FROM VALUED FREEDOMS, TO POLITIES AND MARKETS THE CAPABILITY APPROACH IN POLICY PRACTICE Des Gasper Armand Colin | « Revue Tiers Monde » 2009/2 n° 198 | pages 285 à 302 Article disponible en ligne à l'adresse : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------https://www.cairn.info/revue-tiers-monde-2009-2-page-285.htm -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) Pour citer cet article : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Des Gasper, « FROM VALUED FREEDOMS, TO POLITIES AND MARKETS THE CAPABILITY APPROACH IN POLICY PRACTICE », Revue Tiers Monde 2009/2 (n° 198), p. 285-302. 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Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin ISSN 1293-8882 ISBN 9782200926014 FROM VALUED FREEDOMS, TO POLITIES AND MARKETS THE CAPABILITY APPROACH IN POLICY PRACTICE Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin Cet article considère les concepts et les hypothèses sur lesquels repose la perspective politique développée par Amartya SEN. Il examine d’abord sa conception de, et sa préoccupation pour la liberté, ainsi que la priorité qu’il leur accorde. Il explore les fortes similitudes entre le travail de John Stuart MILL et celui de SEN. Il situe l’approche de la liberté de Sen en relation avec son idée de société et sa conception limitée de la communauté. En second lieu, nous comparons la valeur que SEN donne à la liberté avec sa réticence déclarée à spécifier les valeurs. Ce texte prolonge les arguments de DENEULIN sur l’insuffisance de la liberté par rapport à la théorie du Bien. Il suggère que le développement est une lutte collective pour l’extension des libertés bien raisonnées et des capabilités humaines, en équilibre avec d’autres valeurs raisonnées. Troisièmement, nous examinons le point de vue de SEN sur l’institutionnalisation de ses idées et suggérons que l’incomplétude de la liberté politique ouvre la voie à la promotion d’autres libertés humaines, particulièrement dans le contexte des forces du marché. Nous avons besoin de critères pour évaluer les processus et les résultats de la liberté politique, et de constitutions légales pour donner corps à des valeurs additionnelles au-delà de la liberté politique. Les idées de SEN requièrent une construction nécessairement conflictuelle de l’approche basée sur les droits afin de contrer la concentration toujours plus grande du pouvoir de l’argent. Mots clés : approche par les capabilités, liberté, marchés, communautés. * Institute of Social Studies, La Haye. rticle on line N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 - p. 285-302 - REVUE TIERS MONDE 285 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin Des GASPER * I – AMARTYA SEN’S MILLIAN PROJECT The capability approach proposes that people’s capability, their positive freedom, their ability to achieve valued or approved outcomes, is the most appropriate measure of advantage – not their feelings nor their holding of resources nor the achieved outcomes. It has however become clear that capability too is an imperfect measure. Just like values and preferences, capabilities are adaptive, and so sometimes a lack of capability may be a person’s own responsibility. In addition, freedom is far from the sole relevant value (DENEULIN 2006; GASPER & van STAVEREN 2003). Why then should one highlight capability space, given its imperfections? That choice reflects a set of broader insights and value judgements, which lead one on much further. Even within evaluation as the assessment of advantage, the capability approach’s role is more than to highlight the capability category: it is to encourage reference to a range of types of information, that span traditional disciplinary boundaries in a non ad-hoc manner unlike in much of the discipline-based or eclectic work on quality of life (GASPER 2002, 2007b). Further, the evaluation of advantage – the agenda of conventional welfare economics and the area in which SEN’s capability approach first became prominent – is not the area of the approach’s sole or even necessarily greatest significance or relevance. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin First, prior questions exist about whose advantage to consider and why, and how to ground and motivate mutual concern. SEN’s approach is not explicit here, but its focus on capabilities leads one constantly to think both about people’s options and their abilities to formulate, perceive, choose, and act. In other words, it can convey a picture of people as situated thinkers and doers, as active agents with a potential to grow or to shrink. Martha NUSSBAUM’s version, her “capabilities approach” (NUSSBAUM 2000), treats the questions openly, for it gives a fuller picture of human agents: we are vulnerable as well as capable, creatures of both emotion and reason, and of group affiliation as well as individual personhood. Second, the capability approach provides a criterion for focussing in policyoriented analysis and design, not only an evaluation criterion. It leads to a focus on how particular people live and can live, not merely what they have or spend. We see this in SEN’s work with Jean DRÈZE, as in their books Hunger and Public Action (1989) and India-Development and Participation (2002). They consider how specific groups, distinguished in terms of age, occupation, gender, and community, fare in terms of life expectancy, mortality (especially child mortality), morbidity, nutrition, access to water and electricity, literacy (especially female), physical security, participation and governance. These categories of relevant effects are subjected to wide-ranging causal analysis that crosses conventional disciplinary boundaries and examines how possibilities for human agency are promoted or suppressed. I have attempted elsewhere to articulate the underlying methodology of policy analysis and design (GASPER 2008). If SEN’s approach contained only an evaluation criterion, it should be called simply the capability criterion. We find that it offers in fact a value apparatus broader than just the capability criterion, together with an analytical apparatus 286 REVUE TIERS MONDE - N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin “Mill’s goals of freedom, rationality and human development” (DUNCAN 1973: 294) We will consider thereby also possible political roots of SEN’s popularity. As remarked by various authors, SEN’s work has strong similarities to that of John Stuart MILL in the 19th century. MILL’s criticisms of capitalism did not require its rejection. For him, “improving the human lot... meant primarily increasing and developing the general human capacity for self-determination” (DUNCAN 1973: 211). To achieve this, one “could gradually transform the capitalist system from within” (ibid.: 248). “The development of their [the masses’] capabilities was conceived both as a source of stability and as the major constitutive element in progress” (p.234). MILL considered that reformist change is possible, because, firstly, society’s “different levels or parts are not seen as closely integrated or interrelated. It is not a totality in the Marxian sense” (p.291); and secondly, “the most generally significant [aspects of society are]... ideas and rational decision. MILL’s vocabulary and his moral doctrine focus on the free, choosing individual... Change grows from moral and intellectual roots” (p.291). Thirdly, democracy could manage the market; electoral power could control money power. SEN’s conception of the possibilities of progress in contemporary India has a similar character (DRÈZE & SEN 2002; SEN 2005). Like MILL, his rhetoric of freedom sometimes becomes extreme but his practical policy advice is pragmatic and has strong roles for constitutional, legislative and executive state action, built on and complemented by diverse other forms of public action. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin Séverine DENEULIN’s fine book The Capability Approach and the Praxis of Development (2006) makes three major criticisms and corresponding proposals for SEN’s theory. First, we must deepen the approach by more attention to the societal context, the structures of living together whose historical evolution we must examine. This structural context determines a society’s collective capabilities at a particular moment and hence the real possibilities for promoting human freedoms. We must look at how people have acted within these societal structures and how they have modified them in intended and unintended ways. SEN’s books on India, such as the 1996 book of regional case studies co-edited with DRÈZE, include some of this sort of examination. DENEULIN’s two other criticisms require more modification of his emphases. For, second, DENEULIN argues how insufficient is freedom as a theory of the good and why the capability approach needs more content in such a theory; and third, how insufficient and unreliable political freedom alone is as a path to promotion of other human freedoms. We need criteria to judge the processes and outcomes of political freedom. I would like to underline, extend and amend DENEULIN’s three propositions. We must give specific attention to the role of legal constitutions in embodying other values than political freedom, and thus in constraining and guiding its operation; we must look closely at the power of markets in moulding the rest of society; and we should first deepen and amend the conception of freedom that 1 - Since the label ‘capability approach’ remains in widespread usage to refer to SEN’s system (see e.g. ALEXANDER 2008, DENEULIN 2006) I retain that usage here. N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 - REVUE TIERS MONDE 287 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin and a policy perspective 1. This paper considers the policy perspective and the concepts and assumptions which it uses, including SEN’s treatment of freedom and of democracy, community, states and markets. SEN works with. We must look at the historical contexts and evolution of not only institutions but of the freedom concept itself. This paper examines SEN’s conception of and overwhelming preoccupation with freedom. We situate his treatment of freedom in relation to his notion of society as a complex of arrangements from which individuals can and should choose their affiliations, and his limited conception of community (Section II). We then look at the priority valuation SEN gives to freedom, and compare it with his declared reticence otherwise in specifying or assessing values (Section III). Thirdly, we consider SEN’s views on the institutionalization of his ideas, including ideas on markets, community and democracy (Section IV). I suggest that his ideas require the, in part necessarily conflictual, construction and application of a rights-based approach in the face of evergrowing money power. II – FREEDOM IN SOCIETY Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin SEN treats the notion of freedom in the style of an analytical philosopher rather than also through historical and sociological examination. He works with Kantian style notions of negative freedom (“independence of determination by alien causes”, MAUTNER 2000) and positive freedom (self-determination, autonomy), the latter including both opportunity freedom and process freedom. He rejected NOZICK’s attempt to convert Kantian respect for persons into an overwhelming priority to negative freedom, and stresses rights to be involved, not only rights not to be intruded on. NOZICK’s notion of freedom belongs to an individualistic strand in modern Western thought that typically sees freedom in personal privacy and the absence of being observed or interrupted. Buddhism, in contrast, contains different ideas about personhood and hence about freedom. SEN’s capability approach accommodates these sorts of differences in preference about what are priority freedoms, but his attempt to build an alternative to NOZICK suffers yet from a thin picture of persons and a limited historical perspective. Zygmunt BAUMAN historically situates a number of conceptions of freedom (BAUMAN 1988). First, an early meaning is freedom as freedom from commitments. It is seen in the concept of freed-men, released from slavery or serfdom, and the practice of exemptions from taxes and other duties. Second, an opposed conception concerns freedom as the ability to accept and make commitments, and to see them through to fulfilment. Here life is seen as the entering and playing of roles, not as staying out of commitments. Perhaps some financial speculators and asset-strippers, some economists and young unmarried adults see life as more about choices than about givens (our genetic constitution, our natural and societal and family environments, including our parents and children, and our commitments). In the third conception, external freedom, freedom means having a range of options: Milton FRIEDMAN’s being “free to choose”. Limits of this conception are revealed in our contemporary surfeit of minor choices: 288 REVUE TIERS MONDE - N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin 1 – An ahistorical conception of freedom? oceans of unsolicited advertising in letter boxes, “spam” e-mail and daily telephone solicitation. Barry SCHWARTZ’s The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less shows how freedom to choose between vast ranges of slightly different goods is not a fundamental freedom. Freedom requires instead the skills to distinguish fundamentals from trivia and to pursue the former. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin BAUMAN concludes that freedom is easy to think about when people face specific, intense and repugnant constraints that they wish strongly to remove. Beyond such situations, freedom as some supposedly general and yet definite state becomes hard to conceptualise: “All attempts to do so invariably lead to contradictions” (BAUMAN 1988: 51), as we saw for the conceptions of freedom as absence of commitments or as multiplicity of options. One “Western sort of freedom... can see limits only as barriers to humanity, not as constitutive of it. And it is therefore the very epitome of idealism...” (EAGLETON 2005). This was HEGEL’s criticism of Jacobinism. Lack of a self-limiting dimension in SEN’s perspective on human development – if it does not use terms like enough, sufficient, un-being, end of doing – would leave it in danger of becoming not human but part of modernist utopianism. 2 – An ahistorical conception of community? SEN views people as individuals, who are group members but with the right to exit any group; likewise, communities and groups have the right to rationally reconsider and reconstitute features of community (SEN 2005, 2006). He indicates how identity is multi-dimensional – thus SEN is an Indian, an economist, a man, a Bengali, a humanist, an agnostic, a member of particular professional associations and networks, and so on – but does not address how these different categories of identity have arisen historically. Limited attention to the historical provenance of communities can obscure that communities too are modern, not only individuals. Partha CHATTERJEE sees this as characteristic of liberal thought: “community, in the narrative of capital, becomes relegated to the latter’s prehistory, a natural, prepolitical, primordial stage in social evolution that must be superseded for the journey of freedom and progress to begin. And since the story of capital is [supposedly] universal, community too becomes the universal prehistory of progress” (CHATTERJEE 1995: 235). CHATTERJEE provides examples from a particular historical trajectory of anticolonial nationalism: that of India, notably in Bengal, SEN’s homeland. CHATTERJEE pinpoints the historic significance of new forms of community in struggles against colonialism. In 19th century Bengal the emergent Calcutta Hindu middle class was subordinate to the British but could build a counter-hegemony N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 - REVUE TIERS MONDE 289 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin Fourth, SEN’s conception takes freedom as the power to attain that which one has reason to value. Its necessary partner is, fifth, internal freedom: the power to reason, including sixth, freedom as the recognition of necessity – a Stoic idea that was shared by DURKHEIM - and ability to govern oneself. Seventh, as an extension of internal freedom, KANT saw freedom as reasoned recognition of the other and as conscious acceptance of an understood morality. Likewise for ROUSSEAU, freedom was obedience to a law that one has chosen oneself. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin The lack “in modern European social theory of an independent narrative of community makes possible both the posing of the distinction between state and civil society and the erasure of that distinction. At one extreme, then, we have arguments proclaiming the sovereignty of the individual will, insisting that the state has no business to interfere in the domain of individual freedom of choice and contractual arrangements. At the other extreme are the arguments that would have the one political community, given the single, determinate, demographically enumerable form of the nation-state, assume the directing role in all regulatory functions of society, usurping the domain of civil society and family, and blurring the distinctions between the public and the private... The concepts of the individual and the nation-state both become embedded in a new grand narrative: the narrative of capital. This narrative of capital seeks to suppress that other narrative of community and produce in the course of its journey both the normalized individual and the modern regime of disciplinary power” (CHATTERJEE 1995: 234). Otherwise, “by its very nature, the idea of the community marks a limit to the realm of disciplinary power” (p.237). The attempted substitute for, or version of, community in Western social philosophy is “the nation”. Capital ‘seeks to construct a synthetic hegemony over the domains of both civil society and the precapitalist community. The reification of the “nation” in the body of the state becomes the means for constructing this hegemony (p.212). “Both state and civil-social institutions have assigned places within the narrative of capital. Community, which ideally should have been banished from the kingdom of capital, continues to lead a subterranean, potentially subversive, life within it because it refuses to go away” (p.236). “The crucial break in the history of anticolonial nationalism comes when the colonized refuse to accept membership of this civil society of subjects. They construct their national identities within a different narrative, that of the community... This inner domain of culture is declared the sovereign territory of the nation, where the colonial state is not allowed entry” (p.237). The post independence era is marked by “this unresolved struggle between the narratives of capital and community within the discursive space of the modern state” (p.239). SEN, like J. S. MILL, would not accept that his liberalism is part of “the narrative of capital”. Yet while he picks out markets as ‘a basic arrangement through which people can interact with each other, and undertake mutually advantageous activities’ (SEN 2000: 33), he does not do the same for community, whose role may be even more fundamental, involved in the very formation of “people”. He has much to say as critical evaluation of community, but has become relatively polite in critical evaluation of capital. 290 REVUE TIERS MONDE - N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin by acquiring cultural leadership of the indigenous masses, including through modified forms of religion and new forms of household order. This was a vital phase of achieving sovereignty, even before the political contest or in advance of its outcome, although the political struggle later heightened the incentive to assert difference from the British. Cultural essentialism came as much from the side of the colonized as the side of the colonizer. The nationalist strategy was to strongly reject colonialist claims of difference in the outer realm of business and State politics, but equally strongly reject many colonialist universalist claims about the inner/domestic realm. Naturally, the strategy contained inbuilt tensions, and arguably increased subordination of women as part of the emancipation of men. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin III – FREEDOM AND OTHER VALUES DENEULIN’s second major argument is that the capability approach needs a fuller theory of the good than just a commitment to freedom. Consider three possible tensions in SEN’s work. First, he insists on people’s freedom to choose values, but does he thus insist on primacy for one value: freedom? Second, while he emphasises free choice of values by each polity, he seems to conduct policy analysis in part by using a set of standardised criteria: basic needs. Third, he appears yet to have moved in two decades away from predominant emphasis on the real and tragic paradox of market-mediated and even market-induced famines, to a central rhetoric of development as freedom, with markets presented as vital channels for free choices that further mutual interest (SEN, 2000), and democracy and an open society sometimes seen as promoting all other good things, at least in the long term. This optimistic story mirrors MILL’s vision that the free interaction of increasingly educated agents will uplift and transform capitalism. Related to all the tensions is the particular conception of freedom that SEN uses, which we considered in the previous section. 1 – A reticence in proposing values, in contrast to a strong explicit emphasis on freedom The capability approach, like other positions in welfare economics, is intended for the public arena rather than for private decisionmaking. By focusing on the capabilities space and not on utility data, SEN’s approach is implicitly a N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 - REVUE TIERS MONDE 291 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin SEN brings a concern for individuals and their freedoms, including their freedom to define themselves within the set of values and affiliations provided in the various communities which have formed them; and a concern that no individuals, notably women, be marginalised and sacrificed. Described in the abstract as issues about freedoms that we have reason to value, these matters are simpler than when confronted in their historical specificity: not only are freedoms diverse and conflicting, they are usually ambiguous, hard to define and hard to evaluate. The “we” and the “I” involved are also ambiguous and their definition is part of the debate. As ZIMMERMAN (2006) notes, while SEN asks “Equality of What?” the sociologist adds the question “Equality of Whom?” – who is within the circle of concern, and what are the identity-groupings between which comparisons are made or avoided? From CHATTERJEE we see how the communities are not primordial static entities, but are as modern as the individuals; secondly, the identities which “individuals” declare or compose are built from socially constructed elements; thirdly, the construction of community identities at various levels was central in anti-colonial struggles for political freedoms, and is likely to be equally central in other and future struggles; fourthly, concepts such as freedom which motivate and shape such struggles take historically and societally specific forms, not the disembodied abstract versions of analytical philosophy; and fifthly, these specific forms will contain tensions and contradictions, as in the common anticolonial insistence on non-universalism for the domestic sphere. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin SEN appears afraid of elitism. Further, while he highlights the reasonable diversity of values, he may like HUME and MILL expect major convergence in reasoned public values (DUNCAN 1973). Thus he may assume that general principles of human need are already sufficiently established in the public sphere, and in danger of being too crudely conceived and applied, so that they do not require further emphasis. But if and where public officials are instructed or indoctrinated to ignore principles of need in public prioritization, and to refer only to the outcomes from situations of highly unequal wealth and unequal debate, will SEN’s abstracted language motivate enough such officials, or their political leaders, to adopt his capability approach and use it to benefit the poor? Like capitalism, his version of a capability approach tacitly relies on ethical capital that it does not itself generate or sustain. In his more popular writings SEN turns to vivid and motivating illustrations and references to implied basic needs. Yet, as in the academic work, the value that he most emphasises is freedom, which he seems to treat as inherently good and of primary and unifying significance. a – When is freedom good? Whether opportunities promote well-being depends on how they are used. We tend to conceal this if we define freedom and capability as constituting well-being, rather than simply as one major focus in the exercise of identifying how advantaged are persons’ situations. For SEN as for MILL, however, freedom has independent as well as instrumental value. MILL acknowledged that freedom does not always have good short run effects, but held that the long run effects are better than those of paternalism, and that the freedoms are good in themselves (DUNCAN, 1973). A more fundamental query concerns then whether all freedoms are indeed good. William CONNOLLY (1983) argues that in ordinary discourse the concept of freedom almost invariably has favourable evaluative content: we would not speak 292 REVUE TIERS MONDE - N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin policymakers’ discourse. An individual is less likely to downgrade her own satisfactions, deem her preferences inadequately reasoned, or prioritize capabilities above functionings when deciding for herself. It is public officials and others engaged in public policy debate who would refer to capabilities space. SEN thus talks of the freedoms that “we”, in a political community, would “have reason to value”. But beyond that he says little. Popularisers of the approach reduce his formulation to the freedoms that a person values (see e.g., ALKIRE 2005) and sometimes further reduce it to whatever freedoms individuals want (e.g., ROBEYNS 2005). The slippage of meaning occurs in part because SEN is so reticent in proposing values for the public arena. His largest collection of essays is entitled “Rationality and Freedom”, a narrower, more technical formulation than “Reason and Freedom”. While he advocates universal literacy as a policy priority for India, and no doubt supports India’s 2002 constitutional amendment on the right to primary education, the implication of his formally stated positions could be to accept the output of India’s democratic political processes – namely, failure up to late 2008 to convert that declared right into legislation or budgetary commitment (GHOSH 2008) – as defining what India “has reason to value”. Yet if the capability approach only endorses whatever comes out of a formal democratic process, then what value does it add? (DENEULIN 2006: 65). Building on the work of Eric FROMM, BAUMAN (1988) notes that freedom is an ambiguous experience in reality. Societies based on large-scale expansion of commodity choice have typically increased loneliness and stresses in choice, and partially crowd-out some other important types of opportunity. Consumerism still offers to the majority a feeling of both choice and security. Most people can feel they have made choices for and of themselves, while they safely buy-in to a set of current socially approved symbols. For WEBER, much more was not possible, because “internal freedom” could never be for the majority, who must instead be ruled by bureaucracy (BAUMAN 1988: 47). While SEN identifies as a fallacy the claim that the more the valued options that one has the better must be one’s choice set, he has not engaged in the critique of consumerism. His eyes are focused South more than North and he continues to stress freedom as the primary and central value. b – Freedom as primary and synoptic value? Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin In his 1999 Development as Freedom SEN declared freedom to be both the primary end and primary means of development. In response to critical commentary, the preface to his 2002 book with DRÈZE downgraded its status, to be just one of the main ends and main means. However, his highlighted priority remains freedom, partly due to his treatment of it as a synoptic value. In SEN’s conception, since freedom means freedom to attain whichever values one has reasoned, it appears supportive of rather than competitive with every other value. Yet some of those other values might be opposed to freedom as normally understood: the values say of some religious systems. Freedom can also never be an uninfringeable value, since freedoms conflict, between persons and also for a single person. One man’s freedom can bring another man’s unfreedom. Some freedoms have priority, and some of them require absolute enforcement, like my freedom to not be enslaved, versus your freedom to acquire slaves. Some freedoms are more basic than others, and some are malign. SEN’s formulation about freedoms to achieve other values must not conceal this and promote an unqualified priority to freedom. A generalised prioritisation of freedom can arise in part as a side-effect of a prioritisation of capability above functioning. FLEURBAEY argues that the prioritisation is “unnecessary, and indeed dangerous” (2002: 74). One can, he argues, capture a concern for freedom within a focus on functionings, by recognising that “the exercise of choice is one of the main and most vital functionings for human beings, so that [SEN’s] fear is quite misplaced: a paternalistic society cannot be satisfactory in terms of functionings” (2002: 74). SEN’s focus on “mere access to functionings... automatically abandons those undeserving poor who fail to seize N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 - REVUE TIERS MONDE 293 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin of freedom when an agent faces a wide range of options of which none are compatible with her interests and values; nor, as Charles LINDBLOM observes, do we speak of unfreedom when, despite the presence inevitably of many constraints, “choices judged to be important or valuable are not closed off” (LINDBLOM 2002: 178). CONNOLLY adds, however, that any concept of freedom must consider not only the content of an agent’s wants but also the way in which those wants were formed (1983: 151). Nor do we describe all of the freedoms which we encounter as favourable. Freedom to slaughter others has a negative value. the opportunities offered” (2002: 74; emphasis added). In his reply SEN does not answer on the issue of relative priority, staying on this occasion safely within a more general version of the capability approach which does not include priority status to capability rather than functioning (SEN 2002b) 2. SEN makes no formal list of priority capabilities. In practice, he still employs the idea of capabilities that are basic for survival or dignity, including in terms of required thresholds for minimum necessary attainment (e.g., ANAND & SEN 2000: 85), and a list of five basic “instrumental freedoms” (SEN 1999: 38ff.). As STEWART and DENEULIN note, “In practical work, SEN [accepts] that to be healthy, well nourished, and educated are basic capabilities, which, presumably, he would argue, would always get democratic support” (2002: 64). United Nations agencies’ work on human development and human security, with which SEN is closely involved, is explicit on world-wide priority human needs. The rationale for such permanent agencies is that priorities such as peace, literacy, clean drinking water for all, and avoidance of a greenhouse gases disaster are recognised because legitimate, not only legitimate because recognised. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin So while SEN adopts strongly liberal formulations when theorising, he partly adopts ‘perfectionist’ formulations for practice: “certain features of human life... [make] life better, whether one desires them or not, and their absence impoverishes human life” (DENEULIN 2006: 20). People can pursue a life of their choice only if certain constitutive features of human life are assured. Beggars cannot be choosers (GASPER 2004). The outcome of public debate, while always relevant, is not always sufficient for determination of public priorities, argues DENEULIN: first, people may ignore externalities, and “may value capabilities on the basis of reasons that are good for themselves as particular individual human beings, but not good for themselves as members of a wider human community (RICHARDSON 2002)” (DENEULIN 2006: 24); and second, democratic processes occur within structures of inequality that typically downgrade and distort the views of the less advantaged. The child not sent to school may be a case of this – the interests of the person in a weaker position can sometimes be downgraded by her parents and/or by the democratic choice of people in a stronger position, who decide that schooling for the poor has less priority than highways construction, weapons purchases, space programmes, and debt repayments. When a person’s choice is “harming herself or others... the capability approach cannot remain neutral” (DENEULIN 2006: 31). If we accept the notion of “harm”, a perfectionist notion, then we should become thoughtfully perfectionist rather than only casually and implicitly so. SEN is more perfectionist in practice, where he seems to primarily talk of India, explicitly or implicitly. Why is he more purely liberal when he theorises? His 2 - See GASPER 2007b on different elements within the approach, the different possible combinations and how various authors select or move between them. 294 REVUE TIERS MONDE - N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin 2 – A theory that excludes a list of basic values, and a practice that centres on it IV – POWER, INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND POLICY Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin The capability approach is a policy approach, in the sense that, as DENEULIN observes, it exists because it wishes to change what happens. It asserts the priority relevance of some information spaces. The manner by which it seeks to exert influence makes political presumptions. The most relevant places to look for SEN’s approach on policy are his books with DRÈZE and the OGATA-SEN commission report Human Security Now (CHS 2003). Only for India does he go far with detailed advice. His generalized writings on policy too may be better understood if read as in large part exercises in persuasion for an Indian audience, about feasible yet genuinely emancipatory (not newly oppressive) paths forward for such a country, one that has a functioning State, relatively strong and effective profit sectors and civil society, a non-interventionist military, no constitutionally established dominant group, and enormous internal cultural differences. For India, SEN offers a broad-brush Millian story with themes of participation, governance and empowerment. The 2002 book defines itself as “a ‘peoplecentred’ approach, which puts human agency (rather than organizations such as markets or governments) at the centre of the stage” (DRÈZE and SEN 2002: 6). It gives far more attention to education than to employment, and makes relatively little use of entitlements analysis. DENEULIN (2006) evaluates this general approach, with reference to the limits of political democracy, and aims to put a concern for political freedom into a balanced relationship to other values. 1 – SEN on markets, market power, and the power of markets SEN’s policy positions are partner to the critique from UNDP, ILO, UNICEF et al. of the 1980s and 90s ruling development policy orthodoxy of the IMF, World N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 - REVUE TIERS MONDE 295 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin approach arose through critique of liberal welfare economics and of the Rawlsian criterion for justice, by adding reference to several aspects of human inequality; but he may share their relatively thin theory of personhood and consequently also of freedom. The approach does not have much to say about persons beyond that they are choosers, a description that arises especially in modern marketbased societies (BAUMAN, 1988). It tends to downgrade socially constructed differences in people’s identities. The aspects of human inequality that it introduces are presented as a list of possibilities, not as part of a holistic conception of human life, in which every person is part of a system of emotional, semantic and value interrelations and has a life trajectory from birth to death, from incapacity through capacity to again incapacity. SEN’s picture of freedom in terms of participation and the value of an opportunity set is not much of a picture of personhood or agency, and leads to underemphasis of key requirements for free choice (GASPER and VAN STAVEREN 2003). The capability approach requires an enriched picture of persons as moral agents, seeing them as guided by a variety of feelings of affiliation and as historically located in inherited social orders that gradually evolve. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin SEN’s earlier work on famine highlighted how some people’s freedom can produce other people’s unfreedom. Richer consumers’ ability to pay higher prices draws food away from the poor, as seen in every famine and in the current world food crisis, which in 2008 reportedly reduced the poor in parts of Haiti to eating mud pies to fill their stomachs. The rich’s purchasing power now also draws land away from food production in order to produce fuel. Returning to the third tension mentioned earlier: has SEN’s work on disastrous side-effects of markets evolved into a generalised praise of freedom and general defence of markets as channels of mutually advantageous interaction? In India there has been little open famine since the 1970s, and since the early 1980s an ever growing economic liberalization and dynamism, bringing at least some significant gains in social opportunity for many people, though far from all. For India SEN accepts economic liberalization. At the same time, he puts his efforts into arguing for activist roles by the state and other public actors in education, health, women’s rights, democracy, and so on. He insists that economic liberalization alone is far from sufficient, and is attacked here by some purer market economists. Part of the dispute stems from SEN’s greater degree of belief in the potential of the Indian state. Yet in contrast to his general endorsement of markets that we saw earlier – part of his debate with Calcutta Communists – he does not offer general paeans to other institutions: state or community. SEN consistently addresses some issues of power but not others. His analyses of which types of people died in Bengal’s mega-famine of 1943-1944 and its communal violence of 1946-1947 highlight the centrality of structures of access and exclusion. He is concerned with the possibilities for action, the attainable life-options, for ordinary and poor people. He systematically analyses ways of trying to promote their power, in markets and outside markets. However, while he emphasises how markets exclude via their reference only to money power, he does not discuss how commoditization sometimes dehumanizes, nor the impacts of concentrated money power on values and on all spheres of society. Peter EVANS highlights that Development as Freedom has no criticism of global corporate 296 REVUE TIERS MONDE - N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin Bank, U. S. Treasury, and the rich country governments and corporate giants that backed them. He is not anti-market in any sweeping way but is far from advocating uncontrolled markets. He focuses on influencing and supplementing markets by rules, by changing incentives, by organisational reforms and by investments in public goods, rather than trying to prohibit market transactions which agents have incentives to undertake. He makes extensive proposals for increasing the power of poor people in the market, through public works, strengthened public information and education (and making space for that by reduced military expenditure), pro-employment industrialization, social security arrangements, strengthened civil society monitoring of business, and so on. He gives equally detailed attention to increasing the power of poor people outside the market, by education and health investments, social security arrangements again (including famine relief), progressive constitutional changes (such as the 1990s amendments to the Indian constitution to enforce the presence of elected local governments and of quotas in representation for women and for the scheduled lower castes and tribes; and the 2002 affirmation of the State’s duty to ensure universal primary education), and strengthened civil society monitoring of government, including through a free and concerned press. capitalism, with its “increasing concentration of power over the production of culture, information, and, therefore, preferences” (EVANS 2002: 59), as well as over political agendas and decision-making. Corporations spread rich country consumption standards, which affect also the lives of people who cannot attain them. “The process of preference formation that flows from modern distributions of economic power is the antithesis of the public discussion, argument, and open communication” that SEN extols (EVANS: 58). But SEN’s disapproval is directed more often against community and “the elite guardians of tradition”, observes EVANS. SEN formally accepted EVANS’ criticism (SEN 2002b: 84), but his response did not expand on the tensions between a strong belief in markets and the domination exerted by vast concentrations of money power over the rest of society. Typically he seeks to steer and supplement markets, not to curb or confront them. Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin SEN advocates reasoned public debate and democratic decision-making, on three grounds. They have independent value regardless of their outcomes, for they treat people with respect. They have a constitutive role in forming values: building considered and better accepted statements of public purpose, and mutual awareness and recognition. They have instrumental value in promoting good outcomes, for they constitute and maintain a framework of cooperation, mobilize information and share and test ideas, provide essential political pressure as in open reporting of disasters such as famine, and are “critically important for the development of human capabilities” (SEN 2002b: 79). SEN’s arguments are identical to those of J. S. MILL. MILL stressed, besides people’s right to share in decisions that affect them, how participation in community affairs and local government were the schools for building cooperation, commitment and capacities, including by “bringing inferior minds into contact with superior” (MILL 1960: 351-2, cited by DUNCAN p.249). They promote favourable change and change people favourably. Constitutively they form “the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns – habituating them to act from public and semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another” (MILL 1960: 164, cited by DUNCAN p.250). Participation must be supported by education, which contains “unlimited possibility of improving the moral and intellectual condition of mankind” (MILL 1958: 91, cited by DUNCAN p.252) and can eventually resolve the contradictions within a liberal market society, he believed. Several arguments are similar to those of Charles LINDBLOM in early books like The Intelligence of Democracy. A more sceptical later LINDBLOM stressed also the corrupting impact of massive concentrations of money power, on polities, on disinterested investigation and on autonomous local activity. SEN does not systematically distinguish public debate, democracy and participation (DENEULIN 2005, 2006). His formulation “freedoms we have reason to value” is applied at all scales. This extends a cosy feeling of face-to-face direct N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 - REVUE TIERS MONDE 297 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin 2 – SEN’s abstracted notions of politics Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin The overgeneralised formulations lean towards overoptimism about democracy in really-existing situations. Actual democracies often function in very problematic ways, dominated by those groups (internal and external) who have most power already. Constitutively, democracy can readily support the creation, expression, pursuit and fulfilment of bad values, such as xenophobia and racism. SEN responds weakly to similar lines of criticism by Stewart and DENEULIN (2002); he refers only to India’s 1977 election which displaced an authoritarian Indira GANDHI. More effectively, DRÈZE and SEN (2002) call for two key ways to counter democracy’s problems in India – building the organizations of the poor and increasing the feelings of solidarity between some of the privileged and the underprivileged. The calls are fully valid, but both ways encounter massive counterforces and their impact will at best be limited and gradual. India is historically a conquest society, with a weak sense of shared national political community. Its wealth of antagonistic internal groups are deeply divided, on regional, class, caste and ethnic lines. Many powerful privileged groups see no advantage or duty in supporting the underprivileged to become literate and self-confident. DRÈZE and SEN have the evidence for this, as in their analysis of the extraordinary neglect in press coverage of issues of the basic needs of the poor, but they do not draw out the conclusion. They likewise find no rationale for the huge expenditures of India’s security-dominated State; but apart from the lavish benefits it brings to particular groups, the warpath of antagonism to neighbours can help to maintain essential intra-national cooperation in a grossly unequal society. Indian experience confirms that political democracy, free mass-media and some fora for local participation are not enough to ensure basic human development programs, and sometimes lead in a very different direction. DENEULIN concludes that “the extent to which the exercise of political freedom leads to the removal of unfreedoms depends on a collective and historical [national] background” (2006: 174). She traces for example the resource-rich Dominican Republic’s history of elected autocrats, who have left that country like India with poor human development achievements despite a vigorous public associative life. The implication is not to abandon democracy and call for oligarchy; it is rather to not take the outcomes of political democracy as per se definitive of political virtue. So “a freedom approach to development would need to be structured by certain principles that link the exercise of political freedom to its overall aim” (DENEULIN 2005: 78), the promotion of reasoned freedoms for all persons. In the 3 - SEN 2005, p.188, has qualified the claim: ‘major famines do not occur in democracies’. 298 REVUE TIERS MONDE - N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin discussion, through to the scale of vast differentiated societies. Contemporary theory distinguishes “democratic decisions [as] being decisions taken by freely elected governments, and participatory decisions being decisions taken directly by the people affected by that decision” (DENEULIN 2005:77). We should not merge these two under the label “democratic practice”. A better umbrella term is “exercise of political freedom”, suggests DENEULIN. SEN’s generalised language matches an abstracted notion of politics and a proclivity for broad formulations, such as that democracies do not tolerate famines. Unfortunately not only do they tolerate them on a world scale, they can, as in India, tolerate them internally if only politically marginal minority groups suffer (BANIK 2007) 3. same way that SEN underspecifies constitutive elements of human well-being, he may underspecify acceptable political process, “the constitutive principles of the exercise of political freedom” (ibid., p.79). We must evaluate both the outcomes and procedures of the exercise of political freedom. 3 – Some ways forward Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin Second, the capability approach calls in effect for forms of multi-criteria assessment in public discourse, to openly review what range of variables, procedures and weights to use in decision-making. Sabina ALKIRE’s Valuing Freedoms offers a framework inspired by Finnis, for such assessment: an agenda of dimensions for discussion. DENEULIN argues that “If the dimension approach is to guide development policies adequately... [it] will need to provide a certain framework so that each person has the possibility to flourish in each dimension. It will also need to provide sufficient obligations for governments to comply with that provision” (DENEULIN 2006: 47). In other words it will need to merge into a rights-based approach (GASPER 2008). Participatory multi-criteria evaluation requires a well-informed, well-motivated, well-skilled, well-judging, wellresourced public with the time and the access to participate in public deliberations, and who respect democratic outcomes. But participatory discussion alone does not suffice in a world of massive inequalities and large multi-layered polities. The rich and powerful can dominate unrestricted public allocation, through many channels: they dominate the media and the electoral process, and they may buy support or extra attention from some political parties, politicians, police, judges and other officials. So, thirdly, participatory discussion must be complemented by constitutionally based guarantees for the fulfilment of basic needs and by political struggles. The need for constitutional and legal protection for basic rights is explicit in NUSSBAUM’s work, which focuses on the architecture of the polity – the legal constitution or bill of rights. SEN appears to argue that no universal, identical, constitutional protection is relevant or acceptable across all countries. The disagreement here can be narrowed by distinguishing types of lists of basic rights (GASPER 2007a). Between the extremes of either total openness or belief in a definitive detailed universal list come more relevant variants, including these: indication of some proposed universal priorities, without essaying a complete list (this is perhaps SEN’s de facto position); a belief in lists and in providing a N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 - REVUE TIERS MONDE 299 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin First, the space in SEN’s capability approach called democracy and political freedom needs to be given more content and connected to other values. DENEULIN turns to ideas from ARISTOTLE on practical reason (phronesis), as developed by John FINNIS and Martha NUSSBAUM. She puts forward general requirements regarding procedures of policy decision-making in any political community. “[...] the first normative requirement of the practical rationality underlying the exercise of political freedom... is a matter of judging the various components of human well-being in which human beings are functioning the worst in the particular context in which the judgement is being made. [...] This is the requirement of priority: one should give priority to promoting the well-being of those who are below a threshold level of functioning” (DENEULIN 2006: 111; her emphasis). Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin We can summarise DENEULIN’s rethinking of SEN’s picture of “development as freedom”, by use of a more capacious title: development as the collective struggle for and extension of well-reasoned freedoms and humane capabilities, in balance with other reasoned values. I extended DENEULIN’s propositions to include more attention to markets, the role of legal constitutions, and the conception of freedom that SEN works with. Programatically, I suggest that SEN’s ideas require the necessarily conflictual construction of a rights-based approach, to counter growing concentrations of money power. Analytically, I conclude that SEN’s enlightening ahistorical dissection of concepts and their logical implications must be partnered by historical examination of the construction, employment and evolution of concepts and values; our study of historical trajectories of human development requires also a history of ideas. These two conclusions, for policy and for analysis, have connections; people working in a human rights framework are typically strongly conscious of the associated histories of struggle. SEN’s work derives its bounds from the set of sources who inspired him: he upgrades the work of ARROW and RAWLS, partly by reference to the wider perspectives of SMITH and MILL. But a theoretical framework for human development requires additional sources. MARX warned that MILL’s liberal model alone could not fulfil its own values of freedom, in part because of its neglect of other fundamental human values such as fraternity. DENEULIN like NUSSBAUM adds an Aristotelian stress and examination of philia, the human tendency to form community through cooperation at various levels and in various degrees. Cooperation moulds people. At the same time, communities compete and exclude. Here we encounter a deeper rationale for highlighting capability space despite its imperfections, and for using a list of priority types of capability, though in a more open way than NUSSBAUM sometimes conveys. Thinking in capability space with reference to priority human freedoms promotes sympathetic recognition of and attention to other humans. Bénédicte ZIMMERMANN indicates a direction for further work. She draws out the complementarity between the capability approach and the pragmatism of John DEWEY and his school, which may offer a more wide-ranging, historically and institutionally rich perspective than do ARROW, RAWLS or MILL. (See also GASPER 2008.) “[...] [the core] concepts [of personhood, agency and environment] have 300 REVUE TIERS MONDE - N° 198 - AVRIL-JUIN 2009 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - - - 207.241.231.82 - 26/07/2018 01h49. © Armand Colin universal exemplar of formats of reasoning for establishing context-specific priority lists (ALKIRE 2002); a belief in lists and in providing a universal exemplar of content as well as reasoning (this could be NUSSBAUM’s position, for she sees a list as important not only in distribution processes within an established political community but for motivating mutual respect and concern and thinking about the boundaries of the political community); and finally, belief in a universal list which can be adjusted locally, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Lists are not self-enforcing, but can be valuable instruments in political struggles for human dignity. been connected and deepened within a detailed pragmatist theory of inquiry by DEWEY and PEIRCE... Interactions are missing in SEN’s analytical framework, making the sociologist feel uncomfortable with his concept of agency...and [bringing a tendency] to underestimate the power relations and struggles shaping the totality of environmental conditions and the outcome of action” (ZIMMERMANN 2006: 474). GOUINLOCK (1986) makes a similar comparison of MILL and DEWEY. ZIMMERMANN concludes that the pragmatist tradition “offers a way out of a substantial concept of freedom in favour of a relational one... [It] displaces the accent from situations of action to broader entities and forms of interdependencies” (pp.479-480). So let us move on from MILL, to DEWEY, and beyond. 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Its Core, Rationale, Part- nal of Human Development, 6(1), ners and Dangers”, Journal of Socio- 93-114. Economics, 36(3), 335-359 SCHWARTZ B., 2005, The Paradox of GASPER D., 2007b, Human Well-Being. Choice – Why More is Less, New York, In Human Well-Being: Concept and Harper Perennial. Measurement, edited by M. McGillivray, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. SEN A., 1981, Poverty and Famines. Oxford, Clarendon. 23-64.