Ulus is a key concept for understanding the Mongol Empire; the Mongols called the empire they had created the 'Mongol Ulus' or the 'Yeke (= Great) Mongol Ulus.' It was a single huge ulus containing within itself a large number of multilayered smaller uluses. The sizes of these uluses differed. The three large western uluses of Chaghadai, Jochi, and Hülegü were so large that they looked like independent empires, and in fact they were politically quite autonomous from the Qa'an Ulus in the east. However, their enormous size or political independence notwithstanding, to the Mongols of that time they were after all individual uluses comprising part of the Yeke Mongol Ulus. The notion of ulus appears to have been an important basis that enabled the Mongols to retain a sense of unity within their empire.

This article establishes that the tümens which took part in Jebe and Sübedei's Raid to Europe were not merely conducting a reconnaissance mission, as it is usually described. The campaign was part of Chinggis Khan's conquering strategy aimed at the complete subjugation of the Kipchak and the conquest of the steppe territories not only in Asia but also in Europe. The task of implementing this strategic plan was given to Prince Jochi as the ruler of the western ulus of the Mongol Empire. Jochi was to bring his main military force to Europe while Sübedei, together with Jebe, advanced with their corps to defeat the Kipchak. The Grand Prince of Kiev and other princes of Southern Rus', being allies and relatives of the Kipchak rulers, gave them military support. Therefore, the Mongols retaliated against the Rus'. After defeating the allied Rus' and Kipchak forces at the Kalka River, the Mongols succeeded in crossing the Dnieper and went as far as Kiev. However, the refusal of Jochi to bring his main forces to assist the Mongol vanguard forces nullified the achievements and victories of Jebe and Sübedei. Jochi's reluctance to participate in the Western Campaign of - was related to his conflicts with his younger brothers and Chinggis Khan himself, which, in its turn, brought about Jochi's loss of his former status in the empire, a severe illness and untimely death. As a result, Chinggis Khan had to reconsider his general conquest strategy; the conquest of Kipchak and Rus' was postponed for one and a half decades.

There appeared to have existed much earlier Mongol campaigns against Semiryechye and Central Asia than what the Mongol-related history had covered. In A.D. 1214, Genghis Khan, during some interval between the campaigns against the Tanguts and Jurchens, could be involved in a campaign against the Khitans in the Semiryechye (seven Balkhash Lake rivers) area. This was a campaign against the 300,000 Kara-khitai army, that was carried in Guo Baoyu’s biography, an incredible passage that debunked the prevalent missing [or compacted] one-year history of the Mongols’ Central Asia campaign as carried in the Persian and Arab records, that were invariably copycatted into the European history books as well as palmed off to China as revisionist history [that was seen in Hong Ju and Ke Shaomin’s writings]. In a battle at the E-yi-duo city of [Gu-]Xu-gui-guo state (speculated to be related to the Uygur founder-king Kutlug Boyla or Kutlug Bilge Kaghan’s Peiluo or Boyla city), Guo Baoyu was so seriously wounded that Genghis Khan ordered to cut apart an ox’s belly to put Guo Baoyu inside for preventing hypothermia. In A.D. 1217, Xin Yuan Shi stated that Genghis Khan, hearing that the Merkits were in the Naiman domain, ordered to campaign against Kuchlug, i.e., son of the deposed khan of the Naimans, who was already emperor of Kara-Khitay (Western Liao Dynasty, Qara Khitan). Genghis Khan hence sent Jebe on a campaign against Kuchlug. Xin Yuan Shi erred by one year late here. According to Yuan Shi, Genghis Khan, after return north from North China campaigns against the Jurchens in the spring of A.D. 1216, already ordered Subetei to attack the Merkits at a celebration party near the Tu’ula River, a campaign that continued till A.D. 1219, with Subetei defeating the Merkits at the Chan-he (toad) River in A.D. 1218 or Genghis Khan’s 13th year per Xin Yuan Shi. Subetei’s western campaign could be further divided into two phases of war against the Merkits and Kipchaks in A.D. 1216-1219 [with skirmish with Khwarazm in A.D. 1219] and war against the Khwarazm empire in A.D. 1219-1224 -- that Subetei’s biography bundled together in one passage. Subetei and Chepe appeared to have campaigned to the west at about the same time, with Chepe’s focus being laid on the Kara-Khitai Khitans, instead. In A.D. 1218, Xin Yuan Shi stated that Genghis Khan ordered Chepe to campaign against Kuchlug of Kara-Khitay (Western Liao dynasty). In June of A.D. 1219, Xi-yu (western territories), i.e., today’s Chinese Turkistan, killed the Mongol emissaries. Genghis Khan personally led the campaign against ‘Xi-yu’ (A.D. 1219-1224) and captured chieftain Ha-zhi-er-zhi-lan-tu (Khadie-khan).

Hulegu [Fu-la] was ordered to go to the west to quell the Muslim rebellion in the early 1250s A.D. Mengke issued the campaign order in January of A.D. 1252, i.e., the 2 nd year after enthronement. Mengke wanted to take out the famed terrorist sect of Munaixi (Mulahida) which purportedly pillaged the merchants and emissaries who were destined for the Mongols. Back in A.D. 1229, Munaixi (Mulahida) sent an emissary to seeing Ogedei Khan but was rudely treated by the Mongols. In February of A.D. 1252, Mongol general Cha-han separately attacked Soong China's Suizhou, Ying3zhou, Anzhou (Anlu) and Fu4zhou (Jianli/Tianmen) prefectures. In August, the Mongol khan adopted Kong Yuancuo's petition to collectively revere the Sinitic deities of Hao-tian (expanse of sky) and Hou-tu (mud temple guardian), as well as to make the matched sacrifice to 'Taizu' grandfather Genghis Khan and 'Ruizong' father Tolui. In A.D. 1252, Guo Kan, who was responsible for sacking De'an (Anlu, Hubei) in A.D. 1235, brought the weapons and an ethnic-Chinese artillery army to Mongolia and then was ordered to follow Hulegu (Xu-lie-wu) on a western campaign. In June of A.D. 1253, Sali (Sali-noyan), a subordinate to Hulegu, was ordered to attack India and Kashmir. In today's Iran, the state of Munaixi (Mulahida), i.e., Hashashin (Hashasheen or Assassin or Arsacia), deployed the army troops in two blocs, the Khorasan Mountain (i.e., Kuhestan/Ouhistan) and the Mazandaran Mountain (Rudbar). Arsacia altogether possessed 350 forts. In and around Alamut (eagle's nest), Arsacia deployed half of the total troops, with the mountain top fort being a garden with flowers and trees, a palace stacked with countless treasures of gold and silver and staffed with singing and dancing beauties, an Elysium that overflew with pipes of fine wine, honey, and milk. This was the place Arsacia trained the assassins from childhood onward, who were brought into the Koranic paradise in a coma status after being fed with a kind of marijuana called by 'haschachin', and brainwashed with the belief that they would go to heaven after death from the assassination hit jobs. Haschachin (Hashashin) could have derived from the Arabic word fidai which meant a commando or assassin, with Liu Yu claiming in Xi Shi Ji (Records of An Embassy to the Region in the West, i.e., records of the western mission under Chang De and Liu Yu's delegation, written in A.D. 1263) that both Hashashin men and women were trained as assassins. In July of A.D. 1253, Mongol General Qiedi-buhua (Kitbuqa noyan), a Christian (Nestorian) Naiman, led a 12,000-men herald army for attacking today's eastern and northern Iran, namely, the Khorasan and Mazandaran (Masandelan) mountain area. Guo Kan, leading the ethnic-Chinese artillery troops and called the Khitayan (Khitai/Cathay) people by Juvayni, joined the battles in A.D. 1253. In A.D. 1253, Qiedi-buhua's Mongol army attacked Kuhestan and intruded to Tamigan to lay a siege of the Ji'erduku (Ku-er-du-ku, Gerdkuh) fort. The Arsacia chieftain sent over the relief against the Mongols. At the perpendicular Tan-han (Damghan) mountain with hanging ladders, with the Gerdkuh (Qi-du-bu, or Ji-er-du-que) fort sitting above it, Guo Kan's artillery attack led to the surrender of commander Huo-zhe-na-shier (? Huo-zhe Nasir). The first Mongol siege of Gerdkuh, lasting from April-May to November-December of A.D. 1253, was relieved when the Ismaili reinforcements arrived from the Alamut fortress to the west. Guo Kan's biography, which bundled the events spanning seven to eight years in one paragraph, did not specifically hint at the fall of the Gerdkuh fort itself, which endured another Mongol siege in A.D. 1256 but withstood the attack, and could actually mean that commander Huo-zhe-na-shier , likely a lower mountain defender, surrendered during the second siege in late A.D. 1256 and that the Mongol siege continued from A.D. 1253 to A.D. 1256.

Although the Mongols used many of the tactics and strategies that steppe nomads had used for centuries, the Mongols refined steppe warfare so that this style of warfare reached its apogee during the Mongol Empire. Furthermore, the Mongols developed a style of warfare that made them possibly the greatest military force in history. This work examines several facets of the pre-dissolution period (1200–1260). With the dissolution of the Mongol Empire, Mongol warfare once again changed. In some areas it remained complex while in others it regressed to traditional forces of steppe warfare, still potent but not as effective as the pre-dissolution period.

Khan Özbek's rise to power was a pivotal moment in the Islamisation of the Golden Horde nomads. Recently, Russian researchers have shown an increased interest in Özbek's religious policy and the degree to which Golden Horde nomads were Islamised during his reign. Several researchers argue that Özbek succeeded in completely Islamising his domain at the beginning of his reign. However, this interpretation is largely based on written Islamic sources that should not be taken at face value. Franciscan sources written within the Golden Horde suggest that Islam was not uniformly adopted in the Jochid ulus. A comparison with the neighbouring Ilkhanate at the end of the 13th c. shows that the Mongol rulers achieved relatively limited success in their attempts to forcibly impose Islam on their nomadic subjects.

History of the White or rather Blue Khanate in the Jochid Ulus.