Metaphysica 2022; aop
Joshua R. Sijuwade*
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of
God
https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0036
Published online May 13, 2022
Abstract: In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim
that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence
of the infinite plurality of concrete and abstract possible worlds, posited by David
K. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. This assessment will be carried out within the
(modified) explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne, which will lead to the
conclusion that the existence of God provides a true fundamental explanation
for these specific entities. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation,
we have another good abductive argument for God’s existence and grounds for
affirming a weaker form of the principle of methodological naturalism in our
metaphysical theorising.
Keywords: god, modality, explanation, worlds, actuality, abduction
1 Introduction
Theism, the claim that there is a God, has traditionally been taken to be an
explanation that plays an influential role in accounting for the various facets of
the fundamental structure of reality, which have been systematically studied by
the philosophical field of metaphysics. Yet, in contemporary metaphysics, Theism
has been relegated to the sidelines, with various metaphysicians (epistemologists
and ethicists etc.) following the precedent set by contemporary scientific practice
and adopting a position of methodological naturalism as a guiding principle for
their philosophical investigations. That is, the methodological orientation that is
provided by naturalism has been, as noted by Rouse (2008), ‘the predominant
orientation in analytic philosophy for perhaps the last third of the 20th Century,
especially in the United States; even its critics now commonly endorse some more
tolerant and inclusive version of naturalism’. Hence, in understanding the nature
*Corresponding author: Joshua R. Sijuwade, London School of Theology, Green Lane,
Northwood, HA6 2UW, UK, E-mail: joshua.sijwade@lst.ac.uk
2 | J. R. Sijuwade
of this specific methodological orientation, we can follow Draper (2005, 279) and
adopt the following construal of the notion (with a specific re-interpretation of it
within a metaphysical context):1
(1)
(Methodological Naturalism) An individual should not appeal to supernatural entities when they explain certain data that is in the explanatory scope
of a metaphysical theory.
At the heart of the principle of methodological naturalism is a working
assumption that supernatural entities – entities that are ‘not a part of nature
and can affect nature’ (Draper, 2005, 277) – do not have any part to play in our
metaphysical theorising. Now, as God is traditionally taken to be a supernatural
entity, the existence (and action of) God is not to be viewed as a viable explanation
for any of the ‘data’ that one is seeking to account for through their metaphysical theory. A key question to be answered is: is this position expressed by (1)
warranted? One of the central aims of this article will be to argue that it is not,
as it will be shown that Theism can indeed play an important role in accounting for certain data that is in the explanatory scope of two prominent theories
within the field of contemporary metaphysics,2 and thus, given this role, this data
will also serve as evidence in favour of Theism. More precisely, this article will
focus on assessing the manner in which Theism is the best explanation for the
occurrence of a certain set of metaphysical data and thus, because of this, can
play a ‘fundamental’ role in an important field of contemporary metaphysics.
Hence, Theism is indeed a viable explanation that should not be sidelined in
our metaphysical investigations. To achieve this end, I will assume in this article the cogency of Richard Swinburne’s explanatory framework and resituate
it within a metaphysical context, which will provide a means for me to assess
the extent to which Theism can provide a true fundamental explanation for the
existence of certain entities that feature in the influential modal metaphysical
theories proposed by David K. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga.3 And thus, given the
1 More fully, Draper (2005, 279) provides a definition of the notion of methodological naturalism within a scientific context. Nonetheless, this definition is flexible enough to capture the
methodology that is also followed in the field of contemporary metaphysics (and the wider field
of philosophy in general).
2 Though two specific concepts (of modal metaphysics) will be under focus, it is important to
note that the argument formulated in this article can be extended to other concepts (of modal
metaphysics) as well.
3 In the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion literature, there is a lively debate concerning the consistency of Theism and Lewis’ modal metaphysics – which has been termed ‘Theistic
Modal Realism’. Outside of (Almeida 2017a), there has not been much focus on the theoretical
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 3
truth of this type of explanation, we will have in front of us a new abductive
argument for the existence of God – specifically, an argument for God’s existence based on the fact of him being the best (fundamental) explanation for
the existence for these entities, when otherwise we would not expect them to
exist.4 Hence, at the end of our exploratory journey, we will thus have one more
good reason to believe in the existence of God, and further reason to not adopt
such a stringent methodological naturalistic methodology in our metaphysical
investigations.
Thus the plan of action is as follows: in Section 2 (‘Explanatory Framework’),
I detail the nature of Swinburne’s explanatory framework and resituate it within
a metaphysical context. In Section 3 (‘Explanatory Target’), I explain the specific
explanatory target that is under focus – the existence of an infinite plurality of
concrete or abstract possible worlds. In Section 4 (‘Explanatory Analysis’), I assess
Theism and the alternative positions provided by Lewis and Plantinga, which we
can term ‘Primitivism’. Both of these explanatory options will be assessed in light
of their fulfilment of the abductive criteria detailed in Section 1, with the final
conclusion being that Theism is the only explanation that fulfils these criteria – it
is the simplest explanation, fitting with our background knowledge, that leads us
to expect the data, when otherwise it would not be expected. Theism is thus the
best candidate to be a fundamental explanation of the existence of the data that
is within the explanatory scope of the metaphysical theories under study. Finally,
there will be a concluding section (‘Conclusion’) that will summarise the position
that has been argued for in this article.
benefits of Theistic Modal Realism – and even in the aforementioned work, there has not been
any analysis in the literature of the veracity of Theistic Modal Realism and the evidential basis
that it is ground upon. This article thus seeks to provide this much-needed analysis that can
help to push the discussion on from the consistency of Theistic Modal Realism onto a discussion
concerning its veracity.
4 An abductive argument is a type of argument for the truth of a conclusion that employs
‘abductive reasoning’. Abductive reasoning is a form of reasoning that typically starts with a
set of data and proceeds from this set to the ‘best’ explanation for it, in accord with certain
explanatory criteria. Thus, the type of argument that will be formulated in this article is of this
kind – though it will be stated at an informal level. For a further explanation of the nature
of abductive reasoning, and a comparison of this type of reasoning with that of deductive and
inductive reasoning, see (Douven 2021). Furthermore, the argument that features in this article
is to be read as an extension of two similar arguments for the existence of God based on the
existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the layered structure of reality, and the
instantiation of the grounding relation that connects the non-fundamental entities within this
structure, both of which featured in (Sijuwade 2021c) and (Sijuwade 2021d).
4 | J. R. Sijuwade
2 Explanatory Framework
2.1 Nature of Metaphysical Explanation
In contemporary metaphysics, the nature of a metaphysical explanation is a
hotly contested issue. However, a minimal understanding of a true metaphysical
explanation, as noted by individuals such as Maurin (2019, 1574), is that of it
invoking entities and a non-causal explanatory connection, which accounts for
the nature and/or existence of one entity with reference to another entity, that the
former non-causally and synchronically depends upon. More precisely, we can
construe the nature of a true metaphysical explanation as such:
(2)
(Metaphysical Explanation) An explanation is a true metaphysical explanation of the nature and/or existence of a given entity when it invokes a what
(i.e. a ground) that the entity non-causally and synchronically depends upon
and a why (i.e. a principle) that explains the reason for the dependence of
the former entity on the latter entity.
Once these factors are in place – the what and why – we have a true metaphysical
explanation for the nature and/or existence of a given entity at a specific time.
More specifically, a true metaphysical explanation provides the correct answer to
questions of what determines or makes one entity exist and be what it is. Moreover,
a metaphysical explanation, unlike a general explanation, is focused on providing
a synchronic explanation for the constitutive generation of a dependent outcome
at a specific point in time. And this is done by invoking an entity and a principle or, more specifically, following Schaffer (2017, 305), a ‘law of metaphysics’
– which is simply that of a counterfactual-supporting general principle stating
what grounds what – where grounding is an asymmetric, necessitating dependence relation that links the more fundamental entities to the less fundamental
entities, and is best conceptualised as a type of causation: metaphysical causation.
More fully, as an asymmetric, necessitating dependence relation, grounding has
many important features in common with causation, which leads one to infer that
the best explanation of this striking similarity is that of grounding being identical
to metaphysical causation – which is to be held in distinction from nomological
causation. Specifically, following Wilson (2018),5 we can take the grounding relation to be a special case of the causal relation where, as Wilson (2018, 724) notes,
5 In following Wilson in taking grounding to be identical to causation – metaphysical causation
– we are not taking grounding to be analogous to, but distinct from, causation as Schaffer (2016)
does. For the reasons why Schaffer does not make this identification, see (Schaffer, 2016, 94–96).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 5
‘whenever A grounds B, A is a (metaphysical) cause of B and B is a (metaphysical) effect of A’. Metaphysical causation and nomological causation, are thus
different species of the same genus: causation, such that, for the former, once one
distinguishes the more from the less fundamental, it is quite natural to posit an
explanatorily-backing, generative relation of metaphysical causation. Thus, the
similarity between grounding (i.e. metaphysical causation) and causation (i.e.
nomological causation) centres on the manner in which the causal sufficiency
relation is mediated within a causal and grounding context. More precisely, if
laws of nature mediate a given instance of the causal sufficiency relation, then
it is a case of nomological causation – for example, the throwing of a stone is a
sufficient nomological cause of the breaking of a window, as this causal relation
is mediated by laws of nature. Whereas if the (law-like) principles of grounding
fulfil the role of mediating a given instance of the causal sufficiency relation, then
it is a case of metaphysical causation – for example, the existence of Socrates is
a sufficient metaphysical cause of the existence of Socrates’ singleton set, as this
causal relation is mediated by the (law-like) principles of grounding.6 Grounding
(i.e. metaphysical causation) and nomological causation are thus simply different ways for the causal relation to be mediated and thus obtain (Wilson 2018).7
With this notion of grounding to hand, we can now turn back our attention onto
elucidating our metaphysical explanatory framework.
In utilising Swinburne’s (2004) explanatory framework within a metaphysical context – which focuses on assessing the veracity of physical or scientific
explanation – we can see that there are at least two possible kinds of metaphysical explanation: inanimate metaphysical explanation and personal metaphysical
explanation.8 An inanimate metaphysical explanation is one that invokes an
entity and a law of metaphysics in order to explain the nature and/or existence of
another entity – the what is the former entity and the why is the holding of the law
between it and the latter entity. Whilst, a personal metaphysical explanation is
one that invokes an entity, the beliefs, powers and purposes of that entity and a law
And for a summary of reasons why someone should make this identification, see (Wilson, 2018,
748).
6 Wilson (2018, 1–2) is more instructive than Schaffer (2016) in highlighting the importance of
the different ways that the causal sufficiency relation is mediated. Furthermore, Schaffer (2016,
57) uses the terms ‘laws of metaphysics’ rather than ‘principles of grounding’, which feature in a
later article (Schaffer 2021). We can thus take both of these terms to be synonymous and continue
using the latter.
7 For an explication of the notion of grounding within a theistic context, see (Sijuwade 2021b)
and (Sijuwade 2021d).
8 For an extended unpacking of Swinburne’s understanding of the nature of general or scientific
explanation, see (Swinburne 2004) and (Sijuwade 2021d).
6 | J. R. Sijuwade
of metaphysics in order to explain the nature and/or existence of another entity
– the what is the former entity and the why are the beliefs, powers and purposes
of that entity and the holding of the law between it and the latter entity. In the
metaphysical domain, and unlike in the general explanatory domain, inanimate
and personal metaphysical explanations converge – that is, laws of metaphysics
are present in both – where the only difference between these two different kinds
of explanation is that a personal metaphysical explanation, and not an inanimate
metaphysical explanation, includes the beliefs, powers and purposes of an entity
as an explanatory factor for the constitutive generation of a dependent outcome.
A metaphysical explanation of both kinds can come in three different forms.
It can, first, be a partial metaphysical explanation, which is a form of metaphysical explanation that includes factors – an entity and a law of metaphysics
– that another entity is only partially (non-causally and synchronically) dependent upon. For example, for an inanimate metaphysical explanation, the existence
of an H2 O molecule is partially explained by the existence of an h atom. And, for a
personal metaphysical explanation, the existence of a musical harmony at a certain time is partially explained by the existence of one individual who is singing
a note at that specific time. Within both kinds of explanation, the existence of
the latter entities does not necessitate the existence of the former entities. Second, a full metaphysical explanation is a form of a metaphysical explanation that
includes factors – an entity and a law of metaphysics – that another entity is
fully (non-causally and synchronically) dependent upon – the entity (or entities)
that constitutes a part of the explanatory set of factors is (or are) a ‘full ground’
of the other entity and thus deductively entail, and really explain, its existence.
For example, for an inanimate metaphysical explanation, the existence of an H2 O
molecule is fully metaphysically explained by the existence and arrangement of
2 h atoms and an O atom. And, for a personal metaphysical explanation, the existence of a musical harmony at a certain time is fully metaphysical explained by the
existence of two individuals who are singing a note at that specific time. Within
both kinds of explanation, the existence (and arrangement) of the latter entities
deductively entails, and really explains, the existence of the former entities. Third,
a complete metaphysical explanation is a special form of metaphysical explanation that includes factors – an entity and a law of metaphysics – that another
entity is fully (non-causally and synchronically) dependent upon, and which their
existence is not (non-causally and synchronically) dependent upon another contemporaneously existing entity. In other words, the what and why – that is, the
existence of the latter entity (and/or law) – is the fundamental reason for the former entity existing. So, given the importance of the notion of fundamentality for
this form of explanation, we can now re-term a complete metaphysical explanation as a fundamental explanation. Thus, for example, and to pre-empt the main
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 7
discussion of this article, for an inanimate fundamental explanation, it could be
the case that the existence of entities within the pluriverse or platonic realm is
fundamentally explained by another physical entity, or, in fact, it could be that
they lack an explanation due to these entities being fundamental entities. Or, for
a personal fundamental explanation, it could be the case that the existence of the
entities within the pluriverse is fundamentally explained by the existence of God
(who is himself also a fundamental entity). Now, following Bennett (2011, 27) and
Schaffer (2009), we can take the term ‘fundamental’ – that is at the heart of this
type of explanation – to be synonymous with the term ‘ungrounded’ – such that
if x grounds y, then x is more fundamental than y (though not vice versa), and if x
is ungrounded, then x is absolutely fundamental – which is thus that of this type
of entity being one that has nothing in virtue of which it exists, obtains, or occurs.
Nevertheless, within both kinds of explanation, the existence of the latter entities
deductively entails, and really explains, the existence of the former entities, and
of which there is no further explanation, in the form of contemporaneous, or,
more fundamental factors, for the former entities existing as they do. Taking all
of this into account, these are the different kinds and forms of explanation that
are available within a non-metaphysical and metaphysical context. The important question to be faced now then is: what are the justificatory grounds for one
believing that they have acquired a true, complete explanation for the occurrence
of a given phenomenon or a fundamental explanation for the existence of a given
entity?
2.2 Justification of Metaphysical Explanation
In the context of determining the correct grounds for ‘theory choice’, the justificatory basis on which an explanation is judged to be a correct terminus in
explanation – that is, how probable it is that this explanation is a fundamental
explanation of a particular entity – centres on the extent to which it has (or can
achieve a ‘trade-off’ between) the specific theoretical (or explanatory) virtues of
minimising commitments (at the fundamental level) and maximising explanation
of the data at hand. More specifically, this theoretical aim is (plausibly) achieved
by a candidate explanation fulfilling the following abductive criteria:9
9 For the attentive reader, one will notice that the conceptualisation of the abductive criteria that
is about to be provided is more fine-tuned and robust than that offered in (Sijuwade 2021c) and
(Sijuwade 2021d) by it taking into account – and modifying at certain points – some helpful ideas
concerning theory choice that have been proposed by Graham Oppy – and thus which are not to
be found in the work of Swinburne. Thus, for a further helpful explanation of the importance of
the ‘trade-off’ between minimising commitments and maximising explanation, see (Oppy, 2019,
8 | J. R. Sijuwade
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
The criterion of predictive power
The criterion of background knowledge
The criterion of scope
The criterion of parsimony
For (i): the criterion of predictive power, this criterion assesses whether the postulated explanation predicts the existence of the entity, when otherwise this
event or entity would not be expected to have existed. Importantly, however, as
Swinburne (2004, 70) notes, the ability for an explanation (of a general and metaphysical kind) to predict the data does not imply that this explanation has to do
this in a literal sense (i.e. that the event or entities that constitute the data will
be observed to have occurred or to exist in the future). Rather, an explanation is
only required to provide a sufficient explanation for the data, whether or not this
data was obtained in the past. For (ii): the criterion of background knowledge,
this criterion assesses whether the postulated explanation meshes with other
explanations that are rendered probable by this abductive criteria. That is, an
explanation fits with background knowledge if the entities invoked by the explanation are similar to those entities that are taken to exist (and fulfil some valuable
explanatory role) within other neighbouring fields.10
For (iii): the criterion of scope, this criterion assesses how much the postulated explanation seeks to explain. Generally, an explanation that seeks to
explain more data is less probably true than one that is more restricted in its
explanatory range. However, as Swinburne (2004, 56) sees it, this criterion is not
to be given very much weight, since the specific restrictions of the scope of an
explanation are often arbitrary and complicated, and thus explanations that have
a narrower scope are – although more probably true – typically less simple than
explanations of a much wider scope. Thus, given the importance of the criterion of
120–121). Furthermore, knowledge concerning the truth of this abductive criteria, according
to Swinburne (2001, 122), is obtainable a priori. Moreover, these criteria are taken to be at
the heart of scientific and historical practice – that is, scientists and historians, according to
Swinburne (2001, 74), regularly employ these abductive criteria in their investigations.
10 Swinburne (2004, 60) sees the criterion of background knowledge as being limited in its
usage, in that it is only applicable to explanations that have a narrow scope as, according to
Swinburne, the amount of evidence that resides within the background knowledge, with which
a given explanation will need to fit will decrease the range of its scope. Thus, in Swinburne’s
thought, there will not be any background knowledge that an explanation of enormous scope
will need to fit with. In response to this, Philipse (2012, 210–212) has argued that Swinburne’s
reasoning in support of one eliminating the criterion of background knowledge is fallacious – it
is subject to the ‘fallacy of division’ – and thus must be abandoned. Adjudicating this debate will
take us too far afield, and thus going forward, we will simply continue to maintain this specific
abductive criterion for our analysis of the candidate fundamental explanations.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 9
parsimony which is to be seen now, the criterion of scope is generally less important for determining the probable truth of an explanation. For (iv): the criterion
of parsimony (or simplicity),11 this criterion focuses on assessing the theoretical
commitments required by an explanation – and how successful it is at minimising
these. The nature of these theoretical commitments can be conceived of ontologically (i.e. ontological parsimony) and ideologically (i.e. ideological parsimony).
Ontological and ideological parsimony can come in two varieties: quantitative
ontological/ideological parsimony and qualitative/ideological parsimony. For the
former variety, an explanation is, first, quantitatively ontologically parsimonious
if it postulates the fewest number of entities (i.e. objects, properties and relations).
For example, suppose one wants to assess the explanatory virtue of two physical
theories that equally explain a given set of physical phenomena – yet the first
theory explains the phenomena by positing the existence of a single particle (i.e.
one object), while the second theory explains the phenomena by positing the
existence of two particles (i.e. two objects) – then the first theory, in comparison
to the second theory, would posit the existence of the fewer number of entities and
thus have greater quantitative ontological parsimony. Second, an explanation is
quantitatively ideologically parsimonious if it includes the fewest number of theoretical primitives (i.e. undefined terms). For example, suppose one wants to assess
the explanatory virtue of two mereological theories that equally explain a given
set of metaphysical data – yet the first theory utilises uses ‘part’ to provide definitions for the terms ‘proper part’ and ‘overlap’ as well as other mereological and
compositional relations, whilst the second theory does not, but instead leaves the
terms ‘proper part’ and ‘overlap’ undefined – then the first theory, in comparison
to the second theory, would include a fewer number of theoretical primitives and
thus would have greater quantitative ideological parsimony (Finocchiaro 2021).
For the second variety, an explanation is, first, qualitatively ontologically parsimonious if it postulates the fewest number of kinds (i.e. ontological categories
and/or kinds of objects, properties and relations). For example, in analysing the
11 I take the terms ‘theory’ and ‘explanation’ to be synonymous and I will also alternate between
the terms ‘parsimony’ and ‘simplicity’ without any change in meaning. Furthermore, in previous
work: (Sijuwade 2021c) and (Sijuwade 2021d), I utilised Swinburne’s conception of the criterion
of simplicity, which states that an explanation is simple if it fewest entities, fewest properties
of entities, fewest kinds of entities, fewest kinds of properties, properties that are more readily
observable, the fewest separate laws with the fewest terms relating the fewest variables, and
the simplest formulation of each law being mathematically simple (Swinburne, 2004, 53). Since
the writing of those works, however, I have seen the importance of grounding this important
criterion on a more robust conception of parsimony that draws a distinction between ontology
and ideology in a manner that is more widespread in contemporary metaphysics. Nonetheless,
with that said, Swinburne’s conception does fit with the new conception of simplicity that is
being assumed in the present article.
10 | J. R. Sijuwade
explanatory virtue of a nominalist theory and a platonic realist theory – where
the former theory does not posit the existence of abstract objects but takes every
existing entity to have a spatial and/or temporal location, and the latter theory
does posit the existence of abstract objects – then the former theory, in comparison to the latter theory, would posit (at least) one less kind (of entity) and thus
have greater qualitative ontological parsimony (Finocchiaro 2021). Second, an
explanation is qualitatively ideologically parsimonious if it includes the fewest
number of kinds of theoretical primitives – which, following Finocchiaro (2021,
618), we can individuate by topic. For example, there is an ideological kind that
corresponds to colour – which would be a kind that includes colour predicates
like ‘red’, ‘green’ and ‘blue’ etc. Similarly, there is also an ideological kind that
corresponds to mereology. However, as the thesis of mereological nihilism (i.e. the
thesis that there are no objects with proper parts) does not utilise mereological
terminology, in comparison to other metaphysical theses, it would involve fewer
kinds of theoretical primitives and thus would have greater qualitative ideological parsimony. The criterion of parsimony thus centres on the quantitative and
qualitative ontological/ ideological parsimony of an explanation. However, in following Schaffer (2015, 647),12 and other leading contemporary metaphysicians,13
one can provide a further modification of this criterion within a metaphysical
context by focusing the quantitative and qualitative parsimony of an explanation
on that of fundamental entities, principles or laws, rather than all types of entities, principles or laws. A probably true fundamental explanation is thus one that
is quantitatively and qualitatively ontologically/ideologically parsimonious. The
quantitative and qualitative parsimony of a fundamental explanation is thus that
of it postulating the fewest fundamental entities (i.e. fundamental objects and
fundamental properties), fewest fundamental kinds, fewest fundamental theoretical primitives and fewest fundamental kinds of theoretical primitives. Hence,
12 Schaffer (2015), in a similar manner to Swinburne, also sees the importance of the criterion
of parsimony (or ‘Occam’s Razor’) for metaphysical theorising. However, Schaffer believes that
one must also include a specific restriction to the range of the Razor, which is that of it only
being applicable to fundamental entities and/or properties – Schaffer terms this additional
restriction the ‘Laser’. Interestingly, however, Schaffer’s Laser does not distinguish between
quantitative and qualitative ontological/ideological parsimony. Nevertheless, there is nothing
inherent within the Laser that should stop one from making this distinction.
13 The other contemporary metaphysicians that believe that one should adopt Schaffer’s Laser
as a criterion of theory choice, over that of Occam’s Razor, are that of Bennett (2017, 220),
Cameron (2010, 262), Sider (2013, 240) and Korman (2015, 75–76). For specific reasons in support
of Schaffer’s Laser – which can be divided into sub-arguments from thought experiments,
analogy, ontological innocence and probability theory – see, (Schaffer 2015) and Bennett (2017,
220–224).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 11
if a metaphysical explanation posits the existence of some new particular object,
property or kind – and involves some theoretical primitives – it is required by the
criterion of parsimony that it should postulate as few as possible, and it should
postulate no more than those that are needed to explain the observational data
– in short, it should minimise (ontological and ideological) commitments at the
fundamental level and maximise explanation of the data at hand.
These are the abductive criteria that provide justificatory grounds for holding to the probable truth of a particular metaphysical explanation. Within a
metaphysical explanation, we seek an explanation that minimises fundamental
commitments and maximises explanation – more specifically, that is, it is the
simplest explanation, fitting with our background knowledge, which leads us to
expect the phenomena or entities that do in fact occur or exist, when otherwise
this would not be expected. And the fulfilment of these criteria is the grounds
for one determining the stopping point for a purported fundamental explanation.
More precisely, a full metaphysical explanation of the existence of a collection
of entities is a fundamental explanation, if we believe that the existence of the
entities under question could only be explained further by postulating further full
grounds acting contemporaneously with the entities, which do not have any more
simplicity, greater fit with background knowledge and predictive power than the
full grounds (and laws) featured in the former explanation – these full grounds
would serve as the terminus of explanation as we do not have any further minimisation of commitments and maximisation of explanation. One would thus be
justified in taking a certain candidate explanation to be a fundamental explanation if one had reason to believe that any particular gain in the fulfilment of
one of the abductive factors (i.e. parsimony, fit with background knowledge or
predictive power) would be outweighed by a corresponding loss of another. Thus,
for example, any attempt to provide an alternative explanation of the existence of
a given entity would result in one postulating a more complex explanation – and
thus, it fails to fulfil Criterion (iv) – with only a potentially marginal gain in predictive power (or fit with background knowledge). One is thus to move beyond the
data, and the currently existing explanations of it, only if there is a possibility of
a greater fulfilment of the abductive criteria, and that will be so if there is a potential explanation that is simpler and/or explains the data better, whilst still fitting
with background knowledge – in short, it allows us to make less commitments
at the fundamental level and/or provides a better explanation of the data. Thus,
in regards to Theism, and whether it can serve as a fundamental explanation of
a certain set of metaphysical data, one will need to establish whether Theism,
relative to the data, sufficiently meets the abductive criteria – in that it allows us
to minimise (ontological and ideological) commitments at the fundamental level
and maximise explanation of the data at hand (i.e. our explanatory target). And if
12 | J. R. Sijuwade
it does, given the nature that God is taken to have, he must serve as a fundamental
explanation of this data. In short, once we establish that Theism is probably true
– that is, it is the simplest explanation, fitting with our background knowledge,
that led us to expect the data, when otherwise it would not be expected – then
one has reached a terminus in explanation. So, the question that is now presented
to us is: what is the nature of the particular phenomenon that we are seeking a
fundamental explanation of? In other words, what is our explanatory target? And
how do Theism and any other potential explanation seek to explain it?
3 Explanatory Target
3.1 Modal Structure
Humans regularly make modal statements. Modal statements are declarative sentences that concern what is possibly the case and what is necessarily the case
– such as a person thinking to themselves ‘it is possible that I will become a
doctor’ and ‘it is necessary that I am human’; or a teacher saying to their students ’it is possible that Hitler won WWII’ and ‘it is necessary that Hitler’s mother
was Klara Hitler’.14 One can ask, however, what determines the truth value of
these statements that are part and parcel of our ordinary speech? In the thought
of certain individuals working within the field of modal metaphysics, there is
a certain fundamental, metaphysical structure – or, more specifically, a ‘modal
structure’ – that determines the truth value of these statements. That is, the various modal statements that individuals use in ordinary speech are made true,
and explained by, the existence of this modal structure. Thus, at a general level,
modal metaphysics allows one to discover a fundamentality structure that the
modal statements and locutions that feature in ordinary speech are dependent
upon and determined by. Hence, given this dependence and determination, claims
concerning this modal structure are to be taken to be more fundamental than the
modal statements and locutions that feature in our ordinary speech. For illustrative purposes, we can depict this dependence and fundamentality structure at the
general and more specific level in Figure 1 as such (where ‘L’ stands for ‘linked to’,
‘MFT’ stands for more fundamental than, ‘E’ stands for ‘explains’ and ‘D’ stands
for ‘dependent’):15
14 Assuming, for the latter statement, that origin essentialism is correct.
15 This article will feature a number of illustrations throughout that will serve as heuristic
devices that will help the reader to better grasp (or ‘digest’) the various notions that, at times,
can be quite abstract and difficult to visualise when expressed through written prose.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 13
Figure 1: Modal structure (i).
In analysing our language use and its correspondence to reality, we see
that our various modal statements and locutions are thus conceived of as truthbearers that are made true by the modal structure that is inherent within reality.
In other words, there is thus a ‘truthmaking’ relation connecting the modal statements and locutions to the (more fundamental) modal structure. Re-construing
this truthmaking relation now within the explanatory framework that we are
operating within, this modal structure provides a full metaphysical explanation
for the truth of the various modal statements that are uttered by individuals, in
that the truth of these statements is fully dependent on this modal structure and a
law of metaphysics (i.e. a grounding relation), which together deductively entail,
and really explain, its truth value.16
One can now ask, however, what is the nature of this modal structure that
accounts for the truth of the modal statements and locutions that frequently feature in our ordinary speech? And what accounts for the existence of this structure
itself? In contemporary metaphysics, a number of philosophers have postulated
the existence of an infinite plurality of ‘possible worlds’, which are then identified
as the modal structure under question. Taking this identification as our starting
point, we can now take the following phenomenon as our explanatory target:
(3)
(Explanatory Target) There is an infinite plurality of possible worlds.
This explanatory target captures certain phenomena – namely, the infinite
plurality of possible worlds – whose existence seems, in the minds of some
16 Philosophers writing in the field of modal metaphysics do not regularly utilise the language
of grounding as has been done here. However, this type of language is very helpful in providing a
more fine-grained understanding of the dependence relations that are inherent within the modal
sphere.
14 | J. R. Sijuwade
individuals, to require a further, more fundamental explanation. In the next
section, we will assess the manner in which Theism can serve as this fundamental
explanation. However, it will be important to now (briefly) explicate the general
notion of a possible world that features in our explanatory target, and some of
the roles that this notion is taken to play. Following Inwagen (1986, 192–193),
we can take the concept of a possible world to be a functional concept. The
concept of a ‘possible world’ is one that ‘plays a certain role’ in representing ways
reality is or could be. That is, as Inwagen (1986, 193) notes, at a general level,
it ‘can fill a certain role in philosophical discourse about modality, essence,
counterfactuality, truth-theories for natural languages, and so on’. One important
function that the concept of a possible role has fulfilled within a modal context is
that of it providing a means for one to explicate the important notion of de dicto
modality, which can be stated succinctly through the following bi-conditional:
(4)
(De Dicto) It is possible that x ↔ there is a w such that w is a possible world
and at w, x.
As expressed by (4), the modal operator ‘it is possible that’ (and modal operators
such as ‘it is necessary that’), within a modal metaphysics that utilises ‘possible
world semantics’, is now conceived of as a quantifier over worlds, which thus
provides a further explication and/or analysis of modality – which helps to dispel
the mystery that has often surrounded these type of locutions (Bricker 2007).
In addition to the provision of an analysis of de dicto terms, the utilisation of
the notion of possible worlds also provides a means for one to analyse de re
modality. However, the nature of this type of analysis is best grasped once the
concept of a possible world is further fleshed out. In the contemporary literature,
two specific realist metaphysical theses concerning the nature of the concept
of a possible world have played an influential role: Concrete Modal Realism
and Abstract Modal Realism. Concrete Modal Realism (hereafter, Concretism),
proposed by David K. Lewis, is a possibilist theory (i.e. one that takes there to
exist merely possible entities that are strictly non-actual) that seeks to provide
a reductionist account of modality (i.e. it seeks to reduce modal notions to
non-modal notions) and conceives of a possible world as a concrete object – and
thus there being an infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds (amongst other
things). Whereas Abstract Modal Realism (hereafter, Abstractionism), proposed
by Alvin Plantinga, is an actualist theory (i.e. one that denies the existence of
merely possible entities and takes the actual world to be the only possible world
that does obtain) that seeks to provide a non-reductionist account of modality (i.e.
it does not seek to reduce modal notions to non-modal notions) and conceives
of a possible world as an abstract object – and thus there being an infinite
plurality of abstract possible worlds (amongst other things). Hence, what we are
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 15
presented with through these metaphysical theses are two ontological concepts
(‘concreteness’ and ‘abstractness’) – concerning two types of objects – that are
coextensive with the functional concept ‘possible world’ (Inwagen 1986). It will
be important to now further detail the nature of these two metaphysical theses,17
which can provide one with an analysis of de re modality and, more importantly,
help us to further fine-tune our explanatory target. To this task, we now turn.
3.2 Concretism
According to Lewis (1983, 1986), Concretism is a metaphysical thesis that posits
the existence of a ‘logical space’ or ‘pluriverse’ that is made up of an infinite
plurality of concrete possible worlds.18 More specifically, the central tenets of
Concretism, according to Lewis (1986, 69–81), can be stated as follows:
(5)
(Concretism)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Pluriverse: The totality of metaphysical reality
and the largest domain of quantification that
includes within it three ontological categories.
Concrete Worlds: A possible individual x is a
possible world w if there are some concrete
entities such that each one of the entities is
spatiotemporally related to every object that is
one of the collections of entities, w is the
fusion of these entities, and w is one of an
infinite plurality of ws.
Isolation: No possible individual x, that is part
of a w, is spatiotemporally related to any x that
is not one of the collections of individuals that
are part of w.
Relative Actuality: A possible individual x is an
actual world w solely from the indexical
perspective of an inhabitant of w.
17 I follow Inwagen (1986) in terming these theses ‘Concretism’ and ‘Abstractionism’. Furthermore, Lewis’ Concretism is usually termed ‘genuine’ modal realism – with Plantinga’s
Abstractionism frequently not being termed a modal realist account. However, following
Plantinga’s (2003, 192–228) own identification of his thesis as a modal realist thesis, I will
break convention here in taking both theses to be alternative modal realist accounts.
18 In Concretism, there are no ‘impossible worlds’, and thus one can refer to a ‘possible’ world
simply as a world. However, to keep in line with Abstractionism – which allows for impossible
worlds – the qualifier ‘possible’ will be retained throughout.
16 | J. R. Sijuwade
For (a), the notion of the ‘Pluriverse’ functions in the framework of Concretism
as the metaphysical terrain of the totality of reality. In Lewis’ (1983, 39–40)
thought, the pluriverse is organised into three fundamental ontological categories: possible individuals, impossible individuals and non-individuals. These
three ontological categories can be understood as follows: first, the category of
possible individuals includes within it the entities that exist wholly within a possible world, i.e. as a part of that world. For the category of possible individuals,
each of the worlds within the pluriverse is a (large) possible individual that has
(smaller) possible individuals (such as atoms, humans and planets) as parts.
Hence, any possible individual is ‘bound’ to a possible world through being a
‘part’ of it – with a possible world being an improper part of itself.19 Second,
the category of impossible individuals includes within it the entities that do not
exist wholly in any world, but are composed of possible individuals from two or
more worlds. For the category of impossible individuals, these types of individuals
are mereological summations of individuals within the pluriverse (Lewis 1983).
More specifically, impossible, cross-world, individuals consist of parts from several distinct worlds within the pluriverse. As the name indicates, however, this
type of individual is not a possible individual, as it is not in any world – it is
partly in each of the many worlds. Third, the category of non-individuals includes
within it the entities which do not exist in any world, but nevertheless exist ‘from
the standpoint of a possible world’. That is, for the category of non-individuals,
these types of entities – which are paradigmatically identified as ‘pure sets’ (i.e.
numbers, properties, propositions and events) – do not exist in any world in
the sense of them existing as a part of a possible world, nor do they exist as a
mereological summation of the individuals that exist within the infinite number
of distinct worlds; rather they exist from the standpoint of a possible world, by
existing within the least restricted domain that is appropriate in evaluating the
truth at the world of quantifications (Lewis 1983, 40). Thus, for Lewis (1983, 40),
within the Concretism framework, we have three fundamental ontological categories: possible individuals, impossible individuals and non-individuals, that
are individuated by three distinct relations: being in a possible world (i.e. being
part of a possible world) for possible individuals, being partly in a possible world
(i.e. having a part that is wholly in that world) for impossible individuals, and
existing from the standpoint of a possible world for non-individuals. For illustrative purposes, we can depict the nature of the pluriverse in Figure 2 (where
‘PI’ stands for ‘possible individual’, ‘IPI’ stands for ‘impossible individuals’,
‘N-I’ stands for ‘non-individuals’, ‘Wn ’ stands for a ‘particular world’, ‘the starred
19 More on world boundness below.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 17
Figure 2: Nature of the
pluriverse.
circles’ represents ‘(relative) actuality’, ‘Concrete’ stands for ‘concrete domain’
and ‘Abstract’ stands for ‘abstract domain’).
Now, the positing of the existence of the pluriverse enables one to provide
a reductive account of modality. That is, Concretism, through the notion of the
pluriverse (and, more importantly, the notion of a possible world), seeks to provide
an analysis or reductive account of modal notions such that one can understand
the meaning of modal locutions without them depending upon further modal
notions – namely, these locutions being reducible to concrete possible worlds
– and thus modality not being primitive. To further explicate the metaphysical
thesis of Concretism, and its modal reductionism, it will be important to now
further detail the notion of a possible world, as expressed by (b)–(d) of (5).
For (b), the notion of ‘Concrete Worlds’ expresses the fact that there exists
an infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds within logical space that are
identified as maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally related individuals. The ‘concreteness’ of a possible world expresses the idea that the ‘merely
possible worlds’ that make up the pluriverse are of the same ontological kind
as the ‘actual world’. Lewis (1986), however, is hesitant to directly affirm the
concreteness of possible worlds, given the ambiguity and lack of clarity that
surrounds the abstract/concrete distinction in contemporary philosophy. Nevertheless, Lewis (1986, 82–86) distinguishes four different ways of conceiving of
the abstract/concrete distinction, and the manner in which worlds fit with these
ways: first, the Way of Example: worlds have parts that are taken to be paradigmatically concrete (i.e. donkeys, protons, stars and galaxies). Second, the Way of
18 | J. R. Sijuwade
Conflation: worlds are taken to be particulars and individuals, rather than universals and sets. Third, the Negative Way: worlds have parts that are taken to
stand in spatiotemporal relation to one another. Fourth, the Way of Abstraction:
worlds are taken to be fully determinate entities that are not abstractions from
any other entity. In each of these four ways, according to Lewis (1986, 82), worlds
(and most of their parts) can be conceived of as concrete entities – with all other
types of entities (namely, non-individuals) being conceived of as abstract entities,
due to the fact that these entities are not spatiotemporal and fail to meet the
four-fold criteria. So, a possible world is a concrete entity, yet, there is not only
one world in logical space, but an ‘infinite plurality’ of worlds. More specifically,
any way a world could possibly be is a way that some world is – in short, according
to the Principle of Plenitude, worlds are abundant such that there are no ‘gaps
in logical space’. In underwriting this principle, Lewis posits the holding of a
more specific principle: the Principle of Recombination, according to which, as
Lewis (1986, 88–89) writes, ‘patching together parts of different possible worlds
yields another possible world’. More specifically, the Principle of Recombination
states that anything can co-exist, or fail to co-exist, with anything else. Thus, for
example, as Lewis (1986, 88) notes, ‘if there could be a dragon, and there could
be a unicorn, but there couldn’t be a dragon and a unicorn side by side, that
would be an unacceptable gap in logical space, a failure of plenitude’. Thus,
from the first half of this principle – that anything can co-exist with anything
else – as illustrated by this example, we infer that any number of entities from
different worlds can be brought together in any world, in any specific arrangement permitted by shape and size. However, for the second half of the principle
– that anything can fail to co-exist with anything else – we have the example, as
Lewis (1986, 88) writes, that ‘if there could be a talking head contiguous to the
rest of a living human body, but there couldn’t be a talking head separate from
the rest of a human body, that too would be a failure of plenitude’. We thus infer
from this half of the principle, which expresses the Humean denial of necessary
connections between distinct entities, that there is another world where one of
these entities exists without the other (Bricker 2007).20 Thus, for the Principle of
Recombination as a whole, anything can co-exist with anything, and anything
can fail to co-exist with anything, so long as they are able to come together within
the possible size and shape of spacetime that comprises the world that they are
parts of (Lewis, 1986, 90). The pluriverse is thus made up of an infinite number
(and variety) of concrete possible worlds.
20 However, as worlds do not overlap in the Concretism framework, this principle is to be
understood in terms of intrinsic duplication – a given world is composed of duplicates of the
entities that are brought together from other worlds.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 19
For (c), the notion of ‘Isolation’ expresses the fact that there are no connections between worlds in the pluriverse – in that a given possible world is
spatiotemporally (and causally) isolated from other worlds. The lack of spatiotemporal and causal connections between worlds results in the inhabitants of a given
world being ‘world bound’. More specifically, a possible world is demarcated as a
maximal individual whose parts are spatiotemporally related to one another and
not anything else. That is, a possible world, according to Lewis (1986, 69), has
possible individuals as parts, and is thus ‘the mereological sum of all possible
individuals of one another’. In a possible world, if two things are parts of the same
world, then they are – what Lewis (1986, 69) terms – worldmates. Individuals are
thus worldmates if, and only if, they are spatiotemporally related. Thus, whatever
is in a spatiotemporal relation with another is part of that world. A possible world
is therefore unified, as Lewis (1986, 71) notes, ‘by the spatiotemporal interrelation
of its parts’. However, there are no spatiotemporal relations that connect one
world to another. That is, each world – which is simply the (maximal) mereological fusion of a certain set of concrete entities – is spatiotemporally isolated
from every other world, as Lewis writes, ‘Worlds do not overlap; unlike Siamese
twins, they have no shared parts... no possible individual is part of two worlds’
(Lewis 1983, 39). In other words, as the spatiotemporal relation is an equivalence
relation, each individual (that is, in a possible world) is part of exactly one world
– there is no overlap between distinct worlds; rather, each world is spatiotemporally isolated and exists as the maximal sum of all of the individuals that are
spatiotemporally related to it.
For (d), the notion of ‘Relative Actuality’ expresses the fact that all of the
(‘merely’) possible worlds within the pluriverse have the same ontological status
as the ‘actual world’ – such that the notion of actuality is an indexical term that
simply singles out the specific utterer of the sentence in the particular world
in which they located at. In Lewis’ (1986, 92–96) mind, actuality is a relative
notion, such that each world is actual relative to itself and the individuals that
inhabit it (and is thus non-actual relative to all the other worlds and individuals
that inhabit those worlds). Hence, as mentioned above, for Lewis, actuality is an
indexical notion. That is, the word ‘actual’ is to be analysed in indexical terms,
which is that of its reference varying dependent upon the relevant features of the
context of utterance. Thus, as Lewis (1999, 293) notes, ‘According to the indexical
analysis I propose, ‘actual’ (in its primary sense) refers at any world w to the
world w. ‘Actual’ is analogous to ‘present, an indexical term whose reference
varies depending on a different feature of context’. Therefore, something being
actual to a given individual is that of it being part of the world that the individual
inhabits – in other words, it is spatiotemporally related to that specific individual.
Every world is thus actual at itself, which renders all worlds as being on par with
20 | J. R. Sijuwade
one another. Thus, no world has the ontological status of being absolutely actual
– the merely possible worlds are not to be distinguished from the ‘actual world’
in ontological status. This is the nature of the pluriverse and the various worlds
that exist within it. So, with this in hand, we can now turn our attention back onto
assessing how Concretism provides a means for one to analyse de re modality.
According to Lewis (1983, 1986), the analysis of de re modal statement is best
provided through counterpart theory, which brings together the central tenets of
Concretism found in (5). More specifically, within the framework provided by Concretism, worlds within the pluriverse do not overlap, and thus individuals do not
exist in more than one world. Rather, each possible individual has counterparts
– qualitatively similar individuals – that exist in other worlds. More precisely,
a counterpart of an entity x is one that exists in a distinct world w from x and
resembles x more closely than anything else that exists in w. For Lewis (1986,
8–11), the counterpart relation – instead of the notion of transworld identity – is
the specific resemblance relation that holds between distinct individuals that are
inhabitants of distinct worlds, and thus it provides the grounds for an analysis of
de re modality, which can be expressed through the following biconditionals:
(6)
(7)
(De Re-P) x is possibly F ↔ there is a possible world w and a counterpart x∗ ,
such that in w x∗ is F.
(De Re-N) x is necessarily F ↔ for every world, w, all counterparts of x are F.
Counterpart theory thus provides the truth conditions for the modal properties
that are possessed by a certain entity – and as the notion of resemblance which
underpins this theory is itself a non-modal notion – modal locutions are able to
be explained without reference to modal notions. Counterpart theory thus allows
modal statements and locutions (e.g. x is possibly F) to be reduced to the nonmodal (i.e. counterpart of x is F). Within the framework of Concretism, one thus
has a means of reducing the diversity of modal notions that have usually been
taken as primitive – with this primitiveness in our structure being interpreted as
that of the truth of these notions being ungrounded. At a general level, Concretism
thus allows one to take the non-modal claims made by (this specific theory of)
modality to be a more fundamental ground for the modal statements and locutions
that feature in our ordinary speech. Hence, affirming the veracity of Concretism
provides one with a more economical philosophical system, due to the fact that
one has fewer (primitive) notions that are left unaccounted for within their system – namely, there are none. For illustrative purposes, we can (again) depict
this dependence and fundamentality structure at the general and more specific
level in Figure 3 as such (where all is as before, with ‘FM’ standing for ‘fully
metaphysically explains’ and ‘G’ standing for ‘grounds’):
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 21
Figure 3: Modal structure (ii).
The modal structure – now identified as the infinite plurality of concrete
possible worlds (and counterparts) that make up the pluriverse – provides a full
metaphysical explanation for the truth of a given modal statement – namely,
by this statement being dependent on the existence of these worlds (and counterparts) and the fact that these worlds (and counterparts) ground the truth of
this statement. Hence, within the Concretist framework, the modal structure that
determines the truth or falsity of modal statements is now identified as the infinite
plurality of worlds that fill up logical space – which we can believe to be true,
as Lewis (1986, 3) notes, ‘because the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a
reason to think that it is true’. That is, we should believe in the existence of the
pluriverse – which includes within it an infinite plurality of worlds (and counterparts) – due to the fact that this supposition is pragmatically virtuous. In other
words, the pragmatic virtue of Concretism provides sufficient justification for one
accepting the extravagant ontology that is proposed by it.21 However, Lewis does
not see this virtue as providing a decisive reason to favour Concretism over any
other alternative theory of modality, as Lewis (1986, 4) writes,
21 In the case that one is not persuaded by Lewis concerning the importance of the pragmatic
virtues of a theory in establishing truth value of Concretism (i.e. belief in concrete possible
worlds), Bricker (2007, 120–122) has provided two interesting non-pragmatic arguments: a
‘truthmaker argument’ (i.e. given that possibilia require truthmakers, (concrete) worlds are the
only entities that can fulfil that truthmaking role) and an ‘argument from intentionality’ (i.e.
given that our intentional states about possibilia must stand in relation to relata that exist in
reality, (concrete) worlds are the only entities that can be these relata). Bricker believes that these
two arguments provide one with good reason to favour Concretism over its rivals and establish
a foundation for belief in the existence of concrete possible worlds.
22 | J. R. Sijuwade
[Conceptual] space is a paradise for philosophers. We have only to believe in the vast realm
of possibilia, and there we find what we need to advance our endeavours. We find the
wherewithal to reduce the diversity of notions we must accept as primitive, and thereby
to improve the unity and economy of the theory that is our professional concern – total
theory, the whole of what we take to be true. What price paradise? If we want the theoretical
benefits that talk of possibilia brings, the most straightforward way to gain honest title to
them is to accept such talk as the literal truth. It is my view that the price is right, if less
spectacularly so than in the mathematical parallel. The benefits are worth their ontological
cost.
Lewis thus believes that in affirming the veracity of the framework that is provided
by Concretism, one must perform a cost-benefit analysis. That is, affirming the
truth of Concretism comes at a certain price. However, for those who have not
been willing to pay this price (which is probably most people!),22 the alternative
modal realist thesis of Abstractionism has provided a means to ground the truth
of our modal locutions. It will be important to now further detail the nature of
this metaphysical thesis.
3.3 Abstractionism
According to Plantinga (1974, 1980, 2003), Abstractionism is a metaphysical thesis
that posits the existence of a ‘platonic realm’ that is made up of an infinite number
of abstract possible worlds. More specifically, the central tenets of Abstractionism
are as follows:
(8)
(Abstractionism)
(a)
(b)
(c)
Platonism: The totality of metaphysical
reality that includes within it an infinite
plurality of abstract objects.
Abstract Worlds: A state of affairs s is an
abstract possible world w if s is possible
and maximal.
Actualism: A possible world w has the
special property of being absolutely
actual if s is a maximal possible state of
affairs that actually obtains.
22 One cost, among a number of others, is that of one having to face what has been called
the Humphrey Objection – where modal statements concerning a certain entity are made true
by counterparts of that entity, which seems to clash with our intuitions on the matter. For an
influential statement of the Humphrey Objection, see (Kripke, 1980, 45).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 23
(d)
(e)
World-Properties: An object o has a
property p in a possible world w if w is
actualized and includes o with p and o
essentially has p if every world in which
o exists, that would be actualised,
includes o with p.
Transworld Identity: An object o exists in
more than one possible world w, with an
individual essence e functioning as a
proxy for that entity in those worlds.
For (a), the notion of the ‘Platonism’ functions in the framework of Abstractionism
– as with Concretism – as the metaphysical terrain of the totality of reality.
However, unlike Concretism, in Plantinga’s (1980, 3–4) thought, this realm is
one in which there exist innumerably many necessarily existing abstract objects.
These abstract objects are identified as Platonic universals, properties, kinds,
propositions, numbers, sets, states of affairs and possible worlds (Plantinga 1980,
3). The whole pantheon of abstract objects are conceived of as entities that are,
firstly, spatiotemporal and causally inert – they are not denizens of space and
time, and they are not the relata of causal relations. Secondly, they are everlasting
– they have no beginning or end. Thus, as Plantinga (1980, 4) states, ‘there was
a time before which there were no human beings, but no time before which there
was not such a thing as the property of being human or the proposition there are
human beings. That property and that proposition have always existed and have
never begun to exist’. Secondly, abstract objects are also conceived of as necessary
features of reality – their non-existence is impossible. Hence, as Plantinga (1980,
4) further writes, ‘Sets of contingent objects, perhaps, are as contingent as their
members; but properties, propositions, numbers and states of affairs, it seems,
are objects whose non-existence is quite impossible’. For illustrative purposes,
we can depict the nature of the platonic realm in Figure 4 (where ‘P’ stands for
‘propositions’, ‘U’ stands for ‘universals’, ‘K’ stands for ‘kinds’, ‘N’ stands for
‘numbers’, ‘S’ stands for ‘sets, ‘SA’ stands for ‘states of affairs’, ‘MSA’ stands for
‘maximal possible state of affairs’, ‘PW’ stands for ‘possible worlds’, ‘PWn ’ stands
for a particular possible world, ‘Actual’ stands for ‘the actual world’, ‘O’ stands
for a particular object (that is possibly transworld identical)).
Thus, within the platonic realm of reality, there are an infinite number of
abstract objects that exist as everlasting and necessary beings. It will be important
to now focus on two particular abstract objects that exist within this realm: states
of affairs and possible worlds, which play a central role in (b)–(e) of (8), and its
goal of providing a metaphysical basis for modality.
24 | J. R. Sijuwade
Figure 4: Nature of the
platonic realm.
For (b), the notion of ‘Abstract Worlds’ expresses the fact that there exists
an infinite plurality of abstract possible worlds. A possible world is an abstract
object – it is conceived of as a non-spatiotemporal, causally inert entity that
is grasped by abstraction – and thus, contra Lewis, it is not a concrete object;
neither is it a mereological sum of concrete objects (Plantinga 1974). The nature
of a possible world, according to Plantinga (2003), is to be conceived of simply
as the way the world could’ve been – in other words, it involves the notion of a
‘state of affairs’. For example, Boris Johnson being taller than eight feet is a state
of affairs, as is Joe Biden Jr having become a married bachelor – each of these
examples is a state of affairs; however, the former is (broadly logically) possible,
whereas the latter is (broadly logically) impossible. A possible world, according to
Plantinga (1974, 44), ‘is a possible state of affairs – one that is possible in the
broadly logical sense’. Yet, not every possible state of affairs is a possible world
– as for a possible state of affairs to be a possible world, it must be maximal
(Plantinga 1974). That is, for example, Lionel Messi having brown hair is a possible state of affairs; however, it is not a maximal possible state of affairs as it
is not inclusive enough to be a possible world. The question now is: what are
the conditions for a state of affairs to be inclusive? A state of affairs S, according
to Plantinga, ‘includes’ a state S∗ if it is not possible that S obtain and S∗ fails
to obtain. So, for example, Neil Armstrong being the first human to walk on the
moon includes Neil Armstrong being a human, the moon having been walked on,
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 25
something’s being walked on, and no human having walked on the moon before Neil
Armstrong did (Plantinga 1974). In contrast to this, a state of affairs S ‘precludes’
a state of affairs S∗ if it is not possible that both states of affairs obtain. Thus Neil
Armstrong being the first human to walk on the moon precludes Charles Conrad
being the first human to walk on the moon, as well as the state of affairs of Neil
Armstrong having never left the earth’s atmosphere. On the basis of this, one can
thus conceive of the maximality of a state of affairs, as Plantinga (1974, 44) notes,
as that of a state of affairs S being maximal ‘if for every state of affairs S∗ , S
includes S∗ or S precludes S∗ ’. Hence, a possible world is simply a possible state
of affairs that is maximal. Moreover, Plantinga also takes it to be the case that a
possible world is not to be identified with any concrete individual or set – and
thus, they do not have any mereological or set-theoretic constituents (i.e. mereological parts or subsets/members). Rather, possible worlds are metaphysically
simple – they are entities that are not composed of anything else (Divers 2007).
For example, a possible world in which Sophroniscus is the father of Socrates is
not partly constituted by the state of affairs of Sophroniscus being the father of
Socrates, nor of the individuals Sophorniscus and Socrates or relational property
of being the father of . In short, possible worlds do not have complex natures, but
are metaphysically simple entities that are complex solely at the representational
level (Divers 2007). Possible worlds are thus maximal possible states of affairs that
are metaphysically simple entities. However, as there is a utilisation of the modal
term ‘possible’ in this conception of a possible world, Abstractionism affirms a
non-reductive conceptualisation of a possible world. In short, contra concretism,
modality is not reduced within an Abstractionist framework, but is affirmed as a
real feature of reality.23
For (c), the notion of ‘Actualism’ expresses the fact that there are not (and
there could not have been) any entities that do not in fact exist. For Plantinga,
actuality is a special property (i.e. the property of being absolutely actual) that distinguishes exactly one possible world from all the other possible worlds – that is,
amongst the plurality of possible worlds, just one of these possible worlds, is designated as the actual world – every state of affairs that it includes is actual, and thus
the actual world is the maximal possible state of affairs that has the distinction
23 Plantinga is not explicit in his written work on the metaphysical simplicity of states of
affairs. However, this commitment to their simplicity is attributed to him by (Lewis, 1986, 183),
(van Inwagen, 1986, 185–213) and (Divers, 2007, 82). Hence, given that this is the majority
reading of Plantinga’s position concerning this issue, this construal of states of affairs as metaphysically simple will be affirmed here. Interestingly, if one was to disaffirm this position – and
thus affirm the complexity of states of affairs – the argument of this paper will be further
supported/strengthened.
26 | J. R. Sijuwade
of actually obtaining.24 Thus, all states of affairs are taken to exist necessarily;
however, yet only some of them are actual or obtain. In Plantinga’s (1974, 47)
thought, the notion of obtaining for states of affairs is like truth for propositions:
the proposition Joe Biden Jr is a politician is true; however, had things been different, it would have been a false (but existing) proposition.25 In a similar way to this,
a possible world W obtains; yet, had things been different, W would have been
a merely possible state of affairs; there would have been such a state of affairs
as W, although that state of affairs would not have been actual. Hence, according to Plantinga’s Abstractionism, the term ‘actual’ is not an indexical term but
instead picks out the one possible world that includes only actual states of affairs.
Now, each of the other possible worlds could have been actual but are, in fact,
not. However, according to Plantinga (1974, 45), it is quite clear that at least one
possible world obtains, and it is equally obvious that at most one possible world
obtains. As if one were to suppose that two worlds W and W∗ were both to have
obtained, then as W and W∗ are distinct worlds, there will be some state of affairs
S such that W includes S and W∗ precludes S. Yet, if both W and W∗ are taken to
be actual, then S both obtains and does not obtain, which is clearly inconsistent
(Plantinga 1974). Thus, within this specific framework, actualism expresses the
fact that everything that there is, is actual – everything that exists in any possible
world exists in the actual world. In addition to the notion of actualism, one can
also adopt the further notion of serious actualism. Serious actualism is the view
that everything whatever exists – which is the notion of actualism – in combination with the further view that no entity has properties in worlds in which it
does not exist (Plantinga 1974). Stated more precisely, serious actualism is the
view that necessarily, for any possible world w, entity x and property P, if w had
been actual, then x would have had P, and thus if w had been actual, x would
have existed (Plantinga 1974). Within the conceptual framework provided by the
notion of serious actualism, one can, however, still provide truthmakers for certain
modal statements concerning some non-existent objects and properties – without, however, one being committed to the existence of these non-existent objects
and properties. Now, how this is so is through the use by Plantinga (2003, 13)
of the notion of an individual essence that can serve as a ‘proxy’ for these
24 Plantinga does not term the property of actuality ‘absolute actuality’. However, this terminology is employed here in order to emphasise the difference between having this property and
the state of being relatively actual, which, as noted previously, is had by every possible world
within a Concretist framework.
25 That is, given the necessity of abstract objects, this proposition would be false but not ‘nonexistent’, as there would have been such a proposition, but it simply would not have been
true.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 27
non-existent objects and their properties. That is, if one were to suppose that
it’s possible that there exists an object and/or property that is distinct from
any in the actual world, then what one is committed to within the framework
under question, is that of an unexemplified individual essence being exemplified
in some other possible world W – where an essence of an object x is exemplified in a possible world W just in case necessarily, were W actual, x would exist
(Plantinga 2003, 13).26 One can thus affirm the truth of a given modal statement,
even within an actualist (and serious actualist) framework.
For (d), the notion of ‘World-Properties’ expresses the fact that objects have
properties in worlds and essentially across worlds. Properties are taken here to
be the type of entities that are exemplified by objects in possible worlds – where
a given object has a property in a possible world if that world – if actualised
– includes that entity having that property. More precisely, as Plantinga (1974, 47)
notes, ‘To say that Socrates has the property of being snub-nosed in a possible
world W, is to say that Socrates would have had the property of being snubnosed,
had W been actual; it is to say that the state of affairs W’s being actual and
Socrates’ not being snubnosed is impossible’. Thus, at a general level, an object
exemplifies a specific property, if, and only if, in any possible world where that
object has that property, if the world were to be actualised, there would be a
state of affairs where the object has that specific property. In addition to concrete
objects, abstract objects also have properties in worlds, such as the proposition
‘Socrates is a philosopher’ has the property being true in the actual world, which
in some other possible world it lacks this property by being false. Furthermore,
as Plantinga (2003, 110) notes, ‘The number 9 has the property of numbering the
planets in 𝛼 [the actual world]; but in some other worlds 9 lacks that property,
having its complement instead’. A property is thus essential to an object (concrete
and abstract) if this object has this property in every world in which this entity
exists. And, an object thus has a property accidentally if this object has this
property but does not possess it essentially. Thus, for example, Socrates has
the property of being a human essentially and the proposition ‘all humans are
animals’ has the property of being true essentially – as both of these objects have
these properties in every world in which they exist. Whereas Socrates has the
property of being a philosopher accidentally, and the proposition ‘Socrates is a
philosopher’ has the property of being true accidentally – as both of these objects
have these properties in some worlds in which they exist but not all worlds. Now,
among the properties that are essential to all objects – in addition to the properties
that compose an object’s individual essence – is the property of existence. Some
26 More on the nature of an individual essence below.
28 | J. R. Sijuwade
philosophers, as Plantinga (2003, 110) notes, have ‘argued that existence is not a
property; these arguments, however, even when they are coherent, seem to show
at most that existence is a special kind of property’. The property of existence is
thus taken to be essential to each object, for every object has existence in each
world in which it exists (Plantinga 2003).27
For (e), the notion of ‘Transworld Identity’ expresses the fact that one and
the same object can exist in more than one world. In Plantinga’s (1974) thought, it
is plausible and natural to suppose that identity can hold across possible worlds
– such that the same object can exist in various different states of affairs – and
thus it exists in various different possible worlds. For example, the state of affairs
consisting in Socrates being a good football player – this state of affairs is indeed
possible – and thus there will indeed be possible worlds that include this state
of affairs – however, it is a state of affairs that does not, in fact, obtain – and
thus it would not be a state of affairs that is included within the actual world.
Thus, it is indeed plausible to suppose, if this state of affairs had obtained, then
Socrates would have existed and would have been a good football player – in
short, it is plausible to suppose that Socrates exists in this state of affairs. Yet, as
Plantinga (2003, 73) notes, if Socrates – and other objects similar to him – exist
in states of affairs, then Socrates exists in every possible world including this
specific state of affairs – that is, every possible world including Socrates being a
good football player is such that, had this state of affairs been actual, Socrates
would have existed. Hence, Socrates exists in many possible worlds. A number
of challenges have been raised against this notion of transworld identity. One
important challenge is that of the problem of transworld identification, which goes
as follows: If transworld identity is true, and thus the self-same object can exist in
a number of different possible worlds, then what will be the means or criteria for
one to identify that object across these different worlds? In short, how could one
distinguish that object from other objects in those worlds? If a means or criteria
is not forthcoming, then it seems implausible for one to posit the fact of an object
existing and having certain properties across different possible worlds, as one
cannot even be sure about which object one is discussing. Hence, transworld
identity seems to be a non-starter. In Plantinga’s (2003, 58–62) view, however,
this issue is a pseudo-problem, given the fact that one can indeed provide a
criterion of identification, which centres on the notion of an individual essence.
That is, in Plantinga’s mind, those things which are entitled to be called ‘individual
essence’ can be conceived of as either certain world-indexed properties or identity
properties – both of which an object has essentially, such that there is no world
27 Importantly, however, this is not to say that every object is to be taken to be a necessary being
– as a necessary being is one that exists in every possible world.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 29
in which there exists an object distinct from the former object that has these
properties (Plantinga, 2003). More fully, at a general level, an essence of an object
is a property that is essentially exemplified by that object, and which entails all
of that object’s essential properties and isn’t possibly exemplified by anything
distinct from that object (Plantinga 2003, 5). Now, at a more specific level, under
the first conception of an individual essence, an object x that exists in a possible
world W, and has some property P, would have the world-indexed property of
‘being P-in-W’. This property would be had by x alone in W – such that no other
object has P in W – which renders this world-indexed property as an individual
essence of x. For example, Socrates would have the world-indexed property of
‘being an ancient Greek philosopher who was tried for impiety and sentenced to
death for corrupting the youth in the actual world’, which would thus serve as
his individual essence. Under the second conception of an individual essence,
x would have the primitive identity property of ‘x-ness’ or ‘being identical to x’,
which are two properties that cannot be instantiated by any other object, and as
long as x exists, it will have these specific properties – which thus render these
properties as an individual essence of this object. For example, Socrates has the
property of being Socrates or being identical with Socrates – which we can term
Socraeity. Socraeity is a property that is essential to Socrates, such that there is no
possible world in which Socrates exists and has the complement of the property
of Socraeity – that is, there is no possible world in which Socrates exists and is
distinct from Socrates (Plantinga 1974). Moreover, Socraeity is such that, for any
world W, any object that is distinct from Socrates would have the complement
of Socraeity, as there is no possible world in which there exists an object that is
distinct from Socrates but exemplifies the property of being identical with him
(Plantinga 1974). Hence, contra the problem of transworld identification, one can
distinguish Socrates from other objects on the basis of his individual essence,
conceived of as world-indexed properties or identity properties.
Thus, on the basis of all of this, one can construe the notion of de re modality
within an Abstractionist framework through the following biconditionals:28
(9)
(10)
(De Re-P∗ ) x is possibly F ↔ there is a possible world w and an object x,
such that, in w, x is F.
(De Re-N ∗ ) x is necessarily F ↔ for every world, w, in which an object x
exists, x is F.
28 At a more fine-grained level, the objects featured in these biconditionals are to be identified
as individual essences.
30 | J. R. Sijuwade
At the heart of this construal of de re modality are the notions of property
possession at worlds and transworld identity – where, on the basis of these
two notions, one does not have to utilise the notion of a counterpart to function
as the truthmaker for these modal statements; rather, the self-same object (or,
more specifically, the individual essence of that object) is the truthmaker for the
modal statements made about it. Within the framework of Abstractionism, one
thus has a means to ‘non-reductively’ explicate the nature of the modal structure that grounds the truth of our modal statements. At a general level, one thus
can take the abstract objects of maximal possible states of affairs (i.e. possible
worlds), and the individual essences of the concrete objects that exist within
these states of affairs, to be more fundamental grounds for the modal statements
and locutions that feature in our ordinary speech. This does not necessarily provide a more economical philosophical system – as with Concretism – due to
the fact that the modal notions that feature in this metaphysical thesis are not
being reduced to non-modal notions. Nevertheless, one is provided with a further explication of modal structure that grounds the statements that feature in
our ordinary speech. For illustrative purposes, we can (again) depict this dependence and fundamentality structure at the general and more specific level in
Figure 5.
Within Abstractionism, the modal structure – now identified as the infinite abstract possible worlds (and objects/individual essences that are (possibly)
transworld identical) that are part of the platonic realm – provides a full metaphysical explanation for the truth of a given modal statement—namely, as within
Concretism, by this specific statement being dependent on the existence of these
possible worlds (and objects) and the fact that these worlds (and objects) ground
the truth of this statement. Thus, within contemporary metaphysics, we have
two alternative metaphysical theses that seek to provide a reduction or further
Figure 5: Modal structure (ii).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 31
explication of the modal statements that feature in our everyday speech: Concretism and Abstractionism. Now, given our explication of these two metaphysical
theses, we can also now further refine our explanatory target as follows:
(11)
(Explanatory Target∗ ) There is an infinite number of possible worlds,
identified either as relatively actual concrete objects, existing within the
pluriverse, or absolutely actual abstract objects, existing within the platonic
realm.
Finally, we now have before us a fine-tuned explanatory target – which we
can state more succinctly as there existing an infinite plurality of ‘relatively
actual’ concrete possible worlds or ‘absolutely actual’ abstract possible worlds.29
However, one can now re-ask the important question of if these worlds themselves
require a further explanation for their existence? That is, do the infinite plurality of (concrete or abstract) worlds require a fundamental explanation for their
existence or are they, in fact, entities that exist without explanation – namely,
they are fundamental entities, with their existence being a brute fact?30 To answer
these important questions, it will be helpful to now briefly explicate the primitive
option that has been favoured by Lewis and Plantinga.
3.4 Primitivism
Focusing first on Abstractionism, it is quite clear that Plantinga affirms the primitive existence of the infinite plurality of abstract possible worlds, given that he
takes a possible world to be an abstract object that has the features of existing
everlastingly – which is that of them existing without beginning and without end
– and necessarily – which is that of their non-existence being impossible. In further
emphasising the latter feature of an abstract object, it is quite clear that possible worlds exist within the class of necessary beings that populate the platonic
realm, based on the fact that an object exists in a possible world if, and only if, it
is not possible that that world be actual and the object fails to exist. Therefore, it
follows from this that every possible world exists in every possible world and hence
also in itself. Hence, as Plantinga (2003, 195) notes, the vast plurality of worlds
are complete and world invariant: each of the worlds exists necessarily, and there
could not have been a possible world that is distinct from each of the worlds that
29 For brevity, the terms ‘relatively actual’ and ‘absolutely actual’ will now be suppressed and
included within ‘concrete possible world’ and ‘abstract possible world’.
30 In the following sub-section, there will be an interchanging between the term ‘brute’ and
‘primitive’ without any change in meaning.
32 | J. R. Sijuwade
do in fact exist. Thus, these entities, as with other abstract objects, seem to lack a
further explanation for their existence, as Plantinga (1980, 4–5) asks
did he [God] then create these things? Presumably not; they have no beginnings. Are they
dependent on him? But how could a thing whose non-existence is impossible – the number
7, let’s say, or the property of being a horse – depend upon anything for its existence?
Though Plantinga focuses here on properties and numbers, it is evident, in his
thought, that the everlasting and necessary abstract objects exist without further
explanation for their existence. In short, the existence of the infinite plurality of
abstract possible worlds within the platonic realm is primitive.
Turning our attention now to Concretism, Lewis seems to also express the
position that the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds
that make up the pluriverse lack an explanation. More specifically, Lewis seems
to implicitly and explicitly affirm the primitive existence of the infinite plurality of
worlds. There is an implicit affirmation of this position by Lewis, due to the fact
that he limits the range of necessarily existing entities in the pluriverse to either
that of sets – that exist from the standpoint of every world – or universals – that
exist in a privileged sense as entities that can exist at more than one world, with
it, therefore, being possible for these entities to exist at all worlds (Lewis 1983,
345, n.5). Yet, as sets and universals are (plausibly) abstract objects, they cannot
‘causally’ affect the worlds in which they exist at or at the standpoint of.31 Hence,
these two types of entities cannot serve as the source of the existence of the infinite
plurality of worlds, which is simply to say that these two entities cannot serve as
candidate fundamental explanations for the existence of the infinite plurality of
worlds that make up the pluriverse (nor can they account for one of these worlds
being actual as well). Thus, there are no other entities that can, and do, exist
31 I use the term causal here in a ‘wide sense’ that includes within it relations of grounding
(which are nevertheless identified as a form of causation: metaphysical causation). Furthermore,
Almeida (2017a, n. 31), who is a prominent Theistic Modal Realist, has taken universals to be
entities that can enter into causal relations, as he states that ‘since something’s being red or
yellow, for instance, can cause someone to notice it’. However, this assumption needs to be
argued for. Especially given the fact that philosophers across the board – such as individuals
like Lowe (2006), who affirms the existence of universals, and individuals like Heil (2003) and
Ehring (2011), who deny the existence of universals – each take tropes (or modes) – conceived
of as ‘abstract particulars’ – to be the only entities that can fulfil the role of being the world’s
basic causal relata. That is, causation is taken to be a relation between particular entities, and
thus, given this, universals (if they are held to exist) are taken to be entities that cannot enter
into causal relations – in short, they are causally inert entities. For an interesting argument for
the need to posit the existence of tropes (or modes), in addition to that of universals, in order to
account for the particularity of causation in the world, see (Lowe, 2006, 15).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 33
across (or at the standpoint of) all worlds that can fulfil the role of being the
source of the existence of the infinite plurality of worlds.
Furthermore, there is an explicit affirmation of this position by Lewis (i.e.
that the existence of the infinite plurality of worlds is a brute fact) based on
the fact of him taking the existence of these worlds to be a necessary truth. More
specifically, as Lewis (1986, 73) writes, ‘there isn’t any world where there’s nothing
at all. That makes it necessary that there is something. For it’s true at all worlds
that there is something’. Within the pluriverse, it is a necessary fact that there is
something. Yet, Concretism doesn’t permit the existence of non-concrete possible
worlds; thus, it will be necessary truth that this ‘something’ is a concrete world.
However, given the Principle of Plenitude (i.e. the Principle of Recombination)
as expressed (again) by Lewis, absolutely every way that a given world could be
is a way that some world is. Thus, there will be an infinite plurality of concrete
possible worlds that correspond to a way that a given world could be. And the
existence of this infinite plurality of worlds will thus be a necessary fact. Given
their necessity, each of the infinite plurality of worlds will not have an explanation
of their existence, as Lewis (1986, 73–74), in expressing a similar point, writes,
How bad is this? I think the worst of it is the fear that I might offer to explain why there
is something rather than nothing, just by saying that this is a necessary truth. But don’t
fear; I do not think that would be an explanation. For an explanation, I think, is an account
of etiology: it tells us something about how an event was caused. Or it tells us something
general about how some, or many, or all events of a certain kind are caused. Or it explains
an existential fact by telling us something about how several events jointly make that fact
true, and then perhaps something about how those truthmaker events were caused. So I
think there is nothing I might say that could count as explaining why there is something
rather than nothing; and that includes saying, truly, that there is no world where there
is nothing.
The infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds that make up the pluriverse will
thus lack an explanation of their existence. That is, with the abstract possible
worlds of Abstractionism, the concrete possible worlds exist as ungrounded entities – which must indeed be the case, or these worlds will have an explanation of
their existence. Hence, as ungrounded entities, the infinite plurality of abstract
or concrete possible worlds are thus fundamental entities whose existence is a
primitive or brute fact. We can bring both of the metaphysical theses of Lewis and
Plantinga together and call it the ‘Primitivism Thesis’ (hereafter, Primitivism),
which we can state succinctly as follows:32
32 Though Plantinga is taken here to be an individual who defends the Primitivism thesis in his
(1980) and (2011) work, he does identify the abstract objects within the Platonic realm to be divine
thoughts. This identification is not made in any other major work on modal metaphysics, such
34 | J. R. Sijuwade
(12)
(Primitivism) There is nothing in virtue of which the infinite plurality of
concrete or abstract possible worlds exist.
According to Primitivism, the entities that feature in our explanatory target lack
an explanation of their existence – that is, in other words, they are themselves
absolutely fundamental, and thus facts about their existence are primitive and/or
brute facts. Theism will thus be construed as an ‘anti-primitive’ candidate fundamental explanation – where an explanation is anti-primitive in this context if it
takes there to be a further, deeper explanation for the existence of the concrete
and abstract possible worlds – and will be assessed for its veracity in light of this
alternative option of there not being an explanation of our explanatory target.
Now, as noted above, our assessment will be performed by assessing Theism
and Primitivism according to the abductive criteria that were introduced in the
previous section. Importantly, however, when one is considering explanations
(or explanatory stopping points) of the existence of all of the entities within
the pluriverse or (parts of the) platonic realm, each of these hypotheses will be of
enormous scope.33 Therefore, unless we are to dismiss these and all other potential
fundamental explanations, Criterion (iii) will need to be left out of our assessment.
Thus, Theism and Primitivism will both need to be assessed by Criterion (i), (ii) and
(iv), which boils down to one of our candidates for a fundamental explanation (or
explanatory stopping point) of our explanatory target: Theism and Primitivism,
being most likely the true explanation (or stopping point), if it is the simplest
explanation, fitting with our background knowledge, which predicts the existence
of the infinite plurality of concrete and abstract possible worlds that make up the
pluriverse and platonic realm, when we would not otherwise expect to find them.
Given this framework, the exposition of our explanatory target that has been
made, and the brief unpacking of the nature of Primitivism, it will be important to
as his (2003) collection of papers and his metaphysical magnum opus (1974) work. Thus, I will
continue to take him to be a defender of the Primitivism thesis, though nothing relevant to our
analysis hinges on this assumption. Furthermore, in selecting Lewis & Plantinga’s Primitivism
as one alternative way for one to account for our explanatory target, it does not mean that one is
also committed to there not being any other potential alternative Concretist and Abstractionist
explanations that can explain our explanatory target – as there surely can be. Rather, this selection is made here because, at the current moment, there are not any other viable explanations
available. Thus, till the time comes when these explanations are available, we can view Lewis
and Plantinga’s Primitivism as being the only viable alternative to Theism that is currently on
offer. For an alternative version of Concretism, see (McDaniel 2004) and (McDaniel 2006). And
for an alternative version of Abstractionism, see (Adams 1974).
33 I add the clause ‘(or explanatory stopping points)’ to allow Primitivism, which is not an
explanation, to be included within our framework.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 35
now turn our attention to detailing the nature of Theism, and then assessing both
candidates for a fundamental explanation (or stopping point) for our explanatory
target, according to our abductive criteria.
4 Explanatory Analysis
4.1 Nature of Theism
The theistic explanation centres around the simple claim that ‘there is a God’. This
claim is a personal metaphysical explanation – it seeks to provide an explanation
that invokes the powers, beliefs and intentions of a personal agent – and it is a
claim that is at the heart of the major theistic world religions such as Judaism,
Christianity, Islam and Sikhism. Now, there are various ways to construe this
particular claim; however, the specific way that it will be construed here is as
follows:34
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(Theism) There is a God, identified as a metaphysically simple,
omnipotence-trope.
This specific rendering of Theism centres around the notion of a ‘powerful trope’
– a powerful abstract particular nature of a modifier or modular kind – which has
been introduced and defended by various ‘trope theorists’ such as Williams (1953),
Campbell (1990), Maurin (2002), Fisher (2018, 2020) and Molnar (2003), among
others. In breaking this concept down in a stepwise manner, we can understand
that: first, a trope is abstract, not in the sense that it lacks spatio-temporality, but
in the sense that it is ‘less than its content’ and does not ‘exhaust its plime’ – in
short, multiple tropes can be co-located together to form a compresent bundle.
For example, a shape-trope that a table possesses is abstract because it does not
34 In Swinburne’s (2004, 93–96) conception of Theism, God is, amongst other things, an essentially, everlastingly omnipotent, bodiless spirit. This conception of God has been challenged by
individuals such as Philipse (2012, 205), who argues that the notion of a bodiless spirit fails
to fit with our background knowledge concerning the type of entities that are taken to exist
in neighbouring fields. Given this issue, Criterion (ii) is not met by Swinburne’s conception of
Theism. However, as explained previously, Swinburne (2004, 66) does not see Criterion (ii) as
being overly important for explanations of a wide explanatory scope, and thus does not see this
to be a problem. Nonetheless, the present construal of God does not succumb to this issue, given
the widely held assumption amongst philosophers concerning the existence of tropes, and thus
Criterion (ii) can be met by Theism so construed. This widely held assumption will be further
explained below.
36 | J. R. Sijuwade
exhaust its content, as other tropes, such as a colour-trope and a mass-trope,
are also collocated with the shape-trope by occupying the same content (i.e. the
table). However, in contrast, the table would be concrete by itself exhausting its
content and thus not allowing another table (or object) to also occupy this content
(Williams 1953). Second, a trope is particular in the sense that it can have a distinct
duplicate – in other words, Leibniz’s Law (i.e. the identity of indiscernibles) fails
to hold for it.35 That is, for properties as universals, the Law holds, in that exactly
similar entities (i.e. universals) are identical (i.e. if universal x and universal y
are indiscernible, then x = y). Whereas for particulars (e.g. tropes), the principle
does not hold, as exactly similar entities can be distinct (i.e. if trope x and trope
y are indiscernible, then x ≠ y). For example, a shape-trope is particular because
it is possible that there is a duplicate of this shape, that is, an entity that is
exactly similar, but also distinct from this shape. In short, a trope is particular
if it can have a duplicate. Third, a trope is its intrinsic (qualitative) nature, in
that it does not have, or possess, a nature of its own; rather, it is combinatorially
intrinsic in the sense that the nature of a trope is invariant under the scenarios
in which the given trope is alone or accompanied (Alvarado 2019, 554). However,
the modal invariance of a trope, unlike other entities, is not grounded upon the
possession of an intrinsic nature, but that of it being its intrinsic nature – it
is numerically identical to it. There is nothing more to a trope than its nature,
and thus, as noted by Maurin (2018, §2.2), tropes, at a general level, ‘have no
constituents, in the sense that they are not ‘made up’ or ‘built’ from entities
belonging to some other category’. Tropes are thus primitively qualitative and
irreducible entities – they lack proper parts,36 and thus are metaphysically simple
entities.37 Fourth, a trope can come in two forms: as a modifier or as a module
trope. The central difference between a modifier trope and a module trope is that of
the former being a singly (or minimally) characterising property, whilst the latter is
a singly (or minimally) charactered property in a ‘stretched’ (or analogical) sense
– it is a ‘propertied thing or object’, where an object is a countable, propertybearing particular that has determinate existence and identity conditions and is
not borne or possessed by anything else.38 In other words, a modifier trope is a
property that does not exemplify this character, but simply bestows it upon (i.e.
‘makes’) something else to be charactered in that specific way. Thus, for example,
35 Leibniz’s Law, which is often conceptualised as the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, is conceived of here as its converse – the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which
can be stated formally as such: ∀𝜑(𝜑(x) ↔ 𝜑(y) → x = y).
36 More on the nature of a proper part below.
37 More on the nature of metaphysical simplicity below.
38 I leave the account of analogy here undefined.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 37
a particular object is spherical in virtue of its modifier trope, which ‘spherises’
that object by simply making it spherical without it sharing in that character as
well. The character grounding provided by a modifier trope is thus de novo (or sui
generis) (Garcia 2015a). Whilst, a module trope is an object that exemplifies the
character that it grounds (i.e. is self-exemplifying). Thus, for example, a particular
(thickly-charactered) object is spherical and red in virtue of its module tropes,
which are themselves spherical and red (i.e. exemplify sphericity and redness),
and together (compresently) are parts (or constituents) of that object. A module
tropes’ character grounding, rather than being de novo, can thus be taken to be
some type of parthood (or constitution) relation (Garcia 2016). Furthermore, an
additional distinction between modifier and module tropes is the role played by
these types of tropes in causation. At a more specific level, it is solely module
tropes, rather than modifier tropes, that can play any direct role in causation. As,
for example, a modifier hotness trope cannot fulfil the role of being the direct
cause of a burn mark that an individual has, as it is not itself hot; something else
must thus be the direct cause of the burn mark (Garcia 2015a, 643). Modifier tropes,
in a similar manner to universals, are thus causally inert. However, the modular
view does not have this issue, given that module tropes are self-exemplifying
entities, resulting, in our example above, in a modular hotness trope being able
to be the direct cause of the burn mark. Therefore, it is module tropes, and
not modifier tropes, that are uniquely suited to be the basic terms of causation
(Garcia 2015b). Lastly, a trope, following Molnar (2003), is powerful in at least
five ways: it is, first, directed – in that a powerful trope is directed towards some
characteristic and distinctive manifestation. Second, it is independent – in that,
a powerful trope is ontologically independent of its manifestations; that is, it can
exist when it is not being manifested. Third, it is actual – in that a powerful trope
is an occurrent feature of the object that possesses it. Fourth, it is intrinsic – in
that, a powerful trope is intrinsic to its bearer.39 Fifth, it is objective – in that the
existence of a powerful trope is not dependent on the existence of any conscious,
observing minds.
In addition to these five characteristics of the powerfulness of a trope, one
can also conceive of a trope as ‘multi-track’ – which is that of it being capable
of bringing about distinct ‘manifestation types’ (i.e. different types of effects),
and it often does this in conjunction with other powerful tropes. One way to
understand the outworking of this is through the notion of a threshold that has
been introduced by Mumford and Anjum (2010) – where a given effect occurs
39 We can assume the notion of intrinsicality noted above.
38 | J. R. Sijuwade
Figure 6: Powers modelled as vectors.
when certain powers have accumulated to reach the requisite threshold.40 This
accumulation can then be plotted as vectors which, according to Mumford and
Anjum (2010, 145), ‘is a useful way of modelling powers because, like powers,
they have a direction – the possible manifestation the power is for – and they
have a strength or intensity, indicated by the length of the vector’. This would
thus be depicted on a one-dimensional quality space with F and G representing
two possible manifestation types of some accumulated powers. For example, F
could be the property of being cold and G could be the property of being hot,
as illustrated by Mumford and Anjum (2010, 146) in Figure 6 (where ‘T’ is the
threshold and ‘R’ is the resultant effect).
In this illustration, for one to calculate the final effect, one has to take into
account the strength and direction of each individual vector with the resultant
vector R, representing the fact that an effect is caused when the powers under
question have accumulated to reach a certain point in which that effect is triggered
(Mumford and Anjum 2010). In sum, a trope, of a modifier or modular kind, is
thus powerful in that it fulfils the roles of directedness, independence, actuality,
intrinsicality and objectivity. And one can understand the effects of a multi-track
powerful trope, in a ‘fine-grained’ manner, through the utilisation of the notion
of a threshold and plotting vectors.
Taking this concept of a powerful module trope into account, and applying
it within a theistic context, we can posit that God is, first, abstract in the sense
of him having the trait of being ‘less than the including whole’ – God does not
40 In contradistinction to this, one could hold (as some philosophers do) to the conception of
the powerfulness of a trope as ‘single-track’ – which is that of a given trope only having one
manifestation type.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 39
exhaust his ‘content’ or ‘plime’ (or is less than his ‘content’ or ‘plime’) – where,
in assuming Christian Theism, we take this content or plime to be the Trinity as
a whole and its location – as its content or plime also includes the possibility of
other tropes being collocated with him (i.e. the Son and the Spirit), which results
in him not exhausting either of these things – in short, wherever God is located
there are other tropes that are located there with him. Second, God is particular by
him failing to abide by Leibniz’s Law – as, in assuming Christian Theism again –
there is the possibility of the existence of entities – duplicates, identified as the
Son and the Spirit – that are exactly similar in their intrinsic properties (i.e. their
nature) to him, yet are numerically distinct from him. Third, God is identical to his
qualitative nature – he is the specific character that he has, which is that of him
being omnipotent. God’s nature is thus intrinsic to him, not in the sense of him
possessing a further intrinsic ‘property’, but simply that of him being numerically
identical to this nature. Fourth, God is a module trope, rather than a modifier trope,
which is that of him being a maximally-thinly charactered object – a property in
an analogous sense (i.e. a property∗ ) – that is self-exemplifying and, in assuming
Christian Theism again, serves the role of bestowing this characteristic upon the
Trinity which he constitutes. Moreover, since God is a trope of a modular kind, he
plays a direct role in causation and is thus a basic term of a causal relation. God
is thus identical to a single module trope, which can be illustrated in Figure 7 as
follows:
Moreover, as a module trope, God is powerful in five ways: he is, first, directed
– in that God (or his action) is directed towards some characteristic and distinctive
manifestations, such as that of creating or sustaining the universe. Second, he
is independent – in that God is ontologically independent of his manifestations;
Figure 7: God and module trope identity.
40 | J. R. Sijuwade
that is, he exists when his power is not manifested.41 Third, he is actual – in that
God is an occurrent feature of the object that possesses him: the Trinity. Fourth,
he is intrinsic – God is intrinsic to his bearer, which is, again, the Trinity.42 Fifth,
he is objective – in that the existence of God is not dependent upon the existence
of any conscious, observing minds. God, as a module trope, is thus powerful in
that he fulfils the roles of directedness, independence, actuality, intrinsicality and
objectivity. However, he does this without any of the limitations that certain other
powerful module tropes may have. In other words, God is an unlimited powerful
trope, in that he is multi-track – he is cable of producing distinct manifestation
types – yet he can do this without any limitation except for logic. One way in
which one can further understand the limitlessness of the powerfulness of God is
through the utilisation of the notion of a threshold and a vector depicted on a onedimensional quality space with F and G representing two possible manifestation
types stemming from God’s action. For example, F could be the property of resting
on the ground and G could be the property of being suspended in the air, which
can be illustrated in Figure 8 (where ‘T’ is the threshold and ‘R’ is the resultant
effect).
In this illustration, for one to understand the effect brought about by God
– which, is in this case, is to cause something to be suspended in the air – it is
important to understand that this is not produced by an aggregation of operative powers that have reached a certain threshold for the effect. Rather, God, in
all cases when he exercises his power, is unopposed and does not require other
powers to reach a threshold. In short, God can bring about any effect – and thus
reach the needed threshold for the occurrence of a given manifestation type –
41 Though in the grounding of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the layered structure
of reality, God’s power will not move from inactivity to activity but, instead, would always be
manifested, given that this grounding act will be a necessary action that stems from God’s perfect
goodness. More on this below.
42 As Christian Theism is being assumed here, God is taken to be a ‘part’ of the Trinity and thus
is borne by, and works through, the Trinity (i.e. in cooperation with the Son and the Spirit). This
conception of the Trinity assumes the notion of the ‘monarchy of the Father’ – the teaching that
God is numerically identical to the Father alone – which is contrary to the common position that
holds to God being numerically identical to the Trinity. The difference between these positions is
more than a linguistic issue as proponents of the monarchy of the Father will take the existence
of the Father to be the basis for Christian Theism being monotheistic – as there is ‘one Father’
there is ‘one God’ – whereas proponents of the common position would take the existence of the
Trinity to be the basis for Christian Theism being monotheistic – the ‘unified collective’ (i.e. the
Trinity) is the ‘one God’. For a further philosophical explication of the notion of the monarchy
of the Father and its application to the Trinity, see (Sijuwade 2021b).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 41
Figure 8: God’s powerfulness modelled as a vector.
without limitations from anything – aside from logic. God is thus a single
omnipotence (module) trope – which we can term an ‘omnipotence-trope’ for
short.
Now, as an omnipotence-trope, God is a personal entity – a personal module
trope – due to the fact that for him to exercise his omnipotence, he must be
an entity that has a rich form of consciousness that enables him to perform a
range of actions that are solely limited by logic. Thus, to ward off a potential
objection that can be raised here, conceiving of God as a trope does not rob
him of this personhood, given that he is a trope of a modular nature (i.e. a
property∗ ). Furthermore, given his omnipotence, God would be an entity that is
unlimited in knowledge, presence, freedom and goodness. That is, it follows from
his omnipotence that God would, firstly, be omniscient – he would know of all
true propositions (concerning the past and present), that they are true – as, if he
is to be able to exercise his omnipotence, he would need to know the nature of the
alternative actions that are dependent upon what occurred in the past and what is
presently occurring. Secondly, being omnipotent and also omniscient, God would
be omnipresent – he would be cognizant of, and causally active at, every point of
space – and thus would be present to all existing things through his knowledge
concerning them and his power to act upon them. Thirdly, being an omnipotencetrope, he would also be perfectly free – he would be free from any non-rational
influence determining the choices that he makes – as if he is to be able to exercise
his power in any logically possible way, then his power must operate without any
causal limitation or hindrance. Fourthly, being omniscient and perfectly free, God
would also be perfectly good – he will always perform the best action (or kind
of action) if there is one, many good actions and no bad actions. That is, given
God’s omniscience, he would know the nature of each available action that he
can choose from and thus would possess knowledge of whether each action is
42 | J. R. Sijuwade
good or bad, or is better than some incompatible action. Moreover, in recognising
an action as good, God would have some motivation to perform that action, and
in recognising an action as being better than another action, God would have an
even greater motivation to perform it (Swinburne 2016). Hence, given his perfect
freedom, if God is situated in a scenario in which there is a best possible action (or
best kind of action) for him to perform, then God will always perform that action
(or kind of action), and if there is no best action (or kind of action), then God will
perform a good action and no bad actions.43
These are the attributes – omniscience, omnipresence, perfect freedom
and perfect goodness – that are derivable from the supposition that God is an
omnipotence-trope. However, in construing God as a module-trope, we can also
take him to be metaphysically simple, given the non-composite and irreducibility
of a trope. And so, in conceptualising God in this particular way, we can see that
the derivable attributes of God – unlike Swinburne, who takes these attributes to
be related to God (and each other) by an ‘entailment relation’ – are in fact related
to God (and each other) by a relation of ‘numerical identity’.44 More specifically,
according to the notion of metaphysical simplicity, God is non-composite and
irreducible in the sense of him lacking proper parts – where a proper part is a
portion of an entity that is numerically distinct from it. Thus, by taking God to be
metaphysically simple, there is no portion of God that is numerically distinct from
him. God is a being who intrinsically within himself does not have any division
or ontological composition – be it spatial, temporal or metaphysical composition
– God must be such that he does not have any sort of complexity involving composition. So, the denial of metaphysical complexity in God is thus also a denial
of him possessing any properties as well. More specifically, God does not exemplify any numerically distinct properties (i.e. proper metaphysical parts). Since
43 Whereas in recognising an action as bad, God would have no motivation to perform it
44 As God has ‘attributes’ (or ‘characteristics’), but these attributes (or ‘characteristics’) are not
to be conceived of as ‘properties’, one can ask what the nature of these entities is? One way
is to conceive of these attributes as ‘aspects’ – qualitative differing, yet numerically identical
particular ways that an entity is. Construing these entities in this way enables the primary
objections against the cogency of the notion of metaphysical simplicity to be put to rest – as
God is taken to bear (qualitatively differing) ‘divine aspects’, rather than ‘divine properties’,
which enables God’s power, knowledge, goodness, etc., to be numerically identical to him and
each other – as aspects are numerically identical to their bearers and one another – whilst still
maintaining a qualitative distinction between them – as aspects qualitatively differ from their
bearers and one another. God thus has multiple, qualitatively differing aspects that are ‘improper
parts’ of him (i.e. numerically identical to God) rather than ‘proper parts’ of him (i.e. numerically
distinct from God). For reasons of space, this account will not be further detailed. However, for
a further explanation of this account, see (Sijuwade 2021a).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 43
if God were to exemplify these properties, he would be dependent upon them
in order to be what he is. Yet, as God cannot be dependent in specific this way
– given that he is omnipotent – he thus must not be the bearer of any properties.
Rather, any intrinsic property ‘attributable’ to God must be numerically identical
to him. For example, if the intrinsic property of goodness is attributed to God,
then one is not properly attributing to him an ontologically distinct property that
he exemplifies. Rather, God is instead taken to be identical with his goodness (and
all the other properties that are attributed to him as well). Moreover, given that
God is identical to each of his attributes, one must also infer that his attributes
are identical to each other due to the transitivity of identity. Thus, God’s identity
with his goodness and his power entails the fact of his goodness being identical
to his power (and, again, for all of the other properties that are attributed to
him). Therefore, on the basis of God’s metaphysical simplicity, there is, firstly,
no numerical distinction between God and his attributes and, secondly, there
is no numerical distinction between each of God’s attributes as well, as can be
seen in Figure 9 (where the double-headed arrows represent a numerical identity
relation).
Theism thus postulates the existence of one, metaphysically simple (and
personal) module trope: God, who has the single character of omnipotence and is
numerically identical to each of the attributes of divinity that are rightly predicated
of him. So construed, God is a fundamental entity, by his metaphysical simplicity
and omnipotence rendering him as an explanatory stopping point – his noncompositeness and irreducibility would thus not require him to be an output of
a grounding relation, and by him possessing the ability to perform any logically
possible action, anything that exists will be by him willing, or permitting, it to
exist. Therefore, if God exists, he is rightly understood as a metaphysically simple,
omnipotence trope that exists fundamentally.
Figure 9: God and
attributes identity.
44 | J. R. Sijuwade
This is the nature of Theism. However, one may ask the important question
of how this entity that we call God fits within the metaphysical frameworks that
have been detailed above? In other words, and in a more direct manner, where
is God located in the pluriverse and the platonic realm? Well, for the latter issue
– God’s existence within the platonic realm – as God is a concrete object within the
Abstractionist framework – as he is not causally inert – he is not located within the
platonic realm, but can simply be taken to be an entity that exists outside of it – yet,
as will be noted below, he stands in a certain ‘causal’ (or ‘grounding’) relation to
the entities within the platonic realm. Thus, in short, God exists outside of the
platonic realm but is related (in some manner) to the entities within the platonic
realm. Now, for the former issue (i.e. God’s existence within the pluriverse), one
can conceive of God as existing in the non-individual category: God exists within
the domain of abstract entities – that is, God’s mode of being is him existing with
the status of an abstract entity. More specifically, within the pluriverse, the domain
of abstract entities includes the category of non-individuals, with the instances of
this category each existing at the standpoint of a possible world – where an entity
exists from the standpoint of a possible world if, as noted previously, it ‘belongs
to the least restricted domain that is normally. . . appropriate in evaluating the
truth at that world of quantifications’.45 God does not exist wholly or partly at any
world – and thus is not conceived of within this mode of existence as a possible or
impossible individual. Rather, as with other necessary abstract entities (i.e. pure
sets), God exists from the standpoint of every world. One can thus take God to be
among the objects that exist from the standpoint of each world. In other words,
God has the same ontological status as abstract entities – without, however,
being like these objects in all respects.46 Thus, in short, in locating God within the
45 Cameron (2009) was the first individual to identify God as a non-individual that exists from the
standpoint of every world, with Almeida (2017a, 2017b) further developing Cameron’s position.
The following proposal, however, is not subject to the criticisms that have been raised against
this identification by Sheehy (2009) and Collier (2019, 2021), as, first, the notion of Isolation is
not present in this version of modal realism, and, second, God is not taken to be causally related
to creation from this standpoint (or way of being) – both of which they believe leads to modal
collapse. Rather, in this version of modal realism, worlds are indeed causally related, and it is
in God’s other way of being: as a possible individual that exists at a possible world, that God is
‘causally related’ to created reality, and thus there is no possibility of modal collapse. However,
in a recent article Sijuwade (2021c) has provided a way for God to be located at the standpoint of
every world and within every world – as a multilocated entity. This way utilises a modification of
Lewis’ Concretism. However, as this modification is not employed in this article, we will simply
take God to be solely located at the standpoint of every world.
46 This is important as God is not identified in this framework as an abstract entity, but simply
as an entity that has the same status as an abstract entity – namely, existing from the standpoint
of a possible world. Collier (2021, 59) has helpfully shown that it is not necessary (or sufficient)
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 45
Figure 10: Nature of the pluriverse and platonic realm (i).
pluriverse, one can thus take God to be a non-individual and thus exist, and be
active from, the standpoint of every world. From this standpoint, God has the same
status as an abstract entity, yet can serve the role of grounding each and every
world.47 It will be helpful to now illustrate these two options in Figure 10 (where,
again, for the left image, all is as before with solely the ‘dashed arrowed line’
now representing a grounding relation between God and the concrete possible
worlds, and, for the right image, again all is as before, with solely the ‘dashed
double-arrowed line’ now representing a grounding relation between God and all
the abstract objects (which would include the abstract possible worlds).
So, we have detailed the nature of Theism and found a place for God within
the pluriverse and (outside of) the platonic realm; it will thus be helpful to now
turn our attention to assessing Theism and Primitivism according to our abductive
criteria and in light of our explanatory target. That is, if Theism (or Primitivism) is
to be deemed the fundamental explanation (and terminus in explanation) for the
existence of the infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible worlds within
the pluriverse and platonic realm, we must assess the manner in which this
explanation fulfils our abductive criteria. To this task, we now turn.
for an entity to be an abstract entity (with all the features of it), simply because it exists from the
standpoint of a given world, as Lewis (1986, 83) himself allows impure sets to exists at a possible
world – and not from the standpoint of a possible world – yet, these entities are abstract rather
than concrete entities.
47 This position here is cogent, given that grounding is synchronic, rather than diachronic.
46 | J. R. Sijuwade
4.2 Assessment of Theism & Primitivism
For Criterion (i), Theism has predictive power, in respect to our explanatory target,
to the extent to which we can attribute to God an intention to bring about the
existence of the infinite plurality of worlds. Plausibly it is the best kind of action
for God to bring about this wide variety of entities, given the unique goodness
of this action. Specifically, the performance of this action is a unique good due
to the holding of two principles: the Diffusiveness Principle and the Principle of
Plenitude, which, brought together, we can call the ‘Goodness Principle’ and state
it as follows:
(14)
(Goodness)
(a)
(b)
Diffusiveness: Goodness is necessarily diffusive of
itself.
Plenitude: No genuine potentiality can remain
unfulfilled.
For (a) of the Goodness Principle,48 at a general level, goodness requires something other than itself as a manifestation of itself. Hence, a good being will
inevitably bring about other good things. Thus, as it is better to exist than not
to exist – existence is a good thing – God, as Kretzmann (1991, 223) writes,
‘necessarily (though with the freedom associated with counterfactual choice) wills
the being of something other than himself’. In other words, as perfect goodness is
an essential attribute of God and self-diffusiveness is essential to goodness itself,
the existence of other entities outside of God will be an inevitable consequence
of God’s nature. Restating this within our metaphysical context, God – who is
perfectly good – must diffuse his goodness by ‘grounding’ the existence of all
things outside of himself.49 The existence of other entities will be the necessary
48 Though the Diffusiveness Principle and the Principle of Plenitude are not currently guiding
principles within contemporary metaphysics, they have a storied history – as shown by Kretzmann (1991) and Lovejoy (1936) that, for the former principle, we have them stemming from the
work of Plato, through Augustine and Aquinas, and culminating in the work of Bonaventure,
and, for the latter principle, we have it stemming from the work of Epicurus and Augustine,
through Aquinas, Spinoza and Kant, and culminating in the work of Leibniz – and so, given
the weight of tradition, they should not be dismissed without argument. Furthermore, unlike
some other prominent principles within the field of contemporary metaphysics (such as that
of the principle of unrestricted composition), these principles do not clash with our intuitions
and do not entail some further problematic metaphysical theses. Hence, one should adopt these
principles unless there are good reasons not to – note, the lack of interest in these principles is
not a successful rebutting or undercutting defeater of them!
49 By saying here that God ‘grounds’ the existence of things outside of himself, which, as noted
below, would be primarily that of the infinite plurality of worlds that make up the pluriverse and
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 47
result of God’s intention to produce good things. Thus, God’s action of ‘grounding’
the existence of other entities is a product of his nature that stems from him necessarily, yet wilfully, spreading his goodness in this creative act.50 However, with
(b) of the Goodness Principle, we see that this diffusion of God’s goodness will
not be achieved by him simply grounding a limited range of possible entities;
rather, Diffusiveness requires that God ground other entities outside of himself,
and Plenitude tells us what (number and variety of) entities God would ground,
as this principle requires that no possible entity can remain as a potentiality, as
Lovejoy (1936) notes in expressing this principle:
not only the thesis that the universe is a plenum formarum in which the range of conceivable
diversity of kinds of living things is exhaustively exemplified, but also any other deductions
from the assumption that no genuine potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled, that the
extent and the abundance of the creation must be as great as the possibility of existence
and commensurate with the productive capacity of a ‘perfect’ and inexhaustible Source,
and that the world is the better the more things it contains... the existence of all possible
beings at all times is... an implicate of the divine nature
In line with Lovejoy, and in restating this within our modal framework, there
is a specific metaphysical relationship between value and plenitude – namely,
whatever exists (i.e. the number, variety and diversity of kinds of worlds, states
of affairs and possibilia) must be proportionate to the value of the source of their
existence – with a maximally valuable source leading to a maximisation of the
number, variety and diversity of kinds of possibilia or states of affairs. Hence,
as God is the perfect (and maximal) source of whatever exists, God’s existence
entails the fact that no potentiality (in logical space) will be left unfulfilled.
That is, as Almeida (2017c, 8) writes, it is the case that, given God’s existence
(and perfection) ‘every possible object, kind of object, event, kind of event, state
of affairs and so on exists at some time or other’. For reasons of plenitude, if
one assumes a Concretist viewpoint, then one can conceive of God as having
platonic realm, this grounding action performed by God is a creative act of causation, given that
grounding has been identified above as a form of causation: metaphysical causation. Importantly,
however, as grounding is metaphysical causation – rather than nomological causation – this
creative act of causation would be synchronic and necessitating – instead of diachronic and
contingent – which enable it to take in necessarily existing entities (such as the infinite plurality
of worlds that make up the pluriverse) as its relata (with a relation of nomological causation not
being able to do that).
50 That is, this diffusive act is not an ‘impersonal emanation’ of God but a personal act that
includes, firstly, his powers – that enable him to ground the existence of all entities, secondly, his
beliefs – that grounding the existence of other entities will diffuse his goodness – and, thirdly,
his purposes – to diffuse his goodness by grounding the existence of all other entities.
48 | J. R. Sijuwade
reason to ground every possibility that is consistent with his nature. Or, if one
assumes an Abstractionist viewpoint, then one can conceive of God as having
reason to ground every possible states of affairs (property, universal, proposition
etc.) that is consistent with his nature. Every concrete or abstract world and all
the possible entities and/or individual essences that exist in those worlds exist
by being grounded by God – in other words, God grounds the entire pluriverse
and platonic realm: all the worlds and all the possibilia and individual essences
that are either occupants of those concrete possible worlds or the entities that
are included within the maximal possible states of affairs that make up those
abstract possible worlds. Yet, the goodness that is inherent within the pluriverse
and platonic realm does not depend only on the number of entities that occupy
a given world, but also the variety and number of distinct kinds of entities that
exist in that world. Thus, God’s perfection (i.e. his goodness for Diffusiveness
and his general perfection for Plenitude) necessarily requires him to perform the
specific creative act of grounding the existence of an infinite plurality of concrete
or abstract possible worlds, which will include an infinite variety and diversity of
kinds of individuals and states of affairs. Now, if one conceives of God as grounding
the existence of concrete possible worlds, there is a certain advantage and a certain
drawback. And also, if one conceives of God as grounding the existence of abstract
possible worlds, there is also a certain advantage and a certain drawback. The
advantage of the former is that of there not being any potential problem for God
to ground the concrete possible worlds, as these entities are concrete objects that
can easily stand in causal relations – despite their necessity. Thus, the drawback
of the latter is that of there being a potential conceptual problem in understanding
how God can, in fact, ground the abstract possible worlds, as abstract objects are
usually conceived of as not being able to stand in causal relations. However, one
can overcome this drawback by emphasising the fact that a grounding relation,
which is indeed conceived of as a metaphysical causation relation, allows entities
from any ontological category to be the input or out of the relation (Schaffer 2009).
Hence, abstract objects should indeed be allowed to be the relata of a relation of
grounding – unless additional argumentation is provided against this position.
Thus, what one can affirm – which is in line with the traditional conception of an
abstract object – is that an abstract object is causally inert in the sense of it not
being able to be the input of a grounding relation – it can never be the ground
(i.e. metaphysical cause) of any entity – but it can be the output of a grounding
relation – it can be grounded (i.e. metaphysically caused) by another entity. Thus,
God can indeed serve as the ground of the abstract possible worlds that make up
the platonic realm.
Focusing now on the drawback of Concretism, the issue to be faced here is
that of God lacking the freedom to actualise the worlds that he desires to actualise,
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 49
as, given that actuality is conceived of as an indexical notion, each of the concrete
possible worlds is necessarily actual. All the concrete possible worlds, with the
potential gratuitous evil that plagues them, are necessarily grounded by God.
This is indeed a drawback, as God’s perfect freedom and goodness will seem to
require him to not necessarily ground (and actualise) all of these worlds. However,
one can lessen the impact of this issue by following Swinburne (2010, 7–8) and
conceiving of God’s omnipotence as the ability to do anything logically possible
and his perfect freedom and goodness as that of them requiring him to do the
best, or equal best action, if there is one. Thus, as God stands necessarily in a
grounding relation with these (actualised) concrete possible worlds (given the
holding of the Goodness Principle), it is not logically possible for God not to
ground these worlds, and neither is it a mark against his perfect freedom or
goodness for him to stand in this relation, as the diffusing of his goodness in a
plenitudinous way would indeed be the best act or an equally best act. Now, one
might struggle to stomach this result and thus be pushed (amongst other reasons)
to adopt an Abstractionist perspective, which has the advantage of maintaining
God’s perfect freedom and goodness, given that, as noted previously, he will
(in some sense) have the power of counterfactual choice. More specifically, as
with Concretism, God is necessarily related to the merely possible entities and
states of affairs by grounding their existence. Nonetheless, despite the necessary
existence of the merely possible worlds, God has counterfactual choice in the
form of God’s actualisation of one of the maximal possible states of affairs. That
is, God freely chose to actualise a certain world by conferring a special property
on a specific maximal possible state of affairs, which transformed this possible
world into the actual world – specifically, by bestowing on it a special ontological
status and making it into a different kind from the merely possible states of affairs
– which we take to be one that added further value to that world. Thus, prior
to this actualisation, God existed alongside the merely possible abstract possible
worlds, yet there were no states of affairs that were actual. God then surveyed all of
the maximal possible states of affairs in the platonic realm and elected to actualise
a specific possible world. Once God had elected and actualised a specific world,
a new type of entity came into existence – the actual world. We can illustrate
the manner in which God is related, in Abstractionism, to the infinite plurality
of abstract possible worlds within the platonic realm, and, in Concretism, to the
infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds within the pluriverse in Figure 11 as
follows (where all terms are as before, with the addition of a red arrow, in the left
image, to represent the necessary actualisation of all concrete possible worlds by
God, and the addition of a red arrow, in the left image, to represent the contingent
actualisation by God of a single abstract possible world):
50 | J. R. Sijuwade
Figure 11: Nature of the pluriverse and platonic realm (ii).
In Concretism, there is an absolute necessity associated with created reality
– existence and actuality are necessary. Whereas, in Abstractionism, there is a
contingency associated with created reality – a contingency of actuality, rather
than existence – as plausibly there will be a near-infinite variety of candidate
possible worlds within the platonic realm – whose value exceeds some threshold
value 𝜏 – that God would have good reason to actualise. The actualisation of
a specific world is not necessary; rather, what is necessary is solely that of God
grounding the existence of an infinite plurality of abstract possible worlds and
the actualisation of (at least) one world within that plurality (due to the value that
is added by performing that actualisation). Hence, God’s freedom to create is thus
not that of the creating of a new possible world – as each of the merely possible
worlds necessarily exists as an entity that is grounded by God – but is instead the
creation of a new kind of world – a change in kind of a possible world from being
a merely possible world to being the actual world – with the specific world that
experiences this kind-change being freely chosen by God. Thus, what is at hand is
that of God, given his overall perfection (maximality), goodness and the holding
of the Goodness Principle, having the intention, if Concretism is assumed, to
ground an infinite plurality of spatiotemporally independent worlds, with all of
these worlds being actual. Or, if Abstractionism is assumed, it is the fact of God
having the intention to ground an infinite plurality of maximal possible states of
affairs, with (at least) one of which will be separately actualised by God at some
time or other. As God’s (perfectly good) intentions are always realised, if there
is a God, we can thus expect – with a level of certainty – that there will also be
an infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible worlds, with all being actual
or (at most) one of these possible worlds being actualised. Theism thus fulfils
Criterion (i) to a very high level.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 51
For Primitivism, there is a postulation made concerning the existence of either
an infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds, with each of these possible worlds
being actual, or an infinite plurality of abstract possible worlds, with one of these
possible worlds being actual – with each of these sets of entities being fundamental, due to the fact these entities exist without any further explanation for their
existence. One can ask, however, if we are indeed led to expect this data – that
is, should we expect to find these concrete or abstract entities, without, however,
these entities existing in virtue of any deeper, more fundamental entity? I believe
not. And we can understand why on the basis of three sets of problems that plague
both iterations of Primitivism: the problem of concrete/abstract representation, the
problem of plenitude/insufficiency and the problem of relative/absolute actuality.
Focusing first on the Concretist conception of Primitivism, we have
the problem of concrete representation,51 which has been put forward by
Plantinga (2003, 211–212), and goes as follows: at a general level, possible worlds
possess an intentional property—things are the way that they are according to it
– or, more specifically, a possible world represents reality as being a certain way.
Yet, no concrete object (or set-theoretic construction) can exemplify this type of
intentional property and thus represent things in that way. Hence, as the exemplification of this intentional property – which enables an entity to represent
things in the way that they are – is essential for an object being a possible world,
then there are no possible worlds within the Concretist framework (as within this
framework, and the ontology of Lewis that is grounded upon, concrete entities
(and set-theoretic formulations) are the only entities that exist). Thus, on the basis
of this issue, Plantinga (2003, 212) is led to write, ‘The just conclusion, I think, is
that Lewis is about as much a modal realist as is W. V. Quine’. Within our analysis, we thus do not have any reason to expect there to exist any concrete objects
that fulfil the function of a possible world. That is, on the basis of the inability
for a concrete object to fulfil the function of representing how things are – as
possible worlds are supposed to do – we should not expect, with any high level
of likelihood, that there will, in fact, be an infinite plurality of concrete possible
worlds (which just happen to perform this representative function), rather than
none at all.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that the problem of concrete representation can (somehow) be successfully warded off within a Concretist framework,
Primitivism will still face a further problem in accounting for the fact of the existence of the infinite number and variety of concrete possible worlds – let’s term
this the problem of plenitude. As, certainly, in reiterating (again) a point raised by
51 The naming of this problem is original to this article.
52 | J. R. Sijuwade
Lewis, absolutely every way that a given world could be is a way that some world.
Hence, the Principle of Plenitude is one that is affirmed by a proponent of Primitivism. However, where the problem lies is concerning the lack of a source for this
plenitude. That is, Primitivism faces a problem in accounting for the working of
the Principle of Plenitude (or the ‘Principle of Recombination’ as conceived of by
Lewis), as there is a key relationship, as noted previously, between the value of the
source and the number, variety and diversity of kinds of worlds and possibilia –
with a maximally valuable source leading to a maximisation of the number, variety
and diversity of kinds of worlds and possibilia. However, according to Primitivism,
there is no source of the existence of the entities that make up the pluriverse, and
thus one does not have good reason to believe that there should be ‘no gaps’ in
logical space through there being an infinite plurality of worlds. Rather, as there
is no source, there should instead be gaps throughout logical space (and even
logical space should, in fact, be empty), given that the maximisation of plenitude
would not take place. Thus, again, we should not expect, with any high level
of likelihood, that there will be an infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds,
rather than none at all.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the problem of concrete representation and the problem of plenitude can also be successfully warded off within
a Concretist framework, Primitivism will still face a further problem in accounting
for the actuality of the infinite number and variety of concrete possible worlds
– let’s term this the problem of actuality.52 This problem focuses on highlighting
the incompatibility between the possible existence of island universes that are
actual – actual individuals that do not stand in any spatiotemporal relation to
one another – and some of the central tenets of the Concretist framework. That
is, the possible existence of island universes is problematic, under Concretism,
as the combination of the Isolation and Relative Actuality tenets imply that spatiotemporally disconnected island universes are impossible – in that there is no
actual world that is not spatiotemporally united. As Bricker (2001, 28), in clearly
expressing this issue, writes,
According to Lewis, possible individuals are part of one and the same possible world if,
and only if, they are spatiotemporally related. It follows immediately that no possible
world is composed of island universes of spatiotemporally isolated parts. Given the standard analysis of possibility as truth at some possible world, island universes, then, are
impossible.
52 In the literature, this issue has been termed the problem of island universes. However, for ease
of writing, I will continue to refer to it as the problem of relative actuality.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 53
Thus, it intuitively seems to be the case that it is possible that there could be more
than one actual physical universe that is spatiotemporally unrelated to another.
For example, it is quite clear that there could be two symmetrical physical universes that are exactly similar to one another, yet they are spatio-temporally
unconnected from one another – and thus, each fulfils the requirement of being
an actual concrete possible world (Menzel 2013). This, however, leads to a contradiction as, within the Concretist framework, anything that is spatio-temporally
related to a possible world is a part of it. Yet if there are multiple spatio-temporally
unrelated physical universes – that is, there is a possible world that has multiple possible worlds within it, then this would entail that there is an object – a
concrete possible world – all of whose parts are spatio-temporally related, yet
there are two parts that are not spatio-temporally related – hence, contradiction
(Menzel 2013). Thus, on the basis of this issue, one is provided with good reason
to not expect there to be an infinite plurality of concrete possible worlds, that are
all relatively actual. Given these three issues, our explanatory target is thus not
accounted for by Primitivism, within its Concretist iteration.
Turning our attention now onto the Abstractionism conception of Primitivism, what we have here is that of the problem of abstract representation,53
which has been put forward by Lewis (1986, 174–190), and runs as follows: the
infinite plurality of maximal possible states of affairs, as with the concrete possible worlds of Concretism, are taken to function as possible worlds that represent
reality in the many ways that it can be. One of these maximal possible states of
affairs obtains and thus is the actual world. One can ask, however, why any specific possible world represents our ‘concrete cosmos’ (hereafter, cosmos) in the
way that it does, rather than another possible world fulfilling this role instead?
Within the framework of Abstractionism, there is no informative explanation for
this – that is, a certain possible world – the actual world – represents in the way
that it does simply because it is of its nature to do so. Yet, if that is so, then one
can indeed ask the further question of what is the relation between this specific
possible world and our cosmos, which enables it to represent it in the way that
it does? Is it an external relation or an internal relation? If it is external, then the
cosmos might have borne this relation to a different maximal possible state of
affairs, even if the cosmos had had exactly the same intrinsic properties, which
Lewis (1986, 179) says is ‘especially repugnant’. That is, it seems to be clear that
the relation between the cosmos (in the condition that it actually is) and the actual
world must be a necessary one. In other words, if the cosmos exists, then a specific
possible world is actualised. Yet, if the ‘actualises’ relation is an external relation,
53 The naming of this problem is also original to this article.
54 | J. R. Sijuwade
then one is not provided with any explanation of what this necessary connection
is. One is instead left with a mystery. However, on the other hand, if the relation
is internal, then it is unintelligible. The reason for this is that an internal relation
is one that necessarily holds between the relata, based on their intrinsic natures
– for example, if David is 6ft and Paul is 5ft 8, then Paul necessarily stands in
the shorter than relation to David. Yet, if the relation under question is internal,
then it would be equally mysterious why the relation somehow holds between the
cosmos and the specific possible world that is actualised, given that this possible
world (and all other possible worlds) are mereologically simple, and thus devoid
of any intrinsic structure. That is, if a possible world lacks internal structure, then
one can ask the question of what specific internal structure does it have, which
allows it to be the case that if the cosmos exists, then this possible world bears
this actualisation relation? (In the same way that if David is the height that he is
and Paul is the height that he is, then Paul must bear the shorter than relation to
David). Within the Abstractionist framework, one is not given an explanation of
this, and thus it seems to be a case, as Lewis (1986, 182) notes, of the representative
role of a possible world being one of ‘magic’. However, as plausibly one should
not affirm the veracity of a magical explanation, we do not – as in the case of
Concretism – have any good reason to expect there to be an infinite plurality of
abstract objects that fulfil the essential role of representing reality in the way that
it is (i.e. the cosmos). That is, on the basis of the inability for an abstract object to
fulfil the function of representing how things are, as possible worlds are supposed
to do, we should (again) not expect, with any high level of likelihood, that there
will, in fact, be an infinite plurality of abstract possible worlds (which just happen
to bear the necessary relation that allows them to perform their representative
function), rather than none at all.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the problem of abstract representation can (somehow) be successfully warded off within an Abstractionist
framework, Primitivism will still face a further problem in accounting for the fact
of the existence of the infinite number and variety of abstract possible worlds
– let’s term this the problem of insufficiency. Unlike Concretism, Abstractionism
does not assume a principle that can account for the infinite number and variety
of abstract possible worlds that exist within the platonic realm. One can thus ask
why there should be any number of entities more than a few or none at all. And
one can also ask why there should be a variety of individual essences that feature
within these states of affairs, rather than a few or none at all? One could assume
the Principle of Plenitude adopted by Concretism, but the same issue concerning
the source of the plenitude would also spring up as well. Thus, as it stands, there
is no good reason that one should hold to there being a wide variety in numbers
and kinds of abstract possible worlds – let alone there be an infinite number
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 55
that corresponds to the range of possible ways that reality could be like. As with
the case of Concretism, it appears as there should indeed be gaps throughout
‘platonic’ logical space (and even the platonic logical space should, in fact, again
be empty), given that there is not a sufficient principle in place to underwrite the
(necessary) production of the plurality of abstract possible worlds. Thus, again,
we should not expect, with any high level of likelihood, that there will be an
infinite plurality of abstract possible worlds, rather than none at all.
In addition to this, even if we were to assume that the problem of abstract
representation and the problem of insufficiency can be successfully warded off
within an Abstractionist framework, Primitivism will still face a further problem
in accounting for the fact that, amongst the infinite plurality of abstract possible
worlds, any one of these worlds is indeed actual – let’s term this the problem
of absolute actuality. That is, it is indeed problematic that any maximal possible
state of affairs is of a different ontological kind from another maximal possible
state of affairs – by it being ‘actual’ rather than ‘merely possible’. As the actuality
of a given possible world, plausibly, is not based on the features of the existent
maximal possible states of affairs; rather, one possible world is simply taken
to obtain over the others, and that is it. However, as the actualisation of one
world over another is not grounded on an ontological distinction between the
non-actual worlds – as for a state of affairs to be a possible world is only for it
to be maximal and possible, and for a possible world to be actual is only for it
to obtain – there is not any basis for the assumption that is made that a certain
possible world is indeed actual. That is, outside of our experience of the actual
world – which is indeed open to infamous global scepticism challenges – one
does not have any independent reason in support of the fact that any given world
should be actual, rather than being non-actual. Again, as noted before, one could
assume Lewis’ Principle of Plenitude within an Abstractionist framework and say
that the added value that a given maximal possible state of affairs incurs by being
actualised should be ‘picked up’ by the principle and thus, we can expect there
to be an actual world amongst the infinite plurality of possible worlds? Maybe
so; however, a more serious problem is presented to an individual who takes this
path – namely, that of them needing to assert the fact of all of the infinite plurality
of worlds being actual. That is, as a possible world would be more valuable if it
is actualised, and Plenitude will, in some manner, generate the existence of an
infinite plurality of possible worlds, given the value that is maximised by this,
then each of these possible worlds should be actual, which, as previously noted,
Plantinga took to be an impossibility. So, either one affirms the fact of there
potentially not being any actual worlds, or one affirms the impossible case of all
of the possible worlds being actual. Either way, our explanatory target is, again,
not accounted for by Primitivism, as it is inbuilt into the thesis of Abstractionism
56 | J. R. Sijuwade
(i.e. it is a central tenet of it) that as a minimum, and as a maximum, at most one
possible world is actual. Thus, if there is no God (and the existence of the infinite
plurality of worlds is a brute fact), we should not expect there to exist an infinite
plurality of abstract possible worlds, with one of these worlds being actualised.
Hence, given these three issues, our explanatory target is also not accounted for
by Primitivism within its Abstractionist iteration. Thus, in all, Primitivism thus
does not fulfil Criterion (i).
For Criterion (ii): fit with background knowledge – where this background
knowledge includes other areas of metaphysics (outside of the field of modal
metaphysics), philosophy in general and the natural sciences – we can see that
Theism fits very well with our background knowledge, whereas, on the one hand,
Primitivism does fit with our background knowledge, and, on the one hand, it
doesn’t. In the case of Theism, a claim is made concerning the existence of solely
one entity that exists within the pluriverse (i.e. from the standpoint of every world
or at each of the worlds within the pluriverse). This specific entity: God, is a
metaphysically simple, omnipotence-trope. In assessing this claim’s fit with our
background knowledge, we see that it fits very well with this knowledge, as it
posits the existence of certain a type of entity – a trope – that is at the foundation
of contemporary metaphysics. Specifically, tropes are a standard feature of most
current day ontologies – where influential metaphysicians such as Williams (1953,
1986), Campbell (1990), Schaffer (2001), Simons (1994), Maurin (2002, 2018),
Ehring (2011), McDaniel (2001) and Loux (2015), all have utilised the concept of
a trope within their ontological system. Moreover, tropes do not only feature in
the ontological systems of various metaphysicians, but are also plausible options
for dealing with various issues within contemporary philosophy. That is, tropes,
amongst other things, find their place in wind ranging contexts such as that of
the metaphysics of persistence and identity, where they provide a basis for the
notions of endurance and perdurance (Benovsky 2013), and the philosophy of
physics, where they provide a philosophical basis for quantum theory and the
Standard Model of elementary particles (Morganti 2009). However, where these
types of entities find their primary use is in the metaphysics of properties, where
they provide a means for one to affirm a form of realism (Keinänen, Hakkarainen,
and Keskinen 2016). And one of the reasons why tropes are utilised in this specific
context is due to the fact that these types of entities – unlike those of platonic
universals – are ones that are epistemically accessible – that is, one can easily
possess a justified (or warranted) belief in the existence of them (primarily because
of these entities being able to stand in causal relations to us). Now, the importance
of this specific role will be further illuminated when we turn to assess Primitivism.
Nevertheless, what we can see here is that the belief in the existence of tropes
is widespread in contemporary metaphysics – given their explanatory value in
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 57
further illuminating various areas of reality – and thus the postulation of the
existence of God, identified as a (module) trope, meshes well with other theories
from the neighbouring fields within contemporary metaphysics.54 Theism thus
fulfils Criterion (ii) to a significant level as well.
For Primitivism, where there is a certain fit with our background knowledge
is, first, by Concretism positing the existence of concrete possible worlds, identified as maximal mereological sums of spatio-temporal objects. These types of
entities correspond well with the contemporary mereological concept of the Universe (U), which, as Simons (1987, 15) notes, is ‘the sum of all objects whatever,
a unique individual of which all individuals are part’. A concrete world is simply a spatio-temporally and causally isolated (U). Furthermore, it also fits with
the notion of substantivalism, which has been defended by individuals such as
Sider (2001) and Schaffer (2009) within the wider field of philosophy of space and
time. This specific view, according to the proponents of substantivalism, is one
that conceives of the cosmos as a substance that is a ‘container’ for other material
objects. A concrete world can thus also be conceived of as a large spatio-temporal
substance that contains other material objects as parts. Thus, the entities posited
by Concretism fit well with other theses held within the wider field of philosophy.
Second, there is also a certain fit had by Abstractionism positing the existence of
abstract possible worlds that are identified as maximally possible states of affairs
– as, firstly, the language of states of affairs is widely used throughout various
fields of philosophy, and, secondly, the notion of a state of affairs is one that
has deep roots in philosophy through it playing an explanatory role in the influential philosophical theories of Brentano (1870), Husserl (1901), Reinach (1921),
54 One could raise the objection here that the notion of a ‘personal’ trope is not widespread in
contemporary metaphysics, and thus Theism does not mesh well with our background knowledge. In response to this issue, one can emphasise the importance of the type/token distinction
for the Criterion of Background Knowledge. That is, for the postulation of the existence of an
entity to be such as to fit within our background knowledge, this entity simply needs to be of a
class (i.e. a type) of entities that are taken to exist within other fields; rather than it being a particular instance of this class (i.e. a token) that is regularly seen to be duplicated (as if this were, in
fact, the case, then one would not be able to make discoveries of new instances of a given class,
which one clearly can). Thus, even though God is a personal module trope – that is, he is able to
be ‘picked out’ from the class of tropes by being personal (amongst other things) – as tropes are
a class of entities that are widely taken to exist in other fields within contemporary metaphysics
(outside of the field of analytic theology), the postulation of the existence of God is a postulation
of a type of entity that does, in fact, fit within our background knowledge – even if he is a unique
instance of this kind. Whereas, for example, if one were to assume Swinburne’s (2016, 103–126)
construal of God as an omnipresent spirit, God would indeed be a type of entity that does not fit
within our background knowledge, as spirits are not widely taken to exist in other fields within
contemporary metaphysics (outside of the field of analytic theology).
58 | J. R. Sijuwade
Russell (1918), Wittgenstein (1918), Pollock (1984) and Armstrong (1997) – each
of whom utilise the language and the notion of a ‘state of affairs’ in different
ways and within different philosophical contexts – such as that of a logic context
(with Brentano), a phenomenological context (with Husserl and Reinach), a logical atomistic context (with Russell), a Tractarian context (with Wittgenstein and
Armstrong) and a linguistic context (with Pollock).55 Thus, the type of entity that
an abstract possible world is conceived of as (i.e. as a state of affairs) is grounded
historically in areas outside of the field of modal metaphysics – with this historical grounding being based on the great explanatory value that the concept has
had in these areas. However, despite the correspondence with our background
knowledge that is had here – that is Concretism and Abstractionism both positing
the existence of entities that feature in other areas of philosophy and have some
explanatory value – where we can identify an important potential clash with
our background knowledge concerns the fit between Primitivism and the central
philosophical field of epistemology. More specifically, Concretism and Abstractionism face two epistemological challenges: the Integration Challenge and the
Reliability Challenge, which both highlight the problem of how one can come to
possess knowledge about metaphysical modal truths – and provide a challenge
for those who aim to provide an account of these truths. The Integration Challenge,
proposed by Peacocke (1999) as a generalisation of Benacerraf’s (1973) problem for
Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics, raises the challenge of one reconciling a credible account of what is involved in the truth of a metaphysical statement
with a plausible account of how one can come to know them. Thus, in the context
of the metaphysics of modality, the Integration Challenge is conceived of as that
of reconciling an account of what is involved in the truth of a modal statement
with a credible account of how one can come to know them (Thomasson 2021).
This specific challenge arises quite clearly for Concretism and Abstractionism
as follows: for Concretists, possible worlds are concrete, spatio-temporally and
causally isolated entities. And, for Abstractionism, possible worlds are abstract
entities that are outside of space and time and are causally inert. Within both
theories of modality, possible worlds are conceived of as entities that are epistemically inaccessible to us. That is, unlike ordinary objects that we are able to
be perceived – and which have a causal connection to us – it is unclear how
one can use our particular methods of acquiring knowledge to gain knowledge
about them. More fully, Concretism and Abstractionism require one – in order
to ground de dicto and de re modality – to know what is true at another world
55 For a detailed explanation of the notion of a state of affairs within the works of these
philosophers and the employment within a linguistic context, see (Smith 1989) and (Textor
2018).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 59
than the actual world, yet as these possible worlds are either causally isolated
from ours, within Concretism, or are causally inert, within Abstractionism, there
is no connection by which one can be informed about the truth or falsity of modal
statements about these entities – in short, we do not have any reason to believe
that one can know what is going on within these maximal mereological sums of
concrete individuals or within these maximal possible states of affairs. In short,
how one can have epistemic access to these entities is mysterious. And thus, if
modal knowledge involves knowledge of concrete or abstract possible worlds that
causally disconnected from us, then given the epistemic inaccessibility of these
worlds, the theses of Concretism and Abstractionism, as Peacocke (1999, 3) notes
in a related context, ‘arguably makes modal truth radically inaccessible’.
Now, the Reliability Challenge, proposed by Nozick (2001), raises the challenge of how one can have a justified belief concerning modal statements – in a
manner that fits with contemporary evolutionary theory. More precisely, if one is
to have a justified belief concerning the truth value of various modal statements,
then we should have evolved with a reliable faculty that enables us to come
to know these modal truths. However, as Nozick (2001, 122) notes, ‘we do not
appear to have such a faculty, and it is implausible that evolutionary processes
would instill that within us’. However, as we do not have a cogent explanation for
why one should have developed a reliable faculty for detecting possibilities and
necessity, Nozick (2001, 125) forwards the position that we should be sceptical
about claims that we have such knowledge about modal matters. Now, this issue
is further heightened within the framework posited by Concretism and Abstractionism, given the fact that the concrete possible worlds, posited by Concretism,
and the abstract possible worlds, posited by Abstractionism, are not able to have
any causal impact on our beliefs (Thomasson 2021). However, as it is plausibly
the case that the holding of causal relation in the belief-forming process is one
of the primary factors that ensure reliability, then the lack of a causal relation
between us and the concrete and abstract possible worlds that fulfil the role of
‘modal truthmakers’ undermine one’s claim to having reliable knowledge about
modality (Thomasson 2021).56 Hence, given the lack of causal impact on our
beliefs by these isolated or inert entities, one can indeed see the plausibility of
Nozick’s (2001, 122) when he writes that since ‘our ancestors evolved in the actual
world, there were no selective pressures to reward accuracy about all possible
56 Importantly, however, as Fischer (2017, 270) makes it clear, the Reliability Challenge as just
stated, remains for those who reject a causal theory of knowledge, as he writes ‘the critic can
reframe the problem in terms of a demand for an explanation of our reliability about modal
matters, and abandoning the causal theory of knowledge won’t help with this version of the
problem’.
60 | J. R. Sijuwade
worlds, and there was no handicap to being right only about the actual world’.
Thus, it seems to be the case that it is implausible that one should have evolved
with the faculty to reliably detect (non-actual) possible worlds. Therefore, given
the plausibility of these two challenges: the Integration Challenge and the Reliability Challenge, it seems to be the case that Primitivism does not allow one to
affirm an integrated and reliable epistemology – both of which fit with the truthseeking goals of epistemology – but rather, unlike the affirmation of the existence
of tropes, it leaves us in a state of radical scepticism. Hence, on the basis of this,
Primitivism – despite the positing of entities that fit with, or feature in, other theories within philosophy – does not fit well with the field of epistemology – which
is a staple of contemporary philosophy – and thus Criterion (ii) not sufficiently
met by Primitivism.
For Criterion (iv): parsimony, Theism requires one to minimise (ontological
and ideological) commitments at the fundamental level – whilst also maximising
explanation (i.e. the explanatory power) of the data at hand – that is, in other
words, it is a very parsimonious explanation, or, in fact, the simplest possible personal fundamental explanation. As it explains the various phenomena of reality
in terms of the powerful action of one fundamental personal entity: God – rather
than many fundamental personal entities – and thus it is an explanation that
is quantitatively ontologically parsimonious – it is more parsimonious than any
other polytheistic based personal explanation by postulating the fewest number
of fundamental entities: one. Moreover, as God is metaphysically simple, and
thus lacks proper parts, God has the fewest number of fundamental properties
possible: zero. As, instead of possessing properties, each attribution made of God
is numerically identical to him – God’s attributes are God himself. There is thus no
further explanation that is needed to be provided for why God has the properties
that he does – as he does not have any properties. Furthermore, Theism is also
qualitatively ideologically parsimonious as it includes the fewest number of theoretical primitives. That is, in fact, it does not have any primitives, as each of God’s
attributes are explicitly defined (without needing to use any form of analogy),57
and thus it includes the fewest number of fundamental ideological primitives:
zero. However, Theism is not only quantitively ontologically/ideologically parsimonious, but it is also qualitatively ontologically/ideologically parsimonious, in
the sense that it postulates the existence of the simplest kind of personal fundamental entity – without one needing to utilise different kinds of fundamental
theoretical primitives to conceptualise his nature. More precisely, as Theism identifies God as a trope (of a modular kind), it posits the existence of an entity of
57 For an example of these definitions, see above (pg. 28), and for more precise, formal definition
see: (Sijuwade, 2021a, 7, 29–30).
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 61
the fewest number of fundamental kinds: zero, due to the fact that, in following
Lowe (2006), kinds are correctly conceived of as universals that are instantiated
by particular objects – which is in line with Aristotle who introduced the distinction between two types of universals, i.e. kinds and attributes. Yet, in assuming
‘Classical Trope Theory’ – which is the metaphysical theory that grounds this
conception of God – one will disaffirm the existence of universals and the (problematic) instantiation relation that ties particular objects to these universals – in
a manner that one actually reduces the category of universals to tropes fulfilling
certain roles. Hence, as Lowe (2006, 11) writes, trope-theorists are motivated ‘by a
strong desire for ontological economy and a radically empiricist stance in epistemology, inspiring frequent appeals to Occam’s razor and a nominalistic hostility
to belief in the existence of universals’. Thus, because of this, one will then be
able deny the existence of kinds (at the fundamental level) – as tropes are not
instances of any kind (and do not instantiate anything but are instead simply
identical to their nature).58 Therefore, by Theism positing the existence of God,
one is not required to be committed to the existence of any kinds that he instantiates (at the fundamental level) – that is, God is of zero kinds.59 Furthermore, as
there are no theoretical primitives used in conceptualising God, one can eschew
any kind of theoretical primitives – and thus this type of fundamental explanation allows one to continue to have a very ideologically parsimonious ontology.
Theism is thus quantitatively and qualitatively (ontologically/ideologically) the
simplest possible explanation, due to the fact that it postulates the fewest number
of fundamental entities: one object and zero properties, the fewest fundamental
kinds: zero kinds, with the fewest number and kind of theoretical primitives: zero
for both. Theism thus fulfils Criterion (iv) as well.
Yet, for the proponent of Primitivism, the same cannot be said for their
position, as Primitivism requires one to maximise (ontological and ideological) commitments at the fundamental level – whilst also failing to maximise
explanation (i.e. the explanatory power) of the data at hand (as was noted previously) – that is, in other words, it fails to be a quantitatively and qualitatively
ontologically/ideologically parsimonious explanation. That is, for the former
58 This is due to the fact of a trope being able to play the role of a substance – through forming
a compresent bundle with other tropes – and universal – through the process of abstraction
enabling one to fictionally treat a class of trope as universal-like entities. Furthermore, it is left
open here whether there are, in fact, kinds at the non-fundamental level.
59 In previous work: (Sijuwade 2021c) and (Sijuwade 2021d), I took God to be of one kind: trope.
However, on the basis that a kind is to be correctly conceived of as a universal, I now take it to
be the case that tropes cannot be of any kind. Nonetheless, if this supposition is incorrect, one
can simply re-affirm God being of the kind trope, which still enables him to be a (quantitively
and qualitatively) ontologically parsimonious entity (i.e. he is one entity of one kind).
62 | J. R. Sijuwade
(i.e. quantitative ontological/ideological parsimony), Primitivism, as conceived
of through Concretism or Abstractionism, does not posit the fewest number of
fundamental entities (i.e. objects or properties), as it commits one to posit the
existence of an infinite number of fundamental entities – namely, the infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible worlds that are each fundamental by being
ungrounded. And it also commits one to a countless number of properties that
are either, within Concretism, instantiated by the objects at the possible world
in which they inhabit, or, within Abstractionism, exemplified by the objects at
the possible worlds in which they are included within.60 Thus, counting by entity
and property tokens, there is an infinite number of entity and property tokens
– as there is a multiplication of tokens in indefinitely many combinations to form
the infinite number of possible worlds, and propertied entities, that fill up the
pluriverse and platonic realm. Furthermore, specifically for Abstractionism, one
is also saddled with a vast number of theoretical primitives, as modality is not
reduced within this framework but is taken as an undefined notion (i.e. theoretical
primitive). Hence, this all reveals that Primitivism is a position that posits the existence of many fundamental entities (i.e. objects and properties), rather than the
fewest – and, for Abstractionism, it includes many theoretical primitives within
its ideological framework. Given this, one could say that Primitivism is, in fact,
a maximally quantitatively complex position – as for every possible entity and
property that there could be, one is committed to that entity and property, each of
which, from the position of Primitivism, will be fundamental (with a commitment
to a vast number of theoretical primitives also needing to be made for Abstractionism as well). In addition to this, for the latter form of parsimony (i.e. qualitative
ontological/ideological parsimony), and contra Lewis’ (1986) own position on the
matter,61 one can also see that Primitivism, within Concretism and Abstractionism, does not posit the fewest number of fundamental kinds (of entities), as it
commits one to an infinite number of kinds of objects (or individual essences)
and a countless number of kinds of properties. Focusing on Concretism – though
with this issue applying to Abstractionism as well – this issue is expressed clearly
by Melia (1992, 192) when he writes, ‘For example, Lewis is committed to the
unicorns, to the gods, to the ghosts, to the qualia which occur in other possible
worlds. Indeed, Lewis is committed to every possible kind of thing. And since
Lewis is committed to every possible kind of thing, Lewis’s theory is as qualitatively unparsimonious as any consistent theory could be’. One thus seems to be
60 For Concretism, these properties would not be infinite in number, given that there will be
certain worlds within the pluriverse that are empty, and thus would not have any objects that
instantiate properties at those worlds.
61 Plantinga does not take a position on this in his written work.
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 63
committed to the existence of an entity (i.e. an object (or individual essence)),
and property of that entity, for any kind of entity, or property of an entity, that
there could be. This, again, reveals that Primitivism is a position that posits the
existence of many kinds of fundamental entities and properties, rather than the
fewest – and, ideologically, there will be a requirement (at least in Abstractionism) to invoke a vast number of kinds of theoretical primitives in order for this
metaphysical thesis to do its explanatory work in the modal sphere. One can,
again, say that Primitivism is, in fact, a maximally qualitatively complex position
– as for every possible kind of entity and property that there could be, one is
committed to that kind of entity (i.e. object and property), each of which, from the
position of Primitivism, will be fundamental (with a commitment to a vast number
of kinds of theoretical primitives also needing to be made for Abstractionism as
well).62 Primitivism thus provides an explanation that fails to fulfil Criterion (iv).
Therefore, within our context of analysis, Theism provides an explanation
that enables one to minimise (ontological and ideological) commitments at the
fundamental level, while maximising explanation of the data at hand (i.e. our
explanatory target). More precisely, Theism is the simplest kind of personal fundamental explanation that fits with our background knowledge and leads us to
expect (with a level of certainty) the existence of an infinite plurality of concrete or
abstract possible worlds. Theism thus fulfils all of the relevant components of our
abductive criteria. However, what we find with Primitivism, is that of there being
a position does not, first, yield (or predict the data) – as we do not have good reason to expect an infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible worlds to exist
– whereas if God exists, we do have good reason to expect these entities to exist,
based on the fact of God being perfect and the holding of the Goodness Principle.
Second, Primitivism proposes a position that does not fit with our background
knowledge – specifically that of it not corresponding well with the truth-seeking
goals of the important field of epistemology – whereas Theism posits the existence
of an entity that fits well with our background knowledge – without any sceptical
implications for our knowledge. Thirdly, Primitivism posits the existence of a vast
array of fundamental entities that render the position as maximally quantitively
62 Divers (2002, 154–155) comes to the defense of Lewis on this point by highlighting the fact that
Lewis is only committed to the existence of sets and individuals and thus the numerous possibilia
that inhabit the pluriverse are simply different instances of individuals or sets. Hence, the number
of the kind of entities postulated within the proposed ontology is only two, which seems to show
that Lewis does not propose a qualitatively complex theory. Assuming that one takes Divers (and
Lewis) to be correct on this point, the conclusion reached here will still stand, given the fact that
Lewis postulates the existence of two kinds of entities; whereas Theism postulates the existence
of solely one, Theism is thus still more qualitatively simple than Primitivism, even if the latter is
indeed not maximally qualitatively complex.
64 | J. R. Sijuwade
and qualitatively complex, and thus is less simple (ontologically and ideologically) than the postulation made by Theism, which postulates the existence of
one fundamental entity: God. This single fundamental entity is a metaphysically
simple omnipotence trope (who is identical to each of the attributes ascribed
to him) and thus instantiates zero properties. Theism thus postulates the fewest
number of entities – one module trope, rather than many – and the fewest kind
of entities – zero kinds, rather than (at least) two kinds: substance and attributes
– and the fewest number and kind of properties – zero properties, rather than
many. Thus, in comparison to Primitivism, Theism is a simpler explanation, that
fits with our background knowledge, and leads us to expect the occurrence of our
explanatory target, when otherwise we would not expect this to occur. In other
words, Theism fulfils our abductive criteria to a greater extent than the alternative option that is available. And thus, given this, we have a good reason to take
Theism to be the fundamental explanation (i.e. the metaphysical explanations
that fully explains the data and does not have a further synchronic explanation
for it) that can serve as a terminus in explanation for the existence of the infinite
plurality of concrete or abstract possible worlds. More specifically, as noted previously, if one can formulate an explanation that allows us to have a metaphysical
explanation with a greater fulfilment of our abductive criteria – in this case, a
simpler explanation, that fits with our background knowledge, and predicts the
data to a greater extent than the existing options, without there also being a corresponding loss in the fulfilment of any other of the components of the criteria
– then we have good reason to adopt that explanation as being the fundamental
explanation for our explanatory target. Theism, in comparison to Primitivism, is
the simplest explanation, fitting with our background knowledge, that leads us
to expect the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible
worlds, when otherwise they would not be expected to exist.
Importantly, however, taking Theism to be the fundamental explanation of
our explanatory target does not mean that we need to do away with the theoretical benefits that are provided by modal realism, as the infinite plurality of worlds
still serve as the ‘truthmaker’ for these modal statements – that is, the entities
that provide a full explanation of the truth of our modal statements and locutions.
Hence, what we now have is solely that of a further (metaphysical (or synchronic))
explanation being available that can now be provided for the existence of these
truthmakers – namely, God. The central advantages of Concretism and Abstractionism – namely, the provision of an analysis of modality – is preserved here as
the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible worlds still
provides a full metaphysical explanation for the truth of the modal statements
under question. Thus, what is now added to this explanatory chain is that of the
existence of these truthmakers – the infinite plurality of worlds that make up
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 65
the pluriverse and platonic realm – being now accounted for as well. Thus, we
have a further reductive explanation being available – if Concretism is favoured
– or, at least, a further elucidated metaphysical position – if Abstractionism is
favoured – that enables us to not take the existence of the infinite plurality of
concrete or abstract possible worlds as brute facts, which, as with the primitivism
of modality, provides an even more economical, serviceable and pragmatically
virtuous philosophical system, due to the fact that one has less (brute) facts that
are left unaccounted for within their system – namely, from an infinite number
(i.e. the plurality of possible worlds) now to one (i.e. God). Hence, at a general
level, we now have Theism playing a vital role in the explanatory framework that
is provided by the modal metaphysical theories that have been under study, which
allows us to take Theism to be a more fundamental claim that underpins these
metaphysical theories, in the same manner, that the claims concerning possible
worlds that are made by these specific metaphysical theories are more fundamental than the modal statements that feature in our ordinary speech. Thus, we can
illustrate this structure at the general and more specific level in Figure 12 (where
everything is as before and with ‘CM’ standing for ‘completely (fundamentally)
metaphysically explains’ and ‘G’ standing for ‘grounds’).
The existence of the infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible worlds
has a sufficient fundamental explanation, in the sense that they are themselves
fully explained by the existence of God, who serves as their ground, but is, himself,
Figure 12: Modal structure (iii).
66 | J. R. Sijuwade
ungrounded – and thus does not synchronically depend upon any other at any
given time. In short, God is a fundamental entity that provides a fundamental
explanation for these entities, when they would not otherwise be expected to
exist. The pluriverse and platonic realm centre on, and terminate in, God and
God alone. That is, given this, we have a successful abductive argument for the
existence of God, by the postulation of his existence providing us with the best,
or more specifically, the only true fundamental explanation for the existence of
the infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible worlds that make up the
pluriverse and the platonic realm. We thus have another good reason to believe
in the existence of God. Importantly, in addition to this, we thus also have good
reason to now favour a weaker version of methodological naturalism within our
metaphysical investigations, which can be stated as follows:
(15)
(Methodological Naturalism∗ ) An individual should not appeal to supernatural entities when they explain certain data that is in the explanatory
scope of a metaphysical theory, unless this postulation makes the theory
more economical and/or increases its theoretical (explanatory) virtues.
As Theism provides a fundamental explanation for the entities that are at the
heart of the two most influential metaphysical theories of modality on offer:
Concretism and Abstractionism, an appeal that is made to God is indeed one that
– in adopting the language of Lewis – increases the theoretical (or explanatory)
virtues of this theory and also renders it more economical – where the theoretical
(or explanatory) virtues of the theory are that of it meeting the abductive criteria
of (i)–(iv) noted previously (and thus minimising theoretical commitments (at
the fundamental level) and maximising explanation) and the provision of a more
economical philosophical theory (or system) is that of it, as also noted previously,
reducing the number of entities that are left unaccounted for. Thus, in line with
tradition, Theism, the claim that there is a God, does indeed fulfil an important
role in explaining a certain facet of the fundamental structure of reality – namely,
that of its modal structure. And it can do this without transgressing the boundaries
set by (a weaker, but indeed plausible) methodological naturalism.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, in Section 2, an explanatory framework was established, which
provided us with the needed tools: abductive criteria to assess the potential worth
of a given metaphysical explanation. In Section 3, our explanatory target was
detailed: that of the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete or abstract
possible worlds that make up the pluriverse and the platonic realm. In Section 4,
candidates for a fundamental explanation (or terminus in explanation) of our
Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God | 67
explanatory target were detailed and assessed for their fulfilment of our abductive
criteria. These candidates were: Theism and Primitivism. In this assessment,
Theism was shown to be an explanation that fulfils the abductive criteria to a
greater level than the alternative position of Primitivism. Thus, Theism provides
the simplest explanation, fitting with our background knowledge, that leads us
to expect the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete or abstract possible
worlds that make up the pluriverse and the platonic realm. Theism is the sole,
true fundamental explanation of our explanatory target. And, therefore, given
the existence of the pluriverse or the platonic realm, we thus have one additional
(abductive) reason to believe that God exists and good grounds for God to reclaim
his place at the centre of metaphysics – well, at least in the modal sphere.
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Joshua Sijuwade