Clinical research
Eugen Bleuler’s schizophrenia—a modern
perspective
Anke Maatz, MA, MD; Paul Hoff, MD, PhD; Jules Angst, MD
Introduction
E
ugen Bleuler (1857-1939) was born and raised
in the village of Zollikon near Zurich in Switzerland.
After graduating in medicine, he started his residential
training in psychiatry at the Waldau Hospital in Bern.
Study trips took him to Paris to work with Jean-Martin
Charcot, to Munich where he trained under Bernhard
von Gudden, and to London. He completed his residential training at the University Hospital of Psychiatry in
Zurich, known as “Burghölzli,” and was appointed director of the mental asylum of Rheinau in 1886. After
living with and caring for long-term psychiatric patients
in Rheinau for more than 12 years, he returned to Zurich as professor of psychiatry at Burghölzli in 1898, and
held this position until his retirement in 1927. Eugen
Bleuler died in Zollikon in 1939.
Whilst today Bleuler is perhaps best known for the
introduction of the term and concept schizophrenia, or
more precisely “the group of schizophrenias,” this paper considers his work on schizophrenia principally in
terms of its relationship to long-standing and complex
theoretical debates in psychiatric nosology. These concern the very nature of mental illness, in particular the
The introduction of the term and concept schizophrenia earned its inventor, Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler, worldwide fame. Prompted by the rejection of the
main principle of Kraepelinian nosology, namely prognosis, Bleuler’s belief in the clinical unity of what Kraepelin had described as dementia praecox required him
to search for alternative characterizing features that
would allow scientific description and classification.
This led him to consider psychological, and to a lesser
degree, social factors alongside an assumed underlying neurobiological disease process as constitutive of
what he then termed schizophrenia, thus making him
an early proponent of a bio-psycho-social understanding of mental illness. Reviewing Bleuler’s conception
of schizophrenia against the background of his overall
clinical and theoretical work, this paper provides a critical overview of Bleuler’s key nosological principles and
links his work with present-day debates about naturalism, essentialism, and stigma.
© 2015, AICH – Servier Research Group
Author affiliations: Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Psychiatric Hospital, University of Zurich, Switzerland
Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2015;17:43-49.
Address for correspondence: Anke Maatz, MA, MD, Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Psychiatric Hospital, University of Zurich, Lenggstr. 31, CH 8032 Zurich, Switzerland
(e-mail: anke.maatz@puk.zh.ch)
Keywords: Eugen Bleuler; nosology; bio-psycho-social; naturalism; essentialism;
stigma
Copyright © 2015 AICH – Servier Research Group. All rights reserved
43
www.dialogues-cns.org
Clinical research
relationships between nature and mind and the individual and society. Debates about how nature, ie, the brain
and body, is related to the mind were highly topical with
regard to mental illness in Bleuler’s time and remain so
today,1,2 as nicely captured in Lipowski’s interrogative:
“Psychiatry: mindless or brainless, both or neither?”3
Bleuler would have sided neither with a mindless nor
with a brainless psychiatry, but would have acknowledged both brain and mind, as well as social factors, as
equally important elements in mental health and illness.
He can thus be considered an early proponent of a biopsychosocial model4 in psychiatry. Reviewing Bleuler’s
conception of schizophrenia against the background of
his overall clinical and theoretical work and contrasting
it with Kraepelin’s earlier concept dementia praecox,
this paper provides a critical overview of Bleuler’s key
nosological principles and links his work with presentday debates about naturalism, essentialism, and stigma.
Bleuler’s contribution to nosology
Bleuler’s intellectual background
Bleuler’s work stands in the conceptually rich tradition of turn-of-the-century psychiatry and psychology
and can be considered a synthesis of various contemporary concepts and theories (see ref 5 for an overview). Amongst these are the theories of Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939),
who, through their different theoretical emphases, introduced him to two—in one view opposed, in another
complementary—traditions in psychiatry.6,7
Emil Kraepelin promoted the biological tradition,
viewing mental illnesses as “natural disease entities”
(natürliche Krankheitseinheiten), ie, entities “given by
nature”8 and existing independently from the psychiatric practitioner and researcher. Acknowledging that science at the time did not yet allow identification of these
posited disease entities, he based his preliminary nosology on an alternative principle, namely—following Karl
Ludwig Kahlbaum (1828-1899)9—on the course and
prognosis of a given illness. This led to a dichotomous
nosology based on the distinction between the concept
of dementia praecox, characterized by a fatal course,
and the concept of manic-depressive insanity, characterized by a positive course.10,11 This nosological system
had gained wide acceptance amongst psychiatrists by
the turn of the century.
44
At the same time, Sigmund Freud, founder of psychoanalysis, struggled to find recognition for his new
concepts in academic psychiatry. Also rooted in a biological tradition, yet offering a new psychological explanation of mental illness as the unfolding of unconscious intrapsychic conflicts,12 Freud’s theory was met
with skepticism, if not outright rejection, as a dogmatic
world-view.13 Bleuler was the only influential contemporary academic psychiatrist who not only joined in
the debate about psychoanalysis, but also, while always
remaining circumspect, implemented psychoanalytic
treatment and research at Burghölzli.14,15
Bleuler’s thinking was further shaped by the German philosopher and psychologist Johann Friedrich
Herbart (1776-1841). Championing a scientific approach to psychology, Herbart was one of the major
proponents of association theory. This saw human mental life as consisting in a multitude of basic, individual
mental acts that are combined (“associated”) into more
complex cognitive functions.16 As will be shown in the
following section, Bleuler, like the Viennese psychiatrist Erwin Stransky (1877-1962),17,18 integrated aspects
of this atomistic approach to psycho(patho)logy in his
work on dementia praecox and its reconceptualization
as schizophrenia.
Introducing the “group of schizophrenias”
In 1908, Bleuler publicly introduced the term and concept schizophrenia in a lecture given at the meeting of
the Deutscher Verein für Psychatrie (German Psychiatric Association) in Berlin.19 In the opening paragraph,
he summarized his reasons for abandoning Kraepelin’s
earlier concept dementia praecox:
I wish to emphasize that in Kraepelin’s dementia praecox
it is neither a question of an essential dementia nor of a
necessary precociousness. For this reason, and because
from the expression dementia praecox one cannot form
further adjectives nor substantives, I am taking the liberty of employing the word schizophrenia for revising the
Kraepelinian concept. In my opinion the breaking up or
splitting of psychic functioning is an excellent symptom of
the whole group […]19 (translation from ref 20)
Whilst this passage also underscores the importance of
linguistic labels in psychiatry, the wish to rename Kraepelin’s dementia praecox is only a secondary motive in
Bleuler’s introduction of schizophrenia. Having gathered epidemiological data on the prognosis and end
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience - Vol 17 . No. 1 . 2015
Eugen Bleuler’s schizophrenia - Maatz et al
states of patients admitted with a diagnosis of dementia
praecox, he came to the conclusion that this group of
patients could not be coherently defined by a specific
prognosis, ie, that this Kraepelinian nosological principle had to be rejected.21 Importantly, however, Bleuler
wanted to maintain the nosological unity of the group
of patients that Kraepelin identified by dementia praecox and believed that there was something “specifically
schizophrenic behind the general manifestations” of the
disease.19 He shared Kraepelin’s assumption of an underlying physical disease process that the sciences of his
day could not yet identify, and—having rejected Kraepelin’s principle of prognosis—he set about searching
for alternative criteria to define the essence of schizophrenia. To this purpose, Bleuler turned to psychology, where, influenced by Herbart’s atomistic view of
the mind,16 he identified the alteration of associations,
ie, of the way in which basic mental acts meaningfully
combine into more complex units, as schizophrenia’s
most fundamental feature. This idea is more fully developed in Bleuler’s 1911 volume Dementia Praecox or the
Group of Schizophrenias22:
The connections between associations are lost. The disease interrupts the threads that give direction to our
thoughts in an irregular fashion, sometimes affecting only
a few, sometimes a large proportion of them. Thus, the result of the thought process is rendered unusual, and often
logically incorrect (p 10, translation AM).
In this volume, Bleuler develops a symptomatology
organized around two dichotomous distinctions: that
between basic and accessory and that between primary
and secondary symptoms. Basic symptoms are those
which are necessarily present in any case of schizophrenia; accessory symptoms may or may not occur. The
distinction of primary and secondary refers to both etiology and pathogenesis, with primary symptoms being
caused directly by the assumed neurobiological disease
process, whilst secondary symptoms are seen as the
potentially understandable reactions of the psyche to
the disturbing primary symptoms. The alteration of associations is the only symptom that Bleuler regarded
as both basic and primary, and can thus be described
as the core disturbance in the Bleulerian conception of
schizophrenia. Importantly, the alteration of associations is not to be equated with formal thought disorder
but to be understood as a disturbance affecting all aspects, both cognitive and affective, of mental life.23 Also,
Bleuler was keen to stress that the alteration of associa-
45
tions had been identified by empirical observation, not
by theoretical speculation,19 and that it was accessible
to experimental testing.23 Two other phenomena that
Bleuler characterized as basic (but not primary) symptoms were ambivalence and autism. By ambivalence, he
understood the simultaneous presence of contradictory
ideas and emotions; autism described the phenomenon
of a patient’s getting lost in personal ideas, emotions,
and intentions without being able to adapt to the external reality, resulting in a reduction of communication.
Linking Bleuler’s implementation of psychoanalytic, or more generally psychodynamic, ideas, with his
distinction between primary and secondary symptoms
and thus to the interaction between brain/body and
mind, a further distinction has to be introduced, namely
that between form and content. Bleuler himself did not
systematically introduce nor use this distinction, but it
is implicit in his statement that what is psychologically
understandable is the content of schizophrenic symptoms,24 ie, why a specific hallucination or delusion occurs. As the following quotation makes clear, he thus
assumed a neurobiological disease process giving rise
to a primary symptom, the alteration of associations, to
which—understandably—the psyche reacts giving rise
to secondary symptoms, with individually meaningful
content:
It goes without saying that the disease process cannot give
rise to the complex psychological symptoms which we are
accustomed to consider first and foremost. This process
cannot account for the fact that it is a specific delusional
idea or a specific hallucination that occurs. The process
can only lead to certain fundamental disturbances of the
psyche on the basis of which, in conjunction with precipitating and determining factors, hallucinations and delusional ideas emerge.19 (p. 455, translation AM).
The characterization of schizophrenic symptoms as
bearing individually meaningful content is one of the
important novelties in Bleuler’s understanding of
schizophrenia. In the words of his son Manfred Bleuler:
One of Bleuler’s main aims in choosing and following his
career was to arrive at an understanding of schizophrenic
symptoms as expressions of an inner psychodynamic life.
[…] He studied the schizophrenic’s life essentially in the
same way as we study the inner life of neurotics, of healthy
men, and of ourselves.25
In his summary of the development of the schizophrenia concept at the Burghölzli hospital over the course
of nearly 70 years (1902-1971),26 Manfred Bleuler ex-
Clinical research
panded on this attitude and orientation so central to his
father’s work: he stressed that the view of schizophrenic
symptoms as secondary phenomena, ie, understandable intellectually and emotionally, also made them in
principle accessible to therapy. Such therapy consisted
of two pillars, firstly personal communication (today
analytically oriented psychotherapy) in order to help
patients by understanding their intentions and skills in
adapting to reality; and secondly multiple joint activities, such as work and leisure activities in groups of patients. During his time at the Rheinau Psychiatric Hospital, Eugen Bleuler devoted as much time as possible
to such personal contacts with his patients; later, during
his years at Burghölzli, he suffered severely from a lack
of time to do this.
Unlike Kraepelin, then, Bleuler saw no contradiction
between the assumption of an underlying neurobiological disease process and the assumption of psychological
understandability, but integrated both in his conception
of schizophrenia. The nosological divide between psychotic and neurotic disorders, commonly drawn along
the line of biologically determined versus psychologically understandable disease, is thus blurred. In the light
of his keen awareness of social factors in the course of
the disease and his efforts to address those therapeutically,27,28 Bleuler can thus be seen as an early proponent
of a bio-psychosocial understanding of mental illness.
Whilst the belief in a “specifically schizophrenic”
feature spurred Bleuler’s reconceptualization, he was
anxious to leave his concept open for scientific revision
and to accommodate the possibility that such a unifying
feature might indeed not exist. He therefore spoke cautiously of “the group of schizophrenias” and intended
his account to be a preliminary one.
Bleuler’s nosological changes were met with enthusiasm by some, with criticism by others, and the reception of his work varied between countries—ie, psychiatric cultures. Whilst in Switzerland, for example, the
concept of schizophrenia was quickly adopted, it was
criticized in Germany for carrying too much psychoanalytical baggage and for relying on the poorly defined
concept of association. In Britain, where Kraepelin’s
prognosis-based nosology had been criticized early
on for promoting therapeutic nihilism and unjustified “counsels of despair,”29 the reception of Bleuler’s
schizophrenia was impeded by its perceived close connection with Kraepelin’s dementia praecox. Once the
break with Kraepelinian nosology implicit in the new
46
concept was recognized, this latter aspect was especially
welcomed.30 Later the concept was developed further,
giving rise to derivative concepts, such as schizoidism.31-33 Later the concept was developed further, giving
rise to derivative concepts such as schizoidism, which,
whilst present in Bleuler’s work on schizophrenia from
the outset, was only explicitly introduced under that label by Kurt Binswanger (1887-1981) in 1920.31
Bleuler’s later work
Bleuler’s later writings on general psychology and philosophy received little attention from either his contemporaries or later workers. This may be due to the rather
speculative, and in parts obscure, nature of works like
Psychoids: Organizing Principle of Organic Development34 or “Mnemism and psychoids.”35 In these works,
Bleuler proposes a comprehensive “life science” in
which physical, mental, and social phenomena are not
seen as separate or even opposed, but as equal aspects
of a single integrative life principle.36 In the light of the
portrayal of Bleuler as a proponent of a bio-psychosocial understanding of mental illness given above, these
works might be interpreted as his attempt to theorize
the relation and interaction between brain/body, mind
and the social sphere.
Discussion and conclusion
When we examine Bleuler’s intellectual background
and the major theoretical debates in psychiatry around
the turn of the century, it is hard not to notice important
similarities with ongoing debates today.
Born of the rejection of Kraepelin’s principle of
prognosis, on which his dementia praecox was based,
the view of a variety of possible courses of schizophrenia, often summarized in a simplified manner as a rule
of thirds, belongs to the stock-in-trade of present-day
psychiatry.
Yet current debates about renaming schizophrenia
would seem to suggest that the Kraepelinian understanding still lingers amongst professionals and lay persons alike: one of the declared aims of renaming schizophrenia in Japan, for instance, was to replace the view
of an incurable condition by one associated with therapeutic optimism, in other words, to replace a Kraepelinian by a Bleulerian understanding. This, it was hoped,
would enable better access to psychiatric care and re-
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience - Vol 17 . No. 1 . 2015
Eugen Bleuler’s schizophrenia - Maatz et al
duce stigma.37,38 Why, one might ask, was the Bleulerian
understanding not taken up from the outset? We shall
return to this question later after first reconsidering
other features of Bleuler’s concept.
Stemming from the search for something “specifically schizophrenic,” Bleuler’s approach stands in the
tradition of essentialist views of mental illness, to which
it further contributes through the identification of the
alteration of associations as “schizophrenia’s clinical
core.”39 Whilst not explicitly addressing its phenomenological status, ie, the question of whether this core disturbance has itself phenomenal quality, Bleuler was adamant that it was not a theoretically inferred construct,
but a phenomenon open to empirical observation and
testing.19 He thus challenges the view recently put forward by Mishara and Schwartz,40 that only nonessentialist, phenomenological accounts of mental illness can
provide hypotheses that can be tested by experimental
neuroscience. With regard to the relationship between
neurobiological and psychological understandings
and approaches in psychiatry, it seems that whilst psychological theories and therapeutic approaches have
gained recognition in research and treatment, there is
currently a strong tendency to naturalize the mind, ie, to
hold the mind to be exhausted by nature as understood
by the natural sciences.41 Efforts to naturalize mental
illness come in many forms, and are observable not only
in psychiatry but in all the mind sciences, including psychology and philosophy (of mind).2,42,43 Despite these
efforts, the authors of the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM5)44 have not included biomarkers, regarding them as
still incapable of carving nature at its joints, ie, correctly
and reliably identifying natural disease entities. Moreover, the ontological and epistemological status of such
markers remains unclear.45
This leaves current psychiatry in a position very
much akin to Bleuler’s: whilst a neurobiological basis
of mental illness is generally taken for granted, it is not
considered to provide a sufficiently firm foundation for
a psychiatric nosology. Bleuler’s theoretical position regarding this question is not altogether clear. In the work
47
on schizophrenia he assumes a neurobiological process
underlying the disturbance, without in any way—etiologically, diagnostically, or therapeutically—reducing
the disturbance to the brain process. He was aware of
the variable familial occurrence of schizophrenia and
convinced of the role of genetic factors, but his work did
not focus on biological causes of schizophrenia but on
symptoms, their meanings and their personal and social
consequences.
This suggests that he embraced a kind of non-eliminative naturalism, whilst in his later work he seems to
have turned, or to have been in search of, some form of
mind-body identity theory. Although these theoretical
questions remain unresolved, Bleuler’s clinical position
was clear. In his patient-oriented attitude he displayed
an early understanding of mental illness as bio-psychosocially constituted, and thus needing to be therapeutically addressed on all three levels. Such understanding has proven clinically useful and therefore become
common sense in medicine generally, even though a
theoretically satisfying explanatory model for this biopsychosocial understanding is still lacking.46
To return to the question posed earlier, namely, why
was Bleuler’s construct of schizophrenia as accessible
to understanding and therapy not taken up from the
outset?
Might the sheer multidimensionality of his conception of schizophrenia, which remains hard to grasp
when compared with Kraepelin’s clear-cut dementia
praecox, have impeded acceptance? Or is it, that regardless of the theoretical conception, the phenomena observed in schizophrenia point to something so
utterly unfamiliar that despite all knowledge to the
contrary, a pessimistic prognosis is easily assumed? Or
again, has the difficulty in overcoming therapeutic nihilism and stigmatization less to do with the phenomenon itself and more with society’s general tendency
to search for and define the Other? These remain open
questions, but ones that need to be taken into account
when considering and reconsidering the nosological
status of schizophrenia and psychiatric nosology more
broadly. o
Clinical research
La esquizofrenia de Eugen Bleuler: una
perspectiva moderna
La schizophrénie d’Eugen Bleuler, une perspective
moderne
Con la introducción del término y concepto de esquizofrenia su inventor, el psiquiatra suizo Eugen Bleuler, obtuvo fama mundial. Como Bleuler rechazó el principio
fundamental de la nosología de Kraepelin, que se basaba en el pronóstico, su idea acerca de la unidad clínica de
lo que Kraepelin había descrito como demencia precoz
lo obligó a buscar otros rasgos característicos que permitieran una clasificación y descripción científicas. Esto
lo llevó a considerar factores psicológicos y en menor
medida factores sociales junto con suponer un proceso
patológico neurobiológico subyacente como constitutivo de lo que él entonces denominó esquizofrenia, lo
que hizo de él un precoz defensor de una comprensión
bio-psico-social de la enfermedad mental. Este artículo
entrega una visión crítica de los principios nosológicos
clave de Bleuler al revisar su concepto de esquizofrenia
junto con los antecedentes de todo su trabajo clínico y
teórico, y relaciona su trabajo con los debates actuales
acerca del naturalismo, el esencialismo y el estigma.
Grâce à l’introduction du terme et du concept de schizophrénie, son inventeur, le psychiatre suisse Eugen
Bleuler, est mondialement connu. Comme Bleuler rejetait l’idée principale de la nosologie Kraepelinienne, à
savoir le pronostic, sa foi en l’ensemble clinique de ce
que Kraepelin a décrit comme démence précoce l’obligea à rechercher des traits caractéristiques alternatifs
permettant une classification et une description scientifiques. Ceci le conduisit à prendre en compte les facteurs
psychologiques et dans une moindre mesure, sociaux,
à côté d’un processus pathologique neurobiologique
sous-jacent supposé comme constitutif de ce qu’il a ensuite appelé schizophrénie, faisant donc de lui un des
premiers défenseurs d’une compréhension bio-psychosociale de la maladie mentale. En examinant la conception de Bleuler sur la schizophrénie par rapport au fond
de son travail global clinique et théorique, cet article
présente un aperçu majeur des principes nosologiques
clés de Bleuler et associe son travail aux débats actuels
sur le naturalisme, l’essentialisme et la stigmatisation.
REFERENCES
15. Küchenhoff B. Die Auseinandersetzung Eugen Bleulers mit Sigmund
Freud. In: Hell D, Scharfetter C, Möller A, eds. Eugen Bleuler - Leben und
Werk. Bern, Switzerland; Göttingen, Germany: Huber; 2001:57-71.
16. Herbart JF. Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegründet auf Erfahrung,
Metaphysik und Mathematik. (2 Bände). Kaliningrad: Unzer; 1824/25.
17. Stransky E. Zur Auffassung gewisser Symptome der Dementia Praecox. Neurologisches Zentralblatt. 1904;23:1137-1143.
18. Stransky E. Zur Entwicklung und zum gegenwärtigen Stande der
Lehre von der Dementia Praecox (Schizophrenie). Z Gesamte Neurol Psychatr. 1912;8:616-643.
19. Bleuler E. Die Prognose der Dementia Praecox (Schizophreniegruppe).
Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie und psychisch-gerichtliche Medizin.
1908;31:436-480.
20. Kuhn R, Cahn CH. Eugen Bleuler’s concepts of psychopathology. Hist
Psychiatry. 2004;15:361–366.
21. Maatz A, Hoff P. The birth of schizophrenia or a very modern Bleuler:
a close reading of Eugen Bleuler’s ‘Die Prognose der Dementia praecox’
and a re-consideration of his contribution to psychiatry. Hist Psychiatry.
2014;25:431-440.
22. Bleuler E. Dementia praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien. In: von
Aschaffenburg G, ed. Handbuch der Psychiatrie. Leipzig, Germany; Vienna,
Austria: Deuticke; 1911:1–420; reprinted Nijmegen, the Netherlands:
Arts&Boeve; 2001.
23. Bleuler E. Upon the significance of association experiments. In: Jung
CG, ed. Studies in Word-Association. New York, NY: Moffat, Yard & Company; 1919:1-7.
24. Bleuler E, Jung CG. Komplexe und Krankheitsursachen bei Dementia praecox. Zentralblatt für Nervenheilkunde und Psychiatrie. 1908;31:220–227.
25. Bleuler M, Bleuler R. Books reconsidered. Dementia praecox oder die
Gruppe der Schizophrenien: Eugen Bleuler. Brit J Psychiatry. 1986;149:661-664.
26. Bleuler M. Beiträge zur Schizophrenielehre der Zürcher Psychiatrischen Universitätsklinik Burghölzli (1902-1971). Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft; 1979.
1. Stier M, Schoene-Seifert B, Rüther M, Muders S. The philosophy of
psychiatry and biologism. Front Psychol. 2014;5:1-3.
2. Stier M, Muders S, Rüther M, Schöne-Seifert B. BiologismusKontroversen - Ethische Implikationen für die Psychiatrie. Nervenarzt.
2013;10:1165-1174.
3. Lipowski ZJ. Psychiatry: mindless or brainless, both or neither? Can J
Psychiatry. 1989;34:249-254.
4. Engel GL. The need for a new medical model: a challenge for biomedicine. Science. 1977;196:129-136.
5. Scharfetter C. Eugen Bleuler’s schizophrenias – synthesis of various
concepts. Schweizer Arch Neurol Psychiatr. 2001;152:34-37.
6. Hoff P. Historical roots of the concept of mental illness. In: Salloum
IM, Mezzich JE, eds. Psychiatric Diagnosis - Challenges and Prospects. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell; 2009:3-14.
7. Hell D, Scharfetter C, Möller A, eds. Eugen Bleuler - Leben und Werk.
Bern, Switzerland; Göttingen, Germany: Huber; 2001.
8. Kraepelin E. Ziele und Wege der klinischen Psychiatrie. Allg Zschr Psychiatrie. 1897;53:840-848.
9. Kahlbaum K. Die Gruppierung der psychischen Krankheiten und die Einteilung der Seelenstörungen. Gdansk, Poland: Kafemann; 1863.
10. Kraepelin E. Psychiatrie. Ein Lehrbuch für Studierende und Ärzte. 1st ed.
Leipzig, Germany: Barth; 1883.
11. Berrios GE, Hauser R. The early development of Kraepelin’s ideas on
classification: a conceptual history. Psychol Med. 1988;18:813-821.
12. Freud S, Breuer J. Studien über Hysterie. Leipzig, Germany; Vienna, Austria: Franz Deuticke; 1895.
13. Jaspers K. Zur Kritik der Psychoanalyse. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer;
1950.
14. Schröter M, ed. Sigmund Freud – Eugen Bleuler “Ich bin zuversichtlich,
wir erobern bald die Psychiatrie” Briefwechsel 1904-1937. Basel, Switzerland:
Schwabe; 2012.
48
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience - Vol 17 . No. 1 . 2015
Eugen Bleuler’s schizophrenia - Maatz et al
27. Bleuler E. Die Behandlung der Geisteskranken im Privathause. In:
Fuenfzehnter Bericht des Zürcher Hülfsvereins für Geisteskranke über das Jahr
1890. Zürich, Switzerland: Ulrich und Co; 1891:13–31.
28. Bleuler E. Frühe Entlassungen. Psychiatrisch-Neurologische Wochenschrift. 1905;6:441–444.
29. Norman C. Dementia praecox. BMJ. 1904;2:972–976.
30. Anonymous. Dementia praecox. BMJ. 1904;1:258.
31. Binswanger K. Über schizoide Alkoholiker. Z Gesamte Neurol Psychiatr.
1920;60:127-128.
32. Bleuler E. Die Probleme der Schizoidie und der Syntonie. Z Gesamte
Neurol Psychiatr. 1922;78:373-399.
33. Bleuler E. Syntonie – Schizoidie – Schizophrenie. Journal für Psychologie
und Neurologie. 1929;38:47-57.
34. Bleuler E. Die Psychoide als Prinzip der organischen Entwicklung. Berlin,
Germany: Springer; 1925.
35. Bleuler E. Mnemismus, Psychoide. Schweiz Arch Neurol Psychiatr.
1934;33:177–191.
36. Möller A. Grundpositionen im Spätwerk. In: Hell D, Scharfetter C,
Möller A, eds. Eugen Bleuler - Leben und Werk. Bern, Switzerland; Göttingen, Germany: Huber; 2001:104-112.
37. Sartorius N, Chiu H, Heok KE, et al. Name change for schizophrenia.
Schizophr Bull. 2014;40:255–258.
38. Sato M. Renaming schizophrenia: a Japanese perspective. World Psychiatry. 2006;5:53–55.
39. Parnas J. A disappearing heritage: the clinical core of schizophrenia.
Schizophr Bull. 2011;37:1121–1130.
40. Mishara AL, Schwartz MA. Jaspers’s critique of essentialist theories
of schizophrenia and the phenomenological response. Psychopathology.
2013;46:309-319.
41. Papineau D. Naturalism. In: Zalta EN, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition). Available at: http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/. Accessed January 13, 2015.
42. Thornton T. Recent developments for naturalizing the mind. Curr
Opin Psychiatry. 2011;24:s502-506.
43. Zahavi D. Naturalized phenomenology. In: Gallagher S, Schmicking
D, eds. Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. New York, NY;
Heidelberg, Germany; London, UK: Springer; 2010:3-19.
44. American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders. 5th ed. Washington, DC: APA; 2013.
45. Carroll BJ. Biomarkers in DSM-5: lost in translation. Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 2013;47:676-681.
46. Ghaemi SN. The Rise and Fall of the Bio-Psycho-Social Model: Reconciling Art and Science in Psychology. Baltimore, MD: John-Hopkins University
Press; 2010.
49
View publication stats