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Vernon, Victoria; Zimmermann, Klaus F.
Working Paper
Walls and Fences: A Journey Through History and
Economics
GLO Discussion Paper, No. 330
Provided in Cooperation with:
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
Suggested Citation: Vernon, Victoria; Zimmermann, Klaus F. (2019) : Walls and Fences: A
Journey Through History and Economics, GLO Discussion Paper, No. 330, Global Labor
Organization (GLO), Essen
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/193640
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Walls and Fences: A Journey Through
History and Economics*
Victoria Vernon
State University of New York and GLO; victoria.vernon@esc.edu
Klaus F. Zimmermann
UNU-MERIT, CEPR and GLO; klaus.f.zimmermann@gmail.com
March 2019
Abstract
Throughout history, border walls and fences have been built for defense, to claim land, to signal
power, and to control migration. The costs of fortifications are large while the benefits are
questionable. The recent trend of building walls and fences signals a paradox: In spite of the antiimmigration rhetoric of policymakers, there is little evidence that walls are effective in reducing
terrorism, migration, and smuggling. Economic research suggests large benefits to open border
policies in the face of increasing global migration pressures. Less restrictive migration policies should
be accompanied by institutional changes aimed at increasing growth, improving security and reducing
income inequality in poorer countries.
JEL: F22, F66, H56, J61, N4
Keywords: Walls, fences, defense, security, international migration, mobility
* We thank K. Bruce Newbold and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments and
suggestions on an earlier draft.
1. Introduction
Since the dawn of time, people have moved across land and ocean in search of a better life.
When humans first left Africa to settle across the globe, they were motivated by their need for food,
space and resources. Early large-scale migrations were people fleeing wars, famine and disease.
Warriors and settlers from strong empires moved across continents to conquer weaker neighbors.
Cross-border economic migration gained momentum in the 20th century, fueled by rising per capita
incomes in poorer countries, booming international business, strengthened personal ties with people
in foreign countries, and cost-cutting advances in transportation. Voluntary and peaceful labor
mobility has been beneficial for migrants, whose labor is more productive in richer economies; for
businesses in search of qualified workers; for the natives of host countries, whose assets gained value;
and for migrants’ families back home who receive transfers (Constant and Zimmermann, 2013;
Zimmermann, 2014, 2016; Blau and Mackie, 2016).
Foreign-born people now account for 28% of the total population of Australia, 23% of Israel,
20% of Canada, 13% of the US, 13% of Germany, and 12% of the UK 1. Yet even at its highest level
ever, international migration is surprisingly uncommon: only about 3% of the world population lives
outside of their country of birth 2. In the last decade, regional conflicts in the Middle East, rising
inequality and poverty in Africa, violence in South America, and natural disasters in various parts of
the world have sent a flow of refugees to Europe and the US. Between 2015-17, over 1.5 million
refugees arrived to Europe by sea. 3 This is a small fraction of 21.5 million people displaced by
climate-related catastrophes between 2008-2015 (Miller, 2017).
Gallup estimates that 14% of world adults, 710 million people, would migrate permanently if
they could, and even more would move temporarily. 4 More than 40% of respondents from very poor
countries and countries with armed conflicts are potential migrants. In Africa alone, working age
population is projected to rise by about 1 billion in 2055, increasing the pressure at the gates to Europe
and China, two areas where population is predicted to decline substantially (Bruni, 2019). The flow
of refugees is likely to continue. According to the World Bank, water scarcity, crop failure and
rising sea levels, will displace as many as 143 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia,
and Latin America by 2050 (Rigaud et al. 2018).
Faced with unprecedented inflows of immigrants, developed countries have a choice
of policies to allow or restrict migration. Governments of richer nations have responded by
1
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-bornpopulation.htm
2
United Nations Population Fund http://www.unfpa.org/migration
3
The UN Refugee Agency https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean
4
http://news.gallup.com/poll/211883/number-potential-migrants-worldwide-tops-700-million.aspx
1
erecting walls and fences, investing in border protection and adopting policies to restrict
undocumented migration.
In this chapter, we examine the global phenomenon of building walls, fences, and other manmade physical barriers between nations. We offer a historical perspective on why border barriers
existed in the past, and how the rationale for building walls has changed. We discuss the costs and
benefits of walls and fences, and review literature on alternative policies, including the open border
policy. Section 2 surveys the history of walls and fences. Section 3 discusses their rationale. Section
4 deals with the economics of open borders. And section 5 concludes.
2. A history of walls and fences
2.1 Ancient and medieval walls
Humans on all continents have been building walls for millennia. The main motive for their
early construction was to defend city-states against armies of unwelcome nomadic neighbors. A large
physical obstacle also served as a signal of political power, wealth and strength, intended to deter
future threats, a claim to land, and a way to define who belonged inside and who stayed out. The scale
of walls has differed greatly throughout history, ranging from simple barriers between cities to
massive fortifications between kingdoms.
One of the oldest known city, Jericho in modern day Palestine, was walled as early as 8000
BC (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019). The 600-meter long stone wall was built and improved over
several hundred years. The wall had a tower and a long ditch, and was likely intended as protection
against floods and raiders. The construction project required enormous amount of physical labor –
excavating the ditch, cutting through solid rock for materials, and hauling the stone to assemble the
wall itself. Economists today may wonder how our ancestors planned, organized and managed such
a sophisticated project with so little training in engineering, This was a time when humans were barely
transitioning from hunters to farmers, did not yet use domesticated animals, and would not invent
metal tools or the wheel for thousands of years. It is not clear what kind of manpower was used communal labor, hired workers, or early slaves - or what type of surplus of an essential tradable
resource the population of Jericho produced through mining or agricultural production to generate
enough wealth to finance the wall.
As ancient cities grew all over the world, so did the walls. In 3000 BC, a 9 km wall surrounded
the largest city in the world: the Sumerian city of Uruk in modern Iraq, with a population of 80,000
residents (Dumper, 2007). Around 2030 BC, ancient Sumerians constructed a massive 160 km
fortified barrier across its territory to keep out the Amorite nomadic tribes. It succeeded in fending
2
off enemies for a few years, until the invaders either broke through the wall or simply walked around
it to destroy Sumerian cities (Spring, 2015).
Ancient Greeks built a number of walls, including the siege-proof long walls of Athens around
460 BC. The fortifications, extending from the city to its harbor, protected Athens during one war
with Sparta, but the city surrendered after its navy was defeated at sea (Conwell, 2008).
Around 83-260 AD, the Roman Empire reinforced its borders with a variety of wall-and-ditch
structures made of turf and stone, known as limes. Limes were intended to keep barbarian tribes out
of the Roman Empire, and were also used as customs checkpoints for the movement of goods and
people. Among the best known limes are the 118 km Hadrian's Wall, and the 60 km Antonine Wall
in Scotland, a 750 km wall in North Africa, and 568 km Limes Germanicus in Germany. The Roman
Empire invested heavily in its military, and for a while its military conquests supplied a steady supply
of slave labor to service the walls. Over time, expansion slowed down, and pressure from neighboring
barbarians increased. Overspending on the military and walls led to a financial crisis and a host of
negative effects - oppressive taxation and inflation, widespread tax evasion, and a widening gap
between the rich and the poor, foreshadowing its eventual collapse. Roman Limes made for a good
defense from disorganized robbers from Britain to the Arabian Peninsula, yet they did not protect the
empire against the better-organized barbarian armies of Vandals, Alans and Goths (Hough and Jones,
1964).
Around 460-512 AD, the Byzantines built the 56 km Anastasian Wall near Constantinople, a
stone and turf system of fortifications with towers, forts and ditches. For over a century it helped
protect the empire from invasions from the west, but two hundred years later, the wall was no longer
manned due to decreased threats and the high cost of troops (Williams and Friell, 1998).
In 430- 570 AD, the Sasanid Empire, located in modern-day Iran, invested in several largescale public defense projects to fortify its borders in response to territorial disputes with nomadic
neighbors. The most impressive part of the project was the 200 km Gorgan Wall, the world’s largest
defensive structure at the time and a masterpiece of ancient engineering, made out of uniformly
shaped mud bricks, featuring 38 forts, a well-engineered network of canals that acted as both a water
supply system and a defensive moat, and a garrison of at least 20,000 troops. This effective border
defense system is thought to have contributed to the empire’s longevity for the next 200 years, but
later it was abandoned as the empire’s prosperity came to an end and its maintenance became
unaffordable (Chaichian, 2013).
Between 430-800 AD, Anglo-Saxon kings built and maintained Offa's Dyke, a 240 km long
ditch and piled soil structure. It was intended to demarcate the border between England and Wales,
3
as well as defend against invaders. The Danish kings built and reinforced Danevirke, a 30 km long
defensive structure between 650-968 AD. It was last fortified before 1180, and then abandoned 150
years later (Pulsiano and Wolf, 1993).
Construction of the Great Wall of China began before 220 BC and continued until the 17th
century, the total distance reaching 21,196 km. Its original purpose was to separate the civilized
Chinese farming heartland from nomadic barbarians to the north, and to claim the disputed territory. 5
Over time the wall became a tool to control trade, prevent smuggling, and serve as entry portal with
customs checkpoint. Millions of conscripted peasants lost lives building the wall in harsh climate on
steep hillsides due to inadequate transportation, inhumane living conditions, and insufficient food.
Total annual expenditure on the wall in 1576 was estimated to cost three-quarters of the annual
emperor’s budget. Maintaining and garrisoning the wall was financed by higher taxes and revenues
from government monopolies on selling salt and iron, at the expense of other social projects (Lovell,
2006). Early unconnected fortifications were not real obstacles against nomads. In later centuries, the
wall did provide some protection, but not against the organized army of Genghis Khan in the 13th C.
The wall did not protect against 19th and 20th C barbarians arriving by sea: Europeans, Americans,
and Japanese (Waldron, 1989; Lovell, 2006; Jones, 2016a). Throughout Chinese history, weaker
emperors made investment into the expensive wall as a policy of last resort when all other options diplomacy, bribery, trade, tribute, or punitive military expeditions - had failed. In contrast,
expansionist dynasties -Tang and early Ming- refused to repair the "wall of shame" of their military
superiority (Langerbein, 2009). The wall did not prevent trade and cultural exchange: steppe nomads
came to the early wall to trade horses and leather for pottery and clothing; Chinese rulers learned
nomad’s fighting techniques and integrated nomads as leaders of their own armies. Even though the
protective function of the imperial wall was long obsolete in the 20th C, the government of communist
China kept investing into the wall as it became a symbol of national identity, a monument to the
military superiority of China, a poetic inspiration, and a lucrative tourist attraction.
Virtually all cities in Northern China had defensive walls from as early as 2000 BC. Larger
cities with more economic activity had longer walls; frontier cities subject to a higher probability of
attack had stronger walls. The protective function of the walls may have contributed to a perceived
sense of security and attracted more people and commerce to the walled cities: even today these cities
have larger population and employment densities (Ioannides and Zhang, 2017; Du and Zhang, 2018).
5
Climate change has been identified as a major source of the nomadic invasions against the agriculturalists in mid-tolate imperial China (Pei et al., 2019).
4
In Nigeria, a number of fortifications were built over several centuries from around year 800.
Benin-city was possibly the largest urban planning project in the world at the time, a web of walls
with a total length of 16,000 km that enclosed an entire kingdom made of hundreds of interlocked
cities and villages (The Guardian, 2016). Benin walls were destroyed by the Europeans in 1897. The
other massive wall in the area, Sungbo Eredo, was a 160 km wall and ditch earthworks financed by a
rich queen around year 1000, intended for defense, unification and as a shrine for spirit worshiping
(Onishi, 1999).
In Mexico, a small Mayan city of Tulum was surrounded on three sides by a 740 m long wall
around year 1200, for defense against larger city-states (Bley, 2011). In 1281, Japan built a 20 km
stonewall Genko Borui against Mongol invasion, and it is said to have contributed to the defeat of the
invaders (Vallet, 2016).
Between 1500-1800, the Russian empire fortified its southern borders with barricades of felled
trees with ditches and earth mounds, palisades, watch towers and forts, moving the barriers south as
the empire expanded. These fortifications protected against Tatars and other nomads who were active
participants in the slave market, kidnapping thousands of Eurasians per year and selling them into
slavery to the Ottoman Empire. They also prevented domestic runaway serfs from fleeing, and
demarcated new land for peasant farmers (Kollmann, 2017).
Plagued with chronic raids and territorial disputes, settled agricultural tribes sought to protect
themselves against outside threats to survival by asserting control over land and strategic routes.
Walls were expensive to build and even costlier to maintain. Early construction materials - wood and
mud bricks –would be eroded by weather, leveled by earthquakes, or ruined by invaders. Despite
costing much in resources, wealth and manpower, ancient walls were only partially successful in
achieving their intended goals. These defenses appeared to have worked for the lifetimes of their
builders, sometimes for several subsequent generations, but ultimately lost their value (Spring, 2015).
It is unclear whether the gain of security provided by walls was worth the opportunity cost of their
construction, whether the damage inflicted by barbarians could outweigh the financial burden of the
projects.
It is tempting to speculate how the building a wall relates to the lifecycle of a city-state or an
empire. Do expanding, flourishing, or declining powers build defensive barriers? In pre-modern
history, the pattern suggests that richer rulers whose power was on the decline were more eager to
build a physical defense system. Excessive spending on the walls may have in turn weakened empires
and expedited their collapse.
5
2.2 Modern walls
Between the late medieval times and early-20th C, empires rose and fell, national borders
moved numerous times, finally settling on what later became political borders of modern nations.
This period in history is characterized by declining violence in Europe: rates of homicide from
violence and wars in European countries decreased 10-50 times during that time (Pinker, 2011).
Pinker (2011) attributes the trend to the spread of the power of centralized authority with monopoly
on the legitimacy of violence, adoption of law and order, the advent of diplomacy, development of
trade partnerships, advances in transportation, the rise of literacy, increased life expectancy, adoption
of the values of tolerance and human rights, aversion to violence and cruelty. Recognition of
sovereignty over a territory among states became more common after the 1600s, in part due to
advances in cartography that allowed better records of border lines (Jones, 2016a). Consequently, the
need for defense walls declined and fewer new defense barriers were built during that time.
While construction of physical barriers was on the decline, new legal border barriers emerged.
Their purpose was no longer defense, but rather control over the movements of civilians. Early steps
towards a modern passport system appeared in 14th C England, 16th C Germany, 17TH C France and
18TH C Russia with the introduction of migration permits (Torpey, 2000). Throughout 14-18th C
population growth in Europe was slow, people were seen as wealth and a valuable asset for extraction
of military service, taxes and labor, thus governments sought to restrict outbound migration. At
various times European monarchies introduced restrictions on emigration of skilled labor, such as
artisans (1534, England), ship builders, sailors and fishermen (1669, France). Prussia restricted all
emigration without permission in 1686. China had severe punishments, even death, for anyone going
abroad in the 16-18th C (Xu, 2005). The majority of European settlers who colonized the United States
were ‘illegal’ migrants who bypassed emigration restrictions. Spain, Russia, England, Holland, and
the Ottoman Empire, among other countries, welcomed immigrants and refugees with tax breaks and
other incentives (Dowty, 1987).
Most Western countries adopted passports and visas after WW1. Travel documents, ID cards,
registration and censuses, were early forms of state surveillance and control over citizens’ identities
and their whereabouts. By allowing or depriving people of the freedom to move, states could
efficiently conduct law enforcement, prevent potential anti-government insurgencies, target national
security operations, distribute incentives and punishments, prevent brain drain, administer claims to
assets, supervise population growth and composition (Torpey, 2000).
Leading up to WW2, Europe experienced a revival of defense fortifications. Finland
constructed two lines of fortified defense on the Soviet border in 1920–1940, the Mannerheim Line
6
with fallen trees and boulders, and the Salpa Line with 350,000 stones weighing 3 tons each.
Czechoslovakia 1935-38 built border fortifications with infantry blockhouses and antitank obstacles.
Greece built the 155 km long Metaxas Line of 21 independent fortification complexes to protect from
Bulgarian invasion in 1936-41. France 1929-38 constructed the Maginot Line, a 380 km long
permanent system of fortifications with concrete bunkers, tunnels, tank obstacles, artillery casemates,
machine gun posts along the German and Italian borders. Sweden built the 500 km Skåne Line on its
borders with barbed wire and concrete bunkers along the shore, armed with machine guns and
cannons. Mussolini’s Italy 1930-42 built the Alpine Wall, a system of defensive fortifications along
the 1851 km of its northern frontier facing France, Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia. Nazi
Germany built the Atlantic Wall equipped with coastal guns, batteries, mortars, artillery, and
thousands of stationed troops along the coast of continental Europe and Scandinavia in 1942-44
against an anticipated Allied invasion from the United Kingdom (Kaufmann and Donnell, 2004).
None of these wartime fortifications could stop attacks by air, and some did not even deter the enemy
armies arriving by land and sea. When the Allies eventually invaded the Normandy beaches, most of
the Atlantic Wall defenses were stormed within hours. In the case of the Maginot Line, Nazis avoided
it while invading France using an alternative route through Belgium.
After WWII, the United Nations was formed and countries recognized each other’s political
borders and territorial integrity. The triumph of diplomacy and peaceful coexistence could render the
border walls and fences obsolete. However regional conflicts persisted, and security walls were a
frequent solution.
France built an electric fence with minefields, the Morice Line, before the Algerian War of
1957, to prevent the rebel guerrillas from entering Algeria from Tunisia and Morocco. Israel built a
150 km defense system known as the Bar Lev Line, a massive sand wall supported by a concrete
wall, along Suez Canal during the 1967 Six-Day War with Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Guantanamo
/Cuba, and China/Hong Kong fortified their mutual borders with 30 km walls in the early 1960s.
Oman built a 50 km mined Hornbeam line against guerrilla insurgents in 1973 (Peterson, 2008).
Cyprus was divided by a UN buffer zone after Turkey took over Northern Cyprus in 1974, and
Northern Cyprus built a 300 km concrete wall. Morocco built a 2,700 km sand ‘berm’ with trenches,
barbed wire and landmines against Western Sahara in 1987 to claim disputed territory. North and
South Korea built a 243 km heavily fortified demilitarized zone in the late 1970s.
During the Cold War of 1945-91, the Soviet Union and its allies put up the ‘iron curtain’, a
set of self-imposed physical, legal and informational barriers between themselves and the West
intended to prevent trade with the West and to stop emigration of citizens to the West, in order to
7
protect the emerging fragile new communist society based on work, cooperation, and egalitarianism
from western capitalism based on individualism, competition, and hierarchy. It also included
militarized borders with the West: a 240 km electric fence between Hungary and Austria, and the
Berlin Wall.
Berlin Wall, built by East Germany in 1961, was a complex 150 km long system with sensors,
a fence, barbed wire obstacles, dog-runs, an anti-tank ditch and obstacles, an access road for guards
and vehicles, an alley of lights, 186 guard towers, a control strip of raked sand, followed by the main
exterior wall with 25 border crossings. The wall employed 12,000 elite patrol soldiers and 1,000 dogs;
troops were equipped with 567 armored personnel carriers, 156 heavy engineering vehicles, 2,295
other vehicles, 48 anti-tank guns, 48 grenade launchers, and 114 flame throwers. Despite the high
tech engineering of the wall, tens of thousands of East Berliners managed to escape by climbing over
the wall, digging under, and hiding in secret compartment of cars; 75,000 people received prison
sentences for attempting to flee, and 140 lost lives. Operating much like a prison wall, the Berlin Wall
blocked emigration of skilled labor without which East Germany would arguably not be able to
survive. It extended the life of the regime by at most 28 years till 1989, and when it finally proved to
be an economic failure, the wall collapsed along with the ideology that supported it (Rottman, 2012).
Fences erected by communist regimes were the only physical barriers in history intended to
restrict out-migration. At least 5 were demolished at the end of the Cold War (Berlin Wall, HungaryAustria, Czechoslovakia-West Germany, USSR-Finland, USSR-Norway), only the barrier between
Koreas remained. In contrast, the rest of the world was about to see a wave of walls against inbound
migrants.
South Africa put up a lethal electrified fence on its border with poorer neighbors Mozambique
and Zimbabwe in 1986. The fence was responsible for hundreds of refugee deaths in the first 3 years
of its existence as migrants who tried to cross the fence got electrocuted, while those who tried to
bypass the fence by going through a national park got eaten by lions. Yet most illegal migrants
managed to cross the fence (New Scientist, 1990).
The decade of 1990s was marked by giant strides of the developed world towards unification,
as evidenced by the adoption of NAFTA and common borders in the EU. But it was also the decade
of fast population growth and rising inequality, the emergence of new regional conflicts, and the
expansion of trade in drugs, weapons and human trafficking.
Between 1990-2001, 6 security walls were built against potential terrorists (here and
elsewhere the first country is the builder): Israel/Gaza, Kuwait/Iraq, India/Bangladesh,
Uzbekistan/Afghanistan, Uzbekistan/Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan. In addition, 2 countries
8
built migration walls: US/Mexico, and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco.
Smuggling of drugs, weapons and other controlled goods were secondary reasons for several of these
fences. Although not explicitly stated, claims to land may be additional reasons to erect walls in case
of Israel, India and Central Asian countries, given their history of territorial disputes.
2.3 21st C Walls
Concerns over terrorism magnified after the terrorist attacks of 9-11-2001 in the US. Other
countries including Israel, UK, Spain, Indonesia, Russia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, were also
attacked by terrorist organizations. Between 2002-2010, 15 new security walls and fences were added
to the map around Middle East, when ISIS insurgency began to threaten stability in the region. Israel
built security fences separating it from the West Bank and Egypt. Egypt built an over-and underground wall with Gaza. Saudi Arabia built an 885 km security wall with Iraq and fences with UAE,
Oman, Qatar, Jordan and Yemen. UAE erected fences along its borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman
(migration, smuggling, security). Jordan built walls with Syria and Iraq. Iran walled off Iraq,
Afghanistan and Pakistan (security, smuggling). Israel Defense Forces claim that the Israeli-Egypt
fence was effective in reducing the flow of illegal migrants from Africa. 6
Outside Middle East, 8 new fences were constructed: between Brunei/Malaysia (smuggling,
migration), Myanmar/Bangladesh (security), Lithuania/Belarus (smuggling), Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan
(smuggling), and Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan (smuggling). Russia built a barbed wire barricade on the
border with Georgia (conflict). In Africa, Botswana put up a fence against Zimbabwe in response to
a flood of refugee migrants who were accused of taking jobs, committing crimes and spreading HIV
(Kopinski and Polus, 2012).
In response to massive migration of Middle Eastern and North African refugees to the EU
between 2011-2018, seven migration fences went up in Europe. Macedonia built a fence with Greece.
Greece and Bulgaria have erected barbed wire fences on the border with Turkey. Hungary built a 175
km fence on the border with Serbia and a 350 km fence on the border with Croatia. Slovakia put a
fence with Croatia, Austria with Slovenia. The UK financed a 13-foot-high barrier in the French port
city of Calais, aimed at preventing refugees and migrants from entering Britain.
Middle East and North Africa added nine more security fences, fully or partially built: Oman/
Yemen, Turkmenistan/Afghanistan, Pakistan/Afghanistan. Turkey/ Syria, Turkey/ Iran, Israel
/Jordan, Israel/ Syria, Israel/Lebanon, Tunisia/Libya, and Algeria/Morocco.
6
Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/ccf4b532-3935-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7
9
Regional conflicts and land disputes resulted in seven additional fences in Eastern Europe and
Asia: Azerbaijan/Armenia, Ukraine/ Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania built barriers with the Russian
territory of Kaliningrad, Kyrgyzstan /Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan/ Uzbekistan, and China/ North Korea.
Several countries have announced future construction of fences: Estonia/Russia, Latvia/
Belarus, Poland/Belarus, Poland/Ukraine, Hungary/Romania, Turkey/Iraq, India/Bhutan, Malaysia/
Brunei, Malaysia/Indonesia, Russia (Crimea)/Ukraine, and Algeria/Libya. These appear to be mostly
motivated by smuggling, territorial claim, and animal disease control. Latin America is free of border
barriers except for those erected by the US between Guantanamo and Cuba.
In addition to border walls between countries, there are separation walls within countries
intended to reduce violence. One example is a wall in Baghdad built in 2007 by the US to separate a
Sunni district. Another example is a series of forty "peace walls" in Belfast, Northern Ireland,
constructed in the 1970s to separate Catholic and Protestant communities.
Modern borders differ greatly in their level of complexity and enforcement. Among the most
serious borders is Kuwait/Iraq, made of electrified fencing and razor wire, braced by a 4.6 m-wide
and 4.6 m-deep trench, complete with a 3.0 m-high dirt berm, and guarded by hundreds of soldiers,
several patrol boats, and helicopters. Saudi Arabia/Iraq wall is equipped with ultraviolet night-vision
cameras, buried sensor cables, thousands of miles of barbed wire, 50 radars, 78 monitoring towers,
eight command centers, ten mobile surveillance vehicles, 38 night vision camera-equipped gates, 32
rapid-response centers, and three rapid intervention squads, all linked by a fiber-optic
communications network. Some of the equipment used at the borders can detect a person 19 km away
and a vehicle at 39 km 7. Among relatively porous borders are fences between Malaysia/Thailand, and
India/Bangladesh. Both are lightly patrolled and monitored, and thus not effective deterrents for
migrants and smugglers who often use fake documents and bribes to cross between the two countries.
We estimate that at least 67 international borders are fortified to various degrees with manmade barriers as of 2018, and there are plans to build 10 more in the next few years.
2.4 US-Mexican wall
The US-Mexico wall is an example of a border barrier with several official motives behind it:
stop illegal migration, fight drug and human smuggling, and prevent drug-related violence (Andreas,
2000). The first piece of the wall, the 22 km San Diego fence, was built in 1990-93. Since 2006, a
Gulf News Jan 22, 2015 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-building-hi-tech-border-fence1.1445112
7
10
total of 1,000 km of steel and concrete were added in various parts of this 3,200 km border. About
one-third of the border consists of natural barriers such as desert stretches and the Rio Grande. In
between the walls, there is "virtual fencing" composed of sensors, surveillance cameras, and other
detection technology. Since 9/11, the US side of the border has been further militarized, and the
border patrol budget increased 20 times. There are plans to add another 1,000 km of the wall in the
near future with the total cost up to $25 billion, including labor but not including the cost of land
acquisition from current owners. Once constructed, the government will need to invest a few billion
a year in wall maintenance, repairs, guards, and support infrastructure (The Economist, 2016).
Figure 1. Border Walls and Fences 1970-2020.
Note: The graph presents the authors’ count of all walls and fences in the world, including partially constructed
(Estonia-Russia fence) and planned through 2020. Our estimates are overall similar to those in Vallet (2014), Jones
(2016a) and Carter and Poast (2017), although our estimates are more conservative. Vallet, Barry and Guillarmou
(quoted in Jones, 2016a) suggest an estimate of 69 fences in 2016 while our count is 63. We include only walls and
fences on international borders (this excludes the Wall of Baghdad, the Walls of Peace in Belfast, and the Great Wall of
China), the existence of which we could verify. For example, we are not sure if there is a fence on the border of Russia
with China, Mongolia, and North Korea. There is probably at least partial fencing, but in the absence of information we
did not count them. As construction start dates differ between sources, we used the most commonly reported dates.
Table 1 lists all walls and fences included into our calculations. Rosière and Jones (2012) estimate that by 2012 more
than 13 percent of the world’s borders were marked with a barrier of some kind.
11
The number of undocumented immigrants in the US increased between 1986-2008 from about
3 to 12 million people, or 7% of the US population. In the 1960s, 70 million Mexicans crossed the
border, but 85% returned home. Increased border enforcement made circular migration more costly
and risky, forcing undocumented Mexican migrants to settle permanently in the US (Zimmermann,
2014, Massey et al., 2016).
The US-Mexican wall does not deter drug smuggling. Most illicit drugs are delivered into the
US in vehicles with secret compartments and difficult-to-inspect shipping cargo using legal
checkpoints. Drugs are also conveyed through elaborate systems of tunnels under the wall. Between
1990 and 2016, 224 tunnels were discovered, some with air vents, rails and electric lights (US DEA
2016).
Stricter border enforcement in the US raised the cost of human smuggling by pushing it farther
into the desert into the hands of large drug cartels. Coyotes used to work independently or in small
groups. Now they work for one of the four narco cartels, paying the cartels a huge cut of the profits.
If migrants try to cross the border without paying, they risk getting beaten or murdered. The average
price is upward of $4,000 in 2017 dollars (US DHS, 2017). Smugglers are more often armed and
violent, and conflicts between them and border enforcement agents resemble a war. Migrants are
sometimes left to die in the desert: there have been 4,500 migrant deaths along the U.S.-Mexico
border between 2006-17 (US Customs and Border Protection, 2017).
Similar dynamics is observed in Europe. The Greek fence has forced migrants to pursue more
dangerous and expensive alternative routes. Trips on the Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey’s
Western Coast to Greece now cost over €1,000 (Stamouli, 2016). Between 2014-17, over 11,000
migrants died or went missing in the Mediterranean at sea 8.
The number of people detained without papers on the US-Mexico border has dropped
markedly in 2017 to the lowest number since 2000 (US DHS, 2017). Illegal immigration is on the
decline because of demographics: Mexico's birth rate has plummeted during the last 40 years from
6.1 children per woman in 1975 to 2.2 in 2005, which is not very different from 1.8 births per women
in the US. 9
8
Migration Data Portal https://migrationdataportal.org
9
World Bank Open Data https://data.worldbank.org
12
3. Making sense out of walls
Consider the construction of a border barrier from a costs-and-benefits perspective. Costs
include electric lighting, roads, security equipment and guards. A physical wall requires masonry
foundations, steel and concrete, which is relatively expensive, while barbed wire fences are cheaper.
Resources spent on walls and border enforcement come with opportunity costs - they could have been
directed to alternative uses, such as building better schools and improving cities.
Should a security wall be built to prevent the infiltration of terrorists? Terrorism is costly for
an economy as it leads to loss of life and destabilizes investment in productive assets. For example,
terrorist attacks committed by the Somalian terrorist group Al Shabaab have had a large negative
impact on Kenya’s economy in recent years. 10 A security fence may be justified in this case, even
though Kenya does not have one. The costs of a security fence can be weighed against the benefits of
preventing an attack for a country that faces threats from terrorism. One should keep in mind that
historically, walls have not been effective against military attacks (Jones, 2016a). In recent times,
most terrorist attacks in the US and Europe have been committed by legal residents ‘from within’.
The strongest walls could not have stopped 9/11. Planes and missiles can fly over walls, tanks can
smash them, and biological weapons, drones and cyberattacks bypass walls entirely. The security
effectiveness of borders does not depend on military spending, but rather is a function of institutional
design that encourages local cross-border collaborative policing (Gavrilis, 2008).
Should a wall be built to prevent smuggling of illicit drugs and weapons? There is little
evidence that walls are effective in the war on drugs. Even if they are, the cost of such barriers should
be weighed against the results they achieve, given other law and policy options to regulate drugs and
guns.
The main driving factor of undocumented migration – and therefore of walls - is inequality.
Richer countries build walls against poor neighbors. Jones (2012) estimates that the average GDP of
a country that built a barrier, from 2000 to 2011, was 5 times larger than the GDP of the target country.
Similarly, Carter and Poast (2017) find statistical evidence that economic disparities have a
significant impact on the presence of a physical wall using data on barriers constructed from 1800 to
2014. Therefore addressing the problem of poverty and inequality in the developing world is often
suggested to be a way to reduce migration. However, this is only valid in the very long run. 11
10
The Conversation https://theconversation.com/why-al-shabaab-targets-kenya-and-what-the-country-can-do-about-it87371
11
Economic development and emigration from developing countries are found to be inverse U-shaped. Hence, rising
income increases the possibilities for migration, but migration has also a positive impact on development back home. See
for a review of the rich literature Clemens (2014) and specific articles like Haas (2010), Zimmermann (2017a, 2017b),
and Dao et al. (2018).
13
Should a wall be built against illegal immigrants? The benefit of a migration wall may be high
if uncontrolled migration imposes large costs on a society and if a wall provides sufficient protection
against such inflows. For example, immigrants may commit crime, drain welfare resources, threaten
national unity, and impose hardship on domestic workers. The cost effectiveness of building a wall
should also be compared to the alternative options of regulating migrant’s privileges with policies.
Certain groups and industries – potential voters who influence policymaking - benefit from
the proliferation of walls and militarization of borders. For example, the growth in border barriers
created a multi-billion-dollar security business for private armament and defense companies
specializing in communications, surveillance, information technology and biometrics. Between 2002
and 2017, exports of Israeli companies specializing in high-tech border security increased 22% each
year. Major international companies that have a large share in this market are American Boeing,
Israeli Elbit Systems, Israeli Magal Security Systems, Spanish Amper, European EADS Group
(Saddiki, 2017). Among other likely beneficiaries will be Cemex, a Mexican firm with around half
the quarries close to the border, given that it is not economically feasible to transport cement across
great distances. Then, there are companies like the US Golden State Fence Company, a firm that built
a significant portion of the border wall in Southern California, and was charged millions of dollars in
fines for having hundreds of undocumented workers on its payroll. 12 The list of groups that stand to
benefit from the wall also includes the Department of Homeland Security that employs 240,000
people and has an annual budget of $61 billion, including border enforcement, militarized police
units, ammunition, detention centers, biometric IDs and surveillance (Miller 2017).
All types of border barriers reduce wellbeing of the population by restricting gains from
cooperation, specialization and trade between neighbors. Treb et al. (2018) show that the USMexico border wall expansion between 2007-10 harmed Mexican workers and high-skill U.S.
workers, but benefited U.S. low-skill workers, who achieved gains equivalent to an increase in per
capita income of $0.36. In contrast, a hypothetical policy of openness, which reduced trade costs
between the United States and Mexico by 25%, would have resulted in both greater declines in
Mexico to United States migration and substantial welfare gains for all workers.
The non-economic costs of walls include isolation, broken cultural ties, mistrust that can breed
terrorism, damaged farmlands, and a threat to wildlife (Trouwborst et al., 2016). Political scientist
Brown (2010) writes the following about Israeli and US-Mexico walls in the book ‘Walled States’:
“Both intensify the criminality and violence they purport to repel, and hence, both generate the need
for more fortifications and policing. Yet both are heralded for producing peace, order, and security.
12
New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/15/us/15hiring.html
14
Both confound barricades and borders, and both articulate a border on confiscated lands. Both walled
democracies are justified as state necessity in protecting the people, both draw upon the xenophobia
they also exacerbate and project, both suspend the law in the name of blockading outlaws and
criminals, and both build a "suspended political solution" in concrete and barbed wire”.
Popular justifications for restricting migration are not based on real evidence, but rather the
examples of signaling behavior by governments. In the words of Jagdish Bhagwati who spoke of the
India-Bangladesh fence construction in the 1980s, for a politician, building a fence is “the least
disruptive way of doing nothing while appearing to do something.” (quoted in Di Cintio, 2013).
4. Open or closed borders?
There is a lively debate in the economic literature around the potential consequences of
allowing more migration. Kennan (2013, 2014) and Clemens (2011) argue that lifting the restrictions
on immigration could produce large efficiency gains because the unskilled workers become more
productive when they move from a low wage to a high wage country. As a result, incomes in lessdeveloped countries could more than double and the world GDP would increase by 67-147%.
A large body of research has documented that increased cross-border labor mobility has
beneficial effects for host countries and their residents. For example, the EU labor market has become
more flexible and better able to absorb shocks after the EU eastern enlargement (Kahanec and
Zimmermann, 2009, 2016; Jauer et al., 2019) and this is attributed not only to migrants from the
(new) member states but also to third-country nationals.
There is evidence that immigrants do not take jobs away or depress wages. Instead migrants
help create jobs for natives, because their skills are most often complements rather than substitutes
for the skills of native workers in the production of goods and services (Constant 2014; Peri 2014,
Foged and Peri, 2016). High-tech startups and established firms owned by foreign-born entrepreneurs
have introduced more innovations than firms owned by US-born entrepreneurs (Brown, 2019).
Labor migrants tend to be economically successful taxpayers, and are less likely than natives
to use welfare benefits (Giulietti and Wahba, 2013). In the EU, the generosity of unemployment
benefit spending across EU countries in 1993-2003 had a negligible effect on the inflow of non-EU
migrants (Giulietti, Guzi, Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2013). In the US, the overall cost of public
benefits is substantially less for low-income non-citizen immigrants than for comparable native-born
adults and children (Ku and Bruen, 2013).
It has been shown that higher share of foreign labor is associated with more equality in
developed countries (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009b; Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2014). Social
15
tensions are smaller and attitudes towards migrants are more open if immigrants are selected
according to the needs of the labor markets (Bauer et al., 2000). The wellbeing of natives is shown to
be higher in countries with more - and with more diverse - migrants (Akay et al., 2014; Akay et al.,
2017).
Immigrants commit fewer offenses and less frequently end up in prison than the native
population. For example, the number of illegal immigrants in the US tripled between 1990 and 2013,
while the crime rate plummeted (Ewing et al., 2015). Data on migration flows between 145 countries
between 1970-2000 shows that immigration does not cause terrorism; immigration leads to a decline
in terrorist acts, largely because it fosters economic growth (Bove and Böhmelt, 2016).
Labor migration, particularly that of undocumented workers, is largely circular migration in
the absence of travel barriers, because workers go back home to their families after temporary work
episodes abroad (Zimmermann, 2014, Constant et al., 2013, Massey and Pren, 2012). Mobility
restrictions, paradoxically, create more permanent migrants, because workers, unable to move freely
to and from the host country, bring families with them. This scenario selects for migrants who may
be less willing to assimilate, and the children of immigrants remain culturally diverse (Galli and
Russo, 2019). When immigrant workers travel back and forth between their host and home countries,
the home countries benefit from their skills, knowledge and perspective, as well as from investments
into local businesses and money they spend at home. Remittances sent home by migrants contribute
to the development of some of the world’s poorest countries, accounting for over 30% of GDP in
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, around 25% in Haiti and Yemen, and close to 20% in Moldova,
Honduras and El Salvador 13. In other words, immigrants send home 3-4 times more money than
countries receive in development aid.
Given the evidence, open borders policies rather than walls would improve the world
wellbeing. What are some of the drawbacks? Large inflows of migrants may be disruptive for the
welfare system in the short-run, even if in the long-run the balance is restored. Host country natives
may have legitimate concerns about preserving national identity and granting voting rights to the
newcomers. Potential higher demand for housing, schooling, medical care, and the accompanying
rise in property prices are also important short-run concerns.
In a world where wealth and opportunities are more equally distributed, a smaller number of
individuals would be drawn by labor market needs or want to migrate to explore different cultures.
More people would prefer to stay to be close to their extended families and friends and the home
13
World Bank Migration and Remittances Data 2018
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data
16
country culture. Unfortunately, simple solutions such as sending foreign aid to poor countries do not
reduce emigration (Clemens and Postel, 2017). 14 In fact, rising incomes in developing countries may
have the opposite effect at least initially, it will increase mobility among people who need resources
to move. Reducing migration from poor countries requires complex solutions to global poverty,
inequality and conflicts. Long-term solutions to migration crisis should involve development of
institutions in poor countries, including law and order, property rights, as well as investment in
education, reduced corruption, and peaceful governance.
5. Conclusions: Politics vs Economic Evidence
Contemporary border fences are built for much the same set of reasons as ancient walls. We
have defense walls against external threats of terrorism and infiltration by insurgents. There are walls
that separate conflicting cultures and religions, walls that establish ownership of land, barriers that
regulate trade, and fences that restrict migration of civilians. The attributes of walls have changed
from earthwork, bricks and masonry to sophisticated structures that include concrete, razor wire,
sensors, personnel, dogs, infrared equipment, patrol vehicles, drones, helicopters, planes and
satellites. There are additional invisible walls made of legal and digital barriers to restrict movement
of goods and people, and maritime systems to detect unauthorized boats.
Like ancient walls, modern ‘security walls’ are only partially successful in accomplishing
their goals. No physical barrier can provide effective protection against homegrown terrorists and
modern weapons. No fortification can stop migrants who arrive by air and sea. No wall will reduce
the drug flow when most of it crosses the border through legal entry points. More than ever before,
walls today are politically motivated, reflecting signaling behavior by governments who wish to
appear tough on immigration, and serving the interests of defense industries that stand to benefit from
the projects. Economic literature overwhelmingly suggests that policies of more open borders, with
less restrictive migration and trade, benefit domestic citizens more than walls. Economic policies are
also more effective than walls in dealing with illegal trade and trafficking, while diplomacy is more
effective than walls in addressing security. Ignoring rational economic thinking over populist politics
comes at a price, a loss in well-being.
14
See also footnote 10 and the literature cited there.
17
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23
Table: Modern Walls and Fences
Builder
Target
Constructed
aprox.
Dismantled
East Germany
Hungary
Czechoslovakia
Russia/USSR
Russia/USSR
Before 1990
West Germany
Austria
West Germany
Finland
Norway
1960s-1989
1960s-1989
1960s-1989
1960s-1992
1960s-1992
Cuba
US
(Guantanamo)
China
Syria
Cyprus Northern
Mozambique
Lebanon
South Korea
Malaysia
Western Sahara
Zimbabwe
Pakistan
Hong Kong
Israel
Cyprus
South Africa
Israel
North Korea
Thailand
Morocco
South Africa
India
Between 1990-2001
United States
Mexico
India
Bangladesh
Israel
Gaza
Kuwait
Iraq
Uzbekistan
Afghanistan
Spain
Morocco-Ceuta
Spain
Morocco-Melilla
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Between 2002-2010
Israel
West Bank
Botswana
Zimbabwe
Iran
Afghanistan
Saudi Arabia
Yemen
India
Myanmar
Lithuania
Belarus
Brunei
Malaysia
Arab Emirates
Oman
Arab Emirates
Saudi Arabia
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Iran
Iraq
Iran
Pakistan
Jordan
Iraq
Jordan
Syria
Russia
Georgia
Egypt
Gaza
Myanmar
Bangladesh
Israel
Egypt
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Between 2011-2018
China
North Korea
Greece
Turkey
Bulgaria
Turkey
Algeria
Morocco
Oman
Yemen
Turkey
Syria
Turkmenistan
Afghanistan
Austria
Slovenia
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Hungary
Croatia
1961
1962
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1980
1984
1988
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
1998
1999
2001
2002
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2010
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014
2015
2015
2015
24
Hungary
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Macedonia
Morocco
Slovenia
Ukraine
UK
Israel
Norway
Tunisia
Estonia
Lithuania
Pakistan
Turkey
Iraq
Planned
Algeria
Hungary
India
Latvia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Poland
Poland
Russia
Turkey
Serbia
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Russia
Greece
Algeria
Croatia
Russia
France
Jordan
Russia
Libya
Russia
Russia
Afghanistan
Iran
Syria
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2016
2016
2016
2017
2017
2017
2017
2018
Libya
Romania
Bhutan
Belarus
Brunei
Indonesia
Belarus
Ukraine
Ukraine
Iraq
25