cambridge University, 1 June 2013. Many thanks to David Leech,
Douglas Hedley and Sarah Hutton for their invitation, organization and gracious
hosting for this event.
The assistance of the past librarian of Queens’ College, Cambridge, Karen
Begg, was instrumental for my work with the books left to the College by John
Smith in 2008 and 2009. More recently the current librarian Dr Tim Eggington
has been very encouraging and his postings of materials related to Smith online
have been very helpful for research on the American side of the Atlantic. Many
thanks to the staff of the Manuscript Reading Room at the University Library at
ix
Cambridge University too. Their professionalism made what could have been
tedious work a joy.
Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Terry and Lori
Michaud. Dad and Mom, you’re the reason why I do what I love.
Feast of All Saints 2014
x
REASON TURNED INTO SENSE:
JOHN SMITH ON SPIRITUAL SENSATION
(Order No.
)
DEREK ANTHONY MICHAUD
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015
Major Professor: Ray L. Hart, Professor of Theology and Philosophy of Religion
ABSTRACT
John Smith (1618-1652), the 17th century Cambridge Platonist, employed
the traditional language of the spiritual senses of the soul to develop an early
modern theological aesthetic central to his religious epistemology and thus to his
philosophy of religion and systematic theology. Smith’s place in this tradition
has been under-appreciated by scholars working on the Cambridge Platonists
and the spiritual senses. However, as a Christian Platonist, Smith advocated
intellectual intuition of Divine Goodness as the key to theological knowledge and
spiritual practice. Furthermore, Smith’s theory of prophecy rests on the reception
of sensible images in the imagination. In order to demonstrate this the
dissertation first presents an interpretive summary of the spiritual senses
tradition and proposes a functional typology that registers three uses of noncorporeal perception throughout the history of Christian theology: (1) accounts
xi
of the origin and methods of theological knowledge, (2) descriptions of
spirituality, and (3) attempts to systematically present or defend Christian
theology. Additionally, Smith’s historical and intellectual context in early
seventeenth century England is discussed with particular attention to how his
education prepared him to contribute to the mystical tradition of the spiritual
senses of the soul. Through a close reading of his extant writings it is shown that
Smith’s theories of theological knowledge, method, and prophecy rest on his
development of the spiritual senses tradition, combining intellectual intuition
and imaginative perception. Likewise, the role of spiritual aesthetics in Smith’s
prescriptive account of Christian piety is presented. Here the spiritual senses are
both means and reward in the spiritual life through the process of deification
(theosis). Moreover, it is shown how Smith’s theology forms a coherent system
with intellectual intuition informing natural theology and revelation being
supplemented by spiritual perception via the imagination. The central uniting
feature therefore is the spiritual perception of theological truth. Finally, the
dissertation closes with a summary of Smith’s various uses of the spiritual senses
and proposes future research on his influence upon later figures including
xii
Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, and suggests future constructive work inspired
by Smith’s combination of reason and experience in religion.
xiii
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................iv
Abstract................................................................................................................... xi
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................... 1
1.1 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................ 1
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation ..................................................................... 24
Part I ....................................................................................................................... 26
Chapter 2: The Spiritual Senses Tradition ........................................................ 26
2.1 The ‘Spiritual Senses’: The Contours of a Paradox................................ 27
2.2 Diversity in Language, Use and Meaning .............................................. 39
2.3 The Spiritual Senses Tradition.................................................................. 56
2.4 Modern Theological Interpretations of the Spiritual Senses ................ 61
2.5 Non-theological Approaches .................................................................... 80
2.6 Toward a Functional Approach to the Spiritual Senses Tradition...... 85
2.7 The Functional Typology of the Spiritual Senses Tradition................. 94
2.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 102
Chapter 3: Smith in Context ............................................................................. 104
3.1 Why Smith? ............................................................................................... 104
3.2 Into New Worlds ...................................................................................... 108
3.2.1 Geographical Discovery ....................................................................... 111
3.2.2 Scientific Discovery ............................................................................... 115
3.3 Between the Times: .................................................................................. 125
Scholastic and Modern Learning in Smith’s Cambridge .......................... 125
xiv
3.3.1 Logic ........................................................................................................ 134
3.3.2 Rhetoric ................................................................................................... 135
3.3.3 Ethics ....................................................................................................... 138
3.3.4 Metaphysics............................................................................................ 140
3.3.5 Physics..................................................................................................... 147
3.3.6 Mathematics ........................................................................................... 148
3.3.7 Cosmography ......................................................................................... 150
3.3.8 Theology ................................................................................................. 152
3.4 The Politics of Faith: Civil War & Fellowship at Queens’ .................. 160
3.4.1 Tuckney and Whichcote Correspondence ......................................... 166
3.4.2 Disputes in State and Church .............................................................. 174
3.4.3 Cambridge during the Wars ................................................................ 179
3.5 Smith’s Last Days ..................................................................................... 184
3.6 The Select Discourses ................................................................................. 186
3.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 190
Part II.................................................................................................................... 192
Chapter 4: The Source of Theological Understanding.................................. 192
4.1 The Source of Rational Theology ........................................................... 196
4.1.1 Origen as Model .................................................................................... 199
4.1.2 Origen as Source .................................................................................... 209
4.1.3 Intellectual Intuition and the ‘Spiritual Senses’ ................................ 220
4.1.4 Conclusions along the Way ................................................................. 225
4.2 The Source of Revealed Theology: Prophecy & the Spiritual Senses 226
4.2.1 General Character of Prophecy ........................................................... 227
xv
4.2.2 Degrees of Prophecy ............................................................................. 231
4.2.3 Prophecy Proper .................................................................................... 237
4.2.4 Mosaic Prophecy ................................................................................... 260
4.2.5 Hagiographi and the Bath Kol ................................................................ 268
4.3 The “True Way,” Prophecy and the Spiritual Senses.......................... 274
Chapter 5: Spiritual Sense and Spirituality .................................................... 277
5.1 Purification and Theological Understanding ....................................... 278
5.1.1 Preparation for Prophecy ..................................................................... 278
5.1.2 Spirituality and Exegesis ...................................................................... 280
5.1.3 The “True Way” as a Spiritual Path.................................................... 285
5.2 The Practice of the Christian Religion ................................................... 286
5.2.1 Smith’s Practical Christianity .............................................................. 287
5.2.1.1 Justification .......................................................................................... 288
5.2.1.2 Sanctification ....................................................................................... 298
5.2.1.3 Eschatology ......................................................................................... 305
5.3 The Spiritual Senses and Making Sense of Spirituality ...................... 309
Chapter 6: Sense, System, and Apologetics.................................................... 311
6.1 Smith’s Natural Theology ....................................................................... 312
6.1.1 Superstition ............................................................................................ 312
6.1.2 Atheism ................................................................................................... 316
6.1.2.1 Epicureanism ...................................................................................... 318
6.1.2.2 The Spiritual Effects of Atheism....................................................... 326
6.1.2.3 Materialist Naturalism....................................................................... 328
6.1.3 The Immortal Soul ................................................................................. 329
xvi
6.1.3.1 Arguments against the Epicureans .................................................. 332
6.1.3.2 Platonic Arguments ........................................................................... 344
6.1.3.3 Other Difficulties ................................................................................ 350
6.1.4 The Existence and Nature of God ....................................................... 355
6.1.4.1 The Argument from Self-Reflection................................................. 356
6.1.4.2 The Argument from Morality ........................................................... 361
6.2 The Unity of Natural & Revealed Theology ......................................... 363
Chapter 7: Conclusion ....................................................................................... 366
7.1 Smith’s ‘Spiritual Senses’ ........................................................................ 366
7.1.1 Source & Method ................................................................................... 368
7.1.2 Spirituality .............................................................................................. 370
7.1.3 System ..................................................................................................... 371
7.2 The Legacy of a Living Library .............................................................. 373
7.2.1 Immediate Reception ............................................................................ 374
7.2.2 Eighteenth Century Reception ............................................................ 382
7.2.3 Nineteenth Century Reception ............................................................ 396
7.2.4 Twentieth Century Reception & Beyond ........................................... 400
7.3 Directions for the Future ......................................................................... 407
Appendix ............................................................................................................. 412
The Contents of the Complete Editions of the Select Discourses .............. 412
Works Cited ........................................................................................................ 416
xvii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
When Reason once is raised by the mighty force of the Divine Spirit
into a converse with God, it is turn’d into Sense: That which before
was onely Faith well built upon sure Principles, (for such our
Science may be) now becomes Vision. 1
1.1 Statement of the Problem
This dissertation rectifies a serious gap in the current understanding of the
theology of the Cambridge Platonist John Smith (1618-52). 2 For Smith, theological
knowledge was primarily the product of personal experience. Studies of the
Cambridge Platonists in general and Smith in particular all agree that he used
language derived from the physical senses to discuss this experience. 3 For
example, John Tulloch’s classic treatment of Rational Theology and Christian
John Smith, Select Discourses (London: F. Flesher, for W. Morden Bookseller in
Cambridg, 1660), 16. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in The
Cambridge Platonists, ed. C.A. Patrides (London: Edwin Arnold, 1969), #4 (p.326): “If there be no
Knowledge, there is no Beginning of Religion.”
1
2
For biography see chapter three below.
Including, but not limited to, Robert L. Armstrong, "Cambridge Platonists and Locke on
Innate Ideas," Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969): 187-201; Matthew Arnold, “Introduction” in
The Natural Truth of Christianity” Selections from the Select Discourses of John Smith, ed. W.M.
Metcalfe (London: Alexander Gardiner, 1882); E. T. Campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1901); Charles Taliaferro and Alison J. Teply, eds., Cambridge Platonist
Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 2004); and Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 226-36.
3
2
Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century (1874), which established the
basic understanding of the “Cambridge Platonists” for scholars in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notes that for Smith the origin “of
divine truth is a vital sense or faculty within us which lays hold of its appropriate
objects.” 4 Likewise, the most recent anthology of selections from the Cambridge
Platonists assembled by Charles Taliaferro and Alison J. Teply for the Classics of
Western Spirituality Series (2004) remarks that for Smith “the ‘inward sweetness
and deliciousness’ in divine truth cannot be relished” without the purification of
the soul. 5 However, neither Tulloch nor Taliaferro and Teply make any reference
to the spiritual senses tradition. In this, they are not alone, as scholars have been
nearly silent on the fact that in using the language of sensation to describe
theological understanding, Smith was following a centuries old Christian
tradition. 6 Scholars have typically been content to note Smith’s appeals to
John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth
Century (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1874; Reprint, Elibron Classics,
2005), 2: 141. Tulloch’s authority has been dominate in the study of the Cambridge Platonists
until fairly recently, though he can still be profitably read.
4
5
Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 30.
Commentators typically note that Smith’s sources included Plotinus and Alexandrian
Christian theologians in addition to other ancient philosophers such as Cicero, Epicurus,
Lucretius, Aristotle, and of course Plato, but they tend to ignore the way he follows a longer
Christian Platonist tradition that continued through the early modern period to today. Brad
6
3
spiritual sensation as an element in his theological method and have not
explored the implications of the concept for his theology more generally. 7
More recently, this trend has begun to change as scholars of the spiritual
senses have worked collaboratively on their theme as developed by a wide
variety of authors. With the publication of The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in
Western Christianity in 2012, the place of Smith within this tradition has finally
been explicitly acknowledged alongside Origen, Bonaventure, and Balthasar. 8
However, this acknowledgment has been limited to an exploration, already
Walton (Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections and the Puritan Analysis of True Piety, Spiritual
Sensation and Heart Religion [Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002]) mentions Smith as
continuing a tradition of “heart language” within Puritan theology (and important antecedents in
the history of Christian thought including Augustine and St. Bernard) with similarities to the
spiritual senses tradition but with more emphasis on the will than the intellect and thus more
emphasis on personal piety than theological knowledge. Still, his is the only study I am aware of
that connects Smith to the medieval spiritual senses tradition.
The literature on John Smith (see n. 3 p. 1 above) typically discusses his use of sensible
metaphors for theological knowledge but does not ascribe to him a formal “doctrine of spiritual
sense” in keeping with a long Christian tradition (patristic through medieval and early modern)
nor does it explicate this concept in its full significance for Smith’s theology. This silence in the
literature is puzzling, especially since all agree that Smith employs this language. It is likely that
the reason for this has to do with the backgrounds and training of scholars working on the
Cambridge Platonists, who tend to belong to the analytic school of philosophy and/or explicitly
Protestant theology. Since much twentieth century work on the spiritual senses has been done by
continental Roman Catholics, it may be that those with eyes to see this traditional theme in Smith
simply have not been looking until very recently.
7
Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, eds., The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western
Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7, 19.
8
4
common in specialized studies of John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards, of his
influence upon these better known eighteenth century figures. 9
In this regard, philosopher William J. Wainwright has, rightly, made
much of the role of intellectual intuition in the theological method of Smith, but
at the expense of an appreciation for the place the spiritual senses occupy in his
theology more generally. 10 While it is true that Smith speaks metaphorically of
intellection as having a sensible character in his first Discourse (typically,
“intellectual touch” or “vision”), he also appeals to “spiritual senses” on a closer
analogy with the physical senses in the imagination. 11
For example, William J. Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and his Puritan Predecessors,”
in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, The Spiritual Senses, 224-40, and Mark T. Mealey, “John Wesley,” in
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, The Spiritual Senses, 241-56, both mention Smith as an influence on
Edwards and Wesley respectively. See also the more extended discussion in Mealey’s “Taste and
See that the Lord is Good: John Wesley in the Christian Tradition of Spiritual Sensation” (PhD
diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2006), 20-49, passim.
9
Wainwright suggests that the intellectual intuition that Smith speaks of constitutes his
understanding of “spiritual sense” but ignores the role of the imagination in prophecy as well as
the consistent appeal to multiply sensory modalities in Smith’s descriptions of the spiritual life.
10
In this way, Smith offers an important counter-point for those accounts of spiritual
sense that would stress either the metaphorical or the analogical use of the language of physical
sense. While Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar have argued for one or the other, Smith
employs both, albeit with a preference for the affect laden intellect over a physical and spiritual
sensorium. See Karl Rahner, "The Spiritual Senses According to Origen," in Theological
Investigations, 16 (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 81-103, and "The Doctrine of the Spiritual
Senses in the Middle Ages," in Theological Investigations, 16 (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 104134, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, 1; Seeing the Form
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982). This helps to account for the relative paucity of references in
11
5
R. J. Scott too has recently mentioned, in passing, that Smith had
“confidence” in “the spiritual senses” in the context of a discussion of his theory
of prophecy, but his study ignores the role of the spiritual senses in other aspects
of Smith’s theology, above all methodology and the process of appropriating
knowledge of the divine, or what amounts to the same thing for Smith, living the
Christian life. 12
Thus, Smith’s theory of spiritual sensation has yet to be adequately
understood in relation to the history and development of the Christian doctrine
of the spiritual senses of the soul (an intellectual faculty or faculties for the
sensation of non-physical, spiritual reality), or in its specific form and function
within his theology. 13 This dissertation therefore argues that the spiritual senses
the current study to “theological aesthetics”; for Smith, embodied experience is, at best, of
secondary importance. See chapter two and part II below.
R. J. Scott, “Visions, Dreams, and the Discernment of Prophetic Passions: Sense and
Reason in the Writings of the Cambridge Platonists and John Beale, 1640-60,” in Angles of Light?
Sanctity and the Discernment of Spirits in the Early Modern Period, ed. Clare Copeland and Johannes
Machielsen (Brill, 2012), 230. Scott, misses the mark exactly where Wainwright hits it by ignoring
completely the “spiritual senses” in Smith’s methodology and theory of theological education.
12
“Doctrine” is an important, but controverted, word in the context of this dissertation.
Many (if not most) theologians have understood the “spiritual senses” to refer to a single doctrine,
representing a single faculty or set of faculties. As will become clear below, I do not subscribe to
this monistic view. There is no single “doctrine of the spiritual senses” in the Christian tradition
(for my argument to this effect see chapter two). More importantly, neither is there a single
faculty intended by this general term when applied to authors such as Smith. He does not have a
13
6
represents a complex and sophisticated tradition in Christian thought that
played a central role in the theology of John Smith.
Furthermore, like the loosely affiliated “school” to which he belongs,
Smith is well known today for embracing tolerant liberal views on religion
during the period of the English Civil War (1642-52) as well as advocating a
strong notion of the ultimate harmony of reason and religion. 14 Indeed, it is this
single doctrine of the spiritual senses in the strict meaning of that phrase. Rather, he employs
several different varieties of “spiritual sense” in order to address a series of theological problems
(see chapters four, five, and six). In this, I read Smith as recapitulating the tradition (see chapter
two). Those looking for insight into what the “spiritual senses” really are (e.g., are they sensible,
imaginative, or intellective? Are they one or many? Single or separate physical and spiritual
sensoria? Etc.) will not find their answer with Smith or a historical investigation of Christian uses
of spiritual perception in general. Such work remains to be done in a constructive mode.
Members of the group often argued against such notable figures as Gassendi, Descartes,
Spinoza, and Hobbes on the grounds that their “materialism” leads to atheism (either in the sense
that there is no God distinct from the world or that there is nothing for such a God to do) and is
therefore wrong and immoral (God and the Good being practically indistinguishable). The
Cambridge Platonists (especially More and Cudworth) tried to maintain an atomistic physics and
a spirit/matter dualism that they thought was the doctrine of the ancient “theologians” such as
Moses and Plato (Sarah Hutton, "Cambridge Platonists," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
ed. Edward N. Zalta, last updated Nov 11, 2013, accessed 18 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/cambridge-platonists/). The work of
Cudworth illustrates nicely the group’s contention that the universe is suffused with Reason and
that not even the Divine Will (Puritans) or the will of the monarch (Hobbes) can “overpower”
Reason. Indeed, God acts reasonably for the Cambridge Platonists rather than according to an
arbitrary will. In this sense, even God is constrained by Reason, but since the Divine Logos is God
this constraint is self-imposed and amounts to a priority of the Divine Nature over the Divine
Will (contra Scotus, etc.).
14
7
harmony that fuels their tolerance. 15 Although the Cambridge Platonists
(principally, B. Whichcote 1609-83, P. Sterry 1613-72, H. More 1614-87, R.
Cudworth 1617-88, John Smith, and N. Culverwell 1618?-51) 16 have long been
recognized as vaguely “mystical” it has gone largely unnoticed that an important
source for the mystical character of their theology was the ancient Christian
doctrine of the spiritual senses. 17 The situation is especially noteworthy in the
On the relation between Smith’s willingness to allow a variety of religious views and
his insistence on a realist epistemology see Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), 133-54. An important, though under-noticed element in
Smith’s theological tolerance is his agreement with the Pseudo-Dionysius that ultimately human
beings cannot know God in God’s essence. Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 124-5. Smith cites
Pseudo-Dionysius on the notion of “divine darkness” here. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical
Theology, ch.1, in Paul Rorem, trans., Pseudo Dionysius: The Complete Works (New York and
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988), 133f.
15
There is little consensus on which figures should be called “Cambridge Platonists.”
Generally, lists of members of the group include all those with identifiable connections to
Whichcote. Some scholars object to including such Oxford thinkers as Norris or independent
scholars like Anthony Ashley Cooper the third earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) in the group
despite the influence of earlier Cambridge men on their thought. Until recently, women such as
Anne Conway (1630-79) and Damaris (Cudworth) Masham (1658-1708) were not considered
“Cambridge Platonists” in any meaningful sense. While the term usually refers to figures sharing
a basically Neoplatonic worldview (though never exclusively so) during the 17th to early 18th
centuries some use the descriptor for later thinkers. For the purposes of this project, the
descriptor matters less than the fact that figures associated with the name in the seventeenthcentury share an affinity for spiritual sensibility with Smith. Those figures such as Whichcote,
Cudworth, Sterry, More, Culverwell, and Worthington are particularly important for this
dissertation in that they provide additional context and exposition for concepts Smith treats only
briefly.
16
John C. English ("John Wesley's Indebtedness to John Norris," Church History 60, no. 1
[1991]: 55-69) makes explicit reference to a “Cambridge Platonist” (John Norris) holding a
sophisticated and traditional doctrine of the spiritual senses. On this theme in Norris see Eugene
17
8
case of Smith since his reliance on this traditional account of theological
knowledge is more prominent and developed than other members of the group.
Thus, the failure of the scholarly literature to provide a detailed assessment of
Smith’s spiritual senses reflects a more general failure in the academic
understanding of theological aesthetics.
The most general definition of the “spiritual senses” in the Western
Christian context comes from Coolman who says that the doctrine, in all of its
manifestations, “posits the existence of certain capacities or operations within the
Derek Taylor, “Samuel Richardson’s ‘Clarissa’ (1747-1748) and ‘the Famous Mr. Norris, of
Bemerton” (PhD diss., University of Florida, 2000), ch. 1. George Andrew Panichas (The Greek
Spirit and the Mysticism of Henry More [Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Greek Orthodox Theological
School, 1956]) comes close to making such a claim for Henry More but does not do so explicitly.
Most scholars who have been sensitive to the mystical, experiential aspects of the Cambridge
Platonists’ thought have written about aspects of the spiritual senses but have not acknowledged
the specific tradition being drawn on. Only D. W. Dockrill ("The Fathers and the Theology of the
Cambridge Platonists," Studia Patristica 17 [1982]: 427-33), Aharon Lichtenstein (Henry More: The
Rational Theology of a Cambridge Platonist [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962]) and
C. A. Patrides (The Cambridge Platonists) along with Panichas take seriously the fact that the
Cambridge Platonists were reviving a mode of theology that dates back to the Greek Fathers but
which did not end with them. However, even they do not make note of the way in which Western
Christian speculation throughout the medieval period developed these themes in ways that are
significant for the Cambridge Platonists. Walton (Jonathan Edwards) has made a case for the role
of spiritual sensation in the theology of Jonathan Edwards as an expression of earlier Puritan
thinking about the “religion of the heart,” but this affective component is partial and misleading
with respect to Smith. Smith’s relationship to his Puritan contemporaries is therefore an
important element in the task of contextualizing his reception of the ancient doctrine of the
spiritual senses. Smith’s development of this concept more closely resembles the work of Catholic
medieval theologians in its emphasis on knowledge mediated via spiritual apprehension.
Spiritual sensation plays an important role in personal piety and the religious life for Smith, as it
does for other Puritans, but unlike them Smith thinks that this faculty also provides theoretical
knowledge where other Puritans typically reserve that to Scripture.
9
spiritual dimension of the person for the perception (in the widest sense of the
term) of divine realities . . . which is in some way analogous to that of the
physical senses.” 18 Adherents affirm a continuum of knowledge or an
“intellectual system” treating the physical world through physical sensation
(sensible or natural theology), the mental or spiritual world through spiritual or
inner sense (symbolic theology), and God through speculative or mystical
theology. 19 In its most basic formulation the doctrine affirms the existence of a
faculty or faculties of perception that are directed toward non-physical reality
and which reveal to the mind something of its character (i.e., not just that it is but
something of what it is too).
The most widely recognized treatments of the Christian doctrine of the
spiritual senses took place in patristic and medieval theology from the third
through approximately the 15th centuries CE. 20 It is usually assumed that the
Boyd Taylor Coolman, Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of
William of Auxerre (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 1 n. 1.
18
On the specifically Cambridge Platonist use of “intellectual system” see Ralph
Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe.
19
M. Canévet, "Sens spirituel," in Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique doctrine et
histoire, ed. Marcel Viller (Paris: Beauchesne, 1990), 14: 599-617; Aimé Solignac, "Oculus," in Viller,
(1982), 11: 591-601; M. Olphe-Galliard, "Les sens spirituels dans l'histoire de la spiritualité," in Nos
Sens Et Dieu (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954), 179-94; Karl Rahner, "The Spiritual Senses
According to Origen," and "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in the Middle Ages."
20
10
doctrine ceased to be a serious intellectual principle around the time of the 16th
century Reformations. 21 At that time, Christian theology in the West began to be
based more firmly on authority than reason, even when the two were not seen as
necessarily in conflict with each other. Subsequently, this form of theological
aesthetics remained significant for “spirituality” and poetry but the academic,
systematic, and philosophically rigorous development of the concept largely
passed away until the 20th century; or so the standard scholarly accounts would
have it. 22
In 1533, Ignatius of Loyola presented what has been called the final stage in the
development of the doctrine in his Spiritual Exercises (Balthasar, Seeing the Form, 367, 373-80).
21
The work of any popular writer in “spirituality” from the late medieval period to today
confirms this observation. The writings of many figures make allusions to “spiritual sense”
throughout the modern period but these are usually not developed as philosophical doctrines but
are taken over with a kind of pious naiveté from Scripture to describe experience. Furthermore,
other modern uses of “spiritual sensation” tend to be directed toward practical theology and
personal piety. Spiritual sensation is often used to “prove” conversion or right relationship with
God but more rarely informs an account of speculative, theoretical, knowledge as well, as is the
case in adherents of what is here identified as the spiritual senses tradition. Christian poetry and
hymnody continues to use imagery adapted from the senses regularly but usually in an uncritical
naïve way. On this point see Geoffrey Wainwright and Karen B. Westerfield Tucker, eds. The
Oxford History of Christian Worship (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). On the (relative)
lack of development in the doctrine after the Reformation period, see Balthasar, Seeing the Form,
365-80; Olphe-Galliard “Les sens spirituels”; A. Poulain, The Graces of Interior Prayer, trans. Daniel
Considine, 6th ed. (London, 1910); Bernard McGinn, "The Language of Inner Experience in
Christian Mysticism," Spiritus 1 (2001): 156-71; Karl Rahner, "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses
in the Middle Ages”; and Sarah Coakley, "The Resurrection and the 'Spiritual Senses': On
Wittgenstein, Epistemology, and the Risen Christ," in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Gender
and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 130-152. The argument of this dissertation is
not that Smith is unique in his move to reconstruct the doctrine of the spiritual senses with
intellectual rigor during the early modern period. Rather, the argument is that he is notable for
22
11
Nonetheless, the fact that this account has been overstated can be shown,
in part, by analyzing the use of the doctrine in the early modern period by John
Smith, as supplemented by the work of other Cambridge Platonists. Review of
the texts this group has left to us, as well as those deeply influenced by them,
such as John Wesley (1703-91) and Jonathan Edwards (1703-58), reveals that it is
precisely their insistence on “spiritual apprehension” that enables them to
maintain a traditional theology even while accepting some of the findings of
modern science and philosophy. 23 The findings of the physical sciences are the
result of the rational interpretation of the data of physical sensation while the
findings of theology are the result of the rational interpretation (or illumination)
of the data of spiritual sensation. 24 The two are not ultimately in conflict for
having done so and that both scholars of Cambridge Platonism and the spiritual senses have
overlooked this.
The phrase “spiritual apprehension” is Coolman’s (Knowing God by Experience). I use
the terms “modern” and “contemporary” as general descriptors to designate roughly the periods
between the 15th century and the First World War (modern) and between 1918 and today
(contemporary). I use the word “science” in both its classic meaning as a body of knowledge and
also on occasion to describe (anachronistically) the natural philosophy of Smith’s period.
23
In fact, a review of the works of the Cambridge Platonists reveals two broad categories
of “spiritual apprehension.” First, there is a group of texts, especially those by Cudworth and
More, that stress the singular nature of the mind’s perception of divine realities through the
faculty of intelligence or understanding. For these texts, the human mind or soul is intuitively
aware of God through an apprehension of the intellect often discussed on analogy with vision.
This apprehension takes the form of a kind of single spiritual sense in ways reminiscent of
24
12
Smith not because they are separate spheres with their own “truths” (as
Gassendi and Locke were to argue) 25 but because the truth of each is known by
means of a different (sensory) modality. Theology is not a matter of simple
textual, ecclesiastical, or political authority for Smith and the Cambridge
Platonists either. Confirmation of religious views comes through intellectual
encounter with God guaranteed by means of public morality. The doctrine of the
spiritual senses served as an important, though understudied, element in Smith’s
rational philosophy and theology by providing an account of the means by
which purely spiritual realities come to be known.
William of Auxerre’s treatment of the spiritual senses as formally one though materially multiple
(Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 33-45). Particularly interesting are two faculties posited by
More; the Boniform, which senses the Good, and Divine Sagacity, which perceives the truth when
it “sees” it (Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 18-9; Sarah Hutton, “Cambridge
Platonists”). Second, there is a group of texts that speak of multiple spiritual sensations on
analogy with (at least some of) the five physical senses (but always more than a single sensory
modality). This tendency, while found in most of the Cambridge authors to some degree, is
especially clear in the work of Smith and represents the tendency within the school to associate
spiritual understanding with multiple modes of perception and intellection similar to the classic
expressions of the five spiritual senses as found in Origen and others.
Antonia LoLordo, “Descartes’ One Rule of Logic: Gassendi’s Critique of Clear and
Distinct Perceptions,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 no. 1 (2005): 51-72, “Gassendi
on Human Knowledge of the Mind.” Archiv für Geschichte die Philosophie 87 (2005): 1-22, and
Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Neither Gassendi or Locke thought of these spheres as in conflict of course but they do appeal to
different principles for attaining an understanding in each however.
25
13
Smith does not discuss his views on theological aesthetics in extensive
detail in a single location within a text. Not even Smith’s discourse “Of the True
Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge” presents a full account of his
doctrine of spiritual sensation. 26 Since the spiritual senses perform a
methodological and argumentative function within his work, Smith is more
likely simply to use the concept than to explain it at great length.
Two major approaches have been taken in interpreting Smith, and the
Cambridge Platonists as a group; (1) theological and (2) philosophical/scientific.
Understanding the Cambridge Platonists in terms of the history of English
religion, especially the rise of liberalism and toleration, enjoyed a strong
This is not at all unusual. For example, Origen’s important discussions of the topic
range over more than 150 passages scattered throughout his extant works (Hans Urs von
Balthasar, Origen Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, translated by Robert J. Daly
[Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001], 389-92). A. N. Williams’ study of the intellect (and the spiritual
senses for some authors) in the patristic period likewise makes references to many passages
scattered throughout the work of individual authors (and groups of authors) in order to elicit the
“broad patterns” of thought (The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology [Cambridge
University Press, 2007], 20). Coolman’s study of the spiritual senses in William of Auxerre
similarly draws the structure of the doctrine out of separate passages and often treats these out of
sequential order to make the concepts involved clear (Knowing God by Experience). Both Williams
and Coolman however avoid an important problem facing Balthasar's interpretation of Origen by
relating their selected passages to their historical chronology. In this way, they register
development in the thinking of their subjects. Balthasar in contrast tends to read topically
without regard to the effects of time on Origen's theology.
26
14
following among scholars of “two or three generations ago”. 27 Scholars of this
orientation succeeded in bringing to contemporary eyes Smith and his
colleagues’ positive attitude toward the role of reason in matters of faith as well
as religious tolerance but at the expense of the recognition of their theologies as
continuations of a long tradition within Christian thinking. By framing the
Cambridge Platonists in their immediate religious and political context rather
than the longer history of Christian theology, this approach missed the
importance of the role of spiritual sensation in their thought. Furthermore, it
failed to notice the way in which Smith especially reconstructed the doctrine. 28
In contrast, the literature on Smith has focused on too narrow a context for
the idea of spiritual sensation both historically and within Smith’s texts. Tulloch,
for example, notes that Smith’s spiritual sensation is the heart of his theological
A. Rupert Hall, Henry More and the Scientific Revolution Cambridge Science Biographic
Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 59. In many ways, this dissertation has
been inspired by the reappraisal of the Cambridge Platonists as “spiritual” authors marked by
the publishing of Taliaferro and Teply’s volume in the Classics of Western Spirituality series from
Paulist Press.
27
Typical accounts of the Cambridge Platonists as religious figures spend little time
positioning the group within the history of Christian mystical speculation but instead situate
them within the more narrow (and for that reason deceptive) context of the 17th century religion
and politics of Brittan. See for example, Tulloch, Rational Theology, vol. 2, and Geoffrey Philip
Henry Pawson, The Cambridge Platonists and Their Place in Religious Thought (New York: B.
Franklin Reprints, 1974).
28
15
thought but then goes on to discuss the concept in terms of his methodology
only, and even there in only the most summary, cursory way. 29 Pawson too
remarks that Smith attempted to revive the theology of St. John, Clement of
Alexandria, and Origen without detailing how. 30 The scholarship on Smith thus
lacks the depth of treatment and historical breadth of contextualization necessary
to give an accurate account of his thought. By allowing Smith to speak within the
context of the history of theology, and by listening to his complete theological
system, the role of spiritual sensation in his thought will become clear.
More recently, there has been a significant push to understand the
Cambridge Platonists in terms of their involvement with early modern science
and philosophy. This approach makes much of their correspondence with
Descartes, their relationships with the Royal Society, materialism, “atheism,” the
occult, and both (pseudo)empiricism (e.g., Boyle) and rationalism (e.g., Spinoza,
Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 140f. All scholars repeat this pattern when treating Smith’s
thought, though most do not give spiritual sensation as much (albeit, unsupported) credit as
Tulloch. There is a tendency in the literature, perhaps following the lead of Tulloch, to think that
the mere fact that Smith is a “Platonist” explains all that is necessary to know about his
theological epistemology. This attitude seems content to ignore the centuries of Christian
development that Smith also inherits as a Christian theologian and which justifies his use of the
Neoplatonic tradition. In other words, scholars have assumed that there is nothing more to
discuss because they have ignored the development of the Christian doctrine of the spiritual
senses.
29
30
Pawson, The Cambridge Platonists, 35.
16
Leibniz). 31 This approach understandably focuses nearly all of its attention on
those members of the group whose thought extended to scientific and
See for example Hall (Henry More) who makes much of More’s involvement with the
Royal Society, the philosophy of Descartes, and the occult. Rogers, et al. (The Cambridge Platonists
in Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics, and Religion [Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1997]) contains excellent essays on the relationship between the Cambridge Platonists
and contemporary philosophy and science, especially their disputes with Hobbes and Descartes
on the question of mechanical science and materialism (which they at various times and in
differing ways took to be supportive of and a denial of a properly religious worldview
respectively). See also Charles Taliaferro, Evidence and Faith: Philosophy and Religion since the
Seventeenth Century, The Evolution of Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer and Gary Hatfield
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005); J. E. Saveson, "Descartes' Influence on John Smith,
Cambridge Platonist," Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 258-62, and "Differing Reactions to
Descartes among the Cambridge Platonists," Journal of the History of Ideas 31 (1960): 560-7. The
group likely inspired elements of John Locke’s thought via Cudworth’s daughter and Locke
praised Cudworth’s True Intellectual System as a grand compendium of ancient philosophy
(Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 24-5). Newton was deeply impressed by
Cudworth’s System too and copied much of it directly into his own work (Danton B. Sailor,
"Newton's Debt to Cudworth," Journal of the History of Ideas 49 [1988]: 511-7). More, a fellow of the
Royal Society, carried on a correspondence with many leading figures in natural philosophy
including Robert Boyle whose air-pump experiment More (wrongly, or so Boyle himself thought)
took to be evidence of a “spiritual force in the air” (Robert A. Greene, "Henry More and Robert
Boyle on the Spirit of Nature," Journal of the History of Ideas 23 [1962]: 451-70). More’s theory of the
nature of space almost certainly influenced Newton’s ideas of absolute space (J.E. Power, "More
and Newton on Absolute Space," Journal of the History of Ideas 31 [1970]: 289-96). More’s student,
Anne Conway developed a vitalistic philosophy inspired by her teacher’s work in response to
Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza that influenced Leibniz (Carolyn Merchant, "The Vitalism of
Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz's Concept of the Monad," Journal of the History of Philosophy
17 [1979]: 255-68; Anne Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], xxix-xxxiii). The group, especially More,
influenced the idealism of Berkley as well (Serge Hutin, Henry More: Essai sur les doctrines
théosophiques chez les platoniciens de Cambridge [Hildesheim: Gg. Olms, 1966], 197-201). Both
Cudworth and More made a deep impression on the ethical rationalists of the 18th century
through their arguments for “moral faculties” (Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and
Immutable Morality with a Treatise of Freewill, ed. Sarah Hutton, Cambridge Texts in the History of
Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996]; Hutton, "Cambridge Platonists"). In
general, the history of philosophy and science approach to the Cambridge Platonists singles out
Cudworth and More for study and dismisses the rest as (mere) theologians (Hall’s Henry More,
for example, is very clear, and unapologetic, on this point). This is unfortunate and misleading as
31
17
philosophical circles that are still significant in the academy (especially
Cudworth, More, and Norris) at the expense of the religious and literary
contributions of Cambridge Platonists like Smith and his teacher Whichcote.
Thus, the significance of the Cambridge Platonists is often absorbed into the
scholarly question of the rise of modern scientific rationalism out of (purported)
medieval superstition, magic, and mysticism. In other words, this newer
interpretive approach tries to understand the Cambridge Platonists in their full
intellectual context. While this approach has clear advantages over the earlier,
nearly exclusively theological approach, it too has serious limitations in that it
tends to see the theology of these figures as little more than a constraint on their
development as philosophers and scientists even as it notes the theological
inspiration of their philosophical and scientific ideas. 32 The approach also tends
it tends to highlight only those elements of their thought that had lasting philosophic and
scientific impact while downplaying their theological motives and concerns, which were always
the heart of their work. Norris remains significant as a figure in the history of philosophy for
popularizing Malebranche in England and to a lesser extent for his influence on the theology of
Wesley (English, “John Wesley’s Indebtedness”).
This is true of studies on the Cambridge Platonists even when it is no longer indicative
of the best in contemporary work in this area. A prominent recent example can be found in Hall
(Henry More) who portrays More as a misguided (proto)scientist. It might be argued that More’s
scientific errors arise largely because he is approaching his topic (perhaps unconsciously) from
the perspective of a kind of “sensible theology” and not the empirical science gaining ascendancy
in his day, despite his forays into “experimental” work. In other words, perhaps we misread
32
18
to obscure the significance of Smith as a Cambridge Platonist in particular,
despite his undisputed status as a key figure in the movement, since he had only
a peripheral (and far from unique) relationship with the rise of early modern
science. Furthermore, this approach promotes reading the entire group for their
importance in modern science and philosophy more than as figures within a
Christian theological tradition. These tendencies have left Smith understudied in
recent years and have contributed to the less than rigorous treatment of his
theology.
Both of these common approaches tend to see the group from the
perspective of their importance for contemporary thought rather than letting them
emerge out of the theological tradition that was their intellectual home. By
maintaining a doctrine of the spiritual senses, Smith was able to understand
work in science, philosophy, and religion within a larger theological unity. By
making judgments based on the sensory modality equipped to supply
knowledge of physical, mental, and spiritual realities Smith was a scientist,
philosopher, and theologian at the same time. In this way, Smith was like the
More when we read him as a philosopher/scientist rather than as a theologian concerned with
natural (scientific), symbolic (philosophical), and speculative (mystical) theology.
19
great theologians of the spiritual senses tradition before him, and one needs to
grasp this unity in order to understand the particular dimensions of his thought
as parts of a systematic whole.
By means of his doctrine of spiritual sensation, Smith was able to maintain
the reasonableness of his faith. That is, he was able to come to a degree of critical
self-understanding without recourse to a theology like the neo-Aristotelian
systems of the Thomists, or the Protestant Scholastics, both of which ultimately
rest on assent to the authority of the Bible as interpreted by some clerical body or
another. 33 The spiritual senses, as an intellectual faculty, likewise distinguish
Smith’s theology from the “enthusiastic” religion of his day that stressed the
emotional over the rational. 34 By means of his theological aesthetic, Smith sought
to unite the life of the heart and the life of the mind in a single cognitive and
Indeed, Smith was not one to accept anyone’s views on authority alone. As Pawson
puts it, “He made no man’s system his shroud” (Pawson, The Cambridge Platonists and Their Place
in Religious Thought, 34).
33
Luxon has written insightfully on the movement, especially during the Civil War and
its immediate aftermath, of intense experiential religion (with multiple “Christs” and various
prophets) among Puritans especially. Thomas Luxon, “Not I, But Christ: Allegory and the Puritan
Self,” ELH 60 no. 4 (1993): 899-937, and Literal Figures: Puritan Allegory and the Reformation Crisis in
Representation (University of Chicago Press, 1995). See also Richard L. Greaves, and Robert Zaller,
eds. Biographical Dictionary of British Radicals in the Seventeenth Century. 3 vols. (Brighton, Sussex:
Harvester Press, 1983); Joe Lee Davis, “Mystical Versus Enthusiastic Sensibility,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 4 no. 3 (1943): 301-19; and Nigel Smith, Perfection Proclaimed: Language and
Literature in English Radical Religion, 1640-1660, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
34
20
conative spiritual exercise like Plotinus, Origen, Augustine, Bonaventure, and
Nicholas of Cusa had before him.
While the Cambridge Platonists have tended to be portrayed as either
liberal theologians with an eye for the important trends in their culture, or as
proto-scientists or philosophers in the modern/contemporary sense with a
curious allegiance to traditional religion this is an oversimplification that
ironically complicates rather than illuminates our understanding. By treating the
Cambridge Platonists, through the example of Smith, as a development within
the theological tradition of the spiritual senses a much richer understanding of
their work in theology as well as philosophy and science is won.
For this to succeed, we must let Smith speak to us out of his theological
tradition without projecting what might be important to us back onto him. In this
way, we will come to better understand his theology and, by means of it, his role
in the history of the doctrine of the spiritual senses. Thus, this study of the
spiritual senses in the theology of John Smith will shed light on (1) the history of
the doctrine generally by showing its continuing importance in a modern
Protestant theology, (2) Smith’s theology by showing the way in which it came
out of, and carried on, a long Christian tradition, and (3) the relationship
21
between Smith’s theological, philosophical, and scientific thought by showing
this to be dependent on his doctrine of spiritual sensation. That is, to understand
what Smith’s doctrine is we have also to understand what it does rather than
merely read about it in a single location as commentators on his “theological
epistemology” have done. This process of seeing is made possible by
approaching his text holistically with the tradition of spiritual sensation in view.
In order to demonstrate the significance of the spiritual senses for Smith’s
theology this dissertation will first present an overview of the development of
this key concept in Christian mysticism. In this way, it will become possible to
identify how Smith continues and modifies the tradition. This review and
interpretation of the literature will itself make a modest, yet significant,
contribution to the contemporary understanding of the spiritual senses and by
extension mystical theology in general. 35 This study will not completely satisfy
the need for an account of the doctrine throughout its history because it will trace
Indeed, a prominent English language author in the field has said of the spiritual
senses that “there is no in-depth account of this central thread in the history of Christian
mysticism” (McGinn, "The Language of Inner Experience,” 168 n. 4). Mealey agrees, “Taste and
See,” 34.
35
22
the trajectory most important for Smith. 36 However, it does contribute to the
unprecedented resurgence in scholarly attention being paid by theologians and
philosophers reexamine the spiritual senses tradition and the Cambridge
Platonists. 37
Given the role the Cambridge Platonists played in the intellectual life of
their times, and the lasting historical and intellectual significance of the
In addition this project will not give an account of the relationship of “inner sense” to
the spiritual senses tradition. Inner sense is related to, but usually distinct from, the “spiritual
senses.” The philosophical roots of inner sense are in Aristotle where they are the means by
which the perceptions of the external word are apprehended by the mind. The spiritual senses
are sometimes depicted on analogy with the external and the inner senses (Coolman, Knowing
God, 42 n.75). The inner senses are the means by which the perception of the outer and inner
worlds (material and spiritual) is made known. In this sense, one may speak of the spiritual
senses as a kind of inner sense attuned to God’s manifestation in or to the human spirit. The full
relation between neo-Aristotelian inner sense and Neoplatonic spiritual sense remains to be
studied with necessary depth and this dissertation can only hope to contribute to such a future
philosophic study. See Mark Aloysius Gaffney, The Psychology of the Interior Senses (London: B.
Herder Book Co., 1942). A much larger project would be required to make anything like a
definitive study of this issue but it would be an important step in tracing the continuities and
differences in Christian intellectual thought from its beginnings through Kant and to today.
36
For example, Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993), 51-4; Coakley, "The Resurrection and the 'Spiritual Senses'”;
Coolman, Knowing God; Dillon, "Aisthêsis Noêtê”; Carmela Vircillo Franklin, “Words as Food:
Signifying the Bible in the Early Middle Ages,” in Settimane di studio della Fondazione Centro
italiano di studi sull’ alto Medioevo 52, (Spoleto, 2005) 2:733-62; Rachel Fulton, "’Taste and See That
the Lord Is Sweet’ (Ps. 33.9): The Flavor of God in the Monastic West," The Journal of Religion 86,
no. 2 (2005): 169-204; Gavrilyuk and Coakley, The Spiritual Senses; Rosemary Drage Hale, "‘Taste
and See, for God Is Sweet’: Sensory Perception and Memory in Medieval Christian Mystical
Experience," in Vox Mystica: Essays on Medieval Mysticism in Honor of Professor Valerie M. Lagorio,
ed. Anne Clark Barlett (Rochester, NY: D. S. Brewer, 1995); Gordon Rudy, Mystical Language of
Sensation in the Later Middle Ages, Studies in Medieval History and Culture, 14 (New York:
Routledge, 2002); Fabio Massimo Tedoldi, La dottrina dei cinque sensi spirituali in San Bonaventura
(Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1999; and Williams, The Divine Sense.
37
23
innovations of the seventeenth century, the importance of coming to a better
understanding of their theology is clear. Furthermore, there is no better figure for
such a study than Smith who possessed what has been called the “richest and
most beautiful mind” among the Cambridge Platonists. 38 Smith’s has been
praised as “the most considerable work left to us by this Cambridge School,” and
the Select Discourses have been called as great a work in English literature as they
are in theology. 39 Indeed, nearly every commentator gives a glowing appraisal of
Smith’s Discourses in philosophical, theological, and literary terms even while
they relegate him to far briefer exposition than his peers. It is as if the scholars
who have worked with Smith like him, but do not know what to make of him. It
is my contention that the reason for this is a lack of proper perspective. When
Smith is seen in his relationship to the tradition of the spiritual senses the reason
for the significance attributed to him becomes clear.
38
Quoted in Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 29.
Matthew Arnold, “Introduction,” in The Natural Truth of Christianity, ed. W.M. Metcalfe
(London: Alexander Gardiner, 1882), xi, quoted by Taliaferro and Teply, 205 n.173.
39
24
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of two major parts. Part I reviews the history of
the development of the doctrine of the spiritual senses and offer an interpretation
thereof in light of recent scholarship (Chapter Two) and the intellectual milieu by
means of which Smith received the concept from his predecessors and
contemporaries (Chapter Three).
Part II provides a close reading of John Smith’s Select Discourses as
amplified by his intellectual inheritance and the work of his peers at Cambridge.
Chapter Four presents Smith’s employment of the spiritual senses in his account
of the source of and methods for appropriating theological knowledge. Chapter
Five outlines the role played by the spiritual senses in Smith’s account of the
Christian life. Chapter Six demonstrates how the spiritual senses hold Smith’s
theology together in a coherent system of thought.
A concluding seventh chapter picks up where the preceding extended
section of textual exegesis leaves off with an analytical summary and
reconstruction of Smith’s doctrine of the spiritual senses. Also, the influence of
Smith, and particularly his doctrine of the spiritual senses, on future figures is
reviewed, including Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, the British Romantics,
25
American Transcendentalists, and twentieth century scholars like Rufus Jones
and William Ralph Inge. The dissertation closes with prospects for future
research and an Appendix gives the organization of the Select Discourses across
published editions.
PART I
CHAPTER 2: THE SPIRITUAL SENSES TRADITION
I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I
will proclaim the name of the LORD before thee; and
will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will
show mercy on whom I will show mercy. And he
said, Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no
man see me, and live.
Exodus 33:19-20, KJV
O taste and see that the LORD is good.
Psalm 34:8, KJV
Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.
Matthew 5:8, KJV
For just as in the body there are different sense of
tasting and seeing, so are there, as Solomon says,
divine faculties of perception.
Origen, Commentary on John 20, 33
And hence, having no spiritual senses, no inlets of
spiritual knowledge, the natural man recieveth not
the things of the Spirit of God.
John Wesley, “Awake, Thou that Sleepest”
(Ser. 3, I.11)
27
2.1 The ‘Spiritual Senses’: The Contours of a Paradox
Sensory language has been used to describe the encounter between
humanity and God across every era of Christian history (patristic, medieval, and
modern) and on every branch of the Christian family tree (Eastern, Orthodox,
Catholic, Anglican, and Protestant). From the very beginning of Christian
thought, we find references that seem to suggest a capacity for the non-physical
perception of divine realities. This apparently paradoxical notion is, most
broadly speaking, what is usually meant by the term “spiritual sense(s)” in
philosophical and theological discourse. 1 The language of spiritual sense can
See for example, Karl Rahner, "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in the Middle Ages,"
in Theological Investigations, 16 (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 104-34 and Coolman, Knowing
God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre (Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 2004). The most basic characteristic of the spiritual senses,
its sensory and noetic quality, is also found across religious traditions in various manifestations.
On the noetic aspects of the spiritual senses according to Origen see Robert J. Hauck, “Like a
Gleaming Flash”: Matthew 6:22-23, Luke 11:34-36 and the Divine Sense in Origen, Anglican
Theological Review 88, no. 4 (2006): 557-73. While further comparative study of this phenomenon is
warranted, this dissertation will make a more modest and textually based argument within the
single religious tradition of Christianity. While attention will be paid to the Christian tradition of
the spiritual senses – especially as developed in the Latin West and eventually the AngloGermanic North and far western New World – no study of this concept can avoid some degree of
cross-cultural study. The roots of the concept are found in the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament,
Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Significant developments in Jewish and Islamic thought further
influenced the medieval Christian discussion of the spiritual senses from “outside” the tradition
as well (Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic
Texts," The Harvard Theological Review 28, no. 2 [1935]: 69-133). Specifically, this study will explore
the doctrine of the spiritual senses in its historical trajectory from Origen in the third to John
Smith in the 17th century. In this respect, while the dissertation aims to supply a much-needed
general account of the history of the doctrine such an account will not be complete. The full
intellectual history of the spiritual senses remains to be written. For now, this dissertation aims to
1
28
make a certain kind of rhetorical or literary sense in isolation but its reference to
a stable object or “doctrine” can be seen only in the history of such language. 2 As
Dillon has alerted us, the deep philosophical roots of Christian theological
aesthetics go back at least as far as Plato. 3
While this dissertation is focused on a very specific appropriation and
development of the expressly Christian tradition of the spiritual senses, the
phenomenon can be found across the major world religions as well as across the
centuries of philosophical and theological speculation. 4 Indeed, the place of
contribute to that goal by demonstrating the continuing significance of the doctrine beyond the
commonly accepted time of its demise as an intellectual principle.
The present chapter can offer only a taste of the full extent of the literature on the
spiritual senses. I hope to publish a (nearly) complete bibliography on the theme in the near
future that will represent the range of texts I have consulted. Here however I make mention only
of those texts that I have explicitly used to construct my arguments. It should also be noted that
the overall plan of this chapter predates the work of Gavrilyuk and Coakley on the spiritual
senses. Where I have followed these or other authors directly is clearly indicated in the text
and/or notes to follow.
2
On the Platonic roots see, John Dillon, "Aisthêsis Noêtê: A Doctrine of Spiritual Senses
in Origen and Plotinus," n Hellenica et Judaica: Hommage a Valentin Nikiprowetzky, ed. A Caquot, M.
Hadas-Lebel and J. Riaud (Leuven: Peeters, 1986), 443-55. The ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead for
example asks the gods to give senses like their own to the deceased human’s soul (Eva von
Dassow, Ogden Goelet, and Carol Andrews, The Egyptian Book of the Dead, the Book of Going Forth
by Day: The Papyrus of Ani and the Balance of Chapters from the Theban Recension, translated by
Raymond Faulkner (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1998), Chapter 1, Plate 6.).
3
Eckel has noted sensory imagery related to religious understanding in a Buddhist
context (Malcolm David Eckel, To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). On the Eastern Orthodox Christian vision of divine
light, see Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, translated by members of
4
29
sensation and sensuality is an important growing area of comparative study. The
recent collection of essays Perceiving the Divine through the Human Body alone
catalogues Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, and Christian varieties of “spiritual
sensation” in the broadest sense. 5
Nevertheless, the critical understanding of the Christian tradition of the
spiritual senses requires the examination of a topic that has yet to have its full
the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius (London, 1957). The Hindu Yoga Sutra of Patañjali (2nd
century BCE) speaks of the development of “prescience” and “higher hearing, touch, vision, taste,
and smell” that reveal the “subtle” and the “remote, and the past and future” as well as
sensations of the divine in modes analogous to the five physical senses (Yoga Sutra 3.35 in
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and Charles A. Moore, eds. A Sourcebook of Indian Philosophy [Princeton
University Press, 1957], 475). The enigmatic Daoist classic the Daodejing also speaks of a kind of
sight, hearing, and touch of the Dao that goes beyond normal sense perception (Daodejing, 14 in
Wing-Tsit Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy [Princeton University Press, 1963] 146).
Mystical vision and experience of “Divine light” is a common element in Jewish and Islamic
thought as well. On mystical perception in Judaism, see Moshe Idel, Ascensions on High in Jewish
Mysticism: Pillars, Lines, Ladders Pasts Incorporated, V. 2. (Budapest; New York: Central European
University Press, 2005); Peter Schäfer, The Hidden and Manifest God: Some Major Themes in Early
Jewish Mysticism, Suny Series in Judaica (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992); and
Gershom Gerhard Scholem, Jewish Mysticism in the Middle Ages (New York: Judaica Press, 1964).
For studies of mystical perception in Islam, see Alexander D Knysh, Islamic Mysticism: A Short
History, Themes in Islamic Studies, 1 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000), and Wolfson, "The Internal
Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts." Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and
Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi's Kuzari, SUNY Series in Jewish
Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000) discusses mystical perception
in a comparative Jewish and Islamic context.
Thomas Cattoi, and June McDaniel, eds., Perceiving the Divine Through the Human Body:
Mystical Sensuality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
5
30
history written. 6 This chapter seeks to present a kind of schematic first draft of
such a history. By laying bare the contours it will later become possible to see
John Smith’s place within, and his contributions to, this tradition in the chapters
to follow.
Introduction to the Paradox
Already in the Hebrew Bible we find the invitation to “taste and see that
the Lord is good,” as though immaterial things such as God and goodness could
be “tasted” or “seen.” 7 The Christian (New) Testament only multiplies this use of
sensory language by connecting purity of heart to the vision of God. 8 Paul speaks
both of seeing God “face to face” and of seeing “the glory of the Lord as in a
On this see Bernard McGinn, "The Language of Inner Experience in Christian
Mysticism," Spiritus 1 (2001): 156-71. Also, Mark T. Mealey, “Taste and See that the Lord is Good:
John Wesley in the Christian Tradition of Spiritual Sensation” (PhD diss., University of St.
Michael’s College, 2006), 30, 34, 20-49.
6
Psalm 34: 8. On the central place of the Bible in the spiritual senses tradition see Mealey,
“Taste and See,” 38-41.
7
8
Matthew 5: 8.
31
mirror.” 9 Elsewhere, we read of smelling the aroma of Christ and even touching
the divine Word. 10
All of this language, and there are numerous additional examples, raises
obvious questions in light of the equally well attested notion that God cannot be
“seen” as well as the obvious fact that unlike his first disciples, we can no longer
encounter Jesus Christ in his physical, earthly, form. 11 What, then, can these
descriptions of a purportedly sensory experience of the Divine possible mean?
It is logically possible to interpret talk of “spiritual sense” in at least three
broad ways. One might take a dismissive attitude to such talk and read it as mere
nonsense. This might include reading this language literally, and in the process
raising the apparent problems of outright heresy as well as further issues related
to the exact composition of these “senses” and their relationship to the physical
senses. 12 One might understand spiritual sensation as a metaphorical reference to
9
1 Corinthians 13: 12; 2 Corinthians 2:18.
10
2 Corinthians 2: 15; 1 John 1: 1.
Exodus 33: 19-20. On the role of the senses in making an otherwise absent Christ
present to the Christian in the Gospel of John see Dorothy Lee, “The Gospel of John and the Five
Senses,” Journal of Biblical Literature 129, no. 1 (2010): 115-27, especially, 125-7.
11
Anthropomorphites have long been considered Christian heretics. See Irenaeus, Against
Heresies 2:13:3 in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, ed. Philip Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
2005, accessed 19 May 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01.ix.iii.xiv.html.
12
32
some otherwise well-known faculty such as the intellect. Finally, one may read
the “spiritual senses” as analogous in some non-literal yet meaningful way to the
physical senses and in the process raise difficult further questions about just
what this might mean, and again, how these are related to the rest of our
perceptual and noetic faculties. 13
Many authors throughout Christian history have tried to explore the
meaning of spiritual sense secure in the notion that, whatever else might be
rightly said, it is meaningful and useful to do so, despite the obvious issues this
raises. Passages such as the epigraphs that opened this chapter are prime
examples of a nearly two-thousand year old tendency in Christian thought and
letters to speak of what we might today call “religious or spiritual experiences”
in terms borrowed from everyday sense perception. This kind of language can be
found in Patristic exegesis and apologetics, 14 medieval monasticism, 15 the
Hauck, for example, makes a convincing case for an analogical use of this language in
Origen (“Like a Gleaming Flash,” 573). On these potential meanings, expressed in terms of
definitions of key terms see Mealey, “Taste and See,” 34-43. While we cover the same territory
Mealey’s approach of offering definitions of terms like “images of sensation,” and “philosophical,”
and “theological” categories is problematic because they these terms (or their equivalents) are
also used by the authors in the tradition in their own ways. By defining them ahead of time, and
injecting a modern (though ultimately Thomistic) distinction between philosophy and theology
Mealey projects perhaps as much as he illuminates here.
13
For example, Origen, Commentaria in Epistulam B. Pauli ad Romans, 4. 5 (PG 14. 977D978A) and Augustine, Confessiones, X.27.38 (CCL 27). Also noteworthy are early examples of the
14
33
treatises of the schoolmen, 16 the hymnody of the early Methodists, 17 the
contemporary work of theologians, 18 philosophers of religion, 19 priests, pastors,
and patriarchs. 20 In fact, once one begins to look, the spiritual senses appear to be
a very common theme in the history of Christian thought.
use of the spiritual senses in spirituality. See, Sebastian Brock, The Luminous Eye: The Spiritual
World Vision of Saint Ephrem (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1992), 27-9, 38-9, 46-51, and
67-84.
For example, Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermo de diversis, 10. 2-4, in Jean Leclerq, et al., eds.,
Sancti Bernardi opera (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957-1977), VI.I: 122-4. Also, Rachel Fulton,
“’Taste and See that the Lord is Sweet’ (Ps. 33:9): The Flavor of God in the Monastic West,” The
Journal of Religion 86, no. 2 (2005): 169-204.
15
See, for example, the work of B. T. Coolman on William of Auxerre (Knowing God by
Experience), “Alexander of Hales,” in Paul L. Gavrilyuk, and Sarah Coakley, eds., The Spiritual
Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 12139, and “Thomas Gallus,” op. cit., 140-58.
16
See the hymns of Charles and John Wesley in A Collection of Hymns for the Use of the
People Called Methodists (London, 1781). One need look no further than the 7th and 8th stanzas of
the first hymn for prime examples. Cited by Mark T. Mealey, “John Wesley,” in Gavrilyuk and
Coakley, 243.
17
For example, Sarah Coakley, "The Resurrection and the 'Spiritual Senses': On
Wittgenstein, Epistemology, and the Risen Christ," in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Gender
and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 130-52.
18
William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993). Alston’s approach has recently been given new life in the work of
Wesley Wildman (Religious and Spiritual Experiences [Cambridge University Press, 2011]) as well
as being featured in William J. Abraham’s “Analytic Philosophers of Religion,” in Gavrilyuk and
Coakley, 275-90, especially 281-4.
19
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, “Song and Space: Art, Architecture, and Liturgy,”
in Encountering the Mystery: Understanding Orthodox Christianity Today (New York: Doubleday,
2008) for example, makes reference to hearing, seeing, and touching the “word of life” (31). The
20
34
What makes the language of spiritual sensation noteworthy is, therefore,
not its rarity but its apparently paradoxical nature within Christian thought. The
qualification of Moses being granted a view of God’s “back” 21 notwithstanding,
the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions have all been eager to maintain the
impossibility of seeing God. This originally distinguished the people of Israel from
their neighbors, who could gaze upon idols thought to make present their
various Gods and Goddesses. 22 Christian tradition has long maintained that an
exception of sorts exists in the person of Jesus Christ who has seen God, because
he is of, from, and for God’s purposes in the Incarnation of God’s Logos. 23
first encyclical letter issued by Pope Francis, Lumen Fidei, makes explicit use of various images of
“spiritual sensation” (especially vision) throughout. English translation: The Light of Faith (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2013).
Exodus 33: 23. The notion that Moses spoke to God “face to face” (Exodus 33: 11) is
another interesting (potential) challenge but this was nearly always interpreted allegorically or
symbolically rather than literally since it would suggest that God has a physical face. On this in
the Patristic period see Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the
Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 101-10.
21
At least in theory, if not in practice. See, for example, Judith M. Hadley, The Cult of
Asherah in Ancient Israel and Judah: Evidence for a Hebrew Goddess (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
22
23
John 1:18; 1: 14.
35
However, we are told by this same Jesus that “the pure in heart . . . will see
God.” 24
The Christian tradition of understanding God as non-physical, and
beyond human comprehension, appears to stand in deep conflict therefore with
the notion that one may “see” or otherwise perceive God in any way
(metaphorical or literal). This theological constraint makes it all the more
surprising that one can find such language so often in Christian texts, from the
Bible itself, through the musings of theologians, and the poetry of the
hymnodists. If God is non-physical, and thus non-sensible, there should not be
any of the talk about sensing God that one finds in the history of Christian
thought.
Interpretive Options
So, the affirmation of spiritual sensation – the perception of divine and
therefore (apparently) imperceptible things – entails the paradox of “seeing” the
God who remains always unseen and indeed invisible. One might take our first
Matthew 5: 8. While it might be argued that it makes sense for the divine Logos and
Son of the Father to see God, an extension of God’s self-perception. This on its own however does
little to account for the apparent conflict between the human vision of God being impossible
(Exodus 33) and the vision of God being promised to the pure in heart.
24
36
logical option and dismiss all talk of the perception of spiritual realities as
basically meaningless. This potential meaninglessness would arise from a
contradiction between the prohibition on sensing God and the assertion to do
just that. With such a reading what we have been calling a “paradox” descends
into the realm of outright foolishness. Such a view, however, would seem to rest
on the willful ignorance of the ubiquity of such language in Christian texts from
the biblical witness onward even up to our day. 25 If meaningless, then why such
persistence? Likewise, why is this language so often used both in prayer, liturgy,
popular devotion and academic theology? The spiritual senses are appealed to, it
would seem, too often to be meaningless or arbitrary. Thus, this option has not
been taken seriously by theologians (or most scholars in general). For this reason,
we will not entertain this possibility further.
Perhaps then, as a second possibility, such language is metaphorical or
poetic? That is to say, it may be that spiritual sensation is not meaningless but
that it has a basically different meaning from the literal meaning this language
conveys. For example, when we say in modern English that we “see what you
mean” we do not mean that another person’s meaning is actually visible to us.
On this see, for example, John Eudes Bamberger, “Thomas Merton: Reflections on the
Way of Prayer,” Cistercian Studies Quarterly 45.1 (2010): 83-4.
25
37
We do not really “see” in this case but rather we understand. In this same way,
many authors throughout Christian history have made use of the language of the
senses to describe what is in fact a matter of intellection rather than perception.
For example, William Wainwright has argued that John Smith’s “spiritual
senses” are a kind of intellectual intuition. 26 As we will see in chapter four below,
this reading of Smith is limited and overly simplistic, but more to the point here
altogether too much has been made of the distinction between spiritual sense as
metaphor for intellection, as in the case of Thomas Aquinas, and the analogical
use of such language to refer to a kind of spiritual capacity for spiritual
perception, as in the case of Origen. 27 In fact, it is difficult to imagine why
William J. Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and his Puritan Predecessors,” in
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 229-31, 240.
26
See Richard Cross, “Thomas Aquinas,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 174-89. Also, Peter
Dillard, “Keeping the Vision: Aquinas and the Problem of Disembodied Beatitude,” New
Blackfriars 93 no. 1046 (2012): 397-411. Most of Origen’s primary texts on the spiritual senses are
conveniently collected and extracted under topic headings in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Origen
Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daly (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
2001). Important secondary sources on Origen’s doctrine of spiritual sensibility include: Hans Urs
von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, 1; Seeing the Form, (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1982), 367-71; Robert M. Berchman, From Philo to Origen: Middle Platonism in
Transition (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984); L. Boeve, and Laurence Paul Hemming, eds.,
Divinising Experience: Essays in the History of Religious Experience from Origen to Ricœur, Studies in
Philosophical Theology, 23 (Leuven; Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004); Henri Crouzel, Origen: The Life
and Thought of the First Great Theologian, trans. A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1989); Jean
Daniélou, Origen, trans. W. Mitchell (London: Sheed & Ward, 1955); György Heidl, Origen's
Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of the History of Origenism (Louaize, Lebanon;
Piscataway, NJ: University of Notre Dame; Gorgias Press, 2003); Karl Rahner, "The Spiritual
27
38
language originally used for perception would be employed to describe
intellection unless there is something very much like perception going on in the
process of thinking. Indeed, it may be that intellection involves, or can plausibly
be conceived of as involving, intellectual intuition. 28
More interesting than the metaphorical interpretation of spiritual
sensation is a third approach, more suitable to some authors and some texts than
to others, which identifies such language as descriptions not of otherwise wellknown functions of the mind or soul, but rather of some capacity (or capacities)
that are literally spiritually sensate. That is, in some cases the intent truly does
seem to be to indicate a capacity for experiencing spiritual realities (i.e., God,
grace, love, etc.) via a faculty or power analogous to one or more of the five
Senses According to Origen," in Theological Investigations, 16: 81-103 (New York: Seabury Press,
1979); John M. Rist, Eros and Psyche; Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen, Phoenix: Journal of the
Classical Association of Canada, Supplementary Vol. 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1964); A. Tripolitis, The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen (New York: Libra
1978); A. N. Williams, The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007). In addition to these important sources nearly all studies on the spiritual
senses discuss Origen to some extent and typically record his influence on future theologians too.
Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and His Puritan Predecessors,” 224-40. Intellectual
intuition becomes philosophically suspect with the success of Kant’s critical philosophy in the
late eighteenth century. However, for this reason, a Kantian standard in epistemology is
anachronistic in the treatment of nearly all the figures dealt with here. A constructive defense of
the spiritual senses in light of modern philosophy must await future research. However, the
continued presence of active interest in employing the spiritual senses in one form or another (see
the remains of this chapter) gives the lie to the notion that such talk is without merit after Kant.
28
39
physical senses. 29 For example, as we will see in greater detail below, Origen of
Alexandria argued that the spiritual senses are an additional faculty (or set of
faculties) beyond the usual physical senses, and perhaps intellect as well. 30
2.2 Diversity in Language, Use and Meaning
Unlike determinate loci in Christian doctrine, such as the Incarnation,
there is little stable or unified vocabulary in the discussion of the “spiritual
senses” when the tradition is taken as a whole. In fact, many authors, such as
I restrict my analysis to those theories that posit between one and five spiritual senses
(following Balthasar and recent scholarly practice) and will not go into the speculations about up
to twelve discussed by Fabio Massimo Tedoldi (La dottrina dei cinque sensi spirituali in San
Bonaventura [Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1999]). This move is justified by the
fact that it is the versions of the doctrine that speak of either one sense (usually “spiritual vision”)
or as many as five (matching the physical senses) that have had the greatest historical impact and
is represented in the classic texts in the history of Christian thought. That these “classics” are
such only now in hindsight in no way diminishes their importance. While Smith and the
Cambridge Platonists tend to make explicit reference to ancient Greek authors more than
medieval Latin ones the fact remains that their religious heritage is Western and Latin more than
it is Eastern and Greek. As Protestants in seventeenth century England their religious view point
owes much to the trajectory or development that passes through Augustine, the medieval
synthesis of Bonaventure (and in a negative sense Thomas), and the speculations of the
Renaissance humanists and Reformers of the Church (Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, etc.). Smith
therefore relies explicitly on Plotinus and the Alexandrian theologians but he also references the
“Schoolmen” of his own, Latin, tradition (see, for example, Smith, Select Discourses [1660], 126).
Smith reads his ancient sources through the tradition of interpretation in the Latin West. This
interpretation will be argued for throughout the dissertation. For an under used example of more
than five senses see J. Homer Herriott, “The Ten Senses in the Siete Partidas,” Hispanic Review 20
no. 4 (1952): 269-81.
29
For more on this issue see the discussion in Derek Michaud, “The Patristic Roots of
John Smith’s ‘True Way of Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge,’” in Cattoi and McDaniel,
141-58 and Mark J. McInroy, “Origen of Alexandria,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 20-35.
30
40
Pseudo-Dionysius, do not explicitly speak of “spiritual sense” (or their cognates)
at all. This does not mean however that they have nothing to say on the topic of
spiritual perception. 31 This lack of a unified vocabulary has not kept scholars
from identifying a common concern and even threads of recurring terminology
around the basic idea of non-physical sensation of divine realities however.
There is currently a fairly stable, if complex and sometimes contested,
scholarly vocabulary about the spiritual senses, especially, but not only, around
the interpretation of the primary texts in the tradition. The spiritual senses have
generally been treated as having implications for various issues in philosophy
(epistemology and metaphysics especially) and theology (Christology,
anthropology, etc.). As we will see below, since at least Poulain in the early 20th
century through the most recent work on the spiritual senses the consensus
among theologians and philosophers of religion is that the spiritual senses are
best understood as analogous to the physical senses.
While much work in recent years has been analytical or exegetical, and to
that extent not explicitly constructive of a contemporary doctrine of spiritual
After all, one may use the idea of physical sense without making literal or explicit
reference to vision, touch, taste, smell or hearing. Consider: “Hey, do you know where my keys
are? Oh, never mind. I found them right here.”
31
41
sensation, there have also been notable figures who have drawn on the notion to
inform their own systematic work in theology and the philosophy of religion. For
example, Hans Urs von Balthasar made extensive use of his impressive analytical
and exegetical work on the spiritual senses in his own theological aesthetics. 32
Balthasar’s aesthetic has stimulated a great deal of work in a revitalized Roman
Catholic emphasis on theological aesthetics and the birth of a self-consciously
aesthetic approach in Protestant theology as well. 33 Additionally, the philosopher
William Alston developed his “theory of appearing” into a theory of divine
perception in response to the evidence from the history of mystical or spiritual
experience. 34
The terms “spiritual sense(s)” and “spiritual sensation” have been used in
a large variety of ways that involve either sensibility in general or a particular
(physical) sense – sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch – suitability qualified or
modified by terms such as spirit, soul, heart, mind or intellect, inner, or faith.
32
See McInroy, “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 257-74.
See Oleg V. Bychkov and James Fodor, eds., Theological Aesthetics after von Balthasar
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008).
33
William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1999).
34
42
This broad categorial use of “spiritual sense” as an “umbrella term” is reflected
in the work of Gavrilyuk and Coakley and constitutes an advance in scholarly
consensus over the past century or so. 35
Origen of Alexandria is usually credited with initiating the “spiritual
senses tradition.” He speaks often of “spiritual senses” but also of “inner sense”
as well as other formulations consistent with the general theme of spiritual
perception. That is, the noetic perception of spiritual realities not the physical
perception of disembodied spirits (or ghosts). In fact, although Rudy has recently
challenged accepted scholarly consensus on this issue, 36 Origen is best seen as
arguing for a distinctly immaterial, spiritual sensory capacity which is analogous
to the physical senses but which requires withdrawal from the physical world for
its activation in the noetic, spiritual realm. 37
A degree of openness or vagueness in the definition of spiritual sense is necessary if we
are to speak of a “tradition.” After all, things change over time and in each author or even text.
Therefore, to see the whole requires a general approach capable of registering the common
themes across the differences. It is with this breadth of reference that the term “spiritual sense(s)”
is used here.
35
Gordon Rudy, Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages, Studies in
Medieval History and Culture, 14 (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-15.
36
Rahner, “The ‘Spiritual Senses’ According to Origen,” 89; Mark J. McInroy, “Origen of
Alexandria,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 20-35; and Michaud, “The Patristic Roots,” 144-50.
37
43
A common source of complication, and often confusion, arises from the
Aristotelian language of “inner sense.” This inner sense is often identified with
the “common sense” of Aristotle’s De Anima, De Partibus Animalium, and De
Memoria et Reminiscentia which is thought to unite the objects of the different
sensory modalities to give a unified object of judgment to the understanding. 38
Confusion about Origen’s “spiritual sense” (sometimes called “inner sense” to
mark it is a function of the “inner man” rather than the carnally minded and
bodily “outer man”) and “inner sense” in Aristotelian psychology reached a peak
in the medieval West 39 but the two were seen by most as distinct faculties,
See Pavel Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011). Also, Miira Tuominen, “Common Sense and phantasia in Antiquity,” in Sourcebook for the
History of the Philosophy of Mind, S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, eds. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 10729.
38
Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 1-3; Paul l. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley,
“Introduction,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 14. On the role of the inner and outer senses in
medieval mysticism see, Niklaus Largier, “Inner Senses – Outer Senses: The Practice of Emotions
in Medieval Mysticism,” in Codierungen von Emotionen im Mittelalter/Emotions and Sensibilties in the
Middle Ages, ed. C. Stephen Jaeger and Andrea Kasten (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter,
2003), 3-15. On the inner senses in medieval philosophy see, Simo Knuuttila and Pekka
Kärkkäinen, “Medieval Theories of Internal Senses,” in Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy
of Mind, S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, eds. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 131-45. On Cartesian
developments of the medieval tradition see Lucian Petrescu, “Descartes and the Internal Senses:
On Memory and Remembrance,” in Branching Off: The Early Moderns in Quest of the Unity of
Knowledge, ed. Vlad Alexandrescu (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2009), 116-39.
39
44
however some, such as Nicholas of Cusa, sought to amalgamate them. 40 Notable
approaches to the spiritual senses, whether or not they include “inner senses,”
include the following. 41
Spiritualized Senses
Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor both make little explicit use
of the term “spiritual senses” (΅ΗΌΗΉΖȱΔΑΉΙΐ΅ΘΎ) while also clearly
speaking of the perception (in a broad or analogous sense) of divine things. 42 For
example, Gregory of Nyssa has his Macrina refer to the “eyes of the soul” in
On Cusa see, Garth W. Green, “Nicholas of Cusa,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 211-5. On
medieval inner sense see Harry Austryn Wolfson, "Maimonides on the Internal Senses," Jewish
Quarterly Review N.S. 25 (1935), and "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew
Philosophic Texts."; Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 43, 48, 134; Nicholas H. Steneck,
“Albert the Great on the Classification and Localization of the Internal Senses,” Isis 65 no. 2 (1974):
193-211. See also Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (New York:
Zone Books, 2009).
40
41
For a definitional approach to much the same territory see Mealey, “Taste and See,” 34-
43.
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 5; Sarah Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa,” in
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 36-55; Frederick D. Aquino, “Maximus the Confessor,” in Gavrilyuk and
Coakley, 104-120. See also A.S. Evans, “The Mind Sees: Spiritual Senses in Gregory of Nyssa’s de
anima et de resurrection” (Undergraduate Thesis, Harvard College, 2002) and Natalie M. Carnes,
“Senses of Beauty” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2011), ch. 4. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus in
Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light
We Shall See Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 83.
42
45
relation to thinking in his De anima et resurrection. 43 Likewise, over a century later,
Maximus too speaks of “divine perception” through the “eyes of the mind.” 44
Unlike Origen before them, Gregory and Maximus do not see the spiritual senses
in opposition to the natural physical senses. For both the spiritual senses are the
culmination of the life of piety and asceticism. 45 In fact, as Sarah Coakley has
convincingly argued Gregory came to see the spiritual senses as a transformation
of the physical senses. 46 This anticipates the spirituality of the Hesychast Gregory
Palamas (1296/7-1359), and since then, Eastern Orthodoxy more generally. 47 The
PG 46.28L; The Soul and the Resurrection, trans. and intro. Catharine P. Roth (Crestwood,
NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1993), 34.
43
Mystagogia XXIII 2, 36-7, in Selected Writings, trans. George C. Berthold (New York;
Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985), 204-5.
44
45
Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa” and Aquino, “Maximus the Confessor,” 104-5.
46
Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa.”
The perception of grace was defined as doctrine in the East between 1341 and 1351 and
as remained central to Orthodox spirituality since. John Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas,
trans. George Lawrence (London: Faith Press, 1964), 42-62, 94-101. Interestingly, the renewal of
interest in pagan Platonism in the Greek East that preceded and directly informed the growth of
Renaissance Platonism was itself a reaction to the Hesychast movement. Against the view of
Palamas that one may see the “uncreated light” as the disciples did at the Transfiguration of Jesus
(Matthew 17:1–9, Mark 9:2-8, Luke 9:28–36) with one’s physical eyes figures such as Barlaam of
Calabria (c.1290-1348), Gregory Akindynos (c.1300-1348), and later Georgius Gemistus Plethon
(c.1355–1452/1454) argued on the authority of the ancient Platonic tradition that to literally “see”
God was foolishness. This “Hesychast Controversy” raged through the middle of the fourteenth
century with the view of Palamas eventually winning out. However, the opposition that the
Palamites focused led to intensified study of the pre-Christian religion and philosophy of late
antiquity. By the time of the Council of Ferrara/Florence (1431-49) when Plethon taught Platonic
47
46
seriousness with which these and other theologians treated the implications of
the Incarnation for a positive appraisal of the human body led them to see the
spiritual senses as amplifications of natural powers of perception and
understanding. The physical is deified and transformed rather than given up. 48
Sensus Spirituales
Medieval Western authors developed a more stable vocabulary for
spiritual perception focused around the Latin term sensus spirituales. Figures such
as, famously, Bonaventure, made use of the concept in their commentaries,
treatises, and mystical works. 49 We will see the uses to which Bonaventure put
philosophy to the likes of Cosimo de' Medici (1389-1464) the stage was set for the Florentine
Academy of Ficino, Poliziano, Landino, Pico, and de' Becchi, which in turn helped to inspire the
rebirth of Platonism in England that led to the “Cambridge Platonists.” See Niketas Siniossoglou,
Radical Platonism in Byzantium: Illumination and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 93-124. On the Platonic tradition in seventeenth century England
generally see Sarah Hutton, “Introduction to the Renaissance and Seventeenth Century,” in
Platonism and the English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 67-75.
A similar transformation of the bodily senses is discussed in a radically different
cultural context by Nancy E. Van Deusen in “Reading the Body: Mystical Theology and Spiritual
Actualization in Early Seventeenth –Century Lima,” Journal of Religious History 33, no. 1 (2009): 127. On the development of the cult of relics and icons, another way in which the physical senses
become spiritualized, see Patricia Cox Miller, The Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late
Ancient Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
48
On Bonaventure’s doctrine of the spiritual senses see: Hans Urs von Balthasar, The
Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, 1; Seeing the Form (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982),
371-3; The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, 2, Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles (San
49
47
his understanding of the spiritual senses below. By his day other early scholastic
thinkers had made extensive, systematic, use of the spiritual senses too.
For example, William of Auxerre developed notions of spiritual sense in
his discussion of the Beatific Vision. 50 “The delight by which we delight in God
will not only be in love, but also in vision.” 51 Moreover, William used the
spiritual senses to account for symbolic theology, perceiving God’s effects in the
world 52 as well as in mystic theology to explain perception of God’s effects
within the soul. 53 Even the sacrament of the Eucharist was imagined as an
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 315-26; J. G. Bougerol, "Sensus spirituals," in Lexique Saint
Bonaventure, ed. J.G. Bougerol (Paris, 1969), 117-8; Christopher M. Cullen, Bonaventure (Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Stephen Fields, "Balthasar and Rahner on the Spiritual
Senses," Theological Studies 57 (1996): 225-41; Karl Rahner, “Der Begriff der Ecstasis bei
Bonaventura.” RAM 9 (1934): 1-19; "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in the Middle Ages." In
Theological Investigations, 16 (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 104-34; Fabio Massimo Tedoldi, La
dottrina dei cinque sensi spirituali in San Bonaventura (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum,
1999); and Gregory F. LaNave, “Bonaventure,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 159-173.
Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 21-49. See also K. E. Kirk, The Vision of God: The
Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).
50
51
Summa Aurea IV 18.3.3.1: 501,137ff. Quoted by Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 24-
52
Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 161-183.
5.
Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 184-217. Cf. Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in
Deum, ch. 4, in Works of St. Bonaventure, vol 2. Philotheus Boehner and Zachary Hayes, eds. (St.
Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2002).
53
48
occasion for the exercise of spiritual touch and taste. 54 “Since this food is the
highest sweetness, and since it has entirely every delight and every sweetness of
taste, it would seem that it greatly delights him who has a well-disposed palate
of the heart, since extremely sweet corporal food delights extremely the welldisposed corporal palate. Therefore, since the body of Christ is an extremely
delicious food, it delights to the full him whose palate of the heart is well
disposed.” 55
The Sense of the Heart
Nevertheless, the medieval period also saw a marked increase in the use
of terms such as the “eyes” or “sense of the heart.” Figures such as Bernard of
Clairvaux picked up on the strongly affective dimensions in Augustine’s
treatment of the spiritual life and stressed the role of emotion and will in
spiritual perception. This more affective sort of spiritual sense exerted
considerable influence on later mystics such as Hadewijch of Antwerp,
Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 218-234. On a more broadly liturgical approach to
the spiritual senses see Ella Louise Johnson, “Liturgical Exercise as a Theological Anthropology
in Gertrud the Great of Helfta’s ‘Documenta Spiritualium Exercitionum.’” (PhD diss., University
of St. Michael’s College, 2010), chs. 3 and 4 esp.
54
55
Summa Aurea IV 7.3: 152,83ff. Quoted by Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 2226-7.
49
Mechthild of Magdeburg, and Richard Rolle. 56 These themes of experiential
spirituality carried on in much popular Catholic devotion and even formed an
important aspect of English Puritanism too. For example, John Bradford (15101555), William Perkins (1558-1602), and Richard Baxter (1615-1691). 57
Synesthesia
In addition to this emphasis on the “heart” Bernard of Clairvaux in
particular, among others, is notable for the synesthesia in his discussion of
spiritual sense. As McGinn has noted, for Bernard the spiritual senses mix and
mingle to a remarkable degree. Imagery drawn from sight mixes freely with
themes drawn from hearing, touch, and taste. 58 This blending of the language of
Bernard McGinn, “Late Medieval Mystics,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 190-209. For a
much more developed account of the spiritual senses in Bernard see Killian McDonnell, “Spirit
and Experience in Bernard of Clairvaux,” Theological Studies 58 (1997): 3-18.
56
On this see Brad Walton, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, and the Puritan Analysis
of True Piety, Spiritual Sensation, and Heart Religion (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002). On
the influence of Bernard on John Calvin see Dennis E. Tamburello, Union with Christ: John Calvin
and the Mysticism of St. Bernard (Westminster John Knox Press, 1994). On the tricky business of the
label “Puritan” to describe “the hotter sort of Protestant” in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries see Ian Hugh Clary, “Hot Protestants: A Taxonomy of English Puritanism,” Puritan
Reformed Journal 2 no. 1 (2010): 41-66. In general, my usage follows that of my sources as given in
the notes. Overall, however, a “Puritan” is an English Protestant, unsatisfied with the extent of
reformation in the Church of England who is usually also an adherent of one version or other of
the theology of John Calvin as well.
57
Bernard McGinn, The Growth of Mysticism, The Presence of God: A History of Western
Christian Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 187.
58
50
the five physical senses with each other is a consistent theme throughout the
whole history of Christian speculation on the spiritual senses. 59
Sensus Divinitatis
Still others, notably John Calvin, speak of a generic “divine sense” (sensus
divinitatis), a phrase already found in Origen. For example, Origen importantly
quoted from an unknown Greek version of Proverbs 2:5 as biblical evidence for a
“divine sense” (΅ϟΗΌΗΖȱΌΉϟ΅Ǽǯ 60 Much more well-known is the case of Calvin,
who makes frequent appeal to the sensus divinitatis. For example,
there exists in the human mind and indeed by natural instinct, some sense
of Deity [sensus divinitatis], we hold to be beyond dispute, since God
himself, to prevent any man from pretending ignorance, has endued all
men with some idea of his Godhead . . . this is not a doctrine which is first
learned at school, but one as to which every man is, from the womb, his
own master; one which nature herself allows no individual to forget. 61
Exodus 20:18 for example confuses sight and hearing. See University of California
Television, “Synaesthesia in Mystical Traditions,” YouTube, 26 March 2008, accessed 20 April
2014, http://youtu.be/6LorvbKs79w.
59
Contra Celsum I. 48 (PG 11.749A), trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1953), 44.
60
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, chapter 3, trans. Henry Beverage,
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 30 May 2014,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html. See also Paul Helm, “Turretin on the Senses,”
Helm’s Deep: Philosophical Theology, 1 September 2012, accessed 4 April 2014,
http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2012/09/turretin-on-senses.html.
61
51
Sense of Faith
From the 16th century European Reformations on it becomes more
common to find references to spiritual perception as a “sense of faith” (using the
“eyes of faith” or some other organ). In developing this terminology the
Reformers, Protestant and Roman Catholic, were picking up a thread already to
be found in Augustine who remarked that “faith has its eyes.” 62 This notion was
used by Thomas Aquinas too. 63 In modern Roman Catholicism the expression
Augustine, Epistle 120, 2.8 (PL 33: 458). Particularly relevant secondary sources on
Augustine’s use of spiritual sense include Donald X. Burt, "Let Me Know Myself”: Reflections on the
Prayer of Augustine (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002); Henry Chadwick, Augustine
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); John C. Cooper, "The Basic Philosophical and
Theological Notions of Saint Augustine," Augustinian Studies 15 (1984): 93-113; György Heidl,
Origen's Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of the History of Origenism (Louaize, Lebanon;
Piscataway, NJ: University of Notre Dame; Gorgias Press, 2003); Paul Henry, The Path to
Transcendence: From Philosophy to Mysticism in Saint Augustine (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1981);
P. L. Landisberg, "Les sens spirituels chez saint Augustin," Dieu vivant 11 (1948): 83-105; Margaret
Miles, "Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's ‘De Trinitate’
and ‘Confessions’," The Journal of Religion 63, no. 2 (1983): 125-42 in addition to the extensive
secondary literature on Augustine’s thought more generally. Augustine is more often associated
with the (related) concept of divine illumination in this literature but a strong case can be (and
has been) made for his significant role in the transmission of the spiritual senses to the West (Karl
Rahner, "The Spiritual Senses According to Origen,” 102).
62
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3 q. 55, a. 2, ad I, in The Complete English Edition in
Five Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian
Classics, 1981).
63
52
plays an important role in interpreting revelation. 64 Among Protestants one finds
consistent use of such terms as “sense of faith” and “eyes of faith” especially
among the English Puritans. 65 Today one can find the phrase “eyes of faith” in a
whole host of publications that intend to illuminate some area of study or other
from an evangelical Protestant perspective. 66 Apparently, in recent years these
phrases have come to mean something like a “faith-based lens” on the world.
Intellectual Intuition
Finally, there are authors that speak of intellection in strikingly sensual
ways as a kind of intuition of the mind. Early modern rationalists, such as the
Cambridge Platonists for example, routinely speak of the perception of divine
things through “intellectual touch” 67 but they were also comfortable with the
language of “inner sense(s),” “sense(s) of faith,” “sense(s) of the heart,” and
On the modern Roman Catholic use of sensus fidei see Ormond Rush, The Eyes of Faith:
The Sense of the Faithful and the Church's Reception of Revelation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America, 2009).
64
65
Walton, Jonathan Edwards.
66
For example, see the Christian College Coalition Series published by HarperCollins.
67
For example, John Smith, Select Discourses, (1660), 3.
53
“spiritual sense(s)” as well. The works of the Cambridge Platonists reveal two
broad categories of “spiritual apprehension.”
First, there is a group of texts, especially those by Cudworth and More,
that stress the singular nature of the mind’s perception of divine realities through
the faculty of intelligence or understanding. For these texts, the human mind or
soul is intuitively aware of God through an apprehension of the intellect often
discussed on analogy with vision. 68 This apprehension takes the form of a kind of
single spiritual sense in ways reminiscent of William of Auxerre’s treatment of
the spiritual senses as formally one though materially multiple. 69 Particularly
interesting are two faculties posited by More; the “boniform,” which senses the
Good, and “divine sagacity,” which perceives the truth when it “sees” it. 70
Ralph Cudworth argued for the existence of God on the basis of human knowledge in
The True Intellectual System of the Universe, chapter 5, section 1, in Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists,
195-203. See also Cudworth’s Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, ed. Sarah Hutton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), IV. 1, pp.73-83. Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann
and John Reynell Morell have said of Henry More that he “derived all philosophical knowledge
from intellectual Intuition” (A Manual of the History of Philosophy [London: Bell & Daldy, 1870],
321). For a discussion of this single faculty in Origen as it relates to biblical exegesis especially,
see Hauck, “Like a Gleaming Flash,” 560-8.
68
69
Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 33-45.
For the “boniform faculty,” see Henry More, Enchiridion Ethicum, (London, 1667),
English translation, Handbook of Ethics (London, 1690), 156-8. See also Susan James, Passion and
Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003),
226-8. For “divine sagacity” see his Divine Dialogues (London, 1668), 404. On the faculty similar to
70
54
Second, there is a group of texts that speak of multiple spiritual sensations
on analogy with (at least some of) the five physical senses (but always more than
a single sensory modality). This tendency, while found in most of the Cambridge
authors to some degree, is especially associated with the work of Smith and
represents the tendency within the school to associate spiritual understanding
with multiple modes of perception and intellection similar to the expressions of
the five spiritual senses as found in Origen and others. 71
Historical Trends
These examples of terminological diversity, and they are just that, a
selective collection of examples, could be multiplied endlessly. The sheer variety
of terms used to express the central theme of perception of spiritual (intellectual)
the boniform known as the “moral sense” posited by 18th century thinkers see Luigi Turco,
“Sympathy and Moral Sense: 1725-1740,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7:1 (1999): 79101, Daniel Carey, “Method, Moral Sense, and the Problem of Diversity: Francis Hutcheson and
the Scottish Enlightenment” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5:2 (1997): 275-96; and
Patrick Müller, “Hobbes, Locke and the Consequences: Shaftesbury’s Moral Sense and Political
Agitation in Early Eighteenth-century England,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies (2013; doi:
10.1111/1754-0208.12075): 1-16.
On intellectual intuition in a theological context see, Christopher Dawson, “On
Spiritual Intuition in Christian Philosophy,” in The Dawson Newsletter, Winter 1994, repub.
EWTN.com, ND, accessed 12 April 2014,
http://www.ewtn.com/library/THEOLOGY/DAWSICP.HTM. Also of interest is Nicholas Bunnin,
“God’s Knowledge and Ours: Kant and Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition,” Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 35 no. 4 (2008): 613-24.
71
55
things – the divine realm, we might say (as many do) – makes an overview a
daunting task to be sure. Adding to the potential for confusion, these terms do
not fall on a neat line of historical development. All of the various expressions
mentioned above and others gestured at via a formula of sorts (i.e., “sense of . . .
,” “eyes of . . . ,” etc.) are found throughout the whole history of Christian
reflection on spiritual perception.
Only two trends can be clearly identified in the use of terms over time. (1)
With the dawn of Western Latin scholasticism, the explicit use of “spiritual
sense(s)” multiplies significantly only to decrease again during the rise of
humanism in the Renaissance. (2)The use of the language of the heart multiplies
greatly with the rise of Protestant and Roman Catholic (Counter-Reformation)
pieties in the 16th century, fueled by and large by advances in printing and
literacy as well as the democratization of devotional reading and reflection.
In What Way a “Tradition”?
These trends have contributed to the notion, common among medievalists
and Roman Catholic scholars, that the tradition of the “spiritual senses” all but
died out with the advent of the modern world and especially Protestantism. This
claim rests on a very specific, and needlessly narrow, definition of the tradition
56
itself. In the following sections I make a case for a more expansive view of the
phenomena collectively labeled “spiritual sense,” as well as for a more broad
conception of just what constitutes this “tradition.” By revisiting these basic
commitments it becomes possible to demonstrate clearly what the past century of
research has only gestured at; that the spiritual senses tradition is alive and well,
but also characterized by a very wide diversity of expressions.
2.3 The Spiritual Senses Tradition
While it is clear that Christians have often spoken in this way it is not
obvious that this manner of speaking is a tradition of thought or even more
formally a “doctrine” and not merely a collection of commonly employed
metaphors. 72 Each of the passages discussed above, and countless others like
them, can seem perfectly intelligible in their own right. They are satisfying, each
in their own way, to the contemplative mind of the theologian, the imagination
It may be objected that this manner of speaking is merely metaphorical and thus does
not represent a clear “tradition” so much as a collection of vaguely similar expressions which
fully exhaust their meaning within the confines of their own texts. In light of the ubiquity of the
theme over nearly two thousand years this objection seems obtuse in the extreme. Still, there is
much to learn by analyzing just how the tradition is a tradition. Thus, the present section. My
sense of what constitutes a “tradition” is similar in this respect to that of Andrew Louth in that
we both recognize the “tacit” nature of many traditions (Discerning the Mystery [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1983], 73-95). I owe this observation to Mark Mealey.
72
57
of the poet, and the prayerful gaze of the spiritual seeker. Many are also
suggestive of philosophical insights into the nature of humanity, perception,
knowledge and the Divine as well.
As texts, these passages, and indeed the works they are taken from as a
whole, have a kind of obvious sense to them. When, however, the flow of time
and the happenstances of history are allowed to shine upon them, individually
and especially collectively, a kind of loose trajectory does take shape. There is in
fact a tradition illustrated by these texts, even when that tradition is itself
composed of multiple, sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting,
subtraditions of more close resemblance. After all, it would be impossible to
recognize different authors as treating the theme if they did not represent, in
some sense, a tradition. 73
In some cases this tradition is explicit and clear. Such as when we find the
language of perceiving the Divine in Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the
Confessor, both of whom were clearly influenced by Origen of Alexandria.
Neither Gregory nor Maximus however agrees in every detail with Origen. In
The vague sort of understanding of a tradition of the spiritual senses has clearly been
accepted by the leading scholars in this area. There could not be a volume such as Gavrilyuk and
Coakley’s without this agreement.
73
58
fact, their debt to Origen remains clear regardless, and perhaps even because of,
the differences between Origen and Nyssa especially. 74 Gregory’s spiritual senses
are a clear response to, or development of, those of Origen, just as Maximus
develops themes found in Gregory.
In other cases, this tradition of Christian language of spiritual sensation or
perception is less obvious in a hereditary sense but nonetheless clear. Many
authors speak, for example, of the “eyes of the heart” across the centuries but not
always with any clear line of influence between writers. In this case, the imagery
is biblical and so there is no mystery about its spread among otherwise unrelated
Christians. 75 However, some terms such as the varieties of “spiritual sense”
appear across time and geography without any clear line of descent from a
previous author or the common biblical origin that accounts for “eyes of the
heart” among other phrases. In this way, one may speak of the “tradition” of the
Christian spiritual senses as a complex series (or group of subtraditions) of
borrowings, inspiration, and non-coincidental re-discovery. 76
74
See Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa,” 42-6, 48-9.
75
Ephesians 1: 18.
We may thus speak of a tradition in the strict sense running from Origen through many
of the notable figures in patristic and medieval (mystical/spiritual) theology and including both
76
59
Each major modern commentator on the spiritual senses has her or his
own definition of the tradition. This has led to a multitude of sometimes
overlapping “traditions” each reflecting a different conception of just what is, or
more often ought to be, counted as “spiritual sense(s)”. Often these competing
traditions are informed by the confessional allegiances of their authors; Catholics
speak of a Catholic tradition and Protestants speak of a Protestant tradition
without acknowledging the clear lines of influence between these groups of
Christians for example.
For these, and other reasons to be discussed in the remains of this chapter,
we should follow the suggestion of Gavrilyuk and Coakley and speak of this
tradition in a wide sense as involving “a series of overlapping ‘family
resemblances’” between a variety of teachings that had “diverse beginnings in
the Christian tradition (although always inspired by biblical prototype and
supporters of the Origenist doctrine and those who modify or even reject outright the classic
formulation of the doctrine, especially those who appeal to Aristotelian psychology to do so. Call
this the tradition de jure. We may also speak in a broader sense of a tradition that includes all
those Christian authors who take up this manner of speaking but who are less clearly indebted to
the de jure tradition, either because they find it of little interest per se or because they simply
have no access to this tradition. We may call this the tradition de facto. Importantly, this de facto
line of tradition is marked by numerous (apparent) discoveries of the “spiritual senses” by
authors treating topics and drawing on biblical passages nevertheless common to the de jure
tradition. As will become clear throughout the remaining of this chapter however I do not see
any significant reason to give the de jure priority over the de facto.
60
suggestion)” and doctrines constituting “a hybrid history of marriages of
convenience – or natural attrait – with classical philosophies” all of which
contributes to a wide range of “Christian epistemologies”. 77
Thus, in the interpretation of the spiritual senses there are two intimately
related problems. First, there is the problem of identifying the tradition. Just
what should count as belonging? However, where recent interpreters are content
to mark out a motif with multiple families of interpretation I am arguing for a
more unified tradition characterized by a functional typology capable of
registering a wide variety of specifications. Second, there is the problem of
defining the spiritual senses themselves. What are these things we have been
calling “spiritual senses”? In order to provide an answer to this issue we will
review the dominant recent interpretations and argue that a functional approach
makes up for their weaknesses. In this way, my interpretation addresses both of
the central problems in the field, thereby advancing it in a way that remains open
to further refinement and specification as well as demonstrating the place of John
Smith within the tradition.
77
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 18.
61
2.4 Modern Theological Interpretations of the Spiritual Senses
There have been three major moments in the theological interpretation of
the spiritual senses in the last century. 78 Shortly after the turn of the early
twentieth century Augustin-Francois Poulain continued, and brought special
attention to, a particularly Jesuit line of interpretation of the spiritual senses that
goes back to at least Giovanni Battista Scaramelli in the eighteenth century. 79
Poulain’s Des graces d’oraison was in turn a strong influence on the work of Karl
Rahner who was (with Hans Urs von Balthasar) central to the “rediscovery of the
topic of the spiritual senses in twentieth-century theology.” 80 After these two
There were, of course, a large number of scholars working on the theme of spiritual
sensation in one author or even in a school of thinkers in addition to these four moments.
However, as far as I am aware, and indeed, as far as the literature would have it, only Poulain,
Rahner, Gavrilyuk and Coakley as well as the handful of other recent approaches included below
treat the spiritual senses in general at any significant length. I do not include Balthasar in this list
for two basic reasons. First, Gavrilyuk and Coakley do not take him up in their overview of the
field (but they do discuss Poulain and Rahner). Second, unlike Rahner, Balthasar’s influence has
been felt more directly and widely in the aesthetics of physically sensible objects (Christian art,
etc.). Indeed, Bychkov and Fodor’s Theological Aesthetics after von Balthasar (Farnham: Ashgate,
2008) does not include the phrase “spiritual sense(s)” at all. The best study of Balthasar’s spiritual
senses work is Mark McInroy, “Perceiving Splendor: The ‘Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses’ in
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theological Aesthetics” (PhD diss., Harvard Divinity School, 2009).
78
Coakley, “Gregory of Nyssa,” 40. Giovanni Battista Scaramelli, A Handbook of Mystical
Theology, trans. and abr. D.H.S. Nicholson, intro. Allan Armstrong (Berwick, ME: Ibis Press, 2005),
19-22, 42, 99-102, 142.
79
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” xiii. Augustin-Francois Poulain, Des graces
d’oraison, 10th ed. (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1922); English translations, The Graces of Interior Prayer (St.
Louis: Herder, 1910), also, trans. L. L. Yorke Smith from the 6th ed. and corrected to accord with
80
62
giants of twentieth century Roman Catholic theology the next major attempt at a
comprehensive assessment of the spiritual senses came in the form of The
Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity, co-edited by the Orthodox
theologian Paul Gavrilyuk and Anglican philosopher of religion and feminist
theologian Sarah Coakley. 81
Poulain
Born in 1836 August Poulain was a prominent Jesuit author in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His approach was firmly within the
“manual” tradition of Neo-Scholasticism but his topics of interest were in
mystical theology and spirituality. In 1901 he published the first of ten editions of
Des graces d’oraison (Graces of Interior Prayer). While under appreciated in
the 10th French ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1950). I cite from the 1910
Herder edition in a 1996 reprint by Kessinger Publishing.
In addition, a handful of other lesser known approaches employed by theologians or
those working in fields of immediate importance for theology such as philosophy, history, and
literary studies will be mentioned very briefly near the close of the present section simply to
register the full range of current work in this area.
81
63
Anglophone theology, Poulain’s work was an essential inspiration for the later
twentieth century flourishing of spiritual senses studies in German. 82
Poulain’s discussion of the spiritual senses comes in chapter six of Graces
of Interior Prayer and forms the “second fundamental character of the mystic
union: the interior possession of God” and the “manner in which it is felt.” 83
Thus, Poulain sees the spiritual senses as the mode whereby the mystical
experience is known. In this he follows the tradition of the Jesuits Scaramelli and
Father de le Reguera who likewise saw the spiritual senses as a vital aspect of the
experience of the “approved mystics” of the Roman Catholic Church. 84
Poulain opens with a basic definition of the spiritual senses. “In the mystic
union we have an experimental knowledge of the presence of God,” which is
“the result of an impression, a spiritual sensation of a special kind.” 85 From this
starting point it is clear that Poulain approaches his topic as a consequence of his
real goal, understanding “mysticism” in its orthodox (Roman Catholic)
Mark J. McInroy, “Origen of Alexandria,” 22 and “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von
Balthasar,” 259, both in Gavrilyuk and Coakley.
82
83
Poulain, Graces, 88.
84
Ibid., 88 n.
85
Ibid., 88.
64
manifestations. The spiritual senses are not, therefore, Poulain’s primary focus.
Rather they are important for the function they play in mysticism.
Poulain goes on immediately to describe these spiritual senses as
“intellectual” and yet “having some resemblance to the bodily senses, so that in an
analogous manner ‘the soul’ is able to perceive the presence of pure spirits, and
the presence of God in particular.” 86 So, whatever else is involved, the spiritual
senses are somehow like the physical senses and they are also involved with the
intellect. They have a noetic quality that accompanies their affectivity. Thus, the
spiritual senses are not, for Poulain, merely matters of subjective experience in
the loose sense, but offer a window into the nature of spiritual realities as well. In
this respect, the spiritual senses play an implicitly central role in theological
methodology as well.
Poulain dismisses the notion that the spiritual senses might merely be the
result of the religious imagination on the grounds that the imagination can only
reproduce those things previously known by the physical senses (bodily things
with colors, sounds, etc.). Since the spiritual senses are means of contact with
86
Ibid.
65
spiritual objects the imagination can be of little to no help here. Rather, the
spiritual senses are a matter of “purely intellectual imitation.” 87
Drawing widely from the history of Catholic mysticism (especially the
Counter-Reformation figures Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross), as well as
his own estimate of the common consensus, Poulain asserts that there are, in fact,
spiritual versions of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. 88 Such phrases as to
“see God” are “not mere metaphors” for Poulain. This is not simply poetic
license. Rather, such language intends an experience with a “close analogy” to
the physical senses. 89 That is, when the mystic speaks of divine union as
accompanied by the sight of God they are not merely reporting a vague
“spiritual experience.” Instead, there is something very much like vision about
their experience, and likewise for the remaining four spiritual senses too.
Ibid. In this respect, Poulain would seem to be in substantial agreement with Thomas
Aquinas who does not understand a spiritual sense “as any kind of special faculty,” but instead
“uses the term to refer to an act of cognition” (Richard Cross, “Thomas Aquinas,” in Gavrilyuk
and Coakley, 181). Unlike Cross’s Thomas however, Poulain sees no reason to think that
“spiritual sense” is unworthy of special attention.
87
88
Poulain, Graces, 89.
Ibid., 90. Hauck, “Like a Gleaming Flash,” 573 supports this analogical interpretation in
the case of Origen specifically.
89
66
While he is insistent that all five of the physical senses have their spiritual
analogue, Poulain focuses above all on what he takes to be the most basic of
these modalities, touch. 90 The reason for this is that Poulain sees the spiritual
senses as disclosures of the presence of God “in” the soul. 91 This presence,
closeness, or “saturation” of the soul by God is immediate and not “at a
distance.” Thus, it bears a close analogy with touch and is referred to often as
“interior touch.” 92 Here again we see that Poulain’s central interest is not the
spiritual senses so much as the phenomenon of mystical union. 93
Elaborating on the intellectual character of the spiritual senses, Poulain
suggests, again following the example of Scaramelli, that the mystical experience
is “produced . . . by the [divine] gift of wisdom.” 94 Implicitly this wisdom is in
contrast to scientific or merely propositional knowledge too as, following the
long tradition going back at least to St. Augustine in the Latin West, Poulain
90
Poulain, Graces, 90-98, 102-13.
91
Ibid., 91.
92
Ibid., 91.
93
Cf. “proof #1,” Ibid., 93.
94
Ibid., 96.
67
describes wisdom “as a sweet-savored knowledge of divine things.” This “tasted
knowledge” relies, rhetorically, as it did with Augustine, William of Auxerre,
and Bonaventure, on the etymology of sapientia from sapere meaning both “to be
wise” and “to taste.” 95 Thus, it is not doctrinal precision that would seem to come
from intellectual effects of these spiritual senses so much as the kind of living
familiarity that comes from first-hand experience; knowing as we know a friend
not as we know an object. The knowledge on offer via the spiritual senses is not
abstract or the result of a process of cognitive abstraction. The spiritual senses
reveal and occasion wisdom rather than discursive thinking. 96
Rahner
After Poulain, and indeed following directly in his footsteps in many
ways, the next major movement in the recent theological interpretation of the
spiritual senses comes with the exegetical and theoretical work of Karl Rahner.
Ibid. Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity, 14, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 1, vol. 3,
ed. Philip Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 19 May 2014,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf103.iv.i.xvi.html.
95
96
Poulain, Graces, 88.
68
Karl Rahner, SJ (1904 - 1984), was one of the most influential Roman
Catholic theologians of the 20th century. 97 As Mark McInroy has recently noted,
“Rahner’s articles on the spiritual senses are routinely acknowledged as among
the most important studies . . . in the twentieth century.” 98 Theologians,
philosophers, historians, and others all typically begin their comments on this
strange doctrine with mention of Rahner’s work on the subject. 99 Rahner wrote
two influential articles on the spiritual senses in addition to making use of the
Prior to Vatican II, he was associated with the Nouvelle Théologie school, some aspects
of which were condemned by Pope Pius XII in the encyclical Humani Generis. See Hans Boersma,
Nouvelle Theologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford University Press, 2009).
Also, Pius XII, Humani Generis, 12 August 1950, ET available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxii_enc_12081950_humani-generis_en.html, accessed 16 May 2014. By the time of the Second
Vatican Council his theology had come to deeply influence Roman Catholic thinking. For more
on Rahner and his influence see, “Karl Rahner (1904-1984),” ed. Derek Michaud, incorporating
material by Joas Adiprasetya (2005), Phil LaFountain (1999), and JeeHo Kim (1999), in The Boston
Collaborative Encyclopedia of Western Theology, ed. Wesley Wildman, accessed 16 May 2014,
http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/bce/rahner.htm.
97
McInroy, “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 258. Cf. Gavrilyuk and Coakley,
“Introduction,” 4.
98
For example, Kevin Hart, The Dark Gaze: Maurice Blanchot and the Sacred (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 230, 277, Frank Burch Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and
Christian Taste: Aesthetics in Religious Life (Oxford University Press, 2000), 272 n.4, Bamberger,
“Thomas Merton,” 83-4, Hauck, “Like a Gleaming Flash,” 565, and Andrew Louth, The Origins of
the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys 2nd ed. (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press;
Oxford University Press, 2007), 66 n.13.
99
69
notion in his own constructive work. 100 For our purposes, it is Rahner the
interpreter not, Rahner the creative theologian, that is our focus. 101
Unlike Poulain, Rahner nowhere gives a very detailed account of the
spiritual senses in general. He offers a basic definition of the spiritual senses but
this is no systematic picture of the contours of such a doctrine. 102 Rahner opens
his article on Origen by placing the spiritual senses in the context of mystical
experience. 103 Like Poulain, experience is the basic category here and it is
100
On this constructive use see McInroy, “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar.”
While Rahner addressed the spiritual senses in two early, and heavily influential,
articles, and may even have incorporated aspects of this tradition in his own constructive
theology his general theory of the spiritual senses is found in his exegetical and historical work
on Origen. It is what Rahner says in this article above all that has earned him his place atop the
recent scholarship on the topic. Of course, his article on Bonaventure has been influential as well
but more in the particular area of Bonaventure studies than in the spiritual senses in general. Still,
my account of Rahner’s theory of the spiritual senses makes occasional, usually complicating,
references to this later article as well.
101
However, Rahner does give an extensive account of what he takes to be Origen’s
“spiritual sense doctrine.” While the status of the “spiritual senses” as a “doctrine” depends
entirely on what is taken to constitute a doctrine, nonetheless, this is Rahner’s usage and it is very
common in the literature on this topic for that reason. Since Origen is the originator of what
Rahner calls the “doctrine of the spiritual senses,” and since he compares other patristic authors
to Origen as the paradigmatic example of the doctrine, we can safely assume that the general
character of Origen’s doctrine represents what, for Rahner, constitutes the normative view on this
topic. Cf. Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 4-5. Also, the original French title of the
Rahner’s essay on Origen, “Le debut d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene” makes
the sense in which he marks the beginning of the doctrine very clear.
102
103
Rahner, “The Spiritual Senses according to Origen,” 81.
70
expressed in, or with, the spiritual senses. Unlike Poulain however, Rahner is
comfortable referring to the spiritual senses as “imaginative.” 104
Rahner’s most influential contribution comes in the form of his definition
of the doctrine of the spiritual senses. “One can only speak properly of an idea or
doctrine of spiritual faculties when these partly imaginative, partly literal
expressions . . . are found in a complete system in which five instruments are
involved in the spiritual perception of immaterial realities.” 105 So, for Rahner the
spiritual senses involve five key aspects. First, faculties that are expressed with
“partly imaginative” and “partly literal” language. Presumably this combination
of figurative and realistic language means something like analogy. Second, these
expressions are to be found in a “complete system.” In other words, in order to
count as an example of the spiritual senses an author must make regular use of
such language according to a recognizable plan. Third, the central mark of a
systematic account of spiritual sense is the explicit use of “five instruments” or
spiritual correlates of the five physical senses. Fourth, this doctrine concerns, of
course, “spiritual perception.” And fifth, the object of this perception are
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid., 82.
71
“immaterial realities.” These last two points emphasize that the spiritual senses
are not a species of physical sensation but rather something else entirely.
Thus, “Rahner proposes to understand the spiritual senses on a close
analogy with the five physical senses.” 106 On this “five senses analogy” Rahner
sees the physical and the spiritual sense “as two different sets of powers or
faculties, operating in tandem or separately, or, alternatively, as two states of the
same fivefold sensorium directed at different objects altogether”. 107 In this way,
Rahner’s theory remains open to a wide variety of specifications even while it
ignores those authors who do not speak (clearly) of five spiritual senses.
Complicating matters significantly however is the fact that Rahner did not
restrict himself to his own definition in his article on Origen’s spiritual senses. He
includes, for example, Diadochus of Photike, who speaks of a single spiritual
sense only and should therefore not count as an example of the spiritual senses.
Moreover, in his next treatment of the spiritual senses in the theology of
Bonaventure, Rahner shows little continued interest in the criteria he set forth in
the article on Origen. In fact, in this later essay, “Rahner was more concerned to
106
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 4.
107
Ibid., 5.
72
emphasize the unitive character of spiritual perception than to justify the fivefold
division of the senses, which he had come to consider ‘rather forced’.” 108 Many
have noted the incongruities here between an earlier and later view of the
spiritual senses in Rahner 109 however very little time passed between the original
publication of these essays; the first in 1932, the second in 1933. Additionally,
Rahner saw fit to include them both in the German edition of volume twelve of
his Schriften zur Theologie, 110 albeit with abridgments to each. It may be that there
is not so much different in these apparently contradictory accounts as first
appears to be the case. For in the Origen article, as we have seen, the theory of
spiritual sense is placed within a (unitary) vision of “spiritual experience” in
general. Moreover, Rahner notes that even in Origen, who arguably fits his five
analogy theory best of all the figures he takes up, there is a strong sense of the
five spiritual senses as “different species of the general divine sense.” 111
108
Ibid., 5.
For example, see Stephen Fields, "Balthasar and Rahner on the Spiritual Senses"
Theological Studies 57 (1996): 229-32.
109
110
(Einsiedeln: Verlagsansalt Benzigu & Co., 1975).
111
Rahner, “The Spiritual Senses according to Origen,” 89.
73
Therefore, Rahner’s considered view on the spiritual senses overall, as
opposed to the author and text specific accounts within which one finds this
general theory, is that there is a single capacity for “spiritual experience,” or
alternatively a single “divine sense” as well as five manifestations of this
capability on close analogy with the physical senses. Just as one capacity to
experience our world is expressed (or made actual) by the five physical senses so
too is our capacity to experience spiritual realities expressed (or made actual) by
the five spiritual senses. On this view, Rahner’s famous concern for religious
experience fits perfectly well with his exegetical and historical work on the
spiritual senses. 112
Gavrilyuk and Coakley
The third major moment in the recent theological interpretation of the
spiritual senses came with the publication of The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in
Western Christianity, edited by Paul Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley. This collection
of essays on significant figures (or movements) in the history of Christian
112
McInroy, “Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 263-8.
74
discussion of the spiritual senses 113 offers a wealth of insight on individual
authors and texts. However, as a unified collection it also represents a significant
interpretation of the spiritual senses in general as well. Even in the selection of
figures to be discussed there is operative a kind of general or basic theory of the
spiritual senses in this volume. This, and its place at the leading edge of
international scholarship on this topic, makes The Spiritual Senses at least as
significant as Poulain and Rahner, even though time has yet to reveal this
volume’s influence in the field. In the following I will offer an overview of the
general account of the spiritual senses presented by this work as a whole,
especially as this is formulated in the editor’s “Introduction.”
Whereas Poulain begins his study of the spiritual senses with medieval
authors, and Rahner begins with Origen, Gavrilyuk and Coakley rightly begin
with scripture. They point out that the Hebrew Bible and the Christian New
Testament contain many examples of “sensory language” used “to express
human encounters with the divine.” 114
Despite its title the collection includes figures from the Greek East too (Origen,
Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Maximus the Confessor).
113
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 1. Passages such as Ps 34 (33): 9, 1 Pet 2:3, Isa
1:10, Hos 4:1, Mt 5:8, 1 Cor 13:12, 2 Cor 2:15, 2 Cor 2:18, and 1 Jn 1:1 “point to certain features of
human cognition that makes perception-like contact with God possible” (Ibid.).
114
75
By noting the biblical roots of the spiritual senses Gavrilyuk and Coakley
give occasion to register the distinction from, as well as occasional connection to,
the “non-literal modes of interpreting scripture” that also go by the name
“spiritual sense(s).” 115 What is meant here, is, of course, a sort of “non-physical
human perception” and not the allegorical reading of scripture. However, some
authors who make use of this unusual form of perception do speak of the ability
to do the non-literal interpretation of scripture as closely related to the capacity
to (literally in some sense) “see” divine realities. 116
Gavrilyuk and Coakley raise the obvious problem inherent in the very
idea of “spiritual sensation.” Epistemologically, it is not at all clear that we have,
or could conceivably have, faculties of perception in addition to the familiar five
physical senses. Metaphysically too, God is simply not the sort of entity that
115
Ibid., 4.
Additional important biblical loci in the spiritual senses tradition include, Moses’
ascent of Mount Sinai (connected to Platonic intellectual ascent since Philo), and the problematic
passages of Gen 32:30 and Ex 33:20 (which suggest that divine perception is impossible, at least in
this earthly life). Paul’s “eschatological vision” found in 1 Cor 13:12 and 2 Cor 3:18, 2 Cor 12:2-4
fueled “reflection on the beatific vision” (Ibid., 11.). The Song of Songs with its abundant sensory
language too provided fertile ground for speculation about the spiritual senses. Likewise many
allusions to the five sense or the spiritual senses were found in exegesis of prophetic appeals to
hear and obey as well as many of the Gospel parables including Lk 14:15-24, Jn 4:16-8, Jn 20:17,
Lk 24: 30-1, among others (Ibid.). Despite this wealth of material in the biblical texts there is of
course no biblical doctrine of the spiritual senses. Any such formalized teaching is the result of
the work of the theologian (or prophet) in discerning the spirit (meaning) of the biblical letter.
116
76
could be an object of perception. How can one “see” a God who is “ontologically
different from all ordinary objects of perception”? 117 Moreover, in addition to
these philosophical problems there are, perhaps more importantly for the
Christian theologian, scriptural passages that suggest the impossibility of
perceiving God. 118
After noting that these problems can be dealt with in many ways,
including skepticism (either of a rationalist or empiricist sort), or by way of a
theory of the spiritual senses as an example of the theological anthropology
required for divine self-communication, Gavrilyuk and Coakley offer their basic
definition of the spiritual senses.
‘Spiritual senses’ is an umbrella term covering a variety of overlapping,
yet distinct, expressions in which ‘sense’ in general or a particular sensory
modality (vision, audition, olfaction, touch or taste) is typically qualified
by reference to spirit . . . , heart . . . , soul . . . , mind or intellect . . . , inner
[man] . . . , or faith. 119
Notice that unlike Rahner, and to some extent Poulain, Gavrilyuk and Coakley
do not seek to pin down a narrow definition of spiritual sense. Instead, following
117
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 1.
For example, 2 Corinthians 4: 18 and Hebrews 11: 27 suggest that God cannot be seen
and Exodus 33: 20 famously proclaims that “no one can see Me [God] and live.”
118
119
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 2.
77
the evidence of the essays in their collection, and the recent history of scholarship
on spiritual perception, they look to register the full variety of interesting and/or
historically or theologically influential use of spiritual sense(s). 120 By embracing
an “umbrella” approach to their topic, Gavrilyuk and Coakley make it possible
to register the otherwise hidden cross pollination between and among authors
with otherwise apparently incongruent teachings on the spiritual senses. For
example, their definition allows one to speak of “spiritual sense(s)” with regard
to Origen’s separate set of spiritually sensible faculties, the Reformed (Calvinist)
tradition of the sensus divinitatis, and even the notoriously difficult to trace,
subtle, or implicit “use of the language of sense-perception to describe divinehuman encounter” such as one finds in Augustine. 121
Where Rahner’s approach sought to set boundaries for a doctrine of the
spiritual senses, Gavrilyuk and Coakley cast a wide net and pick up on the
reality of a plurality of teachings about divine perception. A tradition comes into
view composed of family resemblances united as much by the functions they
perform as by the nature of the faculties or powers described. As we will see in
120
Ibid., 3.
121
Ibid.
78
the next section, this feature of the treatment of the spiritual senses by Gavrilyuk
and Coakley marks a significant advance over both Poulain and Rahner that
leads to the present study’s proposed theory of the spiritual senses; which forms
the basis for the interpretation of John Smith that follows in parts two and three
below.
Gavrilyuk and Coakley offer a strong critique of the approach of Rahner,
even while acknowledging the debt all current scholarship owes to his path
clearing work. 122 In particular, and as we have just seen, Gavrilyuk and Coakley
are critical of Rahner’s “five senses analogy” theory, calling it, “unduly
restrictive.” They note that not even Origen has what really warrants the
appellation of a “full system” when it comes to the spiritual senses. Moreover,
many, if not most, authors who speak of spiritual sensation discuss less than the
full complement of five senses. Some authors, they point out, stress one or
another sense. Others emphasize a single sensory capacity. While still others
conceive of some senses as aligned with intellect and others with affectivity.
Finally, they note that even Rahner himself is inconsistent on his five senses
122
Ibid., 4-6.
79
requirement. 123 To this we may add that if a figure as universally deemed
important in the literature on the spiritual senses as Bonaventure is not a neat
and obvious fit for Rahner’s definition, then it is fatally flawed. Thus, the need
for the wider net cast by Gavrilyuk and Coakley.
In perhaps the most significant among the consequences of their
expanded view of the spiritual senses, Gavrilyuk and Coakley notice that while
one may interpret the language of the spiritual senses metaphorically, “it is by no
means obvious . . . that every correlation of the senses with the intellect can be
reduced to a metaphor depicting ordinary mental activity.” For, by metaphor one
typically means that “no close similarity with the functioning of a physical
sensation is intended” while an analogy “obtains when the operation of the
spiritual sense is described in terms a kin to the operation of physical
sensation.” 124
Indeed, the Platonic tradition, which continued as an important aspect of
Christian theology, has always spoken of an “intellectual vision.” 125 Thus, the
123
Ibid., 5.
124
Ibid., 6.
125
Ibid., 7.
80
tradition of the “spiritual senses” includes at least some (analogical) accounts of
the operation of the intellect itself. As we will see, and as Gavrilyuk and Coakley
themselves also note, this will form an important part of John Smith’s doctrine of
the spiritual senses. 126
Similarly, Gavrilyuk and Coakley also make a significant advance in the
field by making room for the often confusing, and occasionally confused,
relationship between Aristotelian “inner senses” 127 and the, differently “inner”,
spiritual senses. 128
2.5 Non-theological Approaches
In addition to the major movements in the theological reception and
interpretation of the spiritual senses outlined above there are several minor
As I employ the term, “doctrine” means simply “teaching” not the more rigorous (and
arbitrary) meaning intended by Rahner.
126
See Pavel Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011) and Garth W. Green, “Nicholas of Cusa,” 210-223.
127
Gavrilyuk and Coakley, “Introduction,” 9. While Origen did use the language of
“inner senses” to refer to his spiritual senses by the medieval period most authors “were aware of
the difference” (Ibid., 10). Origen’s call to remove oneself from outer sense to activate the
inner/spiritual senses can seem somewhat odd to modern readers. However, Stephen Hawking is
said to have developed the ability to do complex mathematics in his mind when he could not use
pen and paper anymore. He also uses mental “images” of four-dimensional space-time. Could he
do this if his gaze was external? Perhaps capacities really do open up in this way?
128
81
moments that warrant mention. Primarily these other approaches are important
because they are recent and common in fields of direct relevance for theology.
Scholars in the academic study of religion (“religious studies”) have
tended to view the literature from what we have been calling the spiritual senses
tradition in markedly different ways from the theological accounts we have
reviewed thus far. For example, historians like Gordon Rudy, have tended to
focus exclusively on what can be gleaned about the authors and their readers
from texts in this tradition. As he says, “my topic is not God or mystical union; it
is what people say and think about God and mystical union—it is about people.” 129
This methodological non-realism is very common in religious studies, and across
the humanities, when theological texts are concerned. However, one need not
rehearse the debate between realists and non-realists to notice that it is not
obvious that texts which purport to be about the Divine can be accurately
understood as simply “human artifacts.” 130 Surely the intent to speak truthfully
about actually spiritual things is an important aspect of these texts.
Gordon Rudy, Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages (New York:
Routledge, 2002), xi.
129
Ibid. See Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger,
Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 19-32 on realism vs. non-realism in the philosophy of religion.
130
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Likewise, critical theorists have tended to focus attention on the spiritual
senses as a means of discussing the body in the context of so-called “mystical”
texts. For example, Patricia Dailey’s recent account of “The Body and Its Senses”
stresses the way the “inner senses” (which is her preferred term for what we are
calling “spiritual senses”) are located in the “inner” person. However, rather
than Paul or Origen’s spiritual “inner man” Dailey is concerned with a two-fold
body. She opens her essay, “the body is not presented as a united whole but is
divided into at least two parts, inner and outer, united only in an unknowable
future.” 131 The result is to offer a reading, especially of the affectively saturated
texts of medieval mystics (e.g., Hadewijch) that minimizes the oppositional
“dualism” between spirit and body. In this way, many postmodern themes are
blended together in a “discourse” that bears remarkably little resemblance to the
works of theology upon whom they are meant to be commentaries. 132
Patricia Dailey, “The Body and Its Senses,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian
Mysticism, Amy Hollywood and Patricia Z. Beckman, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2014),
264. To this example one can add the work of Caroline Walker Bynum (Holy Feast and Holy Fast:
The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women [University of California Press, 1988]) and
Niklaus Largier (“The Plasticity of the Soul: Mystical Darkness, Touch, and Aesthetic Experience.”
Modern Language Notes 125 (2010): 536–551) among others.
131
Thus, some scholars have worked hard to save their sources from the more
egregiously foolish sounding meanings of “spiritual sensation” in the name of good textual or
historical studies. They do so however by falling prey to the more subtle anachronism that so
often bedevils textual scholarship where theology and spirituality is concerned. That said, there is
132
83
By our contemporary (secular) standards spiritual sensation is an
oxymoron at least (which it always was) but more often hopelessly enigmatic
poetics. It can be tempting therefore to read these texts as if the materialism of
our day was a valid lens for reading the work of the ancients. Is it really
necessary to posit a second inner body in order to make sense of language about
“inner” or “spiritual” sensation? Perhaps, but only if one already thinks that
sensation must be in some sense bodily.
We misread texts employing spiritual sense if we do not take what they
say seriously. We also do them a disservice if we read them as if their authors
were unaware of the paradoxical nature of their language. 133 Both tendencies are
a legitimate tension in the tradition between dualistic and monistic versions of spiritual sense. On
this, see Stefanie Knauss, “Aisthesis: Theology and the Senses,” Crosscurrents, March (2013): 10621.
Or, what might amount to the same thing, if we read older texts as if the sensory
experiences that they describe are somehow fundamentally foreign to us. Many scholars have
suggested that our basic sensory perceptions are culturally, and thus historically, constructed.
Suspiciously however these scholars are almost always historians! See for example, Mark M.
Smith’s Sensing the Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching in History (University of
California Press, 2007). While what we see, hear etc. is surely culturally conditioned the sensory
modalities themselves would seem to be a priori in the sense that they are the mode by which
these culturally conditioned experiences are had. Therefore, when an ancient text speaks of
seeing it would seem safe to assume that this is the same sensory modality (vision) we are
accustomed to today. This is made more complex, but not unintelligible, by the addition of the
spiritual qualifier to vision or any other sensory modality. Recently, John H. McWhorter has
argued strongly against this notion of language as a “filter” through which one sees the world in
his The Language Hoax: Why the World Looks the Same in Any Language (Oxford University Press,
2014).
133
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to be avoided as much as possible if the texts are to speak to us today. However,
a kind of creeping anachronism cannot be avoided if they are to speak to us,
today. We cannot read these texts as though the seamless unity they so often
presuppose between science and religion, materiality and spirituality, body and
soul are lived realities for us. In fact, we would do well to be aware of the appeal
of these texts precisely because they speak to us of, and out of, a world made
strange to us by our modern advances in technical skill and descriptive
analysis. 134 Much of the appeal here is of a world that is whole; united across all
dimensions of reality, a scientific and sacramental cosmos within which we are
made to feel at home in body, mind and spirit.
At another level however this longed for rest in a cosmos that includes
ourselves, as selves, and not merely objects in time and space was always a goal
of these authors and never completely realized. Nowhere is this clearer than in
the frequent tension in the texts (and their authors?) between the present
This is, I think, a major part of the fascination of the “spiritual senses” for scholars like
Rudy and Dailey who are drawn to what they take to be the (surprising?) unity of the bodily and
the spiritual in these texts.
134
85
possibility of spiritual sensation and the eschatological certainty of the beatific
vision, the sensation of God “face to face.” 135
Thus, while there is much to be learned from the non-theological literature
on the spiritual senses, it is not merely a matter of allegiance to one’s discipline
that would suggest the focus on theological interpretations followed here. There
are good reasons to think that a theologically informed approach to these texts is
simply a more faithful reading of the texts. Their authors would seem to intend
by their words something about God and human nature and not merely about
their individual subjective experiences (Rudy) nor, certainly, to offer solutions to
our own late-modern problems (Dailey).
2.6 Toward a Functional Approach to the Spiritual Senses Tradition
Each of the major movements in the modern interpretation of the spiritual
senses offers important insights into our subject. However, as we have seen, each
builds upon the apparent weaknesses of the last as well. For example, Rahner’s
definition expands on that offered by Poulain even as it narrows focus on
systematic uses of analogues of each of the five senses. Moreover, where
See K. E. Kirk, The Vision of God: The Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum (New
York: Harper & Row, 1966).
135
86
Poulain’s treatment was limited (or contextualized) by his primary emphasis on
a Neo-Scholastic account of mystical experience, with Rahner the field widens to
include “spiritual perception” more generally. That is, whereas for Poulain the
spiritual senses are marks of expressly mystical experience for Rahner the
spiritual senses are placed within a broader context of religious experience ad
theological anthropology. Especially noteworthy in this regard is Rahner’s
willingness to discuss the spiritual senses as the means by which prophetic
inspiration is accomplished. 136 In contrast, Poulain’s treatment is limited to the
mystical experience of truths already known by revelation. Gavrilyuk and
Coakley likewise make clear advances over the work of Rahner. Most notably
they have definitively challenged his insistence that in order to speak of the
spiritual senses one must have clear evidence of a full system of five spiritual
senses.
Overall the trend has been for greater clarity but also for an increasingly
broad understanding of “spiritual sense” as including diverse expressions and a
wide array of sensory modalities bearing an analogous relationship to the
physical senses. Most tellingly of all is the development of the scholarly
136
See chapter four, starting on p.228.
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consensus around the function of the spiritual senses. 137 For Poulain, they were
part and parcel of (especially early modern Roman Catholic) mystical experience.
For Rahner, they can be understood to perform this mystical or spiritual function
as well as forming the means by which revelation is received by prophets and
theological truths are appropriated by adept Christians as well.
For Gavrilyuk and Coakley, all of these functions remain but to them are
added a more explicit role in intellection (spiritual senses as intellectual intuition)
and in the presentation of a systematic theology. Over recent decades it has
become increasingly clear that determining an exact, and completely consistent,
account of what the spiritual senses are (or what such language is meant to refer
to precisely) is both exceedingly difficult to accomplish and of questionable
utility as well. As Gavrilyuk and Coakley have shown, there are any number of
(often conflicting) specifications of the spiritual senses that have been historically
significant and remain philosophically and theologically interesting even today.
To arbitrarily rule any of these out of consideration (as Rahner did) is misguided
and unnecessary. What is called for therefore is an approach to the spiritual
Even Mealey’s schematic typology arranged by questions is, fundamentally, functional
in the end. His questions about the “thematic place,” source of legitimacy, the stability and
significance of the category, relation to dogma, and relation to “modern canons of meaning” are
all concerned with what I am calling the systematic, spiritual, and originating (or source)
functions of the spiritual senses. Mealey, “Taste and See,” 44-9.
137
88
senses based on the range of functions of the analogous expressions of nonphysical perception. The example of Bonaventure illustrates nicely the
hermeneutical strength of such an approach.
Bonaventure as an Example
St. Bonaventure offers an excellent example of why function is a better
way to look at the spiritual senses than making a determination of what they are,
how many there are, and how they work. He used the “spiritual senses” in
several distinct ways and this has led scholars to try to resolve the apparent
contradictions in his thought. 138
For example, as Stephen Fields has made clear, Hans Urs von Balthasar
and Karl Rahner offered conflicting, yet persuasive, accounts of Bonaventure’s
theory of the spiritual senses. 139 Both focus on the Breviloquium and Itinerarium
Mentis in Deum. Likewise, both Balthasar and Rahner place the spiritual senses
along the mystical path consisting of the purgative, illuminative, and unitive
stages or ways.
Jean-Francois Bonnefoy, Le Saint-Esprit et ses dons selon saint Bonaventure (Paris: J. Vrin,
1929), 210-5.
138
139
Fields, “Balthasar and Rahner on the Spiritual Senses.”
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However, Balthasar offered a “kataphatic interpretation that focuse[d] on
the journey’s second [illuminative] stage.” For him, Bonaventure’s spiritual
senses are connected to the physical senses and reach perfection “when they
perceive the full meaning of the Christ-form.” 140 Rahner, on the other hand,
offered “an apophatic interpretation that focuse[d] on the journey’s third
[unitive] stage.” For him, Bonaventure’s spiritual senses are distinct from the
physical senses and reach their perfection as the corporeal senses become dim
and “the intellect and will attain a mystical union with the utterly
Transcendent.” 141 So, Rahner reads Bonaventure as essentially dualistic with
respect to the physical and spiritual senses while Balthasar reads him as
embracing an embodied anthropology where spiritual perfection arises within
the body. For Balthasar, Bonaventure’s spiritual senses unite the “higher and
lower faculties of the soul . . . the intellect and will and with the corporeal
senses.” 142
140
Ibid., 235.
141
Ibid., 235.
142
Ibid., 237.
90
More recently, Gregory LaNave has offered yet another account which
locates Bonaventure’s theory of the spiritual senses “within his doctrine of grace”
as well as “religious knowledge.” 143 Drawing on a far wider reading of
Bonaventure’s corpus, including a predilection for the very early Commentary on
the Sentences, LaNave sees the spiritual senses as “the ‘use of interior grace with
respect to God himself according to a proportion to the five senses’.” 144 Since,
“’To sense’ is ‘to know a thing as present’” according to Bonaventure’s
Commentary on the Sentences, LaNave compares knowing God as present via the
spiritual senses to the act of “’putting on the mind of Christ’” in the intellect. 145
Thus, for LaNave, Bonaventure speaks of “the spiritual senses only when the
question becomes how we grasp God in his ultimate self-expression – what it is
about what is known that engages our ability to know.” 146
The spiritual senses are, then, the means by which those sanctified by
grace receive the self-revelation of God in Christ the Word. In this manner,
143
Gregory LaNave, “Bonaventure,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 159.
144
Ibid., 162.
145
Ibid., 163.
146
Ibid., 169.
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LaNave is Christocentric in ways that resemble Balthasar. However, for LaNave,
the apparent contradictions between the supposedly different accounts of
Bonaventure’s spiritual senses are resolved (or dissolved) by noting that
wherever he speaks of them they are related to the state of grace and that the
object is the Word.
So, for Rahner, the spiritual senses are a matter of unitive mystical
experience, for Balthasar, a matter of Christian experience more generally as
informed by Christ, and according to LaNave, the means by which “the soul
knows God when it apprehends him in his self-expression.” 147 But who, if any,
offers the correct interpretation? Each tries, in their own way, to resolve the
ambiguity in the various references to the spiritual senses in Bonaventure’s
corpus. However, both Rahner and Balthasar accomplish this resolution by
asserting that aspects of their own constructive theological projects are present in
Bonaventure. This makes one suspicious of the degree to which they truly exegete
Bonaventure. 148 LaNave too is not above some measure of suspicion in this
147
Ibid., 172.
148
Indeed, it would seem that they are involved in at least this degree of eisegesis.
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regard since as a modern systematic theologian he has an interest in finding
workable material in the Seraphic Doctor.
If, instead of concerning ourselves primarily with questions of what the
spiritual senses are we were to focus more closely on how the various references
to them function in Bonaventure’s work we would eliminate the confusions that
arise when trying to make divergent uses consistent with each other. We would
simply notice, as Rahner, Balthasar, and LaNave have also done, that
Bonaventure uses the language of the spiritual senses in his explanation of the
source of theological knowledge, his account of the spiritual life, and in his
attempts to offer a systematic presentation of the content of the Christian faith.
The question of the compatibility of these various uses with each other becomes,
from this functional perspective, secondary at best. 149
In fact, from a functional perspective it is possible to learn from all three of
our interpreters without necessarily siding with any one of them against the
others. It may be that Bonaventure’s “spiritual senses” contributes to a
systematic theology by being concerned both with theological anthropology (as
In short, there is no need on this functional approach to think of the “spiritual senses”
as designating a single group of acts, powers, or faculties. In this way it is possible to more
generously compare texts of different genres and those with radically different contexts and
audiences too.
149
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Rahner emphasizes) and by drawing attention to the Divine object of these
senses (as LaNave argues). 150 In either case, the “spiritual senses” are being
employed in order to give a systematic account, and both may well have been
intended by Bonaventure. 151
Additionally, a functional approach matches well the tendency in the
recent spiritual senses scholarship to employ this concept as a means of
explaining some other issue or concern, and leaving the spiritual senses
themselves frustratingly unexplained. Authors such as Bonaventure are far more
concerned to use the spiritual senses as an explanation than to offer an
explanation of them. In this sense, the spiritual senses perform a functional task
even as they remain underdeveloped themselves. This means that the effort to
pin down exactly what they are is sometimes misguided. Some authors simply
do not define the spiritual senses in a clear or consistent way at all, even while
employing them for various ends. They are an explanation, not something
explained.
For surely the way in which God makes God’s self present to us (LaNave) is itself an
important aspect of who we are, considered theologically (Rahner & Balthasar), and vice versa.
150
This is not to say, definitively, that Bonnefoy was correct in his assessment that
Bonaventure speaks equivocally on this subject. Rather, it is to suggest that such issues are of
minor importance compared to the conceptual work that the “spiritual senses” are put to.
151
94
2.7 The Functional Typology of the Spiritual Senses Tradition
In the interests, therefore, of remaining open to all the actual (and
possible) complexity in the use of the language of spiritual sensation, I offer a
functional typology rather than a strict definition of the spiritual senses. In
proposing this typology, I carry forward the recent trend toward a wider
application of the “spiritual senses” while simultaneously providing a more
defined account of the tradition precisely as a complex collection of trajectories
within a fixed range of functional types. Examples of each of these types are
drawn from the latest research on the spiritual senses as are the types
themselves.
Specialists may object that my approach is so generalized as to be
promiscuously inclusive. However, my approach is no more so than the editors
and contributors to The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity
have been. Likewise, for that matter, any of the countless scholars who have
appealed to the “doctrine of the spiritual senses” in passing. A degree of
abstraction and comparison is always involved when we associate any texts or
figures that are not clearly, historically, and textually, linked to each other and
employing identical formulations. Moreover, by embracing the current
95
consensus 152 as to the general character of the spiritual senses as involving nonphysical sensation and adding to it the further specification that this sensation is
employed in the service of one or more broad functional types, my approach is
actually more specific than the received view.
With all the forgoing in view, my proposal is to interpret the entire
spiritual senses tradition, broadly construed along the lines outlined above, as
involving language of non-physical perception with one or more of the following
three functional purposes: first to account for the source of theological
knowledge; second to explicate important features of the spiritual life; and third,
to provide conceptual leverage to provide a systematic account of the relevant
aspects of a theological perspective.
Thus, my definition of the spiritual senses remains open to as wide a
variety of specific theories or usages as possible while also unifying the often
disparate strands of this tradition of “family resemblances.” Indeed, it is only by
casting one’s net this wide that one can meaningfully speak of a “tradition” at all.
Assertions of a “consensus” in theology are notoriously liable to appear premature or
simply foolish. However, given the concerted effort of the leading scholars in the field; the work
of all contributors (and others) at multiple rounds of meetings and consultations to refine their
individual essays and to provide substantive contributions to the “Introduction” it is well
warranted to consider the approach outlined by Gavrilyuk and Coakley to be the scholarly
consensus at this time. For more on the process of producing The Spiritual Senses. See the “Forward”
to that volume, xiii-xiv.
152
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With this appropriate level of vagueness, my proposal continues the trajectory of
recent scholarship and remains open to future correction or adaptation as the
field develops. This openness is, perhaps, the greatest strength of my approach.
The functional typology has four key elements.
First, the “spiritual senses” require some reference to, or employment of,
non-physical modes or means of perception. This may take the form of any
number of specific phrases so long as the clear intent is to signify the perception
of things that cannot normally, literally, be perceived. “Objects” like Goodness
itself, grace, truth, and God, for example, cannot normally be perceived by the
physical senses because they are (or are taken to be) non-physical. Claims to
perceive such objects, or objects of their ken, are thus claims to “spiritual sense”
as understood here. 153
These modes of non-physical perception are intended to function in one or
another, or often some combination of, three ways. These are as explanatory
I take this to be noncontroversial as the object of these “senses” is universally
understood to be of a “spiritual” nature. In the case of the Incarnate Logos and the sacramental
presence of the divine things become slightly more complex as there is in those instances a
physically sensible object present. However, to perceive the Divinity of Christ is something in
addition to perceiving his humanity. If it were not, presumably everyone he encountered would
have recognized who he was. Likewise, while everyone may see the physical host in the eucharist
only some will perceive, in or through the bread perhaps, Christ.
153
97
principles in the areas of (1) the source and thus also the methods of theology, (2)
spirituality, and (3) the systematic cognition, apprehension, and presentation of a
holistic view of reality as such.
Thus, the second element of my interpretation of the spiritual senses is
that it can be used to provide an account of the origin of theological
knowledge. 154 Gregory the Great speaks of prophecy has involving spiritual
touch and sight in his Homilies on Ezekiel 155 and as George Demacopoulos has
demonstrated, the discernment of scripture too involves spiritual perception. 156
The medieval schoolmen too look to spiritual sensation for an account of
theological knowledge. For example, Alexander of Hales, Thomas Gallus, and
Bonaventure all speak of the heights of mystical ascent in terms of the affective
“Theological” here includes “intellectual” in the Platonic sense, just as, more generally
throughout, “spiritual” includes (or is at least compatible with) “intellectual” as well.
154
See, Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, trans. Theodosa
Tomkinson, 2nd ed. (Etna, CA: Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, 2008), 1.1.4-14, pp.29-36.
155
“Gregory the Great,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 71-85, especially 72-8. Gregory is not
unique in this regard among patristic authors. Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom,
Ambrose of Milan, Augustine, and Gregory of Nyssa speak of spiritual sensation being involved
in theological knowledge too.
156
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spiritual senses of touch and taste assuming the role of intellect in the
contemplation of God. 157
Third, the spiritual senses are frequently used to express, both
descriptively and proscriptively, the proper spiritual path. The faithful “taste”
Christ in the Eucharist 158 and “see” God’s grace at work in the soul. 159 They feel
the Divine presence in prayer, ecstasy, and mystical union. 160 One need look no
further, really, than a hymnal or the transcript of any number of uplifting
See Boyd T. Coolman, “Alexander of Hales,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 121-39,
especially 133-9, and “Thomas Gallus,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 140-58, especially 147-55. On
Bonaventure, see also Gregory F. LaNave, “Bonaventure,” in Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 159-73. This
list of medieval uses of the spiritual senses in theological knowledge could be added to; for
example, William of Auxerre, William of Saint-Thierry, and Bernard of Clairvaux all had
interesting things to say in this regard too as well as other patristic and modern authors. On the
merger of the affective and the cognitive at the apex of the soul see Pekka Kärkkäinen,
“Synderesis in Late Medieval Philosophy and the Wittenberg Reformers,” British Journal for the
History of Philosophy 20 no. 5 (2012): 881-901.
157
On this in William of Auxerre, see Coolman, Knowing God by Experience, 218-234. For
an interpretation of this theme in the middle ages generally see Ann W. Astell, Eating Beauty: The
Eucharist and the Spiritual Arts of the Middle Ages (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
2006). For the patristic era see Georgia Frank, “’Taste and See’: The Eucharist and the Eyes of
Faith in the Fourth Century,” Church History 70 no. 4 (2001): 619-43. On taste in all its
manifestations (spiritual and otherwise) see Priscilla Parkhurrst Ferguson, “The Senses of Taste,”
The American Historical Review 116 no. 2 (2011): 371-84.
158
On the connection between the spiritual senses and the transformation of the soul by
grace see Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum, 4. Also, LaNave, “Bonaventure,” 162-5.
159
Poulain, Graces, 88-113. See also, for example, Ralph Dekoninck, “Feel and Taste”:
Senses in the ‘Spiritual Exercises’ of Saint Ignatius,” Revue d’Histoire Ecclesiastique 101 no. 3-4
(2006): 1228-31.
160
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sermons in any contemporary church to see the spiritual senses being discussed
in relation to living the Christian life. 161 Often spirituality and some sense or
other of receiving divine wisdom go hand in hand as well. 162 For, as Rowan
Williams has noted in reference to the Philokalia, “There is no ‘spirituality’ free of
doctrine.” 163
Fourth, the spiritual senses are also used as a means to unite the disparate
elements of the human experience into a unified account of reality as such. 164 For
example, as the non-physical counterpart to the five bodily senses the spiritual
senses link us to eternal, invisible, and immutable elements just as it is by the
Popular books in Christian spirituality too often take up the theme. For example,
evangelical John Piper, Seeing and Savoring Jesus Christ (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004), and
Anglican Martin Warner, Known to the Senses (London: Morehouse, 2004).
161
Thus type one and two are often found together in discussions of the experience of
prophets, seers, and visionaries. On this see, for example, Pedro Gomez, “’Accende lumen
sensibus’: A Philosophico-Theological Approach to the Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in
Medieval Monastic Theology,” Teologia y Vida 49, no. 4 (2008): 749-770, and Daniel Simmons,
“’We shall be like him, for we shall see him’: Augustine’s De Trinitate and the Purification of the
Mind” International Journal of Systematic Theology 15 no., 3)(2013): 240-64.
162
Rowan Williams, “The Theological World of the Philokalia,” in Brock Bingaman and
Bradley Nassif, eds., The Philokalia: A Classic Text of Orthodox Spirituality, with a forward by
Kallistos Ware (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 102-21, here, 103.
163
This is the import of Green’s argument that Nicholas of Cusa attempted to synthesize
Aristotelian cognitive psychology and the Origenist spiritual senses into a single account
(“Nicholas of Cusa”).
164
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physical senses that the material world is known. 165 This systematic instinct is
perhaps more clear the closer to our own time we come. 166 Enlightenment figures
such as Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley both sought to construct theologies
that remain faithful to the content of their faith and the experience thereof and to
the latest in philosophical and scientific thinking. Edwards tried to model
spiritual perception closely on the model of sense perception given by John
Locke. 167 Wesley too builds much of his notion of spiritual sense in response to,
indeed on the model of, empiricism. 168 One measure of the systematic use of the
spiritual senses lies in the degree to which this notion, in whatever specification,
is brought to bear in order to account for some aspect of a theology. For
On the systematic function in Bernard of Clairvaux see Killian McDonnell, “Spirit and
Experience in Bernard of Clairvaux,” Theological Studies 58 (1997): 3-18, especially 7-18. On a
parallel in Hildegard see Maria Eugenia Gongora, “Look, Know, Imagine: The Vision of the
Source and the Three Maids in ‘Liber Divinorum Operum’ by Hildegard de Bingen,” Revista
Chilena de Literature 68 (2006): 105-21.
165
See Peter R. Anstey, “Branching Off: The Early Moderns in Quest for the Unity of
Knowledge,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 no. 4 (2011): 819-22.
166
Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards,” 225 n.5, 231-40. Also, Paul R. Baumgartner,
“Jonathan Edwards: The Theory Behind His use of Figurative Language,” PMLA 78 no. 4 (1963):
321-5, and Michael J. McClymond, "Spiritual Perception in Jonathan Edwards," The Journal of
Religion 77, no. 2 (1997): 195-216. There are also curious parallels in Edwards with Maximus the
Confessor. See Michael D. Giobson, “The Beauty of the Redemption of the World: The
Theological Aesthetics of Maximus the Confessor and Jonathan Edwards,” Harvard Theological
Review 101 no. 1 (2008): 45-75.
167
168
Mealey, “John Wesley,” 241-56, especially 244-250.
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Bonaventure, in addition to whatever else they do, the spiritual senses are
located “within his doctrine of grace and of religious knowledge.” 169 We might
bemoan the fact that Bonaventure only speaks explicitly about just what he
thinks the spiritual senses are in a “dozen or so” locations with LaNave 170 or we
can recognize, with Bamberger, that authors have taken up this doctrine,
“usually only in passing, without any intent to give a further development to
it.” 171 We know what is beneath us by bodily sense, but we know ourselves and
what is above or beyond us by spiritual sense. 172 Thus, by employing the
spiritual senses one is able to conceive of a single account of human experience,
from the everyday to the Beatific. 173
As we will see in part two below, this functional typology accounts well
for the spiritual senses tradition in general, and the uses John Smith put this
tradition to in particular. Only the arguments offered below for Smith’s
169
LaNave, “Bonaventure,” 159.
170
Ibid.
171
Bamberger, “Thomas Merton,” 83.
The example here is Platonic, ultimately originating with Origen, but the spiritual
senses need not be thought of in as hierarchical a way.
172
On the eclipse of the beatific expectation in modernity see Louis Dupre, “On the
Natural Desire of Seeing God,” Radical Orthodoxy: Theology, Philosophy, Politics 1 nos. 1-2 (2012):
81-94.
173
102
appropriation of these functions from those who came before him can begin to
demonstrate the adequacy of my interpretative theory. A full defense of the
perspective must await an assessment of its usefulness in guiding future research
on the spiritual senses. However, as we have seen above, there are very good
reasons to think that this perspective represents the current scholarly consensus.
2.8 Conclusion
The tradition of the spiritual senses in Christian theology is thus
characterized by paradox, a wide range of individual specifications or theories,
and these have been understood by modern scholars in a variety of ways. We
have seen that the trend in recent interpretation has been to include a wider
variety of phenomena under the general label of “spiritual sense.” Most
importantly a new interpretation of this tradition as involving non-physical
perception and three functional types has been offered that benefits from the
trajectory in recent scholarship and accounts for the range of interpretations
offered for individual theories in the field as well.
Armed with this theoretical and historical context we are now in a
position to fully appreciate the place of John Smith within the Christian tradition
of the spiritual senses. In part two below we will see how Smith used his own
103
formulations of spiritual perception to perform each of the three functional tasks
we have identified in this chapter. First, however, the following chapter will
position Smith in his intellectual milieu. For one can only truly appreciate the use
to which he put the spiritual senses if one knows the world to which he was
addressing his discourse.
CHAPTER 3: SMITH IN CONTEXT
3.1 Why Smith?
John Smith has never escaped the attention of scholars in fields as diverse
as the history of philosophy, 1 religious studies, 2 theology, 3 literature, 4 history of
science and mathematics. 5 Smith’s name appears, as often as not in a footnote
For example, they are often noted as early commentators on, and sometimes followers
of, Descartes. See, for example, Danton B. Sailor, "Cudworth and Descartes," Journal of the History
of Ideas 23, no. 1 (1962): 133-40; J. E. Saveson, "Descartes' Influence on John Smith, Cambridge
Platonist," Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 258-62, “Differing Reactions to Descartes among
the Cambridge Platonists," Journal of the History of Ideas 31 (1960): 560-7;
1
See Charles Taliaferro, and Alison J. Teply, eds., Cambridge Platonist Spirituality (New
York: Paulist Press, 2004), 3, 13, 21, 28-9, 31-2, 37, 41, 44.
2
They are especially associated with the movement known as latitudinarianism. See
Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England
1660-1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 25-88; Martin I. J. Griffin Jr.,
Latitudinarianism in the Seventeenth-Century Church of England, ed. Richard H. Popkin and Lila
Freedman, annotated ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1992); and Patrick Müller, “Hobbes, Locke and the
Consequences: Shaftesbury’s Moral Sense and Political Agitation in Early Eighteenth-century
England,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies (2013; doi: 10.1111/1754-0208.12075): 1-16.
3
Smith, especially, has long been noted as an artful writer. See, J. E. Saveson, "Some
Aspects of the Thought and Style of John Smith the Cambridge Platonist." Ph.D. thesis,
Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge University, 1955. Douglas Hedley has (rightly) called him “the
most eloquent of the Cambridge Platonists” (Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000], 284).
4
References to Whichcote, Smith, More, and Cudworth abound in Mordechai Feingold,
ed., Before Newton: The Life and Times of Isaac Barrow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990) for example. On More in particular see A. Rupert Hall, Henry More and the Scientific
Revolution Cambridge Science Biographic Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
5
105
crediting him with inspiring some other better known figure, in a broad
scholarly literature and it has for several centuries. 6 There are, however, precious
few studies of any length or depth on Smith himself. 7 Indeed, one is consistently
offered his name, and often his own words too in order to explain more obscure
passages in the works of his fellow “Cambridge Platonists” especially Henry
More and Ralph Cudworth. Anyone deemed relevant, even essential, for a
proper study of so many other figures and important movements in the history
of thought is surely due study in his own right. This is one of the central aims of
the present chapter.
Also, John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of the Enlightenment: Science, Religion and Politics from
the Restoration to the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
See for example, John C. English, “The Cambridge Platonists in Wesley’s ‘Christian
Library’,” Proceedings of the Wesley Historical Society 36 (1968): 161-8. John Wesley republished
several Cambridge Platonists in his massive “Christian Library” series, including a few of Smith’s
Select Discourses. This helped to keep Smith et al. in print well through the eighteenth and into the
nineteenth centuries. By the early twentieth century a whole range of anthologies were published
containing representative works of the “Cambridge Platonists,” always including Smith. See, for
example, E. T. Campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901);
Gerald R. Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); C. A.
Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists; and, most recently, Charles Taliaferro, and Alison J. Teply, eds.,
Cambridge Platonist Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 2004).
6
The great exception to this rule of thumb is Mario Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso di John
Smith, platonico di Cambridge (Padua: La Garangola, 1976). Nevertheless, my sketch of Smith’s life
and times is thematic at most. Those interested in the biographical details of Smith’s life can do
little better than Simon Patrick’s funeral sermon, notwithstanding the considerable hagiography.
For a fuller picture of Smith’s context one must consult the sources given in the notes to this
chapter. My purpose here is not historiographical or biographical per se but rather contextual.
7
106
Given his current relative obscurity – Smith has seldom appeared on
reading lists in philosophy or theology since the late nineteenth century – as well
as the combination of the strangeness and the universally acknowledged
significance of his intellectual and cultural context, an extensive introduction to
Smith and his times, is not only useful, but essential. For Smith’s thought arises
out of, and speaks to, an intensely complex world of intellectual, geographic, and
religious dynamism. 8
Given the thematic preoccupation of this dissertation it may be fairly
asked, how or from whom did Smith receive the spiritual senses tradition?
However, as our study of this tradition has shown, the ingredients were readily
available to anyone in Smith’s context. The biblical, patristic, and medieval
sources were all ready to hand, as were more recent important developments in
philosophy and theology. Moreover, the spiritual senses tradition is not the sort
that passes from master to student in a direct line only. Rather, it is a family of
modes of thought that arise naturally within certain aspects of Christian
Smith’s context will be a constant companion in our discussion of his theory of the
spiritual senses in part two below. In order therefore understand what he has to say on this our
primary focus it is necessary to first come to an appreciation of his world.
8
107
philosophy and theology. So, where Smith gets his ideas is a topic taken up in
the midst of the close reading of his discourses to follow in part two below.
Thus, the present chapter proceeds as follows. First, a discussion of the
intellectual context into which Smith was born with special attention to its
quality as an “age of discovery.” Second, we explore the educational culture of
Smith’s day with special focus on his own intellectual formation, especially at
Emmanuel College Cambridge under Benjamin Whichcote. In this way we will
see that Smith was educated in, or perhaps better, between two great
pedagogical eras; the scholastic and the modern. Third, is an exposition of the
political and religious turmoil that marked Smith’s adult life, culminating in civil
war for his nation and an appointment as a Fellow of Queens’ College
Cambridge for himself. Finally, we present the remains of his substantial
personal library bequeathed to Queens’ College upon his death in 1652 as a
window into his formation and inclinations. The chapter closes with some
preliminary remarks about the single literary product available from Smith, the
posthumously published Select Discourses, collected and edited by John
Worthington in 1660.
108
3.2 Into New Worlds
While the long march of history pushes ever forward and greets everyone
with a fresh horizon, some of us are blessed, as the Chinese say, to live in
interesting times. Our own time, with the speedy advance of technology and a
technologically driven (obsessed?) culture, is surely an “interesting time.”
However, only time will tell for us. For those born in the early seventeenth
century we can now see with the aide of hindsight that their world really was
new. It was during the dawn of the modern world that John Smith was born in
the rural English town of (Thorpe) Achurch in 1618.
Known in the Doomsday Book as Asechirce, and located in eastern
Northhamptonshire in the East Midlands of England, the town had been settled,
or at least given its permanent name, during the Danish Invasions of the early
Middle Ages (“Thorpe” being a common Danish place name). 9 The village
church, dedicated to St. John the Baptist, was first built in 1218 by Sir Ascelin de
Waterville in thanks for his safe return from the Holy Land during the Third
Crusade under Richard Cœur de Lion. 10 This Church was most likely the scene of
9
Williams, “Memoir,” v.
“Parishes: Thorpe Achurch,” A History of the County of Northampton Vol. 3, ed. William
Page, British History Online, ND, accessed 14 April 2014, http://www.british10
109
much of Smith’s early formation in Christian piety and perhaps learning more
generally. In which case, reports of his “Puritan” roots are well founded, albeit of
an established church variety often unknown in North America. 11 During Smith’s
youth, the Rector of St. John the Baptist Church was Robert Browne, the famous
Puritan non-conformist, turned priest in the Church of England, who served
there from 1591 to 1633 when he was jailed for not paying taxes. 12 It has also been
suggested that Smith may have “received the rudiments of his education at the
Grammar School of Oundle” near Achurch but this is little more than a likely
supposition. 13
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=66273. Also, The Page Arnold Partnership, “St. John the
Baptist, Achurch, Northhamptonshire,” Northhamptonshire.co.uk, ND, accessed 14 April 2014,
http://www.northamptonshire.co.uk/guides/achurch/7pic.htm.
11
Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 13, 91, 294.
Augustus Jessopp, “Browne, Robert,” in Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 7, ed.
Leslie Stephen (London: Macmillan, 1886), 57-61. Although by Smith’s day Browne had repented
of his earlier separation from the Church of England, the Congregationalism that he first gave
notable voice to in England followed the tide of discovery and exploration to bring the Pilgrim
Fathers to the far shores of North America.
12
13
Williams, “Memoir,” vi.
110
Our John Smith was apparently the son of John and Catharine (or
“Katherine”) Smith, 14 both of whom seem to have been of relatively advanced
age at his birth. 15 Nearly all biographies give his birth year as 1618, however
Williams reports that Smith’s mother was buried “April 4th, 1616.” 16 Thus, our
Smith would seem to have been born early in 1616. The Parish Register of
Achurch notes his baptism on “February 15th, 1617.” 17 This would make Smith
nearly two years older than reported by Simon Patrick in his Funeral Sermon as
well as the “memoir of our Author” written by Lord Hailes. 18 However, at the
time of his death Smith left what he calls “that small land which my Father left
me in Achurch” to his mother. 19 Thus, Williams’ birth date cannot be accurate as
Henry Griffin Williams, “Memoir of the Author,” in Select Discourses 4th ed. corrected
and revised (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1859), v.
14
15
Ibid.
16
These dates are from the Parish Register at Achurch as quoted by Williams, “Memoir,”
17
Quoted in Williams, “Memoir,” v.
v.
Simon Patrick, “A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of Mr John Smith late Fellow of
Queens College in Cambridge, who departed this life Aug. 7. 1652. And lyes interred in the
Chappel of the Same College. With A Short Account of his Life and Death,” in Smith, Select
Discourses (London, 1660), 506. Lord Hailes [David Dalrymple], “Memoir of the Author” in Select
Discourses 3rd ed. carefully corrected (London: Rivingtons and Cochran, 1821), 7.
18
“Will of John Smith, M.A. fell. Qu., dat. 3 Aug. prob. 12 Aug. 1652,” Cambridge
University Library, Baker MSS, Mm.1.37, 215.
19
111
his account rests in part on the supposed burial of Smith’s mother in 1616. For
this reason, there is little doubt that he was born in 1618 after all. 20
The elder Smith would seem to have been a small landowning farmer at
Achurch. 21 Indeed, the parish records indicate that he was churchwarden there in
1601, 1616, 1621, and 1622. He clearly, therefore, “enjoyed the respect of those
among whom he lived.” 22
3.2.1 Geographical Discovery 23
While typical accounts of the early seventeenth century in England tend to
focus on religion, politics, and various markers of “modernity,” 24 our treatment
Moreover, Williams, like most commentators on Smith, knows nothing of his will. He
seems to have learned everything he knows about the disposition of Smith’s estate from Patrick’s
Autobiography only.
20
Kennet, Register and Chronicle, 127, cited by Williams, “Memoir,” vi. The younger Smith
mentions “that small land which my Father left me in Achurch” in his will as well.
21
22
Williams, “Memoir,” vi.
The remaining subsections of 3.2 as well as sections 3.2 and 3.4 below offer a relatively
detailed overview of some of the more significant historical and intellectual trends that formed
the milieu into which Smith was cast. Those familiar with the late Renaissance and Early Modern
periods may safely proceed directly to section 3.5.
23
For example, the economic shift toward capitalism (Christopher Hill, The World Turned
Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution [New York: Viking Press, 1972]; Max
Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism [London: Taylor & Francis, 2001]). On the
construction of “modernity” generally see Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of
Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
24
112
of Smith’s formative context will take an unusually transatlantic perspective. For,
while Smith never traveled far from his birthplace in the East Midlands, the
horizons of his mental world extended all the way to the distant shores of New
England and beyond. The intellectual and entrepreneurial excitement of
geographic discovery was, of course, matched in the early seventeenth century
by the explosive flurry of activity and self-conscious development in philosophy
as well as the soon to be ascendant modern sciences. Just as Smith was to grow
up in a world full of reports of new lands populated by unknown peoples he also
lived in a world with a new heliocentric cosmos above and a heart within that
bore more than a passing resemblance to the pumps used to drain the nearby
fens of Cambridgeshire. 25
The “discovery” and settlement of the New World, especially for our
purposes the English colonies in North America, is easily overlooked by
historians of religion, theology, or (especially) philosophy but to their great loss.
For one cannot rightly appreciate this era without an understanding of the true
breadth and scope of the spirit of discovery that was in the air. Smith came of age
On this see, Henry Clifford Darby, The Draining of the Fens (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011). See also section 3.2.2 below.
25
113
in a generation that not only knew of faraway places but could imagine them as
really possible destinations for exploration or even resettlement as many of his
fellow Emmanuel College men were to do when they left to settle in New
England. 26
From our late modern perspective of instantaneous global
communications it can be hard to imagine it but nearly half of the planet was
“new” to Smith’s contemporaries. Only five or six generations separate him from
the epochal voyage of 1492. For all the renewed realism in our appraisal of
Christopher Columbus’s accomplishments (he did not, after all, “discover”
anything; the Americas were already well-known to many millions), motives
(profit, empire, etc.), and methods (murder in the name of God among them), he
did usher in an new age of discovery for Europeans and set in motion
developments that profoundly changed England. 27
Including Smith’s near contemporary, John Harvard (1607-1638), who left a significant
endowment to the new college in Cambridge Massachusetts thereafter named in his honor. On
the founding of Harvard College see Samuel Eliot Morison, The Founding of Harvard College
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), esp. 92-107, and 210-227 on John Harvard’s
role. See also section 3.4 below.
26
Without the transatlantic Spanish Empire there is no defeat of the Spanish Armada in
1588, and, perhaps, without Spanish gold from the New World, no rebuilding of St. Peter’s to
help set off the Protestant Reformation itself. In any event, unlike so many of his favorite authors
Smith was born into a world that included North and South America. Indeed, through the more
27
114
Among the impressive volumes Smith eventually left to Queens’ College
Library is a copy of Captain John Smith’s Generall Historie of Virginia, NewEngland, and the Summer Isles. 28 The Captain’s narrative includes, most famously,
the story of the early settlement of Jamestown in what is now the US
Commonwealth of Virginia.
By the year of our John Smith’s birth, English exploration and commercial
settlement had been underway for over a century. 29 Smith’s was, therefore, a
sophisticated, English speaking, North Atlantic world, even as he keep his finger
on the pulse of discoveries of different sorts on the European continent. But
North America was not the only “new world” to be explored as Smith arrived on
recent adventures of his fellow Englishmen, Smith was actually very familiar with the Atlantic
coast of North America.
John Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New England, and the Summer Isles (London:
I.D. and I.H. for Michael Sparkes, 1627), Queens’ College Old Library, D.1.32. Also, Queens' MS
47, Queens’ College Donation List (17th century), p.33 (available at
http://issuu.com/03776/docs/qunsdonors, accessed 4 April 2014) and J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue of
the Library of John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist,” Appendix in "Some Aspects of the Thought
and Style of John Smith the Cambridge Platonist" (Ph.D. thesis, Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge
University, 1955), 54. This work includes a reference to the Kennebec River in Maine as a
particularly wild and inhospitable place. This river runs through my home town of Skowhegan.
28
On this history see Peter C. Mancall, Envisioning America: English Plans for the
Colonization of North America, 1580-1640 (Boston: Bedford Books, 1995).
29
115
the scene. 30 This spirit of discovery extended into the sciences, philosophy, and
theology as well.
3.2.2 Scientific Discovery
Smith’s lifetime saw the spread of the heliocentric model of the universe
as well as the sometimes intense debates this “Copernican Revolution”
inspired. 31 Moreover, for all his respect of ancient wisdom, Smith was also
unperturbed by the displacement of the Earth from the center of the universe. 32
During the same period of English exploration and colonial expansion in North
America, there were similar developments in Central and South America, India and the East
Indies, and Africa too. For an interesting perspective on this history see, Hugh Edward Egerton,
A Short History of British Colonial Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The East
India Company settled at Surat in 1608 which remained the headquarters for the Company until
its move to Bombay in 1687. A trading facility was built at Machilipatnam on the Coromandel
Coast of India in 1611 and the Spice Island of Run was defended against the claims of the Dutch
by Nathaniel Courthope in 1616. After protracted conflicts with the Dutch over ownership and
trading rights Run was finally ceded to the Netherlands in exchange for the North American
island of Manhattan in 1665. On the adventures of the East India Company see, for example, K. N.
Chaudhuri, The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-stock Company 1600-1640,
Vol. 4 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999). England’s exploits were merely one, relatively small,
part of a larger pan-European period of discovery and expansion of economic and political power
and influence throughout the world. Across the highways of the seas the Spanish, Portuguese,
Dutch, English, and others brought about the first great age of “globalization.” As one of the best
read scholars of his day, Smith was well versed in all these developments. His was one of the
very first generations to receive prompt, if not always very accurate, word about the habits and
habitats of peoples and places around the planet. In short, Smith’s geographical world (and to
some extent his economic world as well) was well on its way to becoming very much like our
own.
30
In 1543, with the publication of De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, Nicholaus
Copernicus (1473-1543) offered a viable challenge to the Ptolemaic geocentricism that had been
astronomical orthodoxy for over thirteen centuries. There were many heliocentric proposals
31
116
While copies of Copernicus’ works are not among those listed in the
donation of books Smith made to Queens’ College upon his death, his reading in
astronomy does show evidence of being primarily in “the Copernican
tradition.” 33 Copernicus’s heliocentrism was initially not widely accepted but it
was nonetheless tolerated for nearly six decades, so long as it was considered a
hypothesis, useful for calculation, and not a definitive statement of fact. 34 Just two
before Copernicus but his finally took hold. For example, Aristarchus of Samos proposed a
moving Earth in the third century BCE (Thomas Heath, Aristarchus of Samos, the Ancient
Copernicus [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913]). Already by 1514 Copernicus had shared a small
Commentary (Commentariolus) with friends and associates in which he laid out the rudiments of
his heliocentric system. See N. M. Swerdlow, trans., “The Derivation and First Draft of
Copernicus's Planetary Theory: A Translation of the Commentariolus with Commentary,”
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 117 (1973): 423–512. Also, Koyré, Closed World, 2857. Already by the later 1530s however Copernicus’s heliocentric theory was well known among
the intellectual elite of Europe, even if his arguments were not yet fully available. Famously, in
the spring of 1539, Georg Joachim Rheticus, a mathematics professor at Wittenberg, was given
leave to learn Copernicus’s system first-hand in Frauenberg, Poland. News of this trip seems to
have prompted the great Reformer Martin Luther to comment that Copernicus “wishes to turn
the whole of astronomy upside down”. Luther continued, “So it goes now. Whoever wants to be
clever must agree with nothing that others esteem,” a remarkably cynical statement from one so
intent on turning centuries of Catholic belief and practice “upside down.” Martin Luther, Table
Talk, [4 June 1539], in Luther’s Works Vol. 54, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1967), 358–9.
On this development in scientific understanding see Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed
World to the Infinite Universe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958).
32
J. E. Saveson, “The Library of John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist,” Notes and Queries,
May 1958, 216.
33
Indeed, an unauthorized preface to Copernicus’ De revolutionibus was added to the first
edition that suggested it be treated as a mathematical theory only (Michael J. Crowe, Theories of
the World from Antiquity to the Copernican Revolution [Dover, 2001], 85). This (mis)interpretation
34
117
years before Smith’s birth, religious opposition to heliocentrism had grown to the
point that Copernicus’s ideas were in serious danger of official sanction by the
Roman Catholic Church. The great Italian physicist, mathematician, astronomer,
and philosopher, Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) who was, by this time, a convinced
Copernican, attempted to come to the defense of Copernicus in Rome. However,
De revolutionibus was declared contrary to scripture by the Congregation of the
Index in 1616 and Galileo was told to stay away from the controversial, and
apparently unbiblical, theory of heliocentrism. 35
Galileo initially agreed and did not speak openly about his heliocentric
beliefs until 1632 when his friend, now Pope Urban VIII, and the Office of the
Inquisition, approved of his publication of Dialogo sopraidue massimi systemi del
stuck easily since without observational evidence Copernicus’s theory seemed little more than a
mathematical model, not clearly related to reality at all. Indeed, it must be remembered that even
Galileo’s great assault on Aristotelian science was only partly empirical. His hypothesis that
objects fall at a uniform rate regardless of mass was based on reason alone (presented in De Motu,
1590). Scholars are mixed on the question of the famous experiment from the Leaning Tower of
Pisa testing this hypothesis. Many think that Galileo never made such an experiment, having
already established that Aristotle was wrong and that he was correct by a priori reasoning. So,
while the moons of Jupiter and their use as support for the heliocentric model of the solar system
was the result of observations through the telescope, some of Galileo’s contributions were of a
purely rational nature. Altogether fitting for a teacher of mathematics at the University of Pisa.
Maurice A. Finocchiaro, ed., The Essential Galileo (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008), 11. An
account of the “Galileo affair” can be found in this book pp.12-16. See also Peter Machamer,
"Galileo Galilei," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 13
June 2013, accessed 16 May 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/galileo/.
35
118
mondo, The Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Galileo had
overreached however as he did far more than present the arguments for and
against geocentrism and heliocentrism, but actually made only the heliocentric
system seem viable. 36 Thus, Galileo was accused of making a case for the, stillbanned, Copernican system. He was tried and found guilty of “vehement
suspicion of heresy” in June of 1633. 37 Sentenced to prison at first, his sentence
was commuted to house arrest the following day, however his works were also
banned from publication. 38 This ban seems, however, only to have helped to
spread the works of Galileo and the offending heliocentrism still further across
Europe. Smith’s donations to Queens’ College library included six volumes of
Galileo’s works, including a 1635 edition of Dialogus de Systemate Mundi. 39
Largely this was accomplished through the foolish incompetence of the defender of
geocentricism in his dialogue, Simplicio, an Italian name borrowed from the Greek Simplicius,
the famous late Neoplatonist and particular favorite of the Cambridge Platonists. Simplicio can
carry, however, the connotation of a simpleton in Italian too.
36
37
Finocchiaro, Galileo, 15.
38
Ibid., 16.
Queens' MS 47, p.27. Also, Saveson, “The Library of John Smith,” 216 and Saveson,
“Catalogue,” 28-29. In Smith’s discourse “Of Prophecy” he speaks of “an evening star shining
upon the conspicable hemisphere, when another [star] was set” (Select Discourses [1859], 267).
This may well be a reference to the Earth rotating on its axis, a key part of the new astronomy of
this era. On Smith’s theory of prophecy more generally see section 4.2 below.
39
119
In addition to these works of Galileo, Smith also possessed several texts by
Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), who established the heliocentric model of the solar
system still in use today. 40 Kepler’s laws of planetary motion directly informed
Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and thus helped to usher in the
Enlightenment conception of the universe. Smith was therefore among the
leading lights of early modern science.
Smith donated eleven works by Kepler to Queens’ upon his death. Most of
these were first editions including a copy of the Paralipomena in Vitellionem that
includes an inscription, presumably in Smith’s own hand, reading “Johannes
Smith.” 41 All the most significant astronomical works are present among them, 42
such as the Harmonices Mundi (The Harmony of the World, 1619), and including
On Kepler see Daniel A. Di Liscia, "Johannes Kepler," The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 2 May 2011, accessed 16 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/kepler/. Also Koyré, Closed World, 58-87. Until
Kepler, there was an altogether unfamiliar distance between astronomy (and astrology) which
were considered liberal arts, and the “natural philosophy” or sciences of mathematics and
physics. Astronomy utilized mathematical models (especially geometry) from ancient times,
however it was only with Kepler and Galileo that mathematics began to be important in physics
too. In fact, Kepler’s greatest contribution to early modern science is probably his combination of
the mathematics of astronomy and the cosmology of ancient physics.
40
Queens’ MS 47, 27; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 37; J. Kepler, Paralipomena in Vitellionem,
quibus Astronomiae Pars Optica traditur.(Frankfurt-on-Main, 1604), Queens’ Old Library C.14.32.
41
With the exception of the Tabulae Rudolphinae (1627). Smith’s interests in astronomy,
therefore, seem to be primarily theoretical rather than practical. This general attitude is reflected
in his theology as well. See especially sections 4.1 and 4.2 below.
42
120
what Carl Sagan has called the first work of science fiction, Kepler’s
posthumously published novel, Somnium (The Dream, 1634). 43 Smith was even
acquainted with Kepler’s work on the geometry of snowflakes as set forth in De
Nive Sexangula (On the Six-Cornered Snowflake, 1611). 44
Thus, Smith came into a world fast on its way toward the modern
scientific worldview. But it was not just the received wisdom of the ancients on
matters related to the macrocosmos that were being re-evaluated in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The microcosmos of the human body
too was being reassessed in Smith’s day as scholars and increasingly medical
practitioners themselves sought to find more effective treatments for disease than
those found in centuries old authorities.
In 1543 Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) published De humani corporis fabrica,
On the Fabric of the Human Body, dramatically correcting the anatomical
orthodoxy that had held sway since Galen (130-200). 45 Parting ways with
Carl Sagan, "The Harmony of the Worlds" episode, in the series, “Cosmos: A Personal
Voyage,” first aired on PBS, 1980.
43
44
Queens’ MS 47, 27; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 37.
H. K. Walker, “The Origins of the History and Physical Examination,” in H.K Walker,
W. D. Hall, and J. W. Hurst, eds., Clinical Methods: The History, Physical, and Laboratory
Examinations 3rd ed. (Boston: Butterworths, 1990), ch. 1, accessed 15 April 2014,
45
121
tradition, and good morals by the standards of his day, Vesalius began to dissect
a corpse during his anatomy lecture at the University of Padua, long the center of
medical instruction. His magnum opus, the Fabrica was based on these lectures.
The text is notable for its detail, including many fine woodcuts to illustrate the
structures discussed in the text, and its correction of many serious errors made
by Galen and repeated for over a millennium. 46 The Fabrica met with significant
success, both in its official published form and in pirated copies that circulated
widely in Europe. 47
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458/. For primary texts in the history of anatomy and
medicine see David J. Rothman, Steven Marcus, and Stephanie A. Kiceluk, eds., Medicine and
Western Civilization (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995). While the rebirth of
artistic interest in the human body that accompanied the Renaissance had made human
dissection more common than it had been in the Middle Ages, there was still little opposition to
the authority of Galen on anatomical matters. Domenico Laurenza, Art and Anatomy in
Renaissance Italy: Images from a Scientific Revolution (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art,
2012).
Among these errors was the notion that the major blood vessels begin in the liver.
Through observation Vesalius noted that Galen was mistaken on this (they arise in the heart)
because Galen had used animals (dogs and monkeys) rather than human beings. Roger Kenneth
French, Medicine Before Science: The Business of Medicine from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 141-3, 149. Lois N. Magner, A History of Medicine
(CRC Press, 1992), 158-63. Arranged in seven books, Fabrica treats the skeletal, muscular,
circulatory, cardio-pulmonary, nervous, and digestive systems with the care of an expert
observer and the artistic mastery of the late Renaissance. Indeed, without the development of
realistic drawing techniques by the Renaissance masters, Vesalius’ masterpiece would scarcely
have been imaginable.
46
The demand for anatomy texts and the heavy cost of the Fabrica, led Vesalius to
publish a much condensed Epitome of the larger work, and kind of “short introduction” to the
Fabrica. In 1555 a second edition appeared and a third appears to have been contemplated as
47
122
For all his advances in anatomy, both technical and theoretical, Vesalius
followed Galen on the incorrect notion that the veins and arteries carry two
different sorts of blood. The correct theory of the circulation of the blood would
await the work of a fellow Englishman during Smith’s lifetime, William Harvey
(1578-1657). 48 Beyond living a fascinating life during a tumultuous period,
Harvey is best remembered for finally describing accurately the circulation of the
blood in his justly celebrated Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in
Animalibus, An Anatomical Exercise on the Motion of the Heart and Blood by Living
Beings (1628). 49
In De motu cordis Harvey argues that rather than there being two systems
of blood as Galen had insisted, a single volume is circulated throughout the
Vesalius himself made significant annotations to a copy of the second edition. “U[university] of
T[oronto] acquires annotated copy of Vesalius's great anatomical book,” U of T News, March 26,
2013, accessed 15 April 2014, http://news.utoronto.ca/u-t-acquires-annotated-copy-vesaliussgreat-anatomical-book.
See Thomas Wright, William Harvey: A Life in Circulation (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 3-204.
48
William Harvey, “On The Motion Of The Heart And Blood In Animals,” 1628, trans.
Robert Willis, in Scientific Papers; Physiology, Medicine, Surgery, Geology, with Introductions, Notes
and Illustrations The Harvard Classics v. 38 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910), available in
Paul Halsall, ed., Internet Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham University, 1998-, accessed 15 April
2014, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1628harvey-blood.asp. Harvey’s theory dates from
his lectures of 1616.
49
123
body. Most important for the intellectual context that Smith inherited however
was the method employed by Harvey to make his great advance in physiology
and anatomy. Building on the work of others Harvey added above all a
willingness, and the ability, to engage in careful observation and
experimentation. By combining anatomical observation and experiments, such as
selectively opening and closing of the veins and arteries by the use of tourniquets
and ligatures, he was able to work out what must be the case about the heart.
It was by treating the heart as a mechanism that its true physiological
function was first understood. The importance for biological and medical science
of Harvey’s discovery was noticed immediately but the mechanization of biology
was to have lasting effects in philosophy as well. Indeed, the great seventeenth
century materialist Thomas Hobbes is said to have noted that of modern authors
only Harvey was taught during his lifetime. 50
We can be sure that Smith was aware of, and approved, Harvey’s theory
from his own words. In Smith’s discourse “On the Immortality of the Soul” he
speaks of “The constant circulation of the blood through all our veins and
Stewart Duncan, "Thomas Hobbes," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
N. Zalta, last modified 4 February 2013, accessed 15 April 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/hobbes/, §4.
50
124
arteries.” 51 From the context of this unmistakable reference to the circulation of
the blood, Smith was comfortable thinking of the body in mechanical terms along
the lines developed by Harvey and Descartes. 52 Moreover, from the list of works
donated to Queens’ by Smith we know that he owned at least one work by
Harvey, Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium (1651). 53
This sampling of the discoveries of the period immediately preceding
Smith’s lifetime and work clearly shows that he was born into a period of intense
novelty in natural philosophy. These technical and practical developments went
hand in hand, of course, with new developments in philosophy proper too, as we
will see in the next section. 54 Both practice and theory demanded a new account
by Smith’s day, and for many the “new philosophy,” associated (retrospectively)
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 87. Quoted from the modernized version in Smith, Select
Discourses (1859), 88.
51
52
See Saveson, "Descartes' Influence on John Smith," 258-62.
Queens’ MS 47, 27; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 35. As important as Harvey’s discovery was,
there remained an important hole in the theory until the year of the first publication of Smith’s
Select Discourses (1660), when Marcello Malpighi observed blood moving through capillaries in
the lung of a frog using the other great observational device of the early modern period, the
microscope. L. J. DiDio, “Marcello Malpighi: The Father of Microscopic Anatomy,” Italian Journal
of Anatomical Embryology 100, Supplement 1 (1995): 3-9.
53
For the place of the Cambridge Platonists in their philosophical milieu see, G. A. J.
Rogers, J. M. Vienne, and Y. C. Zarka, eds., The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context:
Politics, Metaphysics, and Religion (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
54
125
with Rene Descartes above all, was that way forward. As we will see however,
Smith responded to these same pressures by looking simultaneously to the great
discoveries of his time and back to the ancient wisdom embedded in Christian
Platonism.
3.3 Between the Times:
Scholastic and Modern Learning in Smith’s Cambridge
John Smith enrolled at Emmanuel College, Cambridge on the 5th of April
1636. College records report that he entered as a “sizar,” roughly the seventeenth
century equivalent of a work-study student. Sizars would perform various tasks
in college in exchange for their tuition and board. 55 According to Samuel Salter,
Smith’s job included recording the sermons and other discourses of his tutor and
benefactor Benjamin Whichcote. 56
“Sizar,” Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. 25 (Chicago, 1911), accessed 15 April 2014,
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Sizar.
55
Salter says that one “Mr. Smith” took down Whichcote’s sermons. Salter also says that
this Smith said that he “lived upon Dr. Whichcote.” The similarities to our Smith, who spoke in
this same way of his relationship with Whichcote according to Worthington and Patrick makes it
seem most likely that it was among Smith’s duties as a sizar to record his tutor’s sermons (Samuel
Salter, “Preface to this New Edition,” Moral and Religious Aphorisms. Collected from the Manuscript
Papers of The Reverend and Learned Doctor Whichcote [London, 1753], xviii). Perhaps this was a more
suitable task for one with the obvious intellect and frail health of Smith than cleaning, etc., in
college.
56
126
Whichcote is universally recognized as a founding member of the
Cambridge Platonist movement. Indeed, it is in large measure his influence that
gave to the group their idiosyncratic “Platonism.” 57 He taught both Smith and
Peter Sterry and probably Ralph Cudworth and Nathaniel Culverwell as well. 58
Whichcote enrolled at Emmanuel in 1626 but reacted strongly against the
orthodox Calvinism he was taught by Anthony Tuckney. 59 In 1633 Whichcote
became a fellow at Emmanuel and three years later he began a series of lectures
at Holy Trinity Church which lasted nearly two decades in which he gradually
came to advocate broadly tolerant ideas colored by the hodgepodge of Platonic
and Stoic philosophy that came to be known as “Cambridge Platonism.”
By the “early 1640s” Whichcote was teaching what Samuel Salter called a
“nobler, freer and more generous set of opinions” than the Calvinism then
For example, while they advocated innate ideas they did not have much time for the
Platonic doctrine of recollection. See Dominic Scott, “Platonic Recollection and the Cambridge
Platonism,” Hermathena No. 149 (1990): 73-97 (reprinted in Platonism and the English Imagination,
ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 139-50.
Scott, does not discuss Smith in this article but does, rightly, note that he subscribed to a notion of
innate ideas (n.11, pp.77 and 95).
57
58
Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 12.
59
More on their disagreement below.
127
dominant at Emmanuel. 60 More tellingly for our purposes, Bishop Burnet reports
that Whichcote was “disgusted with the dry, systematical way[s]” of his day.
Instead of merely promoting the late scholastic curriculum, Whichcote had
begun to assign more reading in ancient philosophy, “chiefly Plato, Tully
[Cicero] and Plotin[us].” 61 This reference to Plotinus is particularly telling as he
would become a key influence on Smith.
Alison Teply has suggested that another great light in the “Cambridge
Platonist” movement may have been responsible for bringing the study of
Plotinus to Cambridge. Henry More (1614-1687) of Christ’s College (physically
near Emmanuel and also deeply “Puritan” at the time) had read widely in the
“Platonik Writers, Marsilius Ficinus, Plotinus himself” as well as “the Mystical
Divines” by the time he took his degree. 62 Ralph Cudworth too had become a
Fellow at Emmanuel during Smith’s student days there. Passmore has suggested
Samuel Salter, “Preface,” “Eight Letters of Dr. Anthony Tuckney and Dr Benjamin
Whichcote,” in Moral and Religious Aphorisms (London, 1753), xx. Cited in Alison J. Teply, “The
Mystical Theology of Peter Sterry: A Study in Neoplatonist Puritanism” (Ph.D. Thesis, Emmanuel
College, University of Cambridge, 2004), 12.
60
61
Bishop Burnet, History of My Own Time, 1753, 261. Cited by Teply, “Mystical Theology,”
62
Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 11.
12.
128
that Smith was Cudworth’s “pupil and admirer” on the strength of a letter from
Dillingham to Sancroft. 63 The extent to which Smith learned directly from More
or Cudworth is unclear but it is likely that they did reinforce the interests and
competencies that Smith was already forming under the guidance of Whichcote.
Mention should also be made of another, too-often-neglected, figure in the
growth of Platonism at Emmanuel College, Peter Sterry. As Teply has
demonstrated, Sterry was among the very first to “make a public profession of
Platonism in the University of Cambridge.” 64 There is good reason to take this
claim cum grano salis (Platonic theses were defended in the schools throughout
the medieval period from time to time). However, Sterry is nonetheless a critical
example of the combination of Puritanism and Platonism that seems, from the
J. A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 15.
Marjorie Hope Nicolson agrees with this view of the student-pupil relationship between
Cudworth and Smith. See her "Christ's College and the Latitude-Men," Modern Philology 27, no. 1
(1929): 39, 41-2. Despite obvious similarities on many issues (and we will see several in part two
below) there seems to be little reason to suppose that the relationship was unidirectional in the
ways supposed by Passmore and Nicolson. Yes, Cudworth was a Fellow during Smith’s later
student years at Emmanuel but that does not mean that any similarities between the two are the
result of Cudworth’s influence.
63
64
Thomas Baker, Harleian MS 7033; Baker vi. 84. Cited by Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 11.
129
outside, so strange in this period at Emmanuel College. 65 How is it that scholars
raised to be Puritans found their way to Platonism?
Again, Teply has given us the essential clue. There was a small group of
loosely associated Humanist Puritans in this period. 66 Men like Richard
Holdsworth, briefly Master of Emmanuel College who was a “moderate
Calvinist” had taught at the “Platonist Gresham College [London] in 1629”
where he defended “’Pagan’ authors and greatly admir[ed] Plato.” 67 Moreover,
Sterry himself became chaplain to the “Puritan Robert Greville, Lord Brooke”
(1608-1643) in either 1637 or 1638, shortly after being made a fellow of
Emmanuel. Other Puritan Platonists, such as Thomas Dugard (a Sidney Sussex
graduate) also maintained friendships with Sterry and Brooke. Indeed, in the
turmoil leading up to the Civil War, Lord Brooke provided security for many
For an interesting account of another understudied Puritan Platonist see Norma P.
Rogers, “John Sherman: Puritan and Cambridge Platonist” (PhD diss., University of Mississippi,
1986).
65
66
Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 116, 182.
Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 19. See also Sarah Hutton, “Plato in Tudor Academies,” in
Francis Ames-Lewis, ed., Sir Thomas Gresham and Gresham College – Studies in the Intellectual
History of London in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 1999).
67
130
more moderate divines. Thus a circle of temperate Puritans, educated at
Cambridge, and open to Platonic philosophy formed around Brooke. 68
These more tolerant (pseudo-latitudinarian) and humanistic Puritans help
to explain the presence of Platonic learning at Cambridge in the 1630s and
1640s. 69 In fact, it may even be the case that Sterry himself taught John Smith,
thus helping to pass Platonic predilections to our author. In any event, we know
that Smith was well aware of moderate Reformers well read in Platonic
philosophy; Brooke’s Nature of Truth (1640), an influential stimulus to the
“formation of Platonic ideas during the early decades of the seventeenthcentury,” was included in Smith’s library donation to Queens’ College. 70
Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 20-52. See also James Deotis Roberts, From Puritanism to
Platonism in Seventeenth Century England (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
68
On the notion of “latitudinarianism” see Simon Patrick, A Brief Account of the New Sect
of Latitude-Men (London, 1662); Edward Fowler, The Principles and Practices of Certaine Moderate
Divines of the Church of England Abusively Called Latitudinarians (Greatly Misunderstood) Truly
Represented and Defended Wherein (by the Way) Some Controversies of No Mean Importance Are
Succinctly Discussed in a Free Discourse between the Two Intimate Friends: In III Parts, 2nd ed. (London:
Printed for Lodowick Lloyd, 1671); E. A. George, Seventeenth Century Men of Latitude (New York,
1908); Marjorie Hope Nicolson, "Christ's College and the Latitude-Men," Modern Philology 27, no.
1 (1929): 35-53; John Spurr, "'Latitudinarianism' and the Restoration Church," The Historical
Journal 31, no. 1 (1988): 61-82. Most basically the phrase distinguishes a style of churchmanship
noted for tolerance of a wide variety of views and practices so long as essentials are observed. It
is something like a predecessor to what in contemporary America is called “liberal” or “mainline
Protestantism.”
69
70
Ibid., 36. See also Queens’ MS 47, 21, and Saveson, “Catalogue,” 14.
131
Though almost certainly exposed to a wider range of texts and modes of
thought by his tutor Whichcote, and perhaps also Peter Sterry and others too,
Smith’s official education at Emmanuel would have followed the then standard
late scholastic curriculum. However, beyond these generalities, precious little is
known about the education that Smith received at Emmanuel.
Richard Holdsworth (one-time President of Emmanuel) reports an ideal
course of study in his “Directions for Study” but there is no record of what
students such as Smith actually read. 71 This lacuna is mitigated somewhat by the
more general observations scholars have made about the curriculum at
seventeenth century Cambridge more broadly. In what follows, I will outline this
course of study using Costello as a central guide, supplemented by primary
sources related directly to Smith.
The scholar of thirteenth century Paris would have clearly recognized the
work of seventeenth century Cambridge. 72 By this period scholasticism held on
Richard Holdsworth, “Directions for a Student in the Universitie,” Emmanuel College,
Cambridge, MS 1.2.27.(1); reprinted as “Appendix II,” in Harris Francis Fletcher, The Intellectual
Development of John Milton: The Cambridge University Period (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,
1961), 2: 623-64.
71
Though, of course, with the differences that accrue over time in any living tradition.
Scholastic forms and subject matter had come of age in Paris and Oxford during the early
centuries of the first gathering of scholars along the river Cam (12th and 13th centuries).
72
132
as the official mode of thought and instruction in the University and its Colleges,
even if in some respects they had grown tired and merely formal. 73 In an age
such as ours when academic fashions race by at the speed of digital
communications the contrast could not be greater.
Instruction took the form of three basic scholastic practices and the
informal tutoring that still marks an Oxbridge education. Teaching officials in the
Schools and the Colleges gave regular lectures on the central texts of the
curriculum in the medieval style with students taking down lectures word for
word so as to have their text available for later study. By Smith’s day the
increasing accessibility of printed books was making the lecture less important
than it had originally been, but they continued throughout the seventeenth
century nonetheless.
More dynamic than the formal scholastic lecture were the disputation and
its written cousin the declamation. Disputations were held in both the Colleges
and in the Schools as a “way of examining the talents of those who aspired to a
William T. Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 4.
73
133
Cambridge degree.” 74 Theses, which could be assigned or chosen by the student,
were presented with full academic ceremonial and defended via syllogistic
arguments and debate. As live oral battles of wits, the disputations were a
highlight of the academic life of the University as well as being great
entertainment. The intellectual and rhetorical talent required for participants in a
disputation made for excellent training of young scholars. But most of the skills
needed for disputations were practiced in a third form of scholastic practice, the
declamation.
The declamation was essentially “a polished essay,” though, like the
disputation meant to be presented orally. 75 They were regularly assigned, both
privately in College and publically in the Schools. The central task of the
declamation was effective oratory in a clear and plain rhetorical style. However,
precision in argumentation was expected as well. 76
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 146. On the medieval disputation see Alex Novikoff,
“Toward a Cultural History of Scholastic Disputation,” American Historical Review (April 2012):
330-64, accessed 20 April 2014, https://www.academia.edu/4051209/, and The Medieval Culture of
Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2013).
74
75
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 146.
76
Ibid., 32.
134
The primary subject matter for an undergraduate at early seventeenth
century Cambridge followed the scholastic pattern as well. Students read the
three arts of logic, rhetoric, and ethics and the four sciences of metaphysics,
physics, mathematics, and “cosmography” (a combination of geography and
what would today be geology, anthropology, history, and the like). 77 Graduate
studies at Cambridge were limited to the highest medieval disciplines: music,
law, medicine, and above all, theology.
3.3.1 Logic
The logic studied at seventeenth century Cambridge was Aristotelian. 78
This does not mean that it was Aristotle himself that students read however.
Through “such manuals as Keckermann’s Systema Logicae, Burgersdicius’
Institutimum Logicarum Libri Duo, Heorebords Annotamenta, and Eustachius of St.
Paul’s Summa Philosophiae Quadripartia” undergraduates received “Aristotle
Ibid., 148. On the scholastic curriculum in the (Italian) Renaissance see Paul Oskar
Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains (New York: Harper &
Row, 1961), 92-119.
77
On British Aristotelianism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see Marco Sgarbi,
“Towards a Reassessment of British Aristotelianism,” Vivarium 50 no. 1 (2012): 85-109. Smith’s
logical training is best seen in his argumentation for the principles of natural theology. See
section 6.1 below.
78
135
resystematized and simplified.” 79 Thus, the syllogism and a priori argument was
highly praised as the way to true science. This lead to a relative lack of attention
to inductive, a posteriori, methods of argument in the Cambridge curriculum.
Over time, this meant that the newer scientific approaches of Bacon and Galileo
had no clear line of entry into the curriculum. As we will see below, Smith
managed to work around this delay in the modernization of the curriculum
through extensive reading, discussion, and correspondence. 80
3.3.2 Rhetoric
Every reader of Smith has been impressed by his eloquence. While
undoubtedly owning to his own unique genius, rhetoric was also a central part
of the seventeenth century curriculum as well. Having learned through his
studies in logic to seek the truth the Cambridge undergraduate turned to rhetoric
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 45. Also, M. Sgarbi, “Logic in the Universities of the
British Isles,” in The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiricism (Dordrecht: Springer,
2013), 35-9.
79
John Wallis appealed to correspondence with Smith to back up his claim to have
developed a method for solving cubic equations in which he mentions that Smith had asked him
for his assistance on a some aspects of Descartes’ Geometry. John Wallis, A Treatise on Algebra, both
Historical and Critical (London: Richard Davis, Oxford, 1685), 121, 177, 209. The original
correspondence with Smith is lost but the contents thereof have been more-or-less reconstructed
in Philip Beeley and Christoph Scriba, eds., Correspondence of John Wallis (1616-1703) (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003), 1: 9.
80
136
to make some profitable use of that truth. Holdsworth says of rhetoric that it
“teaches the nature of men’s passions and affections, how to raise and move
them, how to allay, quiet and change them, a knowledge necessary not only in
writing, but speeches and letters, but also in common discourse and dealing with
men, if not to make use of it yourself at least to discover it to other men that you
may not be at any time abused and over reached by it.” 81 In short, rhetoric
teaches one how to persuade and how not to be persuaded by others too easily.
In the still largely oral academic culture of seventeenth century Cambridge the
ability to speak well cannot be overestimated.
Holdsworth recommends that students keep a commonplace book (i.e.,
notebook) for what Costello calls “the idiomatic fruits of reading” primarily in
the Latin classics. 82 The idea being to learn artful expression by imitation of the
masters and in the process to gain fluency in good Latin too. 83 In addition to this
method of imitation, Holdsworth recommended a number of manuals in oratory,
Holdsworth, “Directions,” quoted in Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 55. On the use of
these notebooks in early modern England see Richard Yeo, “Notebooks as Memory Aids:
Precepts and Practices in Early Modern England,” Memory Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 115-36.
81
For an example of these “notebooks” see C. J. Cook, The Palfrey Notebook: Records of
Study in Seventeenth-Century Cambridge (Woodbridg: Boydell Press, 2011).
82
83
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 56.
137
but above all that of the French Jesuit, Nicolas Caussin (1583-1651), De Eloqentia
sacra et humana. 84
Smith would seem to have taken this, or some similar, advice to heart as
his single extant “commonplace book” is full of quotations from the Greek and
Roman classics, poetry, oratory, history, geography as well as the philosophical
sciences. 85 Moreover, the list of authorities given in the early pages of Caussin’s
De Eloquentia (1630) includes nearly every author referenced by Smith in his
Select Discourses, with the exceptions of moderns like Descartes and Platonists
such as Plotinus and Proclus. 86 For example, Caussin recommends Aristotle,
Cicero, Augustine, Plato, Plutarch, Tacitus, Pliny, (Pseudo-)Dionysius, Origen,
Ibid., 56-7. Holdsworth, “Directions,” 11, 33. Nicholas Caussin, De Eloquentia Sacra et
Humana Libri XVI (Cologne, 1634). A slightly earlier edition of this same text was still being used
by the American Founding Father, John Adams (1735-1826) in the eighteenth century. As Adams
was educated at Harvard College and that institution’s roots lay in Emmanuel College,
Cambridge, it would seem likely that the advice to study Caussin’s rhetoric continued well into
the century following Holdsworth’s “Directions.” Adams’ own copy is Nicholas Caussin, De
Eloquentia Sacra et Humana Libri XVI (Paris, 1630), Internet Archive, accessed 16 April 2014,
https://archive.org/details/nicolaicaussinit00caus. On the connections between the two
Cambridges, see Daniel Walker Howe, “The Cambridge Platonists of Old England and the
Cambridge Platonists of New England,” Church History, 57, no. 4 (1988), 470-85.
84
Cambridge University Library MS Dd.ix.44. This manuscript is described in A Catalogue
of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge, ed. Syndics of the
University Press (Cambridge: University Press, 1856), I: 403 (item 531). It contains historical,
geographical and cosmographical notes on many topics as well as some notes on figures of
philosophical and theological significance.
85
86
Caussin, “Auctores qui Laudantur et Expenduntur,” in De Eloquentia.
138
Clement of Alexandria, Chrysostom, Tertullian, and others, all of whom appear
in Smith’s Discourses frequently. A fine copy of De Eloquentia was donated by
Smith to Queens’ College. 87
Holdsworth was also keen on memorizing choice passages out of key
authors in a process he called “getting without book.” It would seem that Smith
excelled at this too, since Simon Patrick referred to him as a “living library”
capable of sharing what he had gleaned from his wide reading with any who
should seek to converse with him. 88
3.3.3 Ethics
As in many other areas, the curriculum at Cambridge looked to Aristotle
for its guide to ethics, at least in the early decades of the seventeenth century.
Aristotelian “virtue ethics” was studied, like logic, less in the original than in
commentaries or summaries by Catholics such as “Victoria, Lessius, De Lugo,
Suarez, and Dominicus Soto” and Protestants like “Melanchthon or Grotius.” 89
Queens’ MS 47, 22; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 20. See Charles Trinkaus, In our Image and
Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1995).
87
88
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 58; Simon Patrick, “Funeral Sermon” (1660), 506-7.
89
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 64.
139
Thus while Aristotelian, the student of ethics was also exposed to (relatively)
modern texts and concerns. For example, Smith himself owned four works by
Grotius, including a copy of the Mare Liberum. 90 His collection also included the
Historiae Florentinae of Machiavelli, 91 Sadler’s Rights of the Kingdom (1649), 92 and
John Selden’s De Jure Naturali (1640), 93 among many others.
While centrally concerned with virtue after the style of Aristotle, the
Cambridge undergraduate knew this approach to morality as it related to others
from classical antiquity as well. Fellow student at Emmanuel, John Balderston,
notes the Epicurean concern for pleasure, the Stoic view of virtue as its own
Smith also owned copies of Grotius’ Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi,
adversus Faustum Socinum (Leyden, 1617), Apologeticus (Paris, 1622), De Imperio Summarum
Potestatum circa Sacra, Commentarius Posthumus (Paris, 1647), as well as the Mare Liberum (edition
uncertain). Queens’ MS 47, 25; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 30, 70 n.54. Smith’s own moral theory is
essentially Aristotelean in the sense that it places great emphasis on the cultivation of virtue. But,
far more importantly, his ethics is theological and spiritual. See especially chapters four and five
below.
90
Queens’ MS 47, 29; J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue,” 42. Nicolai Machiavelli, Historiae
Florentinae Libri VIII (Strassburg, 1610).
91
Queens’ MS 47, 32; J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue,” 53. John Sadler, Rights of the Kingdom; or
customs of our Ancestours (London, 1649).
92
Queens’ MS 47, 33; J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue,” 55. John Selden, De Jure Naturali et
Gentium, juxta Disciplinam Ehraeorum Libri Septem (London, 1640).
93
140
reward, the Platonic goal of “assimilation to God” along with Aristotle’s
“virtuous activity.” 94
In an age as fully saturated with religion (and religious controversy) as the
seventeenth century in England, much of what would today be the purview of
philosophical (meta)ethics was then dealt with under the rubric of theology.
Questions about the moral nature of humanity for example often took the form
of disputes between Catholic and Protestant (and different types of each) over
predestination, justification, etc. 95
3.3.4 Metaphysics
For the seventeenth century, as it had for centuries, metaphysics meant
the primary philosophical science, which dealt with the most generalized
principles of being and which prescinded being entirely from its status as
literary or economic, sensible or suprasensible. 96
In other words, metaphysics included the study of Being qua Being, just as it had
for Aristotle. Closely aligned with theology, in that it too dealt with God,
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 65. See also John Sellars, Stoicism (Berkeley and Los
Angles: University of California Press, 2006).
94
On this see, for example, Jill Kraye, Risto Saarinen, eds., Moral Philosophy on the
Threshold of Modernity (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006).
95
96
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 71.
141
metaphysics differed in that it did not rely on revelation but instead upon reason
alone (or so the scholastic thought). Natural theology therefore was a matter of
metaphysical speculation but so too was the general principles of substance,
form, potential, actuality, and the four causes, which are central to an
Aristotelian account of any sensible or material being at all.
Despite the predominance of Aristotelian metaphysics at seventeenth
century Cambridge, the Platonic tradition was not (completely) neglected. For
example, Neoplatonic themes are clearly apparent in verses composed to
introduce some disputations in the Schools. 97 Moreover, as early as 1605 the
Platonic thesis that “the soul of the man is the man” (Animus cuiusque quisque)
was defended before the Schools and was introduced with the statement that
“only Plato [and presumably the Platonists with him] among all the philosophers
dared” to hold this thesis. The disputant continues, “This opinion is acceptable to
me, not because Platonic, though Plato’s authority carries more weight with me
than that of any other philosopher, but because his opinion seems to me to
approach nearer the truth.” 98 So, while the architectonic of metaphysical study
97
Ibid., 18.
98
Quoted in Costello, 30.
142
remained Aristotelian, already by the early years of the seventeenth century
room was being made for the Platonism that would come to prominence in
Smith and the other Cambridge Platonists. 99
With Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, Smith was among the first at
Cambridge to read the new metaphysics of Rene Descartes. While More carried
on a correspondence with Descartes and both he and Cudworth cooled to his
system over time, Smith remained an uncritical admirer of Cartesian philosophy
up to his death in 1652. For Smith, Cartesian dualism sat well with ancient
The “Platonism” of the Cambridge Platonists was never pure or simple however. As
Sarah Hutton has cautioned, the Cambridge Platonists were well versed in many schools of
ancient philosophy (Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, etc.) as well as the new developments
of Descartes and Hobbes. See Hutton, "The Cambridge Platonists" and “Introduction to the
Renaissance and Seventeenth Century,” in Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton, eds., Platonism and
the English Imagination (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 67-75. Also, John Sellars, “Stoics
Against Stoics in Cudworth’s A Treatise of Freewill,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20
no.5 (2012): 935-52, and “Is God a Mindless Vegetable? Cudworth on Stoic Theology,” Intellectual
History Review 21 no.2 (2011): 121-33; and This mixed bag should not come as a surprise however.
The Platonism present in scholastic philosophy was always a hybrid form combining Christian,
Stoic, and Aristotelian elements. In short, scholastic Platonism was Christian Neoplatonism.
99
143
Platonism. 100 In Descartes’ metaphysics “Smith found contemporary support for
the philosophy of Plotinus.” 101
There are no references to Thomas Hobbes in the Select Discourses at all;
Smith seems to have been unaware of Hobbes’s challenge to the incorporeal soul
and the spiritual God that Smith took for granted. 102 Where More and Cudworth
were to become strong opponents of new varieties of corporealism, 103 the atheism
and materialism that concerned Smith took the form of ancient atomism
(Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius). 104 Commentators have typically
dismissed this as a touch of antiquarian curiosity on his part, as if these ancient
“Gli stessi argomenti per l'immortalita dell'anima in cui l'originalita di Smith consiste
nella combinazione di platonismo e cartesianesimo, sono discussioni speculative elaborate dalla
ragione per chiarire una convinzione generata dall fede . . . ” (Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 100;
see also 81 and 262). See also chapter six below.
100
Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 30. Also, Saveson, “Differing
Reactions to Descartes among the Cambridge Platonists,” Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960):
567.
101
102
Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 141.
On More’s opposition to Descartes see Hall, Henry More, 135-7, 146-67, 193, 236. For
More and Cudworth against Hobbes see I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-century
Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 80-133. For an argument on behalf of Hobbes against Cudworth see
Stewart Duncan, "Knowledge of God in ‘Leviathan’,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 no.1 (2005):
31-48. For Cudworth against Descartes see, for example, his True Intellectual System (1678), 53.
103
104
Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 332. See chapter 6 below.
144
theories were irrelevant. 105 In this, scholarship on Smith has sold him short as a
Christian apologist just as set against materialism as More and Cudworth.
While atomism and various forms of attendant materialism did explode
on to the European philosophical scene in the mid-seventeenth century, the roots
of this flowering go far deeper and were well known to Smith. For one thing, late
medieval and early Renaissance philosophy already had significant attempts to
explain the natural world in terms of atoms, among them the religious reformer
John Wycliffe (1320-84). 106 Both Erasmus and Sir Thomas More in the sixteenth
century thought the philosophy of Lucretius a serious enough matter to compose
a fictional dialogue titled The Epicurean (Erasmus) and to include the epicurean
“pleasure principle” as the guiding force of the (superior) morality of the
inhabitants of Utopia (More). 107
Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2:141-2 and Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist
Spirituality, 29-30 are typical in this regard.
105
Emily Michael, “John Wyclif’s Atomism,” in Christophe Grellard, and Aurâelien
Robert, eds., Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 183-220.
106
Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2011), 227-8. Desiderius Erasmus, “The Epicurean,” in Colloquies, Vol. 1,
trans. Craig Ringwalt Thompson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 1070-94. Thomas
More, Utopia, ed. George M. Logan and Robert Merrihew Adams (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002). In their later disputes Martin Luther often accused Erasmus
of being an “epicurean,” clear evidence that it was plausible that one might be such in the early
sixteenth century. Charles Kay Smith, “French Philosophy and English Politics in Interregnum
107
145
In the early seventeenth century, on the heels of the execution of Giordano
Bruno, Jesuits at the University of Pisa were given a Latin prayer against the
temptations of atomism to recite daily.
Nothing comes from atoms.
All the bodies of the world shine with the beauty of their forms.
Without these the globe would only be an immense chaos.
In the beginning God made all things, so that they might generate something.
Consider to be nothing that from which nothing can come.
You, O Democritus, form nothing different starting from atoms.
Atoms produce nothing; therefore atoms are nothing. 108
When Bruno began to write his “heretical” views of the cosmos as infinite, the
heliocentric solar system, 109 pantheism, and the denial of the divinity of Jesus, he
chose to do so in Latin verse, following Lucretius’s De rerum natura as his
guide. 110 Indeed, Greenblatt has argued convincingly that Bruno was deeply
Poetry,” in Malcolm Smuts, ed., The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 177. Also, Catherine Wilson, “Epicureanism in
Early Modern Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, ed. James Warren
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 266-86.
Anonymous, “Exercitatio de formis substantialibus et de qualitatibus physicis, in
Pietro Reddondi, Galileo Heretic, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 340, quoted
by Greenblatt, The Swerve, 250.
108
109
See Koyré, Closed World, 28-57.
Ingrid D. Rowland, Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/Heretic (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2008), 214. Importantly, it was not for his scientific views that Bruno was burnt at the
stake in 1600 but rather his theological opinions. There was no official position within the
Catholic Church against heliocentrism at the time. Sheila Rabin, "Nicolaus Copernicus," The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 16 August 2010, accessed 19
110
146
influenced by his reading of Lucretius while Rowland notes that much of what is
“most revolutionary” in Bruno “had already been ventured by ancient Greek
philosophers.” 111
In England, Puritans frequently hurled the label “epicurean” at the
despised members of King Charles’ Court. Some of this was simply a fashionable
and learned way of calling Royalists un-Godly in the moral sense. However,
there were actually some entanglements with actual philosophical Epicureanism
at Court too. 112 Clearly, then, materialism in the form of Epicurean atomism was
a living concern in Smith’s day. When he offers arguments directed against
Epicurus and Lucretius he is not only offering a lesson in the history of
April 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/copernicus/. Also, M. A.
Finocchiaro, “Philosophy versus Religion and Science versus Religion: the Trials of Bruno and
Galileo,” in H. Gatti, ed., Giordano Bruno: Philosopher of the Renaissance (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002),
51–96.
111
Greenblatt, The Swerve, 233-41; Rowland, Giordano Bruno, 216.
C. K. Smith, “French Philosophy and English Politics,” 177-8. Also, Reid Barbour, “The
Early Stuart Epicure,” English Literary Renaissance 23 (1993): 173-200; Douglas Brooks-Davis, The
Mercurian Monarch: Magical Politics from Spencer to Pope (Manchester, 1983), 101-7. More generally,
see Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008).
112
147
philosophy. Smith is there making a case against a real threat to sound Christian
philosophy as he understands it. 113
3.3.5 Physics
Early seventeenth century physics included elements of what today
would be called philosophy and several sciences too. What kept all the disparate
strands of physics, or natural philosophy, together was that it treated being in so
far as it is subject to change. Physics was, in its more philosophical guise,
essentially “concerned with the universal principles of matter, form, time, place,
and extension.” 114 In addition, physics treated the physical composition of the
universe including astronomy, the elements (ether, fire, air, water, and earth),
There are two potential reasons why this has been ignored by scholars working on
Smith and the Cambridge Platonists more broadly. First, it has become eccentric in the extreme to
think of ancient schools of philosophy, and the texts associated with them, as anything like a
living challenge to our understandings of nature and ourselves. This was not so in Smith’s day
when, as we have seen, the texts, phrases, and modes of thought of the ancients were the very
stuff of current thinking and writing. Second, compared to More and Cudworth (who lived to
respond to the challenge of Hobbes and the “mind-body problem” in ways that were not as
relevant in Smith’s lifetime, Smith offers relatively little in the way of explicit argument against
his ancient atomist foes. See chapter six in part II below for my argument that this owes much to
Smith’s reliance on the spiritual senses in his theology. In short, for Smith one can “see” that the
Epicurean system is false when one lives and thus comes to consciousness of the true Christian
Neoplatonic system.
113
114
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 90.
148
Aristotelian psychology including the rational soul of human beings, and the
origin of the world.
3.3.6 Mathematics
The state of mathematical knowledge at early seventeenth century
Cambridge lagged well behind that of universities in Italy and elsewhere.
Emmanuel student John Wallis reports that during his time there (the early
1630s) he “did thenceforth prosecute it [mathematics] . . . not as a formal study,
but as a pleasing diversion, at spare hours . . . For I had none to direct me.” 115 The
general lack of notebooks and disputations related to mathematics makes it all
the more remarkable that among Smith’s personal library collection are several
works from the cutting edge of early modern mathematics. For example, Smith
owned a copy of Descartes’ Geometry and many books of astronomy in the
tradition of Copernicus. 116 These include eleven works by Kepler, Galileo’s
Dialogus de Systemate Mundi, as well as works by Rheticus (Narratio Prima) and
the scientific works of Giordano Bruno. 117
115
Quoted in Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 102.
116
Saveson, “The Library of John Smith,” 216.
117
Ibid.; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 14, 28-9, 37.
149
In addition to these newer texts in mathematics and physics, Smith also
possessed, and likely used in conjunction with Descartes’ Geometry in his
mathematical teaching, copies of the geometrical works of Jacobi de Billy,
Bonaventura Cavalieri, Oronce Fine, Marini Ghetaldi, Michaelis Havemanni,
Petri Ryffii, and Petrus Ramus. 118 He would have also had available the Elements
of Euclid with an influential preface by the sixteenth century magus John Dee. 119
Mordechai Feingold tells us that it was most likely Smith, and a few others, that
set Isaac Barrow on his path toward the development of the fundamental
theorem of calculus, a key step on the road to the great breakthroughs of
Barrow’s student, Isaac Newton a generation later. 120 Unlike his contemporaries,
Smith both had the opportunity to study mathematics and obviously the
proficiency to help bring that field to prominence at Cambridge by the end of the
seventeenth century.
118
Saveson, “Catalogue,” 12, 17, 28, 32, 51.
Translated by Sir Henry Billingsley and first published in 1570 and again in 1650. On
the preface by Dee see, Gerald Suster, ed., John Dee (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 2003),
37-46.
119
Mordechai Feingold, “Isaac Barrow: Divine, Scholar, Mathematician,” in Mordechai
Feingold, ed., Before Newton: The Life and Times of Isaac Barrow (Cambridge University Press, 1990),
19. More on Smith’s mathematical teaching below.
120
150
3.3.7 Cosmography
The last of the four sciences in the undergraduate curriculum is virtually
unheard of today and in fact was heavily neglected even in the seventeenth
century. Cosmography was the science of the general features of the cosmos,
including the heavens and the Earth. It included what today would be called
geophysics and geography, but also history, physical and cultural anthropology,
and comparative religions/philosophies too. Cosmography treated the shape and
location of geographic features as well as the cultures and histories of the
inhabitants of far off lands.
Surprisingly, given the pace of English colonization at the time, there was
little emphasis on cosmography at seventeenth century Cambridge. This may be
related, as Costello suggests, to the poor state of mathematical knowledge since
cartography increasingly relied on mathematics during this period. 121 But, most
likely the work of merchants and explorers was simply not “academic” enough
to receive attention at Cambridge in the early modern period. 122
121
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 104.
Even so, there were notable efforts made in this area such as the cosmographic works
of Samuel Purchas. Ibid.
122
151
In this area, Smith’s interests seem to be particularly unusual for his
context. As we have already seen, he had deep interests in the geography and
history of the world. Smith’s commonplace book is mostly full of citations from
histories. 123 His library too included a vast number of histories and geographic
texts as well. 124 Smith’s interests here are suggestive of an active imagination on
his part, precisely the sort of lively faculty that plays a central role in his version
of the spiritual senses. 125
In light of his unusual interest in cosmography, mathematics and the new
physics, Smith was clearly no less concerned with the developments of his own
day than the classical and scholastic elements of his education. Smith was a
modern scholar but one who clearly knew his scholastic tradition too. As we will
see in Part II below, this combination was to serve him well when he came to
compose his Select Discourses.
A Catalogue of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge, ed.
Syndics of the University Press (Cambridge: University Press, 1856), I: 403 (item 531).
123
For example, the geographical works of Lamberti Danaei, Ferrari, Abraham Golnitzi,
among many others. Saveson, “Catalogue,” 24, 27, 31.
124
125
See part two below.
152
3.3.8 Theology
In addition to the undergraduate studies outlined above there were four
graduate disciplines in early modern Cambridge; theology, medicine, law, and
music. 126 There is little evidence however of any particular interest in law or
music on Smith’s part, and this is basically in keeping with the overall paucity of
these studies at Cambridge. Medicine too was not a major concern of the scholars
along the Cam. Most who did study the healing arts did so after they left
Cambridge, often at the great international center for medical training, Padua, as
we have seen in the example of Harvey. 127 The one area that really excelled at
Cambridge was theology. We will see much more about the religious situation in
Smith’s time at Cambridge in the next section but the academic aspects (which
are not really distinguishable from the more general religious and political
situation) can be presented relatively briefly.
At Emmanuel there were, by statute, weekly theological disputations that
were intended to follow the “usual custom of the other colleges.” 128 Presumably
126
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 107.
Ibid., 128-45. On Renaissance medical education see Nancy G. Siraisi, Medieval and
Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2009), 48-77.
127
128
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 110.
153
then, such theological battles of wits were common across Cambridge. In
addition to disputations conducted by Fellows and attended by scholars there
were opportunities to be schooled in the basics of Puritan, that is Calvinist,
theology at Emmanuel. For example, in 1628 Anthony Tuckney, who would
eventually engage in valuable epistolary debate with Whichcote and rise to the
Mastership of Emmanuel, delivered what has been recorded as “A brief and
pithy catechism” in the College Chapel.
This catechesis as well as the numerous sermons given in chapel (attended
by all while in college), from the pulpits of the surrounding churches, and the
University sermons given at Great St. Mary’s were well attended by scholars
who were encouraged to take them down word for word (“diting”) so that their
content could be further reflected on and studied later. 129 Often sermons were
answered by another preacher in something resembling the disputation; a kind
of disputation by alternating sermons. 130 The Divinity School disputations too
“were the acme of the school exercises, and the undergraduates attended.” 131
129
Ibid., 111.
130
Ibid., 111-2.
131
Ibid., 112.
154
Thus, the Cambridge student was well versed and rehearsed in theology and
theological controversy. 132
The content of the majority of theological instruction at Cambridge in the
early seventeenth century was Reformed, in the Lutheran/Calvinist sense, while
on issues of ecclesiology, ritual, and the like, opinions differed from very nearly
what would today be called Anglo-Catholic to non-conformist and extreme
Protestant (Presbyterian, Congregational, etc.). Even those who wished to
maintain the episcopacy and the rituals of the medieval church tended to be
thoroughly Protestant on issues of salvation, stressing the free gift of salvation
through faith. Indeed, the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England are fully
consistent with a Reformed interpretation even as they keep open the possibility
of retaining some Catholic practices. This is why, while Emmanuel College was a
clearly “Puritan” institution in Smith’s day, this does not mean that its members
opposed the established Church of England. Not all Puritans were nonconformists, or indeed Parliamentarians during the Civil War. Holdsworth, for
example, was both a Puritan and a Royalist.
So much so that one recent graduate was able to argue, complete with full scholastic
flourish, with a French Catholic priest in Latin. Ibid.
132
155
The theology taught along the Cam was a kind of scholastic Protestantism.
Prominent among the disputation topics in theology were the central issues of
contention between Protestants and Catholics at the time. However the only real
options open to members of Cambridge Colleges was how Protestant to be;
Catholicism was itself essentially illegal from 1559-1685 and again from 16881829 in England. 133 Students of theology included Calvinists of various stripes,
including the more extreme Puritans like Anthony Tuckney, but also Arminians
of either High (Laudian) or Low Church sorts too. 134 While they differed deeply
“History of the Catholic Church in England (16th – 19th Century),” Pope Benedict XVI
in the United Kingdom, accessed 16 April 2014http://www.thepapalvisit.org.uk/The-CatholicFaith/History-of-the-Catholic-Church-in-England-16th-19th-Century. Edwin Burton, Edward
D'Alton, and Jarvis Kelley, "Penal Laws," in The Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. 11 (New York: Robert
Appleton Company, 1911), accessed 16 April 2014,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11611c.htm.
133
Arminianism takes its name from Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609). His basic tenants
were: “1. Prior to being drawn and enabled, one is unable to believe . . . able only to resist. 2.
Having been drawn and enabled, but prior to regeneration, one is able to believe . . . able also to
resist. 3. After one believes, God then regenerates; one is able to continue believing . . . able also
to resist. 4. Upon resisting to the point of unbelief, one is unable again to believe . . . able only to
resist” (Stephen Ashby, "Reformed Arminianism," in Four Views on Eternal Security [Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2002], 159). Thus, “Arminianism” is associated, especially by (orthodox) Calvinists
with the notion that one may (must) cooperate with grace in the process of salvation. Arminians
were often accused of Pelagianism (the heresy that original sin left no taint on human nature) by
opponents. The classic study with regard to the Cambridge Platonists (Cudworth and More
primarily) is Rosalie L. Colie, Light and Enlightenment: A Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the
Dutch Arminians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). “Laudian” refers to that style of
churchmanship promulgated by Archbishop William Laud. It was “High” in ritual and
ecclesiology and tended toward Arminianism in theology.
134
156
on issues of grace, justification, the freedom of the will as well as ritual and
polity, a common collection of texts and authors remained the steady diet of the
typical Cambridge divine. Medieval schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas,
Bonaventure, and John Duns Scotus, were read and used along with modern
scholastics such as Suarez, Molina, and Victoria. 135 With these masters, and many
others, the scholar was also expected to turn to the Church Fathers for help in
understanding scripture. Among them, Augustine, Justin Martyr, Clement of
Alexandria, and Ambrose of Millan, figured prominently. Even a figure of such
questioned orthodoxy as Origen was read, even at Puritan Emmanuel. 136
Notice should also be made of the move toward reading scripture in its
original languages, Hebrew and Greek, rather than in Latin only. Here the
driving forces are Renaissance humanism and the Protestant Reformation. In
Costello, Scholastic Curriculum, 121, and 81. Scholastic authors abound in the libraries
of Emmanuel and Queens’ Colleges in the early seventeenth century. See S. Bush, Jr. and C. J.
Rasmussen, The Library of Emmanuel College Cambridge 1584-1637 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005) and T. H. Horne, A Catalogue of the Library of The College of St. Margaret and
St. Bernard, Commonly Called Queen’s College in the University of Cambridge (London, 1827).
135
Origen‘s Contra Celsum, was owned by both Emmanuel and Queens‘ Colleges’s
Libraries in a 1605 Greek and Latin edition. For Emmanuel College see Bush and Rasmussen, The
Library of Emmanuel College, 146. This volume was in the collection for the first year of Smith‘s
undergraduate studies in the College. There was also most likely a copy, of the same edition, at
Queens‘ College when he became a fellow in 1644. See Horne, Catalogue, 122. The edition in both
cases was that of David Hoeschelius.
136
157
fact, it was Catholic humanism that led to Erasmus’ Greek New Testament. And
one of the first great vernacular translations of the Bible was composed by
Martin Luther in German from that quintessential work of humanist
scholarship. 137 Moreover, many an Oxbridge don was set to work in the early
seventeenth century putting the sacred texts into English out of their originals. 138
Smith too was well read in Hebrew and Greek as well as Latin, and shows
clear signs of interest in other Near Eastern languages in his library collection as
well. 139 Like Thomas Aquinas, who read and learned from Maimonides, and the
Renaissance Platonist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who read the Kabbalah,
John Smith benefited from a relatively extensive study of Judaica. Smith was well
Luther’s New Testament in Early New High German (1522) used as its source text the
second edition of Erasmus’s Textus Receptus (1519).
137
The Holy Bible, Conteyning the Old Testament, and the New: Newly Translated out of the
Originall Tongues (London: Robert Barker, 1611). On the process of translating this “Authorized”
or “King James Version” from a theological perspective see Alister McGrath, In the Beginning: The
Story of the King James Bible and How It Changed a Nation, a Language, and a Culture (New York:
Random House, 2008), and for a historical account, Adam Nicolson, God's Secretaries: The Making
of the King James Bible (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).
138
139
Saveson, "The Library of John Smith," 216 ; Saveson, “Catalogue,” 9-78.
158
versed in the Talmud and the works of many Rabbis, but above all the Great
Rambam himself whom he relies on often in his discourse on prophecy. 140
As we have seen above, Smith was both a product of his educational
milieu and in some respects highly unusual for his day. His fluency with the
classics shows his clear debt to the late scholastic curriculum. Simultaneously his
interest and expertise in the new science, mathematics and cosmography mark
him out as a thoroughly modern thinker as well. However, even his modern
concerns for geography and history are typically put to use in service of Smith’s
classical rhetoric. As we will see in part II, the new learning seemed to fit in
seamlessly with the old for Smith; all offering occasions for embellishment with
an apt quote or commonplace.
Perhaps most noteworthy in terms of Smith’s divergence from the typical
pattern is his Platonism. In an age still dominated by the long (albeit dimming)
shadow of Aristotle, Smith and his colleagues were unusual for their interest in,
This rabbinic learning is nowhere more in evidence than in the sixth of his Select
Discourses, “Of Prophesie” (Smith, Select Discourses [1660], 167-280). The wealth of references
herein to the work of Maimonides and other Rabbis may help to account for this discourse
remaining influential well into the following century and beyond. Indeed, this discourse was
translated into Latin for a Continental audience and included in Jean Le Clerc’s Commentary on the
Prophets (Amsterdam, 1731). The further details of Smith’s reading and influences in theology are
explored in depth in chapter four below.
140
159
and approval of, Platonic modes of thought. However, it would be a mistake to
make too much of this apparent “outbreak” of Platonism at Cambridge.
Platonism had always been present within scholasticism and Smith is a second
generation Platonist after Whichcote and Sterry. 141 Moreover, the rhetorical text
recommended by Holdsworth at Emmanuel lists Plato and several Platonist
Fathers as important authorities. Among them, Smith was particularly drawn to
Origen and Clement of Alexandria. Interest in the later pagan Neoplatonists,
such as Simplicius (c.490 – c.560) who Smith cites approvingly many times, is
much more unusual for a seventeenth century Cambridge scholar. However, this
is in all likelihood the influence of the Renaissance Neoplatonism centered in the
Platonic Academy of Florence. There Ficino and others were acquainted with,
used, and translated later Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus and Proclus. 142
See, for example, Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as
Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). On
Whichcote, Sterry, More, and other contemporary Platonists see Teply, “Mystical Theology,” 1821, 36-52.
141
Ficino alone translated Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Iamblichus, and PseudoDionysius. He also wrote commentaries on several of Plato’s dialogues, Plotinus, Porphyry, and
Proclus and used a wide variety of platonic and Hermetic sources in his own constructive work.
Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York: Columbia University Press,
1943); James Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1989); Amos Edelheit,
Ficino, Pico, and Savonarola: The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/2-1498 (Leiden: Brill, 2008);
Michael J. B. Allen, and Valery Rees, with Martin Davies, eds., Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His
Philosophy, His Legacy (Leiden: Brill, 2002). On the rise of Platonism in the Renaissance see, for
142
160
3.4 The Politics of Faith: Civil War & Fellowship at Queens’
The religious and political context into which Smith was born is the stuff
of whole libraries, and, therefore, cannot be given adequate treatment here. 143
Nonetheless, it is critical to an appreciation of Smith to note at least the broadest
outlines of the religio-political situation.
From the start, no one was happy with the English Reformation. Begun as
a matter of state to remedy Henry VIII’s (1491-1547) need for a male heir, it also
afforded an opportunity for what started as an underground movement keen to
example, K. Meredith Ziebart, Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect: A Case Study in 15thCentury Fides-Ratio Controversy (Leiden: Brill, 2013) and James Hankins, Humanism and Platonism
in the Italian Renaissance, Vol. 1 (Rome: Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 2003). On Plato in England at
this period see Sears Jayne, Plato in Renaissance England (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1995). The classic study of the impact of Florentine Platonism in England is Ernst Cassirer, The
Platonic Renaissance in England, trans. James P. Pettegrove (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,
1953). However, the impact on the Cambridge Platonists seems to have been primarily as
transmitters of ancient Platonist texts. Smith, for example, makes no explicit reference to Ficino’s
thought at all. See Sarah Hutton, “Marsilio Ficino and Ralph Cudworth,” in The Rebirth of Platonic
Theology, ed. James Hankins and Fabrizio Meroi (Florence: Olschki, 2013), 295-310.
Particularly useful secondary sources include: Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform, 12501550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1981); Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Reformation: A History (New York: Penguin,
2005); David Bagchi, and David C. Steinmetz, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Reformation
Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and G. W. Bernard, The King's
Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the English Church (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2007).
143
161
follow the lead of the Protestant Reformers in Continental Europe. 144 With the
Act of Supremacy (1534) ties between English bishops and the Pope were cut and
shortly thereafter Henry declared himself to be head of the English Church. 145
Upon his death in 1547, Henry’s Protestant son Edward succeeded to the
throne and used the royal supremacy to take the Church in a much more
Reformed, Calvinist, direction. 146 Just as the Church seemed to be heading clearly
Many of whom first began to read Luther at the White Horse Inn in Cambridge. This is
commemorated with a “blue plaque” on an otherwise nondescript wall of King’s College facing
King’s Parade. See Jo Edkins, “Plaques and notices in Cambridge,” 2010, accessed 15 April 2014,
http://gwydir.demon.co.uk/jo/walks/plaques.htm#inn.
144
Still, the King that had earned the title “defender of the faith” for his opposition to
Luther’s views on the sacraments remained a Catholic at heart. Bernard, The King’s Reformation,
225-42. Also, Christopher Haigh, English Reformations: Religion, Politics and Society under the Tudors
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152-67.
145
“Calvinist” is a notoriously difficult label. In general however, it refers to followers of
the theology of John Calvin (laid out in his many scriptural commentaries and in the Institutio
Christianae religionis [1536] and subsequently revised and translated several times; John Calvin,
Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beverage [London, 1599]). In general, what is
typically taken to represent Calvin’s thought most, especially in early seventeenth century
England, are (1) the sufficiency of scripture, (2) salvation by faith not works or merit, (3)
emphasis on covenant, (4) total depravity owing to original sin, (5) monergism in salvation
through God’s free election and grace (there is no cooperation with grace on the part of the
believer), and (6) double-predestination, the idea that God has already ordained some for
salvation and some for damnation. Beyond these basics, Calvinist or Reformed theologians differ
widely on specifics. Returning to the Reformation in England, in 1548, “images” began to be
removed from churches, including also vestments, ashes, palms, holy water, and crucifixes – all
important objects in Catholic ritual. In 1549 Thomas Cranmer finished the first English Book of
Common Prayer, emphasizing the participation of the laity, providing for the reading of the entire
Bible over the year, and retaining the fast days but not also the feasts of the saints. Three years
later this first Book of Common Prayer was replaced by a second that was even more expressly
Protestant; it removed all reference to the “real presence” of Christ in the eucharist, did away
146
162
in the direction of Calvinism in terms of ritual, polity, and doctrine Edward VI
died only to be followed by his half-sister Mary and the return of Roman
Catholicism in 1554. Protestants of many varieties were executed at the stake
during Mary’s brief reign; nearly three hundred in total including five bishops,
one hundred priests, and sixty women. 147
In 1558 the moderate Protestant Elizabeth was crowned Queen, ushering
in the “Elizabethan Settlement.” 148 In 1563, the Thirty-nine Articles were drafted
as a statement of doctrine for the Church of England, marking the via media of
Anglicanism; Reformed in doctrine, yet Catholic (to some extent) in worship. 149
with vestments, the sign of the cross during confirmation, holy oil, the reserved sacrament, and
prayers for the dead, as they imply either purgatory or the intervention of saints or both.
Diarmaid MacCulloch, Thomas Cranmer: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 173-454.
See Eamon Duffy and David Loades, eds., The Church of Mary Tudor (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2007) and John Foxe, Acts and Monuments (London, 1563). Foxe’s “Book of Martyrs” was
added to, reprinted, and translated several times in the late sixteenth century and has remained
continuously in print to this day. See also, Haigh, English Reformations, 203-50.
147
See, for example, A. G. Dickens, The English Reformation (Fontana, 1967) and Judith
Maltby, Prayer book and People in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
148
See Elizabeth’s Acts of Supremacy (1559), Uniformity (1559), and Subscription to the
Thirty-nine Articles (1571), collected in Henry Gee and William John Hardy, eds., Documents
Illustrative of English Church History (London: Macmillan, 1914), 416-545., available at
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/ENGref/links.html, accessed 17 April 2014. The phrase “via
media” is above all associated with Richard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1594-1604),
although he nowhere uses it. The phrase is generally meant to signify the particularly Anglican
approach to theology and the life of the Church; Reformed in doctrine but Catholic in ritual and
149
163
In 1603, James Stuart succeeded Elizabeth. 150 By this point, the English Church
contained a wide variety of views on nearly all matters. “Puritans,” in particular,
sought for a more complete Reformation of the Church of England along
Calvinist lines.
Already by 1584 Emmanuel College had been founded in Cambridge by
Sir Walter Mildmay, Chancellor of the Exchequer to Elizabeth and a Puritan, to
train Protestant (Reformed/Calvinist) preachers. 151 Thus by the dawn of the
seventeenth century, Emmanuel was a center of learned Calvinism. 152 During
James’ reign the Authorized Version of the Bible was commissioned and first
governance. See, Richard Hooker, The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine Mr. Richard Hooker
with an Account of His Life and Death by Isaac Walton, Arranged by the Rev. John Keble, 7th
edition revised by R.W. Church and F. Paget, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), available
from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1731, accessed 17 April 2014. Also, W. J. Torrence Kirby,
Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 18-28 on the dangers of an oversimplification of Hooker’s place in the “middle way.” His alternatives were not, orthodox
Protestantism on the one hand and Roman Catholicism on the other. Rather, his horizons were
within the more-or-less Reformed vision of the Elizabethan Church.
Jenny Wormald, "James VI and I (1566–1625)," in Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also Barry Coward, A Companion to Stuart
Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
150
Emmanuel College, “History of the College,” Emmanuel College Website, accessed 17
April 2014, http://www.emma.cam.ac.uk/about/history/college/.
151
On the history of Emmanuel College see A. Sarah Bendall, Christopher Nugent,
Lawrence Brooke and Patrick Collinson, A History of Emmanuel College, Cambridge (Boydell Press,
1999).
152
164
published in 1611, becoming the standard edition in English until very recently.
Many bishops appointed under James were Calvinist, but the elements of
Catholic ritual and polity set in place by Elizabeth remained in most cases. Still,
by the second decade of the seventeenth century the Church of England was
strongly Reformed in theological orientation. 153
A period of growth in the direction of High Church Anglicanism (if not
Catholicism) began in 1625 with the coronation of Charles I (1600-1649). Under
the direction of Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud (1573-1645), more
ornate rituals and decorations were (re-)established in the Church of England,
much to the dismay of the Puritan party. Moreover, Laud and others among the
“Caroline Divines” leaned toward Arminianism, and thus away from Calvinism,
in doctrine. 154 This made many Puritans eager to leave England altogether and in
Tom Webster, Godly Clergy in Early Stuart England: The Caroline Puritan Movement,
c.1620-1643 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-14, 36-59. While the more extreme
Calvinists, known as Puritans, were by no means a majority a basically Reformed outlook was
very common in the Church of England (and not just among Presbyterians). While James favored
the episcopal governance of the Church he also had no time for Arminians or Dissenters. On this,
see David Harris Willson, King James VI & I (London: Jonathan Cape, 1963), 240-1.
153
Chief among these “divines” are Lancelot Andrewes and William Laud himself among
others. On them see, Benjamin Guyer, Beauty of Holiness: The Caroline Divines and Their Writings
(Norwhich, UK: Canterbury Press, 2012); and John E. Booty, “Standard Divines,” in The Study of
Anglicanism, Stephen Sykes, John E. Booty, and Jonathan Knight, eds., (Minneapolis, MN:
Augsburg Fortress, 1998), 176-86.
154
165
fact helped bring about the Great Migration of English Puritans (and others) to
New England in the 1630-1640s. 155
By the time Smith arrived at Emmanuel in 1636 there were separatist
Puritans, conforming Puritans, Arminians, Laudians, and a variety of
Anabaptists in England, each vying for influence, if not over the nation as a
whole, then at least over their own individual spiritual lives. To what extent this
diversity led to political instability will be explored below. For now, we turn to a
more focused review of some of the religious tensions within Cambridge in the
period by way of the example of a series of letters between the Cambridge
Platonist Benjamin Whichcote and the Puritan Anthony Tuckney. 156
See, Virginia DeJohn Anderson, New England's Generation: The Great Migration and the
Formation of Society and Culture in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1991). Also, Webster, Godly Clergy, 167-332, on the religious roots of New England
migration. Among the families that made the pious migration from England to New England
were the ancestors of my maternal grandmother who settled Hingham and Dorchester,
Massachusetts.
155
To separate our treatment of religion and politics in the years of Smith’s life at
Cambridge is already to misunderstand the deeply intertwined nature of both in early modern
English history. Still, for purely analytical purposes, and to facilitate presentation of this key
context, this degree of anachronism is justified.
156
166
3.4.1 Tuckney and Whichcote Correspondence
Tuckney was named Master of Emmanuel in 1645 after already having
established himself as an excellent tutor there in the 1630s. Among his students
was Benjamin Whichcote. Salter reports that he was “a man of great reading and
much knowledge, a ready and elegant Latinist, but narrow, stiff, and
dogmatical” in religion. 157 In fact, he was a strict Puritan of the Presbyterian sort
who was equally suspicious of Roman Catholics, Arminians, and Independents
(Congregationalists, Baptists, etc.). 158 Tuckney played an active role in the
doctrinal work of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. 159 In 1653 he was named
Master of St. John’s College and in 1655 Regius Professor of Divinity. 160 As
Whichcote’s former tutor, Tuckney initially believed him to be a like-minded
Puritan but in the autumn of 1651 a commencement sermon delivered by his
protégé gave him reason to doubt. In the first of eight letters exchanged between
157
Salter, “Preface,” xii.
158
Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 53.
The Westminster Assembly was a committee formed by Parliament during the English
Civil War to work on reforms for the Church of England. It was Puritan in orientation and the
resultant documents of this Assembly are still held as the standard of orthodoxy by some
Calvinists even today. More on the Assembly below with respect to the governance of Cambridge
Colleges under their influence.
159
Emmanuel College, “Anthony Tuckney (1599-1670),” Emmanuel College Website,
accessed 17 April 2014, http://www.emma.cam.ac.uk/about/history/masters/?id=5.
160
167
them in quick succession, Tuckney wrote to Whichcote, then Vice-Chancellor of
the University and Provost of King’s College, on the eighth of September 1651 to
express his, and others’, distress at the content of his sermon and his teaching in
recent years.
While the full exchange well rewards careful study, an exposition of the
first two letters only will give a taste of the issues involved for both the orthodox
Calvinist and the budding “Cambridge Platonist.” 161 In his first letter, Tuckney
comes to his point immediately by contrasting “ingenuity” with “saving grace”
by which he means to draw a distinction between the natural light of reason
Whichcote has been praising, and the supernatural, imputed righteousness that
is the work of the Holy Spirit.
More specifically, Tuckney takes issue with four things he has observed in
Whichcote’s recent sermon. First, Tuckney opposes Whichcote’s assertion that
some things in religion may be disagreed upon by equally well intentioned
While the disagreement between the two men is heated there is an impressive degree
of affection expressed by both for the other. They are an excellent example of committed debate
that does not become personal and degenerate into ad hominem attacks and counter attacks. Each
seems honestly to seek the truth and be willing to hear the other out and even be persuaded (to
some extent) by the other. The correspondence can be found in Samuel Salter, ed., Moral and
Religious Aphorisms, Collected from the Manuscript Papers of the Reverend and Learned Doctor
Whichcote (London: J. Payne, 1753) and in Tod E. Jones, ed., The Cambridge Platonists: A Brief
Introduction, With Eight Letters of Dr. Anthony Tuckney and Dr. Benjamin Whichcote, with
translations by Sarah E. Phang (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), 51-156.
161
168
people. Indeed, for Whichcote, some issues in piety and polity are adiaphora
(“things indifferent”) for which competing evidence may be found in scripture.
Thus, there is no way to determine who is correct. For the Calvinist, this is
“unsafe and unsound” presumably because it suggests that Puritan
interpretations of scripture might be in error. Indeed, in the Church of England
many ancient Catholic customs were retained for exactly the reason that nothing
in scripture suggested that they should be removed and that they do no harm.
Tuckney’s second objection is that Whichcote advocated limiting religious
language to those “Scripture words and expressions” upon which “all parties
agree” in order to limit disagreements over “forms of words which are from
fallible men” that disrupt the peace of Christendom. Third, Tuckney returns to
his suspicions about the role of human reason in religion. Where Whichcote had
advocated using one’s rational faculties to discern spiritual matters for one’s self,
Tuckney worries that such license (“libertas prophetandi”) opens the door to all
manner of monstrous opinions. The use of the language of prophesy here on
Tuckney’s part recalls both the early church’s struggles with the Montanist
heresy and more recent conflicts, dating from the reign of Elizabeth I, over
“prophesyings,” meetings of clergy and laity to discuss scripture and the state of
169
the church including the need for reform. 162 In the later sense, prophesy was
associated with a breakdown of discipline in the Church of England. 163 While
Tuckney wished to see the Church of England reformed on Presbyterian lines he
was still very much in favor of a centralized Church polity. 164
Finally, Tuckney comes to an objection that goes to the very heart of his
disagreement with Whichcote and illustrates nicely the central preoccupation of
the orthodox Calvinist; reconciliation between humanity and God. For Calvin, as
for Tuckney, the reconciliation of sinful human beings with their Creator is an
entirely divine action. Against the traditional Catholic model of cooperation with
God’s grace (synergism) Calvin and other Reformed theologians (including
Luther, Beza, and Cramner) 165 argued that humanity is in no position to even
Roger E. Moore, “Sir Philip Sidney’s Defense of Prophesying,” Studies in English
Literature 1500-1900 50 no.1 (2010): 35-62.
162
John D. Schaeffer, “Tropical Latitude: Prophecy, Orality, and the Rhetoric of Tolerance
in Jeremy Taylor’s The Liberty of Prophesying,” Studies in Philology 101 no.4 (2004): 454-70.
163
Jones, Eight Letters, 71-3. This offers an excellent reminder for Americans especially
who tend to think of “Puritans” as being synonymous with the more radical sort that famously
settled in New England. Even they were mostly in favor of the established Church of England too
however. Separatist or Non-conformist Puritans were in the minority at least until the height of
the Civil Wars.
164
Indeed, disagreement over this was one of the central issues in the Reformation from
the very start.
165
170
cooperate with grace. Reconciliation with God is thus God’s doing in the individual
by grace through faith. All of the active contribution stems from God’s side of the
relationship (monergism). Whichcote, in contrast, seemed to be advocating the
idea that human beings can and must cooperate with grace through the use of
their reason and will.
Within days Whichcote wrote a humble reply to his old tutor. First he
addresses their relationship and the offense that Tuckney had taken at his
commencement sermon. More interestingly for our purposes, Whichcote
explains the ideas he had presented in his sermon from his notes. First, that “all
truly good men among us, do substantially agree; in all things saving.” 166 That is,
that while various sorts of Christians disagree on many things all agree on the
issue of salvation. An odd claim, given the Reformed preoccupation with
opposing salvation by grace through faith to the good works of (stereotypical)
Catholic theology. The important point here is not the current state of agreement
but Whichcote’s faith that such an agreement can be had between Christians of
good faith and clear reason.
166
Jones, Eight Letters, 77.
171
Second, Whichcote repeats the claim that the issues that Christians differ
on are non-canonical. He mentions too that perhaps the level of specificity that
gives rise to disagreement is in excess of the divinely appointed revelation. The
disagreements that arise stand, therefore, upon what God has seen fit to keep
veiled from us. 167 The clear connotation being that our theologizing is too-often a
blasphemous presumption on our part. In this respect, Whichcote seeks to be
more scriptural, and more humble than his Puritan interlocutor.
Third, Whichcote’s proposal to restrain theological language to those
expressions that are found in scripture is elaborated as a practical device for
keeping the peace among Christians. 168 The century of religious warfare in
Europe is clearly in his mind here as he seeks to find common ground and good
pious reasons for limiting theological language to those things upon which all
can agree. However, he is quick to establish his Protestant bona fides in this
regard by making the connection between sola scriptura and this call for humility
and economy in theological discourse. Far from calling for unchecked
167
Ibid.
168
Ibid., 77-8.
172
rationalism as Tuckney feared, Whichcote is upping the ante on a fundamental
principle of Protestantism.
Fourth, Whichcote quickly and directly affirms that he does, in fact, think
that an “ingenuous-spirited Christian, after application to God, and diligent use
of meanes to finde-out truth; might fairly propose, without offense taken, what
upon search he finds cause to believe; and whereon he will venture his own
soule.” 169 In other words, an intelligent Christian can, and should, use his
faculties to grow in the pious knowledge of God.
Finally, on the issue of reconciliation, Whichcote explains that he “had no
intention of undervaluing the free grace of God, but only sought to bring out the
necessity of Christ’s work being recognized as not only something without us
but also within us.” 170 In short, where Tuckney’s Calvinism would prefer to hear
of complete monergism in salvation, Whichcote maintains that the work of God
must be internalized too and not merely an act from outside of the human heart.
169
Ibid., 78.
170
Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 64.
173
To the imputed righteousness of Tuckney, Whichcote seeks to add sanctification
and reform of the soul in the image and likeness of God. 171
Still, despite his largely scriptural arguments in response, Tuckney
persisted in condemning the way Whichcote had “cried up” (we might say,
“talked up”) reason. His dislike of the employment (or advocating) of reason in
theology is best summed up in his denunciation of the (over)use of the phrase,
“the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord.” 172 Ironically, this biblical phrase is
thought by Tuckney to have “no relation to the truths of supernatural or
evangelical theology.” 173 So, where Whichcote sees a biblical precedent for the
life of the pious mind, Tuckney would have no elevation of human faculties,
even to work with the grace of God. In this, Tuckney is a classic example of
monergistic thinking, while Whichcote, for all his protestations to the contrary, is
also a monergist, albeit of a more internal kind. For Whichcote salvation is
entirely the work of God (he is not a synergist) but this work is not simply a
matter of declaring us to be reconciled from without but also of making us
regenerate from within too. In this sense, we can identify both Reformed
171
Perhaps an indication of the classic Platonist formula that only “like can know like.”
172
Proverbs 20:27.
173
Jones, Eight Letters, 84-85; Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 65-6.
174
theological elements and more “mystical” aspects in the teaching of Whichcote;
he is, to this extent, a Reformed Platonist while Tuckney is a Calvinist Puritan.
Neither, however, represent the radical ends of the ideological spectrum
in their period. They are, after all, academics as well as religionists. Theirs is,
therefore, a dispute among colleagues. For all his resistance to the importance of
reason in religious matters (as advocated by Whichcote) Tuckney was famous in
his own time for making appointments to fellowships on the basis of erudition
not piety since while, “they may deceive me, in their Godliness; they can not, in
their Scholarship.” 174
3.4.2 Disputes in State and Church
During Smith’s early childhood, as Calvinism was very popular in the
Puritan varieties discussed above, Charles I married the Catholic daughter of
Henry IV of France, Henrietta Maria in 1625. The match was deeply unpopular,
partly owing to the historic enmity between the English and the French, but also
because it seemed to signal a change in religion for the monarch and thus the
nation. For Puritans who already thought of the Church of England as “papist”
174
Slater’s “Preface,” in Jones, Eight Letters, 59.
175
an actual Catholic in the Royal family was cause for serious alarm. 175 As if to
confirm his papist leanings, at least in Puritan eyes, Charles re-issued the
Anglican Thirty-nine Articles in 1628. The following year, Parliament,
increasingly dominated by Puritans, passed Three Resolutions against the
excesses of Charles’ reign. In response, Charles had several members arrested. 176
Rocky relations between King and Parliament continued through 1633
when Charles, in an effort to curb the rise of Puritanism, appointed Laud
Archbishop of Canterbury. At the same time that Laud was reforming the
Church of England, Charles was imposing new taxes, called “ship money” to pay
for the royal navy. A tax not approved by Parliament flew in the face of Magna
Carta and the Three Resolutions of 1629. Moreover, as merchants were often
Puritans many of those who saw in Charles an enemy to their faith found a pickpocket as well. 177
Diane Purkiss, The English Civil War: Papists, Gentlewomen, Soldiers, and Witchfinders in
the Birth of Modern Britain (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 244-51.
175
Anthony Milton, "Laud, William (1573–1645)," in Dictionary of National Biography
(London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1885-1900). The resolutions were: First, that Parliament would
oppose any change in religion. Second, that they would condemn any taxes levied without their
consent. And third, that to pay illegal taxes was a violation of English liberty.
176
Keith Lindley, The English Civil War and Revolution: A Sourcebook (London and New
York: Routledge, 1998), 7, 12, 35-7.
177
176
In April 1640 a new Parliament refused to authorize any new taxes to pay
for the King’s conflicts in Scotland, where the Book of Common Prayer had recently
been imposed on the deeply Calvinist Kirk. Charles was also already involved in
conflict in Ireland along Catholic/Protestant lines too and thus in desperate need
of funds. 178 The “Short Parliament” was dismissed after just three weeks of noncooperation with the King. By November 1640 however Charles was willing to
deal, and the “Long Parliament” approved funds to handle the Scots but only if
Charles granted concessions to Parliament. 179 The legislative body had begun to
take the upper hand after over a decade of being shut out of the business of the
Kingdom.
In 1641 Parliament’s grievances against the King were put to paper in the
Grand Remonstrance. 180 By January of 1642 both Parliament and the King were
preparing for war, even as negotiations continued. In June, Parliament proposed
Nineteen Propositions to Charles. Among these was the demand for a new
178
Lindley, Sourcebook, 9, 13, 18, 21, 24, 46, 79-84.
179
Ibid., 7-17, 60-78.
“The Grand Remonstrance, with the Petition accompanying it,” in Samuel Rawson
Gardiner, ed., The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1906), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/conpur043.htm, accessed 18 April 2014.
180
177
constitution that would place Parliament in charge of nearly all matters of state.
By August, Charles gave his answer as he raised his standard against Parliament
at Nottingham. On October 23rd 1642 the armies of the King and Parliament
fought to a stalemate in the first battle of the English Civil Wars at Edgehill in
Warwickshire. 181
The following August (1643) the Solemn League and Covenant was
drafted. The document, accepted by the English Parliament in September,
guaranteed to preserve the Scottish Kirk and to reform the religion of England
and Ireland along Calvinist lines “according to the word of God and the example
of the best reformed churches.” 182 A synod of divines and Members of Parliament
had already been gathered to propose reforms in faith, polity, ritual, and
government of the kingdom (a necessity since the Church of England was
essentially a department of state, answerable to the crown). This Westminster
Michael Braddick, God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars
(Penguin, 2009), 209-61.
181
“The Solemn League and Covenant,” in Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, available
at http://www.constitution.org/eng/conpur058.htm, accessed 18 April 2014. Also, Braddick, God’s
Fury, 304-22.
182
178
Assembly (1643-1653) sought to model the Church of England on the
Presbyterian system of the Scottish Kirk. 183
By the summer of 1646 Charles surrendered to a Scottish army aligned
with the English Parliament. 184 At the close of this First Civil War (1642-1646)
three political and religious factions remained in England: Royalists,
Independents (or separatists/nonconformists) and Presbyterians. While
Parliament debated a new constitution (the “Putney Debates”) Charles escaped
leading to the Second Civil War. 185 This conflict ended with the recapture of
Charles (December 1648), his trial, and execution (30 January 1649). 186 However,
later in 1649 a Third Civil War erupted between Parliament and Royalists
including Charles II in league with Scottish covenanters. Under Oliver Cromwell,
During its ten years the Assembly produced a new constitution, as well as a
Confession of Faith, a pair of Catechisms, and a Directory for Public Worship (1645; known as the
Westminster Directory in Scotland). John Murray, “The Work of the Westminster Assembly” The
Presbyterian Guardian, 11 (1942), in The Westminster Presbyterian,
http://www.westminsterconfession.org/confessional-standards/the-work-of-the-westminsterassembly.php, accessed 18 April 2014. The best source on the work of the Assembly is Chad Van
Dixhoorn, ed., The Minutes and Papers of the Westminster Assembly 1643-1652, 5 vols. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
183
184
Purkiss, English Civil War, 451-62. Charles was imprisoned in late January 1647.
185
Ibid., 532-51.
186
Ibid., 552-60.
179
the Parliamentary forces won a decisive victory and established the
Commonwealth of England, which persisted until the restoration of the
monarchy in 1660. 187
3.4.3 Cambridge during the Wars
Cambridge remained in Parliamentary hands throughout the Civil Wars,
but the effects of these conflicts were deeply felt there nonetheless. In January
1644 Parliament appointed Edward Montagu, the second Earl of Manchester, to
“regulate” the University of Cambridge. He, and his designees, were granted the
“power to call before them all provosts, masters, and fellows of the colleges, all
students and members of the University.” Manchester was also given “power to
eject such as he shall judge unfit for their places . . . and to place other fitting
persons in their room, such as shall be approved of by the assembly of divines
sitting at Westminster.” Moreover, the authority to “administer the late covenant
. . . to all persons” and to “examine and inhibit all such as do obstruct the
reformation, now endeavoured by the Parliament and assembly of divines.” 188
187
Lindley, Sourcebook, 167-175.
“Regulation of the University of Cambridge, Monday, 22 January 1643/1644,” William
Oldys and Thomas Park, The Harleian Miscellany (London: John White, 1809), 3: 246-7. On this
period at Cambridge generally see G. R. Evans, The University of Cambridge: A New History
188
180
It was in this context that Manchester removed Dr. Edward Martin from
his post as President of Queens’ College. On the eighth, ninth, and eleventh days
of April 1644, he also ejected nine fellows from the College. 189 In total, over two
hundred fellows were ejected from Cambridge Colleges. 190 The charges against
the ejected fellows of Queens’ were “non-residence,” “not returning to College
when summoned,” and, one suspects the real reason in the midst of Puritan
reform, for “refusing to take the solemn league and covenant.” 191
On April eleventh Manchester appointed Herbert Palmer the new
President of Queens’ and installed replacement fellows, including John Smith
from Emmanuel, who had “been examined and approved by” the Westminster
Assembly. 192 It was this bit of Parliamentary intervention and an arcane policy at
Emmanuel that led to Smith’s all too short tenure at Queens’. By statute no two
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 211-20 and David Hoyle, Reformation and Religious Identity in
Cambridge, 1590-1644 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007).
189
Williams, “Memoir,” vii-viii.
John Twigg, A History of Queens’ College, Cambridge 1448-1986 (Bury St. Edmunds and
Wolfeboro, NH: The Boydell Press, 1987), 522.
190
191
Williams, “Memoir,” vii.
Williams, “Memoir,” viii. See also Arnold Gwynne Matthews, Walker Revised: Being a
Revision of John Walker's Sufferings of the Clergy During the Grand Rebellion, 1642-60 (Clarendon
Press, 1948).
192
181
fellows of Emmanuel could then be of the same county of origin. Since William
Dillingham, who enrolled around the same time as Smith, was also from
Northhamptonshire, and took his BA a year before Smith, he and not Smith rose
to a fellowship there in 1642. 193
That Smith was selected within days of the ejections that made his
position available says much about the estimate of his talents among those
involved. That Smith accepted the fellowship says that he was “agreeable to the
late solemn nation league and Covenant” as well. 194 The degree to which Smith
was committed to the Westminster Assembly’s agenda is unclear, but in any case
they were clearly committed to him.
Little detail remains concerning Smith’s work at Queens’. However as a
Fellow he would have begun to tutor students immediately. 195 By the 24th of June,
1644, Smith was named Hebrew Lecturer, a sign that the familiarity with Jewish
Williams, “Memoir,” vii. Much has been made in the literature on Smith of this county
policy but it would seem that Smith was also simply slower to proceed to the MA then
Dillingham.
193
194
Twigg, History of Queens’ College, 525; Queens’ College Archives, Box 31.
Williams, “Memoir,” viii-xi. See also, Simon Patrick, “The Autobiography of Symon
Patrick,” in The Works of Symon Patrick: Including His Autobiography, ed. Alexander Taylor (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1858), 9: 418-23.
195
182
literature evident in the Select Discourses was already well in hand and well
known. In the fall of that year (10 September) he was named “Censor
Philosophicus” as well. To this already impressive collection of appointments
was added the post of Greek Praelector on 16th September 1645. Clearly then, he
was already a well-respected authority on the literature for which he has come to
be especially known. Moreover, his position as a “Censor Philosophicus,” a
position previously held by the late President Martin, while only just having
been made a fellow would seem to suggest that he was on friendly terms with
those in power. 196
When in 1648 the Lord Mayor of London, Sir John Wollaston, sought to
improve the quality of mathematics at Cambridge with funds for a University
Martin, it should be noted, had been elected President at the urging of Archbishop
Laud in 1631. William George Searle, The History of the Queens' College of St Margaret and St
Bernard in the University of Cambridge: 1560-1662 (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Co., 1871), 469.
Recent discoveries of high church choir music from the 1630s at Queens’ College has begun to
shed light on the degree to which the institution embraced Laudian reforms under Martin. Tim
Eggington, “Musical discovery in Queens’ Old Library: tenor part book of early English church
music found bound up within ‘Book of Common Prayer’,” Queens’ Old Library Books Blog, 15
October 2013, accessed 22 April 2014, http://queenslib.wordpress.com/2013/10/15/importantdiscovery-in-queens-college-old-library-tenor-part-book-of-16th17th-century-english-churchfound-bound-up-within-a-printed-copy-of-the-booke-of-common-prayer/.
196
183
Lecturer, it was John Smith who “was appointed the first incumbent.” 197 He
seems to have taken up the post in November of 1648 “with a course of lectures
on Descartes’ Geometry” a volume that, as we have seen, was among those
donated to Queens’ College upon Smith’s death in 1652. 198
In 1650, Smith was named Dean and Catechist of Queens’ College. It was
in this capacity, which included regular preaching and teaching in the College
Chapel, that Smith came to draft the majority of the discourses later published by
Worthington as the Select Discourses. 199
Mordechai Feingold, “Isaac Barrow and the Foundation of the Lucasian Professorship,”
in Kevin C. Knox and Richard Noakes, eds., From Newton to Hawking: A History of Cambridge
University’s Lucasian Professors of Mathematics (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 49.
197
Strangely, the appropriate copy among the collections of Queens’ College Library
today has no annotations at all. It is almost certain that Isaac Barrow was among those attending
Smith’s lectures. By 1652 this Wollastonian Lectuership had ceased since in that year John Pell
was seeking funding for a new lecturer in mathematics and in 1658 John Worthington, Smith’
editor, was petitioning for funds for a professorship in mathematics as well. This position would
eventually be funded by Lucas becoming the famous Lucasian Professorship of Mathematics held
by Isaac Barrow, Isaac Newton, and Steven Hawking. See Feingold, “Isaac Barrow,” 49 n.6.
Worthington mentions Smith’s mathematical lectures in his “To the Reader,” in Select Discourses
(1660), x. See also Beeley and Scriba, Correspondence of John Wallis, 1: 9.
198
William Ralph Inge, The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought: The Hulsean
Lectures at Cambridge 1925-1926 (New York and London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), 62;
Williams, “Memoir,” ix; Worthington, “To the Reader,” xii-xxx; Mario Micheletti, Il pensiero
religioso di John Smith, platonico di Cambridge (Padua: La Garangola, 1976), 17.
199
184
3.5 Smith’s Last Days
Smith’s health seems to have been fragile from the first, as one might
expect of one who died so young. This may help to explain the length of time
Smith spent at studies. He did not earn the Master of Arts until 1644. Health
concerns may also be behind the otherwise curious (though not unheard of) fact
that while the statutes of Queens’ College required that he be ordained in 1646 to
maintain his fellowship, Smith was granted permission to postpone for four
years. 200 Smith appears to not have been ordained at all, perhaps owing to
concerns over his health or other practical issues related to the Civil War. In any
event, his contribution to the learned ministry in England was significant in his
various capacities at Queens’ College (1644-1652).
In 1651 Smith fell ill with what was most likely the beginning stages of
tuberculosis. By the spring of 1652 he had transferred his students to his friend
Simon Patrick. In the spring of that year Smith went to London seeking treatment
from Dr. Theodore Mayerne. 201 On May 5th the “Master and Fellows” granted
200
Williams, “Memoir of the Author,” ix. The Order is dated Jan. 19 1646 (1647).
Patrick gives his name as “Mahern”. Patrick, “Autobiography,” 420-1. See also Hugh
Redwald Trevor-Roper, Europe's Physician: The Various Life of Sir Theodore de Mayerne (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2006).
201
185
Smith “his whole stipend and dividend for this current quarter and likewise his
stipend for so much of the last quarter as he was absent upon the same cause of
his sicknesse.” 202 He continued a patient of Mayerne for a few months but “he
derived no benefit” from this care. 203
In late July, Smith returned to Cambridge, apparently resigned to his fate
after finding no relief from any of his many medical practitioners. After lying in a
“state of listlessness for nearly a week” he experienced a lucid moment during
which his friends took down his last will and testament. Smith died however
before he could sign this document on the 7th of August 1652. He was buried in
the College Chapel of Queens’ College, the site of the funeral sermon given by
Simon Patrick and likely many of Smith’s own discourses. Smith was
accompanied to the grave by the Vice-Chancellor of the University, all the Heads
of House (Masters, Presidents, etc.), the Fellows, and students. He now lies,
appropriately for a “living library,” in the present War Memorial Library of
Queens’ College. 204
202
Queens’ College Register, quoted by Williams, “Memoir,” xi n.1.
203
Williams, “Memoir,” xi.
204
There is no known marker for his burial.
186
3.6 The Select Discourses
Other than the remembrances of friends, John Worthington, Simon Patrick,
and others, his library gift to Queens' College, and a single commonplace book,
all that we have from John Smith is the posthumously published Select
Discourses. 205 These were collected and edited by Worthington from papers given
to him by Cradock upon Smith’s death. How long Worthington possessed them
is not known. The Discourses were primarily composed during Smith’s time as
Catechist at Queens’. 206 Indeed, several were first preached in the Chapel there,
and all were apparently meant to be delivered aloud. To his original papers
however Smith added considerable material after they had been presented. 207
But, even these were in need of significant editing. 208
“A Common Place Book,” Cambridge University Library MS Dd.ix.44. See the
Appendix below for a full listing of the discourses contained in the Select Discourses. Cf. the
arrangement of Gregory of Nazianzus’s Theological Orations and Origen’s On First Principles
(Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light
We Shall See Light [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008], 39). Like these patristic texts the Select
Discourses starts with theological method, proceeds to the general character of theology in general
and closes with specifically revealed theology.
205
Worthington, “To the Reader,” v; Williams, “Memoir,” ix; Micheletti, Il pensiero
religioso, 17.
206
207
Worthington, “To the Reader,” iii-iv.
208
Ibid., iv.
187
Worthington’s procedure was four-fold. First, gathering papers that “were
loose and scattered” in some cases forming proper “discourses” out of diverse
material. 209 Second, transcribing the papers and examining the quotations in
Smith’s discourses. 210 With the help of unnamed friends, Worthington identified
whatever quotations seemed most important (i.e., where the substance was
significant and Smith had not provided author or text). Third, in a remarkable
gesture, Worthington also sought to translate from the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew
into English the significant quotations that were not also already clear from the
context of the surrounding English text. Fourth, Worthington added, especially
to the first six discourses which he reports were written as a single treatise
“without any distinction or sections,” divisions between discourses, chapters,
and sections as they seemed to facilitate the reading of the text. Worthington also
added summaries of the contents of each discourse, chapter or section. 211
The text of the Select Discourses published in 1660 by F. Flesher in London
for W. Morden, a bookseller in Cambridge, was, as many seventeenth century
209
Ibid., v.
210
Ibid., iv-v.
211
Ibid., v.
188
volumes were, highly flawed. There were numerous mistakes in text and
citations from the start. Moreover, the highly non-standard spellings are
annoying at best to the modern reader (some words have multiple spellings on
the same page!). Thus it is no surprise that the Select Discourses were reprinted in
a “corrected” edition by John Hayes in Cambridge, again for Morden.
Apparently Smith was something of a “bestseller.”
Still, the text left much to be desired, and in 1821 another full edition, this
time “carefully corrected” appeared in London at the hands of Rivington and
Cochran. By far the most helpful edition to date, however, was that “corrected
and revised” by Henry Griffin Williams published by Cambridge University
Press in 1859. Above all, Williams’ edition provides the best published guide to
the massive number of quotations in Smith’s text. 212
Among the more obvious issues with the original 1660 text, which has
been the most widely used and reprinted over recent years, is the fact that
Worthington’s translations from Latin, Greek, and Hebrew are haphazard at
Williams makes frequent alterations to Smith’s original but faithfully conveys the
sense always even when he moves Smith’s quotations in foreign languages to footnotes. The
great advantage of his edition is the number and quality of the citations to Smith’s (likely)
sources. Its biggest limitation is that these sources are given in nineteenth century editions with
no regard for the texts Smith had access to.
212
189
best. While he probably did translate what, in his day, seemed most in need of
“Englishing,” a great number of phrases remained un-translated in his and most
of the following editions. In fact, many quotations are not referenced even in
Williams’ edition of 1859. 213 There remains, therefore, a clear need for a proper
critical edition of the Select Discourses.
Beyond the state of the text in the most basic sense, there is also the matter
of the work’s treatment at the hands of Worthington. The original papers upon
which the Select Discourses are based appear to be lost, so the degree to which
they can be said to reflect the authentic work of Smith or a kind of collaboration
between Smith and his editor cannot be adequately judged. From what
Worthington tells us about his procedure in bringing the Select Discourses to print
it seems most reasonable to conclude that the texts, as we have them, are
substantially Smith’s but to a considerable extent the organization belongs to
Worthington. An answer to these questions must await a careful study of the
known works of Worthington and a critical edition of the Select Discourses.
For the purposes of the present study, the authorship of the Select
Discourses is assumed rather than carefully argued. That is, I take the published
For example, a key quotation from Origen is left untranslated. Smith, Select Discourses
(1660), 4. On this, see chapter four below.
213
190
editions of the Select Discourses to be, de facto, the work of (the literary) John
Smith. The historical Smith is, as nearly as can be discerned, the literary Smith,
albeit with allowances made for the editing of his work by a friend. There is no
reason to suspect that Smith himself did not in fact write the Select Discourses,
even if the presentation of them owes much to Worthington. None of Smith’s
close companions treats the Select Discourses as anything but an authentic
presentation of his thought and teaching.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have situated Smith in his intellectual and cultural
milieu. We have seen that his was an age of discovery in geography, the sciences,
and philosophy. Smith was educated in a mixture of the older scholastic style
and work at the very cutting edge of early modern science, philosophy, and
mathematics. We have also seen how Smith’s career at Queens’ College involved
all these influences during the tumultuous period of the English Civil Wars. In
part II below we will see specifically how all these elements contribute to Smith’s
use of the spiritual senses tradition. As argued in chapter two above, this
tradition is best understood by way of a functional typology.
191
The “spiritual senses” are employed by the tradition to (1) explain the
source of theological knowledge, (2) account for aspects of the spiritual life, and
(3) to hold together one’s theology as a coherent system of thought. Thus, chapter
four presents the role of the spiritual senses in Smith’s account of the
appropriation and ultimate source of theological knowledge. Chapter five
demonstrates the place of spiritual sensation in Smith’s description of the
spiritual life. Finally, chapter six argues that the spiritual senses perform a
central systematic function in Smith’s theology. In this way, both Smith’s debts to
the tradition and his innovations therein become clear, illustrating his place in
Christian theological aesthetics generally.
PART II
CHAPTER 4: THE SOURCE OF THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING
How do we come to know the Divine? From where do we receive the
theological knowledge that is presupposed by the life of faith? For surely, we
cannot love and serve a God that we do not first know. 1 Such Augustinian
considerations were not lost on John Smith. He too felt the pressing need to give
an account of the source of theological understanding. Indeed, the growing
skepticism of his early modern world made such an account all the more acutely
felt. 2 Smith responded to this need with an apologetic just as surely as More and
Cudworth. Inheriting a newly relevant, yet ultimately, Patristic sense of the need
to answer critiques of traditional theology, Smith was also heir to the scholastic
distinction between the rational or natural and the revealed knowledge of God. 3
1
Augustine, Confessions, I. 1.
Peter Klein, "Skepticism," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
28 October 2010, accessed 28 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/skepticism/.
2
See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton Pegis (University of Notre
Dame Press, 1975), I, ch.3, n.2.
3
193
Thus, to appreciate Smith’s account of the origins of theological understanding
one must look, above all, in two places.
First, for the source or method of coming to natural knowledge of God
one must consult the first discourse, “On the True Way or Method of Attaining to
Divine Knowledge.” 4 Here we find that for Smith rational theology, and the
personal appropriation of revealed truths, rests on “spiritual sensation.” Indeed,
Smith draws from Origen both as a model and as a source for constructing his
own account. Second, for the corresponding, and complementary, account of the
source of revealed theology one must turn to the sixth discourse “Of Prophesie.” 5
Here we find that revealed truths are communicated to the prophet in sensible
images in the imagination and intellectually via intuitions. 6 In both cases these
John Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 1-21. For Smith, “natural theology” does not mean
the complete absence of scriptural references. Rather, it signifies that branch of theology that
attempts to give rational arguments in support of theological claims. In short, natural theology is,
for Smith, rational theology (as opposed to biblical exegesis).
4
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 169-281; (1859), 170-293. For an excellent overview of the
philosophical issues raised by prophecy see, Scott A. Davison, "Prophecy," in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 26 March 2010, accessed 2 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/prophecy/.
5
Smith is not very explicit or consistent with his use of terms. Partly this is because much
of the philosophical terminology relevant to his discussion of religious epistemology was in a
period of flux between older scholastic meanings and early modern ones familiar in the work of
figures like Locke, Hume, and Kant. Also, Smith is adverse to the terminological precision of the
old scholasticism because it “entombs” our understanding of divinity more than it enlightens.
6
194
communications are supplied, ultimately, by God. While some are merely
inspired by the presence of the Holy Spirit, others receive actual spiritual (i.e.,
non-corporeal) sensations of the Divine will in the imagination, either in a vision
or in a dream. Still others, Moses and presumably Jesus Christ as well, receive an
“intellectual touch” in the intellect without a sensible image (“face to face”). In
such cases of what Smith calls “prophecy proper” the prophet comes to know by
spiritual perception.
Both rational (natural) and revealed theology involve, for Smith, what we
have identified as the “spiritual senses.” Each combines the metaphorical
However, from his usage “mind,” “soul,” and “intellect” refer to the same non-corporeal aspect
of the human person as that which thinks or employs reason in an immediate, intuitive, and nondiscursive way. He would seem to have in view something much like nous in the Neoplatonic
sense but he rarely uses the term except in quoting some ancient authority or other. On the
concept of mind in the Cambridge Platonists (really More and Cudworth only) see G. A. J. Rogers,
“John Locke and the Cambridge Platonists on the Nature of the Mind,” in Essays on the Concept of
Mind in Early-modern Philosophyǰȱǯȱȱ Dzȱȱ ȱ ȱǻ ȱȱ¢DZȱ
Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 81-96. Also Alexander M. Schlutz, “Epistemology, Metaphysics, and
Rhetoric: Contests of Imagination,” in Mind’s World: Imagination and Subjectivity from Descartes to
Romanticism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 15-35. “Imagination,” “fancy”
(phantasia) and variations on these terms are used by Smith for the faculty of representing objects
of perception. It is the “stage” upon which information is presented to the understanding.
However, there is no reason to think that this must be the result of the external senses for Smith.
This inner sense of imagination is capable of receiving images directly, as in the case of prophecy,
without an external sensory object. See the Oxford English Dictionary under “imagination,” 1.a.
“the power or capacity to form internal images or ideas of objects and situations not actually
present to the senses”; 1.b. “an inner image or idea of an object or objects not actually present to
the senses”; also “fantasy/phantasy,” 1.a. “mental apprehension of an object of perception”; and
“fancy,” A.1. “in scholastic psychology: = FANTASY n.1”; A.4.a. “In early use synonymous with
IMAGINATION,” A.4.b. “a mental image.”
195
(intellection as “vision”) and the analogical (perception of a spiritual kind). In
both cases the imagination serves as a bridge between the sensible realm of
corporeal reality and the purely intellectual realm of reason and God. 7 And,
both, in the final analysis, disclose the same Divine truths. For Smith, as for other
Christian Platonists such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, 8 natural theology is
complemented or completed, but not replaced, by revealed theology. 9 Like his
While Smith draws explicitly on primarily Patristic and Rabbinic sources, Marsilio
Ficino had also spoken of the imagination as a vehicle for divine presence. See, Daniel Pickering
Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic: From Ficino to Campanella (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2000), 76-80; John Cocking, Imagination: A Study in the History of Ideas
(Oxford: Routledge, 2005), 178-81; on this in Agrippa, see Christopher I. Lehrich, The Language of
Demons and Angels: Cornelius Agrippa's Occult Philosophia (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 57-65. For an
interesting overview of the history of the imagination in western thought see W. Norris Clarke,
“The Creative Imagination in Western Thought,” in The Creative Retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas:
Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 209-25.
7
On Thomas as a Christian Platonist despite of his obvious Aristotelianism, see Wayne J.
Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000) and “Aquinas and the Platonists,” in The Platonic Tradition in
the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach, ed. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, with the
assistance of Pierter Th. van Wingerden (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter,2002), 279-324. On
Aristotle himself as a Platonist see Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2006). For objections to this argument see, for example, the review of
Aristotle and Other Platonists by John Bussanich in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (13 March
2006), accessed 24 April 2014, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24985-aristotle-and-other-platonists/.
8
See Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in The Cambridge Platonists,
ed. C.A. Patrides (London: Edwin Arnold, 1969), #99 (p.327): “Reason discovers, what is Natural;
and Reason receives, what is Supernatural.”
9
196
tutor Whichcote therefore, Smith does not set the rational and the spiritual
against each other, “for spiritual is most rational.” 10
4.1 The Source of Rational Theology
In the chapel at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, among the more unusual
sights in an otherwise properly plain, “Puritan” space, whose only images are of
opened books, are a series of stained glass windows. Like St. Paul’s in London,
this Wren church too did not survive the Victorian love of interior decoration.
Along the north wall, a series of panels depict great ecclesial and educational
organizers and systematic theologians, ranging from St. Augustine to John
Harvard. Along the south wall, one finds a series of panels representing great
figures in spirituality and mystical theology. The series begins with Origen of
Alexandria and the second to the last is John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist.
Origen and Smith, the windows tell us, have a connection. The Emmanuel
College Chapel windows present vestiges in light and glass of an insight from a
more romantic age, when resonance and sensitivity were still important tools for
Benjamin Whichcote, in Jones, The Cambridge Platonists, 138. Cf. Smith, Select Discourses
(1660), 434. See also, Whichcote, “The Use of Reason in Matters of Religion,” in C.A. Patrides, 4261, and “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, #76 (p.327).
10
197
the scholar. 11 And the windows are correct; there is a deep bond between Origen
and Smith, a tradition unbroken by the fall of empires and the discovery of new
worlds.
This section explores a key aspect of that tradition. It provides an analysis
of the reception and modification of Origen of Alexandria’s doctrine of the
spiritual senses in the “Discourse on the True Way or Method of Attaining to
Divine Knowledge.” The analysis offered here is twofold. First, an argument
about the exegetical and hermeneutical roots of Origen’s presentation of the
spiritual senses is compared to a closely analogous approach found in Smith.
Second, Origen is shown to have supplied an important source for Smith’s
conception and employment of the spiritual senses as the means by which one
comes to natural knowledge of the Divine and the way to appropriate revelation
for one’s self.
As will be demonstrated below, Smith accepted important elements of the
doctrine of the spiritual senses as he found it in Origen but was too modern to
take the doctrine on authority. Instead, Smith offers his own case for the spiritual
For images see, “College Chapel Windows,” Emmanuel College Website, accessed 24
April 2014, http://www.emma.cam.ac.uk/collegelife/chapel/windows/.
11
198
senses, at once mimicking Origen’s interpretive synthesis of (Middle/Neo)Platonism and Scripture (as model), and echoing Origen’s own words (as
source). Smith used this twofold influence as the basis for his distinctive
theological method that seeks to base all other theological work on immediately
self-evident principles encountered through spiritual sensation.
“The True Way,” Smith’s first discourse, begins by making his intentions
and his methods clear. Just as all other arts and sciences have as their basis and
starting point some precondition or principle(s) upon which everything else
depends so too with divinity. 12 Divinity rests on and in fact is “a divine life”
rather than a “divine science.” 13 The principle for the intelligibility of divinity
lays in the varieties of “Spiritual Sensation” which unite the will, intellect, and
the affections, says Smith, and this is the basis of his theological method. 14
Smith’s intent here is to establish a firm foundation upon which all his later work
12
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 1-2.
13
Ibid., 2.
14
Ibid.
199
can stand. In this, his deep admiration for Descartes shines through. 15 However,
much of what Smith has to say about this method echoes Origen. 16
4.1.1 Origen as Model
Origen affirmed the existence of a set of five spiritual senses analogous to
the physical senses located in the mind or soul, what Origen calls the “inner
man,” which is distinct from the physical body and thus also from the physical
senses. 17 Origen largely developed his view based on biblical evidence and as a
way of interpreting passages where the clearly non-sensible (i.e., spiritual,
conceptual or intellectual) is said to be sensed. 18
On the relationship between Smith and Descartes, see J. E. Saveson, "Descartes'
Influence on John Smith, Cambridge Platonist," Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 258-62, and
"Differing Reactions to Descartes among the Cambridge Platonists," Journal of the History of Ideas
31 (1960): 560-7.
15
While it is not usually possible to demonstrate a clear line of influence directly to
Origen (he makes very few direct references to Origen for example) Smith’s understanding of the
sensible nature of spiritual understanding nevertheless echoes the Alexandrian in important
ways and in at least one critical case makes direct appeal to the Father of the spiritual senses.
16
Smith too, as we have seen, tends to speak of the “mind” and “soul” as essentially the
same thing. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “The Work of Reason,” in Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists,
63 where he equates the “internal” with the mind and soul.
17
Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition From Plato to Denys (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 66-7. This point is not without contention however. Several
scholars have suggested that Origen’s language about the spiritual senses is best understood as
metaphorical either throughout his corpus or in one supposed stage or another in his developing
thoughts on the matter. The received scholarly opinion on the issue is however that
18
200
For I do not suppose that the visible heaven was actually opened, and its
physical structure divided, in order that Ezekiel might be able to record
such an occurrence….although such an occurrence may be a stumblingblock to the simple, who in their simplicity would set the whole world in
movement, and split in sunder the compact and mighty body of the whole
heavens. But he who examines such matters more profoundly will say,
that there being, as the Scripture calls it, a kind of general divine
perception which the blessed man alone knows how to discover,
according to the saying of Solomon, You shall find a divine sense; and as
there are various forms of this perceptive power, such as a faculty of
vision which can naturally see things that are better than bodies, among
which are ranked the cherubim and seraphim; and a faculty of hearing
which can perceive voices which have not their being in the air; and a
sense of taste which can make use of living bread that has come down
from heaven, and that gives life unto the world; and so also a sense of
smelling, which scents such things as leads Paul to say that he is a sweet
savour of Christ unto God; and a sense of touch, by which John says that
he handled with his hands of the Word of life; — the blessed prophets
having discovered this divine perception, and seeing and hearing in this
divine manner, and tasting likewise, and smelling, so to speak, with no
sensible organs of perception, and laying hold on the Logos by faith, so
that a healing effluence from it comes upon them, saw in this manner
what they record as having seen, and heard what they say they heard…. 19
Thus, for Origen the spiritual or allegorical reading of scripture suggests that
references to sensing the divine are not literal accounts. In this way, Origen
notwithstanding elements of metaphor here and there, Origen, by in large, does intend to speak
of five spiritual senses that function analogously to the physical senses. See the work of Dillon,
Rudy, and McInroy on this topic.
Origen, Contra Celsum, I.48 (Crombie, trans.). This translation is taken from the Ante
Nicene Fathers translation with corrections to match Chadwick in the reference to Proverbs 2:5.
“Knowledge” has been changed to the misreading of the LXX that Origen actually gives, “sense.”
19
201
counters the ridicule of Celsus and other critics of Christian doctrine. At the same
time, however, Origen is convinced that references to spiritual senses are not
without literal meaning of some kind. That is, rather than reading these passages
as mere metaphorical references to knowledge, or comprehension, Origen takes a
sudden and unexpected turn by suggesting such passages refer to literal spiritual
senses, actual spiritual capacities for perceiving the non-sensory. 20
While Karl Rahner is certainly correct about the exegetical provenance of
Origen’s doctrine, his claim that it is a conclusion based solely on scripture fails
to convince. 21 Beyond the possible incarnational or sacramental reasons for such
a reading lies the possibility, suggested by Dillon, that Origen is drawing on
previous and contemporaneous speculation about “a noetic correlate of senseperception” found in Plato, Albinus, a Gnostic treatise (Zostrianos), Plotinus
Some passages related to spiritual sensation do seem to be simply metaphorical for
Origen but clearly not all. Some of Origen’s reading of scripture seems to indicate an analogy
between spiritual sense and physical sense. For a sample of the debate on this point see Louth,
Origins, 66-7; J. M. Dillon, “Aisthesis Noete: A Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in Origen and in
Plotinus,” in Hellenica et Judaica, A. Caquot, et al., eds. (Leuven; Paris: Peeters, 1986), 443-55; and
G. Rudy, Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages (New York: Routledge, 2002).
20
Karl Rahner, « Le debut d’une doctrine des cinq sens spirituals chez Origene, » Revue
d’ascetique et de mystique 13 (1932): 112-45; English translation, “The ‘Spiritual Senses’ According
to Origen,” in Theological Investigations, XVI (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 89-103. The claim
about the exclusively biblical source of Origen’s doctrine is made on p.83 in the ET.
21
202
(Ennead VI.7), and Philo. 22 Only if the spiritual senses have an initial air of
plausibility can the move to read biblical passages allegorically, but not totally
so, be justified. 23
Without some reason to suggest that such a thing is even possible, Origen
should be expected simply to allegorize the language of sensing the divine out of
the picture entirely. Since Origen does not do that, and instead affirms literally
spiritual senses, and given that there was ample non-Christian speculation about
spiritual sensibility in Origen’s intellectual milieu, it seems likely that he asserts
his view of the spiritual senses with a basically platonic philosophical and a
Christian scriptural background in mind. Origen finds the spiritual senses in his
reading of the Bible but he was able to find them because he already had access
to the philosophic tools needed to “see” them. Origen’s interpretation was thus
likely given additional, and necessary, philosophical credence by a common
Dillon, “Aisthesis Noete,” 454-5, here 455. To Dillon’s suggestive, albeit speculative, list
could be added the much more ancient tradition of the postmortem opening of the senses in
order to interact with the Gods found in the Egyptian Book of the Dead and numerous additional
passages in Plato that speak of “intellectual vision” and inner “eyes” (e.g., Republic 519A,
Symposium 219A, etc.) as well as other passages from Plotinus of particular interest to John Smith
such as Ennead I.8.1, I.6.9, I.3.4, and VI.7.13.
22
Dillon is far more nuanced in his discussion but I argue that he need not be in this area.
This same kind of plausible warrant seems to be at work in other decisions of Origen to limit his
allegorizing. For example, his numerous appeals to Old Testament signs for Christ only makes
sense in light of a knowledge of Christ as that to which the allegory refers.
23
203
tradition within the intellectual context Origen shared with Plotinus and others
who also suggest similar intellectual senses. 24 Regardless of the specific methods
employed, Origen’s concerns are exegetical and, to that extent, Rahner is correct. 25
As we have seen, Origen draws on scripture and, if our argument based
on Dillon’s suggestion is correct, elements in the prevailing philosophical
speculations of his day to advance the reality of the spiritual senses of the soul. In
much the same manner, Smith appeals directly to scripture and the
Neoplatonism of Plotinus as his “evidence” for the spiritual sensation upon
which all theological understanding rests. Spiritual concepts are understood by
being perceived, and this spiritual sensibility is thoroughly intellectual and
therefore not physical, and yet, somehow, still best described by way of
perceptual language. For both Smith and Origen the spiritual senses are
capacities of mind that are both conceptual and perceptual. Perceptual in the
sense that it is by means of these senses that purely noetic (purely spiritual)
24
The apologetic impulse in Contra Celsum, is made more clear by this suggestion as well.
As Mark McInroy has pointed out, in following the suggestion of Dillon against the
position articulated by Rahner, I am parting company with most observers since Rahner’s
influential treatment of Origen’s doctrine of spiritual sense. While Rahner’s approach makes
Origen’s thoughts on these matters seem more clearly “Christian,” mine makes what Origen says
more clearly intelligible.
25
204
objects are brought to awareness and conceptual in the sense that they have to do
with realities that are by their very nature concepts or ideas not physically
sensible things. In this sense, what we have here are examples of intellectual
intuition.
Smith is notable for his insistence that divinity is a practical, living
enterprise. 26 Divinity is a “Divine life,” rather than a “science” conveyed by mere
“Verbal description” because it has to do with things of “Sense & Life” and thus
requires “Sentient and Vital faculties.” Smith here makes explicit his
employment of Neoplatonism in the service of scriptural exegesis, and both in
spiritual guidance, by combining Plotinus’ affirmation that, in Smith’s words,
“Every thing is best known by that which bears a just resemblance and analogie
with it” with the biblical principle, derived specifically from Proverbs 10, that a
good life is the prolepsis for coming to an understanding of divine things. 27
See in the first instance Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2 but the point is made
repeatedly throughout the First Discourse and the whole of the Select Discourses.
26
Ibid., 2. Smith’s plotinian reference is to Ennead I.8.1. The biblical allusion is to Proverbs
10 (“the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom”). On the Stoic notion of a prolepsis and on
their epistemology generally see R. J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Stoicism, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59-84.
On the influence of the Cambridge Platonists on the moral sense theory of Shaftesbury, including
his use of “preconceptions” for the Stoic notion of prolepsis see Patrick Müller, “Hobbes, Locke
and the Consequences: Shaftesbury’s Moral Sense and Political Agitation in Early Eighteenth27
205
A little later, Smith introduces the sixth Beatitude from the Sermon on the
Mount (Matthew 5:8) with a reference to Plotinus; “Divinity is indeed a true
enflux from that eternal light” but this light does not merely enlighten, but
enlivens also. While the framework for intelligibility here is borrowed from the
light mysticism common to Plotinus and Origen (and others), 28 the authority for
Smith’s point lies with Christ, who connects “purity of heart with the beatific
vision.” In this way, Smith offers support for his claim that what is essential in
theology is a practical, existential, and spiritually sensitive approach and not the
study or composition of dry treatises. 29 In nearly the same breath, Smith returns
to Plotinus and the imagery of light for the idea that just “as the eye cannot
behold the sun . . . unless it hath the form and resemblance of the sun drawn in
it” so too for the soul to “behold God . . . unless it be Godlike.” This touchstone
on the landscape of platonic intelligibility leads back again to scripture
immediately, “and the apostle St. Paul, when he would lay open the right way of
century England,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies (2013; doi: 10.1111/1754-0208.12075): 1-16,
esp. 7-11.
28
See Louth, Origins, 35-72.
29
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2.
206
attaining to divine truth, saith, that ‘knowledge puffeth up,’ but it is ‘love that
edifieth.’” 30
For Smith, no less than Origen, emotion and the will, especially love, play
a central role in the directedness of our attention. When we strive after physical
things, we are drawn by our love (or “lust) away from the inner spiritual realities
and therefore we fail to love rightly that which is more valuable in itself (i.e.,
spirit not matter). When we direct our wills toward inner spiritual things, love
plays a positive role in spiritual sensation. The spiritual senses are partly
activated by, and partly cause and deepen, love of God possible through God’s
grace in creation and salvation. It is within the inner realm of the heart that the
spiritual senses operate for Smith. In this, Smith differs slightly from Origen who
stresses intellect with respect to the spiritual senses, but for both it is the inner
person, the mind or soul, which is the locus of spiritual sensation. However, like
Origen, Smith finds his basis for spiritual sensibility in the Bible with the aid of a
(neo)platonic framework that helps to make it noticeable and plausible.
Ibid., 3. The Pauline reference is to I Cor. 8:1. The reference to Plotinus appears to be
Ennead I.2.4. On the perfection of divine knowledge in love in Smith, Richard Hooker, Pascal, and
others see Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 234-42.
30
207
Three additional passages form the heart of Smith’s affirmation of the
reality and necessity of spiritual sensation. The first comes from Plotinus. After
pointing out the uselessness of seeking divinity in books alone where it is
“entombed” more often than “enshrined,” Smith gives Plotinus as his source for
the sentiment that one is to “seek God within” our “own soul” for God “is best
discerned by an intellectual touch.” 31 This is not allowed to stand on its own
however, and is buoyed within the same sentence by reference to the First Epistle
of John (1:1); “we must ‘see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, and our hands
must handle the word of life.” Smith adds to this that, “the soul itself hath its
sense, as well as the body” and again within the same sentence goes on to say
that it is for this reason that David recommends in the Psalm “not speculation
but sensation” as the means of arriving at an understanding of divine goodness;
“Taste and see how good the Lord is.” 32
Enneads I.2.6 and V.3.17 seem to be the inspiration for Smith’s reference here but as is
often the case his reference is not exact and does not match the words of the passage so much as
the likely meaning of it. This tendency will be important later in our discussion of Smith’s use of
Origen as a source. The phrase, “intellectual touch,” is a key to the way in which spiritual
sensation is concerned with a blending of the conceptual and the (in some sense) perceptual.
31
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3; Psalm 34:8. Cf. Smith’s “internal sensating Faculty” for
the good (Ibid., 138) discussed in 6.1.4.1 below. Also, Douglas Hedley on the influence of this
opposition to “mere speculation” on Coleridge (Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000], 225, 281).
32
208
In this way, Smith follows Origen’s hermeneutical approach (as suggested
by Dillon) but as a late Renaissance Neoplatonist, Smith sees no reason to keep
his reliance on a pagan philosopher implicit. Plotinus is for Smith a great teacher
whose limits are overcome by the revelations of scripture but who nonetheless
supplies a sure and steady guide by supplying the context within which
scriptural passages can be read in their most literal way possible. Like Origen,
Smith denies that there is biblical warrant for a vision of divine things with the
physical eyes but his allegiance to a Neoplatonism open to the possibility of
noetic sensibility allows him to affirm that these passages are not merely poetic
devices.
Smith’s initial presentation of the reality of spiritual sensation rests on
much the same combination of philosophical plausibility and scriptural warrant
that Origen relies on. The most significant difference in this regard seems to be
the added level of expressly methodical concern in Smith. As an early, and in
some respects uncritical, admirer of Descartes, Smith seeks to offer foundations
for his theological work in ways that Origen does not, but Smith finds his
foundations not in modernity, but in Origen’s era. In other words, Smith was
209
urged by his present to recover a past within the tradition of Christian Platonism,
because this is a living tradition for him. 33
4.1.2 Origen as Source
As has been demonstrated, Smith seems to follow the example of Origen’s
creative combination of platonic plausibility and allegorical scriptural exegesis.
This move on its own however only demonstrates that Smith is a Christian
Platonist. His specific indebtedness to Origen is seen when one considers the
way in which Origen acts not only as a model but also as a source for Smith’s
presentation of the spiritual senses. This indebtedness to Origen as source will in
turn offer support for the preceding argument about Origen as model.
Several specific elements in the theories of both figures might be discussed
in this regard. For example, both Origen and Smith suggest that all human
beings have a natural capacity for spiritual sensation as part of our original make
up as rational beings. However in our earthly, sinful, fallen, life most people do
not realize this potential. To actualize one’s spiritual senses requires God’s grace
as well as personal effort and practice, essentially, moral behavior, philosophical
Saveson has suggested that Smith seems to think of the French Oratory, Descartes and
Copernican astronomy as manifestations of a generally platonic philosophy.
33
210
training, reflection, prayer, scriptural study, and other spiritual practices. 34
Likewise, both ascribe to the spiritual senses the ability to perceive spiritual life
and spiritual death. 35 Both Origen and Smith describe particular spiritual senses
as taking for their objects various delightful manifestations of the Divine Logos. 36
Finally, both locate the spiritual senses within an inner person as opposed to the
outer, and both suggest that one’s attention to the external senses must decrease
in order for the spiritual senses to increase. 37 All of these similarities are
suggestive of Smith’s debt to Origen; however, discussion here will be limited to
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3, 8, 10-11, 12, 16, 21; Hans Urs von Balthasar, ed. Spirit
and Fire, trans. Robert J. Daly (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), nos. 637-658, 674.
34
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 4-5, 7; Origen, Cant. Co. 1, in Balthasar, Spirit and Fire,
nos. 545, 547.
35
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3 (“we must see with our eyes, and hear with our ears,
and our hands must handle the word of life”); Balthasar, Spirit and Fire, nos. 539-540, 604-693.
36
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3, etc.; Balthasar, Spirit and Fire, nos. 519-521, and 536.
Origen follows St. Paul and platonic convention and Smith follows Descartes and what he takes
to be the Christian tradition. Cf. John Norris, Reason and Religion, or the Grounds and Measures of
Devotion Considered from the Nature of God and the Nature of Man, in Cragg, ed., The Cambridge
Platonists, 157: “. . . the mind sees the divine essence must be totally and thoroughly absolved
from all commerce with the corporeal senses.” There is an interesting parallel here with the
philosophical objections raised by opponents of the Hesychast movement in the fourteenth
century. Like the Greek Humanist Platonists Smith thinks that to suppose one may see God with
one’s physical eyes is to make a category mistake. See Niketas Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in
Byzantium: Illumination and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), 93-124.
37
211
their common apologetic use of the spiritual senses where Smith makes explicit
reference to Origen.
From the very start of his first discourse Smith is eager to show that
theology has a kind of demonstration that is different from the pure ratiocination
of the intellect, or the dry presentations of doctrines and proofs in books. For
example, Smith tells us, “They are not alwaies the best skill’d in Divinity, that are
most studied in those Pandects which it is sometimes digested into, or that have
erected the greatest Monopolies of Art and Science.” 38 A little later Smith adds,
“We must not think we have attained to the right knowledge of Truth, when we
have broke through the outward shell of words & phrases that house it up; or
when by a Logical Analysis we have found out the dependencies and coherences
of them with one another.” 39 Smith is here framing his presentation of the “True
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2. Cf. Ralph Cudworth, “. . . as if Religion were nothing
but a little Book-craft, a mere paper-skill” (“A Sermon Preached before the House of Commons,
March 31, 1647,” in C.A. Patrides, Cambridge Platonists, 91).
38
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 8. To these quotations can be added: “The knowledge of
Divinity that appears in systems and models is but a poor wan light” (3). “All Light and
Knowledge that may seem sometimes to rise up in unhallowed minds, is but like those fuliginous
flames that arise up from our culinary fire, that are soon quench’d in their own smoke; or like
those foolish fires that fetch their birth from terrene exudations, that doe but hop up & down ,
and flit to and fro upon the surface of this earth where they were first brought forth; and serve
not so much to enlighten, as to delude us; nor to direct the wandering traveler into his way , but
to lead him farther out of it” (3-4). Others like this are found throughout the first “Discourse” and
indeed throughout the entire Select Discourses.
39
212
Way” in apologetic terms against a merely logical or intellectual approach to
philosophy and theology. His opponents in this apologetic are the early modern
Skeptics, various types of materialists (especially Epicureans), other “atheists,”
and especially Christian scholastics.
In the midst of this apologetic Smith repeatedly points to the true method
as that of a purified life and the awakening of a capacity for spiritual sensation
which grants knowledge more akin to personal encounter than logical inference.
This is the different kind of demonstration that Christianity has for Smith,
proven not in the unaffected intellect calmly accessing the evidence but felt in a
direct experience of God by the soul. It is in the midst of this apology that Smith
makes his only direct appeal to Origen. “It is but a thin, aiery knowledge that is
got by meer Speculation, which is usher’d in by Syllogisms and Demonstrations;
but that which springs forth from true Goodness, is ΌΉϱΘΉΕϱΑȱΘȱΔ΅ΗΖȱ
ΣΔΓΈΉϟΒΉΝΖ, [theioteron ti pases apodeixeos, “a more divine demonstration” or
“more divine than any demonstration”] as Origen speaks, it brings such a Divine
Light into the Soul, as is more clear and convincing than any Demonstration.” 40
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 4. Without the full context it is difficult to be precise
about the intended meaning of the phrase from Origen. Cf. Henry More, A Brief Discourse of the
40
213
Examination of Origen’s works, and the editions of Origen known to have been
available to Smith, reveals that the “quote” here is most likely a paraphrase taken
from Contra Celsum I.2.
In keeping with Smith’s general practice, the phrase is not attributed to a
specific passage in Origen. Unlike most other quotations from Greek and
Hebrew, this phrase has not been “Englished” by Smith’s editor. 41 Apparently,
Worthington judged a translation of this passage “was less needful” because of
the surrounding text. C. A. Patrides translates the phrase, “more sacred than any
evidence.” 42 No edition of the Discourses has offered a specific citation for this
phrase and the most recent abridged edition of the first “Discourse” offers only
the suggestion that Smith may have in mind Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of
John, Book X, 25, in which Origen, “discourses on the Divine light.” 43 This
True Grounds of the Certainty of Faith in Points of Religion, in Cragg, ed., The Cambridge Platonists,
147: “This is not to be argued, but by an internal sense to be felt.”
41
Worthington, “To the Reader,” in Select Discourses (1660), iv-v.
The Cambridge Platonists (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), 130. “Sacred” is an unusual
choice for Smith who is much more partial to variations on “divine.” Also, Smith’s larger point is
that there is a kind of “evidence” for Christianity. It is just not discursive argument.
42
43
Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 218 n.378.
214
suggestion however seems to have more to do with the English phrases that
follow Smith’s quotation from Origen and not the quotation itself.
According to the online Thesaurus Linguae GraecaeǰȱΌΉϱΘΉΕϱΑȱȱŘŝȱ
times in Origen’s corpus but this phrase is never given. 44 However, a search of
Origen’s works in the Patrolgia Graeca (Migne) edition also reveals that the phrase
in fact does not occur in exactly this form in Origen. Furthermore, according to
Origen’s, Opera Omnia, Lexicum Proprium seu 'Concordances,’ the word ΌΉϱΘΉΕϱΑȱ
occurs only once and this phrase is not there. 45 Chadwick’s edition has,
“something divine about him” in this place. 46 Similar forms of Smith’s Greek for
“divine” and “proof/demonstration” do occur in Contra Celsum I.2 however,
where the same sentiment, though not the exact phrase, is found. Apparently,
Smith has paraphrased Origen from memory or less-than-exact notes. This is not
at all unusual for Smith; the majority of his references in the first “Discourse,”
except for the Bible, are of this sort.
44
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, accessed 11 March 2010, http://www.tlg.uci.edu/.
Cooperatorum Veritatis Societas, Documenta Catholica Omnia (2006), accessed 30
October 2008, http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/1004/1001/local_general_index.html.
45
46
Contra Celsum, col. 00336 (1.31), in Chadwick trans., 30.
215
It should also be noted that although the seventeenth century manuscript
list of books from Smith’s library donated to Queens’ College Library upon his
death in 1652 does not include Origen’s Contra Celsum, both Emmanuel (where
he was a student) and Queens’ (where he was a fellow) had copies in a 1605
Greek and Latin edition. The Emmanuel volume was removed before 1693 when
the current copy held there was donated by Sancroft. The volume was in the
collection for the first year of Smith’s undergraduate studies in the College
however. 47 There was also most likely a copy, of the same edition, at Queens’
College when he became a fellow in 1644. 48 Moreover, Smith did know the Contra
Celsum; he references it specifically in his discourse “Of Prophecy.” 49
That Smith intends this passage specifically is indicated most strongly by
the parallel intensions at work in both texts. In Contra Celsum I.2, Celsus is
critiqued for trying to apply the criterion of a “Greek proof” to Christianity and
S. Bush, Jr. and C. J. Rasmussen, The Library of Emmanuel College Cambridge 1584-1637
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 146.
47
T. H. Horne, A Catalogue of the Library of The College of St. Margaret and St. Bernard,
Commonly Called Queen’s College in the University of Cambridge… (London, 1827), 122. The edition
in both cases was that of David Hoeschelius published in 1605 in both Greek and Latin (on
alternating pages but with continuous pagination) and copious notes and apparatus. The Queens’
copy remains in the Old Library.
48
49
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 283. Contra Celsum, 7.8.
216
then Origen says, “Moreover, we have to say this, that the gospel has a proof
which is particular to itself, and which is more divine than a Greek proof based on
dialectical argument. This more divine demonstration the apostle calls a
‘demonstration of the Spirit and of power’ – of the spirit because of the
prophecies and especially those which refer to Christ, which are capable of
convincing anyone who reads them; of power because of the prodigious miracles
which may be proved to have happened by this argument among many others,
that traces of them still remain among those who live according to the will of the
Logos.” 50
Likewise, Smith appeals to Origen in his own apologetic use of spiritual
sensation. Immediately after his reference to Origen, Smith continues his attack
on the “thin speculations” of logicians (both believers and non-believers). 51 In
addition, Origen suggests that the prophets employ the spiritual senses and that
there is a single spiritual sensibility that takes five forms later in book I at chapter
forty-eight. Chapters two and forty-eight are thus closely related for Origen and
Origen, Contra Celsum, I.2 (trans., Chadwick), emphasis added to show Chadwick’s
English for the similar forms of the Greek offered by Smith as a “quotation” from Origen.
50
What I am calling Smith’s “apology” runs the full length of the first numbered section
of the first discourse (Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 1-13).
51
217
both play a role in defending the sensible language of scripture from outside
attack. And, as we will see below, just as Origen relates the spiritual senses to
prophecy as the means by which revelation is received by human beings, so too
does Smith. 52
While it would seem from these considerations that the spiritual senses
are not merely metaphorical for Origen, it remains to be seen if they are rightly
understood to be five in number or if they are merely so many ways of speaking
of a single spiritual capacity or “intellectual sense” as Smith puts it. 53 In light of
what Origen says about the inner and outer person however, it would seem that
he indeed does intend to maintain that there are five distinct spiritual senses.
This is important because it implies that there is something about the divine
objects of these senses that could not be captured by a single noetic sense.
There is however no reason to affirm a strict opposition between one
spiritual sensibility and five spiritual senses. Indeed, in Contra Celsum I. 48
Origen suggests, in the midst of his discussion of the connection between the
demonstration of the Spirit in prophecy and its connection to the five spiritual
52
See below on Smith’s theory of prophecy.
53
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3.
218
senses, that there is a single “general divine perception” but that this single
spiritual sensibility takes many forms, which Origen gives as the five spiritual
senses.
Smith seems to be in basic agreement on this point. However, he is far less
interested in speaking of a full set of five spiritual senses than is Origen. Smith
moves easily from talking about spiritual sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell,
to speaking of a single spiritual sensibility, often called an “intellectual touch”
and occasionally referred to as a sense of the heart. 54 Unlike Origen, Smith does
not put forward a clear theory of five distinct spiritual senses with anything
approaching consistency in regards to their objects or other particulars, but he
does consistently speak of the spiritual senses as more than simply one. Divinity
is best known through a spiritual sensation for Smith that may take a form
Boyd T. Coolman has shown a very similar arrangement in William of Auxerre who
also poses both a single noetic sense and five spiritual senses as parts of this whole (Knowing God
by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre [Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 2004]). Thus, it is not at all unprecedented within the tradition to
speak this way. It should be noted however that I am not aware of any direct connection between
William and Smith.
54
219
analogous to any of the physical senses, in keeping with Origen’s statement in
Contra Celsum I.48. 55
It seems probable therefore that Smith has in mind an arrangement very
much like the one suggested by Origen where a “general divine perception”
takes many different forms in order that the plentitude of the divine nature may
be more fully expressed. 56 This would help account for the ease with which
Smith can go from speaking of a single noetic sense, using sensory language as a
metaphor for knowledge (i.e., intellectual intuition), to multiple senses akin to
the physical senses with different sensory objects within the spiritual realm (i.e.,
spiritual sight, taste, touch, of etc.). 57 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that
Smith is drawing on Origen’s discussion in the first book of Contra Celsum.
For example, Smith speaks of spiritual sight, touch, and taste already on p.3 of the
“True Way” discourse (1660).
55
And this is exactly what one finds in Smith’s treatment of the divine inspiration in the
imagination of the prophet. See below.
56
Smith will speak of this sort of variety especially in his discussion of the influx of
divine revelation upon the imagination in prophecy. However, this also helps to explain the
otherwise merely poetic appeal to different sensory modes in a “spiritual” key in the “True Way.”
57
220
4.1.3 Intellectual Intuition and the ‘Spiritual Senses’
As we have seen, for Smith we come to a natural understanding of divine
things via the activation of our capacity for spiritual sensation. This power is
noetic and functions as an intuition of Divine truth. Moreover, this ability is
affective and captured best by employing the language of sense. 58 I have argued
that what Smith means here is both intellectual intuition and something more
along the lines of the five spiritual senses as employed by Origen. However, it
seems that there is a problem with understanding how Smith’s “spiritual sense”
can be simultaneously intellectual and sensible. At least one commentator has
tried to get around this issue by interpreting Smith’s discussion in the “True
Way” discourse as entirely concerned with intellectual intuition simpliciter.
In his important study of the spiritual senses in Jonathan Edwards,
William Wainwright argues that spiritual sensation for Smith is a matter of
“affect-laden intellectual insight or intuition.” 59 Drawing on many of the same
passages discussed above, Wainwright focuses on the obviously intellectual
On the Platonic tradition of affective cognition to the Cambridge Platonists see Susan
James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 225-52.
58
59
Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards,” 229.
221
nature of Smith’s talk of spiritual sensation. 60 He rightly concludes that the
spiritual senses are, for Smith, a matter of intellectual intuition with a strong
“affective dimension.” 61
However, because he ignores the influence of Origen in the “True Way”
discourse, and because he does not explore the use of spiritual sensation in the
theory “Of Prophecy” 62 at all, Wainwright misses the subtle way in which Smith
actually sees the spiritual senses as both unitary, as a metaphor for intellection,
and diverse, on analogy with the five physical senses. 63 Moreover, Smith is
explicit that the “internal sensating Faculty” by which goodness is perceived is
not a matter of the intellect but the will. 64
While Wainwright is correct in acknowledging that the affections are
involved in Smith’s account of spiritual sensation in the “True Way” he misses
60
Ibid., 229-231.
61
Ibid., 231.
62
See section 4.2 below.
On the way sensory language for intellection may be analogical and not merely
metaphorical see Mark T. Mealey, “Taste and See that the Lord is Good: John Wesley in the
Christian Tradition of Spiritual Sensation” (PhD diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2006),
37. Thought is metaphorically referred to with images drawn from sense but in such a way as to
suggest an analogy between the mind and the faculties of sense.
63
64
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 138.
222
the possibility that in Smith’s day the emotions (i.e., being “amorous of Divine
beauty” for example) can be thought of as receptive, like sense. After all,
Descartes famously argued that the “passions” were a species of sensation. 65
Wainwright is again correct that “Platonists think that reason itself has an
affective dimension” 66 but the emotional response to the intuition of Divine
things is also perceptual for Smith. It is perceived through a “living sense” in and
through a truly spiritual life. Wainwright mentions that other “analogies are at
least as apt” as that between intellection and sense and goes on to include, as an
example, “our immediate acquaintance with numbers.” 67 However, Smith thinks
that the “true Perfection, Sweetness, Energie, and Loveliness” of the purified soul
reflecting Divine truth “is ΓϾΘΉȱΕΘΓϾȱΓΙΘΉȱ·Ε΅ΔΘΓΑ [neither explicit nor written]
. . . [and] can no more be known by a naked Demonstration, then Colours can be
This tendency to associate affect with sense begins with Aristotle, can be found in the
medieval scholastics (e.g., Thomas Aquinas) and continued well into the seventeenth century
with figures like Descartes and into the eighteenth century with Francis Hutcheson. See Amy M.
Schmitter, "17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 15 October 2010, accessed 29 April 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotions-17th18th/. Also Susan James, Passion
and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003).
65
66
Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards,” 231.
67
Ibid.
223
perceived of a blinde man by any Definition or Description which he can hear of
them.” 68 But what does it mean to have an “immediate acquaintance” with
numbers or other mathematical objects other than to be brought to a proper
cognition of them by a demonstration, definition, or description?
It would seem, therefore, that there is more of the actually sensible going
on in Smith than Wainwright has allowed. For, our intellectual intuition of divine
things must remain in this life “but here in its Infancy.” Even the understanding
of the “true Metaphysical and Contemplative man” must still contend with the
“Imaginative Powers” that will be “breathing a grosse dew upon the pure Glasse
of our Understandings” so that at best we intellectually intuit “in a glass
darkly.” 69 That is, the sensible images of our imaginations remain with us while
we live. The goal remains the pure “affect-laden intellectual . . . intuition” but
this is a goal we are, here on Earth, only ever approaching; a goal only reached in
the life of the world to come.
68
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 15.
69
Ibid., 20, 21.
224
Additionally, Smith speaks of “knowing of the truth as it is in Jesus” 70 and
of the results of his “True Way” as transforming what “was onely Faith” into
“Vision.” 71 Thus, he rather clearly means to say that as well as providing natural
or rational access to the basics of theology, his “method” is also a means by
which one comes to realize the truths of revelation for one’s self. By purifying
one’s mind one comes to see that what Christ and the prophets have revealed is
real and living truth. What starts out as belief of propositions from without
becomes the perception of truths from within.
It is true that intellectual intuition is involved for Smith, but that is not all
that is going on in his treatment of the “spiritual senses.” For all the
intellectualism in the “True Way,” the imagination is not, cannot be, completely
surpassed. To do so would be to take important aspects of the “life” out of
Smith’s proposed method. Furthermore, the role of the will is far more important
than merely an affective adjunct to the intellect. In the perception of the Divine
Goodness it is the will that senses, not the intellect. 72 Moreover, as we will see
70
Ibid., 8.
71
Ibid., 16.
Though, to be fair, Smith does not hold to a consistent or firm distinction between
intellect and will. He tends to see them both simply as activities of the one soul.
72
225
when we turn to Smith’s discussion of prophecy, the imagination, no less than
the intellect, plays a key role in the reception of the saving truths of revelation. 73
4.1.4 Conclusions along the Way
John Smith was influenced by the doctrine of the spiritual senses as
expressed by its first systematic Christian exponent, Origen of Alexandria. Smith
has been shown to follow Origen’s practice as the basis for his own presentation
of spiritual sensibility. Whereas Origen relied on Middle Platonism and scripture
however, Smith relied on Neoplatonism (especially Plotinus) as well as scripture.
Smith is also indebted to Origen for important elements in the content of his
doctrine. Both employ spiritual sensibility in a presentation of the means by
which one comes to a proper theological understanding and Smith makes
explicit reference to Origen’s apologetics as support for his own. Together this
twofold influence is suggestive of a conscious appropriation of Origen’s thought
by Smith.
Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, #99
(p.327): “Reason discovers, what is Natural; and Reason receives, what is Supernatural.” On Smith
on the imagination in “la Communicazione di Dio all’umanita’attraverso Cristo” (the
communication of God to humanity through Christ) see Mario Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso di
John Smith platonico di Cambridge (Padova: La Garangola, 1976), 360-85.
73
226
Although other lines of influence cannot be ruled out with absolute
confidence, the cumulative case is strong. While Smith follows Origen’s lead only
briefly by the letter, and even then only as a paraphrase, in spirit Smith’s debt to
the Alexandrian is clear. Therefore, the Emmanuel College Chapel windows are
correct. Smith is rightfully thought of as an heir to the legacy of Origen, and
much of this inheritance is manifest in Smith’s discussion of spiritual sensation.
4.2 The Source of Revealed Theology: Prophecy & the Spiritual Senses
In addition to the use of these varieties of spiritual perception in
accounting for natural theological knowledge, Smith employs complex notions of
spiritual sensation in his presentation of the origin of revealed theology too. For
this, Smith will allow for only one “way whereby” this “Revealed Truth which
tend[s] most of all to foment . . . true and real Piety” and that is prophecy. 74
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 171; “Of Prophecy,” ch.1. In this section I cite from the
edition of Williams published in 1859 because of his helpful citations of Smith’s rabbinic sources.
For corresponding pages in other full editions see the Appendix. See also Sarah Hutton, “The
Prophetic Imagination: A Comparative Study of Spinoza and the Cambridge Platonist, John
Smith.” In Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought: International Symposium under the Auspices of
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Commemorating the 350th anniversary of the Birth
of Spinoza, Amsterdam, 24-27 November 1982, edited by C. Deugd, 73-81. (Amsterdam: NorthHolland, 1984). Cf. More, A Brief Discourse, 145: “. . . the moral and human certainty of faith
grounded upon the certainty of universal tradition, prophecy, history, and the nature of things
delivered, reason and sense assisting the mind in her disquisitions toughing these matters. . . . By
prophecy I understand as well those divine predictions of the coming of Christ, as those touching
the Church after he had come.”
74
227
4.2.1 General Character of Prophecy
Smith opens his discourse by noting the classic scholastic distinction
between natural theology and “Revealed Truth” or revealed theology. 75 This
signals a major shift in the Select Discourses to this point. The previous five
discourses have treated topics in natural theology (“Of the True Way of Method
of Attaining to Divine Knowledge,” “Of Superstition,” “Of Atheism,” “Of the
Immortality of the Soul,” and “Of the Existence and Nature of God”). But now,
with the sixth, Smith’s attention turns to matters dependent “solely upon the
Free will of God.” 76 As Worthington reports on the state of Smith’s papers, and
as Smith himself reports in the beginning of his discourse “Of the Immortality of
the Soul,” the plan was to pivot here to discourses on “The Communication of God
to Mankind through Christ.” 77 In order to introduce revealed theology Smith takes
up much the same task as we have seen above in the case of “The True Way”
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 171. See Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St.
Thomas Aquinas, 2nd revised ed. (1920), trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Online
Edition, at New Advent.org, ed. Kevin Knight (2008), accessed 30 April 2014,
http://home.newadvent.org/summa/1001.htm#article1, I 1.1 (First Part, First Question, First
Article).
75
76
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 171.
Worthington, “An Advertisement,” in Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 294; (1660), 280.
These Smith did not live long enough to compose; Worthington attempts to make up for them by
providing some related discourses in the remains of his edition of Smith’s work.
77
228
discourse. He gives an overview of the way by which one comes to receive
revelation, which he asserts is only accomplished through prophecy.
Where “natural truth” is “engraven upon” 78 and “folded up in” 79 our own
essences as “participations of the Divine Mind” within the human, “positive
truth can only be made known to us by a free influx of the Divine Mind upon our
minds and understandings.” 80 In this way Smith contrasts the innatism of the
78
Cf. Plotinus, Ennead V. 3. 4.
Smith’s use of the phrase “folded up in” is reminiscent of the language of Nicholas of
Cusa. For Cusanus, enfold-unfold (complicare-explicare) are technical terms of art signifying the
relationship between God, in Whom all things exist qua enfolded, and the multiplicity of creation,
where things are unfolded qua individuals. If Smith has this connotation in mind, he would seem
to be suggesting that our native notions of God are enfolded within us. Thus, on this reading we
are the idea or form of God; perhaps another way of speaking of humanity as made in the imago
Dei. Interesting as such a speculative reading is, there is (1) no reason to think that Smith had
read Cusa, and (2) for this metaphor to work one would need to posit real plurality in God (and
make of the Deity a human creation too). See Christopher M. Bellitto, Thomas M. Izbicki, Gerald
Christianson, eds., Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a Renaissance Man (New York and
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), 459-60 and Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance:
A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning
Press, 1985). Douglas Hedley has made a case for greater partiality on the part of Christian
theology to “the claims of the imagination” in part on the basis of the imago Dei in his “Homo
Imaginans and the Concursus Divinus,” in Charles Taliaferro and Jil Evans, eds., Turning Images
in Philosophy, Science, and Religion: A New Book of Nature (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012), 114-32, here 132.
79
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 171. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious
Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, #460 (p.331): “Reason is not a shallow thing: it is the first
Participation from God: therefore he, that observes Reason, observes God.” Since Smith will
elaborate that the intellect and the imagination are inspired in prophecy it seems clear that he
includes the imagination in or with the “mind.” On the idea of knowledge of God being placed in
the mind by God see also Henry More, An Antidote Against Atheism (1652), in Cragg, ed., The
Cambridge Platonists, Book I Chapter 8, p.177: “For this idea of God being no arbitrarious figment
80
229
natural with the free gift ad extra of the revealed. Still, in contrast to the radical
monergism of the Calvinists of his day, “the souls of men are as capable of
conversing with” this divine disclosure “as they are with any sensible and
external objects.” Moreover, “there is some analogical way, whereby the
knowledge of Divine Truth may also be revealed to us.” 81 That is, revelation
takes a form that is analogous to everyday corporeal sensation.
In fact, Smith is prepared, though he does not develop the idea fully, to
speak of the “historical truth of corporeal and material things” as “revealed” to
our understanding. 82 To reinforce this notion Smith argues that just as God has
made us capable of communication with each other so too has God made us
“capable of receiving any impressions from Himself.” This form of divine
communication is “originally nothing else but prophetical.” 83
taken up at pleasure, but the necessary and natural emanation of the mind of man.” Also, on the
necessity of God from the nature of our knowing, see Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual
System of the Universe, Chapter V, section 1, in Cragg, Cambridge Platonists, 195-203.
81
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 172.
Some contemporary philosophers have spoken in much this same way about
phenomenal experience as “revealed.” See, Dominique Janicaud, Phenomenology and the
"Theological Turn": The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).
82
83
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 172.
230
While the primary purpose of prophecy will be to communicate those
truths that must be freely given by God, Smith is also quick to acknowledge that
it can be a means of arriving at natural truths more quickly too. For this reason,
“Scripture treats, not only those pieces of truth which are the results of God’s free
counsels, but also those which are most akin and allied to our understandings
[natural truths], and that in the greatest way of condescension [i.e.,
accommodation] that may be, speaking to the weakest sort of men in the most
vulgar sort of dialect.” 84 In this, Smith is clearly following the well-worn
scholastic consensus. 85 God’s “Truth is content” when expressed in scripture “to
wear our mantles, to learn our language.” In order that we might understand the
record of prophecy in scripture “speaks with the most idiotical sort of men in the
most idiotical way.” 86 For this reason, the best way to approach scripture “is not
rigidly to examine it upon philosophical interrogatories, or to bring it under the
84
Ibid., 173.
See “Accommodation,” in Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological
Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 19. Also,
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.13.1, trans. Henry Beveridge, Christian Classics
Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 2 May 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.iii.xiv.html.
85
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 173. “Idiotical” here is meant in the now obsolete sense
of plain, simple, or unlearned not “idiotic” in our contemporary sense.
86
231
scrutiny of school definitions and distinctions [i.e., scholastic inquiry].” 87 Instead,
one must interpret passages that speak of God sensing, feeling, or moving as
symbolic of omniscience or omnipresence or the like. 88 In the same way, hell and
heaven too, while spoken of as places are rather to be understood as states of the
soul instead. 89 Thus, scripture speaks of divine things metaphorically in order that
we might understand, even though the prophet has received the truths so
recorded in a way analogous to ordinary sensible experience.
4.2.2 Degrees of Prophecy
While this discourse is primarily concerned with prophecy, that is actually
not its overall topic. For Smith includes in this discourse discussions of those
who do not technically count as prophets at all. Some received divine revelation
in more perfect ways than others. The real topic of the discourse is divine
inspiration, enthusiasm and illumination and all the varieties of this broader
87
Ibid., 174.
88
Ibid., 174-6.
Ibid., 176-7. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A.
Patrides, #100 (p.327): “Both Heaven and Hell have their Foundation within Us. Heaven primarily
lies in a refined Temper; in an internal Reconciliation to the Nature of God, and to the Rule of
Righteousness. The Guilt of Conscience, and Enmity to Righteousness, is the inward state of Hell.
The Guilt of Conscience is the Fewel of Hell.”
89
232
category. As will be made clear below, what Smith means by “inspiration,”
“illumination,” and “enthusiasm” comes into sharpest focus in his treatment of
the specifics of each of these degrees of the reception of revelation. Some
preliminary words of clarification must be made from the start however.
Unlike the very different meaning of terms such as enthusiasm and
illumination as employed by some other authors, Smith means to express by
them that process whereby the individual human soul receives divine revelation.
Rather than our contemporary meaning of a particularly intense emotional
interest in someone or something (i.e., “I’ve always been a great ice hockey
enthusiast”) or even the meaning that one finds in Henry More of an “illregulated or misdirected religious emotion,” especially associated with ecstasy,
purported prophecy or other inspiration from God, Smith nearly always uses
“enthusiasm” in its original sense as signifying “supernatural inspiration.” 90
“Inspiration” in this context means for Smith the influence of God, perhaps via a
mediating angel, upon a person. “Illumination” can call to mind Augustine’s
See the Oxford English Dictionary under “enthusiasm.” On More’s concerns to
distinguish true from false or “enthusiastic” visions and dreams see Scott, “Visions, Dreams, and
Discernment,” 215-20. The classic text is Henry More, Enthusiasmus triumphatus, or, a discourse of
the nature, causes, kinds, and cure, of enthusiasme…and prefixed to Alazonomastix His Observations and
reply…. (London: J. Flesher, sold by W. Morden, Cambridge, 1656).
90
233
famous epistemological theory and a whole host of similar uses that arose from
his influence. Smith, in contrast, usually intends by the word merely an instance
of inspiration or revelation in the mind. While Smith is happy to use the
metaphor of light as Augustine did he shows no obvious sign of following the
great Church Father in specifics. 91 In general, therefore, Smith uses terms such as
revelation, inspiration, enthusiasm, and illumination more or less synonymously
to indicate the act of communication between God and human beings.
Smith calls upon the definitions of prophecy by Maimonides and Joseph
Albo (c.1380-1444) to establish that this communication is effected via the action
of God upon the imagination and the mind or intellect. 92 “’The true essence of
Indeed, Smith’s usage seems to owe more to earlier Greek Patristic and pagan
philosophical models than to Augustine or the Scholastics. Cf. See R. Crocker, “The Role of
Illuminism in the Thought of Henry More,” in G. A. J. Rogers, et al., eds., The Cambridge Platonists
in Philosophical Context, 129-44. For a standard treatment of divine illumination of the
Augustinian variety see Robert Pasnau, "Divine Illumination," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 4 April 2011, accessed 26 April 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/illumination/. For a more recent perspective
that challenges the traditional philosophical interpretation see Lydia Schumacher, Divine
Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2011). Smith tends to employ illumination in ways more like Schumacher’s “intrinsic”
interpretation of Augustine’s theory than the usual “external” approach found in Pasnau. That is,
Smith, like Schumacher’s Augustine, thinks of divine illumination as arising within us rather than
coming from without.
91
Important background for medieval theories of the “inner senses,” including the
imagination, can still be found in Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic,
and Hebrew Philosophical Texts," The Harvard Theological Review 28, no. 2 (1935): 69-133. For
Maimonides in particular see Wolfson’s "Maimonides on the Internal Senses," Jewish Quarterly
92
234
prophecy is nothing else but an influence from the Deity first upon the rational,
and afterwards upon the imaginative faculty’” according to Maimonides. 93 Rabbi
Albo agrees, saying, “’Prophecy is an influence from God upon the rational
faculty, either by mediation of the fancy [imagination] or otherwise.’” 94 Smith
will follow his Jewish sources here and maintain that the grades of revelation are
distinguished by the relative involvement of the two faculties of the imagination
and the intellect. Additional specification comes only in the context of Smith’s
discussion of the various types of this general category of phenomena.
Review N.S. 25 (1935). His “Isaac Israeli on the Internal Senses” (Jewish Studies: In Memory of George
A. Kohut 1874-1933, ed. Salo Wittmayer Baron and A. Marx [Alexander Kohut Memorial
Foundation, 1935], 583-98) and “Notes on Isaac Israeli's Internal Senses,” Jewish Quarterly Review
51( 1961): 275–287 are also of interest. Part III on “Common Sense, Imagination, and Estimation,”
in Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind (S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola, eds. [Dordrecht:
Springer, 2014], 107-170) gives an excellent overview of the historical developments in this area.
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 179. Maimonides would seem to have adopted this view
from Al-Farabi. See F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London, 1958), 36-45; cited by Dov Schwartz,
“Mosaic Prophecy in the Writings of a Fourteenth Century Jewish Neoplatonist Circle,” Journal of
Jewish Thought and Philosophy 2 (1992): 97. Also Heidi M. Ravven, “Some Thoughts on What
Spinoza Learned from Maimonides about the Prophetic Imagination: Part 1. Maimonides on
Prophecy and the Imagination,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 no. 2 (2001): 193-214.
Wolfson has noted that John of Damascus’s suggestion that dianoia includes divination in dreams
may have led to the “connection between dreams, imagination, and prophecy which we find in
Arabic and Jewish philosophy” (“Maimonides on the Internal Senses,” 454). However, prophetic
dreams are also a commonplace in the Hebrew Bible. Moreover, communication between the
divine and humanity was a common theme in the Ancient Near East generally. See, for example,
the Gilgamesh Epic (Tablet VII), where Enkidu learns of the displeasure of the Gods in a dream
(The Epic of Gilgamesh, trans. Andrew George [London: Penguin Classics, 2003], 54-9.
93
94
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 180.
235
Smith follows the example of biblical and rabbinic tradition in arguing
that there is a “gradual variety” among those who have received revelations.
Above all there is the distinction between Moses and the rest of the prophets.
Moses shares, of course, the status of being a prophet with many others but in
terms of the quality, “clearness and evidence,” he far exceeds them all. 95 The
other prophets, e.g., Elijah, Isaiah, John the Baptist, rank below Moses as having
revelations of a similar but less perfect kind. Below these are yet another rank of
hagiographi, figures inspired by the Spirit of God to write biblical works such as
the Psalms, Job, and the Song of Solomon, among others. These texts are not
“prophetic” in the full or proper sense but they are “inspired” by God, and thus
they represent a lower degree of revelation. 96 Finally, at the lowest level of the
hierarchy of illumination is the Bath Kol, or the “voice of God” heard through the
corporeal sense of hearing.
Tellingly, this last degree of revelation is not mentioned in chapter two
where the others are first introduced. Instead, Smith adds a brief review in what
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 178. Also, Deut. 34: 10. “Evidence” here refers to the
quality of being evident not data or testimony.
95
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 178-83; 268-71. In addition to Numbers 12: 5-8, Smith’s
authorities for this division include Maimonides and Joseph Albo.
96
236
became chapter ten, just before laying out the highest degree of prophetical
illumination, the Mosaic. 97 Smith does note however that Joseph Albo
“distinguished prophecy into . . . four degrees.” The lowest degree being that in
which “the imaginative power is most predominant” corresponds to the Bath Kol
in being most associated with physical perception and thus least intellectual. 98
The next “when the strength of the imaginative and rational powers equally
balance each other” to the hagiographi. The third, yet again more perfect grade, is
“when the rational power is most predominant” is associated with the prophets
in the full sense. Fourth and finally, the most perfect form of prophecy, that
associated with Moses above all others, is that “in which all imagination ceaseth,
and the representation of truth descends not so low as the imaginative part, but
is made in the highest stage of reason and understanding.” 99
The ordering of the material, it must be remembered, was done by Worthington after
Smith’s death. Given the repetition and overall flow of this discourse in particular however it
seems likely that it was in a very rough state indeed.
97
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 181. Thus, the imagination is perceptual. It is where the
objects of sense are presented to the understanding. It is between, therefore, the intellect and the
senses, or as Smith puts it, it is the “middle region of man” (200).
98
99
Ibid., 183.
237
In endorsing Albo’s hierarchy of prophecy Smith is also making clear his
commitment to the hierarchy of faculties in the soul following the ordo
cognoscendi. 100 But his true guide is not Aristotle, but, Platonic, as what makes
these grades hierarchical is their level of conformity to the divine realm of true
noesis. 101
4.2.3 Prophecy Proper
As befits his purposes in this discourse Smith spends most of his time on
what he calls “prophecy proper” or those degrees of divine inspiration that
involve either a predominance, or the exclusive use, of the rational faculty over
that of the imagination. 102 For most prophets, revelation is received in the
That is from external sense, to the inner faculties of perception, imagination, and
memory, up to those of judgment and intellect.
100
There is an interesting parallel between Albo’s degrees of prophecy and the four ranks
of men according to their degree of knowledge and way of life, stemming ultimately from Plato’s
Divided Line (Republic, 509d-510a), in “The True Way” discourse (1660, 17). We take this up in
full in chapter five below.
101
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 180. R. J. Scott has offered an important, albeit brief and
imperfect account of Smith’s theory of prophecy as related to visions and dreams in “Visions,
Dreams, and Discernment,” 201-33. In so far as Scott tries to draw conclusions about Smith by
contrasting him with Thomas Aquinas (an unnecessary stand in for Protestant scholastics; Smith
would be familiar with Thomas too) I think an important aspect of Smith’s thought is overlooked.
He was resolutely opposed to the schoolmen of his day and to Aristotelians in particular.
Maimonides and the other rabbinic sources Smith relies on are excepted not because of their
philosophy but because they speak for the ancient Jewish tradition.
102
238
imagination as a representation of sensible objects. “The imaginative power . . .
set forth as a stage, upon which certain visa and simulacra were represented,” as
Smith phrases it. 103 These “apparitions” or “types and shadows” are “symbols of
some spiritual things.” That is, these presentations in the imagination are
manifestations of purely “intelligible mysteries” which are seen by the intellect in
their symbolic reflections. This intellectual intuition is occasioned by the action of
God upon the intellect in coordination with the influx of images into the
imagination. 104
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 180. Douglas Hedley has pointed to the collegiate
context that may help to account for this image of the imagination as a “stage” in his Sacrifice
Imagined: Violence, Atonement, and the Sacred (London and New York: Continuum, 2011), 55-6. He
reports a 1640 inventory held by the Old Library at Queens’ College that includes a “Colledge
stage” (56). Hedley has also called attention to the work of I. R. Wright (“An Early Stage at
Queens’,” Magazine of the Cambridge Society 18 [1986]: 74-83) who notes that Cambridge had been
a center for drama from the middle of the sixteenth century. In fact, Elizabeth I viewed
performances in 1564 and “Charles I saw a play at Queens’ in 1632” (Hedley, Sacrifice, 56).
Moreover, D. F. McKenzie has observed that “Trinity and Queens’ [Colleges] seem to have been
the only colleges left in which plays were still performed with distinction” by the late 1630s (“A
Cambridge Playhouse of 1638,” Renaissance Drama 3 [1970]: 270; quoted by Hedley, Sacrifice, 56).
While it does seem probable therefore that Smith was familiar with the early modern English
stage, it is worth noting that his Select Discourses contain no overt references to specific plays,
playwrights, or the like except for his metaphorical use of the stage to describe the imagination.
Moreover, the imagination, while key to divine revelation through prophecy, is clearly
subservient for Smith to the intellect. However, since by the time of his appointment as a Fellow
at Queens’ the Puritans had banned the theater, there may be purely practical reasons for his
relative silence (cf. Hedley, Sacrifice, 56).
103
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 181. “Images” here should be taken simply to mean the
objects of the imagination. They are not limited to the visual for Smith as a prophet often “hears”
divine things too. In principle, any of the five sensory modalities can be represented in the
imagination.
104
239
Agent Intellect
In two places in chapter two “Of Prophecy” Smith makes apparent
reference to Aristotle’s “active” or “agent intellect” 105 in order to account for that
which impresses the intellect and imagination of the prophet with divine
revelation. 106 Now few concepts have been more influential or more controverted
in the history of philosophy than Aristotle’s notion of the active intellect. 107
Reading the cryptic references to active and passive intellect in De Anima III 5 in
the light of Metaphysics XII 5-7 led some commenters to conclude that the active
intellect is external to the individual human mind. Some, beginning with
Alexander of Aphrodisias, identified this external active intellect with Aristotle’s
105
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 179, 185. Also Hedley, Sacrifice, 51-3.
On Aristotle’s psychology see De Anima, trans. W. S. Hett with Greek in On the Soul.
Parva Naturalia. On Breath, Aristotle vol. VIII, Loeb Classical Library 288 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1957); also translated by J. A. Smith in Introduction to Aristotle, 2nd ed.
rev., ed. Richard McKeon (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 153-247. Also,
Christopher Shields, "Aristotle's Psychology," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Edward N. Zalta, last modified 23 August 2010, accessed 30 April 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/aristotle-psychology/. On the early reception of
Aristotle’s psychology see Miira Touminen, The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle
(Durham: Acumen, 2009), 158-99.
106
Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 3. On the late ancient context for later Arab Aristotelianism see Josef
Lossel and John W. Watt, eds., Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity: The Alexandrian
Commentary Tradition between Rome and Baghdad (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).
107
240
Unmoved Mover or God. Later Arabic philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Avicenna,
and Averroes continued to view the active intellect as external to the individual
human mind and singular for all rational beings but as an entity proceeding from
God rather than identified with God. 108
Maimonides, Smith’s primary reason for bringing up the topic in this
context, seems to have understood the active intellect to be an emanation from
God closest to human beings in the celestial hierarchy and thus the point of
contact between God and the human mind. 109 Thus, Maimonides defines
prophecy as “nothing else but an influence from the Deity first upon the rational,
and afterwards upon the imaginative faculty, by the mediation of the active
Andrea Falcon, "Commentators on Aristotle," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 8 August 2013, accessed 30 April 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/aristotle-commentators/; Sajjad H. Rizvi,
“Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (c.980—1037),” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2006), accessed 30
April 2014, http://www.iep.utm.edu/avicenna/; H.C. Hillier, “Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126—1198),”
in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2010), accessed 30 April 2014,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ibnrushd/. See also Sarah Hutton, “The Cambridge Platonists and
Averroes,” in Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni, eds., Renaissance Averroism and its Aftermath:
Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 197-211. Hutton rightly
reports that Smith “makes no more than passing reference to the Averroist conception of
intellectus agens” (202).
108
On this see, Josef Stern, “Maimonides’ Epistemology,” in Kenneth Seeskin, ed., The
Cambridge Companion to Maimonides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 107-15. Also,
Alfred L. Ivry, “The Guide and Maimonides’ Philosophical Sources,” in Seeskin, 58-81; and
Seymour Feldman, “Maimonides – A Guide to Posterity,” in Seeskin, 324-60.
109
241
intellect.” 110 In contrast, Smith sees the prophetic influence as simultaneously
intellectual and imaginative, but in general he agrees with Maimonides here.
However, Smith speaks of “the imagination and mind of the prophet” being
“made subject wholly to some agent intellect informing it and shining upon it,”
implying that whereas Maimonides thinks of there being a single active or agent
intellect (“the active intellect”), Smith thinks that there are many (“some agent
intellect”). 111 Since Smith does not explain just what he means by the use of the
phrase in this discourse we must turn to his “Of the Immortality of the Soul”
chapter eight to get a sense of what he might intend here.
It comes as no surprise that Smith takes up a discussion of Aristotle’s
psychology in order to address his view on the immortality of soul. For, many, if
not most, commenters have noted that for Aristotle there can be no such thing.
Smith is therefore understandably dismissive of the ill-placed praise Aristotle
receives by “so many” who “take [him] for the great intelligencer of nature, and
omniscient oracle of truth; though it be too manifest that he hath so defaced the
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 179. Also Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed,
trans. Shlomo Pines, intro. Leo Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), Part II ch. 36.
110
111
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 185. My emphasis.
242
sacred monuments of the ancient metaphysical theology by his profane
hands.” 112
What has caused many to "stumble” with regard to the immortality of the
soul is the definition that Aristotle gives of soul as “nothing else . . . but an
entelechia or informative thing, which spends all its virtue upon that matter
which it informs.” Because Aristotle famously gave a basic definition of soul as
the form inherent in a living being, it would seem that the soul is mortal just as
the body. But, Smith continues, “he intended not this for a general definition of
the soul of man” because Aristotle soon thereafter says that “the rational soul is
‘separable from the body, because it is not the entelech of any body.’” 113 The
mind, unlike those aspects of the soul that are necessarily connected with the
body, “’seems to be another kind of soul, and that only is separable from the
body.’” 114
112
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 107-8.
113
Ibid., 108; citing De Anima II 1.
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 109; citing De Anima II 2. Smith cannot resist adding
that Aristotle is apparently making a little dig at the Platonists and Pythagoreans – what
imprudence! – who, Smith says, believed in the immortality of all kinds of soul. Interestingly,
Smith does not deny the truth of such a doctrine.
114
243
This first problem posed by a common reading of Aristotle resolved to his
satisfaction, Smith goes on to address the “other difficulty with which Aristotle’s
opinion seems to be clogged” namely his assertion that the passive intellect is
corruptible. 115 Some have misunderstood Aristotle here to mean by active and
passive two distinct faculties when in fact, “he means nothing else by his ΑΓΙΖȱ
Δ΅ΌΘΎϱΖ [passive intellect], but the understanding in potentia, and by his ΑΓΙΖȱ
ΔΓΘΎϱΖ [active intellect], the same in actu or in habitu.” 116 The active intellect,
therefore, for Smith (if not for Aristotle), is nothing but the potential for thought
realized. After a brief attack on the argument of Aristotle against Plato’s theory
of innate ideas 117 Smith returns to show once again that when Aristotle
“distinguisheth between his intellectus agens and patiens, he seems to mean almost
nothing else but what out ordinary metaphysicians do in their distinction of actus
and potentia.” 118 Thus, there are as many active intellects as there are thinking
115
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 111; citing De Anima III 5.
116
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 111.
117
Ibid., 111-2.
118
Ibid., 112. Smith’s authority on this point is Simplicius.
244
beings for Smith. In this, he differs from his chief guide to prophecy,
Maimonides, yet Smith seems not to appreciate, or be bothered by, the fact.
The apparent explanation for Smith’s lack of concern over his
disagreement with Maimonides on the nature of the active intellect is to be found
in Smith’s agreement with the Rambam on the issue as it concerns his discourse
on prophecy. That is, with regard to prophecy Smith only makes mention of the
“active intellect” in order to refer to that mind, in act, that is the “immediate
efficient” cause of “prophetical visions.” On this question, Smith and
Maimonides are in basic agreement; the immediate cause of prophecy is not God
directly (exceptional cases such as Moses notwithstanding) but rather an angel. 119
Smith disputes the details of Maimonides’ position on this however,
saying that he “pretends” it to be a settled issue that “there is no prophecy but
either in a dream or vision, or by the ministry of an angel.” 120 That is, for
Maimonides all prophets, except Moses alone, received their prophecy from an
angel. However, Nachmanides argued in the opposite direction that any who
Ibid., 215-6. How this might possibly be so for Maimonides while he also asserts that
prophecy is mediated by the single active intellect is a matter for Maimonidean scholars.
119
120
Ibid., 218, 217.
245
“beholds an angel, or hath any conference with one, is not a prophet.” 121
However, Smith argues that Nachmanides has overstepped the bounds of
tradition in so far as “all antiquity reckoned Zechariah as a prophet” even
though “all his visions are perpetually represented by angels.” 122
Moreover, the Talmud confirms, in a comparison of Numbers 12: 6 and
Zechariah 10: 2, that true prophecy has been communicated by angels. This
opinion is supported by the views of the rabbis Rami, Jehudah, Bechai, and
Albo, 123 but nowhere more convincingly, for Smith (ever the Protestant
theologian), than in scripture itself. 124 In particular, Smith draws our attention to
Genesis 32: 24, the story of Jacob’s struggle with an angel 125 and his subsequent
prophetic dream of a ladder between Earth and Heaven in Genesis 38: 12. 126 In
this dream of the ladder “we find angels ascending and descending, to intimate
121
Ibid., 218.
122
Ibid., 219.
123
Ibid., 221-2.
124
Ibid., 222.
Ibid., 222-5. Smith cites Hosea 12:4 on the angelic identity of the “man” Joshua
wrestled with.
125
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 225-6. Cf. John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent,
trans. Colm Luibheid and Norman Russell (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 71-292.
126
246
that this scala prophetica, whereby divine influence descended upon the mind of
the prophet, is always filled with angels.” 127 That prophetic inspiration is
mediated by angels Smith also asserts on the authority of Philo of Alexandria’s de
Somniis, St. Jerome, and the New Testament visions of St. Paul (Acts 27: 23). 128
Dreams and Visions
Having established that prophecy works via the imagination and the
intellect, often by the mediation of an active intellect or angel, Smith proceeds to
elaborate on the “two ways, whereby God would reveal Himself to every other
prophet [besides Moses and the Messiah, who intuit divine truth without
images] – either in a vision or a dream.” 129 In both of these cases “visa and
simulacra sensibilia” (presentations and images of sensible objects) are “impressed
[by divine agency] upon [the] common sense or fancy [phantasia, i.e., the
imaginative faculty].” 130 This “common sense” is not described in any way,
127
Ibid.
128
Ibid., 226-7.
Ibid., 183. See Peter Holland, “The Interpretation of Dreams in the Renaissance,” in
Reading Dreams, ed. Peter Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 125-46 on the treatment
of dreams in Smith’s immediate historical context.
129
130
Ibid., 184.
247
making Smith’s precise meaning difficult to unravel, but most likely this is a
reference to the “higher-order perceptual power that emerges from the unity of
the perceptual capacity of the soul,” a faculty that works in connection with the
imagination in bringing sensible images to cognitive awareness. 131 Smith’s
theological point here is clear however, even if his philosophy is muddled. It is in
visions and dreams that the prophet receives revelations as present to his or her
understanding, though without external objects of sense.
Of the two, there is for Smith only a circumstantial difference between a
vision and a dream. In both, “the representation of divine things by some
sensible images or some narrative voice must needs be in them.” 132 In fact, as
Maimonides reports of Abraham, a prophet may fall into sleep from a waking
because the “external senses are bound” or shut up in a vision. 133 While
extraordinary in their power to close off the external senses Smith is quick to
note, following Rabbi Bechai, that prophetical visions, and presumably dreams
Pavel Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
120. My interpretation rests largely on this view being the way Simplicius, an important authority
for Smith, reads Aristotle. Alternatively Smith is using the phrase as simply a synonym for the
“fancy” or phantasia.
131
132
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 184.
133
Ibid., 185. Also Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, Part II ch. 45.
248
as well, are still human visions. The prophet views an image as humans usually
do and he “saw like a man, and understood things after the manner of men” as
well. 134
In visions, which are not limited to visual impressions despite their name,
and in dreams, the prophet “sees” or “hears” spiritual things symbolically in the
imagination. St. Paul intends just this when he says, “’Now we see ΈȇȱπΗϱΔΘΕΓΙȱ
πΑȱ΅ϢΑϟ·ΐ΅Θ—by a glass, in riddles or parables’” by which Smith takes him to
mean that “the highest illuminations which we have here” in contrast to the
“constant irradiation of the Divinity upon the souls of men in the life to come.” 135
Smith proceeds in chapter three to give a rather lengthy discussion of the
distinctions between various types of dreams met with in scripture. His point
here is simply to note that not all dreams are prophetic, a notion that would seem
to go without saying except that he acknowledges, with Maimonides, a class of
dreams that are true but nevertheless not prophetic. These “somina vera”
Maimonides describes as simply an “admonition or instruction . . . given by God
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 185-6. R. Bechai is almost certainly Bahye ben Asher ibn
Halawa (1255-1340) and not one of the other Bechai’s also from Spain. See “Bahya (Behai) ben
Asher ben Halwa,” in The Jewish Encyclopedia (1901-1906), accessed 26 April 2014,
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/2367.
134
135
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 185. Cf. Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 21.
249
. . . in a dream.” 136 As Smith interprets this out of R. Eleazar and R. Joshua in
addition to the Rambam, the primary reason such dreams are not counted as
prophetic owes to the status of the dreamer. The “partakers of them were
unsanctified men; whereas it is a tradition amongst them [the Rabbis], that the
spirit of prophecy was not communicated to any but good men.” 137
A true dream sent by God is “much weaker in their energy upon the
imagination.” 138 Whereas a prophetic dream has “strength and force of a divine
evidence” the somina vera (or ΑΓΙΌΉΘΎΣ; admonition) are dull and not obviously
of divine origin. This qualitative difference seems to be connected to a difference
in the content of the dream as well. A non-prophetic, true dream “ordinarily
contained . . . something that was ΣΕ·ϱΑ [idle, useless], or void of reality.” In
contrast, as Albo has it, “prophecy is a thing wholly and most exactly true.” 139
Moreover, Smith lays out the opinion of Philo of Alexandria (20 BCE – 50
CE) on this topic as related in his de Somniis. In part Smith’s aim here is to further
136
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 187.
137
Ibid., 187. More on this in chapter five below.
138
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 187.
139
Ibid., 188. Smith backs up this point with the Gemara (Babylonian Talmud) and Albo.
250
expound on his theme but, ever the humanist, he also takes the opportunity to
correct the Latin translation of Sigismund Gelenius. For Philo the “proper
character” of a prophetic dream is that it be accompanied by “ecstatical rapture”
as Smith phrases it. By this he takes Philo to mean little more than that these
dreams are powerful and leave a deeper impression on the dreamer as being of
divine origin. Philo speaks of three types of divine dreams that one meets with in
scripture.
First, when God addresses the imagination, such as the dreams of Joseph,
in such a way that the dreamer at first does not know what to make of the
dream. 140 Second, when the reason is moved with the world soul and predicts
things to come in future, which Philo associates with Jacob’s ladder and Laban’s
sheep. 141 And third, when the soul is moved by itself and the content of the
dream is clouded in obscurity and in need of an interpreter as in the case of the
dreams of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar. This last type is thought by Smith to be
those identified by Plato too which “cannot be understood without a prophet.” 142
140
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 189.
141
Ibid., 190.
Ibid., 192. The allusion appears to be to Timaeus 72a. This blending of Judaic and
Platonic scholarship is a classic example of Smith’s profound breadth of learning.
142
251
In chapter six “Of Prophecy” Smith asks if actions ascribed to prophets
should be understood to be real historical events or if they are merely imaginary
in the sense that visions and dreams are. Following the lead of Maimonides,
Smith suggests that because “the prophetical scene or stage upon which all
apparitions were made to the prophet, was his imagination” where the “things
which God would have revealed . . . were acted over symbolically, as in a
masque,” that “it is no wonder to hear of those things done which . . . have no
historical or real verity.” 143 What matters is the content of the revelation and not
whether or not a prophet actually did what is attributed to him or her.
In this way Smith is able to save Hosea from the untoward act of actually
marrying the “harlot” Gomer, 144 Abraham from the awkwardness of seeing the
stars during the daytime, 145 Jeremiah from various unlikely stories, 146 and Ezekiel
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 230. On the question of the “objectivity” of prophetic
dreams for Maimonides see Leaman, Maimonides, Imagination, and the Objectivity of Prophecy, 69-80.
“The only objectivity which we can discuss here is the objectivity of the relationship between the
parable and the state of affairs which as a consequence is made comprehensible to us” (Leaman,
79).
143
144
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 230.
145
Ibid., 232.
146
Ibid., 232-4.
252
from actually eating a scroll, 147 among others. All such unlikely events as these
are to be understood to be imaginary or symbolic only. As a general rule, Smith
proposes, with Abarbanel, that we consider any such story to be imaginary, and
therefore as signifying something else, unless there is “some positive declaration
to assure us that they were performed in history.” 148
True and False Prophecy
In chapter four Smith takes up the difference between true and false or
demonic prophecy. Since prophecy involves the imagination, and false
enthusiasm involves nothing more than the imagination, it is easy to be mistaken
about the truth or falsity of a purported prophetic experience. Thus, he sets out
to “examine the nature of this false light which pretends to prophecy, but is
not.” 149 False prophecy, like the true, is “seated” in the imagination. However,
whereas for the true prophet the intellect is also involved, the false has only their
imaginative faculty activated.
147
Ibid., 235-6.
148
Ibid., 231.
149
Ibid., 194.
253
Smith draws on a threefold categorization by Maimonides to illustrate his
point. There are, first of all, those who are “wholly intellectual . . . from whence .
. . ariseth the sect of philosophers, and contemplative persons.” Second, are those
who experience the “rational and imaginative” together, and these include the
prophets. Third, there are those who engage the “imaginative only . . . from
whence proceeds the sect of politicians, lawyers, and lawgivers . . . also the sect
of diviners, enchanters, dreamers, and soothsayers.” 150 These last, of course, are
in no sense “prophets” for Maimonides, or Smith. In fact, Smith judges that his
own day is much infected with such “enthusiastical impostors” in matters
secular and sacred. 151 Against the deluded enthusiast and the tradition of the
Renaissance magi Smith shows nothing but contempt. “This pseudo-prophetical
spirit, being not able to rise up above this low and dark region of sense or matter,
150
Ibid., 195.
Ibid. Cf. More, Enthusiasmus triumphatus. Also, Michael Heyd, “Be Sober and
Reasonable”: The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries (Leiden:
Brill, 1995), 92-108, and passim; Frederic B. Burnham, “The More-Vaughan Controversy: The
Revolt against Philosophical Enthusiasm,” Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974): 33-49; Robert
Crocker, “Mysticism and Enthusiasm in Henry More,” in Henry More (1614-1687) Tercentenary
Studies, ed. Sarah Hutton, International Archives of the History of Ideas (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1990), 137-55; David W. Dockrill, “Spiritual Knowledge and the Problem of
Enthusiasm in Seventeenth Century England,” in The Concept of Spirit, ed. David W. Dockrill and
R.G. Tanner (Auckland: University of Auckland, 1985); and Daniel C. Fouke, The Enthusiastical
Concerns of Henry More: Religious Meaning and the Psychology of Delusion, (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
151
254
or to soar aloft into a clear heaven of vision, endeavored always, as much as
might be, to strengthen itself in the imaginative part: and, therefore, the wizards
and false prophets of old and later times have been wont always to heighten
their fancies and imaginations by all means possible.” 152 As if to assure his reader
of his knowledge in this matter Smith calls upon the expertise of the Dutch
occultist Johann Weyer (1515-1588) who speaks of witches eating “such food as
they understand from the devil is very fit for” enhancing their imaginations. 153
Divination of this sort has often been mistaken for prophecy by “weaker
minds” but even the “wiser sort of the heathens have happily found out the
lameness and delusiveness of it”; one need not be a Christian to discern that
these are false prophets. For example, Plato addresses such matters in the
Timaeus, Charmides, and the Phaedrus. 154 Following their master’s lead, “the
Platonists generally seemed to reject, or very much to slight, all this kind of
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 196. We see here the hierarchy of the rational over the
imaginative or sensible that we met with above. For Smith, as for Origen and Plotinus, to remain
fixated on the physical world of appearance is to limit ourselves to a view intrinsically beneath
our proper dignity as rational beings. While in this life sense and imagination are important for
our cognition they are the lower partner with reason.
152
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 197. Smith knows Weyer as Ioannes Wierus, the author
of De praestigiis daemonum (Basel, 1563).
153
154
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 197-9.
255
revelation.” 155 The Stoics too would “scarce allow their wise man at any time to
consult an oracle.” 156 From this Smith discerns the general principle that the true
“prophetical spirit doth never alienate the mind . . . but always maintains a
consistency and clearness of reason, strength, and solidity of judgment.”
Moreover, this true spirit “doth not ravish the mind, but inform and enlighten
it.” 157
In contrast then to the comparatively calm temper of mind occasioned by
prophecy Smith notes several examples out of antiquity of false prophets
displaying mania or melancholy among other alienations of the mind. For
example, the Pythian prophetess, Cassandra the sibyl, and the early Christian
Ibid., 199. Smith mentions only the eclectic Maximus Tyrius (late 2nd century CE) and
the Neoplatonist Porphyry (c.234-c.305) here. Presumably he is intentionally downplaying
Platonists such as Iamblichus with their overt embrace of ΌΉΓΙΕ·ϟ΅ (theurgy) by mentioning
Porphyry. On this see Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
155
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 199. Smith cites Arrian of Nicomedia (c.86-c.160),
Epictetus (c.55-135), Simplicius of Cilicia (c.490-c.560), and Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (39-65) in
support. On Smith on the Stoics see J. Lagree, “John Smith et le Portique,” in The Cambridge
Platonists in Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics, and Religion, eds. G.A.J. Rogers, J. M.
Vienne, and Y.C. Zarka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 79-92.
156
157
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 200.
256
heresy of Montanism, all share a wild and unintelligible experience. 158 Smith cites
Clement of Alexandria (150-215), Tertullian (160-220), Eusebius (263-339), and
Jerome (347-420) against these “abruptions of mind.” 159 John Chrysostom (c.347407) says it best, “It is the property of a diviner to be ecstatical, to undergo some
violence, to be tossed and hurried about like a madman. But it is otherwise with
a prophet, whose understanding is awake, and his mind in a sober and orderly
temper, and he knows every thing that he saith.” 160
While not as wildly “out of mind” as the false prophets, Smith qualifies
his argument thus far by noting “that observation of the Jews . . . concerning
those panic fears, consternations, affrightments, and tremblings, which
frequently seized upon them, together with the prophetical influx.” 161 In
On Montanism generally and the intriguing theory that Montanism was a far more
wide spread, if not “mainstream” view in the very early Church see Rex. D. Butler, The New
Prophecy & “New Visions”: Evidence of Montanism in the Passion of Perpetua and Felicitas
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univerrsity of America Press, 2006).
158
159
Ibid., 202.
Ibid., 203. Smith cites from the 29th Homily on 1 Corinthians (12: 1, 2) which is given by
Talbot W. Chambers as “For this is peculiar to the soothsayer, to be beside himself, to be under
compulsion, to be pushed, to be dragged, to be haled as a madman. But the prophet not so, but
with sober mind and composed temper and knowing what he is saying, he uttereth all things” in
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series 1, vol. 12, ed. Philip Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal
Library, 2005, accessed 27 April 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf112.iv.xxx.html.
160
161
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 203.
257
evidence of the exhaustion, fear, and overall impact of having divine disclosure
revealed Smith cites the biblical figures of Daniel, Abraham, Jeremiah, Ezekiel,
Habakkuk, Isaiah, Samuel, Adam, Job, Elijah, and St. John the Divine, 162 as well
as a whole host of rabbinic sources including Maimonides, Albo, Solomon Jarchi,
Abarbanel, Jonathan the Targumist, and Nachmanides (Moses ben Nachman
Gerondi). 163
Qualifications and Preparation for Prophecy
Smith next turns to a discussion of what he calls the “qualifications”
needed to become a prophet (chapter eight). In doing so he makes clear that not
just anyone can become a prophet. While the ultimate standard is the free choice
of God to reveal something to the prophet, this does not happen without due
preparation of the would-be receiver of this revelation. This is mirrored in the
“old Heathens” as well as being what Smith takes to be the consensus of
scripture, the rabbinic tradition, and clear reason. Even the pagan diviners “were
Daniel 10: 8; Genesis 15: 1, 12; Jeremiah 23: 9, 28, 29; Ezekiel 3: 14, 9: 1, 2: 9; Habakkuk 3:
2; Isaiah 21: 3; 1 Samuel 3: 7; Genesis 3: 8, 9; 1 Kings 19: 11; Job 38: 1; Revelation 1: 10, 4: 1, 6: 1, 8: 5,
10: 3, 9.
162
163
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 204-14.
258
wont in a solemn manner to prepare and fit themselves for receiving the influx
thereof.” 164
The rabbinic consensus as Smith reports it is that the qualifications
necessary “to render any one habilem ad prophetandum [able or apt to prophecy]
are true probity and piety.” 165 Maimonides, who is a constant companion for
Smith’s exploration of prophecy, adds to this consensus a threefold requirement
of perfection of (1) an “Acquisite or rational” (2) “Natural or animal” and (3)
“Moral” type. Differences in these three areas account, for Rambam, for the
degrees of prophecy too. All of this leads Maimonides to his conclusion that “all
prophecy is the proper result of these perfections, as a form arising out of them
all, as out of its elements compounded together.” 166
Smith has in view here the Rambam’s infamous theory of prophecy as a
kind of natural faculty subject to development through the diligent perfecting of
the moral, physical, and intellectual powers. 167 As Leaman has put it,
164
Ibid., 249. Smith’s source here is Rabbi Albo.
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 250. Smith’s Latin appears to have failed him here but
his meaning is clearly “able or apt to prophecy.”
165
166
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 251.
167
Ibid., 252.
259
“Maimonides . . . seems to treat [prophecy] as a natural phenomenon.” 168 In this,
Maimonides parts company with much of his own tradition, which Smith is
quick to point out, by downplaying the role of God in making the prophet. 169
“I know no reason,” asserts Smith in an uncharacteristic use of the first
person, “to infer any such thing as the prophetical spirit, from the highest
improvement of natural or moral endowments.” 170 Smith is aghast that such a
learned authority as Maimonides could fail to see the necessity of divine
inspiration for prophecy. Preparation is one thing, that may make it easier to
receive a revelation, but God must still send this communication to the prophet.
Moreover, Smith contends, with a rather more voluntarist view of the divine will
than is typical for him and the other Cambridge Platonists, that God is fully
capable to sending this inspiration to anyone God chooses. He is quick to add
that this is “not likely” that God would so address the mind of one who was ill
Oliver Leaman, “Maimonides, Imagination, and the Objectivity of Prophecy,” Religion
18 (1988): 69.
168
“This opinion of Maimonides I find not any where entertained, only by the author of
the book Cosri.” Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 252-3. Leaman points out that the roots of this
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱάȱǻǼǯȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
the more curious that Smith chooses this place to insist, as a Protestant Christian might be
expected, that there is no prophecy without the will of God making it so. Curious, because, as we
have seen, Smith is very much at home with Neoplatonic emanation. See Leaman, “Maimonides,”
70-1.
170 Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 253.
169
260
prepared, but the possibility remains. 171 Smith’s attitude toward the idea that
prophecy is a sort of natural phenomenon is nowhere more clear than it is when
he begins to take up the topic of the various “schools of prophecy.” He tells us
that “anciently many were so trained up in a way of school-discipline, that they
might become candidati prophetiae, and were as probationers to these degrees,
which none but God Himself conferred upon them”; one may work to become
prepared but only God grants prophetic inspiration. 172 Still, overall, Smith agrees
with Maimonides that in general a prophet will have true piety, wisdom, an even
temper of mind full of cheerfulness. 173
4.2.4 Mosaic Prophecy
Smith comes to his most detailed discussion of Mosaic prophecy in
chapter eleven. Here, his chief concern is to relate just what it is about the
prophecy of Moses that makes it the “highest degree of divine inspiration.” In
171
Ibid., 253.
Ibid., 261. The analogy to the running of a school may hint at our author’s sense of
humor. He was a dean at Queens’ College at the time of writing.
172
173
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 253-61.
261
this, his most important guide is Maimonides, and drawing on him Smith gives
us four “characteristical differences” between the Mosaic and other prophecy. 174
First, unlike the other prophets Moses received revelations while
completely awake. “Moses was made partaker of these divine revelations per
vigiliam; whereas God manifested Himself to all the other prophets in a dream or
vision.” 175 This is an important distinction because, as we have seen, lesser
prophets receive their communications from God in dreams or visions and thus
within their imaginations. Moses, in contrast, encounters divine truth as an
intellectual influx.
Second, unlike other prophets “Moses prophesied without the mediation
of any angelical power, by an influence derived immediately from God.” This,
for Smith is the meaning of the phrase that God spoke to Moses “face to face” but
he interprets this in a thoroughly intellectual sense. Moses communicates with
God “face to face” in the sense that God reveals God’s self with “clearness and
evidence of the intellectual light.” While the others saw in a glass darkly Moses
174
Ibid., 272.
175
Ibid.
262
sees in a glass clearly. 176 That is, where others received divine inspiration by the
mediation of an angel within the imagination and the intellect, Moses perceived
by an intellectual intuition implanted directly by God.
Third, Moses was “able to understand the words of prophecy, without
any disturbance and astonishment of mind.” Notice that while the lesser
prophets received divine revelation in images within the imagination, Moses
“hears” the Word of God in his mind. 177
Fourth, Moses, unlike the rest, was able to prophesy when he chose. Other
prophets were communicated to when God willed it, and they knew not when
that would be, but Moses seems to have “had free recourse to this heavenly
oracle at any time.” 178 Or so Maimonides would have it; Smith for his part thinks
that the Rambam “here somewhat hyperbolizeth, and scarce speaks consistently
with the rest of the Hebrew masters.” All the same, Smith thinks it “most
176
Ibid., 273. Smith’s source here is Philo of Alexandria.
Ibid., 274. The presentations to the imagination of a prophet is not, of course, limited to
visual images however Smith’s preferred metaphor is visual for lesser prophets and auditory for
Moses.
177
178
Ibid., 272. Also, 274-5.
263
probable that he [Moses] had a greater liberty of prophesying than any other of
the prophets.” 179
Thus, the “gradus Mosaicus” exceeds all others in prophetic power because
it is a “clear, distinct, kind of inspiration made immediately upon an intellectual
faculty in a familiar way.” 180 That is, Moses’ greatness lay in his having an
intellectual understanding of divinity given by God directly. Smith thinks that
this intensity of prophecy was necessarily short lived (i.e., the life of Moses
alone) because it was to serve as “the basis of all future prophecy among the
Jews.” The other prophets aimed primarily to support the prophetically revealed
law of Moses and to clarify the practical means of observing this law. 181
Moreover, Moses’ prophesy was supported or authenticated by many “signs and
miracles done in the sight of all the people.” For example, the turning of his staff
into a serpent, the parting of the Red Sea, and the Bath Kol heard by all the people
179
Ibid., 275.
Ibid., 275. While it may be merely coincidental, the implied reference here to “clear
and distinct ideas” calls to mind Descartes’ famous epistemological formula.
180
181
Ibid.
264
at Sinai made sure that Moses’ prophecy would be remembered if not always
believed. 182
Smith closes his discussion of Mosaic prophecy with a paragraph that
reads like the impassioned plea of an excellent preacher, who just happens to
also be a great scholar too. In contrast to being convinced by miracles and the
like Smith wishes that we might become acquainted with divine truth through
“moral arguments” and the inherent reasonableness of the things of God. “I wish
this . . . way of becoming acquainted with divine truth were better known
amongst us: for when we have once attained to a true, sanctified, frame of mind,
we have then attained to the end of all prophecy, and see all divine truth that
tends to the salvation of our souls in the divine light, which always shines in the
purity and holiness of the new creature, and so need no further miracles to
confirm us in it.” 183
Thus, Smith draws his own connection between the “True Way or Method
of Attaining to Divine Knowledge” with its advocacy of a purified will and mind
as the preconditions for a proper understanding of divinity and “Of Prophecy”
182
Ibid., 276. See also, Exodus 7: 10, 14; 14: 26-9; 20: 2-3.
183
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 277.
265
which accounts for the first revelation of saving truths. Divine knowledge
originates in prophecy but it is in a spiritualized life that we attain the end of
prophecy for ourselves. And herein lies the explanation for the curious degree of
similarity between the “True Way” and Mosaic prophecy. Both the greatest of
the original revelators and the recommended path to appropriate the truth of
that revelation work by a kind of intellectual intuition. Their difference lies,
therefore, not so much in method as in chronology.
Moses is the first in the line of Jewish and later Christian individuals (and
in more limited ways pagan philosophers too) to have had an intellectual vision
of divine truth. In this, it seems that Smith subscribes to a version of what Moshe
Idel has called the “unilinear” theory of the prisca theologia which sees the
tradition of true theology as beginning with Moses and extending through later
Jewish prophecy, pagan philosophy, and finally the incarnation of Christ and the
birth of Christian wisdom. 184
Still, Smith is clearly opposed to the naturalized theory of prophecy he
encounters in Maimonides, so what are we to make of the strong similarity
Moshe Idel, “Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino and in Some Jewish Treatments,” in
Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees, and Martin Davies, eds., Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His
Philosophy, His Legacy (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 138-9.
184
266
between the intellectual intuition of the “True Way” and the purely intellectual
prophecy of Moses?
First, to be completely free of images in one’s encounter with divine truth
is extraordinary in this life. As we saw in our look at the “True Way” our
intuition is not without the influence of the imagination until the beatific vision
of heaven. In violation of this natural principle, Moses was granted a direct “face
to face” revelation of an entirely intellectual kind while he lived. Only the direct
action of God can overcome the natural necessity of a sensible image in this life.
This, then is what makes the Mosaic revelation special vis-à-vis the method of
the “True Way.”
Second, the intellectual intuition recommended in the “True Way” is not
entirely “natural” in the usual sense. For, when we turn our purified attention
within ourselves to see the vestiges of divine truth enfolded there we become
witness to the primordial revelation of God in our very creation. At root, there is
nothing that is completely “natural” for Smith, as all things, including especially
267
our capacities for cognition and volition, derive ultimately from a divine
archetype. 185
Third, building on this, and in keeping with the spirit of his tutor
Whichcote, natural and revealed theology are not, ultimately, distinct in kind at
all, but rather in degree. This is why many readers of Smith have suggested that
he does not so much offer arguments sufficient to convince the unbiased mind as
he discourses upon what he takes to be the clear conclusions of a pious
Christian. 186 Such a view, however, imports an unnecessary and unwelcome gap
between philosophy and theology, reason and faith, into its reading of Smith. As
Tulloch observed, “All our primary and higher knowledge may in a sense be
called revelation.” 187 Smith, maintains a distinction between natural and revealed
Thus, his claims against Epicurus and “Epicureans” throughout the Select Discourses
([1859], xxvi-xxviii, 14, 17-9, 22, 44-53, 60, 66, 70-9, 83, 85, 104, 139, 375, 412, 452, 482).
185
This tendency would seem to begin with Metcalfe who said, “So implicitly does
SMITH trust to our intuitive knowledge, that he does not even attempt a proof of so important a
doctrine as that of the existence of God” (W. M. Metcalf, “Memoir,” in The Natural Truth of
Christianity: Selections from the “Select Discourses” of John Smith, with an introduction by Matthew
Arnold, ed. W. M. Metcalfe [London: Alexander Gardner, Paisley, 1882], xli, see also xxviii-xxix).
186
Tulloch, Rational Theology, 2: 175. This sentiment is Augustinian in most of its Western
(Latin) forms and owes much to the theory of illumination which makes all knowledge a kind of
revelation. In Smith, this Augustinian sentiment is represented in primarily Greek categories
borrowed directly from the Neoplatonists and the Alexandrian Fathers. “A central belief, even
assumption, running through the published work of [Henry] More and his fellow Platonists, is
187
268
truths, and only the truths of revelation are “saving,” but this distinction does
not signal the kind of radical difference in kind that many contemporary readers
will expect. As Smith himself says, “It was a degenerous and unworthy Spirit in
that Philosophy which first separated and made such distances between
Metaphysical Truths & the Truths of Nature.” 188 In this, he is thoroughly in
keeping with his fellow Cambridge Platonists. 189
4.2.5 Hagiographi and the Bath Kol
The last degrees of divine inspiration are those of the “Rauch Hakkodesh”
or Holy Spirit and the Bath Kol or a voice out of heaven. Neither of these rise to
the level of prophecy proper but share with that gift the disclosure of the Divine
Will to humanity. Smith takes up the inspiration of the “Holy Spirit” in chapter
seven and the Bath Kol in chapter ten.
that the ultimate goal of both religion and philosophy is a state of mystical and intellectual
illumination, or ‘deification’” (Crocker, “Illuminism in More,” 130).
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 434. Given his open hostility toward Aristotle and his
causal animosity toward the bulk of the schoolmen, it seems likely that Smith has in view here
the Aristotelian approach to philosophy and theology perhaps best exemplified in Thomas
Aquinas, even though he traces the historical roots to the Sophists in opposition to Socrates.
188
Gerald R. Cragg, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 16-20; C. A. Patrides, “’The High and Aiery Hills of Platonisme’: An
Introduction to the Cambridge Platonists,” in The Cambridge Platonists (London: Edward Arnold,
1969), 8-16; Taliaferro and Teply, Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, 6-10, 12.
189
269
The ruach ha-kodesh or “holy spirit” is characterized as the inspiration of a
writer of a sacred text. For this reason Smith will also speak of this degree as
“Hagiographical”. The sacred books of the Hebrew Bible that are not formally
prophetic are said to have been inspired by this Holy Spirit but without the
mediation of a vision or dream. 190 While the holy writers thus inspired
“ordinarily expressed themselves in parables and similitudes . . . they seem only
to have made use of such a dress of language to set off their own sense of divine
things.” That is, while they express themselves in imagery they do not receive
their inspiration as images presented to the imagination directly. There is “no
labour of the imagination in this way of revelation.” Indeed, taking his lead from
Maimonides, Proclus, Plotinus, and Empedocles, Smith contends that “this
enthusiastical spirit seated itself principally in the higher and purer faculties of
the soul.” 191
This raises the difficulty of distinguishing this degree of revelation from
that of the Mosaic degree of prophecy. That this is distinct from the category of
“prophecy proper” is clear from the lack of communication in the imaginations
190
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 238-9.
191
Ibid., 239. The “higher and purer” faculties are those of cognition and conation.
270
of the hagiographi. However, as a more purely intellectual disclosure, this
“Spiritus Sanctus” would seem to bear a strong similarity to the prophecy of
Moses. The distinction would seem to rest simply on the authority of the Jewish
tradition of dividing the “Old Testament” books according to the Torah (from
Moses), the Prophets (from the other prophets), and the Writings (from the
hagiographi). 192 The only other distinguishing mark that separates these from the
prophecies of Moses is the subject matter involved. Those inspired by the Holy
Spirit speak, and sometimes sing, with deep wisdom but not of matters given in
a “visum propheticum.” 193
Prophets, it must be remembered, do not always receive inspiration of the
same degree. When they are inspired to write songs for example they are merely
inspired by the Holy Spirit and not prophesying. 194 In fact, the writing of songs
“was not the proper work of God himself, but the work of the prophet’s own
The hagiographic writings include: Ruth, Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles,
Lamentations, Daniel, Esther, Ezra, and the two books of Chronicles.
192
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 244. In his attempt to remain true to his sources on
Jewish antiquity and tradition Smith seems to strain to make this degree fit his Neoplatonist
inspired sense of what constitutes higher and lower levels of revelation. He should, I think, view
this more purely intellectual variety as like the Mosaic degree of prophecy in essentials. And
perhaps he would, if it were not for the authority of the tradition that none were greater or even
equal to Moses.
193
194
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 245.
271
spirit.” 195 In this, the hagiographer has a higher degree of independence in what
she or he relates to others under divine inspiration. They are free to compose
imagery of their own to illustrate the divine wisdom they receive without
images. 196
The “lowest degree of revelation among the Jews . . . was their . . . Bath
Kol, filia vocis, which was nothing else but some voice which was heard as
descending from heaven, directing them in any affair as occasion served: which
kind of revelation might be made to one, as Maimonides tells us, that was no
way prepared for prophecy.” 197 This phenomenon Smith is more interested to
relate out of the New Testament than the Old. He cites as examples the voices
heard in John 12: 28-9, Matthew 3: 17, and 17: 5-6. 198 This Bath Kol is external and
perceived by the corporeal senses. It has more of the miracle about it than the
prophetic revelation in this respect. This externality, and the potential for
195
Ibid., 245.
196
Ibid., 246.
197
Ibid., 268.
198
Ibid., 270-1.
272
empirical observation by many people, makes it less authentic for Smith than true
prophecy which is a “divine inspiration into the mind of the prophet.” 199
The End of Jewish and Christian Prophecy
As a kind of colophon to his discourse on prophecy Smith takes up in
chapter twelve a discussion of the “period of time it was in which this
prophetical spirit ceased, both in the Jewish and the Christian church.” 200 This is
important because it signals (and this is otherwise not obvious from his
descriptions of prophecy) that the period of divine revelation has in fact ended.
In making this clear Smith is standing in solid opposition to those who would
argue for a whole host of non-biblical prophecy, up to and including those
produced in his own day. 201
Since the Bible is silent on this issue, as one would expect, it being a record
of prophetic utterances, Smith turns to “such histories as are like to be most
Ibid., 271. Again, there is a difficulty in consistency here. Speaking as he does of the
contrast between the Bath Kol and prophecy would include those inspired by the Holy Spirit
among the prophets. However he is at pains to keep that degree separate from “prophecy proper”
as we have seen above.
199
200
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 278.
On the “influence of the non-Biblical vernacular prophetic traditions in early modern
England” see Tim Thorton, Prophecy, Politics and the People in Early Modern England (Woodbridge:
Boydell & Brewer, 2006), esp. 1-13, 53-98.
201
273
authentical in this business.” 202 While Justin Martyr suggests that John the Baptist
was the last Jewish prophet, Clement of Alexandria is a much better guide, as he
argues that the line of prophets ends with Malachi. Clement’s case is stronger
because he speaks “with the consent of all Jewish antiquity.” 203 Thus, Smith dates
the end of Jewish prophecy to time of the Second Temple, the sixth or fifth
centuries BCE. 204 At this time the Jews were left with only the Bath Kol remaining
for a brief time after. 205 “This cessation of prophecy determined as it were all that
old dispensation wherein God had manifested Himself to the Jews under the
law, that so, by its growing old and thus wearing away, they might expect that
202
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 278.
Ibid., 279. Smith’s authorities here are the Babylonian Talmud, Maimonides, and
others (279-80).
203
Smith cites the “Corsi,” R. Jehuda, and R. Abraham ben Dior to the effect that
prophecy remained for only about forty years after the beginning of the Second Temple. Smith,
Select Discourses (1859), 280. The “Corsi” appears to be the Kitab al Khazari (or Kuzari) of Judah
Halevi (c.1075-1141). If so, Smith must have worked with a Hebrew translation as the first Latin
edition dates to 1660, well after his death. On Halevi see, Diana Lobel, “Taste and See That the
Lord is Good: Halevi's God Revisited,” in Jay M. Harris, ed., Be’erot Yitzhaq: Studies in Memory of
Isadore Twersky, 161-78 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), and Between Mysticism
and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi's Kuzari (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2000). Rabbi Abraham ben David, or ben Dior (c.1125-1198), is
known to Smith as an anti-Aristotelian Talmudist. See Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières: A
Twelfth-Century Talmudist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
204
205
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 280.
274
new dispensation of the Messiah, which had been promised so long before, and
which should again restore this prophetical spirit more abundantly.” 206
Thus, with the coming of Jesus Christ, or more precisely the sending of the
Holy Spirit among the early Church, the gift of prophecy was renewed. 207 On the
basis of the testimony of Eusebius, Justin Martyr, and Origen, Smith concludes
that prophecy came to an end in the Christian Church in the second century
CE. 208
4.3 The “True Way,” Prophecy and the Spiritual Senses
In this chapter we have seen that John Smith makes consistent appeal to
what we have identified as the spiritual senses in his theory of the source and
methods appropriate for coming to theological understanding. In particular,
Smith sees natural knowledge of divinity, as well as the appropriation of
revealed truth, as a matter of intellectual intuition, but never completely
206
Ibid., 281.
Smith finds prophetic proof of this in the words of Joel 2: 28. Early Christian prophecy
is attested to by Acts 2: 17; Revelation 19: 10; John 8: 39; Ephesians 4: 8; and Acts 19: 2. Smith,
Select Discourses (1859), 281.
207
Ibid., 282-3. This dating, Smith remarks, is convenient for dismissing the Montanist
heresy since by its rise in the late second century prophecy is said to have already ceased.
However, Smith also cites Origen (apparently approvingly) to the effect that prophecy was
simply rare after the second century (Ibid., 283). Origen, Contra Celsum 7. 8.
208
275
separated from sensible images in the imagination. Implicitly dismissing as
wrongly oriented for its task the physically sensible approach of Aristotelian
(cosmological) natural theology from the start, Smith recommends the path of
moral and spiritual purification leading to affective intellectual intuition with the
remains of sensible images while we live. We appropriate Divine truths via our
intellect, which gives symbols to our imaginations, when we begin to taste the
sweetness of divinity in Christ and we appreciate this transformation sensibly in
our reformed lives as well.
Moreover, Smith argues that revealed knowledge of God involves the
perception of implanted images in the imagination as well as communication
with the human intellect. The most basic form of this revelation is purely sensible
in the Bath Kol or voice of God heard miraculously in prophetic times. Others are
inspired by the Ruach Hakodesh or Holy Spirit with the revelation of the Divine
Will to the intellect of psalmists, poets, and sages. To the prophets are given
influxes of divine truth in the form of images made present in the imagination
and ideas in the intellect by the ministrations of an angelic messenger. Finally,
with Moses and Jesus Christ alone does God give a purely intellectual revelation
276
“face to face” in the sense of “mind to mind.” Thus, what begins in sense, reaches
new heights in imagination, and is perfected in intellect. 209
The content of true religion was thus given to external sense by the
miracle of the voice of God, to the inner, spiritual, senses of the imagination by
angelic deposition, and the intellect as immediate intuition by the Divine Mind
itself. The content of these revelations then became the content of faith, first
assented to by clear minds, 210 appreciated in purified symbols in the
imagination, 211 and made sensible in the external world in the life of the “true
and sober Christian who lives in Him who is Life it self, and is enlightened by
Him who is the Truth it self.” 212
209
Perfected in our earthly life for Moses and for the rest hereafter.
210
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 16.
Ibid., 3, 8-9, 15, 21. One looks in vain for a post-Kantian understanding of the faculties
of the soul. While clearly separate from the external senses, the mind, for Smith, is not without a
power of representation.
211
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 21. He alludes to the Gospel of John 14: 6: “Jesus saith
unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me” and to
First John 2: 20: “But ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things” (KJV).
212
CHAPTER 5: SPIRITUAL SENSE AND SPIRITUALITY
But he was alwaies very urgent upon us that by the
Grace of God and the help of the mighty Spirit of
Jesus Christ working in us, we would . . . labour after
Purity of heart, that so we might see God. 1
John Smith’s Select Discourses are saturated with a rational piety that is
virtually unknown today, and was an innovation, or recovery, in his own time.
In chapter four we saw the first example of his rationalism in the form of his
Christian Platonist account of the source and methods of theology. In chapter six
we will see how he attacked the central doctrines of natural theology; above all,
the immortality of the soul and the nature and existence of God. In this chapter
we explore the role of spiritual sensation in the life of the Christian as Smith
understood it. First, we look back to the acquisition of theological understanding
to focus more specifically on the preparation and purification Smith thought was
essential to that task. Second, the practice of the Christian religion as he taught it
is explored. In both respects, Smith calls upon the spiritual senses as an essential
component of his account.
Simon Patrick, “A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of Mr John Smith . . . ,” in John Smith,
Select Discourses (1660), 510.
1
278
5.1 Purification and Theological Understanding
As we saw in chapter four, theological understanding has two sources for
Smith. Specifically Christian theological knowledge originates in prophecy and
the life of Christ both of which are perceived spiritually. Natural theology arises
from intellectual intuition. In both of these cases however Smith asserts that
preparation is necessary. Those who would be theologians, and Smith thinks that
all Christians should be divines, must first become purified in their conduct and
their intellect.
5.1.1 Preparation for Prophecy
Following the rabbinic consensus, especially Maimonides, and the
wisdom of the philosophers Smith argues in chapter eight of his discourse “Of
Prophecy” that there are “several qualifications that . . . render a man fit for the
spirit of prophecy.” 2 This is important for his conception of theology generally
because he is suggesting that such knowledge is practical or experiential even in
its origins. Moreover, this practical, experiential, basis is best expressed in terms
of the leading of a spiritual life free from obstacles to prophecy. To be a prophet,
2
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 249.
279
and thus to be the medium by which divine revelation is passed on to the people,
involves, first of all “true probity and piety.” 3 That is, the would-be prophet must
be morally pure and inwardly religious. Smith is vague on just what constitutes
moral purity but the overall sense is that it means essentially being selfdisciplined, temperate, and not given to sensual indulgence. The whole person of
the prophet is sanctified; will and outward behavior as well as mind and inward
temper.
The building up of the heart and mind typically involves a great deal of
study and effort on the part of the candidate to prophecy. Indeed, Smith speaks
often of prophecy as being in some ways akin to the conferral of degrees upon
students in a collegiate setting. 4 Still, it is not through study or the natural
perfection of human faculties that one becomes a prophet. Without the special
intervention of God to inspire the imagination and intellect there is no true
prophecy. 5
3
Ibid., 250.
4
Ibid., 261-7.
5
Ibid., 253.
280
5.1.2 Spirituality and Exegesis
An understanding of the preparations needed for true prophecy is critical,
for Smith, to rightly interpreting scripture. For example, since “’The spirit of
prophecy dwells not with sadness, but with cheerfulness’” King David was
denied the prophetic vision while he was full of “sorrow and grief in mind, upon
reflection of his shameful miscarriage in the matter of Uriah.” 6 In his dejected
state David lost that “free spirit” that is the “temper of mind” most conducive for
receiving prophetic inspiration. Knowing this makes one able to rightly interpret
the fifty-first Psalm as a prayer asking for “the restoration” of the precondition
for prophecy. 7
Moreover, by understanding how the prophets received their revelations
via the inspiration of their imaginations and intellects, or how they perceived
divine things by their spiritual senses, one is able to interpret “prophetical writ”
profitably. 8 It is only in this context that Smith’s rules for exegeting prophetic
passages of scripture are intelligible. For example, his first rule is that reports of
6
Ibid., 256. On David, Uriah and Bathsheba see 2 Samuel 11: 3-11, 12: 9-10, and 1 Kings 15:
5.
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 256-7. On this, Smith follows Jarchi, Abenezra, Kimchi,
and the “Talmudists” generally (257).
7
This is the topic of the final chapter (13) of the discourse “Of Prophecy” in Smith, Select
Discourses (1859), 284-95.
8
281
divine revelation be understood to be inspired by God but not dictated word for
word. “He imprinted such a clear copy of His truth upon them . . . that it became
their own sense . . . so . . . they were able to deliver and represent it to others, as
truly as any can paint forth his own thoughts.” 9 Only if one understands that the
prophetic inspiration takes the form of a spiritual perception, in the imagination,
does this not lead immediately to the idea that the prophets simply “make it up”
themselves; a notion that Smith is absolutely opposed to just as much as he
opposes a fundamentalist account of the origins of the letter of the biblical
record.
Additionally, one looks in vain for “a constant, methodical contexture of
things carried on in a perpetual coherence” in prophetic scripture. Indeed, if one
were to find too closely consistent and logical a report that would be evidence,
for Smith, that it was “a human and artificial contrivance rather than any
inspiration.” 10 This is, again, because of the nature of the prophetic experience
itself. Specifically, the prophet receives images simply as they come and not
9
Ibid., 284.
10
Ibid., 289.
282
necessarily (or typically) in (chrono)logical order. 11 Thus, Smith’s second rule for
reading prophetic scripture rests on the understanding of the experience of
inspiration as imaginative rather than discursive.
The third, and final, rule for reading prophecy is that “no piece of
prophecy is to be understood of the state of the world to come, or the mundus
animarum [world of souls]: for, indeed, it is altogether impossible to describe that,
or comprehend it in this life . . . therefore, all divine revelation in scripture must
concern some state in this world.” 12 This is so, for Smith, because of the limits of
our human capacities to receive divine truth. The “state of blessedness in heaven,
it is major mente humana [greater than the human mind], much more is it major
phantasia [greater than the imagination].” 13 Some things are simply not
communicable to human faculties of intellect or imagination, and since these are
the means by which prophetic inspiration is accomplished, eschatology must
remain mysterious to us, because of the limits of our spiritual senses. 14
11
Ibid., 290.
12
Ibid., 291.
13
Ibid., 293.
In this, Smith is on solid scriptural (cf. Isaiah 64: 4; Matthew 11: 13), rabbinic (“Gem.
Berachoth, cap. V. fol. 36 A.”), but not Patristic grounds. Apparently, Smith has no room here
14
283
Likewise, Smith recommends as his method of discerning true from false
prophets a clear understanding of the role of the mind as well as the imagination
in the perception of true divine communication. 15 The false, either demonic or
simply overly “enthusiastical,” prophet speaks of images disclosed to their
imaginations but at the expense of reason. This alienation of the intellect does not
occur, for Smith, in true prophecy and in knowing this to be an aspect of the
experience of inspired authors one can rightly discern divine revelation from
those “impostures” that would otherwise easily delude us. In this way, again,
Smith calls for the use of an understanding of the nature of prophecy as
involving the spiritual senses, both intellectual and imaginative, in the spiritual
formation and exploration of his readers.
Of more immediate concern for the right interpretation of scripture are the
remarks Smith makes in the “True Way” discourse to the effect that the inner
even for an apophatic (non)glimpse of heaven as one finds in Pseudo-Dionysius (The Celestial
Hierarchy, in Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheld [New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press,
1987], 143-91). Moreover, this contrasts sharply with the all-too-eager voices of others in Smith’s
period who give sometimes elaborate depictions of heaven and hell (above all, John Milton’s
Paradise Lost [1667] and Paradise Regained [1671]). See Elizabeth A Herman, “World Without End:
Conceptions of Heaven in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Protestant England,” PhD
Dissertation (Yale University, 2012) and Philip C. Almond, Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 81-110, 144-61.
15
Smith, Select Discourses (1859), 183-202.
284
state of one’s soul is both informed by scripture and enables one to rightly
understand what is contained therein. For, while “Divinity” is best understood to
be a “Divine life” rather than a “Divine Science” and while the best knowledge of
such things comes in the form of a “Christ-like nature,” still one can only come to
any knowledge of specifically Christian truth through scripture. 16 Only by an
initial acquaintance with Christ in the New Testament (and proleptically in the
Old) does one begin to conform to the “life and practice” in which alone one may
come to an appreciation of the “inward beauty, life and loveliness in Divine
Truth.” 17
The contrast to the educational practices of contemporary theology
departments is illustrative here. Whereas Smith is recommending, with the
Patristic and medieval Christian tradition as well as the Greek philosophers, that
one first purify one’s behavior, heart, and mind and only then take up and read
scripture with renewed spiritual eyes to see with, today students are introduced
16
Ibid., 2, 8.
17
Ibid., 8-9.
285
to the letter of the biblical text and only then to the spiritual practices, traditions,
and modes of thought necessary to find living Divine truth in it. 18
5.1.3 The “True Way” as a Spiritual Path
Finally, it should be remembered that it is a process of moral and
intellectual purification that Smith recommends as the prolegomena to
theological understanding. 19 As we have seen, Smith insists repeatedly that
divinity is a practical, living enterprise. Because divinity has to do with things of
“Sense & Life” it requires “Sentient and Vital faculties.” 20 These “faculties” are
the intellect purified of its attachments to the body and to physical matter. By
removing our attention from what is “beneath” us it becomes possible for us to
return our focus on first ourselves as spiritual beings and ultimately on God.
Such, at least, was my early training in theology and I suspect that this is fairly
standard in Protestant institutions today. See Glenn T. Miller, Piety and Profession: American
Protestant Theological Education, 1870-1970 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2007) and
“Education: Seminaries and Theological Education,” in Encyclopedia of Religion in America, ed.
Charles H. Lippy and Peter W. Williams (La Jolla, CA: Granite Hill Publishers, 2010), 663-72.
18
As does Henry More as well. See his “The Purification of a Christian Man’s Soul,” in
The Cambridge Platonists, ed. C.A. Patrides (London: Edwin Arnold, 1969), 200-12. Cf. Christopher
A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See
Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 87-90.
19
20
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2.
286
In this way, the intellectual intuition that we cultivate, even as it is the free
gift of divine grace, becomes the means by which we arrive at spiritual experience
and understanding. In this, Smith relies on Plotinian Neoplatonism and scripture
to affirm that “Every thing is best known by that which bears a just resemblance
and analogie with it.” 21
At the same time however this supra-sensible encounter with our purified
selves as imago Dei and with the Divine Original is also the goal of our spiritual
lives. This is why “our Saviour hath in his Beatitudes connext Purity of heart
with the Beatifical Vision.” 22 The intellectual intuition that puts us in contact with
God also provides the blessed rest and fulfillment that makes one seek the
Divine in the first place.
5.2 The Practice of the Christian Religion
Smith did not live to complete his intended discourses on the
“Communication of God to Mankind in Christ” leaving only the preliminary
Ibid. Also Ennead I.8.1., and Proverbs 10 (“the fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom”).
21
22
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2.
287
work “Of Prophecy” to be published by Worthington under that heading. 23 In
order to make up for this loss, Smith’s editor published an additional four
discourses given in “Some Chappell-Exercises.” 24 These were not originally
intended to be included in the work but they help to round out our appreciation
of Smith’s theology by discussing justification (“A Discourse Treating of Legal
Righteousness, Evangelical Righteousness, or the Righteousness of Faith” and
“The Shortness and Vanity of A Pharisaick Righteousness”), sanctification (“The
Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion”) and eschatology (“The Excellency
and Nobleness of True Religion” and “A Christians Conflicts with, and
Conquests over, Satan”). This section presents Smith’s views on these topics as
related to the spiritual senses. 25
5.2.1 Smith’s Practical Christianity
Rather than setting forth dogma when it comes to the particulars of the
Christian religion, Smith emphasizes practice and experience. Still, he is a
23
Ibid., 280.
24
Ibid., 281.
This limit is important to bear in mind. I have not tried to offer a definitive assessment
of Smith’s theology overall, but only those ways in which he employs the spiritual senses as
developed in chapter two above.
25
288
product of his time. Like Calvin and his English followers among the Puritans,
Smith addresses questions of high importance about justification, whether it is by
works or by faith, sanctification, if it is sudden or gradual, permanent or
temporary, and the fate of humanity in the eschatological future. These were
some of the dominant points of theological disputation in the early seventeenth
century, and Smith, as a teacher and a divine, could not have passed them by
without comment. 26 However, while the scholastics, both Protestant and
Counter-Reformation Roman Catholic, sought to lay out ever more precious
definitions of doctrines Smith pointed to practical and experiential Christian
living. “If any . . . will doe his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.” 27
5.2.1.1 Justification
In his discourse on “Righteousness” Smith begins by rehearsing his
account of theological knowledge. “There is a Divine and Spiritual sense which
only is able to converse internally with the life and soul of Divine Truth.” 28 Right
See chapter three above and Michael A. G. Haykin and Mark Jones, eds., Drawn Into
Controversie: Reformed Theological Diversity and Debates Within Seventeenth-century British
Puritanism (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011).
26
27
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 9; quoting John 7: 17 (KJV).
28
Ibid., 286.
289
relation with God (“converse”) requires therefore (1) a spiritual sense, and (2) an
inward orientation. Only an elevated “sense” can convey our communion with
God because it is only by a living faculty that one can appreciate “Divine
wisdome” which is a “Tree of life to them that find her, and it is only Life that can
feelingly converse with Life.” 29 Indeed, the “Principles of our Christian Religion . .
. is an Influx from God upon the Minds of good men.” 30 This is, for Smith, the
“great designe and plot of the Gospel, to open and unfold to us the true way of
recourse to God; a Contrivance for the uniting of the Souls of men to him, and
the deriving a participation of God to men, to bring in Everlasting righteousness,
and to establish the true Tabernacle of God in the Spirits of men.” 31
These ends were anticipated by “the Law” of the Hebrew Bible but the
Gospel has the great advantage that it “so clearly unfolds the Way and Method
of Uniting humane nature to Divinity.” 32 That is, in the Christian Gospel is
revealed the means by which true communion with God, and thus true
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 287.
31
Ibid., 288.
32
Ibid.
290
righteousness, is to be achieved. The primary difference between the Old Law
and the New Gospel then for Smith is that under the Law attention is external,
“Moral, Judicial & Ceremonial,” but the Gospel transforms from within, making
one anew with a living sense of God through an approximation to the Divine
(deification). 33
Following standard Protestant readings of St. Paul, Smith relates the
merely “external,” “legal righteousness” of the Jewish religion. 34 Of particular
importance for us is his association of the Jewish Law with the “External
Senses.” 35 The spiritually sensible nature of divine revelation notwithstanding
the Jews are portrayed here as reliant for their point of contact with God on a
Ibid., 289. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “The Manifestation of Christ and the Deification of
Man,” in C.A. Patrides, 62-76. Also, Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 190. More on this in the discussion of
sanctification below.
33
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 288-307. Here, Smith uses his extensive reading in
Jewish sources to back up an uncharacteristically polemical attack on the supposed failings of
Judaism. Reconciling this with his praise and dependence on the same Jewish sources in other
places is an important task that is yet to be taken up. On the reading of Jewish texts by Christians
in the medieval period see Deeana Klepper, The Insight of Unbelievers: Nicholas of Lyra and Christian
Reading of Jewish Text in the Later Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2007). On Christian interpretations and uses of Jewish texts and rituals in the early modern
period see Yaacov Deutsch, “’A View of the Jewish Religion’ – Conceptions of Jewish Practice
and Ritual in Early Modern Europe,” Archiv für Religionsgeschichte 3 (2001): 273-95 and Allison P.
Coudert and Jeffory S. Shoulson, eds., Hebraica Veritas? Jews and the Study of Judaism in Early
Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
34
35
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 291.
291
Law given to them from without, and thus received as other, via the external,
physical, senses. One reads, hears, or sees the Jewish Law with physical eyes and
ears. Moreover, the performance of these laws are merely formal for Smith too. 36
In language strikingly similar to Luther’s against the “works righteousness” of
the Roman Catholic Church, Smith speaks of Jewish religion as little more than a
system of earning merit through outward conformity with the Law. 37 Thus, he
thinks it clear that Judaism, at least in the form known by St. Paul if not also in
his own day, is a “Lean and Spiritless Religion.” 38
Over against the “Jewish” approach of earning merit through external
observance of the Law, or “Legal Righteousness,” Smith sets up what he calls
“Evangelical Righteousness” or “the Righteousness of Faith.” 39 Essentially, the
difference is this: “That the Law was the Minstery of death, and in it self an
Smith echoes much of the argument we are rehearsing here in his discourse on “The
Shortness and Vanity of A Pharisaick Righteousness” (Select Discourses [1660], 349-72). However,
in this additional discourse Smith associates “Jewish” legalism most strongly with what he
elsewhere calls “superstition.” For that reason, we will look at this discourse in chapter six when
we take up his arguments against the two natural enemies of religion, superstition and atheism.
36
Ibid., 297-307. Cf. Martin Luther, "Two Kinds of Righteousness," in Martin Luther:
Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Anchor Books, 1961).
37
38
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 303.
39
Ibid., 308-25.
292
External and Liveless thing, neither could it procure or beget that Divine life and
spiritual Form of Goodness in the Souls of men, which God expects from all the
heirs of Glory, no that Glory which is only consequent upon a true Divine life.
Whereas on the other side the Gospel is set forth as a mightly Efflux and
Emanation of life and spirit freely issuing forth from an Omnipotent source of
Grace and Love, as that true God-like vital influence whereby the Divinity
dreives it self into the Souls of men, enlivening and transforming them into its
own likeness, and strongly imprinting upon them a Copy of its own Beauty and
Goodness: Like the Spermatical virtue of the Heavens, which spreads it self
freely upon this Lower world, and subtily insinuating it self into this benumbed
feeble earthly Matter, begets life and motion in it. Briefly, It is that whereby God
comes to dwell in us, and we in him.” 40 Thus, evangelical righteousness makes one
inwardly God-like so that we may experience our Divine origin within ourselves,
that is, in our hearts and minds via a spiritual perception of God in ourselves as
Ibid., 308-şǯȱǯȱ ȱ¢ȂȱȱȱȱΗΔΉΕΐ΅ΘΎϱΖȱΏϱ·ΓΖȱǻlogos spermatikos; ratio
seminalis) in Second Apology, 8, 10, 13. See also Leslie William Barnard, St. Justin Martyr: The First
and Second Apologies (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997), 15-6, 89, 100, 159, 196-200.
40
293
imago Dei and present to ourselves as the Spirit that enlivens and transforms us in
grace. 41
Concern for outward merit and reward, on the other hand, blinds one to
the “light of Divine grace and bounty.” 42 Thus blinded, the legally minded can
only appreciate the “dead letter” of the Law as being of an “External
administration” and thus alien to oneself whereas the Gospel is “Intrinsecal and
Vital” and thus more truly one’s own. 43 The Gospel is “God’s imprinting his
Mind and Will upon mens hearts” so that it may become “living Laws written in
the living Tables” thereof. 44 The knowledge that results is primarily practical
rather than theoretical in the sense that it fuels the righteous living of the true
and good Christian. Smith’s Platonism does not lead to the withdrawal from the
world but rather a reformation of one’s being in the world.
Where his Antinomian contemporaries, such as John Eaton, as well as
more orthodox Calvinists and Lutherans were wont to emphasize the free gift of
Cf. Bonaventure, Itinerarium in mentis Deum, 4. Here Bonaventure introduces his
spiritual senses in the context of contemplation of God in the imago Dei reformed by grace.
41
42
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 310.
43
Ibid., 311.
44
Ibid., 316.
294
God’s justification of sinful humanity, Smith readily acknowledges that this must
be coordinated with the true state of affairs. 45 That is, God does not judge one
acceptable without one actually being so. 46 In this, Smith is rejecting one of the
fundamental issues separating the Reformed from Roman Catholicism. Clearly,
then, Smith’s reading in the Christian Platonist tradition, including the Greek
Fathers more so than the Latin, served to overcome his Puritan context in early
seventeenth century Emmanuel and Queens’ after Parliamentary supervision
under the guidance of the Westminster Assembly. 47
In essence, Smith has embraced a view of justification much like
synergistic processes advocated by Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox
theologians. This is nowhere more clear than in his insistence, against the views
Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant Theology,
1525-1695. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 114. Lutherans and
Calvinists traditionally view justification as a forensic matter of justification being “imputed” by
God for the sake of Christ’s paying of the penalties owed by the believing sinner. See Alan C.
Clifford, Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology, 1640-1790: An Evaluation (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990). A classic expression of this notion is John Owen, Doctrine of Justification by
Faith (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1965), also available from Christian Classics
Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 7 May 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/owen/just.
45
46
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 325.
47
See chapter three above.
295
of Luthereans, 48 that justification and sanctification are part of the same process
of becoming deiformed or Christ-like. “God’s justifying of Sinners in pardoning and
remitting their sins carries in it a necessary reference to the sanctifying of their Natures;
without which Justification would rather be a glorious name then a real privilege to
the Souls of men.” 49 In this Smith anticipates the views of John Wesley and looks
back to those of the Greek Fathers and Anglicans like Lancelot Andrewes. 50
The righteousness carried by the Gospel finds its roots in the hearts of
Christians via faith. In this, Smith is no less Reformed than the hottest sort of
Puritan. Faith, for him, is the “powerful Attractive which by a strong and divine
Sympathy draws down the virtue of Heaven into the Souls of men, which
This is clearly expressed in the classic Lutheran formula “simul justus et peccator.” See
Philipp Melanchthon’s Apology of the Augsburg Confession 2.38-41 (in The Book of Concord: The
Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, eds.,
[Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000]). For a more recent, and more consistent with Eastern
Orthodoxy, reading of Luther see Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., Union with Christ:
The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998).
48
49
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 329.
John Wesley, “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” Sermon 43, in The Sermons of John
Wesley, ed. Thomas Jackson (1872), in John Wesley Sermon Project, ed. Ryan N. Danker and George
Lyons (1999-2011), accessed 9 May 2014, http://wesley.nnu.edu/john-wesley/the-sermons-of-johnwesley-1872-edition/. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 4. 38 (Anti-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, ed. Philip Schaff,
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 9 May 2014,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01). Lancelot Andrewes, “A Sermon of Justification,”
(Whitehall, 23 November 1600), in Project Canterbury, Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology,
Lancelot Andrewes Works, Sermons, Volume Five (104-126), transcribed by Marianne Dorman (2003),
accessed 9 May 2014, http://anglicanhistory.org/lact/andrewes/v5/misc5.html.
50
296
strongly and forcibly moves the Souls of good men into a conjunction with that
Divine goodness by which it lives and grows.” 51 Justification is thus
accomplished by union with God in Christ and this union is faith.
Smith agrees with monergists that faith itself comes from God. “This is
that Divine Impress that invincibly draws and sucks them in by degrees into the
Divinity.” 52 And it is by faith as “something in the hearts of men which, feeling
by an Occult and inward sensation the mighty insinuations of the Divine
goodness, immediately complies with it; and being first begotten and enlivened
by the warm Beams of that Goodness, it alwaies breaths and gasps after it for its
constant growth and nourishment.” 53
Still, while the initiative is first God’s we are not without a role to play in
the process. For we are persuaded by the goodness and loveliness of God to fly
away from our previously “benummed Minds.” 54 Smith argues that we “should
51
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 333.
52
Ibid.
Ibid. This is a fine expression of the Calvinist notion of irresistible grace and the
permanence of true conversion, faith, and justification. See for example, John Calvin, on John 6:
41-5, in Commentary on John, Vol. 1, trans. William Pringle, Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
2005, accessed 7 May 2014, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/calcom34.xii.vii.html.
53
54
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 336.
297
work out our salvation in the most industrious manner, trusting in God as one
ready to instill strength and power into all the vital faculties of our Souls.” The
goal of such labor is nothing less than building up a capacity to “apprehend that
for which also we are apprehended of Christ Jesus.” 55 Thus, justification by faith
involves the perception of God as goodness, beholding “Moses-like” the divine
“glory shining thus out upon us in the face of Christ” that we should receive “a
Copy of that Eternal beauty upon our own Souls, and our thirstie and hungry
spirits would be perpetually sucking in a true participation and image of his
glory.” 56 In Christ, perceived through faith, one comes to a vision of the Good. 57
In faith, “we shall goe on from strength to strength until we see the face of our
loving, and ever-to-be-loved, God in Sion.” 58
In a process very much like that recommended in the “True Way”
discourse, Smith argues that we come to the confirmation of our justification
before God. We apprehend by an intellectual intuition the true, beautiful, nature
55
Ibid., 337. Smith is alluding to Philippians 3 and 1 Corinthians 13:12.
56
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 336.
57
Cf. Plato, Republic, VII (514-520d) and Psalm 34: 8.
58
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 338.
298
of God as Goodness and thereby “we live in Christ, and . . . he lives in us.” 59 For
Smith, then, accompanied by a living sense of the sweetness of God and an
image of the beauty of Christ in our (reformed) souls, we come to be
transformed; declared just and made so too.
5.2.1.2 Sanctification
As we have seen, for Smith, justification comes hand in hand with
sanctification. There cannot be one without the other. Nevertheless, Smith
addresses sanctification explicitly in “The Excellency and Nobleness of True
Religion,” since, the religious life is synonymous with becoming deified. 60 In
eleven short chapters Smith presents an account of the origin of religion 61 as well
as its nature, 62 properties, 63 progress, 64 and end. 65 Of these it is the discussion of
59
Ibid., 339.
60
Ibid., 377-451.
Ibid., 380-4. To the account that we have already seen in chapter four above this section
adds a reference to what Calvin called the semen religionis. “Religion is an Heaven-born thing, the
seed of God in the Spirits of men” (Ibid., 381). Cf. Henry More, “That this Word of God, which is
the Seed of the Soul, is a living and everlasting Word” (“The Purification of a Christian Man’s
Soul,” in C.A. Patrides, 209). See also Paul Helm, "John Calvin, the Sensus Divinitatis, and the
Noetic Effects of Sin," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 no. 2 (1998): 87–107.
61
62
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 385-92.
63
Ibid., 392-439.
299
the nature and properties that most clearly bear upon Smith’s employment of
spiritual sensation.
In describing the nature of the “Nobleness of Religion” Smith stresses that
it is in opposition to the “narrow prison of Sensual and Corporeal delights.” 66 He
goes so far as to cite, approvingly, the saying of Porphyry’s that Plotinus
“seemed ashamed of being in the body.” 67 Whereas “Wicked men bury their
Souls in their Bodies,” the religious man rises above such merely physical things
to converse with the eternal and divine. 68
Additionally, the religious person lives a life that is consist with reason;
“he lives at the height of his own Being.” 69 This “height” is intellectual and not
64
Ibid., 439-43.
65
Ibid., 443-51.
66
Ibid., 386.
Ibid. Porphyry, “On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books,” in Plotinus,
Porphyry on Plotinus, Ennead I, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1966), 3.
67
68
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 386.
69
Ibid., 387.
300
conative as in most accounts of synderesis. 70 Moreover, Smith has nothing but
disdain for the notion that “Religion should extinguish Reason” because
“Religion makes it more illustrious and vigorous.” Indeed, “they that live most
in the exercise of Religion, shall find their Reason most enlarged.” 71
Finally, the “good man,” for this is simply another way of naming the
person “informed by True Religion,” is raised into an intimate communion with
God. 72 In so doing, the religious man “moves in a larger Sphere then his own
Being, and cannot be content to enjoy himself, except he may enjoy God too, and
himself in God.” 73
Thus, the nature of true religion is, for Smith, totally in keeping with the
etymology of “religion,” coming as it does from the Latin, religare (“to bind
together”). Religion, then, is the process of being united to the Divine and this
communion is accomplished through and accompanied by “an inward sense of
See, for example, Tobias Hoffman, “Conscience and Synderesis,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brain Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 255-64; and R. A.
Greene, “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord and Synderesis,” Journal of the History of Ideas (1991):
617-44.
71 Ibid., 388.
70
In contrast, the “more feeling and comfortable sense” of Divine goodness that is
available in true religion is lacking for “Wicked men” for whom “God is not present” (Ibid., 391).
72
73
Ibid., 389.
301
Divine sweetness.” 74 That is, the exercise of religion itself involves a spiritual
sensation of the delectable nature of God.
Smith discusses seven properties or effects of the nobleness of religion.
Most of these are primarily moral. For example, the first property and effect is
“That it widens and enlarges all the Faculties of the Soul, and begets a true Ingenuity,
Liberty and Amplitude, the most free and Generous Spirit, in the Minds of Good men.” 75
However, even with this emphasis on the purification and restoration of the will
Smith addresses the noetic effects of religion often too. For, in “being purified
and spiritualliz’d” the soul becomes not just morally better but also “more and
more” remade “into the glorious Image of God.” 76 Indeed, Smith speaks directly
of ΌΉΝΗΖ (theosis) or deification as the result of growth in religion. 77 As the
perversions of self-love and self-will pass away “the Spirit of true Religion”
74
Ibid., 391. Also an “inward touch” (Plotinus, Ennead VI.1.9).
75
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 393.
Ibid., 403. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides,
#798 (p.333): “Reverence God in thyself: for God is more in the Mind of Man, than in any part of
this world besides; for we (and we only here) are made after the Image of God.” On the imago Dei
in the Renaissance see Charles Trinkaus, In our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian
Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).
76
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 407. Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious
Aphorisms,” #248 (p.329): “We Worship God best; when we Resemble Him most.”
77
302
steers and directs “the Mind and Life to God, makes it an Uniform, Stable and
quiet thing.” 78
This process of deification is accompanied, for Smith, with contentment,
joy, and pleasure. 79 “Religion is no sullen Stoicisme or oppressing Melancholie . . .
but it is full of a vigorous and masculine [i.e., active] delight and joy.” 80 This is so
because true delight and joy are the result of “some discerning Faculty with its
proper Object” and the “proper Objects for a Mind and Spirit are Divine and
Immaterial things.” 81 That is, the soul delights in the intellectual intuition of the
Divine made ever clearer through the process of becoming a better image of, and
home for, God. 82
Implicitly drawing on the analogy of the sun and the Allegory of the Cave,
Smith suggests that “There is an Inward sense in Mans Soul, which, were it once
awaken’d and excited with an inward tast and relish of the Divinity could better
78
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 406.
79
Ibid., 412.
80
Ibid., 416-7.
81
Ibid., 416.
See Ibid., 408 on the “Good man” as a “Tabernacle” wherein the “Divine Shechinah”
resides (Hebrew: “divine presence,” associated especially with the Temple).
82
303
define God to him then all the world else.” 83 Here again, we see the spiritual
sense of the soul playing the critical role of bridging the divide between
discursive reason and the actuality of the Divine presence.
A “sincere Christian” is one that “tasts and sees how good and sweet the
Lord is” and this fills her with joy, peace, and hope. 84 The good or religious
person “views” eternity “transacted upon the inward stage of his own Soul.” By
“reflecting upon himself he may behold a Heaven opened from within, and a
Throne set up in his Soul, and an Almighty Saviour sitting upon it, and reigning
within him.” 85
Like Origen and the Cappadocian Fathers before him, Smith understands
the process of deification as an unending one. 86 His inspiration for this view,
83
Ibid., 426-7. Cf. Ibid., 434-5.
84
Ibid., 427. Smith is here referencing Psalm 34: 8 and Romans 15.
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 428. Cf. the “Infant-Christ . . . formed in his Soul” Ibid.,
21. Also, Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 175 on the role of morality in Smith’s implicit Christology.
85
The notion would seem to be implicit in Origen’s (supposed) doctrine of the apotheosis
of all souls (see De Principiis, 3.4.3 in P. Koetschau, ed. [Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913], trans. G.W.
Buttwerworth, [London: SPCK 1936; reprinted Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973]). The doctrine
of epectasis (roughly “perpetual deification”) is especially associated with Gregory of Nyssa. See
his Life of Moses 2.225-30 (in Gregory of Nyssa, trans. Abraham Malherbe and Everett Ferguson
[New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1978]). Also, Rowan Williams, The Wound of
86
304
however, is as much pagan as Patristic. Smith sees in Plotinus’s “flight of the
alone to the alone” an example of just this sort of unending growth in union with
the Divine. 87 The soul is alone for Smith in the sense that it is centered upon itself
and acts freely not in the sense of being isolated from others. And this ever
expanding conformity to, and apprehension of, God Smith equates with Heaven.
For, “Heaven is not a thing without us, nor is Happiness any thing distinct from
a true Conjunction of the Mind with God in a secret feeling of his Goodness and
reciprocation of affection to him, wherein the Divine Glory most unfolds it
self.” 88
Knowledge: Christian Spirituality from the New Testament to St John of the Cross (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1990), 57-8.
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 423; citing Plotinus, Ennead VI. 9. 11. Smith gives the
Greek and his text (perhaps translated by Worthington) gives also “flight of the Soul alone to
God alone.” On the connection between Plotinus on this point and Gregory of Nyssa and others
see, Kevin Corrigan, “’Solitary’ Mysticism in Plotinus, Proclus, Gregory of Nyssa, and PseudoDionysius,” The Journal of Religion 76 no. 1 (1996): 28-42. Far from being an example of the
stereotypical “character of pagan mystical thought: self-absorbed, solitary, narcissistic, and
world-renouncing” (28) Corrigan reads Plotinus as having a “pronounced affinity” with Proclus,
as we would expect, but also Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Dionysius too (30). For “’To be alone’
in the sense of ‘solitary,’ ‘isolated,’ or ‘abandoned’ in Plotinus means to be in, or to belong to,
something else (‘to be of it’) so that one is alienated (allotrion) from oneself. To be ‘in oneself,’ by
contrast, is to be ‘alone’ in a different sense, that is, self-gathered and self-dependent” (32). This is,
I think, also Smith’s meaning here.
87
88
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 410.
305
5.2.1.3 Eschatology
The final aspect of the excellency and nobleness of religion discussed by
Smith is the “Terme and End of it.” 89 And this end is “nothing else but Blessedness
it self in its full maturity.” However, he is uncharacteristically shy about
explaining this particular of his topic; “yet I may not here undertake to explain,
for it is altogether ΣΕΕΘϱΑȱΘϟ [something inexpressible], nor can it descend so
low as to accommodate it self to any humane style.” 90 Still, following the author
of the First Letter of John, Smith is not content to leave this topic without giving
“some glimpse of it” for “ϵΐΓΓȱ΅ЁΘХ πΗϱΐΉΌ΅, we shall be like him, for we shall see
him as he is.” 91 Notice that the eschaton is simply the perfection of the progress of
the spiritual senses and the process of deification that marks the religious life at
all its stages.
Still, the end of true religion is difficult to apprehend and we cannot know
what there “may be from God upon Souls in Glory, that may raise them into a
state of Perfection surpassing all our imaginations.” 92 However, it will be
89
Ibid., 444.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid., citing 1 John 3: 2.
92
Ibid., 445. Notice the role of the imagination in anticipating the beatific vision.
306
enjoyable in the highest degree, not despite the loss of our bodies as the
Epicureans argue, but in part because of it. 93 Likewise, the happiness of the soul
is more than Stoic apathy too; it is not merely the elimination of disturbances but
the presence of something truly wonderful. 94
Smith is clear that the heavenly end of the true Christian is something to
be only anticipated while in our earthly lives and bodies. Yet, he is also adamant
that Heaven and Hell are characters of the souls of human beings, and not
“places” or “containers” for them. “Hell is rather a Nature then a Place: and Heaven
cannot be so truly defined by any thing without us, as by something that is within
us.” 95 That is, Heaven and Hell are states of the soul. Moreover, “the Devil is not
onely the name of one particular thing, but a nature” and “it is the difference of a name
rather than any proper difference of natures that is between the Devil and Wicked
Cf. K. E. Kirk, The Vision of God: The Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum (New
York: Harper & Row, 1966), 33-4, 67, 386, 480-7.
93
94
Ibid.
Ibid., 446-7. Cf. the contemporary, popular work of Andrew Farley, Heaven is Now:
Awakening Your Five Spiritual Senses (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012).
95
307
men. Wheresoever we see Malice, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Hatred, Self-will, and Selflove, we may say Here, and There is that Evil spirit.” 96
The good, religious, person will have a foretaste of the Heavenly bliss in
as much as they attend to divine things. Likewise, the foolish, bodily minded
person will find themselves so consumed in the realm of death and despair that
they too can be said to taste of Hell in this life. 97 Thus, “the Tyranny of the Devil
and Hell is not so much in some External things, as in the Qualities and Dispositions
of mens Minds.” 98
Interestingly, Smith opposes the theory put forward by Augustine, and
accepted by many Western theologians, of the inheritance of original sin from
Adam and Eve. “I fear the grounds of most mens Misery will prove to be a
second fall, and a Lapse upon a Lapse . . . It will not be so much because our First
parents incurred God’s displeasure, as because we have neglected what might
have been done by us.” 99
96
Smith, Select Discourses (1660)., 463.
97
Cf. Ibid., 462-9.
98
Ibid., 464.
99
Ibid., 449-50.
308
Above all it is the “Unreasonableness or the smothering and extinguishing
the Candle of the Lord within us” that has “no piece of Religion, nor
advantageous[ness] to it.” 100 Yet, what Smith fears most is that speculation about
our ends might “exercise mens Wits” more than it causes them to “reform their
lives.” 101 For all his emphasis on the mystical experience of suprasensible union
with the Divine, Smith’s religion remains eminently practical and directed at
leading a moral life here and now. His otherworldliness, constantly contrasting
“religion” and “goodness” with the body and the physical senses, serves not an
escapist retreat from the world but a transformed orientation to living a life in it.
Smith’s religion is one that remains in the world but avoids being of the world. 102
As he closes this discourse on the excellency of religion: “Let us therefore labour
to purge our own Souls from all worldly pollutions; let us breath after the aid
and assistance of the Divine Spirit, that it may irradiate and inlighten our Minds,
that we may be able to see Divine things in a Divine light: let us endeavor to live
Ibid., 448. The “candle of the Lord” is a well-known, often-used, phrase among the
Cambridge Platonists to indicate the divine nature of human reason. Its source however is
biblical, Proverbs 20: 27.
100
101
Ibid., 449.
102
Romans 12: 2.
309
more in a real practice of those Rules of Religious and Holy living commended to
us by our ever-Blessed Lord and Saviour: So shall we know Religion better, and
knowing it love it, and loving it be still more and more ambitiously pursuing
after it, till we come to a full attainment of it, and therein of our own Perfection
and Everlasting Bliss.” 103
5.3 The Spiritual Senses and Making Sense of Spirituality
Largely on the basis of his account of the origin of theological
understanding, Smith argued for a rational faith expressed in inner reflection,
moral purity, and deification. In so doing he made intellectual intuition and the
imaginative reception of symbols of the divine central to the life of true Christian
piety. Smith’s use of what we have identified as the spiritual senses tradition was
therefore both descriptive and prescriptive.
For Smith, only those who have been transformed through purification of
their affections, intentions, and thoughts are capable of perceiving divine things.
There can be no disinterested theologian for Smith. The ways of purification,
illumination, and union are how he accounts for the fact that divines and
103
Ibid., 451.
310
prophets have had theological understanding even as he recommends this same
path to his reader if they would seek to know God. 104
Conspicuous in its absence in the Select Discourses are references to prayer,
worship, and liturgy. Smith makes no mention of the sacraments, not even
baptism. There is never more than passing mention of prayer. 105 However, if by
“prayer” one includes contemplation, then Smith clearly echoes the patristic
wisdom summarized by Evagrius Ponticus, "If you are a theologian, you will
pray truly. And if you pray truly, you are a theologian." 106
Cf. Benjamin Whichcote, “Moral and Religious Aphorisms,” in C.A. Patrides, #169
(p.328): “Religion begins in Knowledge; Procedes in Practice; and Ends in Happiness.”
104
Patrick records that Smith did pray (“Funeral Sermon,” 515) but Smith does not speak
of it in a positive way in his Select Discourses. His references to prayer are always negative,
showing what not to do.
105
Chapters on Prayer, 61; PG 79: 1180B; in Evagrius Ponticus: Practikos and On Prayer, trans.
Simon Tugwell (Oxford: Oxford University Faculty of Theology, 1987), quoted in Evagrius
Ponticus: Ad Monachos, trans. with comm. Jeremy Driscoll, ACW 59 (New York: Mahwah, NJ: The
Newman Press, 2003), 339. “Prayer” here is a form of knowledge as well as spiritual practice.
106
CHAPTER 6: SENSE, SYSTEM, AND APOLOGETICS
To this point we have seen that, like the long Christian tradition before
him, Smith employed the spiritual senses of the soul in his account of theological
knowledge, both natural and revealed, as well as in his description of the
spiritual life. In this chapter we show how Smith looks to the spiritual senses in
his natural theology and how this consistent reliance helps to draw his thought
together into a unified whole. It is, in part, by using the concept of spiritual sense
that Smith presents his readers with a systematic theology. Moreover, this system
is intended to offer a critique of early modern naturalism and an apology for
traditional Christian Platonism.
The first five of the Select Discourses form a unified whole, relating John
Smith’s natural theology. 1 Of these only two treat positive doctrines as such;
discourse four, “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” and discourse five, “Of the
Existence and Nature of God.” However, these are prefaced by discourses upon
“The True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge,” “Of
Superstition,” and “Of Atheism.” With these first three discourses, Smith sets the
John Worthington, “To the Reader,” in John Smith, Select Discourses (1660), v; “An
Advertisement,” Ibid., 280.
1
312
scene for his arguments for the immortal soul and God, which together constitute
the first two of his three “great principles of religion.” 2
6.1 Smith’s Natural Theology
As we saw in chapter four above, Smith’s “True Way” discourse is
concerned with the epistemology and methodology of theology. Drawing on
biblical, Patristic, and ancient philosophical sources, Smith argues for a form of
emotionally charged, and partly imaginary, intellectual intuition as the means by
which one comes to know divine things. 3 After establishing this, Smith goes on
to discuss what he takes to be the two primary challenges to true, natural and
revealed, religion: superstition and atheism.
6.1.1 Superstition
The first of these “Anti-Deities” taken up by Smith is superstition, which he
defines as “that Temper of Mind which the Greeks call ̇ΉΗΈ΅ΐΓΑ΅ . . . an
overtimorous and dreadfull apprehension of the Deity.” 4 Indeed, following Hesychius
The third is the “communication of God to mankind through Christ” or revealed
theology, which we have explored in chapters four and five above.
2
3
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 1-21.
4
Ibid., 26.
313
(5th century CE) Smith argues that ΈΉΗΈ΅ΐΓΑ΅ is synonymous with ΠΓΆΓΌΉ΅
or fear of the Gods. 5 This mistaken affective orientation to the Divine makes one
think of God as “dreadfull and terrible,” “rigourous and imperious,” “austere
and apt to be angry, but yet impotent and easy to be appeased . . . by some
flattering devotions, especially if performed with sanctimonious shewes and a
solemn sadness of Mind.” 6 By understanding God as something external and
negative the superstitious person does not apprehend the “Goodness of God”
and this leads him or her to “attribute their [own] impotent passions and
peevishness of Spirit to him.” 7 That is, having an incorrect notion of God
prompts the superstitious to create and then project their own weaknesses on to
this idolatrous notion. 8
Citing Porphyry, Smith claims that superstition leads to the urge to “bribe
the Deity” and this he finds in the rites of “the Jews” as well as nominal
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., 27.
Smith’s point here is that a moral and psychical failing on the part of some people leads
to the creation of false deities, such as the “superstitious” one that is feared and prompts efforts
at appeasement. In this regard, his theory of a form of bad or false religion is strikingly similar to
Freud’s theory of religion in toto. See Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W.D.
Robson-Scott (London: Hogarth Press, 1928).
8
314
Christians. 9 This form of superstitious religion Smith especially associates with
what he elsewhere calls “Pharisaick Righteousness.” 10 In this stereotypical
account of Jewish righteousness by works under the law Smith contrasts the
“Pharisee” who by a “bare External appearance of Religion” pretends to have
earned “true Blessedness.” 11 And like all forms of superstition, the “Pharisaick”
are fueled by a mistaken sense of God, lacking in an apprehension of the divine
goodness that fosters love not servile fear. 12
Smith recognizes grades of superstition. 13 Indeed, against Plutarch he
argues that polytheism, which he equates to daemon worship, is but “one
branch” of superstition rather than the sum total thereof. 14 Others are driven to
superstition by strong apprehensions of their own guilt, which they project as
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 29. On Jewish “superstition” Smith is following Plutarch,
but only so far as their rites and ceremonies are concerned.
9
10
Ibid., 349-72.
11
Ibid., 353.
12
Ibid., 361-6.
13
Ibid., 29.
14
Ibid., 30. The relationship is rooted in the common origin of both in fear.
315
divine judgment upon themselves. 15 Still others, are brought to fear and thus
superstition by a lack of understanding of the forces of nature that makes them
seek out a divine agent both quick to anger and easy to appease. 16 Thus, fear
reinforces mistaken notions that support rites and rituals which again fuel
further superstitious ideas. Sometimes the process leads to “Magick and
Exorcismes, other times into Pandanticall Rites and idle observations of Things and
Times.” 17 The pious person is a friend of God while the superstitious is a
flatterer, being of a “base and slavish” temperament. 18 Unlike his fellow
Cambridge Platonist Henry More, who would make much of stories of ghosts
and the like as evidence against a purely materialist philosophy, Smith dismisses
talk of “Spectres and frightfull Apparitions of Ghosts and Mormos” as examples of
the delusions of “weak minds.” 19
15
Ibid., 31.
16
Ibid., 31-2. Here, Smith is implicitly dismissing the so-called “God of the gaps.”
17
Ibid., 32.
18
Ibid., 34, 33.
Ibid., 32. On More’s occultism see A. Rupert Hall, Henry More and the Scientific
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82-103, 128-45. “Mormos” is a
reference to Mormo a spirit that bit misbehaving children in Greek mythology. It has essentially
the meaning of our “bogeyman.”
19
316
Smith’s discussion of superstition is eminently practical in orientation. In
this respect, his discourse here is as much concerned with “spirituality” as
anything else. In fact, it is not immediately obvious that it plays any clear role in
Smith’s natural theology at all. However, his concern here is, above all, with a
kind of “false piety” which makes an appreciation of theology, even natural
theology, impossible. That is, unless one is prepared to let go of her or his
emotionally charged attachments to a basically wrong-headed notion of God one
cannot fully see the truth of what Smith has to offer about the immortal soul or
the existence and nature of the true Deity. 20 Most importantly, Smith’s inclusion
of this bit of spiritual wisdom in a prolegomena to his natural theology indicates
to us that he does not fully separate the two. The end of natural religion and
revealed truth is one and the same; union with God as the Supreme Good.
6.1.2 Atheism
In much the same vein, Smith takes up his discourse “Of Atheism” in
order to demonstrate the practical roots and errors of not believing in God. In
Ibid., 36; Superstition, like the darkness in the prologue to the Gospel of John,
“comprehends not the true Divine good that ariseth to the Souls of men from an internall frame of
Religion” (Ibid.).
20
317
fact, he argues that superstition and atheism are closely related and deeply
similar in that “as Superstition is engendered by a base opinion of the Deity as
cruell and tyrannicall . . . so also is Atheism.” 21 No less an authority than Plato is
brought to bear on this point, who suggests in The Laws that there are three
temperaments toward God: total atheism, partial atheism (the denial of
providence or what we might call Deism), and the superstitious “perswasion . . .
that they [the Gods] are easily wone by sacrifices and prayers.” 22
Moreover, it is superstition that opened the way for atheism in that “it
could not so easily have banish’d the Belief in a Deity, had not that [superstition]
first accused and condemn’d it as destructive to the Peace of Mankind; and
therefore it [atheism] hath alwaies justified and defended it self by Superstition.” 23
Drawing on Simplicius and Dionysius Longinus, Smith sums up these two “antideities”:
21
Ibid., 42.
Ibid., 34. Referencing Plato, ̐ϱΐΓ (de Legibus), 10; Laws, 885a-e, trans. A.E. Taylor, in
The Collected Works of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), 1440-1.
22
Ibid. In this one is immediately reminded of the “New Atheists” of our own time
(Dawkins, Dennett, Harris, etc.) whose attacks on theism are nearly always directed at the
grossest sorts of anthropomorphism in religion (thus “superstition” by Smith’s standards). On
this see Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2009).
23
318
If the Superstitious man thinks that God is altogether like himself . . . the
Atheist will soon say in his heart, There is no God; and will judge it not
without some appearance of Reason to be better there were none . . . . 24
Smith notes that the great epicurean poet Lucretius (first century BCE) rejected
the Gods, in part, because of the monstrous superstition that they were appeased
by Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia. 25
6.1.2.1 Epicureanism
His train of thought having brought him to the Epicurean school of
philosophy in the supportive example of Lucretius, Smith next takes up an
extended discussion of the “secret Atheists of the Epicurean sect.” 26 For Smith,
Epicurus and his followers were too careful to admit their atheism but neither
can they hide it since “when they would seem to acknowledge a Deity, [they]
could not forget their own beloved Image which was always before their eyes;
and therefore they would have it as careless of any thing but its own pleasure
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 43. Quoting Psalm 14: 1 “The fool hath said in his heart,
There is no God.”
24
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 45. Also, Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, I.80-101, in The
Nature of Things, trans. A. E. Stallings, intro. Richard Jenkyns (London: Penguin, 2007), 5-6.
25
26
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 46.
319
and idle life as they themselves were.” 27 Thus, the Epicureans fell in with the
“Anthropomorphitae.” 28
Smith sets out to relate the contours of the epicurean school out of
Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura but in actuality relies seldom on this source. 29 After
demonstrating that Lucretius is a faithful follower of Epicurus on the basis of his
“prologue” in praise of the master of the Garden, Smith notes that the poet
argues that superstition has arisen from observations of nature. The mysteries of
the natural world have led people to imagine Gods that might be appeased. For
this reason, says Lucretius, he seeks to unfold the secrets of nature so that
superstition may be put away. This, Smith interprets as a challenge to the
doctrine of creation, and thus upon the nature and existence of God. 30
27
Ibid.
Ibid., Just who these “athropomorphites” might be, in addition to the Epicureans, is
unclear. However, the tendency toward anthropomorphism has a long history both within and
outside of Christianity. Smith may have in mind, no doubt among others, the fifth century
Christian heresy of Audianism. See Theodoret of Cyrus, Ecclesiastical History, IV.9, "Of the heresy
of the Audiani," in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, series 2, vol. 3, in Christian
Classics Ethereal Library, 2005, accessed 12 May 2014,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf203.iv.viii.iv.ix.html.
28
While Smith does clearly know Lucretius, he relies much more consistently on antiepicurean sources from Cicero and Plutarch.
29
30
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 46.
320
This attack upon the notion of the divine creation, and sustaining, of the
world is rooted in the atomic physics of Epicurus and his school. Smith pokes
fun of the lack of originality in Epicurus by calling his school merely the “fosterfather” of atomism; Democritus gets credit, or more accurately blame, for being
the “father” of this form of physics. 31 Nevertheless, Epicurus’s “master-notion” is
laid out by Smith as the familiar summary of atoms and the void (“empty
space”). He remains somewhat vague on the particulars of Epicurus’s theory at
first, suggesting that his audience could be expected to know the basics. Smith’s
full understanding of Epicurean philosophy does not come into view until his
digression on it comes to a close.
Description gives way to apologetic argument as Smith offers a version of
the design argument against the epicurean view that the complexity of nature is
the result of mere chance. 32 Even Aristotle, he admits begrudgingly, had to
recognize the need for a First Mover. If Aristotle, who is himself no friend to
Ibid., 47. Smith is being a bit snarky here. He wants to dismiss the view as
fundamentally wrong-headed but also heaps scorn on Epicurus for not coming up with the idea
himself. He may also be taking this up from other ancient sources as it was a common criticism of
Epicurus.
31
32
Ibid.
321
religion for Smith, can admit of God then what gross errors must be at play in the
philosophy of Epicurus? 33
Even if one were to grant, against Aristotle and good sense, that material
nature has the power of motion itself, there remains the problem of persistence
over time for Epicurus. If, merely by chance, things come together to form
complex new forms, what keeps them from immediately falling apart again if not
a Divine influence over the whole? 34 Moreover, from whence does the order we
so clearly observe in nature come? Smith is clearly doubtful that atoms, void, and
the “swerve” are enough to account for the radical coincidences represented by
trees, hills, and human beings. 35
More importantly, even if Epicurus is correct about physics, his
theological conclusions are not borne out. While Smith does not subscribe to
Epicurean physics, he does agree that one’s study of nature rests on empirical
observation. Science begins with the physical senses but requires interpretation
by an incorporeal soul. In order to embrace the epicurean denial of providence,
33
Ibid., 48.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid., 48-9.
322
which amounts to atheism for Smith, one must be morally and spiritually
disposed toward this view by attachment to matter and the objects of physical
sense. 36 That is, in order to find atomic physics compelling on theological issues,
such as the nature of God’s relationship to the world, one must first be the type
of sensualist that has his or her reason so tangled with physical sense that they
cannot come to a knowledge of first principles. 37
Thus, the Epicurean is so far from the “True Way” of coming to a proper
understanding of metaphysical truth that Smith thinks it unworthy, even if some
truth may be had by it in the realm of physics. Moreover, he is doubtful that
anyone can be so completely ignorant of the true nature of God as would seem to
be required to assent to a system that is entirely “natural” like the Epicurean
philosophy. For there is “a Natural Sense of God that lodges in the minds of
[even] the lowest and dullest sort of vulgar men.” 38 This natural sense of God
would appear to be similar to what Calvin calls the sensus divinitatis in that both
work “like a natural instinct antecedent to any mature knowledge” providing
36
Ibid., 49.
37
Ibid., 17.
38
Ibid., 49-50.
323
grounds to know that there is a Deity. 39 However unlike the Reformer’s version
of the spiritual senses, Smith thinks of this sense of God as also functioning as a
kind of innate knowledge, “being indeed the First principle of” mature or
experiential knowledge. 40
Clearly then, Smith is concerned to combat what he takes to be the errors
of Epicureanism. However, it might justly be wondered why he, or anyone,
would see in this ancient school of thought a living challenge to “true religion.”
Smith makes much of it because in his day Epicureanism was on the rise across
Europe and at home in England. Worthington tells us, in a reference to Hobbes
among others, that Smith “lived not to see Atheism so closely and craftily
insinuated, nor lived he to see Sadduceism and Epicurism so boldly owned and
industriously propagated, as they have been of late.” 41 Still, this renewal of
Epicurean principles was only relatively more frequent and more bold in the
Ibid., 50. See also Paul Helm, "John Calvin, the Sensus Divinitatis, and the Noetic
Effects of Sin," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 no. 2 (1998): 87–107.
39
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 50. Smith sides with the Stoics in calling this “sense” a
kind of “momentum toward God” (ΓΕΐφȱΔΕΓΖȱΘΓΑȱΌΉΓΑ, reading ΓΕΐφ for ΓΕΐφΑ) rather than
Plutarch’s “cognition of God” (ΌΉΓΙȱΑΓΗΑ). See also R. J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in
The Cambridge Companion to Stoicism, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 59-84.
40
John Worthington, “To the Reader,” in Smith, Select Discourses (1660), xx. The reference
to the Sadducees (known primarily from the New Testament and Josephus) is another way of
referring to those who deny the immortality of the soul, resurrection, and final judgment.
41
324
years after Smith’s passing. For already in the mid-fifteenth century there were
printed editions of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura beloved by Humanists across
Europe, including Erasmus and Thomas More. 42 Diogenes Laertius too was
published in 1472, bringing his account of the Lives and Opinions of Eminent
Philosophers, including Epicurus, to a wide public. 43 At the very end of the
sixteenth century, Giordano Bruno came under the suspicion that would
ultimately lead to his death by fire in the Campo de' Fiori in part because of his
embrace of epicurean principles. 44
By the time of the publication of Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy
in 1641, Pierre Gassendi was already working toward his own system of
Christian Epicureanism. 45 In his contribution to the Objections and Replies
See Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2011), 219-63, and Eugene O’Connor, “Introduction,” in The Essential
Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragments, trans. Eugene O’Connor
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 14-5.
42
Ilario Tolomio, "Editions of Diogenes Laertius in the Fifteenth to Seventeenth
Centuries," in G. Santinello et al. eds., Models of the History of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993),
1: 154ff.
43
Ingrid D. Rowland, Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/Heretic (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2008), 214.
44
Saul Fisher, "Pierre Gassendi," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N.
Zalta, last modified 18 November 2013, accessed 20 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/gassendi/. Also, David K. Gildden, “Hellenistic
45
325
published along with the Meditations, Gassendi offers significant criticism of
Descartes’s view of the self as mental and therefore non-corporeal. 46 Thomas
Hobbes too in his Objections raises the notion that the mind is merely a kind of
movement of a body. 47 By the 1640s, Walter Charleton (1619-1707), a friend of
Hobbes, had begun to bring explicitly Epicurean philosophy to England, notably
in the form of adaptations of the work of Gassendi. 48
Thus, Epicureanism, or at least a form of physicalist naturalism at least
nominally similar to that ancient school, was a living possibility among the
intelligentsia of Europe. In so far as this entailed a denial of divine providence,
the immortality of the soul, or the existence and nature of God, the presence of
Background for Gassendi’s Theory of Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas 49 no.3 (1988): 405-424.
Gildden highlights in particular the way that Gassendi’s philosophy was translated into English
without making his dependence on ancient thinkers as clear as they might otherwise have been.
This, may well have helped to spread Epicurean notions without the negative baggage of the
name in early modern England. Smith knew at least Gassendi’s Epistolica exercitatio, in qua
principia philosophiae Roberti Flvddi medici reteguntur (Paris: Sebastian Cramoisy, 1630). See Saveson,
“Catalogue,” 29.
Fifth Objections, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, trans. (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2: 179-277.
46
47
Fourth Objections, in Philosophical Writings, 2: 138-78.
Charleton was physician to Charles I during the Civil War. It is possible that this
helped to fuel hostility on Smith’s part to Epicurean ideas, being, as they were, associated with
the Royal Court. Robert Kargon, “Walter Charleton, Robert Boyle, and the Acceptance of
Epicurean Atomism in England,” Isis 55 no. 2 (1964): 184-92.
48
326
Epicurean philosophy signaled the spread of atheism for Smith. Thus, Smith
responded much like Henry More in his Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul, and
the Antidote against Atheism. 49
6.1.2.2 The Spiritual Effects of Atheism
Following Plutarch, Smith sets two further points before his reader
concerning atheism. The first, that while superstition is “unlovely” it is still “more
tolerable then Atheism.” 50 This is because atheism offers “the greatest violence to
mens Souls that may be” in weeding out the roots of our innate notions of God. 51
That is, while superstition may lead to false religion, that is still to be preferred to
no religion at all. Second, Smith avers that atheism is a “most ignoble and
uncomfortable thing” in itself. 52 Here he is turning the great virtue of the
Worthington, “To the Reader,” xxii. Henry More, The Immortality of the Soul, So farre
forth as it is demonstrable from the Knowledge of Nature and the Light of Reason (London, 1659), and An
Antidote Against Atheism, Or an Appeal to the Natural Faculties of the Mind of Man, whether there be
not a God (London, 1653; enlarged 2nd ed., with appendix, London, 1655).
49
50
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 51.
51
Ibid., 52. The agricultural metaphor is Smith’s (“pulling up . . . which have spread their
52
Ibid. Here he follows Plutarch and Cicero against “Colotes the Epicurean” (c.320-c.268
Roots”).
BCE).
327
“Epicureans,” namely pleasure, against them by suggesting that attending to
merely physical pleasures is not nearly as enjoyable as one might expect. 53 For
one thing, one cannot achieve the “Highest Happiness,” communion with God, by
way of a “corporeal touch.” 54 This is in contrast, of course, to the “Intellectual
touch” by which Smith teaches we may come to know God in the “True Way”
discourse. 55 In addition, a rightly spiritual enjoyment of the eternal things of God
is everlasting, whereas physical enjoyment is a fleeting, momentary matter at
best. 56 Above all however, Smith’s objection to Epicurean hedonism is basically
aesthetic and moral. “I dare say that all those that have any just esteem of
humanity, cannot but with a noble scorn defy such a base-born Happiness as this
is, generated onely out of the slime of the earth.” 57 To Smith, it is simply repellent
From the context here and elsewhere it is clear that Smith follows most ancient,
medieval and early modern critics of Epicureanism in thinking of it as a school of pure hedonism
in the positive sense rather than the more accurately negative hedonism of Epicurus and
Lucretius that seeks to avoid disturbance (ataraxia). Eugene O’Connor, “Introduction,” 9-14.
53
54
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 52.
55
Ibid., 3.
56
Ibid., 52-3.
Ibid., 53. One wonders what Smith would make of modern evolutionary science with
its theory that all life arose out of just this “slime of the earth.” Given his friendly embrace of
Platonic and Cartesian dualism, I suspect that Smith would not resist our science, provided that
room remains for the immaterial soul.
57
328
and beneath the dignity of human beings made in the imago Dei to think that we
are merely “dust,” fine particles of lifeless matter.
6.1.2.3 Materialist Naturalism
Late in his discourse on atheism Smith refers in passing to a central
doctrine of Epicureanism as itself being the take-home point for atheism in
general. Namely, he equates the atomic materialism of the Epicureans with the
whole “portion of Atheism.” 58 In so doing he confirms what his reader must
suspect from the outset; that “atheism” is essentially identical to materialist
naturalism. Epicureanism is atheistic for Smith because it is reductively
materialistic (all is merely atoms and the void) and entertains only natural causes.
Likewise, atheism is epicurean in so far as it leaves no room for spiritual
substance and action. Against this Smith suggests (with the Stoics) that in order
to account for the world one must admit both God and providence. 59 “Remove
God and Providence out of the world, and then we have nothing to depend upon
58
Ibid., 53.
In addition to the Stoics we might add also the Puritans, always keen to stress divine
providence, as well as those natural theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas, who have argued
from the “governance of the world” to the existence of God.
59
329
but Chance and Fortune.” 60 Such a world is both physically impossible and
psychologically intolerable for Smith. 61
6.1.3 The Immortal Soul
In his discourse on the “Immortality of the Soul” Smith makes four
arguments; two negative against Epicureanism, and two positive, all drawing on
Platonism. He concludes his discussion with the additional resolution of two
potential difficulties in accepting the immortality of the soul; one from Aristotle
directly, and the mind-body problem.
While he goes on to give what he takes to be solid rational grounds for
admitting the immortality of the soul, Smith opens by apologizing for taking up
the notion in the first place. The Epistle to the Hebrews lays out the principal
doctrines of religion, which are (1) that God exists, (2) that God rewards those
who seek Him, and (3) the communication of God to humanity through Christ.
To this second principle, Smith adds the immortality of the soul as a necessary
accompaniment, in a classic display of his erudition, on the authority of Ficino,
60
Ibid., 54.
61
Ibid., 54-5.
330
Simplicius, Jewish tradition, the New Testament, the Delphic Oracle, Plutarch,
Cicero, and Clement of Alexandria. 62 Thus, both scripture and reason show these
three (or four) principles to be the foundations of true religion. And since the
chief natural way to know God, for Smith, is by first knowing the soul, he begins
his discussion of natural theology with the immortal soul.
Having given sufficient reason to take up a topic that he otherwise takes
to be uncontroversial among any one he respects Smith next offers three
premises upon which his arguments about the soul will rest. An appreciation of
the argumentative force of Smith’s discourse rests profoundly on keeping these
premises in mind. Without them, his arguments may seem to beg the question,
making him seem more a casual apologist than philosophically astute theologian.
Smith’s first premise, if it can be so called, is that the immortality of the
soul does not, properly speaking, require demonstration at all. It is, suggests
Smith, an entirely natural notion that has been accepted by “all Nations” across
history. In an utterly pragmatic (even democratic) bit of reasoning Smith offers
Ibid., 60-2. Ficino is, perhaps, the intent of Smith’s reference to “a novel” or new
“Platonist writing a Summary of Plato’s Divinity” who “intitles his book, De Deo & Immortalitate
Anima” (60). Cf. Marsilo Ficino, Theologica Platonica: De Immortalitate Animorum, in Platonic
Theology, trans. Michael B. Allen, ed. James Hankins, 6 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2001-2006).
62
331
that the immortality of the soul has been accepted even by the most “Idiotical
sort of men” and only a few “unskilful Philosophers” have questioned it. 63
The second premise goes to the very heart of Smith’s approach to theology
and philosophy. In order to rightly understand his arguments, he suggests that
one must already have had “converse” with their own soul. 64 That is, in order to
appreciate the truth of what he will argue one must be able to recognize his
demonstration as reflecting what one has already come to know by first-hand
experience. Only one who has thus seen has eyes to see the truth of his case. To
this extent, Smith has established as a premise for his arguments the reality of the
spiritual perception of the imago Dei he sets out as the defining characteristic of
his theological epistemology in the “True Way.” 65
The third and final premise is more directly philosophical, and thus
absolutely essential to the arguments that follow if one is looking for reasoning
that is apt to convince the skeptic. Smith asserts that no substantial and
63
Ibid., 63.
64
Ibid., 65-6.
65
Ibid., 1-21.
332
indivisible thing ever perishes. 66 This premise has the great strength that even his
opponents, the Epicureans, grant its truth, for it is on this basis that they argue
for the eternity of atoms. 67 Moreover, this principle is supported by Smith’s allies,
above all Plato and Plotinus, but even Aristotle too. 68
6.1.3.1 Arguments against the Epicureans
Smith’s first formal argument, actually a set of related arguments, is that
the soul is not corporeal, directed against Epicurean philosophy which argues
that, like everything else, the soul is simply a collection of atoms. He is thus
attempting to reason to a position consistent with his third premise, which even
his opponents grant, that what is indivisible cannot pass away. Smith’s approach
is a form of informal reductio ab absurdum wherein he shows that the Epicurean
position is inconsistent with known facts and thus false. 69
Ibid., 66-8. Ben Lazare Mijuskovic calls this the “simplicity” argument and he traces it
through its Platonic roots to Kant in The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments (The Hague: Martinus
Mijhoff, 1974).
66
Ibid., 66. Note that Smith again is taking up this ancient school of philosophy as a living
threat to the fundamental principles of religion.
67
68
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 66-8.
Ibid., 69. While the success of Smith’s argument rests upon the degree to which he finds
actual absurdities in the thesis of his opponents for our purposes we are interested primarily in
69
333
The Epicurean theory, as Smith knows it, is that the soul is a corporeal
entity and that just as the body passes away at death so too therefore does the
soul. 70 This is the basis for the famous Epicurean argument against the fear of
death. As Epicurus himself puts it in his Letter to Menoceus, “Death . . . is
nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present, and whenever death is
present, we do not exist.” 71 Thus, for the Epicurean the material soul necessitates
the mortality thereof and this is why Smith seeks to show that the soul is
immaterial as an essential step toward his demonstration of the soul’s
immortality. Moreover, regardless of attempts at terminological refinement, the
Epicurean principle remains; the soul is a body. 72
Smith asks immediately however how one can arrive at a rational soul
from mere body. The solution offered by Epicurus, here represented above all by
Lucretius, is that like all other phenomena in the cosmos rationality is the result
what he argues and not if he is fair to the Epicurean view. See Mijuskovic, Achilles, 23-7, 63-5 for
an account of Smith’s argument that places it within the history of such arguments.
Ibid., 69. See also James Hankins, “Lucretius’s Arguments against Immortality in De
Rerum Natura, III, 425-829,” in The Rebirth of Platonic Theology, edited by James Hankins and
Fabrizio Meroi (Florence: Olschki, 2013), 148-51.
70
Epicurus, “Letter to Meoeceus,” 125, in The Essential Epicurus, trans. with intro. Eugene
O’Connor (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 63.
71
72
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 70.
334
of atoms in motion through the void of empty space. 73 But this account raises
many difficulties, including the question of the origin of motion.
Smith notes that there is nothing in the definition of body that necessitates
motion. Something may be extended in space without also being subject to
motion. Thus, it would seem that some explanation is required to account for the
movement of atoms. In a convenient truce with his sometime enemy Aristotle,
Smith brings the Peripatetic principle “that Motion cannot arise from a Body”
alone to bear against the Epicurean physics. 74 Epicurean physics seems therefore
to require an efficient cause to set the system in motion that is expressly ruled
out by that very system.
In addition to this deep flaw in Epicurean physics, there is the more
specific matter of the origin of perception. For even a bodily Epicurean soul must
be able to perceive, that being one of the essential tasks of a soul. 75 Lucretius
suggests motion as an explanation of perception. However, at best the motions of
bodies can produce the variety of objects various in magnitude, position, figure,
73
Ibid., 71.
Ibid., 71. Smith’s reference is to Aristotle’s De Caelo (On the Heavens) but the principle is
ubiquitous in his philosophy.
74
75
Ibid., 72.
335
and motion that makes up the objects of perception (the “phanomena,” or as the
Epicureans call them, “eventa”). 76 But to perceive is to sense these phenomena; to
have them as objects. Thus, this power cannot come from these bodily
phenomena themselves any more “then Vision can rise out of a Glasse.” 77 That is,
bodies and their interactions are what is seen (i.e., objects) and at most that by
which we see (the sense organs, etc.) but in no way are bodies to be identified
with our act of seeing.
Additionally, appeals to infinitesimally small “corpuscular” bodies
(atoms) are no help to the Epicurean cause either. Atoms themselves do not have
the power of sense, and therefore, argues Smith, neither can any combination or
motion thereof. This otherwise curious denial of the possibility of what today
would be called “emergent properties” rests on the principle, well attested by
both Platonists and Aristotle, that an effect cannot have something that was not
given it by its cause. 78 Therefore, atoms in motion cannot account for perception.
76
Ibid., 72.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid., 73.
336
As supplementary support for this conclusion Smith notes the apparent
difficulty that even Lucretius seems to have in holding to the theory of the
corporeal soul. 79 Taking his lead from Plotinus, Porphyry, and Plutarch, Smith
adds that interactions of atoms cannot be sensitive to their own motions because
that would be like musical instruments hearing their own vibrations. Sensation is
not motion or impressions caused by motion but the recognition of those motions
by a faculty of a different sort altogether. 80
Moreover, even if it were possible sense perception alone would be
insufficient to account for knowledge. If sense were all that one had we could not
know some rather important things. For example, we could not know that we
know. 81 Judgment is needed to make sense of sensory information as well but
this is accomplished via innate ideas already contained in the reasoning faculties
79
Ibid., 73-5.
Ibid., 76. Alan Gabbey has suggested that it may have been Smith, rather than
Cudworth or More, who first took up the attack upon “mechanical religion.” “Cudworth, More
and the Mechanical Analogy,” in Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England 1640-1700, ed.
Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zagorin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008), 109-27, here 121, 127 n.50. See also Simon Patrick, The Parable of the Pilgrim (London, 1688),
195, 204, 210; cited by Gabbey (127 n.50).
80
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 77. Smith adds this additional bit of argument because
sense perception does indeed involve the body and that gives a degree of plausibility to the
Epicurean theory.
81
337
of the soul. 82 Thus, along with Aristotle, Smith argues that judgment and reason
are not faculties or powers of sense. They are how we are able to distinguish
between hallucinations and proper perceptions, and thus they are not themselves
perceptual.
In addition, if there is no higher principle of knowledge than sense one
could not know, for example, that the sun is actually much larger than it appears
because an understanding of that sort rests on immaterial mathematical
reasoning. 83 Pure empiricism therefore is not enough even for an accurate
apprehension of the physical world. Thus, Smith concludes, there is a more noble
power in the soul that judges and reasons upon the data provided by sense and
this cannot be a body. In this way, Smith argues, to his own standards of proof,
that there is at least a higher aspect of the soul that is immaterial and thus
immortal.
Three particulars follow from these arguments. First, the mental faculty by
which we discern and judge is not a body and must therefore remove itself from
82
Ibid., 70.
83
Ibid., 79.
338
bodily concerns to “nakedly discern truth.” 84 This is in keeping with Smith’s
generally ascetic approach to spiritual aesthetics as we have seen in chapters four
and five above.
Second, we must have a faculty that “collects and unites all the
Perceptions of our several Senses, and is able to compare them together:
something in which they all meet as in one Centre” for as Plotinus suggests
“That in which all those several sensations meet as so many Lines drawn from
several points in the Circumference and which comprehends them all, must
needs be One.” 85 While Smith does reference Aristotle’s de Anima in his
discussion of this unitive sense faculty he does so only to back up the general
principle “That must be one that judges things to be diverse.” 86 Curiously, Smith does
84
Ibid., 80.
Ibid., 82. Smith cites Ennead IV.7.6 but the idea originates with Alexander of
Aphrodisias, De Anima, 8-13 (A.P. Fotinis, The De anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias [Washington,
D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), cited in Plotinus, Ennead IV, trans. Armstrong, vol. IV,
355, n.1. Mijuskovic suggests an anticipation of Kant in Smith’s argument “that only an
immaterial simple can serve as a ‘transcendental’ condition for the unity of consciousness”
(Achilles, 65). However, Smith’s reason for bringing this up is not epistemological but rather to
shore up his case against Epicureanism by suggesting that the simple (indivisible) soul is also
immaterial. After all, the Epicurean atom too is indivisible (and thus eternal in its own way).
85
86
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 82; translating from Aristotle, De anima, 3.2.
339
not name this faculty the ΎΓΑχ ΅ϦΗΌΗΖ or sensus communis, but it is clear that
this is the faculty he has in mind. 87
Smith’s third particular is that remembering and predicting (“Prevision”)
cannot be bodily processes. Essentially, he is asking what could possibly unite
the past, present, and future together as our mental faculties do if they were not
in some sense participants in eternity themselves? 88 If conversant with eternity, if
only in its shadow cast upon memory, present awareness, and prescience, then
surely the soul has no truck with the body and is itself immortal.
Where this first argument prominently displays Smith’s Platonism, his
second against the Epicureans demonstrates his knowledge of the new science of
his day. Essentially, his argument is that the body and soul can act without each
other. 89 There are actions that arise without any mental effort or attention and
there are those that are deliberate and against bodily demands, as when we delay
eating even when feeling hungry.
However, given the relative paucity of explicit uses of the phrase in Aristotle, its
absence in Smith is perhaps not surprising. Still, the label would have made for much more
readable prose in Smith’s discussion.
87
88
Ibid., 82-3.
89
Ibid., 85.
340
Spontaneous bodily actions, including emotional reactions without
external causes, originate in the body but are felt by the soul. For this reason
there must be a close connection or relation between the soul and the body. The
“machina” of the body cannot perceive and so there must also be an immaterial
soul for that purpose. 90 However, most bodily motions are unconscious, what we
would call “autonomic functions” that we do not perceive or initiate such as
breathing, heart beating, pupil dilation, etc. All of this leads Smith to conclude
that the body and soul must be distinct things.
The parallel to Descartes here is very strong. Both argue that body is
primarily defined by extension and soul primarily by active mental functions. 91
Descartes calls these mental events “thought” while Smith maintains distinctions
like perception, judgment, reasoning, and the like but their points are the same.
Body occupies space and cannot actively respond to the world, soul (or mind)
does not occupy space and can actively respond to the world in perception,
judgment, and intellection. 92
90
Ibid., 87.
91
Mijuskovic calls this the “simplicity” argument and he traces it through its Platonic
roots to Kant in The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments (The Hague: Martinus Mijhoff, 1974).
92
Descartes, Meditations, 6, in Philosophical Writings, 2: 50-62.
341
Smith also follows Descartes and other contemporary natural
philosophers in arguing that the human body operates through various material
forces carried by spirits, blood, and humors throughout our anatomy. Many of
these processes are basically hydraulic or pneumatic in character and they
represent the ways one part of the body can influence the others and how
physical motions can lead to emotional passions too. 93 Like Descartes, Smith is
arguing that the body operates like a machine but something additional is
needed to come to an awareness of these mechanical actions. This something
more, is, for Smith, the soul.
Smith also brings up volitional acts as evidence of the superiority of the
soul over the body. Not only are they distinct, as we can see from the fact that we
are not always conscious of subtle bodily motions, but the soul is able to dictate
to the body which actions it will take. 94 The soul becomes aware of bodily needs
(showing, again, that the soul is not the body) but the soul, or more precisely the
See Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, in Philosophical Writings, 1: 328-404. Also, Gert-Jan
Lokhorst, "Descartes and the Pineal Gland," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
N. Zalta, last modified 18 September 2013, accessed 16 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/pineal-gland/. Smith, Select Discourses (1660),
86-9.
93
94
Ibid., 88-91.
342
will, can postpone or deny these actions (showing that the soul is in control).
Displaying little interest in the ordering of the faculties that had so dominated
scholastic psychology and would come to prominence again in modern
philosophy, Smith is content to merely note the understanding and the will as
vital powers and therefore carried out by the soul.
Furthermore, the soul is free from astral or astrological influences for
Smith as well. Just as he dismisses other forms of occult science (witchcraft, etc.)
as superstitious nonsense, Smith has no time at all for astrology, at least when it
comes to predicting the course one’s soul might (or must) take. 95 Along these
same lines, Smith is dismissive of Lucretius’s view that all motion, including
human action, originates in an initial “Motion of declination” or what Greenblatt
has recently (and famously) called a “swerve.” 96 For, the purely physical
Ibid., 89. Smith was clearly interested in astronomy and so he would most likely not be
opposed to what is called “natural astrology” but only “judicial astrology” which sought to
discern the inclinations of the heart and fate. In this he is a bit unusual for his day but less so
among Puritans; Calvin had written against astrology in An admonicion against astrology iudiciall
and other curiosities, that raigne novv in the vvorld, trans. G.G. (London, 1561).
95
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 90. The theory is given by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura
2.215-24. Atoms moving through an infinite void “swerve a little” and thus start off the chain of
collisions that leads to more complex objects like rocks, trees, and human souls. Without this
“change of course” atoms would simply fall in a straight line and never meet. Lucretius, The
Nature of Things, 42. Greenblatt’s The Swerve, documents the rediscovery of Lucretius’s poem and
the change in course this helped to inspire in the early modern period (toward the modern
secular world of today).
96
343
interaction of bodies according to mechanical laws leaves no room for the
exercise of free will. By introspection he thinks that we can see clearly that our
souls are not constrained by the “rigid laws of Matter” and in so noticing we
apprehend our souls to be immaterial. Our soul, says Smith in a remarkable
passage from one so soon to come to bodily death, “feels it self able to preserve it
self from the forrein force of Matter, and can say of all those assaults . . . as the
Stoick did, all this is nothing to me, who am yet free and can command within,
when this feeble Carkass is able no longer to obey me; and when that is shattered
and broken down, I can live any where else without it; for I was not That, but liad
onely a command over It, while I dwelt in it.” 97
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 91. Clearly then Smith subscribes to a view not unlike
that of Descartes, and arguably Plotinus, whereby personal identity is associated with soul/mind
and the body is essentially something that this spiritual substance has and inhabits (like a ghost
in a machine). Eyjolfur Emilsson has argued to the effect that Plotinus was essentially a Cartesian
on the issue of the mind and body (Plotinus on Sense-Perception [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008]; “Plotinus and Soul-Body Dualism,” in S. Everson, ed., Psychology,
Companions to Ancient Thought, vol. 2 [Cambridge, 1991]) and John Dillon has argued that
Plotinus was the first Cartesian (“Plotinus, the First Cartesian?,” Hermathena 149 [1990]: 19-31).
While this has been challenged ably by Donald L. Ross (“Plotinus, the First Cartesian?,”
Hermathena 169 [2000]: 153-67) it is clear that Smith thought this to be the case. Or, more
accurately, that both Plotinus and Descartes had, in this respect, discovered the “true religion” he
associates with the ancient philosophers, essentially the prisca theologia of the Renaissance
Platonists.
97
344
6.1.3.2 Platonic Arguments
With his third argument Smith turns his attention away from the
Epicureans and seeks to offer a positive demonstration of the immaterial nature
of the soul by a consideration of the power of mathematical reasoning. In classic
Platonic fashion Smith uses mathematics as his prime example of those functions
of the soul that do not depend or even relate to the body at all. 98 Mathematical
notions, in particular basic concepts in geometry such as the point, line, plane,
equality, symmetry, and divisibility, are contained within the soul but crucially
they cannot be “buried in Matter.” 99
In fact, our mathematical reasoning can easily perform operations that
when attempted in the physical world are impossible. For example, in geometry
it is an easy thing to divide an arch into as many parts as may be without losing
any of the arch in the process but when one tries to cut a physical object of that
shape some material must be lost in the cutting. 100 We also find that “in these
98
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 93.
99
Ibid.
Ibid., 93-4. A far more typically erudite example comes in the form of a reference to the
doubling of the cube, supposed to have been asked of the Delians by the Delphic Oracle who
consulted Plato who interpreted the task as an indication that they should study mathematics to
purify their minds. While Smith has his story a bit mixed up (he reports Athenians rather than
Delians) the important point is that by the use of the geometers tools, a compass and straightedge,
100
345
Geometricall speculations . . . our Souls will not consult with our Bodies,” thus
the mental substance performing these tasks cannot be a body. Moreover, as St.
Augustine (“Austin”) argued some “Archetypal Ideas” are present in our souls
such as quantity which we employ in making judgments about sense objects but
which are not themselves the product of any sensible experience. These
immaterial notions therefore “must needs be immediately ingraven upon an
Immaterial Soul.” 101
For his fourth and final argument Smith looks to the fourth degree of
knowledge he first introduced in the “True Way” discourse. Borrowed from
Proclus, and ultimately Plato, Smith divides all human knowers into four
degrees. The lowest rely on “Sensible impressions” alone. The second, achieves a
“Miscellaneous kind of knowledge arising of a collation of its Sensations with its
own more obscure and dark Idea’s.” 102 Third, is the level of “Discourse and
Reason” including mathematical knowledge. Finally, the fourth level involves
the “naked intuition of Eternal Truth which is alwaies the same” such as “the
alone the doubling of a given cube cannot be done. Smith’s likely source here is Plutarch who
related the story several times, but it was also a geometrical commonplace.
101
Ibid., 94. Smith is referencing De Quantitate Animae, 13.22-14.23.
102
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 96-7.
346
Archetypall Idea’s of Justice, Wisdome, Goodness, Truth, Eternity, Omnipotency, and
all those Morall, Physicall, or Metaphyisical notions, which are either the First
Principles of Science, or the Ultimate complement and final perfection of it.” 103
Being the home of such immaterial and eternal principles, the soul too is not a
body and thus immortal.
Interestingly, rather than leave his argument in the capable hands of the
Platonists alone Smith draws on Cartesian distinctions as well to further support
his cause. This is not all that surprising, given that Smith read Descartes as,
essentially, a Christian Platonist rather than the harbinger of secularism that he
became to Henry More and Ralph Cudworth. Smith reports that self-reflection
shows that we know our soul better than we know our body just as Descartes
had argued in the Second Meditation. 104 Indeed, while unnamed, Smith’s words
could just as easily be Descartes’s own: “the notions which we have of a Mind,
i.e. something within us that thinks, apprehends, reasons, and discourses, are so clear
Ibid., 97. While Smith’s stated source here is Proclus’s commentary on Plato’s Timaeus
(76A-F) the degrees match the Divided Line (Republic, 509D–513E) too. See In Platonis Timaeum
Commentarii, ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig, 1903-1906).
103
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 98. Cf. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 2, in
Philosophical Writings, 2: 16-23. We know from the list of works donated by Smith upon his death
that he owned a copy of the Meditations on First Philosophy, almost certainly in the original Latin.
See Saveson, “Catalogue,” 17.
104
347
easily conceive that if all Body-Being in the world were destroyed, yet we might
then as well subsist as now we doe.” 105 Moreover, the “Immediate motions” of the
mind (i.e., thoughts) do not involve extension or divisibility as corporeal things
do. Thus, the mind is immaterial and what is immaterial cannot pass away.
Therefore, the mind is immortal. 106
Being immaterial, the mind intuits immaterial intelligible things, such as
wisdom, power, eternity, goodness, justice, mercy, etc., without the involvement
of the body. And since these Ideas are eternal so too must be the mind that
perceives them. In fact, in an anticipation of his arguments for the existence of
God, Smith suggests that all these intelligibles converge in our understanding in
a “greater Oneness” or “Unity.” 107 That is, the realm of the multiplicity of
unchanging intelligibles (i.e., Plato’s Forms) are intuitively known to proceed
from a higher Unity, which, like Plotinus, Smith identifies with the Good itself. 108
105
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 98.
106
Ibid. Cf. Descartes, Meditations, 6, in Philosophical Writings, 2: 50-62.
107
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 99.
108
Ibid.
348
Plotinus’s “sober ecstasies” provide further, experiential proof that the
soul (or mind) is superior to and distinct from body of any kind. 109 However,
Smith is quick to offer a word of caution on our human capacity to achieve pure
or perfectly clear knowledge of “true Being.” 110 The limit placed on the
understanding even of an immaterial soul is a residual multiplicity. Just as in the
“True Way” Smith suggests that a purely intellectual intuition, without any
imaginative aspects, is not to be expected in this life, so too in this his retelling of
the Allegory of the Cave are we to hold out as an ideal the perfected intuition of
the One even as our knowledge is accompanied by (ever more purified)
images. 111 Indeed, only a very few will be capable of the degree of abstraction
from material images to proceed very far on this scale of perfection in
intellection. 112 Still, only our “highest speculations” will give to us a “true sense”
of divine goodness. This intellectual intuition is apprehended by the “Intellectual
eye” alone as God grants a perception of God’s own Goodness. But, God would
Ibid., 100. Smith is calling attention to Ennead IV.8.1 and also Proclus’s In Platonis
Timaeum Commentarii, ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig, 1903-1906), II.
109
110
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 101.
111
Plato, Republic, 7, 514a- 521d.
112
Ibid.
349
not raise up the mind to “such Mounts of Vision, to shew it all the glory of that
heavenly Canaan flowing with eternal and unbounded pleasures, and then
tumble it down again into that deep and darkest Abyss of Death and Nonentity.” 113 The allusion here to the view of the Promised Land by Moses from
Mount Nebo is especially important since it is to the prophet to whom all
theological knowledge is first revealed. 114 Smith is essentially arguing that God
would not reveal such anticipations of eternity to the minds of prophets and
philosophers unless the soul truly were immortal.
Smith’s argument is experiential but not in the democratic sense common
in contemporary philosophical arguments. He does not say that we all have an
experience of x, therefore y. Instead, his claim is that since sages like Plotinus and
prophets like Moses have had the experience of intuiting eternal truths, therefore
the human soul is immortal. The logic is participatory; in these extraordinary
men and their experiences we gain proleptic insight into the common fate of all.
In this respect, Smith’s argument here mirrors the effect of the incarnation of the
Logos in Christ, who is for Smith above all a prophet, teacher, and in that sense,
113
Ibid., 103.
114
Numbers 27: 12-4; Deuteronomy 3: 23-8.
350
savior. Thus, Smith’s final “natural” argument for the immortality of the soul
rests on an ultimate convergence of the rational and the revealed in intuition;
reason and revelation transformed into a living sense. 115
6.1.3.3 Other Difficulties
Having given his arguments for the immortality of the soul Smith
proceeds to clear up two potential remaining obstacles. First, in chapter eight, he
discusses Aristotle’s view on the immortality of the soul. On the strength of a
brief reference in De Anima 2.1 Smith concludes that for Aristotle the “Rational
Soul” (the only sort of “soul” that concerns Smith) is “separable from the Body . . .
because it is not the Entelech [actuality] of any Body.” 116
It should be noted however that Smith is arguing for a view of the immortal soul
arguably more consistent with late antique philosophy than Christian scripture. For Smith, as for
the Neoplatonists, the soul is immortal by its very nature. There is no question here of God’s
additional grace in making the soul immortal, nor does Smith entertain the orthodox Christian
doctrine of the resurrection of the body at the final judgment. Indeed, in mentioning such a view
his proof text in opposition is Plotinus (Ennead IV.7.10) to the effect that what is divine is also
necessarily immortal (103-4). Still, Smith reads this as entirely consistent with scripture. On the
philosophical issues involved in the doctrine of the resurrection see Georg Gasser, ed., Personal
Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death? (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). I assess some
of the essays in my review, “Personal Identity: How do we Survive Our Death?,” The Heythrop
Journal 54, Issue 20 (2013): 330-1.
115
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 107. Smith’s text offers this citation, Aristotle, De Anima,
2.1, however in this place Aristotle makes much more strongly the opposite point that the soul
cannot be separated from the body. His only real concession to Smith’s agenda is to note that
there might be beings (presumably non-human) for which the soul is not the actuality of a body.
Either Smith is being deliberately cheeky with his scholarship here or he is following the lead of
116
351
The second difficulty to clear Smith addresses in chapter nine is a variety
of the mind-body problem that was to become a pressing issue in Smith’s day
and even more so thereafter. 117 Against the objection to the immaterial soul
raised on account of the relationship between the soul and the body in
perception and motion Smith argues that this relationship amounts to merely a
mutual relation between them. That is, “the Sympathy of things is no sufficient
Argument to prove the Identity of their essences.” 118 Basically, his argument is
that just because the body affects the soul and the soul directs the body does not
necessitate that they are of the same kind of substance. In support of this view
Smith brings in considerations drawn from Plotinus to the effect that the close
relationship between soul and body is entirely to be expected for “to make such a
Complex things as Man is, it was necessary that the Soul should be so united to
the Body as to share its passions and infirmities so far as they are void of
an unnamed (Platonic) commentator. On Aristotle’s definitions of “soul” see Thomas Kjeller
Johansen, “Circumscribing the Soul: De Anima 1.1 and 2.1,” in The Powers of Aristotle's Soul
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9-33.
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 112-7. See also Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 3 November 2011, accessed
26 May 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/dualism/ and Richard E. Aquila,
“The Content of Cartesian Sensation and the Intermingling of Mind and Body,” History of
Philosophy Quarterly 12 no.2 (1995): 209-226.
117
118
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 113.
352
sinfulness.” 119 Led by Proclus’s notion of “a spiritual kind of vehicle”
transporting information back and forth between the soul and body, Smith takes
up a rather lengthy discussion of the psycho-physiology of the passions
obviously indebted to Descartes. 120
Almost certainly drawing on his French copy of The Passions of the Soul,
although he makes no explicit mention of it here, Smith notes that the point of
contact and interaction between the soul and body has been discovered by a “late
sagacious Philosopher.” 121 No longer concerned with mere “sympathy” between
the soul and the body, Smith describes the location of this interaction as “that
part of the Brain from whence all those Nerves that conduct the Animal spirits
119
Ibid., 114; citing Plotinus, Ennead IV.8.1.
On Proclus’s “vehicles”, Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 115. See Proclus, In Platonis
Timaeum Commentarii, III 236.31ff. and The Elements of Theology, § 207–210, in ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd
ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, reprinted 2005), 181-5. For discussion, see Christoph Helmig
and Carlos Steel, "Proclus,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last
modified 14 May 20122, accessed 16 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/proclus/.
120
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 115-6. Saveson’s “Catalogue” of Smith’s library reports
a copy of “Cartesius de passionibus. Gallice.” (17). This is most likely a reference to the French
edition of The Passions of the Soul published in Paris (1649 or 1650), Amsterdam (1650), or Rouen
(1651). While neither myself nor Saveson found the volume in the Old Library at Queens’ I think
it most likely that Smith’s was an early edition from Paris; all the more reason to note that it is
“Gallice” in the donation manuscript. On Descartes’s theory of mind-body interaction via the
pineal gland see Gert-Jan Lokhorst, "Descartes and the Pineal Gland.”
121
353
up and down the Body take their first Original.” 122 This seems plausible for
Smith because, “we find all Motions that first arise in our Bodies [i.e., sensations],
to direct their course straight up to that . . . and there only to be sensated.”
Likewise, it is from this location in the brain that “all the imperate motions of our
Wills issuing forth from the same consistory.” 123 In other words, Smith accepts
the (notoriously bad) Cartesian explanation that the mind and body interact in a
specific location within the brain. The body is used for perception and operated
like a great machine by the soul from this location “in some mysterious way.” 124
While (understandably) fuzzy on the details, Smith has the confidence of an early
adopter that it is from this mysterious bodily throne that the animal spirits are
registered and manipulated as a puppeteer pulls upon the strings. 125 How, one
wonders, it could escape his notice that an immaterial, and thus non-spatial, soul
could not interact in these ways with a material, and thus extended, body
remains unknown. Perhaps, and this is speculation upon a lack of evidence,
122
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 116.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
Ibid., 116-7. Smith even speaks of nerves as “Chords” that once pulled make the
muscles move (117).
125
354
Smith was groping after a notion of extended spirit such as we meet in Henry
More. 126 However, if that were the case, surely Smith would tell us, since More’s
correspondence with the “sagacious philosopher” must surely have been an
important enough event to warrant notice. 127
The sympathetic reader may wish that Smith had kept his discussion of
the mind-body issue limited to his distinction between sympathy and identity.
Nevertheless, having presented arguments against materialist naturalism
(Epicureanism), for Platonic-Cartesian dualism, and clearing away two
remaining issues, Smith had demonstrated to his own satisfaction the
immateriality, and therefore immortality, of the souls of human beings.
Most importantly for our purposes is the fact that in his arguments Smith
leans heavily on the spiritual senses he developed in his treatments of the source
and methods of theology as well as the rational piety he recommended to
Cambridge scholars and rustic country folk alike. The reason for the denial of
See John Henry, "Henry More," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N.
Zalta, last modified 22 August 2012, accessed 16 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/henry-more/.
126
See Rene Descartes, Correspondance avec Arnauld et Morus : Texte latin et traduction,
Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques, ed. Geneviève Lewis (Paris, 1953) and Rene Descartes, The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. III: The Correspondence, ed. John Cottingham, Dugald
Murdoch, Robert Stoothoff, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
127
355
immortality is that some have not experienced their own souls. As Smith states in
his second premise to the arguments for the immortality of the soul, one must be
able to recognize the truth of what he says within oneself. Even where he offers
his most philosophically rigorous arguments, Smith relies on his reader “seeing”
the truth thereof by intuition. His demonstrations are like a narrative of a
geometrical proof, guiding his reader to the realization of his conclusion for
themselves.
6.1.4 The Existence and Nature of God
Smith’s discourse on the “Existence and Nature of God” is a curious text.
Unlike countless other attempts to demonstrate the Deity then and now, Smith’s
arguments do not rest on observations about the world outside us. Rather, Smith,
predictably, perhaps, looks within the soul for his evidence. In the process he
presents two arguments, both thoroughly psychological. Moreover, Smith does
not rest content with showing simply that there is a God. Rather, he seeks to
show as much of the nature of this God as can admit of rational argument too.
356
6.1.4.1 The Argument from Self-Reflection
The first of Smith’s arguments for the existence of God is less an argument
than an invitation to reflect upon one’s own soul with him. For, the best way to
know that there is a God is by reflecting on the soul within where God is
pictured. Importantly, Smith weeks “not so much [to] demonstrate That he is, as
What he is.” 128 Thus, his arguments for God’s existence are not of the type most
commonly seen in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Smith does not
even try to offer irrefutable logical proofs. Instead, he follows the lead of Plato
and Plotinus in suggesting that “we may best learn from a Reflexion upon our
own Souls.” 129
Introspection is the way to know that there is a God and also who this
God is because it is in the immortal, incorporeal soul of the human being that
God has left the greatest imprint of God’s self. Smith’s metaphor is of the soul as
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 123. Here Smith is drawing on the Platonic image of the
soul as a mirror that was central to medieval treatments of the spiritual senses such as one finds
in Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum, 4. On spiritual vision as like a flawed mirror in this
earthly life see Dallas G. Denery II, Seeing and Being Seen in the Later Medieval World: Optics,
Theology and Religious Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 101-13, 169-70, esp.
106. See also Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 109.
128
129
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 123.
357
a statue where “the lovely Characters of Divinity may be most easily seen and
read of all men within themselves.”
His example is illustrative here; the great “Statue of Minerva” (Athena) in
the Parthenon on the Acropolis in Athens. 130 As the famous icon of the Goddess
of Wisdom made Her present to the Athenians, so too does the Divine Image in
the soul make present the one God. But whereas Minerva was crafted by the
human hands of Phidias, the “Impresse of Souls is . . . nothing but God himself,
who could not write his own name so as that it might be read but onely in
Rationall Natures.” 131 As supremely rational, God can only properly be depicted
in similarly rational images like the soul of human beings. Thus, “whenever we
look upon our own Soul in a right manner, we shall find an Urim and
Thummim,” the instruments of ancient Israelite divination “by which we may
ask counsel of God himself.” 132
Explicitly drawing on his arguments on the immortality of the soul, Smith
suggests that the “dismall and dreadfull thoughts” of our own mortality darkens
130
Ibid., 124.
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.
358
our ability to see beyond “the compass of corporeal dimensions” of time and
space. 133 Those who do not know themselves to be immortal souls – images of the
Eternal God – cannot apprehend the Deity where God has placed “the most clear
and distinct copy of himself.” 134 This blindness is both caused by, and occasions,
the “black Opinions of Death and the Non-entity of Souls (darker then Hell it
self)” and causes one to “shrink up the free-born Spirit which is within us.” 135
When our souls are properly attuned they are instead “dilating and spreading”
themselves “boundlessly beyond all Finite Being” to the intellection of the
unlimited Forms. 136
When removed from the limited realm of the corporeal – where things
come to be and pass away; a kingdom of death – the soul sees “beyond Time and
Matter” and “finds no more ends nor bounds to stop its swift and restless
motion.” Ascending ever more into the “ΌΉϟΓΑȱΗΎϱΘΓΖ” (divine darkness) the
133
Ibid.
134
Ibid., 125.
135
Ibid., 124. Smith is describing the hopelessness of nihilism.
136
Ibid., 124-5.
359
soul becomes “swallowed up in the boundless Abyss of Divinity.” 137 When we
“rest and bear up” ourselves on the contemplation of the “Immaterial centre of
Immortality within” we find ourselves able to proceed from “self-reflexion into
the contemplation of an Eternall Deity.” 138 We are able to spiritually perceive
God in and through viewing God’s image in ourselves. 139
While there is a copy of God’s “Perfections in this conspicable and
sensible World” we must have “some interpreter within” in order to perceive
it. 140 We best understand “that copie which we find” in the “externall
appearances” of the universe when we compare it to the “copie which we find of
them within our selves, with that which we see without us.” 141 Thus with
unnamed “Schoolmen” Smith distinguishes between the “Vestigia Dei” found in
Ibid. Smith cites Pseudo-Dionysius on the notion of “divine darkness” here. Cf.
Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, 997A-1001A, in Paul Rorem, trans., Pseudo Dionysius:
The Complete Works (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988), 135-7.
137
138
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 125.
Cf. Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, chs. 3 and 4. Unlike Bonaventure,
however, Smith makes no reference here to the necessity of grace to overcome the epistemic
obstacle posed by original sin. In this, Smith demonstrates his more “Eastern” style of theology;
Augustine’s theory of original sin is a very limited influence on him. Though, not absent (cf.
Smith, Select Discourses [1660], 136; “Ever since our Minds became so dim-sighted . . . .”).
139
140
Ibid., 125.
141
Ibid., 126.
360
external sensible theology and the “Faciem Dei” found in internal symbolic
theology when reflecting on the Image of God in one’s own soul. 142 Thus, coming
to know one’s self most truly presents one with the intuition of God.
This introspection does more than simply suggest to us that there is a
God. It also leads us, Smith says, to a knowledge of the Divine unity,
omniscience, omnipotence, love, goodness, eternity, omnipresence, and freedom.
For example, when we reflect on our own “Idea of Pure and Perfect Reason” in
addition to knowing that we do not measure up to it, we notice that this notion
“points us not . . . This or That Particular, but something which is neither This or
That, but Totall Understanding.” 143 Thus there is a “One Infinite source of all that
Reason and Understanding” in which our finite minds participate. 144
142
Ibid., 126.
143
Ibid., 126, 127. Cf. Descartes, Meditations, 2.
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 128. Smith connects this argument to the “old
¢ȱ¢Ȅȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȃ̏ϱΑ΅Ζȱȱ¢Ȅȱȱȱȱȱ
of all “Particularities and Numbers” (Ibid.). He is referring to the Pythagorean and Platonic One.
Cf. Deirdre Carabine, “A Thematic Investigation of the Neoplatonic Concepts of Vision and
Unity,” Hermathena No. 157 (1994): 43-56.
144
361
Smith argues in very much the same way for the rest of the divine
attributes classically associated with theism. 145 The key service provided by the
knowledge of the soul’s immortality, from a philosophical perspective, would
seem to be that it removes the tendency to place boundaries on our thought,
opening the way to the contemplation of our basic concepts in a pure, and thus
eternal and infinite, sense. These notions (such as reason) lead to the idea of their
perfection and source in God Who is these very Perfections. Thus from our
rationality we are lead to intuit the unity and omniscience of God. 146
6.1.4.2 The Argument from Morality
The second of Smith’s arguments for the existence of God is recognizable,
even today, as a live strategy in the philosophy of religion. For here he argues
that the motion of our wills toward supreme and infinite goodness suggests that
It is well worth noting that Ralph Cudworth coined the English term “theist” in his
True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678) , I. 4. IV
145
From these basic notions Smith goes on to “deduce” five additional things about the
Divine Nature. 1. “That all Divine productions or operations that terminate in something without Him,
are nothing else but the free Effluxes of his own Omnipotent Love and Goodness,” (140) 2. “That that
Almighty Wisdome and Goodness which first made all things, doth also perpetually conserve the govern
them,” (144) 3. “That all True Happiness consists in a participation of God arising out of the assimilation
and conformity of our Souls to him,” (147) 4. That the “Notion of the Divine Justice and scope whereof
is nothing else but to assert and establish Eternal Law and Right,” (151) 5. “That seeing there is such
an Entercourse and Society as it were between God and Men, therefore there is also some Law between
them, which is the Bond of all Communion” (154).
146
362
there is, in fact, a Supreme Good. And that, every good Christian Platonist at
least, knows to be God.
Smith begins by observing that human beings are perpetually restless. We
crave “some Supreme and Chief good” and we “will not be satisfied with any thing
less then Infinity it self.” 147 We find nothing in the corporeal world to be
ultimately satisfying. This is why even “when men most of all flie from God,
they still Seek after him.” 148 As Augustine put it, “our hearts are restless” until
they rest in God. 149
All this suggests, for Smith, that God is this Supreme Good that we seek.
But the finding is an aesthetic experience more than an intellectual one. “He is
not onely the Eternal Reason, that Almighty Mind and Wisdome which our
Understandings converse with; but he is also that unstained Beauty and Supreme
Good which our Wills are perpetually catching after: and wheresoever we find
true Beauty, Love and Goodness, we may say, Here or there is God.” 150 Moreover,
147
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 135.
148
Ibid., 137.
149
Confessions, I.1: “. . . inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.”
150
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 137.
363
just as our minds cannot apprehend God without some “primitive” intuition
thereof, so too do our wills need a “latent sense” of God “whereby they can tast
and discern how near any thing comes to that Self-sufficient good they seek
after.” 151 Thus, Smith posits an “internal sensating Faculty” that is distinct from
outer sense and the intellect and is attuned to goodness. It is by this faculty that
one comes to know God as the Supreme Good. 152
6.2 The Unity of Natural & Revealed Theology
This chapter has demonstrated how Smith’s natural theology relies on just
the same sorts of spiritual senses as his revealed theology. Just as one comes to be
a prophet via intellectual intuition so too does the theologian come to know the
immortality of her or his own soul. Just as moral purification is required to
appropriate the truths of revelation for oneself, so too does one come to
appreciate that there is a God. Smith does not offer extensive, logical, arguments
for the immortal soul or the existence and nature of God, not because he cannot
do so, but because to do so would be to distort the very things he wishes to
Ibid., 138. Cf. Henry More’s “Boniform Faculty,” which is also distinguished from the
intellect. An Account of Virtue (Enchiridion Ethicum), ch.4, in Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists, 265,
267.
151
Following Plotinus and Simplicius, Smith thinks that “the Good” is the preeminent
name for contemplating God, above Being and even the One (Smith, Select Discourses [1660], 139).
152
364
demonstrate. Only in the living apprehension of divine truth can that truth be
properly appreciated. To reduce divinity to a series of discursive arguments
would be, for Smith, to cease to speak of the Divine. All “things of Sense & Life
are best known by Sentient and Vital faculties,” and “he that wants true Vertue,
in heavn’s Logick is blind, and cannot see . . . .” 153
The only way to be convinced of the truth of the Christian religion, as
Smith understands it, is to “taste and see” the goodness, beauty, and truth
thereof for oneself. This capacity is both natural to us as rational creatures made
in the image of God, and the result of God’s grace freely given to all. The
spiritual senses are, for Smith, both natural and supernatural. Natural in the
sense that they are proper to our true nature and present in all to one degree or
another. Supernatural in the sense that they are the result of the free influx of the
Spirit of God in us. 154 Thus, his arguments against superstition and atheism make
153
Ibid., 2, 4.
Mark T. Mealey has suggested that Smith is far more a Platonist than a Christian
(“Taste and See that the Lord is Good: John Wesley in the Christian Tradition of Spiritual
Sensation” [PhD diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2006], 25-6). However, this raises more
difficulties than it clears. First, it presupposes that one can only be one or the other. One need
look no further than Augustine to see the mistaken assumption in that conclusion. Second, it
suggests that a concern for “doctrine” in the sense of creedal orthodoxy is the standard by which
one ought to judge the “Christianity” of an author. Moreover, Smith is no less “biblical” in his
theology for all his love of Platonism. Only, again, if one assumes from the start a contradiction
between the Platonic and the Biblical traditions does he look more like a Platonist than a
154
365
appeal, not so much to demonstrations of their errors in logic, as to the great
benefit to the soul of following the true path of the clear minded, yet passionate,
Christian Platonist. And above all, in every argument that Smith makes, he
appeals to the spiritual sensation, by his reader, of what he is discoursing upon.
Whether it is by intellectual intuition, a conative sense of the Good, or the
imaginary visions of the prophets, one must “see” and “hear” the truth, “taste”
and “smell” the goodness, and “touch” the eternal being of one’s soul
continually remade in the image of God. It is in and through the repeated appeal
to varieties of the spiritual senses, therefore, that Smith’s theology forms a
systematic whole.
Christian. Rather, Smith is a thoroughly Christian Platonist in the mold of Origen before him (cf.
Mealey, “Taste and See,” 45). On the combination of Platonism and Christianity in another early
modern figure usually thought to lean in a fideist direction see Bernard Wills, “Pascal and the
Persistence of Platonism in Early Modern Thought,” The International Journal of the Platonic
Tradition 6 (2012): 186-200.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
This final chapter rehearses the results of our exegetical work above. In so
doing it sets out the ways in which John Smith employs the spiritual senses in his
theology. The chapter also looks ahead to avenues for future research by tracing
his influence on selected figures in the centuries since his death in 1652.
7.1 Smith’s ‘Spiritual Senses’
Smith developed two basic sorts of “spiritual sense” in the Select
Discourses. The first, and most common, is a kind of intellectual intuition
(cognition as “sense”) which Smith employed in his accounts of the source and
method of divinity, spirituality, and as a central bit of argument in his systematic
theology. As it was for the other Cambridge Platonists, religion is an eminently
rational matter for Smith. But this rationality is not of the cold, distant,
calculating kind. Rather, like Plato’s philosopher rapt in the vision of the Good,
religious reason is a matter of personal encounter with the Author of all truth.
Knowing God is more like vision than data processing.
Second, and far too often ignored, Smith made frequent appeal to the
imaginative perception of divine truths in the same range of accounts. For all his
367
emphasis on the rationality of religion Smith is equally clear about the positive
role played by the purified and inspired imagination. Through sensible images,
above all the Image of God that is the human soul, one engages with Divine
Realities with all one’s heart as well as all of one’s mind.
These two forms of spiritual intuition are what the “spiritual senses” are
for Smith. Where many have emphasized either a metaphorical or an allegorical
form of spiritual sensation he combines the two. Some spiritual sensation is a
matter of sense-like intellection. But some spiritual sensation is far more literally
“sensible” as it functions in and through the human capacity to make present
images that are not (and in this case cannot be) also present to the physical
senses.
However, as argued above, the uses to which he puts there spiritual sense
are far more telling. 1 For Smith brings his varieties of spiritual sensation to bear
in order to give an account of other, larger, considerations. That is, Smith uses
the spiritual senses to explain himself on the nature of theology and spirituality.
Because he often uses intellectual intuition and the imagination to account for
1
See chapters two, four, five, and six above.
368
other key aspects of his theology, just as his predecessors in the tradition did, the
best way to summarize his doctrine is to review the functions it performs. 2
7.1.1 Source & Method
Smith made consistent appeal to the spiritual senses in his theory of the
source and methods of theology. Even as his contemporaries were searching the
globe and reforming science and philosophy he too searched for an experiential
foundation for divinity. Natural knowledge of the Divine, as well as the
appropriation of revealed truth, is a matter of intellectual intuition. However,
this “intellectual touch” is never completely separated from sensible images in the
imagination too. For Smith, one appropriates Divine truths via the intellect but
this also gives symbols to the imagination by which one begins to taste the
sweetness of divinity in Christ for example. This signifies that whereas later
modern philosophy (especially Kant), and medieval Aristotelianism, maintained
rather strict borders between sensible and intellectual faculties, Smith does not
do so. It would be anachronistic to hold him to Kantian standards of course but
he did know the late scholastic perspective on this issue and simply rejects it as
2
See chapter two above.
369
unfit for divine philosophy (i.e., theology). Instead of the clear categories and
distinctions of his scholastic forbearers and their early modern imitators, Smith
appeals to an older, Platonic aesthetic that sees perception and feeling as central
to thought and that views intellection as essentially sense-like. In this Smith
anticipates the Romantics with their insistence that imagination and feeling are
mediums of divine relation. As Descartes based his metaphysics on the
immediate intuition of the thinking self, Smith rooted his theology in the
immediate intuition of the soul as imago Dei. Smith, as a late Renaissance figure,
thus stands between medieval sense and modern sensibility.
Revealed knowledge too involves the perception of images implanted in
the imagination by God (mediated by angelic beings) as well as communication
with the human intellect in prophecy. To some was given a purely sensible
revelation in the form of the Bath Kol or voice of God heard miraculously in
prophetic times. Poets and sages were inspired by the Ruach Hakodesh or Holy
Spirit in intellect so that their psalms sing God’s own self-praise and their
wisdom echoes the Divine Logos in and through human hearts and voices.
Prophets received influxes of divine truth in images revealed to the imagination
and ideas to the intellect, all by the mediation an angelic messengers. And for
370
Moses and Jesus Christ alone, God gives a purely intellectual revelation “mind to
mind.” 3 Thus, what begins in sense, reaches new heights in imagination, and is
perfected in intellect. 4
7.1.2 Spirituality
Developing his account of theological understanding further, Smith
argued for a rational faith expressed in inner reflection, moral purity, and
deification. In so doing he made intellectual intuition and the imaginative
reception of symbols of the divine central to the life of true Christian piety. This
way of purification, illumination, and union is how Smith accounts for the fact
that divines and prophets have had theological understanding even as he
recommends this same path to his reader if they would seek to know God. Only
one who has been transformed through purification of his or her affections,
intentions, and thoughts is capable of perceiving divine things, either
Perfected in his earthly life for Moses and for the rest hereafter. Theological knowledge
for non-prophets too begins in sense with the reading of scripture and the hearing of sermons, etc.
It proceeds in imagination through the lovely images of the reformed soul and the graciousness
of Christ. And it reaches perfection in the intellectual vision of the Good.
3
4
See chapter four above.
371
intellectually or imaginatively. Thus, there can be no disinterested theologian for
Smith. For him the spiritual senses are both descriptive and prescriptive. 5
7.1.3 System
Perhaps most unexpectedly, given the role of the spiritual senses in
revelation, Smith’s natural theology too relies on just the same sorts of spiritual
perception. Just as one comes to be a prophet via intellectual intuition so too does
the natural theologian come to know the immortality of her or his own soul. Just
as moral purification is required to appropriate the truths of revelation for
oneself, so too does one come to appreciate that there is a God.
Smith does not offer extensive logical arguments for the immortal soul or
the existence and nature of God, not because he cannot do so, but because to do
so would be to distort the very things he wishes to demonstrate. 6 Only in the
living apprehension of divine truth can that truth be properly appreciated. To
5
See chapter five above.
This is not to say that Smith is without philosophical refinement however. He most
likely precedes, and may have contributed to, similar arguments in the other Cambridge
Platonists (especially Cudworth and More). He also clearly anticipates arguments for the unity of
the judgments of consciousness. For a sense of the sophistication of Smith’s arguments in a
philosophical perspective see Ben Lazare Mijuskovic The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments (The
Hague: Martinus Mijhoff, 1974), esp. 23-7 and 63-5.
6
372
reduce divinity to a series of discursive arguments would be, for Smith, to cease
to speak of the Divine, for all “things of Sense & Life are best known by Sentient
and Vital faculties,” and “he that wants true Vertue, in heavn’s Logick is blind,
and cannot see . . . .” 7
The only way to be convinced of the truth of the Christian religion, as
Smith understands it, is to “taste and see” the goodness, beauty, and truth
thereof for oneself. This capacity is both natural to us as rational creatures made
in the image of God, and the result of God’s grace freely given to all. The
spiritual senses are then both natural and supernatural for Smith. Natural in the
sense that they are proper to our true nature and present in all to one degree or
another. Supernatural in the sense that they are the result of the free influx of the
Spirit of God in us.
In every argument that Smith makes, he appeals to the spiritual sensation,
by his reader, of what he is discoursing upon. Whether it is by intellectual
intuition, a conative sense of the Good, or the imaginary visions of the prophets,
one must “see” and “hear” the truth, “taste” and “smell” the goodness, and
“touch” the eternal being of one’s soul continually remade in the image of God. It
7
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2, 4.
373
is in and through the spiritual senses, therefore, that Smith’s theology forms a
systematic whole and offers an account not just of God but of one’s true self as
well. 8
7.2 The Legacy of a Living Library
It is easily overlooked that Smith was among the first members of the
group we know as the Cambridge Platonists. As such, he was in a position to
influence not only his contemporaries but those who would follow after him well
into the twentieth century and beyond. In this concluding section I offer a broad,
but highly selective, overview of the reception, and influence, of John Smith’s life
and work. 9 It marks more of a call for future research than as an authoritative
presentation of Smith’s legacy.
8
See chapter six above.
This section began as a paper, “John Smith's Lasting Influence: The Transatlantic
Reception of a 'Living Library'” read at the “Revisioning Cambridge Platonism: Reception and
Influence” workshop at Clare College, Cambridge, 1 June 2013. My presentation there as here is
necessarily selective. Mention could also have been made of Smith’s influence upon John Howe,
Samuel Hartlib, John Worthington, Lord Hailes, Henry Scougal, Matthew Arnold, and John
Tulloch, among many others.
9
374
7.2.1 Immediate Reception
Smith is closely associated with Benjamin Whichcote among the
Cambridge Platonists for the good reason that he was his student. Less well
appreciated is the likely role that Smith played in recording the work of his
mentor. If Samuel Salter’s reports can be trusted, Smith took down many of
Whichcote’s sermons, thus preserving his work for eventual publication. 10 The
degree of collegial cooperation, if any, between them must remain a matter of
(irresistible) speculation for lack of clear records. But it may be that their
relationship was collaborative in the way that professors and advanced graduate
students often are in our time. In any case, there is a close affinity between many
arguments and even phrases used by Whichcote and Smith. 11
Smith was almost certainly an influence on the most prominent
Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth and More. Alan Gabbey has suggested that it
may have been Smith, rather than Cudworth or More, who first took up the
attack upon “mechanical religion.” 12 Still Smith’s importance for them is less a
Samuel Salter, “Preface to this New Edition,” in Benjamin Whichcote, Moral and
Religious Aphorisms, enlarged edition by Samuel Salter (London: J. Payne, 1753), xvii-xviii.
10
11
Many of these have been noted above.
“Cudworth, More and the Mechanical Analogy,” in Philosophy, Science, and Religion
in England 1640-1700, ed. Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zagorin (Cambridge:
12
375
matter of shared doctrines but of a general approach to philosophy and
theology. 13 Thus, Smith’s spirit, if not the letter of his work, can be clearly seen in
the ease with which Cudworth and More see reason and religion as compatible if
not ultimately identical. This comfort with philosophical religion, and the
“philosophy of religion,” a phrase coined by Cudworth, can be seen in Damaris
Masham’s correspondence with John Locke as well.
Masham, Cudworth’s daughter, discussed the “power of reason to attain
knowledge of God” with the great empiricist drawing from Smith’s Select
Discourses in so doing. 14 In addition, unlike Whichcote (often called the
“founder” of the movement) it is in Smith, More, and Cudworth that references
to Plotinus appear on the scene in mid-century Cambridge, suggesting at least a
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 109-27, here 121, 127 n.50. See also Simon Patrick, The Parable
of the Pilgrim (London, 1688), 195, 204, 210; cited by Gabbey (127 n.50).
As D.C. Gilman, H.T. Thurston, and F. Moore (eds., New International Encyclopedia
[New York: Dodd, Mead, 1905]) have aptly put it (under “Smith, John”).
13
Sarah Hutton, “Debating the Faith: Damaris Masham (1658-1708) and Religious
Controversy,” in Debating the Faith: Religion and Letter Writing in Great Britain, 1550-1800, edited
by A. Dunan-Page and C. Prunier (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 165. See also John Locke, The
Correspondence of John Locke, edited by E. S. de Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 2: 485
(letter 684), 488 (letter 687), and 500 (letter 696).
14
376
mutual affinity for the great Neoplatonist if not a causal influence between them
on each other. 15
Queens’ College Library
Upon his death in 1652 the impressive collection of books that Smith had
collected, primarily from Continental authors and presses, was left to the Library
of Queens’ College. The only record of his collection as it existed in his lifetime is
a manuscript list of the volumes accepted by the College which lays out the
nature of the bequest as well. 16 As we have seen above, this list is of central
importance but it does not, unfortunately, record the complete contents of
Smith’s library. Only those volumes that the librarian thought worth adding to
the College collection are now known.
Suspicious in their absence are editions of the works of many of the great
Platonists Smith clearly knew well. Of the antique Platonists Smith’s collection is
only known to have included Plato’s Timaeus, Proclus’s Platonic Theology,
Porphyry’s works against killing and eating animals (De abstinentia ab esu
15
C.A. Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), 17-8.
Queens’ MS 47, Queens’ College Donation List (17th century), digital copy available at
http://issuu.com/03776/docs/qunsdonors, accessed 4 April 2014
16
377
animalium and De non necandis ad epulandum animantibus), and Iambilchus’s Vita
Pythagorae and his Exhortation to the Study of Philosophy (Protrepticae Orationes ad
Philosophiam). 17 Nevertheless, Smith’s known collection is remarkably broad in
the range of interests it reveals in its collector; history, geography, languages,
mathematics, philosophy, religion, and science all mingle together in the sort of
eclectic mélange one would expect from a late Renaissance scholar.
Significantly, Smith’s bequest is still remembered among the very most
important of the early contributions to the academic life of the College and it
marked a vast improvement in the Library’s holdings at the time; a poor
substitute for the loss of the “living library” at such a young age, but an abiding
consolation in the immediate aftermath of his untimely death and a significant
contribution to the scholarly life of the College ever since. 18
J.E. Saveson, “Catalogue of the Library of John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist,” in
“Some Aspects of the Thought and Style of John Smith the Cambridge Platonist” (Ph.D. thesis,
Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge University, 1955), Appendix with separate pagination (1-78).
17
See Tim Eggington, "The Advancement of Learning" at Queens' College in the 17th
century,” Exhibition, Queens’’ College Old Library, Michaelmas term 2012, accessed 27 May 2014,
http://www.queens.cam.ac.uk/bookcollecting, and “Living Library' of John Smith (1618-52),”
Exhibition, Queens’ College Old Library, Michaelmas term 2013, accessed 27 May 2014,
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.638144929550814.
18
378
Simon Patrick and Latitudinarianism
The Cambridge Platonists have long been closely associated with the socalled Latitudinarian movement. 19 The latitudinarians were members of the
Church of England who nonetheless viewed specific doctrines (especially
Calvinist predestination), liturgical practices, and polities as of minor importance
compared to what C.S. Lewis called “mere Christianity.” Smith’s relation to the
“new sect of latitude men” is nowhere more clearly seen than in the case of his
eloquent eulogizer, and first observer of this liberal movement, Simon Patrick. 20
Patrick, who eventually went on to become bishop of Ely among other
high offices in the Church, began his studies as a sizar at Queens’ within weeks
of Smith’s appointment as a Fellow there in 1644. While Smith was not Patrick’s
tutor, the two did study closely together during the latter’s student days and
Indeed, several figures such as Whichcote, John Wilkins, and Simon Patrick, overlap
the standard lists of both groups; depending on whom one includes in each, somewhat
anachronistic “group” or “movement.”
19
S[imon].P[atrick]. A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men (London, 1662). Also,
“A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of Mr. John Smith, late Fellow of Queens College in
Cambridge, who departed this Life Aug. 7. 1652. And Lyes Interred in the Chappel of the Same
College. With a Short Account of his Life and Death,” in Select Discourses (1660), 481-526, and
“The Autobiography of Symon Patrick,” in The Works of Symon Patrick: Including His
Autobiography, vol. 9. Alexander Taylor, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1858). Also, J. Van
den Berg, “Between Platonism and Enlightenment: Simon Patrick (1625-1707) and His Place in
the Latitudinarian Movement,” Dutch Review of Church History 68 no. 2 (1988): 164-79.
20
379
they remained close friends when Patrick joined Smith as a Fellow. In his
Autobiography Patrick speaks with obvious affection for Smith. In particular,
Patrick credits Smith with helping him to “remove doubts” he had in “certain
religious subjects” that never again troubled him. 21 It may be safely assumed that
this theological mentorship played a significant role in establishing Patrick on
the trajectory toward his long career as a cleric in the Church of England.
In Smith, Patrick found a role model for the central place of morality in
religious piety over ritual or doctrine that came guide the latitudinarians.
Comparing his departed master to Socrates, Patrick remarks “that he could say
nothing about the Gods and such like . . . but . . . he was continually busied and
imployed; instructing of their Youth, amending of their Manners and making
them truly virtuous . . . Such an one was the party deceased.” 22 And “he was
always very urgent upon us that by the Grace of God . . . we would endeavor to
purge out the corruption of our Natures and . . . to labor after Purity of heart,
that so we might see God.” 23 Likewise from Smith, Patrick learned to trust in
21
Henry Griffin Williams, “Memoir of the Author,” in Select Discourses (1859), x.
22
Patrick, “Funeral Sermon,” 491-2.
23
Ibid., 510.
380
human reason as a guide in all things religious. “If he was not a Prophet like
Elijah, yet I am sure he was . . . an Interpreter of the Spirit.” 24
Thus, it can scarcely be imagined that Smith’s rational religion, containing
as it did a latitudinarian’s appreciation for adiaphora, did not have a major
impact on Patrick. While he is but a single well-known latitudinarian, Smith’s
impact on this significant movement in late seventeenth and eighteenth century
Anglicanism is certain and worthy of specialized research.
Mathematics at Cambridge
One of the less well known influences of Smith was on the development of
mathematics at Cambridge. As we have seen in chapter three above, he began
teaching mathematics in a university lectureship founded by John Wollaston in
1648. In this capacity Smith may have taught Isaac Barrow, the discoverer of the
fundamental theorem of calculus who became the first Lucasian Professor of
Mathematics in 1663. Barrow, of course, was famously a teacher of Isaac Newton
who would finish his work toward calculus as well as taking up optics like
Barrow and the study of prophecy like Barrow and Smith (albeit in less orthodox
24
Ibid., 484.
381
ways than his teachers). The connection is not absolutely sure for lack of good
records about the teaching of mathematics at Cambridge in the seventeenth
century but it is very likely that Smith (as well as Cudworth and More) stands
among those “giants” upon whose shoulders’ Newton stood. 25
Early Colonial America
The still relatively new phenomenon of publishing philosophical and
theological works in English helped Smith’s influence spread across the North
Atlantic to the British colonies of New England and Virginia. Review of the
library catalogues of the extant colonial colleges of America (now basically the
Ivy League universities) shows that they all have seventeenth century copies of
Smith’s Discourses (Harvard, William & Mary, Yale, Princeton, UPenn, Columbia,
Brown, Rutgers, and Dartmouth). Smith and the other Cambridge Platonists
were well known, if not always approved, in colonial Boston, New York,
Philadelphia and Charleston. In fact, by the early eighteenth century Smith
Mordechai Feingold, “Isaac Barrow: Divine, Scholar, Mathematician,” in Before Newton:
The Life and Times of Isaac Barrow (Cambridge University Press, 1990) and “Isaac Barrow and the
Foundation of the Lucasian Professorship,” in Kevin C. Knox and Richard Noakes, eds., From
Newton to Hawking: A History of Cambridge University’s Lucasian Professors of Mathematics
(Cambridge University Press, 2003).
25
382
formed a key part of the inspiration for a divine working on the frontier of
European settlement in western Massachusetts named Jonathan Edwards.
7.2.2 Eighteenth Century Reception
While Smith’s memory continues today mostly as an ancillary curiosity or
source of contextual (or rhetorical) leverage for the study of the more famous
Cambridge Platonists, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More especially, in the more
immediate aftermath of his brief career, Smith exerted a profound influence on
many divines. 26 This was especially the case in the eighteenth century on both
sides of the Atlantic. Of particular interest here is a deep affinity between
Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley on the “spiritual senses” and way both drew
upon Smith for their theories.
On the general state of Platonism in eighteenth century England see part IV in
Platonism and the English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 181-98.
26
383
Jonathan Edwards
Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) is “widely acknowledged to be America's
most important and original philosophical theologian.” 27 He was born into a
family of Congregational ministers in East Windsor, Connecticut in 1703. In 1716
Edwards enrolled at Yale where he read Newton, Locke, Malebranche, and the
Cambridge Platonists. After briefly ministering to congregations in New York
and Bolton, Connecticut, Edwards returned to Yale where he completed his
Master of Arts and became senior tutor in 1724. He was chosen to succeed his
grandfather as minister of the church in Northampton Massachusetts in 1725
where he oversaw and commented definitively on the religious revivals of 1734
and 1740–41, the latter of which came to be known as the “Great Awakening.”
Edwards' defense of the revivals, and criticisms of its excesses, culminated in his
first major treatise, the Religious Affections in 1746. 28
William Wainwright, "Jonathan Edwards," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Edward N. Zalta, last modified 3 October 2012, accessed 27 May 2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/edwards/.
27
Jonathan Edwards, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, in Three Parts, Christian
Classics Ethereal Library, 2006, accessed 27 May 2014,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/affections.toc.html. See also the critical edition in The Works of
Jonathan Edwards, gen. eds. Perry Miller (vols. 1–2), John E. Smith (vols. 3–9), and Harry S. Stout
(vol. 10–26) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957-2008).
28
384
Disputes over qualifications for church membership (Edwards called for
public profession of saving faith, unlike his more laxed grandfather) led to his
dismissal from his ministry in 1750. Instead of accepting offers to preach
elsewhere in North America and Scotland, Edwards took up work at the Indian
mission at Stockbridge where he had charge of two congregations, supervised a
boarding school for Indian boys, and completed his last major works. 29 Edwards
was appointed President of the College of New Jersey (now Princeton) in 1757
but died from complications arising from a smallpox inoculation on 22 March
1758, less than five weeks after taking up the post.
As Wainwright has demonstrated, Edwards’s writings stress two themes
above all, “the absolute sovereignty of God” and the “beauty of God's
holiness.” 30 Divine beauty is discussed “in accounts of God's end in creation, and
of the nature of true virtue and true beauty.” 31 Divine creation “manifest[s] a
holiness which consists in a benevolence which alone is truly beautiful. Genuine
Freedom of the Will (1754), Original Sin (1758), End of Creation and True Virtue (both
published posthumously in 1765), in The Works of Jonathan Edwards.
29
Wainwright, "Jonathan Edwards." Divine sovereignty is most clearly defended in
Edwards’ occasionalism. He argued that God is “the only real cause or substance underlying
physical and mental phenomena.” Ibid.
30
31
Ibid.
385
human virtue is an imitation of divine benevolence and all finite beauty is an
image of divine loveliness. True virtue is needed to discern this beauty, however,
and to reason rightly about ‘divine things’.” 32
References to the influence of Smith abound in the massive literature on
Edwards. Four areas of this influence have been identified; spiritual sensation,
deification, morality, and Edwards’ rhetoric all draw heavily on Smith and the
other Cambridge Platonists.
Smith was an important, and widely cited, source for Edwards’ doctrine
of the “sense of the heart.” 33 However, while noting this, scholars have been
overly tentative in asserting a clear line of influence. As Brad Walton puts it, “all
commentators since John E. Smith have recognized that John Smith’s own
discussion of the ‘spiritual sensation,’ presented in the first chapter of the Select
Discourses, constitutes a clear anticipation of Edwards, and probably exercised a
32
Wainwright, "Jonathan Edwards.”
Brad Walton, Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, and the Puritan Analysis of True Piety,
Spiritual Sensation, and Heart Religion (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), 121-2; William
Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards and his Puritan Predecessors,” in The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving
God in Western Christianity, eds. Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 224-40; Brandon G. Withrow, Becoming Divine: Jonathan Edwards’s
Incarnational Spirituality within the Christian Tradition (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2011), 58, 62-3,
194.
33
386
direct influence on his own thinking.” 34 This merely “probable” case for Smith’s
influence is rooted in the mistaken notion that it is only in the first Discourse that
Smith discusses “spiritual sensation.” As has been made clear above, this ignores
the role of spiritual or intellectual sense in Smith’s arguments for the basics of
theism, his account of prophecy, and the role of sensibility in practical religion as
well. Far from merely a likely influence, Edwards drew directly and definitively
from Smith’s Discourse on “The Shortness of a Pharisaick Righteousness” and
even quotes him at length on the “inward sense of the Divine goodness.” 35
Edwards also quotes at length the closing passage of this Discourse on the
“boiling up of the imaginative powers” and comments that it is a “remarkable
passage.” 36
Moreover, since as we have shown, Smith employs the spiritual senses
throughout his theology we would be wise to look more broadly than “religious
experience” in Edwards for his influence on the American Evangelical. Edwards
has received significant attention in recent years for his theory of sanctification or
34
Brad Walton, Jonathan Edwards, 121.
Religious Affections, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 217-9;
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 361.
35
36
Walton, Jonathan Edwards, 121.
387
deification. Brandon Withrow especially has noted the strong resemblances
between Edwards’ view and those of patristic and later Orthodox theologians
(such as Origen, the Cappadocians, and Gregory Palamas). 37 While the
similarities are striking, there is however little to “no evidence that Edwards had
access to these writings.” 38 McClymond and McDermott have more recently
argued that Edwards’ theory of divinization should be read “against the
backdrop of Renaissance and early modern Neoplatonism, and specifically the
writings of the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonists” including Whichcote,
Cudworth, More, and especially John Smith. 39 In particular passages from Smith
such as “God is the First Truth and Primitive Goodness: True Religion is a
vigorous Efflux and Emanation of Both upon the Spirits of men, and therefore is
called a participation of the divine Nature” display a profound similarity to
expressions used by Edwards. 40 Indeed, many passages in Edwards’ End of
Brandon Withrow, “A Connecticut Valley Yankee in a Cappadocian Court: Jonathan
Edwards, Eastern Christianity, and the ‘Spiritual Sense’,” (Unpublished paper, read at the
American Academy of Religion, 3 November 2008).
37
Michael J. McClymond and Gerald R. McDermott, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 413.
38
39
Ibid., 413-4.
40
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 377-451.
388
Creation are anticipated by Smith in both argument and even phrasing. 41 The
influence of Henry Scougal’s The Life of God in the Soul of Man (1677) on Edwards,
and the connections between Scougal and Smith, are also likely sources of the
New Englander’s concerns for the inner life of Christian piety too. 42
Additionally, “Edwards’s moral reflections were . . . shaped by his
reading of the Cambridge Platonists, especially John Smith and Henry More.” 43
Like the Platonists, Edwards too rejected the harsh and arbitrary portrayal of
God in mainstream Calvinism and like Smith he argued that God is
“fundamentally goodness and love.” 44 Moreover, just as Smith had argued that
“God judges creatures not by an arbitrary will but by his own internal goodness”
so too did Edwards. In particular one can find remarkable similarity in Smith
and Edwards’s views that “everything good in the created world is an emanation
from God.” 45 This is of course classic platonic doctrine but Edwards’ source for
41
Ibid., 142, 147, 155; Edwards, End of Creation, ch. 1 sect. 3.
Gerald R. Cragg, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 30.
42
43
McClymond & McDermott, 534.
44
Micheletti, Il pensiero religioso, 327
45
McClymond & McDermott, 534.
389
this ancient wisdom seems to have been Smith and the rest of the Cambridge
Platonists rather than the original authors themselves. 46
Finally, Smith seems also to be connected to Edwards’ rhetorical style.
Compare for example the following passage from Smith and the proceeding
from Edwards.
God does most glorifie and exalt himself in the most triumphant way that
may be ad extra or out of himself . . . when he most of all communicates
himself . . . And we then most of all glorifie him when we partake most of
him. 47
As there is an infinite fullness of all possible good in God . . . and as this
fullness is capable of communication, or emanation ad extra; so it seems a
thing amiable and valuable in itself that this infinite fountain of good
should send forth abundant streams. . . . They are all but the emanation of
God’s glory; or the excellent brightness and fullness of the divinity
diffused, overflowing, and as it were enlarged; or in one word, existing ad
extra. 48
Since Edwards is the first great New World philosopher in English and
“America’s Evangelical” there is great interest in understanding his sources and
There is no Plotinus in Edwards’s catalogue of books and only an abridged edition of
select dialogues of Plato. Jonathan Edwards, Catalogues of Books, The Works of Jonathan Edwards,
vol. 26, ed. Peter J. Thuesen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
46
47
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 142.
48
Edwards, End of Creation, ch.1, sect. 4; ch.2, sect. 7.
390
influences. 49 Moreover, it may well be that a lasting echo from Smith persists
today in and through the continued appeal of Edwards. For all these reasons,
future research on the influence of John Smith on Jonathan Edwards is needed,
especially with regard to the spiritual senses.
John Wesley
In addition to his connection to the first great American theologian,
Smith’s influence can be traced to John Wesley, the founder of Methodism as
well. Wesley was born near London in 1703. In 1723 he enrolled at Christ
College, Oxford where he earned both a Bachelor’s before and a Master’s after
being ordained a deacon in the Church of England in 1726. Wesley served as a
Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford while beginning to minister to the parish of
Wroote. In the 1730s Wesley began to meet with a small group, including his
brother Charles, to pray and study scripture that was dubbed the “Holy Club”
by opponents who saw this as unjustified “enthusiasm.” It was around this time
that others began to refer to the Wesley’s as “Methodists” a name originally
49
Philip F. Gura, Jonathan Edwards: America's Evangelical (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005).
391
meant to signify their over-eagerness in spiritual matters but which was
eventually co-opted by followers. 50
John Wesley’s major teachings include the possibility of Christian
perfection and the denial of Calvinist predestination, both sentiments that
resonate well with the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians of the
Church of England. 51 While Wesley himself never left the Anglican Church, his
movement, “Methodism,” is today a major branch of Protestant Christianity
which has itself given rise to the Holiness Movement as well as Pentecostalism.
Most relevantly for our purposes, Wesley’s own doctrine of the spiritual
senses owes much to his reading of John Norris, an “Oxford Platonist,” who was
deeply influenced by Smith’s circle, especially Henry More, in addition to
Malebranche. 52 Moreover, in addition to publishing an abbreviated edition of
Stephen Tomkins, John Wesley: A Biography (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2003),
12-42, 95-100.
50
Thomas C. Oden, John Wesley's Teachings, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 20122014), vols. 1& 2; and Don Thorsen, Calvin vs. Wesley: Bringing Belief in Line with Practice
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2013), 29-57, 72-87.
51
John C. English, "John Wesley's Indebtedness to John Norris," Church History 60, no. 1
(1991): 55-69. Also, Mark T. Mealey, “Taste and See that the Lord is Good: John Wesley in the
Christian Tradition of Spiritual Sensation” (PhD diss., University of St. Michael’s College,
Toronto, 2006), 20.
52
392
Smith’s Select Discourses in his Christian Library, Wesley may also have drawn on
Smith’s version of the spiritual senses in formulating his own approach. 53
As Isabel Rivers has aptly shown, John Wesley was among a significant
group of clerics in the 18th century to use various means at their disposal to
promote the Cambridge Platonists. 54 In Wesley’s case and relative to Smith in
particular this took the form of publishing selections from Smith’s Discourses in A
Christian Library: Consisting of Extracts From and Abridgments of the Choicest Pieces
of Practical Divinity Which Have Been Published in the English Tongue, in fifty
volumes (the first in 1750). Wesley included selections from the Preface by
Worthington and from all ten of the Discourses, thus making for essentially the
publication of an abridgement of the Select Discourses. 55
Ibid., 26-27. See also Mealey, “John Wesley,” in The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in
Western Christianity, ed. Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 241-56.
53
Isabel Rivers, “The promotion of the Cambridge Platonists by some clerics and
ministers from the later seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries: Gilbert Burnet, Henry
Scougal, William Wishart, John Wesley, Richard Price, Alexander Knox, John Jebb,”
(Unpublished paper, read at Revisioning Cambridge Platonism, Workshop 3: Reception and
Influence, Clare College, Cambridge, 31 May 2013).
54
John Smith, Selections from the Select Discourses, in A Christian Library. Consisting
of Extracts from and Abridgements of The Choicest Pieces of Practical Divinity, Which have been publish’d
in the English Tongue. Vol. 19: 161 – Vol. 20: 260, ed. John Wesley (Bristol: Felix Farley, 1752, 1753).
55
393
Whereas the “philosophical avant-garde” in the eighteenth century (e.g.,
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Reid) developed notions of moral and aesthetic
sensation Wesley’s spiritual senses stand far more closely in the tradition of the
“various heart-religion movements in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.” 56 In this, one can appreciate Smith as standing chronologically before
and conceptually between Shaftesbury and Wesley with his intellectual,
imaginative, and affective versions of spiritual sense. Like Smith too, Wesley
draws from the Greek Patristic Fathers, especially Origen, Clement of
Alexandria, and others. 57
Mealey suggests however that Wesley’s “doctrine . . . resembles the
Macarian homilies much more than it does, say, John Smith the Cambridge
Platonist.” 58 This judgment, however, ignores the deep similarities between
Smith’s doctrine and the Greek spirituality found in Pseudo-Macarius. For
example, both the Cambridge Platonist and the monk emphasize the role of the
56
Mealey, “Taste and See,” 26-7.
57
Ibid., 28.
58
Mealey, “John Wesley,” 256.
394
spiritual senses in discerning one’s path through life. 59 Moreover, both authors
speak of progress by degrees in the perception of divine things. 60 Wesley may
have been particularly drawn to the Macarian corpus but the themes therein are
not wanting in Smith either.
Nevertheless, Mealey is correct that care should be taken to distinguish
between the influences of others, including Smith, and Wesley’s unique
development of this theme in his own particular way. 61 Clearly then, additional
careful study of the similarities, and important differences, between Smith’s and
Wesley’s spiritual senses is necessary.
Le Clerc and the Prophecy Discourse
In addition to Wesley’s influential abridgement in the 1750s an additional
edition was printed in Edinburgh 1756; further evidence of the continued interest
Pseudo-Macarius, “Homily 4,” in The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and the Great Letter, trans.,
ed., with intro. George A. Maloney (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992), 50-62; and
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 3, 8-912-3.
59
60
Pseudo-Macarius, “Homily 50,” 244-6; and Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 17-21.
61
Mealey, “Taste and See,” 29-30
395
in Smith’s Select Discourses in the English speaking world. 62 Earlier in the century
however and after two complete editions in English, Smith’s lengthy discourse in
thirteen chapters on prophecy was translated into Latin for an international
readership. This translation was appended to Jean Le Clerc’s (1657-1736)
Commentary on the Prophets, part of his massive commentary project on the entire
Bible. 63 It seems especially fitting that Le Clerc, a pioneer in the critical exegesis
of scripture with special attention to the historical context and purpose of biblical
books, included Smith’s essay. In “Of Prophecy” Smith includes long passages
from Jewish authors, especially Maimonides among others, bringing their native
insights to bear on Old Testament prophecy rather than simply reading it
through a Christian lens. In this way, Smith contributed, albeit in a roundabout
way, to the development of modern critical biblical scholarship in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.
For full and abridged editions of the Select Discourses (excluding twentieth century and
newer anthologies) see “Editions of John Smith’s Select Discourses” in the Works Cited below.
62
“Dissertatione Joh. Smith de Prophetia,” in Jean Le Clerc, Veteris Testamenti Prophetae ab
Esaia ad Malachiam usque ex Translatione Joannis Clerici cum ejusdem commentarii Philologicis et
Paraphrasi in Esaiam Jeremiam ejus Lamentationis et Abdiam (Amsterdam: R. & J. Wetstenios & Gul.
Smith, 1731), i-xxix.
63
396
Indeed, “Of Prophecy” remained an important resource for biblical
scholars well into the mid-nineteenth century when it was recommended by John
Kitto among others. 64 William B. Collyer too cites Smith as an authority on
prophecy in his Lectures on Scripture Prophecy. 65 Even in our time, Smith has been
cited as an important commentator on prophets and prophecy. 66 It remains to be
seen, however, the degree to which Smith’s version of the spiritual senses found
a receptive audience through his work on prophecy.
7.2.3 Nineteenth Century Reception
Smith’s influence in the English speaking world continued apace well into
the Victorian era as his Discourses appeared in print several times and his
thought stimulated some of the great minds of the 19th century on both sides of
John Kitto Cyclopaedia of Biblical Literature (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1845),
2: 568. Kitto’s work was a valuable resource among evangelical bible scholars resistant to newer
“liberal” scholarship for nearly a century.
64
65
William B. Collyer, Lectures on Scripture Prophecy (London: Williams and Smith, 1809),
20, 79.
For example, Barbara A. Johnson, Reading Piers Plowmen and The Pilgrim’s Progress:
Reception and the Protestant Reader (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), 57-8;
Phyllis Mack, Visionary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1995), 62-4, 282-3; Joad Raymond, Milton’s Angels: The EarlyModern Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 7; and Susan Juste, Doomsayers:
Anglo-American Prophecy in the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2011), 35, 42.
66
397
the Atlantic. 67 In fact, there was hardly a generation without a new edition or
significant abridgement of the Discourses from the middle of the 18th through the
end of the 19th centuries. This alone speaks to the continued appeal of Smith’s
thought among philosophers, moralists and divines.
Coleridge
The appreciation that the great English Romantic Samuel Taylor Coleridge
(1772 – 1834) had for John Smith is well documented. Coleridge commented
favorably on a number of Smith’s Discourses in several places including his Aids
to Reflection 68 and in his Literary Remains. 69 On a trip to Sicily, Coleridge
“gratefully noted” Smith’s thoroughly platonic observation that as “the eye
cannot behold the Sun . . . unless it be Sunlike . . . neither can the Soul of man,
On nineteenth century English Platonism in general see part V in Platonism and the
English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 201-67.
67
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection in the Formation of a Manly Character on the
Several Grounds of Prudence, Morality, and Religion: Illustrated by Select Passages from our Elder
Divines, especially from Archbishop Leighton (London: Taylor and Hessey, 1825), 246.
68
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Literary Remains, ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge (London:
William Picering, 1836-1839), I: 213-4; III: 415-9.
69
398
behold God . . . unless it be Godlike.” 70 This language of participation in God on
analogy with light and the sun remained consistent throughout Coleridge’s
literary career. 71
Smith was also an important source for Coleridge’s conception of
Christian philosophy as a spiritual discipline. 72 Like Smith, Coleridge is highly
critical of mere speculation in philosophy and theology. 73 Common notions such
as the platonic commonplace of the soul as a mirror and more specific images
such as the Christological heart of morality too may well find their roots in
Coleridge’s reading of Smith. 74 Finally, in his distinction between the merely
external nature of the Jewish Law and the inward transformation of Gospel
Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 2-4, quoted in John Beer, Coleridge’s Play of Mind (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 128.
70
Ibid. Cf. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Notebooks, eds. Kathleen Coburn and Anthony John
Harding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959-2002), 2: 21-64.
71
Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 98-99.
72
73
Ibid., 225, 281.
74
Ibid., 109, 175.
399
righteousness Coleridge follows not just the Apostle Paul but also John Smith,
the “most eloquent of the Cambridge Platonists.” 75
Emerson
Both Coleridge and Smith exerted a deep influence on Ralph Waldo
Emerson (1803 – 1882), the founder of American Transcendentalism. Thus, the
Cambridge Platonist’s legacy extends to the second noteworthy moment in the
history of American philosophy after Jonathan Edwards. Notably, the third, C.S.
Peirce and William James’s Pragmatism, too is a New England development,
born of learned Puritan ancestry, first at Smith’s Emmanuel College and later at
Harvard in Cambridge, Massachusetts. While Emerson drew on a far wider
range of sources than the Cambridge Platonist was in a position to (i.e., Indian
texts and traditions), he found in Smith inspiration and confirmation of the
lasting significance of critical thought in religion and of Platonism in particular.
A quotation from “Plato; or, the Philosopher” in Representative Men (1850) gives
something of the flavor of this influence upon Emerson and his school.
How many great men Nature is incessantly sending up out of night, to be
his men,- Platonists! the Alexandrians, a constellation of genius; the
75
Ibid., 190, 284.
400
Elizabethans, not less; Sir Thomas More, Henry More, John Hales, John
Smith, Lord Bacon, Jeremy Taylor, Ralph Cudworth, Sydenham, Thomas
Taylor . . . . 76
Here John Smith takes his place in the Transcendentalist pantheon beside Plato,
Plotinus, Jeremy Taylor, and Thomas Taylor. Clearly then, Smith was an
important representative of the Platonic tradition in nineteenth century America.
7.2.4 Twentieth Century Reception & Beyond
The twentieth century saw a proliferation of publications that selected,
extracted, and collected texts from the Cambridge Platonists. 77 Among these
collections several of Smith’s Discourses almost always appeared, including
especially the first on the “True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine
Knowledge.” The editors of the many collections of texts from the Cambridge
Platonists in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have played an
absolutely invaluable role in keeping the attention of new generations of scholars
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Plato; or, the Philosopher,” in Representative Men: Seven
Lectures (Boston: Phillips, Samson and Company, 1850), 22-46, here 23. On the influence of the
Transcendentalists on later Neoplatonism in America see Jay Bregman, “The Neoplatonic Revival
in North America,” Hermathena no. 149 (1990): 99-119.
76
On Platonism more generally in the twentieth century in England see part VI in
Platonism and the English Imagination, ed. Anna Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 271-342.
77
401
fixed on the group as a whole and Smith specifically. In particular, Campagnac,
Cragg, Patrides, and Taliaferro and Teply have helped keep texts in the hands of
successive generations (including myself).78 However, contemporary assessments
of Smith are frequently colored by the selection process. Too often the Discourses
are treated as standalone texts when most were actually intended to form a
whole larger work.
In 1979 the entire first edition of Smith’s Select Discourses was reprinted
with a brief introduction by C.A. Patrides. 79 This edition has since been the go-to
version of the text despite the many errors corrected in the second, third, and
fourth editions (to say nothing of the helpful annotations added by various
editors in those later editions too). With the advent of the internet and especially
the scanning of entire books by Google and scholarly projects like Early English
E. T. Campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901);
Gerald R. Cragg, The Cambridge Platonists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); C. A.
Patrides, The Cambridge Platonists (London: Edward Arnold, 1969); and Charles Taliaferro and
Alison J. Teply, eds., Cambridge Platonist Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 2004).
78
John Smith, Select Discourses, ed. C.A. Patrides (Delmar, NY: Scholars’ Facsimiles &
Reprints, 1979).
79
402
Books Online access to the Discourses has become as widespread as it is currently
possible to imagine. 80
Most noticeable by its absence in 20th and 21st century work on Smith is a
modern critical edition of the Select Discourses. The availability of digital copies of
previous editions is a great help to the scholar, and perhaps also for a certain
kind of eccentric, but nothing can replace a clean, modern text, with scholarly
annotations for guiding students and potentially interested professionals alike
through what is difficult territory. In fact, more time has now passed without a
new edition of the Select Discourses than at any other time since Smith’s passing. 81
A new critical edition of the Select Discourses is now a project worthy of the
considerable labor required as there is no single edition that has both a
consistently reliable text and accurate annotations.
There was a distinct turn in the disciplinary attention paid to Smith in the
twentieth century toward literature and criticism, no doubt owing to the
references to him and his circle in the works of figures like Coleridge and
Emerson. Indeed, it is not among the theologians or philosophers that one finds
80
http://books.google.com/ and http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home.
81
Either 155 (1859) or 129 years (1885) if abridgements count.
403
the most enthusiastic (and knowing) readers of Smith, but instead among the
poets, critics, and historians of English literature. Cudworth and More have
enjoyed a far better reception among philosophers and theologians in recent
decades but ironically when one wants to make one of their points clearly and
briefly it is often a good idea to quote Smith instead.
Nevertheless Smith did not go unnoticed among twentieth century
philosophers and theologians. Indeed, there have been a several notable
promoters of Smith in the century just passed. In particular, William Inge in
Britain and Rufus Jones in the United States kept alive a historical and
philosophical appreciation for the Cambridge Platonists in general and Smith in
particular.
William Ralph Inge (1860 – 1954) wrote widely and frequently on
Neoplatonism and Christian mysticism. 82 Dean Inge was born in 1860, educated
at King’s College, Cambridge and became successively Lady Margaret's
Professor of Divinity at Cambridge and Dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral, London. He
is perhaps best known today for his Gifford Lectures on Plotinus (published in
Adam Fox, Dean Inge (London: John Murray, 1960) contains a helpful biography and
bibliography.
82
404
two volumes in 1918) but he also keep alive an interest in Christian Platonism in
the early twentieth century. While Whichcote appears to be his favorite
Cambridge Platonist, Inge’s early Christian Mysticism makes frequent approving
references to Smith. 83 Personal Idealism and Mysticism opens with an adaptation
from Smith, “Such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them.” 84 Such
references continued throughout Dean Inge’s career. Perhaps most importantly,
Inge had a natural understanding of the practical rational piety of Smith. “A
study of . . . Smith’s Select Discourses, may not make the reader a better Catholic
or a better Protestant, but they cannot fail to make him a better Christian and a
better man.” 85 The impact of Inge’s “Smithian” outlook had a profound impact
on Anglican theology that can still be felt today. 86
Rufus Jones (1863 – 1948) was born (not far from my hometown) in central
Maine and he is one of the best known Quakers of the 20th century. He “was
W.R. Inge, Christian Mysticism: Considered in Eight Lectures Delivered before the University
of Oxford (London: Methuen & Co.,1899), 9, 285-96.
83
W.R. Inge, Personal Idealism and Mysticism (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 1;
cf. Smith, Select Discourses (1660), 5.
84
85
W.R. Inge, Studies of English Mystics. (London: John Murray, 1906), 172
Owen C. Thomas, “An Anglican Interpretation of the Christian Life,” in Christian Life
and Practice: Anglican Essays (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 1-17, esp. 12-3.
86
405
among the organizers of the Quaekerspeisung after World War I. In 1938 he
traveled to Berlin seeking a personal meeting with Hitler after Kristallnacht. His
efforts as a peacemaker were rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize for the
American Friends Service Committee in 1947. 87
Jones was also a noted historian and theologian as well as philosopher
who singled out Smith as one of two examples of the “spirit of Cambridge
Platonism” (the other was Whichcote) and dedicated an excellent chapter to him
in his Spiritual Reformers in the 16th & 17th Centuries as well as making passing
use of him throughout his twenty-two books and many articles. 88 Given the
importance of the relationship between Henry More and Anne Conway, and
since the controverted nature of Quaker religion lies at the heart of that
relationship in its later stages, it would seem that Cambridge Platonism and the
Society of Friends had a significant influence upon each other. 89 Nevertheless, the
influence of Smith on modern Quakerism is in need of additional research.
87
Claus Bernet, Rufus Jones (1863-1948) (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), 3-17.
Rufus Jones, Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries (New York: Macmillan and
Co., 1914), 305-19. Also the bibliography in Claus Bernet, Rufus Jones, 49-136.
88
The Conway Letters: The Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and
their Friends, 1642-1684, edited by N.H. Nicolson and Sarah Hutton (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
89
406
Smith has remained an important influence upon some strands of
contemporary work in philosophy and theology too. Pierre Hadot, for example,
placed Smith in the historical context of the reception of Simplicius’ important
Commentary on the Manuel of Epictetus. 90 More recently, Charles Taliaferro,
Sarah Hutton and Douglas Hedley have contributed to the historical
appreciation of Smith and also made constructive use of his thought too. Charles
Taliaferro and Douglas Hedley have contributed to the historical appreciation of
Smith and have also made constructive use of his thought in works such as
Taliaferro’s Evidence and Faith; Philosophy and Religion Since the Seventeenth
Century 91 as well as Hedley’s Coleridge, Philosophy, and Religion 92 and his trilogy
1992), passim; and Carol Wayne White, The Legacy of Anne Conway (1631-1679) (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2008), 11-38.
Pierre Hadot, “La survie du Commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d’Epictete du
XVe au XVIIe siecles: Perotti, Politien, Steuchus, John Smith, Cudworth,” in Simplicius, sa vie, son
oeuvre, sa survie, edited by Ilsetraut. (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1987), 326-68.
90
Charles Taliaferro, Evidence and Faith; Philosophy and Religion Since the Seventeenth
Century (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-4, 11-5, 17, 18-24, 26, 29, 31-8, 40, 42-55, 62, 79, 117,
136-8, 168, 178, 384. His Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge University Press, 1994),
does not cite Smith or the Cambridge Platonists but it does walk in their footsteps.
91
Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy, and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2000),
98-9, 109, 175, 190, 225, 281, 284.
92
407
on the religious imagination. 93 Sarah Hutton too has helped to keep alive an
appreciation for Smith with her entry in the Dictionary of National Biography
(2005) as well as an important paper on Smith’s theory of prophecy. 94 (Hutton
1984, 73-81).
7.3 Directions for the Future
When one begins to look John Smith appears as a consistent, and
significant if sometimes subtle, influence across the modern North Atlantic
world. He played an important, even if peripheral, role in the development of
theology (Latitudinarianism, American Evangelicalism, and Methodism),
philosophy (Platonism, Cartesianism, and Transcendentalism), literature
(Romanticism), and mathematics (calculus). His understanding of prophecy too
was long held in high esteem across Europe. Indeed, Smith was a ubiquitous
authority among eighteenth and nineteenth century scholars in Britain and the
Hedley, Living Forms of the Imagination (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 5, 15, 22, 31, 33, 48,
81-2, 89-90, 93, 108, 117, 133-4, 145, 184, 186-7, 224, 265, 270, 273; Sacrifice Imagined: Violence,
Atonement, and the Sacred (New York and London: Continuum, 2011), 11-6, 51-6, 58, 109-11, 113-9,
121-3, 125, 136, 183, 201-24, 226; and The Iconic Imagination (New York and London: Continuum,
2015, forthcoming).
93
Sarah Hutton, “The Prophetic Imagination: A Comparative Study of Spinoza and the Cambridge
Platonist, John Smith,” In Spinoza's political and theological thought: international symposium under the
auspices of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, commemorating the 350th anniversary of
the birth of Spinoza, Amsterdam, 24-27 November 1982, edited by C. Deugd, 73-81 (Amsterdam: NorthHolland, 1984).
94
408
United States. With the close of the Victorian era Smith began to fade from favor
as various forms of positivism, existentialism, and scientism came to displace the
idealist and romantic modes of thought that had been so congenial to his own
unique brand of Christian Platonism. However, through consistent publication of
selections from his Discourses and the regular historical study and constructive
use of his thought Smith’s influence has never vanished.
The task before us now that Smith’s place in the Christian tradition of the
spiritual senses has been laid bare is to trace his influence on later figures. A
preliminary review shows that his impact was clear and distinct upon two
founding figures in major theological traditions today. Through Jonathan
Edwards, something of Smith’s experiential piety passed to American
Evangelicalism. Through John Wesley Smith’s insistence on the unity of reason
and experience passed to Methodism. Additionally, Smith seems to have had a
lasting impact on Anglican and Quaker thought that deserves far more scholarly
attention than he has received.
Along with these issues of historical and textual interpretation the
theological and philosophical viability of Smith’s system requires careful
constructive attention. This dissertation has only commented in passing on the
409
truth, or more minimally plausibility, of the accounts of human nature, God,
knowledge, and morality offered by Smith. However, our period would appear
poised to benefit from the lessons Smith has to teach about faith and reason
generally, and religion and science in particular.
Smith speaks exactly to our situation with the apparent conflict between
piety and rationality brought on by superstitious anthropomorphic conceptions
of God. Perhaps by purging religion of these false idols born of all-too-human
fear and turning instead to the transcendent Divinity of Smith’s brand of
Christian Platonism the tired conflicts between “religion” and “science” can be
overcome. Such a development would require movement on the part of many
religious people and perhaps most scientific naturalists, but the prize to be won
is a more humane worldview that lacks neither rigor nor living existential power.
In personal spirituality and communal worship too Smith’s appeal to
essentials in religion provides a potential calming voice for our time. Against the
secular relativistic approach to religions that makes them all equal in their
410
irrelevance, Smith offers genuine friendship based on actual unity in essentials
and an eagerness to tolerate adiaphora in the name of that essential unity. 95
Since the themes of systematicity, spirituality, and the foundations of
theological understanding all depend, critically, upon the spiritual senses for
Smith, renewed attention to, and development of, that traditional way of
thinking and being Christian is called for as we continue to navigate and (co)create our world; seeking to be at home, whole, and aware of otherness and
transcendence too. 96 A renewed Christian Platonism, at once theological and
humanistic. A theology that lets us think what we feel and binds us to the Good
that we may be God’s hands and feet in the world. These are the tasks to which
Smith’s doctrine of the spiritual senses calls us today. And they are exactly the
tasks that the Christian tradition of the spiritual senses has given to each
generation for nearly two-thousand years. 97
“In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas.” Marco Antonio de
Dominis, De Repubblica Ecclesiastica Libri X (London, 1617), 676
95
Cf. Conor Cunningham, “Naturalism Lost: Nature Regained,” in Turning Images in
Philosophy, Science, and Religion: A New Book of Nature, eds. Charles Taliaferro and Jil Evans
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 156-88.
96
“Ruusbroec withdrew into mysticism, to create a radical spiritual response to the crisis
in his own times caused by the decline and opaqueness of the institutional, Christian religion,
which was in his judgment rooted in a lack of taste-experience (smaken) in religious matters”
97
411
(Pyong-Gwan Pak, “The Relevance of Mystical Spirituality in the Context of Today’s ‘Spirituality
Phenomenon’,” Logos 15 no. 3 [2012]: 117.
412
APPENDIX
The Contents of the Complete Editions of the Select Discourses
Pages
Discourse
1660
1673
1821
1859
iii-xxxi
iii-xxx
iii-xxxii
xiii-xxxv
Way or
1-21
1-21
3-25
1-22
Method of
§ I 1-13
§ I 1-13
§ I 3-15
§ I 1-13
Attaining to
§ II 13-7
§ II 13-7
§ II 16-20
§ II 13-7
Divine
§ III 17-21
§ III 17-21
§ III 20-5
§ III 17-22
23-37
23-36
27-42
23-39
39-55
37-52
43-60
40-55
57-120
53-115
61-129
57-123
Ch.1 59-62
Ch.1 54-7
Ch.1 63-7
Ch.1 59-63
Of the
Ch.2 63-8
Ch.2 58-63
Ch.2 67-73
Ch.2 63-9
Immortality
Ch.3 68-84
Ch.3 63-79
Ch.3 73-91
Ch.3 69-85
of the Soul
Ch.4 85-92
Ch.4 80-7
Ch.4 91-99
Ch.4 86-93
Ch.5 93-6
Ch.5 88-91
Ch.5 99-103
Ch.5 93-7
Ch.6 96-101
Ch.6 91-96
Ch.6 103-8
Ch.6 97-102
Ch.7 101-5
Ch.7 96-100
Ch.7 108-13
Ch.7 102-7
“To the
Reader,”
Worthington
Of the True
Knowledge
Of
Superstition
Of
Atheism
413
Ch.8 106-12
Ch.8 101-7
Ch.8 113-20
Ch.8 107-14
Ch.9 112-20
Ch.9 107-15
Ch.9 120-9
Ch.9 114-23
121-65
117-60
131-78
125-68
Ch.1 123-6
Ch.1 118-21
Ch.1 133-6
Ch.1 127-30
Ch.2 126-34
Ch.2 121-9
Ch.2 137-45
Ch.2 130-8
Ch.3 135-9
Ch.3 130-4
Ch.3 145-50
Ch.3 138-42
Of the
Ch.4 140-4
Ch.4 135-9
Ch.4 151-5
Ch.4 143-7
Existence and
Ch.5 144-7
Ch.5 139-42
Ch.5 155-8
Ch.5 147-9
Nature of God
Ch.6 147-51
Ch.6 142-6
Ch.6 159-62
Ch.6 150-3
Ch.7 151-3
Ch.7 146-8
Ch.7 163-5
Ch.7 153-5
Ch.8 154-8
Ch.8 149-53
Ch.8 166-70
Ch.8 156-60
Ch.9 158-61
Ch.9 153-6
Ch.9 170-4
Ch.9 160-3
Ch.10 162-5
Ch.10 157-60
Ch.10 174-8
Ch.10 163-8
167-280
161-273
179-301
169-
Ch.1 169-75
Ch.1 162-8
Ch.1 181-8
Ch.1 171-8
Ch.2 176-83
Ch.2 169-76
Ch.2 188-96
Ch.2 178-86
Ch.3 183-9
Ch.3 176-82
Ch.3 197-203
Ch.3 186-93
Ch.4 190-209
Ch.4 183-202
Ch.4 204-25
Ch.4 193-215
Ch.5 210-9
Ch.5 203-12
Ch.5 226-236
Ch.5 215-27
Ch.6 220-9
Ch.6 213-22
Ch.6 237-46
Ch.6 227-37
Ch.7 229-39
Ch.7 222-32
Ch.7 247-58
Ch.7 237-48
Ch.8 240-51
Ch.8 233-44
Ch.8 258-71
Ch.8 249-61
Ch.9 252-7
Ch.9 245-50
Ch.9 271-6
Ch.9 261-7
Ch.10 257-60
Ch.10 250-3
Ch.10 277-80
Ch.10 268-71
Ch.11 261-7
Ch.11 254-60
Ch.11 281-7
Ch.11 272-8
Ch.12 267-72
Ch.12 260-5
Ch.12 287-93
Ch.12 278-83
Ch.13 272-80
Ch.13 265-73
Ch.13 293-
Ch.13 284-93
Of Prophecy
414
Advertisement Advertisement
(JW) 280-1
(JW) 273-4
301
Advertisement
Advertisement
(JW) 294-5
(JW) 302-3
283-346
275-338
305-74
297-360
Of the
Ch.1 285-88
Ch.1 277-80
Ch.1 307-10
Ch.1 299-302
Difference
Ch.2 288-96
Ch.2 280-8
Ch.2 311-20
Ch.2 302-11
between the
Ch.3 297-307
Ch.3 289-99
Ch.3 320-32
Ch.3 311-22
Legal and
Ch.4 308-25
Ch.4 300-17
Ch.4 332-51
Ch.4 323-40
Evangelical
Ch.5 325-32
Ch.5 317-24
Ch.5 351-8
Ch.5 341-7
Righteousness
Ch.6 332-42
Ch.6 324-34
Ch.6 359-70
Ch.6 347-57
Ch.7 343-6
Ch.7 335-8
Ch.7 371-4
Ch.7 357-60
347-72
339-64
375-402
361-84
Of the
Ch.1 349-53
Ch.1 341-5
Ch.1 377-81
Ch.1 363-6
Shortness and
Ch.2 353-7
Ch.2 345-9
Ch.2 381-5
Ch.2 367-70
Vanity of
Ch.3 357-61
Ch.3 349-53
Ch.3 385-90
Ch.3 370-4
Pharisaick
Ch.4 361-6
Ch.4 353-8
Ch.4 390-5
Ch.4 374-8
Righteousness
Ch.5 366-72
Ch.5 358-64
Ch.5 395-402
Ch.5 379-84
375-451
365-440
403-87
385-459
Intro. 377-9
Intro. 366-8
Intro. 405-8
Intro. 387-9
Ch.1 380-4
Ch.1 369-73
Ch.1 408-13
Ch.1 390-5
Ch.2 385-92
Ch.2 374-81
Ch.2 413-21
Ch.2 395-402
Ch.3 392-6
Ch.3 381-5
Ch.3 422-6
Ch.3 403-7
Ch.4 397-403
Ch.4 386-92
Ch.4 427-33
Ch.4 407-13
Ch.5 403-11
Ch.5 392-400
Ch.5 434-42
Ch.5 413-20
Ch.6 412-23
Ch.6 401-12
Ch.6 443-55
Ch.6 421-31
Ch.7 423-9
Ch.7 412-8
Ch.7 456-62
Ch.7 432-7
Ch.8 429-35
Ch.8 418-24
Ch.8 463-8
Ch.8 438-42
JW Note 373
Of the
Excellency
and
Nobleness of
True Religion
415
Ch.9 435-9
Ch.9 424-8
Ch.9 469-73
Ch.9 443-6
Ch.10 439-43
Ch.10 428-32
Ch.10 474-8
Ch.10 447-50
Ch.11 443-51
Ch.11 432-40
Ch.11 478-87
Ch.11 451-9
Of a
453-80
441-68
489-519
461-87
Christians
Ch.1 455-8
Ch.1 443-6
Ch.1 491-4
Ch.1 463-6
Conflicts
Ch.2 458-62
Ch.2 446-50
Ch.2 495-9
Ch.2 466-9
with, and
Ch.3 462-9
Ch.3 450-7
Ch.3 499-506
Ch.3 470-6
Conquests
Ch.4 469-74
Ch.4 457-62
Ch.4 506-11
Ch.4 476-80
over, Satan
Ch.5 474-80
Ch.5 462-8
Ch.5 512-9
Ch.5 481-7
481-526
469-512
521-57
489-521
Funeral
Sermon,
Patrick
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Vita
Derek Michaud
75 Western Ave.
PO Box 486
Fairfield, Maine 04937
EDUCATION
PhD, Theology, Boston University, 2015
STM, Philosophy, Theology, & Ethics, Boston University School of Theology,
2003
MA, Theology, Bangor Theological Seminary, 2001
BA, Psychology, University of Maine, 1999
EXPERIENCE
Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, 2012-present
Adjunct Instructor of Philosophy, Middlesex Community College, 2011-2013
Adjunct Instructor, “20th Century Humanities,” Thomas College, 2002
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ϵΘȱΉϨΈΓΑȱΓϡ ϴΠΌ΅ΏΐΓϟȱΐΓΙȱΘϲ ΗΝΘφΕϱΑȱΗΓΙǰ
϶ ψΘΓϟΐ΅Η΅ΖȱΎ΅ΘΤ ΔΕϱΗΝΔΓΑȱΔΣΑΘΝΑȱΘЗΑȱΏ΅ЗΑǰ
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