Trends in Electoral Violence in Nigeria

J ournal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. TREN DS IN ELECTO RA L VIO LEN CE IN N IGERIA Olowojolu Olakunle1, Rasak Bamidele2, A ke M odupe1, Ogundele Oluwaseun & Afolayan M agdalene 1 Depart ment of Polit ical Science and Int ernat ional Relat ions, Landmark Universit y, Omu A ran N igeria; 2 Depart ment of Sociology Landmark Universit y, Omu A ran, N igeria 1 1 Email; kunleolowojolu@yahoo.co.uk, rasak.bamidele@lmu.edu.ng, akemodupe@gmail. com, ogundele.oluwaseun@lmu.edu.ng, afolayan.magdalene@lmu.edu.ng A bstract ; Since the Independence era, elections in N igeria have been characterized by high scale of electoral malpractices, money politics, electoral violence and the use of ethno- religious divide in order to influence the voting patterns of the electorates. Electoral violence is one of the strategies employed by N igerian politicians during electioneering period. Desperate and power drunk politicians often sponsor unemployed youths and stark illiterates to carry out assaults on their perceived political opponents with a view to manipulating election results to their own advantage. This paper shall make an indepth analysis of electoral violence in N igeria with particular focus on the fourth republic. Keywords: Election, Electoral Violence, Electoral Security. IN TRODUCTION Ordinarily, electoral process is expected to contribute towards democratic consolidation in any given society. Through elections, the electorates are provided with the ample opportunity t o vote for the candidates and parties that will represent their varying interests. However, in many A frican countries such as N igeria, the electoral process has brought about unwarranted political instability. N igeria, with a population of about 190 million and abundant mineral resources is being widely touted as one of A frica’s brightest prospects on the global stage. Despite N igeria’s huge potential, the country has been bedeviled by series of political unrest from the first republic (1960 - 1966). N igeria was thrown into a 30 month civil war ( 19671970 ) that claimed the lives of millions. During the course of ISSN: 2277-0038 37 Copyright © 2018 Cenresin Publications (w ww.cenresinpub.com ) Olowojolu Olakunle; Rasak Bamidele; A ke M odupe , Ogundele Oluwaseun & A folayan Magdalene N igeria’s chequered political history, different military regimes governed the country ( 1966- 1979; 1983- 1999) in her fifty eight years of independence. On M ay 29, 1999, N igerians heaved a sigh of relief after the military relinquished power to the democratically elected government led by Olusegun Obasanjo, an ex- military ruler. From that time, N igeria has enjoyed over 18 years of democratic rule albeit, with various episodes of violence ranging from the N iger Delta militancy to the Boko Haram Insurgency in some parts of N ort hern N igeria. The year 20 15 served as the turning point in N igeria’s democracy as the main opposition party, the A ll Progressives Congress (A PC) upstaged the erstwhile ruling party, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) at the general elections. The major thrust of this paper shall be geared towards analyzing both the pre- election and post- election violence at the 20 15 general polls. The first section is the introduction; second focuses on the theoretical contextualization of electoral violence; the third section deals with the historical account of the trends and patterns of electoral violence in N igeria’s fourth republic; the fourth section is premised upon the N igerian state, electoral violence and democratic consolidation, while the fifth part is the conclusion. CO N CEPTUA L CLA RIFICA TION Elections Elections form the bedrock of a genuine democratic system. Osumah and A ghemelo ( 20 10 ) see election as a process through which the people choose their leaders and indicate their policies and programme preference and consequently invest a government with authority to rule. Roberts and Edwards ( 1991) cited in Omotola ( 20 0 7) view election as a method of selecting persons to fill certain public offices through choices made by the electorate; those citizens who are qualified to vote under the laws and procedures of the electoral system. Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary ( 20 0 6) defines election as 38 J ournal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. “the act or process of organizing systematic ( s) election (permitting mass participation and method of choosing a person or persons by vote for a public office position in which state authority is exercised”. Electoral Violence A ccording to A lbert ( 20 0 7) , electoral violence involves all forms of organized acts of threats aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder or opponent before, during and after an election with an intention to det ermine, delay or influence a political process. Ogundiya and Baba ( 20 0 5) , see electoral violence as all sorts of riots, demonstrations, party clashes, political assassinations, looting, arson, thuggery, kidnapping spontaneous or not, which occur before, during and after elections. Fischer ( 20 0 2) defines electoral violence ( conflict ) as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced “protection”, blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination. Similarly, Igbuzor ( 20 10 ), sees electoral violence as: A ny act of violence perpetuated in the course of political activities including, pre, during and post election periods, and may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with electoral processes. The above definitions are the hallmarks of electoral violence in N igeria’s fourth republic. Electoral Security Electoral Security is defined as “the process of protecting electoral stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers, media, and observers, electoral information and campaign materials; electoral facilities such as polling stations and counting centre and electoral 39 Olowojolu Olakunle; Rasak Bamidele; A ke M odupe , Ogundele Oluwaseun & A folayan Magdalene events such as campaign rallies against death, damage, or disruption of the electoral processes (USA ID) . Furthermore, Fischer ( 20 10 ) , defined electoral security as “the process of protecting electoral stakeholders, information, facilities or events. TH EO RETICA L FRA M EW O RK For the purpose of this discourse, this paper will rest on Karl M arx’s dialectical materialism which gives vivid explanations on electoral violence in N igeria. Karl M arx’s dialectical materialism suits N igeria’s scenario. A bbas (20 10 ) observed that dialectical materialism is premised on man’s inherent motivations of economic pursuits and needs. Thus, man’s fierce inclinations and struggles to acquire, control and maintain political power at all cost justify the choice of this theory. Therefore, the relations between the people in the production processes are symbiotically connected with the nature and direction of the political struggles to capture political power in order to determine economic fact ors. Furthermore, this assertion was supported by Dudley ( 1965 cited in Etannibi, 20 0 4) . Dudley said that: “The reality was that N igerian politicians perceived politics and political office as investment and as an avenue for the acquisition of extra ordinary wealth ( through corruption) which they think is not possible through other forms of legitimate vocation and enterprise. Thus, in N igeria, the shortest cut to affluence is through politics. Politics means money and money means politics…to be a member of the government party means open avenue to government patronage, contract deals and the like”. In a country where over 70 per cent of the population lives in extreme poverty, politics is seen as an escape route from poverty. This is worsened by the high level of corruption among public office holders in N igeria. Over the years, N igerian politicians and other public office holders have promoted ost entatious lifestyles not been mindful of the sufferings of the N igerian masses. One of N igeria’s brightest political scientists, Claude A ke ( 1964) asserted that:”Those 40 J ournal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. who win state power can have all the wealth they want even without working, while those who lose the struggle for state power cannot have security in the wealth they have made even by hard work. The capture of state power inevitably becomes a matter of life and death. That is one reason why our politics is so intense, anarchic and violent”. Comparatively, it has been discovered that elected representatives of the people at the local, state and federal levels of government earn higher wages and allowances more than their counterparts in the developed countries. Hence, the struggle for political power through any means becomes inevitable in N igeria’s political space. Electoral Violence Prior to 1999 Electoral violence in N igeria is traceable to the first republic especially during the 1964/ 65 elections. The dominant political parties in the first republic, namely; the A ction Group ( A G) , the N orthern People’s Congress (N PC) and the N ational Council of N igeria and Cameroons (N CN C) were ethnically based parties t hat wanted to maintain the wide followership they enjoyed from the regions were they emerged. A G was essentially the party for the Yoruba race, N CN C was regarded as Ibo party, while N PC was predominantly an Hausa/ Fulani party. During the 1964/ 65 elections, politicians were involved in wide scale murder, kidnapping and arson. A lso, there were gross irregularities in the conduct of the elections that precipitated the military to stage a coup that ended N igeria’s first democratic experiment. Electoral violence reared its ugly head again during the highly controversial 1983 general elections. The elections were massively rigged for instance, in the then Oyo and Ondo states, the two Unity Party of N igeria (UPN ) controlled states were declared for the ruling N ational Party of N igeria ( N PN ) . The announcement led to the outbreak of violence ( Babarinsa, 20 0 2). The scandalous 1983 elections caused general apathy among N igerians. It was not surprising when the military intervened by ousting President Shehu Shagari on December 31, 1983. 41 Olowojolu Olakunle; Rasak Bamidele; A ke M odupe , Ogundele Oluwaseun & A folayan Magdalene The June 12, 1993 election organized by then M ilitary President, General Ibrahim Babangida was expected to break the jinx of N igeria’s chequered political history. The campaign strategies; government’s support, the enthusiasm of registered voters and the generality of N igerians towards June 12, 1993 are yet t o be surpassed. The election was supposed to put an end to the eventful regime of General Ibrahim Babangida and usher in a democratically elected government (Olowojolu, 20 15). Two political parties were created namely, Social Democratic Party ( SDP) and N ational Republican Convention (N RC) . The June 12, 1993 was unique in the sense that the two political parties fielded two muslim candidates in the person of highly influential billionaire M KO A biola and the affable Bashir Tofa. M KO A biola, a Yoruba from Western N igeria was the Presidential flag bearer for SDP while, Bashir Tofa, a native of old N orthern cit y, Kano was the Presidential candidate of N RC ( Olowojolu, 20 15) . Despite the choice of SDP in picking A lhaji Babagana Kingibe as running mate, N igerians did not raise eyebrows on the muslim- muslim ticket of SDP. On the other hand, N RC picked Sylvester Ugoh, a Christian from Eastern N igeria as Tofa’s running mate. Throughout the electioneering period, religious and ethnic affiliations did not influence voting patterns of N igerians. June 12, 1993 election widely believed to have been won by M KO A biola remains the freest and fairest election in N igeria’s history. The hopes of many N igerians were dashed when the military government annulled the presidential election. Shortly afterwards, nationwide protests, industrial strike action and civil disobedience engulfed the country. The post June 12 crisis led military ruler, General Babangida to abdicate his exalted position as head of state on A ugust 27, 1993. General Babaginda hurriedly relinquished power to an unpopular Interim N ational Government ( IN G) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan (Olowojolu, 20 15) . The Interim N ational Government was sacked by General Sani A bacha on N ovember 17, 1993. In 1994, General A bacha arrested the acclaimed winner of June 12, 1993 election, M KO A biola on the 42 J ournal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. account of treason as A biola declared himself the president elect. A bacha’s authoritarian regime expired when the head of state died on June 8, 1998 under controversial circumstances. On June 7 1998, M KO A biola died on what was supposed to be his date of release. The newly appointed military ruler, General A bdulsalami A bubakar promised to return N igeria to civilian rule in 1999 (Olowojolu, 20 15) . Eventually, the military regime ushered in N igeria into the fourth republic. On M ay 29, 1999, ex- military ruler, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in as the President of N igeria. It marked the beginning of a new era in N igeria’s history. Trends and Patterns of Electoral Violence in the Fourth Republic N igeria’s fourth republic has witnessed the conduct of general elections in 1999, 20 0 3, 20 0 7, 20 11 and 20 15 respectively. These elections have been deeply enmeshed in series of violence before, during and after the elections. The 1999 elections had minimal record of violence largely because the military supervised the electoral process that birthed the fourth republic. The 20 0 3 elections were conducted by President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration who was seeking his second tenure. The 20 0 3 elections were characterized by manipulation, rigging, thuggery and the assassination of perceived political opponents. The ruling People’s Democratic Part y ( PDP) swept t he polls as it consolidated its hold on the N igerian political landscape. A fter the completion of two terms as President, Obasanjo’s administration conducted perhaps the worst election in N igeria’s history. Prior to the 20 0 7 elections, the outgoing President Obasanjo asserted that the election was going to be a “do- or- die” for the ruling PDP. A nimashaun (20 0 8), argued that there were massive irregularities in the 20 0 7 elections and it was characterized by inflation of voting figures, declaration of results where elections were never held or not conclusive, intimidation of voters as well as manipulation of the security services. Results of elections conducted in some were totally different from those announced in A buja contrary t o the provisions of t he 20 0 6 Electoral 43 Olowojolu Olakunle; Rasak Bamidele; A ke M odupe , Ogundele Oluwaseun & A folayan Magdalene A ct (TM G, 20 0 7). The Human Rights W atch (20 0 7) noted that there were scores of political killings, bombings and armed clashes between rival political groups. The outcome of the 20 0 7 elections generated a lot of controversies and wide spread condemnation from both the local and international observers. The winner of the presidential election, late Umaru M usa Yaradua admitted that the electoral process in 20 0 7 was highly fraudulent. Shortly after assuming office as the Executive President, Yaradua instituted an Electoral Reform Commit tee headed by Justice Uwais with a view towards correcting the ills in N igeria’s electoral system. Some of the recommendations of the Electoral Reform Committee were included in the amended Electoral A ct. It is also on record that Yaradua’s administration promoted non- interference in the judiciary. This was evident in the various judgements dispensed at both the Tribunal and A ppeal courts over electoral disputes. Gubernatorial elections in states such as Ekiti, Osun, Edo and Ondo that were initially declared to have been won by PDP were upturned in favour of A ction Congress of N igeria ( A CN ) and Labour Party ( LP) respectively (A niekwe, et al, 20 11). The 20 11 general elections were adjudged by many observers as the most credible election organized by the Independent N ational Electoral Commission (IN EC) since 1999. For example, Terence M cCulley, U.S. A mbassador to N igeria praised the N ational A ssembly election as the first- ever ‘credible, transparent, free and fair general election’ in N igeria, and declared that it provided a ‘historic opportunit y for N igeria to consolidate its democracy and further expand its voice on the world stage’ (A gbambu and A jayi, 20 11) . In the same vein, EU Election Observation M ission to N igeria said ‘the 20 11 general elections marked an important step towards strengthening democratic elections in N igeria, but challenges remain’ (EU EOM , 20 11) . Prior to the presidential polls, some N orthern politicians including A damu Ciroma, Iyorchia A yu, Lawal Kaita, Bello Kirfi, Yahaya 44 J ournal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. Kwande, and Bashir Yusuf Ibrahim wrote a letter to the PDP N ational Chairman on 17 September 20 10 requesting the party leadership to restrain President Goodluck Jonathan from contesting the 20 11 elections under the party’s platform. The group argued that eightyear, two- term presidency ceded to the N orth in line with the PDP, which began with former President Umaru M usa Yar’A dua in 20 0 7, must continue through another N ortherner following Yar’A dua’s death. The group warned that the failure of the ruling PDP to apply the principle of zoning would threaten the stability of N igeria, saying; ‘we are extremely worried that our party’s failure to deliver justice in this matter ( power- shift to the N orth) may ignite a series of events, the scope of magnitude of which we can neither proximate nor contain’ ( A bdallah, 20 10 , Obia, 20 10 ). Inflammatory messages sent through the social media worsened the tensions created by religious and ethnic campaigning by supporters of President Jonathan and M uhammudu Buhari ( Harwood and Campbell, 20 10 ) . Figure 1.0 20 11 Presidential Election in N igeria 45 Olowojolu Olakunle; Rasak Bamidele; A ke M odupe , Ogundele Oluwaseun & A folayan Magdalene The N orthern states of the country were thrown into chaos and anarchy after Dr. Goodluck Jonathan was declared the winner of the 20 11 presidential election. Human Rights W at ch (20 11) reported that about 80 0 lives were lost as a result of the post election violence. Similarly, the Human Rights Watch (20 11) claimed that more than 65,0 0 0 people were displaced after the 20 11 post election violence. The N igerian Red Cross Society released a slightly lower figure indicating that the violence displaced 48,0 0 0 persons in 12 states (Omenazu and Paschal, 20 11). In the run up to the 20 15 elections, the security challenges had become worrisome most especially in N orthern N igeria and A buja the Federal Capital Territory. This is largely due to the meteoric rise in the Boko Haram Insurgency. The CLEEN Foundation Security Threat A ssessment published in M arch 20 15 found that 15 states were on red alert level. The N ational Human Rights Commission ( N H RC) in it s Pre- Election Report stated that at least 58 persons have been killed even before the conduct of 20 15 general elections (CLEEN , 20 15) . There were changes in the political configuration of the country as could be seen in the formation of a mega opposition party, the A ll Progressives Congress (A PC) . Formed in 20 13, A PC was the amalgamation of the Congress for Progressive Change ( CPC) ; the A ction Congress of N igeria ( A CN ) ; the A ll N igeria People’s Party (A N PP) and a faction of A ll Progressive Grand A lliance ( A PGA ). Former military ruler, General M uhammudu Buhari (retd) was picked as the presidential flag bearer for A PC. On the other hand, the PDP which has dominated N igeria’s political space since 1999 chose the incumbent president, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan as the presidential candidate. Prior t o the 20 15 polls, PDP suffered setbacks due to the mass exodus of key political players to A PC. Jonathan who hails from the Ijaw ethnic group in the South- South region was perceived as the candidate of the South East and South- South of N igeria. 46 J ournal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. N ew measures were introduced with the view towards curbing electoral fraud and electoral violence during the 20 15 general elections. The Independent N ational Electoral Commission ( IN EC) under the leadership of Prof A ttahiru Jega introduced the use of Card Readers and Permanent Voters Card ( PVC) for the upcoming 20 15 general elections. The technology of the Card Reader system has ensured credible elections in Ghana, Kenya and Sierra Leone ( Vanguard, February 25, 20 15). A ccording to IN EC, there were 66 reports of violent incidence all across the country. The violence were recorded in Rivers State ( 16 incidents) ; Ondo ( 8) ; Cross Rivers ( 6) ; Ebonyi ( 6); A kwa Ibom ( 5); Bayelsa (4) ; Lagos and Kaduna ( 3 each); Jigawa, Enugu, Ekiti (2 each) ; Katsina, Kogi, Plateau, A bia, Imo, Kano and Ogun (one each) ( Vanguard, A pril 12, 20 15). The European Union Election Observation M ission reported that about 30 people were killed on A pril 11, 20 15 Election Day as a result of inter- party clashes and attacks on election sites ( EU EOM , 20 15) . The roles of some stakeholders and the international community in ensuring a peaceful election cannot be overemphasized. A former M inister of Foreign A ffairs, Prof. Bolaji A kinyemi appealed to the major contestants of the presidential election to sign a M emorandum of Understanding (M OU) that will commit them to control their supporters against violence after the 20 15 general elections ( Punch, December 22, 20 14). Similarly, the N at ional Peace Committee for the 20 15 General Elections led by former military ruler, General A bdulsalami A bubakar ( retd) facilitated peace accord bet ween General Buhari ( retd) and President Jonathan (Punch, M arch 26, 20 15) . Concerned that N igeria could burst into flames, A merica’s Secretary of State, John Kerry flew to Lagos to discuss about the 20 15 elections with President Jonathan and General Buhari ( retd) respectively ( Gordon, 20 15). Overall, the 20 15 general elections were adjudged to be quite successful and more credible than every other election since the 47 Olowojolu Olakunle; Rasak Bamidele; A ke M odupe , Ogundele Oluwaseun & A folayan Magdalene commencement of the fourth republic. The A PC made history at the 20 15 polls by becoming the first opposition party to defeat the ruling party in N igeria. Thus, former military dictator, Gen. M uhammudu Buhari ( retd) who had previously contested for the presidency in 20 0 3, 20 0 7 and 20 11 upstaged the incumbent president, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. The finest hour during the general polls was the noble character displayed by erstwhile President Jonathan when he accepted his defeat and ensured a smooth transition process that ushered in Buhari’s administration on M ay 29, 20 15. RECO M M EN DA TION S A N D CON CLUSIO N Indeed, the 20 15 general elections re- ignited the hopes of many N igerians who believe in the enormous potential of the country as a leader in A frica. In order to ensure to institutionalize true democracy in N igeria, the paper has come up with recommendations. Firstly, government at all levels should ensure that electoral offenders before, during and after the elections are arrested and made to face the court of law. This will serve as deterrence to the financiers and foot soldiers that use violence to promot e their political objectives. Secondly, N igeria must improve on its existing security apparatuses in order to combat the dynamic and sophisticated 21st century security challenges. Recruitment of securit y personnel ought to be based on merit. Government should ensure that the funds made available to the security agencies are judiciously utilized for the acquisition of skills and the procurement of up to date equipment. Thirdly, the Government should form a platform that will accommodate all stakeholders such as the politicians, the media, civil society organizations and religious institutions at the local, state and national levels in order to sensitize and re- orientate N igerians on peaceful co- existence and the consequences of electoral violence. This enlightenment programme should be sustained in order to help N igerians inculcate democratic norms and values. 48 J ournal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. Furthermore, the fight against corruption, which has eaten deep int o the fabrics of the N igerian society, should be given top priority by successive governments in N igeria. A s long as public office holders and their acolytes continue to live in stupendous wealth, political violence will remain a central feature of N igerian politics. A gain, it is high time successive governments in N igeria invested in rapid socioeconomic transformation through diversification of the economy, increase in foreign direct investment and proper management of the vast wealth of the country. Once N igeria can attain appreciable economic development, the struggle for political power will experience a sharp decline. In conclusion, this paper has attempted to review the trends in electoral violence in N igeria. It identified the economic interests of politicians as the major force behind electoral violence using Dialectical M aterialism as its theoretical standpoint. The out come of the 20 15 polls in N igeria is considered as the beginning of a new chapter in N igeria. N igeria only needs to build on the good legacies left behind by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s administration and IN EC under the chairmanship of Prof. A ttahiru Jega for a brighter future. REFEREN CES A bbas, I.M . (20 10 ) . Election violence in N igeria and the problem of democratic politics. Seminar Paper presented at the Department of Political Science, A BU Zaria on February 26. A bdallah, N .M . (20 10 ) , ‘Zoning: N wodo snubs Ciroma, A yu, others’, Sunday Trust, 10 October. http:/ / sundaytrust.com.ng/ i ndex.php?option=com A gbambu, C. and A jayi, A . ( 20 11) , ‘US Rates N igeria’s Elections High, Says Country M ade H istory with A pril Polls…’ N igerian Tribune ( Ibadan) , 29 A pril . 49 Olowojolu Olakunle; Rasak Bamidele; A ke M odupe , Ogundele Oluwaseun & A folayan Magdalene A ke, C. (1964). ‘The Political Question’ in O. Oyediran (ed). Governance and Development in N igeria: Essays in Honour of Professor B.J. Dudley. Ibadan. Oyediran Consult International. A lbert, I.O. (20 0 7). Reconceptualizing electoral violence in N igeria, In I.O. A lbert, D. M arco and V. A detula ( Eds). Perspectives on the 20 0 3 Elections in N igeria. A buja: IDA SA and SterlingHolding Publishers. A niekwe, C.C. and Kushie, J. ( 20 11) . Electoral violence situational analysis: Identifying hotspots in the 20 11 general elections in N igeria (A Report Submitted to N ational A ssociation for Peaceful Elections in N igeria ( N A PEN ) , A buja, N igeria. A nimashaun, M .A . (20 0 8) . The 20 0 7 elections and the imperative of electoral reform in N igeria. Covenant Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 1 and 2, 123- 141. Babarinsa, D. (20 0 2). The house of war. Lagos. Tell Communication Publishers. CLEEN Foundation ( 20 15) . Electoral Violence Risks in the 20 15 Gubernatorial Elections. A Policy Brief, Election Security Brief 0 12. Ettanibi, O.A . ( 20 0 4) . Elections as Organized Crime: N igerian Experience. Paper presented at the Centre for A frican Studies Seminar, at the University of Cape Town, on M ay 12. EU EOM (20 11) , EU Observation M ission to N igeria: Final Report on the 20 11 General Elections: A buja: European Union. European Union Election Observation M ission ( 20 15). Final Report on General Elections 28 M arch and 11 A pril 20 15. Fischer, J. ( 20 0 2) . Electoral conflict and violence IFES. W ashington, D.C. 50 J ournal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. Fischer, J. ( 20 10 ) . “Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention”. Washington, D.C: International Foundation for Election Systems. Gordon, M . ( 20 15), Kerry M eets With N igerian Leaders to Encourage Peaceful Election, The N ew York Times, January 25. Harwood, A . and Campbell, J. ( 20 10 ), ‘Opinion: Text M essaging as a Weapon in N igeria’. Global Post, September 22.http:/ / www.globalpost.com/ dispat ch/ africa/ 10 0 916/ textmessaging- weapon- northern- nigeria Human Rights Watch. ( 20 0 7) . Election or “Selection”? Human rights abuse and threats to free and fair elections in N igeria. N ew York. Human Rights W atch. (20 11) . N igeria: Post- Election Violence Killed 80 0 . Washington DC: H uman Rights W at ch http:/ / www.hrw.org/ news/ 20 11/ 0 5/ 16/ nigeria- post- electionviolence- killed- 80 0 . Igbuzor, O. (20 10 ) . Electoral violence in N igeria. A saba, A ction A id N igeria. IN EC’s website, M ap of 20 11 Presidential Election M ap. See http:/ / www.inecnigeria.org Obia, V. (20 10 ) , ‘Tough Talk in Tough Times’, ThisDay, N ovember. http:/ / ww w.this daylive .com/ articl es/ t oug h- talk- intough times/ 743531. Ogundiya, S.I. and Baba, T.K. ( 20 0 5) . Election Violence and the Prospects of Democratic Consolidation in N igeria in Odofin & Omojuwa ( eds) ops cit. Olowojolu, O. ( 20 15), Ethnicit y and Religion: Key Indicators in N igeria’s Electoral System, International Conference on Social Sciences, Istanbul, Turkey. 51 Olowojolu Olakunle; Rasak Bamidele; A ke M odupe , Ogundele Oluwaseun & A folayan Magdalene Omenazu, E. and Paschal, N . ( 20 11). ‘N igerians Displaced Polls Violence- Red Cross’, Daily Independent ( Lagos), 21 A pril. Osumah, O. and A ghemelo, T. ( 20 10 ). Elections in N igeria since the End of M ilitary Rule. A FRICA N A . Volume 4, N o.2. Roberts & Edwards ( 1991) cited in Omotola (20 0 7 Omotola, J.S. (20 0 7). Godfathers and the 20 0 7 N igerian general elections. Journal of A frican Elections. 6( 2), pp.134- 154. Transition M onitoring Group ( 20 0 7). Report on 20 0 7 Elections. USA ID (20 10 ) . Electoral Security Framework Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers. Washington D.C: United States A gency for International Development. Vanguard (20 15) . Buhari threatens to back out of A buja A ccord, February 25. http:/ / www.vanguardngr.com/ 20 15/ 0 2/ buharithreatens- to- back- of- abuja- accord/ Vanguard ( 20 15). “Election Violence: IN EC to bring culprits t o justice”, A pril 12. http:/ / www.vanguardngr.com/ 20 15/ 0 4/ elec tion- violence- inec- to- bring- culprits- t ojustice/ # sthash.c5RnM BVb.dpuf. Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary. ( 20 0 6). pp 583- 584. Reference to this paper should be m ade as follows: Olowojolu Olakunle et al., (20 19) , Trends in Electoral Violence in N igeria. J. of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Vol. 11, N umber 1, Pp. 37- 52 52