Varieties of Inclusive Representation

chapter six Varieties of Inclusive Representation Samuel Hayat I nsofar as political representation entails “making present . . . something which is nevertheless not present,” (Pitkin 1972, 8–9) it is always suspected of excluding the represented from the political scene.1 By speaking on behalf of the people or a group, a political representative (elected or self-appointed) renders their direct participation in decisions concerning them unnecessary. Such suspicion is reinforced by the importance given to representation by the minimalist (or realist) theories of democracy that dominated postwar politics (Bachrach 1980; Hindess 2000). In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, a reference work for these theories (despite the low importance it assigned to the issue of democracy), Joseph Schumpeter (2013) radically criticized direct participation— by asserting, for example, that “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field” (262)— at the same time that he defended a view of democracy that understands the people as a mere arbiter between representatives competing for state power. According to realist theory, political exclusion of the people goes hand in hand with representing them. Therefore, constructing a more substantial or “strong” democratic theory based on the inclusion of citizens and aimed at creating political equality among them generally involves denouncing representation altogether (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984). At the very most, representative democracy might be accepted as a “second best” (Brennan and Hamlin 1999) or “defective substitute” (Mansbridge 2003) for direct democracy. From this perspective, the political inclusion of citizens— via participatory devices, social movements, public debates, and so on— matters above all else, whether outside of or even in opposition to representation. uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 141 7/27/18 1:40 PM 142 samuel hayat To challenge the dichotomy between representation of citizens and direct participation by citizens, I would like to show that, as an act of speaking, standing, or acting for others, representation can function in two ways. On the one hand, it can be exclusionary, that is, tending toward the monopolization of power by representatives (especially the institutions of representative government) and the exclusion of the represented from the political scene. It can then be used to justify the division of political labor, the absence of citizen control over governance, and the complete suppression of any form of representation outside state institutions. On the other hand, representation can be used inclusively by involving the represented in political decision-making more than they were prior to or without representation. The reason representation can in fact facilitate direct political participation of the represented is linked to its constructivist aspects (Saward 2010; Disch 2015). When representatives— whether rulers and political professionals or spokespeople for social groups and the public— claim to speak and act on behalf of others, the represented become present in the political scene and are enabled to act directly in this scene. In this use of representation, it is precisely because the representatives speak and act on behalf of the represented that the latter are invited to judge them directly, control them, and create alternate forms of representation if they are not satisfied with how they are represented. Seen this way, only exclusionary representation obstructs direct participation by the represented and with it the prospects for the creation of substantial political equality. Conversely, inclusive representation offers a way to broaden direct political participation, making it possible for the voices of the dominated to be heard and, perhaps, for democratic institutions to give more room to citizens’ direct participation in achieving collective outcomes. But there is an imbalance between these two forms of representation. With the historical triumph of representative government, exclusionary representation effectively became a given, embedded in state institutions where the elected are rulers independent of their electors (Manin 1997). Exclusionary representation does not appear as just one form of representation; it has become the only politically valid form of representation and nearly synonymous with electoral delegation. Consequently, the vast majority of research on political representation examines only exclusionary applications, following the direction inspired by Pitkin’s classic work and employing the inherently exclusionary principal/agent model (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Citizens may influence collective results directly uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 142 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 143 through social movements and participatory devices or indirectly through their elected representatives, but the idea that representation itself could enhance the direct participation of citizens in the production of collective outcomes is rarely, if ever, explored. Therefore, thinking about representation in its inclusive sense requires the additional explication that this chapter will introduce. To accomplish this, I will combine an analytical approach— one that uses theories of political representation and Pierre Bourdieu’s political sociology to distinguish forms of inclusive representation— with predominantly historical material. Representation has been a central concept in European political vocabulary since the thirteenth century, long before the triumph of representative government (Hofmann 1973; Faggioli and Melloni 2007). If one desires to rethink representation beyond the exclusionary forms that representative governments adopted, unearthing the forgotten meanings and uses of the concept may be the best route. I will focus on the debates that accompanied the imposition and consolidation of the institutions of representative government in France during the century of controversies, revolutions, and institutional innovations begun by the 1789 Revolution (Rosanvallon 1998). Representation was discussed extensively during this period, which allows us to explore the concept of representation developed by those who opposed representative government for the sake of democracy. Through these historical examples, I hope to elucidate what inclusive representation could mean both theoretically and institutionally. Inclusion through Partisan Politicization The reason it is possible to characterize the way representative government uses representation as exclusionary is that between one election and the next nearly all citizens— the represented— are excluded from political decision-making (Manin 1997). This division of political labor, a core feature of Benjamin Constant’s “Liberty of the Moderns,” is one of the elements of representative government in greatest conflict with the democratic ideal (Finley 1973). For this reason, radical criticism of this political form denounces the oligarchic tendency of representative government on the assumption that division of political labor inevitably establishes groups of professional politicians whose very existence excludes the majority of citizens (Michels 1962). Thus, the professionalization of politics goes hand in hand with exclusionary representation and with the construction of uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 143 7/27/18 1:40 PM 144 samuel hayat politics as a domain isolated from the citizenry. The sociologist Daniel Gaxie (1978) notes that “the exercise of the political profession is associated with the manipulation of a specific language, which therefore becomes a language of professionals. The mastery of this language by agents in the political field is at the source of the relative incompetence of other social agents, and tends to dispossess them of their potential to be involved in political activities” (95). According to the very mechanisms of representative government, the exercise of politics by elected representatives results in the dispossession of the constituents, since political competence is defined by the ability to speak the language of professional politicians. However, electoral competition between professionals has historically taken forms that were not unequivocally exclusionary. In France, during the French Revolution, the Society of the Friends of the Constitution, better known as the Jacobins, which was at first a mere parliamentary club, soon opened itself to citizens, becoming the first mass party in French history. Then, during the whole nineteenth century, the professionalization of French politics went hand in hand with the development of parties that served both as electoral machines for professional politicians and as tools for mass political socialization (Huard 1996; Scarrow 2006). If we define inclusive representation as instances of representation where the represented gain access to decision-making they did not have previously, then participation in mass political parties may well constitute a form of inclusive representation. Through parties, citizens may fight against exclusion from professional politics by learning professional political language and using it to intervene in decision-making processes. This form of inclusive representation can be designated as the inclusion of citizens through their partisan politicization. Here, representation is inclusive in the sense that the represented may start a new direct political activity by entering a party and/or adopting a language they had not mastered before being represented. This may allow them to make their views heard in political arenas from which they were previously excluded; when mass political parties exist, representation may induce direct citizen participation through partisanship (Urbinati 2006, 30–33). Understood this way, inclusion through partisan politicization occurs within the institutions of representative government when electoral competition is based on mass political parties. In these parties, the represented are included by direct interaction with the world of professional politicians and by using their language, which thus becomes a shared partisan language, that is, an ideology (Freeden 1996). Consequently, when representa- uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 144 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 145 tive government is a “party democracy” (Manin 1997, 206–18), representation is both exclusionary (due to the monopolization of political power by the representatives) and inclusive (as the excluded represented enter mass political parties and thus participate directly in politics). Seen this way, political representation in party democracies has a unique, intrinsically mixed meaning. Just as, for Bernard Manin (1997, 191), representative government is essentially mixed— in that it is based on a procedure that is both democratic and aristocratic, the election— it can be said that, according to this notion of inclusion through partisan politicization, representation is intrinsically both exclusionary and inclusive. Should we then say that this inclusive power is a product of representation itself, irrespective of its institutional context? This is the underlying discourse of many authors who attempt to demonstrate the a priori compatibility between representation and democracy, advocating a “representative turn” in democratic theory (Brito Vieira 2017, 4–5). According to one of the founding texts of this approach, “the opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite of representation is exclusion” (Plotke 1997, 19). This perspective precludes the possibility of representation being exclusionary, despite the opposition to democratic participation of the founders of representative governments (Morgan 1974; Baker 1987; Dupuis-Déri 1999; Rancière 2014). According to most theorists of the representative turn, representation is intrinsically democratic and inclusive: to represent is to include, and therefore to be represented is to be included. Thus the idea of representative democracy constitutes a true tautology (Näsström 2006). So why then have institutions of representative government faced constant criticism for being insufficiently democratic since they were established? Far from proving the tension between representation and democracy, according to authors of the representative turn, this criticism proves the inherently democratic aspect of representation. For example, for Georges Kateb (1981), the suspicion surrounding the discourse of representatives establishes the “moral distinctiveness” of representative democracy by creating a desirable distance between the represented and their government. According to Didier Mineur (2010) the crisis of representation is intrinsic to the concept itself, and for Bruno Latour (2003) it is a consequence of the specificity of political speech. All these arguments rest on the idea that representation is democratic because it opens the possibility of judgment of the actions of representatives by the represented. Far from preventing citizens from participating in politics, representation uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 145 7/27/18 1:40 PM 146 samuel hayat would be the only way citizens could acquire the ability to make political judgments. Applying his theories on aesthetic representation to political representation, Frank Ankersmit (2007) states that “the faculty of representation makes us into the inhabitants of two worlds, the private one (that we possessed already) and the public one (to which we can get access thanks to this faculty of representation)” (27). Mirroring the action of their representatives, the represented have their subjectivity split in two, thereby enabling them to move from the sphere of personal interest to that of political judgment. Not only would representation be inherently inclusive, it would be the only possible form of political inclusion. However, this appealing theory is in contradiction with some prominent historical and sociological features of citizen politicization. Since the instauration of representative governments in Europe, political judgment was never exercised solely in reference to the political field. Democratic modernity entailed the development of mass political parties but also forms of mobilization and association that took place outside of the state, sometimes against it. For example, trade unions were not a byproduct of representative government; they developed from preexisting forms of trade organizations (Sewell 1980). This does not mean that these movements did not make use of representation. But they were not necessarily linked with the institutions of representative government. As political representation existed before representative government, representation continued to exist and develop outside of the electoral relation between the represented and their professional representatives. Inclusion through partisan politicization is but one aspect of inclusive representation. Other relations of representation take place outside the state; they may contribute to the inclusion of citizens— or extend their exclusion. To assess the inclusiveness of these, we need to take into account the processes of politicization that take place outside of the institutions of representative government. Inclusion through Autonomous Politicization Recent years have seen the rise of both self- appointed representatives such as nongovernmental organizations (Montanaro 2012) and social movements like the indignados or occupiers that develop radical critiques of representative democracy (Ogien and Laugier 2014). It can always be argued, in a deliberative framework, that these new representative claimmakers participate in the representative system (Kuyper 2016). However, it uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 146 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 147 is analytically useful to distinguish between two kinds of situation. On the one hand, popular sovereignty being “a diarchy of will and judgment” (Urbinati 2011, 26), passing judgments on representatives is part of representative democracy and can take place inside the institutions of representative government such as political parties. The inclusiveness of the representative system would then depend on the extent of partisan politicization. But, on the other hand, in certain situations citizen politicization may lead to a rupture between representatives and their constituents and to the subsequent invention of alternate forms of representation. As Urbinati (2005) puts it, “when the continuity between the representatives and the citizens is interrupted, the latter are likely to generate extra-parliamentary forms of (self-)representation” (198). The difficulty then is assessing to what extent these relations of representation that take place outside of the institutions of representative government are inclusive or exclusionary. Such forms of representation become particularly visible during events in which the institutions of representative government simply no longer function. History shows that the break with institutions of representative government is not incompatible with representative claim- making. On the contrary, during the 1848 revolution— an example of a critical moment of questioning representative government— the brutal delegitimization of the July Monarchy was accompanied by the proliferation of rhetoric using the vocabulary of representation, along with the rapid establishment of alternative institutions of representation different from those of the representative government (Hayat 2014, 2015). The first of these institutions was the provisional government that seized state power after the success of the insurrection on February 24, 1848. It acted “in the name of the French people” (the sentence was used in every official act of the provisional government) and managed to have its representative claim recognized. In a way, it was using a form of exclusionary representation: its very existence implied a decrease of direct popular participation since the insurrection stopped, barricades were wiped out, and order was restored. Still, for several days, the provisional government faced demands from armed Parisian workers and during its ten weeks of existence received many petitions and delegates from demonstrations, associations, and intermediary bodies. Compared with previous representative bodies, the kind of representation implemented by the provisional government in 1848 was much more inclusive. Nevertheless, in 1848 the real innovation in the representation system was not the provisional government but the other representative institutions born from the insurrection. First, the national guard, a previously uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 147 7/27/18 1:40 PM 148 samuel hayat bourgeois militia, became open to all male citizens, including workers, who received weapons and uniforms. National guards elected officers, who thus became important local representatives especially in popular neighborhoods (Hincker 2007). Then, due to popular pressure, the provisional government implemented a workers’ parliament in the Luxembourg Palace— the former House of Lords— which was directly elected by the trades. Finally, in the weeks following the revolution, hundreds of clubs were created and were massively attended: an estimated one hundred thousand attended in Paris alone (Amann 1975). While these clubs were at first isolated, they soon federalized in order to create a unified club movement able to represent citizens, to organize demonstrations, and to control the actions of state authorities. These institutions were representative but born from an insurrection that destroyed previous elected assemblies. They triggered mass citizen participation and relied on it to work properly, especially the national guard and the club movement, but they were neither institutions of representative government nor invested with legislative power. They developed a relation of inclusive representation and contributed to politicize citizens but in a different way than partisanship. Here politicization and inclusion did not primarily mean acquiring the language of professional politicians or passing judgment on their actions. For citizens, it implied participating directly in the defense of their own neighborhood, in the definition of their own labor conditions, and in the expression of popular opinion. They were represented not as mere constituents but as active members of more partial and localized communities, increasing their autonomy through representation. Therefore, we can describe this form of inclusion, which happens when relations of representation emerge outside the state legislature or government, as autonomous politicization. Autonomy here does not mean that citizens are not represented but that representation takes place outside of the institutions of representative government, sometimes in opposition to them. Autonomous politicization requires the creation of representative devices or bodies that should be at least partially autonomous from government, be it from their origin, their localization, or their goals. Contrary to parties, they do not primarily seek to participate in electoral competitions, and, while they may pass judgment on elected representatives, they may also have aims of their own. Some of these devices may be agonistic, aiming at exercising power over the institutions of representative government, in which case they would relate to what Pierre Rosanvallon (2008) calls “counter-democracy.” Or they may develop with no reference uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 148 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 149 to elected rulers, seeking to influence collective outcomes by expressing a will, as participative devices may enable participants to do, or through collective action. The institutional consequences of these two forms of inclusion through politicization are therefore completely different. In partisan politicization, the inclusionary power of representation is located inside the institutions of representative government— exclusion and inclusion cannot be separated one from the other. Conversely, in autonomous politicization, inclusion takes place through processes of representation located outside of the institutions of representative government. This is, therefore, much more than a theoretical distinction. In the history of representative government, supporters of the inclusive effects of electoral representation long debated those who advocated supplementing electoral representation with other representative devices. In this regard, the 1848 revolution was an excellent testing ground because of its large-scale implementation of universal suffrage (despite continued exclusion of women). For some, universal suffrage was sufficient to guarantee the inclusion of all (male) citizens in the republic. This was Lamartine’s position when speaking on behalf of the provisional government following the popular demonstration of March 17, 1848: “The election belongs to all without exception. As of the date of this [electoral] law, there are no longer any proletarians in France. Every adult Frenchman is a political citizen. Every citizen is a voter. Every voter is sovereign. The right is equal and absolute for all” (Actes du gouvernement provisoire 1848, 148–49). For Lamartine, universal suffrage was enough to guarantee the equal inclusion of all citizens, to the point of eliminating any class barrier and any inequality between rulers and the governed. Conversely, other voices claimed that elections alone could not guarantee the inclusion of all citizens and that it was therefore necessary to add external devices of popular participation to the institutions of representative government. These would achieve inclusion by allowing citizens to organize themselves and express their will directly and potentially to monitor the elected assemblies. In 1848, clubs played such a role. Some club leaders even felt that this experience should last beyond the election of the National Assembly and proposed the establishment of a “Popular Convention” made up of club representatives. This unelected assembly, which would hold sessions on the premises of the former Chamber of Deputies, would not replace the National Assembly but would play a specifically inclusive role. It would “translate [the] acts [of the Assembly], relay [to it] a faithful expression of the feelings that they aroused in the People,” but, uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 149 7/27/18 1:40 PM 150 samuel hayat even more importantly, it would become “a shelter for the great school of the people.”2 While the National Assembly would make laws, this Popular Convention would be aimed at developing citizens’ political capacity, both through their direct participation in clubs and through their autonomous representation in the convention. This proposal, which was never put into practice because the counterrevolution soon submerged France, is a good example of the concept of inclusion through autonomous politicization. Electoral representation alone is not enough to guarantee the politicization of citizenry excluded through the division of political labor. It must be intensified by representative devices that are not focused on electoral competition but devoted to the politicization of the represented and the development of their direct participation. Therefore, two forms of inclusion through politicization coexist. For the first, the partisan form, the institutions of representative government, especially in party democracies, have both inclusive and exclusionary aspects. For the second, the autonomous form, the exclusionary uses of representation must be offset by inclusionary devices outside of representative government. However, both conceptions of inclusion through politicization share an important feature. They imply that political representation excludes citizens as a collective whole. Therefore, whether they are based solely on election or on other devices, the proposed mechanisms of inclusion prove blind to the fact that exclusion is exercised differently depending on the social characteristics of the represented. Returning to the example of the 1848 revolution, inclusion through politicization can be accounted for by the extension of suffrage, the importance of electoral committees reviewing statements of principles by candidates (inclusion through partisan politicization), as well as the enormous increase in newspapers and clubs and the establishment of a democratized national guard and assembly of workers (inclusion through autonomous politicization). However, this fails to provide a framework of analysis sufficient to explain speeches made in the name of specific social groups, in particular workers and women. There was indeed some form of representation here in the sense that those who spoke on behalf of these groups considered themselves as their representatives and, particularly in the case of skilled workers, may sometimes actually have been elected by members of their social group. However, any analysis of this form of representation must consider the fact that it occurred within a social group and not within the overall framework of the relationship between citizens and their representatives. uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 150 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 151 Inclusive Representation of Social Groups All the represented are excluded from politics because of the exclusionary ways of using representation. However, we can add a second, more sociological meaning to the first definition of exclusionary representation, which stems from the social conditions under which the political field is organized. Representation as implemented by representative government is exclusionary for nearly all citizens in a general sense due simply to the division of political labor. But representation also excludes specific citizens who are “divested of the material and cultural instruments necessary for them to participate actively in politics” (Bourdieu 1991b, 172). Social actors less endowed with the cultural capital and free time required for political participation are left “no choice but delegation— a misrecognized dispossession of the less competent by the more competent” (Bourdieu 1984, 413–14). From this perspective, governments speak and act for the governed, but dominants also speak for the dominated, for whom representational exclusion is then doubled. Historically, suffrage based on the ownership of property accompanied representative government (Rosanvallon 1992). For its theoreticians and practitioners during the first half of the nineteenth century, this form of suffrage was the legal framework for the double exclusion noted above. However, the extension of suffrage did not eliminate this exclusion. That is, instead of being excluded from suffrage or eligibility by poll tax requirements, the dominated were excluded because of their lower “political competence” (defined as an “aptitude to speak the language of the professionals”), thereby leading to their “radical dispossession” (Gaxie 1978, 83, and 95). As dominated social groups suffer specific exclusion, it is necessary for a democratic representative system to implement specific ways of including them in the process of decision-making. A primary way of carrying this out is to identify the groups that should receive specific representation and then grant within the institutions of representative government a certain number of positions or seats to representatives from these groups. This is the method adopted by those who support (particularly feminists) group representation (Williams 2000; Squires 2001), which is based on a descriptive concept of representation (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999) that serves as a foundation of quota politics (Squires 1996; Achin 2001; Dutoya 2012). This form of representation assumes inclusion of dominated groups in the political field, based uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 151 7/27/18 1:40 PM 152 samuel hayat on the following principle: “a democratic public should establish mechanisms for actually recognizing and representing the individual voices and perspectives of those from these constitutive groups who are oppressed and disadvantaged” (Young 1990, 184). This demand for inclusion through group representation is not new. It was present in the strategies of the nineteenth- century workers’ movement, from the seminal 1832 article by the republican and Saint-Simonian Jean Reynaud with respect to “the need for a special representation of the proletarians” to the 1864 Manifesto of the Sixty, which advocated separate candidacies for workers in the elections (Rosanvallon 1998, 87–129). This institutionalized collective inclusion is analogous to individual partisan politicization: excluded groups are included in politics through their presence in the institutions of representative government. As with individual politicization, institutionalized inclusion is not the only possible option when thinking about the inclusion of dominated groups. It can also occur through the construction of autonomous forms of representation outside institutions of representative government. Correcting the exclusionary features of representation does not then occur by seeking greater inclusivity from established representative institutions but by constructing alternative autonomous means of representation specifically dedicated to representing an excluded social group. Because of the electoral exclusion of workers, the French labor movement of the 1830s was largely established around the right to association. This was understood to mean the right of workers not only to associate with one another but also to create a federative association on the national level, grouping together the various corporations and therefore ensuring the creation of an autonomous representative body. A similar demand was seen in the women’s clubs of 1848, together with the demand for a broadening of suffrage. The exclusion practiced by institutionalized politics was thus challenged not only by demands for inclusion in the institutions of representative government but also by assertion of the right of autonomous association as women to defend the interests and rights of women. In his Political Capacity of the Working-Classes (1865), Proudhon responded to the Manifesto of the Sixty and theorized about the strategy of a split to divide representation of the working class. According to him, by establishing autonomous federative institutions separate from the state, workers could collectively pursue their emancipation without waiting for an assembly of legislators to grant them the right to do so. This, for Proudhon, constituted the superiority of an autonomous representation strategy over uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 152 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 153 the strategies of inclusion in the institutions of representative government. In the same way as it is possible to think about the inclusion of citizens by their politicization within or outside institutions of representative government, dominated social groups may pursue institutionalized or autonomous strategies of inclusion. The Exclusionary Risks of Group Representation The parallel between individual and collective inclusion may be misleading. One could easily imagine that giving presence to social groups through inclusive group representation (institutionalized or autonomous) would induce the politicization of individuals belonging to these groups. According to Bourdieu (1984), however, the path to specific representation of the dominated always runs the risk of continuing their exclusion or even deepening it by giving the dominated the illusion that someone is speaking for them, since they would be “at the mercy of the discourses that are presented to them. . . . At best, they are at the mercy of their own spokesmen, whose role it is to provide them with the means of repossessing their own experience” (461–62). Therefore, to include the dominated by representing them is to make them dependent on a trustee who can always pass off her own interest as theirs. Since the dominated are excluded from representation, those who speak and act on their behalf can in fact claim to be authorized by them without the least assurance that these spokespeople are actually defending their interests. This is true for the working class studied by Bourdieu but also for any social group whose representation is based entirely on the goodwill of the representatives who advocate for them, whether from within the institutions of representative government or autonomous organizations. As far as dominated groups are concerned, representation as “advocacy” (Urbinati 2000) may well worsen their dispossession. Inclusive representation of dominated social groups does not entail inclusive representation of their members; the former gives presence to dominated social groups through representatives of these groups, while the latter requires direct participation from individuals belonging to these groups. A significant historical example of this form of representation of the dominated by spokespeople acting as their advocates— with no guarantee that they are actually defending the interests of the represented or helping them to participate— can be found in France during the 1840s. In this uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 153 7/27/18 1:40 PM 154 samuel hayat period the combination of suffrage based on property ownership and the strict limitations for potential association or expression made workers largely dependent for their representation on the goodwill of deputies, who were not electorally accountable to them. The career path of Alexandre Ledru- Rollin exemplified this construct well. As a young, bourgeois, Parisian attorney, he was elected in 1841 in the course of making an uncommonly radical statement of principles. He began by invoking the “miseries with which the poor classes were plagued.” He described the people as “a flock led by a few privileged beings,” justified the people’s uprising at the start of the 1830s, compared it to the work of Christ, and eventually advocated a break with representative government (LedruRollin 1841, 52– 53). In this statement of principles, which brought him immediate fame within radical circles, he presented himself as being authorized by the poor— considered by him as the only real people— and by worker insurrections to proclaim his primary political aim, namely, the struggle for the republic. Speaking of the workers and the poor as the excluded, he demanded their inclusion, and more generally spoke out in defense of their rights. What gave force to Ledru-Rollin’s discourse was not the substance of what he proposed (a regime change) but that he declared his objective to be the very goal of the workers, who he implied were on the verge of an uprising. Bourdieu (1991b) sees this as being at the heart of the representation process: “the speech of the spokesperson owes part of its ‘illocutionary force’ to the force (the number) of the group that he helps to produce as such by the act of symbolization or representation; it is based on the metaphorical coup d’état by which the speaker invests his utterance with all the power his utterance helps to produce by mobilizing the group to which it is addressed” (191). The power in Ledru-Rollin’s discourse stemmed from the power of the group that he claimed to represent (the workers, the poor, the people), despite the absence of proof of any specific relationship between him and this group, other than its exclusion and his speaking on its behalf. That Ledru-Rollin spoke in the name of workers did not in and of itself create workers’ inclusion— it is well within the exclusionary forms of representation that workers are represented here. In a certain way, their double exclusion, as citizens and as dominated persons, earned them the right to a specific form of representation (by Ledru-Rollin in this case), but this representation is once again exclusionary: as doubly excluded, they are doubly represented, without this double representation necessarily being uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 154 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 155 inclusive. Eventually, in June 1848, when workers appeared directly on the political scene, the spokesperson role established by Ledru-Rollin did not keep him from participating in repressing the same worker insurrections that he had justified just a few years earlier. The risk of combining inclusive representation of a social group with exclusionary representation of its members is prominent when social groups are not recognized as such. Taking the French working class as an example: its recognition as a class was the result of a political process in which representative claims played a major role (Moss 1976; Sewell 1980). After the 1830 revolution some workers, who were admittedly a minority, began to rethink their traditional trade actions and organizations in terms that transcended the barriers between the trades. They established newspapers edited and written exclusively by workers, and it was only then that terms such as working class or proletarians started to refer to a class identity. Thus, worker identity was the result of an activity led by spokespeople to the extent that it can be said that the working class was created as a political subject by those claiming to represent workers. According to Bourdieu (1991c), such a process of subjectivation is at the core of the sociological mechanisms of representation. Spokespeople create the groups they claim to speak for through a “process of institution, ordinarily perceived and described as a process of delegation, in which the representative receives from the group the power of creating the group” (248). The process of instituting, masked by the idea of delegation, is based on the joint establishment of the representative and of the represented as an outcome of the emerging representative’s activity: “in appearance the group creates the man who speaks in its place and in its name— to put it that way is to think in terms of delegation— whereas in reality it is more or less just as true to say that it is the spokesperson who creates the group. It is because the representative exists, because he represents (symbolic action), that the group that is represented and symbolized exists and that in return it gives existence to its representative as the representative of the group” (Bourdieu 1991a, 204). In this sense, unlike delegation, representation is not a transfer of power between two established social entities (the representatives and their constituents) but rather the establishment, by a signifying individual or group, of a signified group, which thereby acquires the status of a political subject. This form of representation appears then to push its exclusionary features to the extreme; the spokesperson assumes the right, free of any control, to speak in the name of a social group that is not recognized yet, uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 155 7/27/18 1:40 PM 156 samuel hayat irrespective of the participation of the group’s presumed members. But on the collective level it also involves an inclusive dimension, that of giving voice and presence to groups that have thus far been deprived of any recognized social identity. When new social groups are given presence by such a process of subjectivation, individuals that belong to these groups enter a relation of representation with them. These relations of representation may themselves be inclusive or exclusionary, depending on whether they stimulate or inhibit direct participation of group members in the collective decisions concerning it. Direct participation may then lead to new processes of subjectivation, questioning established identities as new divisions appear within the social groups represented. Anne Phillips (1995) explains this in regard to the representation of women: “In the subsequent development of feminist politics, the question of who can best speak for or on behalf of another became a major source of tension, for once men were dislodged from their role of speaking for women, it seemed obvious enough that white women ought also to be dislodged from their role of speaking for black women, heterosexual women for lesbians, and middleclass women for those in the working class” (9). Representation involves a necessarily dynamic view of social identities. Since groups can be established through representational activity, the allocation of the ability to speak for the group cannot be set once and for all. Subjectivation processes constantly reveal new political subjects, who produce new dividing lines within the established social groups, thereby creating the need for new devices of inclusion. The Politics of Inclusive Representation Far from being a simple way to justify the division of political labor, representation can be understood as a means of including the represented. Exclusionary representation assumes that the represented are absent, made present exclusively through the person of their representative. Inclusive representation, on the other hand, is measured by the fact that it gives presence to the represented. But presence does not mean the same thing for individuals and for groups. As far as individuals are concerned, representation may be called inclusive when being represented favors direct citizen participation in decision-making. This may entail either partisan or autonomous politicization, depending on whether citizens participate in the institutions of representative government such as political parties or in uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 156 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 157 other organizations and movements. For social groups, inclusive representation rests on the inclusion of group representatives in decision-making, either inside the institutions of representative government or through the creation of autonomous representative bodies. These two forms of inclusive representation do not necessarily go hand in hand. On the contrary, the inclusion of dominated social groups may rest on processes of representation that exclude members of these groups, especially when their recognition requires the activity of self-appointed spokespersons. Inclusive representation can assume various forms, but in every instance it is not the activity of representatives but the presence of the represented that constitutes the relevant criterion for defining the inclusiveness of representation. From this perspective, inclusive representation appears to stand in opposition to exclusionary representation and its norms. According to Pitkin, it is responsiveness on the part of the representative and the absence of conflict with those represented that signals good representation— while with inclusive representation it is the activity of the represented, going so far as to conflict with and break away from representatives, that determines effective representation. A representative system is inclusive to the extent that established representatives are subject to ongoing public judgment, competing with external forms of representation implemented by the represented themselves and by spokespeople for groups deemed poorly represented or not represented at all— spokespeople who may themselves be contested by those in whose name they speak. What makes representation inclusive is not that representatives have been elected, that they resemble the represented or defend their interests, but rather that the represented appear directly on the public stage, that they pass judgment, express their will, dispute what is said and done in their name, and construct alternative institutions. In this regard, inclusive representation policies would consist in multiplying the opportunities for dominated social groups to gain specific representation and for the represented to become directly involved in decision- making. It remains to be seen if such democratic reforms could fit in the malleable but deeply exclusionary institutions of representative government. Notes 1. A previous version of this article was published in French in Raisons politiques 50 (May 2013), and translated by Cairn International. I thank the Presses de Sciences Po for their permission to publish this modified version. uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 157 7/27/18 1:40 PM 158 samuel hayat 2. The petition was signed in May 1848 by la Commission chargée du travail (the commission responsible for labor) of the Société des Droits de l’homme (Human Rights Society). References Achin, Catherine. 2001. “‘Représentation miroir’ vs parite: Les debats parlementaires Relatifs à la parite revus à la lumiere des theories politiques de la representation.” Droit et société 47 (1): 237–56. Amann, Peter H. 1975. Revolution and Mass Democracy: The Paris Club Movement in 1848. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ankersmit, Franklin Rudolf. 2007. “Political Representation and Political Experience: An Essay on Political Psychology.” Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History, 11:21–42. Bachrach, Peter. 1980. The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Baker, Keith Michel. 1987. “Representation.” In The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf, 1:469–92. Oxford: Pergamon. Barber, Benjamin R. 1984. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Translated by R. Nice. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. 1991a. “Delegation and Political Fetishism.” In Language and Symbolic Power, edited by John B. Thompson, 203–19. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1991b. “Political Representation: Elements for a Theory of the Political Field.” In Language and Symbolic Power, edited by John B Thompson, 171–202. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1991c. “Social Space and the Genesis of ‘Classes.’” In Language and Symbolic Power, edited by John B Thompson, 229–51. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brennan, Geoffrey, and Alan Hamlin. 1999. “On Political Representation.” British Journal of Political Science 29 (01): 109–27. Brito Vieira, Mónica. 2017. Reclaiming Representation: Contemporary Advances in the Theory of Political Representation. London: Taylor & Francis. Disch, Lisa. 2015. “The ‘Constructivist Turn’ in Democratic Representation: A Normative Dead-End?” Constellations 22 (4): 487–99. Dupuis- Déri, François. 1999. “L’esprit antidémocratique des fondateurs de la ‘démocratie’ moderne.” Agone, 22 :95–113. Dutoya, Virginie. 2012. “La représentation de la nation à l’épreuve de la différence de genre : Quotas et représentation des femmes dans les Parlements de l’Inde et du Pakistan.” PhD diss., Sciences Po, Paris. uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 158 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 159 Faggioli, Massimo, and Alberto Melloni. 2007. Repraesentatio: Mapping a Keyword for Churches and Governance. Berlin: Lit Verlag. Finley, M. I. 1973. Democracy Ancient and Modern. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Freeden, Michael. 1996. Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. Oxford: Clarendon. Gaxie, Daniel. 1978. Le Cens caché : Inégalités culturelles et ségrégation politique. Paris: Seuil. Hayat, Samuel. 2014. Quand la République était révolutionnaire : Citoyenneté et représentation en 1848. Paris: Seuil. ———. 2015. “The Revolution of 1848 in the History of French Republicanism.” History of Political Thought 36 (2): 331–53. Hincker, Louis. 2007. Citoyens-combattants à Paris, 1848–1851. Villeneuve-d’Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion. Hindess, Barry. 2000. “Representation Ingrafted upon Democracy ?” Democratization 7 (2): 1–18. Hofmann, Hasso. 1973. Repräsentation: Studien zur Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert. Schriften zur Verfassungsgeschichte. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Huard, Raymond. 1996. La naissance du parti politique en France. Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. Kateb, George. 1981. “The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy.” Ethics 91 (3): 357–74. Kuyper, Jonathan W. 2016. “Systemic Representation: Democracy, Deliberation, and Nonelectoral Representatives.” American Political Science Review 110 (2): 308–24. Latour, Bruno. 2003. “What If We Talked Politics a Little?” Contemporary Political Theory 2 (2): 143–64. Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre. 1841. “Profession de foi.” Revue du progrès politique, social et littéraire 5:52–56. Manin, Bernard. 1997. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes.’” The Journal of Politics, 61:628–57. ———. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” American Political Science Review 97 (4): 515–28. Michels, Roberto. 1962. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: Collier. Mineur, Didier. 2010. Archéologie de la représentation politique: Structure et fondement d’une crise. Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. Montanaro, Laura. 2012. “The Democratic Legitimacy of Self-Appointed Representatives.” Journal of Politics 74 (04): 1094–107. uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 159 7/27/18 1:40 PM 160 samuel hayat Morgan, Robert J. 1974. “Madison’s Theory of Representation in the Tenth Federalist.” Journal of Politics 36 (04): 852–85. Moss, Bernard H. 1976. The Origins of the French Labor Movement, 1830–1914: The Socialism of Skilled Workers. Berkeley: University of California Press. Näsström, Sofia. 2006. “Representative Democracy as Tautology Ankersmit and Lefort on Representation.” European Journal of Political Theory 5 (3): 321–42. Ogien, Albert, and Sandra Laugier. 2014. Le principe démocratie: enquête sur les nouvelles formes du politique. Paris: La Découverte. Pateman, Carole. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon. Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1972. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Plotke, David. 1997. “Representation Is Democracy.” Constellations 4 (1): 19–34. Przeworski, Adam, Susan Carol Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. 1999. Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rancière, Jacques. 2014. Hatred of Democracy. Translated by Steve Corcoran. London: Verso. Rosanvallon, Pierre. 1992. Le sacre du citoyen. Histoire du suffrage universel en France. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1998. Le peuple introuvable. Histoire de la représentation démocratique en France. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2008. Counter-democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Saward, Michael. 2010. The Representative Claim. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scarrow, Susan E. 2006. “The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern Political Parties: The Unwanted Emergence of Party-Based Politics.” In Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, 16–33. London: Sage. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 2013. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Routledge. Sewell, William Hamilton. 1980. Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Squires, Judith. 1996. “Quotas for Women: Fair Representation?” Parliamentary Affairs 49 (1): 71–88. ———. 2001. “Representing Groups, Deconstructing Identities.” Feminist Theory 2 (1): 7–27. Urbinati, Nadia. 2000. “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation.” Political Theory 28 (6): 758–86. ———. 2005. “Continuity and Rupture: The Power of Judgment in Democratic Representation.” Constellations 12 (2): 194–222. ———. 2006. “Political Representation as a Democratic Process.” Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual History, 10, 18–40. uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 160 7/27/18 1:40 PM varieties of inclusive representation 161 ———. 2011. “Representative Democracy and Its Critics.” In The Future of Representative Democracy, edited by Sonia Alonso, John Keane, and Wolfgang Merkel, 23–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Melissa S. 2000. Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. uncorrected text for review only PDF Creator Trial Castiglione_9780226588360_text (CHI Castiglione 14941).indd 161 7/27/18 1:40 PM