Article
The radical right, the labour movement and the competition for the
workers' vote
MOSIMANN, Nadja, RENNWALD, Line, ZIMMERMANN, Adrian
Abstract
This article analyses the capacity of radical right parties to attract support from un-ion
members in recent elections in Western Europe. It is argued that unionized vot-ers resist the
appeals of the radical right better than non-union members. Using data from the European
Social Survey 2010–2016, the article shows that union members are overall less likely to vote
for the radical right than non-union members. Even though it is found that unionized
working-class and middle-class voters are less like-ly to vote radical right than their
non-unionized peers in the pooled sample, it is also observed that these subgroups of
unionized voters and especially unionized working-class voters are not immune to radical right
voting in all the countries analysed. The article thus indicates a growing capacity of the radical
right to attract unionized working-class segments of the electorate in some countries and to
directly compete with left parties for these voters.
Reference
MOSIMANN, Nadja, RENNWALD, Line, ZIMMERMANN, Adrian. The radical right, the labour
movement and the competition for the workers' vote. Economic and Industrial Democracy,
2018, p. 0143831X1878031
DOI : 10.1177/0143831X18780317
Available at:
http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:108523
Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.
Mosimann, N., Rennwald, L. and Zimmermann, A., 2018. The Radical Right, the
Labour Movement and the Competition for the Workers’ Vote. Economic and Industrial Democracy. Online first August 2018,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X18780317
Postprint version
The radical right, the labour movement, and the competition for the
workers’ vote
Nadja Mosimann, Universities of Zurich and Geneva
Line Rennwald, University of Geneva
Adrian Zimmermann
Abstract
This article analyses the capacity of radical right parties to attract support from union
members in recent elections in Western Europe. It is argued that unionized voters
resist the appeals of the radical right better than non-union members. Using data from
the European Social Survey 2010–2016, the article shows that union members are
overall less likely to vote for the radical right than non-union members. Even though
it is found that unionized working-class and middle-class voters are less likely to vote
radical right than their non-unionized peers in the pooled sample, it is also observed
that these subgroups of unionized voters and especially unionized working-class voters
are not immune to radical right voting in all the countries analysed. The article thus
indicates a growing capacity of the radical right to attract unionized working-class segments of the electorate in some countries and to directly compete with left parties for
these voters.
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
2
Introduction
It was the event between the two rounds of the 2017 French presidential election: In a
well-orchestrated appearance, Marine Le Pen, presidential candidate from the radical
right Front National, went to the Whirlpool plant in Amiens to meet with strike pickets
three days after she had been qualified for the second round of the election. In January
2017, the management of Whirlpool had announced the delocalisation of their production of tumble dryers to Poland and had scheduled the closure of the French plant in
Amiens for June 2018. The crux of the matter was that Le Pen’s centrist-liberal opponent for the second round, Emmanuel Macron, had held a meeting with trade unions
and representatives of workers in the city centre of Amiens that same morning. In
front of the plant, Marine Le Pen (unjustly) claimed that the meeting in the city centre
was not representative and declared her solidarity with the striking workers who were
“resisting against rampant globalization and a shameful economic model.”1 She then
went on to criticize her opponent for not actually coming to the plant. Eventually,
Macron reacted to Le Pen’s accusations by also visiting the plant and speaking to workers on the picket line.
In our view, the highly mediatized event in Amiens perfectly illustrates the attitude of
the radical right towards workers and trade unions that is at the centre of our article.
Even though Marine Le Pen’s visit to Amiens might seem like random political opportunism at first glance, it is not a coincidence that she labelled trade unions – with
whom Macron was meeting – as not representative of workers only to simultaneously
claim solidarity with these workers. In this article, we will characterize the attitude of
the radical right towards workers and trade unions as consisting exactly of such attacks
________________________
1
BFMTV, Marine Le Pen sur le site de Whirlpool [Video file] (last accessed, 26th April 2017), available at:
http://www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/marine-le-pen-sur-le-site-de-whirlpool-je-suis-ici-a-maplace-exactement-ou-je-dois-etre-938359.html.
3
Union membership effects on radical right voting
on labour movement organisations while pretending to defend workers' interests and
appropriating some of the labour movement’s demands. In doing so, we are above all
interested in the electoral implications of this strategy of the radical right. More precisely, we focus on the analysis of vote choice among union members and non-union
members at the individual level. By exploring whether or not union membership affects citizens’ propensity to vote for radical right-wing parties and how such union
membership effects differ across social classes and countries, we contribute to the investigation of the relationship between trade unions and democracy that is at the core
of this special issue. Existing literature has led to ambiguous findings on the matter –
especially with regard to radical right voting among unionized working-class voters.
Moreover, trade unions themselves are worried that the political offer of radical rightwing parties might generate sympathies for them among union members (see Stöss,
2017). Contrary to popular wisdom, we argue that unionized workers resist the radical
right’s appeals to at least some degree and in some countries, while simultaneously
assuming that the radical right manages to expand its vote shares among non-unionized workers who form a growing constituency in the context of de-unionization.
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold: First, we contribute to the literature on
the relationship between union membership, political behaviour, and the democratic
representation of workers’ interests. Previous research has led to inconclusive findings
where the relative ability of the radical right to attract unionized segments of the electorate is concerned. More broadly, we also aim at contributing to the research on trade
unions as producers of specific norms that shape political attitudes and political behaviour in democratic societies (e.g., Mosimann and Pontusson, 2017). Second, we
contribute to the large literature on radical right parties and their voters’ sociology by
focusing our analysis on the demand-side of voters. We also wish to inform the literature on the supply-side of parties’ policy positions and strategies by characterizing the
attitude of the radical right towards the labour movement and describing (in a more
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
4
explicit way than previous research) why the political offers of these two movements
are in competition.2 By doing so, the article particularly strengthens the literature dealing with the socio-economic agenda of the radical right (e.g., Afonso, 2015; Afonso
and Rennwald, 2018; De Lange, 2007; Röth et al., 2017).
The next section of this article discusses the attitude of the radical right towards workers and its organisations and explains why the political offers from the radical right and
the labour movement are in competition with each other. We then review the literature
on the relationship between union membership and radical right voting. In a next section, we explain why we expect union membership to matter to radical right voting
and present our hypotheses. After informing about our methodological choices, we
analyse the relative electoral success or failure of the radical right’s strategy at the individual level on the basis of European Social Survey (ESS) data for 2010 to 2016. A
concluding section summarizes and discusses our findings.
Undermining solidarity among workers versus forging solidarity among workers
Through their policy positions and rhetoric, radical right parties (explicitly or implicitly) undermine key principles of the labour movement that consist in promoting and
defending solidarity among workers irrespective of nationality and origin. Therefore,
the political offers of the radical right and the labour movement (that is, trade unions
and the political arm of the labour movement) differ radically from each other. At the
same time, however, radical right parties also pretend to take care of (certain) workers’
interests. The strategy of the radical right thus consists of attacking labour movement
________________________
2
We understand all the organisations that were founded by the working class to serve its emancipation as making
up the labour movement: Trade unions that defend workers’ rights on the shop floor and in the economic
sphere (the economic arm of the labour movement) and socialist parties that promote workers’ interests
in the political sphere (the political arm of the labour movement), as well as several structures of cooperatives, self-help organizations, and cultural and sports associations.
5
Union membership effects on radical right voting
organisations and undermining their core principles while simultaneously appropriating and re-using some of their demands and struggles. In this section, we will first
discuss the radical right’s strategy and why the political offers from the radical right
and the labour movement are mutually exclusive. In a second step, we will take a look
at history and show the existence of some similarities (but also important differences)
between the contemporary radical right’s strategy towards the labour movement and
those of fascist movements and regimes in the interwar period.3
Trade unions and the radical right: Two mutually exclusive political offers
Radical right parties all over Europe frequently (but to varying degrees) pretend to
defend the interests of workers in a way linked to key characteristics of this party family, namely their nativist ideology, their anti-immigration agenda, and their populist
rhetoric (e.g., Mudde, 2007). First and foremost, pretending to defend the interests of
workers does not take on a universal form, but is restricted to the defence of native
workers against migrants. Furthermore, the rhetoric of radical right parties around the
pretence to defend workers’ interests is reminiscent of when they talk of themselves
as advocates of the “common man” against corrupt political elites.
Moreover, the radical right’s discourse on the defence of native workers is also closely
linked to their chauvinist welfare ideology, which aims at restricting welfare state benefits to native people (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990; Kitschelt, 1995). To a varying
degree across countries and in combination with elements of economic nationalism,
elements of welfare chauvinism have been present in the policy positions of radical
right parties for a long time (Mudde, 2007). Over the last years, welfare chauvinism
has, however. gained importance in the agenda of the radical right. Radical right parties
________________________
3
Disassociating themselves from “old” extreme right parties constitutes a key defining characteristic of the new
radical right in the scholarly literature (e.g., Ignazi, 1992; Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007).
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
6
increasingly address welfare state issues in their manifestos and seem to position themselves more and more pro-welfare (chauvinism) in numerous countries (Afonso and
Rennwald, 2018; Lefkofridi and Michel, 2017). Even the radical right parties with the
clearest neoliberal outlook like the SVP in Switzerland nowadays include elements of
welfare chauvinism in their party program (e.g., Mazzoleni, 2008) while also heavily
emphasizing the notion of “deservingness” by differentiating between those who deserve social benefits (e.g., pensioners) and those who do not (e.g., the unemployed)
(Afonso and Papadopoulos, 2015; see also Ennser, 2016; Van Oorschot, 2006).4
Conversely, trade unions have promoted the idea of solidarity among workers irrespective of nationality, origin, race, or gender since its beginning.5 This core principle
is at odds with the exclusionary values and the nativist ideology of the radical right that
separates members of an alleged homogeneous national community from all “others”
who do not belong to it and supposedly threaten it (e.g., foreigners or minorities).
While the labour movement aims at building and reinforcing solidarity among workers,
the radical right exploits tensions and creates new divisions among them and thus undermines working-class solidarity.6
Both the radical right and the labour movement hence try to mobilize workers as voters. However, they do so with competing and mutually exclusive offers in terms of
policies: Radical right parties, with their anti-immigration agenda, pretend to protect
________________________
In the case of the nationalist New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) that advocates neoliberal positions, scholars have
advanced the concept of “welfare producerism” to capture its socio-economic agenda. It is based on the
idea of a hardworking middle class producing the wealth of the nation and thus deserving support from
the welfare state (Abts and Kochuyt, 2013; Abts et al., 2016).
5 In their policies and practices, trade unions have sometimes strayed from these principles. It seems, however,
difficult to find examples where this core principle has been put into question by the socialist labour
movement. In his analysis of the positions of trade unions towards immigration, Donnelly (2016) shows
that both ideologically oriented and more pragmatic unions have tended to become more pro-immigration over time.
6 We understand working-class solidarity in a broad sense, that is, as a co-operative form of representing common
interests through trade unions and left-wing politics. Besides the working class in a more restricted sense,
also segments of what is commonly described as middle class can be involved in building working class
solidarity.
4
7
Union membership effects on radical right voting
native workers from competition from migrants by restricting migration (and migrants’
rights), whereas the labour movement, that is, trade unions and their allied socialist
parties, want to regulate competition among workers by more internal regulations such
as minimum wages, working time regulations, and improved labour standards (therefore giving migrants the same rights as natives; see also Donnelly, 2016).
“Destroy and co-opt” – Classical fascism and the labour movement
Because radical right parties and parties linked to the labour movement compete for
workers’ vote, it is not surprising that radical right parties criticize the legitimacy of
trade unions. As in the case of Marine Le Pen in France, radical right parties seek to
represent workers, but attack the official and recognized organisations of these workers. It is (and often has been) the case that radical right parties accuse labour leaders
of betraying the interests of native workers and try to use internal tensions in the labour
movement to weaken it. However, the attempts of the contemporary radical right to
undermine the legitimacy of labour movement organisations does not normally take
on the form of physical attacks. Conversely, the fascist movements of the interwar
period – from which contemporary radical right parties generally distance themselves
– violently attacked trade unionists, socialists, and communists.7 Moreover, once they
had been handed over dictatorial state power, Italian and German fascists violently
repressed the labour movement. Independent trade unions, strikes, and free collective
bargaining were outlawed, and thousands of trade union leaders, shop-stewards, and
activists of the labour parties imprisoned without trial.
________________________
7
In a notorious terror campaign in Northern and Central Italy in 1921 and 1922, fascist paramilitary groups (black
shirts or squadristi) physically attacked trade union members and killed hundreds of them. Moreover, in
these “punitive expeditions,” the fascists destroyed offices, printing presses, and cultural centres of the
labour organisations and violently forced socialist municipal councillors to step down. Similarly, during
the early 1930s, the Sturmabteilung (SA), the paramilitary wing of the Nazi party, terrorised working-class
neighbourhoods in Germany (Reichardt, 2002: 125-129).
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
8
Interestingly enough, fascists simultaneously tried to destroy the democratic labour
movement in the interwar period and appropriate workers’ demands. As the Italian
scholar Brunello Mantelli (2004: 44) has argued, fascists wanted to “destroy and coopt” the labour movement. Fascists thus always explicitly tried to appeal to workers
and to win them over with pseudo-socialist elements in their rhetoric and by re-using
and diverting symbols and principles of the labour movement. The name chosen by
the German Nazi party – Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei – indicates that this
party claimed to be socialist and a workers’ party. Furthermore, on 1st May 1933, the
Nazis had managed to transform the mayday rallies of the labour movement – one of
the most important symbols of socialist internationalism – into a “day of national labour” (Wildt, 2014).8 It is also interesting to note the existence of so-called “yellow”
workers’ organisations. Active mainly at the beginning of the 20th Century, these organisations propagated a vague programme of class harmony and were involved in
systematic and violent strike breaking. They were often funded by large industrial companies (such as Schneider in France, Krupp and Siemens in Germany, and Sulzer in Switzerland) as part of a strategy aimed at defeating trade unions (Gruner, 1988: 829-836).
These organisations have been described as one of the fore-runners of fascism in preWorld War I Europe (Sternhell, 2000: 163-166, 304-307) and several personal connections existed between the leaders of “yellow unions” and the extreme right.9
________________________
The decisive attack of the Nazis against trade unions took place just a day later, on 2nd May 1933. The SA occupied
and vandalised trade union buildings, and mistreated and arrested trade union officials.
9 For example, Pierre Biétry, one of the leaders of the French yellow unions, also founded a short lived “national
socialist” party and propagated ultra-nationalist and anti-Semitic views (Arnold, 1999; Maillard, 2008).
The railway worker Anton Drexler, founder of a small ultra-nationalist “workers party” in Munich that
later became Hitler’s NSDAP, also had a background in the yellow union movement (Stegmann, 1971:
410-411).
8
9
Union membership effects on radical right voting
Immune or not to the radical right? Class, union membership, and radical right voting
Is the strategy of the radical right successful or not at the ballot box? At least workingclass voters have been shown to not have remained immune to the radical right’s strategy of pretending to defend the interests of (native) working-class voters. Research on
the class basis of party families indicate that radical right parties have gained traction
among working-class voters from the mid-1980s onwards (Afonso and Rennwald,
2018; Arzheimer, 2013; Rydgren, 2013), while social democratic parties have suffered
losses among these voters (Arndt, 2013; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015; Rennwald,
2015). At the beginning of the 21st Century, the working class has become the “contested stronghold” of the left and the radical right, and old and new patterns of class
voting co-exist (Oesch and Rennwald, 2017).
The capacity of the radical right to attract working-class votes is well-established in the
literature. We know, however, less about the penetration of organised segments of the
working class. The existing literature is unclear on whether or not union membership
makes a difference to radical right voting among the working class, and this article is
particularly interested in this question. The inconclusive findings with regard to a union
membership effect on radical right voting among the working class is particularly puzzling when we look at history. During the inter-war period, the strength of the socialist
labour movement was the main reason for the relative “immunity” of workers against
fascist appeals. Classic studies of the electorate of the Nazi party (Geiger, 1930; Lipset,
1960) conclude that it was essentially a party of the old (small and medium business
owners) and new (white-collar workers) middle classes.10 In relatively backward and
agricultural Italy, the middle- and upper-class bias of the fascist membership and electorate was even more evident than in highly industrialised Germany (Petersen, 1983).
________________________
10 More recent
publications (Hamilton, 1982; Childers, 1983; Falter, 1991) have put this into question and emphasise
that the German Nazi party drew support from all social classes. However, nobody seriously contests
that blue-collar workers were underrepresented in the fascist electorate (Geary, 2002).
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
10
Today, the literature on the link between union membership and vote choice presents
consistent findings with regard to left-wing parties which continue to receive important
support from trade union members (Arndt and Rennwald, 2016; Mosimann, 2017;
Rennwald, 2015). Findings are less straightforward when it comes to radical right parties and existing research shows some variation in the “union membership effect” on
voting for the radical right depending on the countries analysed, the specific social
classes focused on, and the analytical strategy chosen. Against this backdrop, we aim
to empirically establish if union membership reduces voters’ support for the radical
right, and if the effect holds for different social classes and in different countries.
Before turning to the hypotheses, let us briefly summarize the existing literature on the
link between trade union membership and voting for the radical right. When contrasting support for radical right parties with support for social democratic parties in
sixteen West European countries based on European Social Survey (ESS) data for 2002
to 2010, Arndt and Rennwald (2016) show that union members are significantly less
likely to support the radical right (see also Arndt and Rennwald, 2017) and that the
membership effect is even slightly bigger when contrasting the radical right with the
left than when contrasting the centre-right with the left. In a case study of Sweden,
Arndt and Rennwald find, however, also signs of support for the Sweden Democrats
among members of the blue-collar confederation LO in 2006 and 2010. This hints at
some cross-national variation when it comes to union members’ party choice.
In an article testing different explanations of radical right voting based on ESS data
for 2002, Oesch (2008) finds contradictory results regarding the effect of union membership. Being a union member reduces the likelihood to vote radical right (slightly) in
Austria, Norway, and Switzerland, has no effect in France, and even (slightly) increases
support for the radical right in Belgium. Finally, Mosimann (2017) analyses union
11
Union membership effects on radical right voting
members’ party choice based on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) for seven West European countries for 2011 to 2017 and does not find
that union membership consistently affects radical right voting. Interestingly, she finds
a clear effect among citizens simultaneously supporting redistribution and opposing
immigration. Among these voters with leftist redistribution preferences and rightist
immigration attitudes, union membership makes an important difference and clearly
reduces the likelihood to support the radical right.
Existing findings are even more ambiguous if one focuses exclusively on the working
class. Using data from the ESS round 4 in 2008 for fourteen West European countries,
Bornschier and Kriesi (2013) analyse the determinants of radical right voting among
the manual working class. They do not find a general significant effect of union membership on the propensity to support the radical right. When contrasting support for
the radical right with support for the mainstream left, they observe, however, that
skilled unionized workers are less likely to vote for the radical right than non-unionized
ones. This is not the case for unionized routine operatives and the authors suggest that
only the core of the manual working class is immunized from radical right voting.
Also analysing the determinants of radical right voting among the working class based
on ESS data from 2002 to 2008, Rennwald (2015) shows an important effect of union
membership in Switzerland. Non-unionized working-class voters are more likely to
support the Swiss People’s Party, while unionized working-class voters prefer the Swiss
Socialist Party. In Austria, non-unionized working-class voters are also more likely to
support the FPÖ than unionized ones, but the effect is less marked than in Switzerland. These results indicate – again – some cross-national variation in the effect of
union membership on radical right voting.
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
12
Why union membership matters to radical right voting
Why should union members be better equipped to resist the appeals of the radical right
than non-union members? It is possible to argue that the politics and strategies of trade
unions matter or that union members have some specific characteristics that distinguish them from non-union members. One obvious reason why union members might
refrain from voting radical right results from the idea that organisations generate and
diffuse specific values, and that members of such organisations are somehow exposed
to these values. For this line of reasoning, we draw on the work by Mosimann and
Pontusson (2017) who emphasise the role of trade unions in the formation of (redistribution) preferences. They argue that the behaviour and rhetoric of unions create
norms that influence the preferences and behaviour of their members. One of the
main principles of the labour movement since its beginning is the idea of solidarity
among workers irrespective of nationality, origin, race, or gender. By diffusing and
reinforcing values of solidarity among their members, trade unions can therefore act
as powerful counter-agents to the exclusionary ideology of the radical right. Moreover,
union members are not individually exposed to the propaganda of the radical right,
because trade unions offer their members a space to collectively discuss these issues
and exchange points of views (see Iversen and Soskice, 2015, on unions’ role as political discussion networks). Finally, unions are organisations in which foreign workers
can become members and this creates opportunities for exchanges between workers
regardless of origin and nationality.11
If one adopts a “bottom-up” perspective, one could argue that workers decision to
join a union might not be entirely independent from pre-existing ideological convictions (see Ebbinghaus et al., 2011, for a review of decisions to join unions). It is thus
possible that at least some voters who feel close to the goals of the labour movement
and oppose those of the radical right self-select into trade unions. Especially in a period
________________________
11
Yet, migrant workers remain on average less organised than native workers (Kranendonk and de Beer, 2016).
13
Union membership effects on radical right voting
in which employers’ attitudes towards trade unions have become more hostile, ideological motivations to join a union may become more important. In the only existing
study based on panel data that allows analysing the causal impact of union membership, Hadziabdic and Baccaro (2017) indeed find selection effects in the relationship
between union membership and political attitudes. Studying various political attitudes
in Switzerland and Great Britain, the authors show that differences between union
members and non-union members are to a large extent due to the fact that unions
attract workers who are more interested in politics, participate more, and have more
sympathies for pro-labour parties. It is therefore not the experience of membership per
se that transforms political views. The authors also show that people tend to transform
their attitudes and become more similar to union members prior to joining unions. In
our view, this effect does not completely rule out some causal impact of union membership – especially in the longer time frame of individuals’ life-trajectories and when
it comes to radical right voting.
Our cross-sectional design does not allow us to properly test for self-selection effects.
We report our results, however, with and without a control for individuals' ideological
self-placement (see Mosimann and Pontusson, 2017). If union members are less supportive of radical right parties even when we control for ideology, the idea that union
membership is not a mere proxy for having sympathies for pro-labour parties becomes
more credible. Since we mainly want to test whether or not there is still congruence
between unions and their members in as far as they both reject the political ideas of
the radical right, it is furthermore not that important to our argument if we observer
union membership effects on radical right voting as a result of the diffusion of values,
self-selection, or a combination of both. We therefore posit that: 12
________________________
12
Even though we restrict our hypotheses to voting for the radical right in this theoretical section, we will consistently compare this vote choice to voting for mainstream parties of the left – unions’ traditional allies in
the political sphere – in our empirical analysis. Additionally, we include the option of non-voting in our
empirical analysis. The fact that union members are more likely to turnout is well established in the
literature and our findings should not differ from previous literature.
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
14
H1: Union membership decreases citizens’ likelihood to vote for radical right parties.
As discussed, previous findings with regard to the effects of union membership on the
electoral behaviour of working-class voters are particularly ambiguous. Since the radical right’s strategy that we have described primarily – although not exclusively – targets
workers with low and medium skills, they are most likely to be disoriented by the radical right’s promises to defend native workers’ interests. Moreover, differences in political sophistication across classes provide working-class citizens with fewer individual
resources to decipher the discourse of the radical right when compared to middle-class
citizens. Collective organisation is thus likely to matter more to working-class voters
than middle-class ones by compensating the former for a possible lack of individual
resources.13 On this basis, we expect that union membership renders working-class
and middle-class voters less likely to vote for the radical right as discussed under H 1
but posit that union membership has a stronger negative effect on radical right voting
among working-class voters:
H2: The negative effect of union membership on the likelihood to vote radical right is stronger among
working-class voters than middle-class voters.
Data and variables
Data
The test of our hypotheses is based on rounds 5 to 8 of the European Social Survey
(ESS) – or, more precisely, on elections after the start of the Great Recession in 2008
________________________
13
With regard to political participation, many authors have highlighted the importance of unions in boosting turnout among groups known for high abstention rates such as working-class citizens (e.g., Mahoney et al.,
2008, Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995; Warren, 2001). In a different context, Donnelly (2016) finds that
being a union member has a similar effect on pro-immigration preferences as having one additional year
of education.
15
Union membership effects on radical right voting
covered by these ESS rounds as shown in Table 1. The countries included in our
analyses are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In all these countries we not
only find parties on the entire left-right spectrum, but also radical right parties with a
vote share substantial enough to test our hypotheses.
Our final sample contains 16,044 respondents above the age of 18 (16 in the case of
Austria) after having excluded non-citizens and other respondents not eligible to vote
(further descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix).
[Table 1]
Dependent variable
We rely on a combination of two ESS questions on (a) respondents’ self-reported voting in the last national election in their respective country and (b) respondents’ selfreported party choice in that election to construct our dependent variable. To assess
self-reported voting, respondents are presented with the following question: “Some
people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last national
election?” The variable takes on the value 1 if the respondent states having voted in
her respective country’s last national election and 0 if not.14 We identify party choice
with the following ESS question: “Which party did you vote for in that election?” Respondents are presented with a country-specific list of parties that we recode into 1
“social democratic parties” and 2 “radical right parties” as shown in Table 2 (see Oesch
and Rennwald, 2017). Based on a recoding of the voting question, we add “abstention”
________________________
14
Even though self-reporting tends to overstate voting, especially among well-educated respondents (e.g., Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012), and underreport voting for the radical right (e.g., Ivaldi 2001) we have no
reason to think that such misrepresentation is more common among union members than non-union
members.
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
16
as third option to these party choices to generate our dependent variable with three
vote choices.
[Table 2]
Independent variables
Among the variables included in our analyses, we are most interested in union membership and in how union membership conditions the effect of class on vote choice,
especially radical right voting. A dummy variable identifies respondents currently belonging to a trade union based on the ESS question: “Are you or have you ever been
a member of a trade union or similar organisation?” We code respondents currently in
a trade union with 1, those previously or never belonging to a trade union with 0. As
stated above, we expect trade union membership to be negatively correlated with radical right voting.
We rely on a simple dichotomy between the working class and the new and old middle
class to measure class. Drawing on Oesch’s classification of occupations (Oesch,
2006), we simplify his class schema by conceiving the working class as being composed
of service workers, production workers, and office clerks, while the middle class encompasses the other three classes characterized by dependent employment, that is,
socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, technical (semi-)professionals, and (junior) managers as well as the two classes characterized by independent employment, that is, small
business owners and self-employed professionals as well as large employers. As argued,
we anticipate a stronger effect of union membership on radical right voting among
working-class voters than middle-class voters and also expect voting for the radical
right to be more likely among the working class than the middle class.
17
Union membership effects on radical right voting
We include several control variables that matter to party choice and union membership
and might also affect the relationship between union membership and radical right
voting, namely sex (with men coded as 0 and women coded as 1), age, education (differentiating between 1 “less than upper secondary,” 2 “upper secondary,” and 3 “tertiary”), income (measured in income deciles), and sector of employment (with private
sector coded as 0 and public sector coded as 1). Finally, we include ideological selfplacement measured on a scale from zero (left) to 10 (right) in part of our models to
address the issue of self-selection.
Method
We employ multinomial logistic regression models to simultaneously model
respondents’ choice between the three unordered categories on our dependent variable
namely (1) voting for the social democrats, (2) voting for the radical right, and (3)
abstaining with (1) as base category.15 To account for the nested data structure of ESS,
our models include country-years fixed effects in the form of country-year dummies.
Since the interpretation of multinomial logistic estimates is complex and since we are
interested in relationships not directly accessible in the models’ raw estimates, our full
models are only shown in the appendix and we present our results as (1) average marginal effects of union membership and other variables of interest and (2) average predicted probabilities and differences in average predicted probabilities.
Union membership effects on radical right voting
Table 3 shows average marginal effects of union membership and our other
independent variables on respondents’ electoral behavior (based on models 1 and 2 in
________________________
15
Multinomial logistic models rely on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Long and Freese, 2014: 207). A
Hausman-McFadden test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) of this assumption provides no evidence that
the odds of choosing between any two categories on the dependent variable are not independent.
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
18
appendix A3). We calculate contrasts for our categorical variable education, a change
from 0 to 1 for our binary variables and a standard deviation change for our continous
variables. Effects in the left-hand columns are based on a model not controlling for
respondents’ ideological self-placement, while those in the right-hand columns are
based on a model that does so.
In line with H1, union membership decreases respondents’ likelihood to vote for a
radical right party whether we control for respondents’ ideological self-placement or
not. 16 As shown in Table 3, it also increases their likelihood to vote for a social democratic party or to abstain from voting irrespective of having a control for ideology in
the model or not. Effects of union membership are biggest when it comes to left voting
and smallest with regard to radical right voting while effects on non-voting fall somewhere in between.
[Table 3]
All effects of union membership clear the .001 threshold of statistical significance except the membership effect on radical right voting in a model controlling for ideology
(p=.012). Effects are, however, smaller once we account for voters’ ideological selfplacement: The impact of union membership on the probability to vote for the social
democrats decreases from 13 percentage points to about 10 percentage points and the
effect of union membership on the probability to vote for the radical right shrinks
from 4 percentage points to 1.5 percentage points. Its effect on abstaining is almost
stable at around 9 percentage points.
________________________
16
Note that over 12.6 percent of unionized respondents self-identify as extremely rightist in our sample (that is, as
having an ideology between a score of 8 and 10 on the left-right axis), while 13.6 percent of non-unionized
respondents and thus an only slightly higher share of non-union members self-identifies as extremely
rightist too. Note also that unionization rates are pretty constant across the entire ideological spectrum
at around 28 to 32 percent – except at the extreme right-pole where it falls to 20 percent.
19
Union membership effects on radical right voting
The other variables affect respondents’ vote choice more or less as expected. In a
model not controlling for ideology, the probability to vote left increases with income,
age, and education and left voting is also more likely among the working class, public
sector employees, and women than the middle class, private sector employees, and
men. Conversely, non-voting is more likely among the working class, younger, and less
educated voters as well as voters with lower income and those working in the private
sector. We find, however, no differences between the sexes with regard to non-voting.
Finally, the probability to vote radical right increases with income, but decreases with
public sector employment and among women. While respondents with an upper secondary education are more likely to vote radical right than those least educated, we
find no differences with regard to radical right voting between those with the lowest
educational attainment and those with a tertiary education. We also observe that age
and class do not alter respondents’ likelihood to vote radical right.
Overall, these variables’ effects on vote choice are very robust to the inclusion of a
control for ideology. Once we control for ideological differences across respondents,
differences in radical right voting across classes become, however, slightly more pronounced and clear the .01 level of statistical significance. Unsurprisingly, self-placing
more to the right on the ideological spectrum renders voters significantly less likely to
vote left and significantly more likely to vote radical right. Voters with a more rightist
ideology are also more likely to abstain.
To better assess the effect of union membership on radical right voting, Figure 1 plots
the average marginal effect of union membership on respondents’ voting behaviour
separately for the eleven countries in our sample. In seven countries, the negative effect
of union membership on the probability to vote radical right clears (or comes very
close to clearing) the .05 threshold of statistical significance as shown in Figure 1: Aus-
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
20
tria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Conversely, union membership has no effect on radical right voting in Belgium, Finland,
France, and the United Kingdom. In all countries but France, union members are
moreover significantly more likely to vote the social democrats than non-union members. And in all but three countries (Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland), unionized
voters are significantly less likely to abstain from voting than non-unionized ones.17
Figure 1 shows that the negative membership effect on radical right voting is most
substantial in Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland.
[Figure 1]
To explain this cross-national variation, further investigation is needed, and we limit
ourselves to some very provisional observations here. In all the countries, in which a
negative effect of union membership on radical right voting can be observed, a labour
movement of the classic social-democratic type is present. In this type of labour movement, trade unions and social democratic parties are organisationally independent from
each other but consider themselves allies that fight for the emancipation of labour in
a clear division of work with unions as responsible for the economic and the party as
responsible for the political arena. All the countries, in which a union membership
effect on radical right voting is absent, have labour movements that differ from this
pattern in some respect: The British Labour party was itself set up by unions, which
remain collective members of the party, and in France, unions are still heavily influenced by the syndicalist tradition that stresses the need for complete independence
from any political party. The Finnish and Belgian labour movements are close to the
social democratic model but display some major deviations from this model: In the
case of Finland, a very strong trade union movement of the Nordic type co-exists with
________________________
17 When we
employ 90% confidence intervals, we additionally find a negative effect of union membership on radical
right voting in Belgium, a positive effect of union membership on left voting in France, and a negative
effect of union membership on non-voting in Denmark.
21
Union membership effects on radical right voting
a rather weak social democratic party that traditionally faces competition from a quite
strong communist party. Belgium is the country with the highest union density in continental Europe with strong Christian and liberal unions besides FGTB-ABVV with
strong ties to the socialist parties. There does, however, not seem to be a clear connection between the union membership effect on radical right voting and union density.
Such an effect is present and absent in countries with high (Belgium and the Nordic
countries), intermediate (Austria and UK), and low (all the other countries in our sample) levels of union density.
The particular strength of the negative effect of unionisation on radical right in Denmark, Austria, and Switzerland could be linked to some common feature of the radical
right parties in these three countries. All of them have conserved a clearly “bourgeois”
outlook with a neoliberal economic policy position. Moreover, all three parties have at
some stage openly acted as allies of the more traditional centre-right party in their
respective country. The Swiss People’s Party even used to be a traditional centre-right
party before its populist turn in the 1990s. Up to a certain degree this is also the case
for the Austrian FPÖ – although the fact that it was conceived as a gathering place for
former Nazis from the outset complicates the picture.
Union membership effects across social classes
Table 4 displays average predicted probabilities for respondents’ vote choice and
differences in these probabilities for four different groups of respondents: (1)
Unionized and (2) non-unionized working-class citizens as well as (3) unionized and
(4) non-unionized middle-class citizens. Table 4 shows that all these groups are more
likely to vote for the social democrats than the radical right and that the probability to
abstain falls somewhere in between.
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
22
Surprisingly, being a union member affects voting patterns in a very similar way among
the working class and the middle class: Union members are more likely to vote for the
social democrats and less likely to vote for the radical right or to abstain than nonunion members. All these membership effects reach the .001 level of statistical significance.18 As in Table 3, membership has the biggest impact on the probability to vote
left (about 13 percentage points) and the smallest impact on the probability to vote
radical right (about 4 percentage points).
Union membership effects are slightly bigger among working-class respondents than
middle-class respondents. Union membership boosts the probability to vote for the
social democrats by 1.6 percentage points more among the working class than the
middle class and decreases the probability to vote for the radical right or to abstain by
about 1 percentage point more among the working class than the middle class. Even
though this finding supports H2, differences in the membership effect across classes
fail to reach statistical significance.19
[Table 4]
As before, we are also interested in whether these union membership effects hold in
different countries. Figure 2 thus depicts average marginal effects of union membership on the probability to vote radical right among the working class and the middle
class. In Figure 1, we have found a negative union membership effect on the probability to vote radical right in Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
________________________
All but one of these membership effects are robust to the inclusion of a control for ideology (see Table A5 in
the appendix): While union memberhsip continues to decrease the probability to vote radical right among
the working class (-.018, p=.033), middle-class voters no longer differ in their likelihood to vote radical
right across union membership status once the model controls for ideological differences between union
members and non-union members (-.013, p=.112).
19 For the pooled sample, union membership effects are pretty much identical to the effects presented in Table 4
when we code the classes differently or restrict the sample to respondents in dependent employment,
that is, when we restrict the middle class to socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, technical (semi-)professionals, and (junior) managers.
18
23
Union membership effects on radical right voting
Sweden, and Switzerland. Figure 2 shows that this negative effect holds among working-class voters in Austria, Norway, and Switzerland and is absent in all of the other
countries in our sample.20 When it comes to middle-class voters, we find a negative
union membership effect on the probability to vote radical right that clears (or comes
very close to clearing) the .05 threshold of statistical significance in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Conversely, we see no difference in radical right voting between union members and non-union members among
middle-class respondents in Finland, France, the Netherlands, and the UK.21 While
membership effects on radical right voting among specific occupational groups in Figure 2 thus correspond to the overall membership effects found in Figure 1, a union
membership effect shows up in Belgium once we differentiate between working- and
middle-class voters. To explain the specific effects of union membership on political
sympathies in different occupational groups across countries, further investigation is
needed, especially on the level of union density in particular segments of the salaried
middle classes and country-specific traditions in the relationship between white collar
unions and political parties.
[Figure 2]
Conclusion
In this article, we have analysed the capacity of radical right parties to attract support
from union members in recent elections in Western Europe and if this capacity differs
across countries and social classes. We have argued that trade union members, that is,
the core of the labour movement, should resist the appeals of the radical right to a
________________________
When employing 90% confidence intervals, we additionally find a negative effect of union membership on radical
right voting among the working class in Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as a negative membership
effect on radical right voting among the middle class in the Netherlands.
21 In France, we observe that unionized middle-class respondents are more likely to vote for the Front National than
their non-unionized peers once we set confidence levels to 90%.
20
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
24
higher degree than non-union members, that is, the periphery of the labour movement.
Such a negative effect of union membership on radical right voting can work through
two related mechanisms: On the one hand, trade unions diffuse values of solidarity
irrespective of nationality and origin to their members and this core principle of the
labour movement is at odds with the authoritarian ultra-nationalism and welfare chauvinism of the radical right. On the other hand, people having pre-existing sympathies
for the principles of the labour movement might be more likely to become members
of one of their organisations, making union members less likely to support the radical
right due to processes of self-selection.
The article has underlined how radical right parties seek to compete with the political
arm of the labour movement for the votes of workers in general and workers with low
to medium skills in particular. We have also discussed how this strategy is reminiscent
of the fascist movements’ strategy of co-opt and destroy between World War I and II.
Instead of openly attempting to destroy the labour movement as the old extreme right
in the interwar years did, the new radical right tries to undermine working-class solidarity with its anti-immigration agenda, by pretending to take care of (native) workers
with its welfare chauvinism, and by attacking the legitimacy of trade unions in their
discourses. Since the radical right’s strategy is mainly aimed at working-class voters
who might partially lack the political sophistication that middle-class voters possess,
we have expected trade union membership to have a stronger effect on voting patterns
among the working class than the middle class.
Our empirical analysis of elections across Western Europe since the start of the Great
Recession show that union members display signs of resistance to the strategy of the
radical right. Union members continue to mainly support the mainstream left and we
find that unionization immunizes voters overall against the radical right – especially
where the political and economic arm of the socialist labour movement are strongly
25
Union membership effects on radical right voting
linked and where the radical right adheres to a neoliberal ideology and has colluded
with the traditional centre-right in the past.
Surprisingly, our results show that membership effects on radical right voting are about
the same among the working and the middle class in the pooled sample but that effects
of union membership among these groups differ across countries and are especially
weak when it comes to working-class voters. This suggests that the core of the labour
movement is generally less susceptible to voting radical right than its periphery whether
or not it is directly targeted by the radical right’s strategy. It also suggests, however,
that unionization no longer prevents (working-class) voters from choosing the radical
right in certain contexts. Further research should consider how the membership composition of trade unions and the radical right’s strategies towards the labour movement
differ across countries to better understand why effects of union membership vary
across countries.
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
26
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Union membership effects on radical right voting
Tables and figures
Table 1. Elections included in the sample
Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
ESS
2010
2010
2009
2010
2009
2010
2010
ESS
2012
2010
2011
2011
2012
2009
2012
2009
2010
2011
2010
ESS
2014
2013
2014
2011
2011
2012
2013
2012
2013
2014
2011
2010
ESS
2016
2013
2014
2015
2012
2013
2012
2013
2014
2015
2015
Table 2. Parties included in the sample
Country
Social Democratic Parties
Radical Right Parties
Austria
Social Democratic Party of Austria, SPÖ
Alliance of the Future of Austria, BZÖ
Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ
Belgium
Socialist Party (Flemish), SP.A
Socialist Party (French), PS
New-Flemish Alliance, N-VA
Flemish Interest, VB
National Front, FN
Denmark
The Social Democrats, SD
Danish People’s Party, DF
Finland
Social Democratic Party of Finland, SDP
True Finns, PS
France
Socialist Party, PS
National Front, FN
Social Democratic Party, SPD
Alternative for Germany, AfD
National Democratic Party, NPD
Labour Party, PdVA
Party for Freedom, PVV/List Wilders
Norway
Norwegian Labour Party, A
Progress Party, FRP
Sweden
Social Democrats, S/SAP
Sweden Democrats, SD
Socialist Party, SP
Swiss People’s Party, SVP
Labour
UK Independence Party, UKIP
Democratic Unionist Party, DUP
Germany
Netherlands
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
32
Table 3. Average marginal effects of union membership and other variables on vote choice
Variables
Union membership
Class (ref. middle class)
Income
Sector of employment (ref. private)
Age
Sex (ref. male)
Social
Democrats
.129
(.000)
-.029
(.001)
.035
(.000)
.099
(.000)
.097
(.000)
.049
(.000)
Radical
Right
-.039
(.000)
.011
(.112)
.013
(.000)
-.064
(.000)
-.003
(.285)
-.054
(.000)
Abstain
.027
(.009)
.116
(.000)
.024
(.004)
-.013
(.143)
-.050
(.000)
-.103
(.000)
-.090
(.000)
.018
(.018)
-.048
(.000)
-.035
(.000)
-.094
(.000)
.005
(.505)
Social
Democrats
.101
(.000)
-.035
(.000)
.042
(.000)
.062
(.000)
.090
(.000)
.028
(.001)
Radical
Right
-.015
(.012)
.017
(.006)
.007
(.024)
-.034
(.000)
.002
(.402)
-.032
(.000)
Abstain
.028
(.003)
.087
(.000)
-.163
(.000)
.022
(.002)
.008
(.316)
.152
(.000)
-.050
(.000)
-.095
(.000)
.011
(.001)
-.086
(.000)
.018
(.018)
-.049
(.000)
-.027
(.001)
-.092
(.000)
.004
(.587)
Education (ref. less than upper secondary)
Upper secondary
Tertiary
Left-right self-placement
P-values in brackets. For continuous variables, the average discrete changes for a standard deviation change is calculated, for dichotomous variables a change from 0 to 1 is calculated,
and for categorical variables contrasts are calculated. ESS 2010 to 2016, marginal effects based on models 1 and 2, Appendix A3.
Table 4. Predicted probabilities of vote choice conditional on union membership and class
Social
Democrats
Radical
Right
Abstain
.570
.432
.172
.215
.258
.353
.138
(.000)
.043
(.000)
.095
(.000)
.588
.466
.166
.202
.247
.332
diff
.122
(.000)
.036
(.003)
.085
(.000)
diff in diff
.016
(.287)
.007
(.545)
.010
(.510)
Working Class
Union Member
Non-Union Member
diff
Middle Class
Union Member
Non-Union Member
P-values in brackets; t test of equality hypothesis for differences. ESS 2010 to 2016, based on model 3 in
Appendix A4.
33
Union membership effects on radical right voting
Figure 1. Average marginal effects of union membership on vote choice by country with
95% confidence intervals
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
A: Abstention, RR: Radical Right, SD: Social Democrats.
ESS 2010 to 2016, marginal effects based on models for single countries identical to model 1, Appendix A3 (available upon request) including time fixed effects instead
of country-years fixed effects. Sample sizes are: Austria (817), Belgium (1,830), Denmark (539), Finland (1,250), France (1,657), Germany (2,417), Netherlands (1,573),
Norway (1,872), Sweden (1,298), Switzerland (952), United Kingdom (1,839).
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
34
Figure 2. Average marginal effects of union membership on radical right voting among the
middle and working class by country with 95% confidence intervals
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
ESS 2010 to 2016, marginal effects based on models for single countries identical to model 3, Appendix A4 (available upon request) including time fixed effects instead
of country-years fixed effects.
35
Union membership effects on radical right voting
Appendix
Table A1. Sample size
Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
ESS
2010
604
735
522
699
394
684
ESS
2012
412
284
429
552
545
379
440
302
332
347
ESS
2014
383
421
255
432
574
623
361
338
303
282
443
ESS
2016
434
393
389
531
514
311
395
299
338
365
Total
3,638
4,022
4,415
3,969
Total
817
1,830
539
1,250
1,657
2,417
1,573
1,872
1,298
952
1,839
16,044
Table A2. Descriptive statistics, ESS 2010-16
Variable
Country
Year
Vote choice
Union membership
Class
Income
Sector of employment
Age
Sex
Education
Left-Right self-placement
N
16,044
16,044
16,044
16,044
16,044
16,044
16,044
16,044
16,044
16,044
16,044
MEAN
5
51
5
S.D.
3
17
2
MODUS
Germany
2014
Social Democrats
Non-union member
Middle class
5
Private
55
Male
Upper secondary education
5
MEDIAN
2014
5
51
Upper secondary education
5
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
36
Table A3. Union membership and other variables as determinants
of vote choice with vote for social democratic party as base category,
fixed effects multinomial logistic regression models
Variables
Constant
Union membership
Class (ref. middle class)
Income
Sector of employment (ref. private)
Age
Sex (ref. male)
Radical
Right
.573***
(.095)
.586***
(.031)
1.145*
(.062)
.996
(.010)
.534***
(.029)
.986***
(.001)
.645***
(.031)
Model 1
Abstention
1.132
(.150)
.518***
(.026)
1.153**
(.053)
.900***
(.008)
.695***
(.032)
.963***
(.001)
.904*
(.037)
Radical
Right
.570**
(.105)
.657***
(.039)
1.262***
(.075)
.971**
(.011)
.640***
(.039)
.985***
(.002)
.723***
(.038)
Model 2
Abstention
1.340*
(.184)
.537***
(.028)
1.190***
(.056)
.889***
(.008)
.753***
(.036)
.963***
(.001)
.927†
(.039)
Education (ref. less than upper secondary)
Upper secondary
Tertiary
1.069
(.069)
.700***
(.052)
.781***
(.043)
.513***
(.033)
Left-right self-placement
Country-years fixed effects
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald chi2
Pseudo R2
N
Yes
-13,976
3,711***
.156
16,044
1.071
(.077)
.814**
(.065)
2.040***
(.034)
.776***
(.044)
.551***
(.036)
1.361***
(.017)
Yes
-12,490
4,968***
.246
16,044
Odds ratios based on multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors, standard errors in brackets - *** significant
at .01%, ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%, † significant at 10% - continuous variables centred at their sample mean and
cases with missing values removed from sample. Data from ESS 2010-16.
37
Union membership effects on radical right voting
Table A4. Union membership and other variables as determinants
of vote choice with vote for social democratic party as base category
and interaction between membership and class, fixed effects multinomial logistic regression models
Variables
Constant
Union membership
Class (ref. middle class)
Income
Sector of employment (ref. private)
Age
Sex (ref. male)
Radical
Right
.566***
(.094)
.612***
(.045)
1.179**
(.074)
.996
(.010)
.532***
(.029)
.986***
(.001)
.644***
(.031)
Model 3
Abstention
1.122
(.149)
.538***
(.038)
1.177***
(.060)
.901***
(.008)
.693***
(.032)
.963***
(.001)
.902*
(.037)
Radical
Right
.562**
(.104)
.690***
(.055)
1.303***
(.091)
.972**
(.011)
.637***
(.039)
.985***
(.002)
.720***
(.038)
Model 4
Abstention
1.324*
(.182)
.566***
(.040)
1.222***
(.064)
.890***
(.008)
.750***
(.036)
.963***
(.001)
.924†
(.039)
Education (ref. less than upper secondary)
Upper secondary
Tertiary
1.072
(.069)
.700***
(.052)
.782***
(.043)
.513***
(.033)
Left-right self-placement
1.074
(.077)
.813**
(.065)
2.040***
(.034)
.778***
(.045)
.550***
(.036)
1.361***
(.017)
Interaction
Membership * class
Country-years fixed effects
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald chi2
Pseudo R2
N
.917
(.090)
.927
(.086)
Yes
-13,976
3,713***
.156
16,044
.907***
(.099)
.902***
(.086)
Yes
-12,489
4,972***
.246
16,044
Odds ratios based on multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors, standard errors in brackets - *** significant
at .01%, ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%, † significant at 10% - continuous variables centred at their sample mean and
cases with missing values removed from sample. Data from ESS 2010-16.
Mosimann, Rennwald, and Zimmermann (2018)
38
Table A5. Predicted probabilities of vote choice conditional on
union membership and class, controlling for ideology
Social
Democrats
Radical
Right
Abstain
.549
.438
.191
.209
.260
.353
.111
(.000)
.018
(.033)
.093
(.000)
.571
.479
.177
.190
.252
.331
diff
.092
(.000)
.013
(.112)
.079
(.000)
diff in diff
.019
(.217)
.005
(.655)
.014
(.366)
Working Class
Union Member
Non-Union Member
diff
Middle Class
Union Member
Non-Union Member
P-values in brackets; t test of equality hypothesis for differences. ESS 2010 to 2016, based on model 4 in
Appendix A4.