International Political Sociology (2011) 5, 446–462 IPS FORUM CONTRIBUTION (ISSUE 4, VOL. 5) The International as an Everyday Practice Xavier Guillaume (Ed.) University of Geneva The concept of the everyday is an emerging concept in the field of international studies that has made faint but repeated appearances in the literature for the past ten years (essentially through the medium of ethnographic or autobiographic accounts) and has become a key component of critical International Political Economy. The idea of this forum is to offer a space for authors to engage with the concept of the everyday in order to provide different venues by which the international can be approached from the perspective of the everyday. The everyday is a concept that has seen a variety of theoretical engagements from very different authors or groups, including Michel De Certeau, Michel Foucault, the surrealists, Pierre Bourdieu, James Scott, the situationists, Henri Lefebvre, Erving Goffman, Michel Maffesoli, American pragmatists or Mikhail Bakhtin (for useful overviews and engagements with the literature see, for instance, Gardiner 2000; Highmore 2002; Hviid Jacobsen 2009; Moran 2005; Sheringham 2006). These authors have provided us with a variety of concepts or approaches to think about everyday life and practices as a central feature of relations among social, political or economic subjectivities as well as the relations between these subjectivities and general, even global, structures. Within the field of international studies, the everyday can be read as a text that illuminates central practices at the heart of the production of ‘‘international’’ representations, the reproduction of relations of domination—gendered, economic, social—at the international ‘‘level,’’ as well as the consumption of ‘‘international’’ goods, ideas and norms. The authors of this forum provide answer to the questions ‘‘why’’ and ‘‘how’’ the everyday is an important tool to understand the international as a practice and a process. Five different issues will be looked at: gender, gaming, counterinsurgency, world economy, and resistance. References Gardiner, Michael E. (2000) Critiques of Everyday Life. London: Routledge. Highmore, Ben. (2002) Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction. London: Routledge. Hviid Jacobsen, Michael, Ed. (2009) Encountering the Everyday. An Introduction to the Sociologies of the Unnoticed. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Moran, Joe. (2005) Reading the Everyday. London: Routledge. Sheringham, Michael. (2006) Everyday Life. Theories and Practices from Surrealism to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Guillaume, Xavier et al. (2011) Contributions to the Forum: The International as an Everyday Practice. International Political Sociology, doi:10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00145.x  2011 International Studies Association Cynthia Enloe 447 The Mundane Matters Cynthia Enloe Clark University By definition, the ‘‘everyday’’ appears inconsequential. How could paying attention to who makes breakfast add to our analytical powers? How could monitoring laundry take us deeper into causality? Surely, assigning weight to casual chats in the elevator or before meetings begin would be a waste of precious intellectual energy. The everyday is routine. It is what appears to be unexceptional. Devoid of decision making. Seemingly pre-political. For an embarrassingly long time, I didn’t pay attention to the everyday. I, of course, lived it. My relationships with others—parents, friends, colleagues, interviewees—depended on my everyday routines somehow meshing with theirs. But I didn’t think to spell them out when I engaged in formal analytical efforts. I presumed that my task was to reveal the workings of—and consequences of—power, and that those workings would manifest themselves by standing out from the mundane. If this were true in my attempts to understand ethnic politics in Malaysia (my initial research), it would be, I imagined, all the more true when I began to investigate the causes and consequences of international politics. I was wrong. It was feminist analysts who opened my eyes to how wrong I was and what exactly I was missing in the dynamics of international politics by naively imagining that the everyday was pre-political, analytically trivial, and causally weightless. The most famous late twentieth-century feminist theoretical pronouncement is, ‘‘The personal is political.’’ Its crafters were calling on women (and any men who had sufficient nerve) to look to the everyday dynamics in their lives to discover the causes of patriarchal social systems’ remarkable sustainability. This call would have profound implications, we gradually learned, for understanding the flows of causality, the constructions of political cultures and the inter-locked structures of relationships between those actors we so simplistically call ‘‘states.’’ The sites for research, these pioneering feminists argued, were not just states’ corridors of power, not just political parties’ or insurgencies’ strategy sessions, not just corporations’ board rooms. The sites where we would have to dig for political causality were kitchens, bedrooms, and secretarial pools; they were pubs, brothels, squash courts, and factory lunch rooms—and village wells and refugee camp latrines. This was an astounding revelation: that power was deeply at work where it was least apparent. It was also disturbing for many social scientists, especially those who had found alluring the challenge of revealing the ‘‘Big Picture’’ of the international system, who certainly had not been initially attracted to their professions by images of themselves taking notes in a brothel, a kitchen, or a latrine. In asserting that ‘‘the personal is political,’’ feminist analysts were claiming that the kinds of power that were created and wielded—and legitimized—in these seemingly ‘‘private’’ sites were causally connected to the forms of power created, wielded and legitimized in the national and inter-state public spheres —and, moreover, that state and economic elites each knew it, even if they rarely openly admitted it. That was why those with their hands on the levers of state, cultural, and economic institutional control were so preoccupied with designing and promoting marriage, prostitution, child care, and reproductive regimes that both would ensure that patriarchal domestic hierarchies continued to be of a sort that supported patriarchal public hierarchies and, simultaneously, would 448 The Mundane Matters perpetuate the useful myth that private and public spheres were structurally separate. State elites’ preoccupations? Oh, surely they were taxation, labor unrest, trade imbalances, national sovereignty, and militarized security! Look again, warned the feminists. Feminist analysts were not contending that state elites were unconcerned about these things. Rather, they argued, state elites believed that sovereignty couldn’t be guaranteed without state control over women’s sexuality: likewise, that state elites believed that inter-state militarized rivalries couldn’t be managed without most male citizens becoming invested in a certain mode of manliness. Novelists had realized this for more than a century, especially writers of ‘‘domestic’’ novels. These were not stories of grand adventure or elite machinations. Rather, they were stories of the hearth, parlor, and dining table. Any reader of Jane Austen’s or George Eliot’s astute novels learned that the maintenance of inter-class and gendered power in the nineteenth century relied on the day-in, day-out ‘‘below-the-radar’’ reinforcements of particular domesticated sentiments and expectations—and that they, in turn, formed the pillars of a distinctive sort of imperial state. But scholars of international politics haven’t been in the habit of recommending that their students read Mansfield Park or Middlemarch. At first, in my fledgling attempt to test the analytical usefulness of ‘‘the personal is political’’ in the exploration of international politics, I wasn’t sure where to look. Where was the mundane, the personal, the private, the domestic in the politics of militarized international politics, in the politics of globalized trade? Weren’t international politics as far from the domestic as one could get? And, to be honest, I was afraid that I would lose my tenuous hold on my credentials as a ‘‘serious’’ political scientist if I let it be known that I was becoming interested in what went on in the parlor. Nobody, furthermore, had ever encouraged me to think that taking the lives of ordinary women seriously or plunging into the daily workings of femininity would earn me professional respect. Then, of course, there was the problem that, as a mere political scientist, I had not been equipped to investigate the domestic sphere, much less intimate relationships, even if I could figure out where those sites were in international politics. In my conventional kit were tools to observe and make sense of policy processes, institutional structures, formal ideologies, public rivalries, and social mobilizations. Each of these tools seemed too blunt or out-of-scale for pursuing my new feminist-informed questions. But I had to begin somewhere, so I started thinking about two sites simultaneously, not sure what I’d uncover or whether anyone would recognize it as ‘‘political’’ or as ‘‘international.’’ The first was the assembly line of multinational corporate export factories. The second was the private households of male soldiers. Both of these ongoing investigations would have lasting effects on how I investigated the ideas, rituals, players, structures, and formal policies whose interactions made and remade international politics. I would have to find the intellectual stamina to follow much more extended chains of causality, from the micro to the macro, from the mundane to the dramatic. Perhaps more challenging, I would have to overcome the cultural assumption pervading most social sciences that whatever was tarred with the brush of femininity was intellectually trivial. While, initially, I explored the international politics of gendered export assembly lines and gendered military households separately, they eventually converged. National state officials and corporate managers were relying on masculinized militaries (and militarized police) to keep feminized garment, sneaker, and electronics assembly lines profitably rolling. It was feminist-informed labor organizers of women in multinational factories who showed me the way. Women organizing export factory women workers in Cynthia Enloe 449 Hong Kong, South Korea, the Philippines, and Mexico in the 1980s had discovered through trial and error that the orthodox, that is, masculinized, formulas for organizing male factory workers didn’t work for women. Concentrating on issues arising solely within the factory (for example, the speeding up of the assembly line) and on salary-focused demands derived from presumptions about paid work and workers’ lives that were out of sync with the everyday realities of women factory workers would be ineffective. That is, to be successful as a labor organizer, one had to start from—not treat dismissively, not treat as trivial, not treat as private—the mundane dynamics of most women’s wall-to-wall, dawnto-dark lives. That is, to take on the international alliances between local state elites and the executives of Nike or Motorola or Levis, activists would have to not only ‘‘think big’’; they would have to ‘‘think small.’’ And they would have to do both simultaneously. This intellectual strategy adopted by feminist activists would guide me to a new analytical approach to international political economy. Oddly (or perhaps, perversely) enough, Jesse Crane-Seeber has found that US counterinsurgency strategists have discovered that it is as hard to persuade American male combat soldiers to take seriously the messy complexities of Afghan civilians’ everyday lives as it has been for feminist labor activists to persuade conventional labor union organizers to take seriously the demanding, gendered lives of women factory workers (see Crane-Seeber in this Forum). A woman working in a sneaker factory in South Korea or an electronics factory in Hong Kong or a garment factory in Mexico did not enjoy the masculinized luxury of imagining herself first and foremost to be a paid employee of a particular export-oriented company. She usually had to keep clearly in mind that, if unmarried, she must meet her own, her parents’, and the state’s expectations of her as a ‘‘dutiful daughter,’’ a young woman who would prioritize her responsibilities to her parents back in a poor rural village. If unmarried, she simultaneously (and she, her parents, and male government officials all hoped this fit neatly with her daughterly goals) had to be daily aware of her need to act in ways that kept her femininized respectability in tact, that is, that kept her ‘‘marriageable.’’ If the woman factory worker were already married, then she had to be sure that she behaved in everyday ways that put her marriage first, that sustained her public reputation as a ‘‘good wife,’’ and that did not embarrass or anger her husband. The threat of a husband’s domestic violence against a wife displaying autonomy served not just the husband, but the foreign-investment dependent state and its multinational corporate sponsors. Remain stubbornly uninterested in the minutiae of domestic violence, and one stood little chance in making adequate sense of contemporary international political economy. Analyzing these everyday realities had strategic implications for feminist labor organizers of factory women. They could not unthinkingly call after-work meetings as male organizers usually did, certainly not evening meetings, since merely attending an after-hours gathering could jeopardize many women’s social standing as respectable young women or responsible wives. If such meetings became essential, then organizers and the women workers themselves would have to explicitly confront the definitions of ‘‘dutiful daughter’’ and ‘‘good wife.’’ Neither could be treated as mere side issues. Together, the women workers and feminist organizers also would have to politicize women’s everyday understandings of feminine respectability and women’s everyday experiences of domestic violence. Marriage, local cultural constructions of the ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ woman, and violence against women, not just decent wages and shop-floor hierarchies, had to become integral to women’s organizing strategies in multinational export factories. When they did, demands could be made in solidarity, strikes were more likely to succeed, wider community support for women workers could be mobilized. As Xavier Guillaume notes, acts of resistance may have global consequences, they may even be promoted by strategists who are involved in 450 Everyday Counterinsurgency global networks, yet in the eyes of the individuals doing the actual resisting, their resistance may feel intensely local, even intimate (see Guillaume in this forum). Listening to these feminist labor organizers and those women factory workers producing goods for overseas markets who joined their efforts led me outside the factory gates. I would have to follow these women workers home. I would have to take into account their relationships with their mothers and fathers, as well as their anxieties about their relationships with their husbands and boyfriends. If I were to make feminist sense—that is, more reliable sense—of the international politics of the trade in privatized goods and of states’ stake in that trade, I would have to start giving serious thought to the gendered politics of marriage, the constructions of femininities and masculinities, and the strategies women use to avoid violence. I couldn’t do any of this unless I devoted careful, sustained attention to women factory workers’ everyday lives, before dawn until long after dusk. If I shrank from this task, I would risk under-estimating the amount and kinds of power shaping international politics. It was, I newly realized, too big a risk to take. Everyday Counterinsurgency Jesse Crane-Seeber North Carolina State University What makes an occurrence or practice ‘‘everyday’’ is the extent to which it is unremarkable, taken-for-granted, or ostensibly natural (see the helpful elaboration by Enloe, in this forum). War operations seemingly lie far afield from everyday activities, unless the focal-point is the experience of combat participants themselves. For those on a 12-month deployment overseas or unlucky enough to live near a foreign combat outpost, foot patrols, convoys, detentions, and checkpoints are everyday occurrences. While International Relations scholarship typically treats combat as an exceptional state of affairs requiring explanation, the everyday activities of professional combatants (or militants in an occupied country) focus on preparing to purposefully kill other humans. Rendering the exceptional routine is the hard work required of combatants. Training regimes are designed to make this easier, with mock cities and war games as ‘‘rehearsals’’ for combat in Afghanistan or Iraq, all part of a determined effort to psychologically ‘‘prepare’’ warriors for killing (Grossman 1995:sections 1, 4; Rose 1999:15–52). From basic training onward, exercises automate responses to commands, while shooting drills make aiming and firing a weapon at a human-shaped target normal. In the repetition of these and other practices, a particular type of person is called for, and combatants must work upon themselves to ‘‘be all that they can be’’ (cf. Sasson-Levy 2007). Paying attention to meaning-making helps reveal the everyday practices that let combatants ‘‘normalize’’ contemporary war operations. As Garfinkel wrote, ‘‘society hides from its members its activities of organization and thus leads them to see its features as determinate and independent objects’’ (1967:182). Focusing analysis on those ‘‘activities of organization’’ helps reveal the hard work people do to render their experience of the world meaningful. I aim to show what can be learned when the meaning-making practices of combatants are the focal point Jesse Crane-Seeber 451 of research on conflict,1 thus highlighting the ways that the past is invoked to give the present meaning. The recent embrace of Counterinsurgency (COIN) discourse by political and military elites has redefined combat operations as development-enabling struggles for occupied people’s loyalties, and is officially propounded by the civilian officials and generals who led these operations under both Presidents Bush and Obama. COIN calls for the long-term routinization of overseas occupations under emancipatory and developmental ideological cover, integrating combat operations into a larger ‘‘intervention and relief’’ framework (cf. Duffield 2007). Because there are no self-evident ‘‘insurgents,’’ COIN operations aim to cultivate support for local allies and separate ‘‘good bad guys’’ from ‘‘bad bad guys.’’2 Commanders see interlinked economic, social, political, religious, and military processes as crucial to success, leading to a ‘‘spaghetti soup’’ of a campaign plan.3 It depends on ‘‘those at tactical levels—the so-called ‘‘strategic sergeants’’ and ‘‘strategic captains’’—who turn big ideas in counterinsurgency operations into reality on the ground’’ (Petraeus 2010:3). Blurring the distinction between everyday operations and strategic success, like the blurring of emergency relief and war operations that Duffield describes, transforms the relationship between mundane and exceptional events. Unlike exceptional moments of mass pitched battles (which armies train for almost exclusively), long-term occupation does not provide the blank check for action portrayed in war films and video games. Rather than storm a village, using artillery on all resistors, COIN calls for patient and cooperative expansions of governance and development. War thus becomes an enabling condition, a prerequisite for further interventions by emergency relief and development workers. Among frontline troops, this can feel as though the ‘‘real war’’ has moved on. One soldier serving in Iraq said that in Afghanistan ‘‘it’s not so much about the economics and governance,’’ and that advisory missions are ‘‘not what we’re trained to do [and] not really what we’re good at’’ (Gisick 2009). Similarly, a soldier deployed for disaster relief said ‘‘I joined the Army to shoot people. Nowhere in that contract did I say I wanted to come to Haiti and hand out humanitarian aid’’ (McCloskey 2010). Where COIN doctrine imagines a seamless transition between ‘‘clear, hold, and build’’ operations, combatants themselves may see relief work or restrictions on firepower as illegitimate interference. They prepare for armored combat, raiding homes, and close-quarters battles, yet find themselves training local militias, guarding roads, or delivering aid. Making sense of these duties requires the normalization and routinization of confusing and contradictory mission directives. This bundle of activity takes on meaning through comparisons, narratives, and analogies that put current operations into a better-known context, connecting methods to goals. David Petraeus, the former commander in Afghanistan and current CIA Director, had a personal hand in writing the FM 3-24 manual on COIN (United States 2006), which points toward ‘‘lessons learned’’ from US interventions in the Philippines, the Caribbean, Vietnam, and Central America, as well as French and British colonial wars. FM 3-24 cites these experiences, yet is silent on the moral crises domestic publics experienced when confronted with the torture, assassination, and widespread suffering that these colonial and Cold War occupations entailed (Bass 2008; Hunt 2010). Since COIN doctrine emerges explicitly from this history, it isn’t surprising that a recurrent theme in everyday meaning-making about COIN operations is 1 Good examples include Ethnographic, Psychological, and other approaches (cf. Kraska 1998; Wong, Kolditz, Millen, and Potter 2003; Sasson-Levy 2007; Hale 2008). 2 This phrase first circulated in Iraq (Ardolino 2009). 3 An elaborate flow-chart attempts to outline integrated civilian and COIN operations (cf. Engel 2009). 452 Everyday Counterinsurgency comparison to previous wars. Military personnel invoke symbols from the ‘‘wild west’’ while deployed in ‘‘Injun Country’’ (Kaplan 2005:3-15), all the while, Tomahawk missiles and Apache helicopter gunships fly overhead. In Afghanistan, Forward Operating Base Tombstone is decorated with wanted posters and an ‘‘OK Corral’’ sign over the parking area (Torchia 2010). When soldiers use this language, they make sense of their experiences in terms of the brutal and genocidal wars fought between the US Army and indigenous peoples west of the Mississippi (Cheyfitz 1993). This story invokes a conflict between ‘‘civilized’’ soldiers and unpredictable, erratic tribes, a trope common to many western militaries occupying non-western peoples (Ivie 2005). By highlighting similarities between past and present, the uniqueness of current wars drops away, leaving behind a seemingly inevitable state of affairs. Just as US forces come with taken-for-granted notions about what they’re doing, Afghanis have their own history-laden imagery. An anthropologist advising US forces noted ‘‘There is a word that is used to label all foreigners: ‘Agriaz.’ It simply means, ‘the English,’ but [the connotation] is xenophobic [because] Afghans remember British history in Afghanistan negatively’’ (Ardolino 2010). Not surprisingly, all those involved in ongoing conflict bring the already-existing narrative resources of their communities to bear when interpreting events. The meaning-making of NATO and Afghani combatants alike depends on their ability to see themselves as part of something worthy, to give the chaos and terror of combat a purpose. Focusing analysis on these meanings draws attention to patterns of historical memory, to the dispersion of official discourse, and to the reinterpretation of the past and present simultaneously in everyday life. References Ardolino, Bill. (2009) Down, Not Out. Longwarjournal.org, December 4. http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/12/bbgs_down_not_out.php. Ardolino, Bill. (2010) The Checkered History of Musa Qala. Longwarjournal.org, July 13. http:// www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/the_checkered_histor.php. Bass, Thomas A. (2008) Counterinsurgency and Torture. American Quarterly 60 (2): 233–240. Cheyfitz, Eric. (1993) Savage Law: The Plot Against American Indians in Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh and The Pioneers. In Cultures of United States Imperialism, edited by A. Kaplan, and D. E. Pease. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. Duffield, Mark R. (2007) Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. Cambridge: Polity. Engel, Richard. (2009) So What is the Actual Surge Strategy? NBC News December 2. http:// worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2009/12/02/4376696-so-what-is-the-actual-surge-strategy. Garfinkel, Harold. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Gisick, Michael. (2009) Some troops in Iraq look longingly to Afghanistan. Stars and Stripes, October 25. http://www.stripes.com/news/some-troops-in-iraq-look-longingly-to-afghanistan-1.95878. Grossman, Dave. (1995) On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown. Hale, Hannah C. (2008) The Development of British Military Masculinities through Symbolic Resources. Culture & Psychology 14 (3): 305–332. Hunt, David. (2010) Dirty Wars: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam and Today. Politics & Society 38 (1): 35–66. Ivie, Robert L. (2005) Savagery in Democracy’s Empire. Third World Quarterly 26 (1): 55–65. Kaplan, Robert D. (2005) Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground. New York: Random House. Kraska, Peter B. (1998) Enjoying Militarism: Political ⁄ Personal Dilemmas in Studying U.S. Police Paramilitary Units. In Ethnography at the Edge: Crime, Deviance, and Field Research, edited by J. Ferrell, and M. S. Hamm. Boston: Northeastern University Press. McCloskey, Megan. (2010) Trained for War, Troops Find a Different Mission in Haiti. Stars and Stripes, January 30. http://www.stripes.com/news/trained-for-war-troops-find-a-different-missionin-haiti-1.98494. Mark B. Salter 453 Petraeus, David H. (2010) COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, Headquarters: ISAF and US Forces Afghanistan, August, Kabul http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/COMISAF/ COMISAF_COIN_Guidance_01Aug10_.doc. Rose, Nikolas S. (1999) Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, 2nd ed. London, New York: Free Association Books. Sasson-Levy, Orna. (2007) Individual Bodies, Collective State Interests: The Case of Israeli Combat Soldiers. Men and Masculinities 10 (3): 296–321. Torchia, Christopher. (2010) Wild West Motif Lightens Mood at Afghan Base. Army Times, The Associated Press, February 8. FOB Tombstone, Afghanistan http://www.armytimes.com/news/ 2010/02/ap_wild_west_afghanistan_020810/. United States. (2006) Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf. Wong, Leonard, Col. Thomas A. Kolditz, Lt. Col. Raymond A. Millen, and Col. Terrence M. Potter. (2003) Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in War. U.S. Army, July. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB179.pdf. Gaming World Politics: Meaning of Play and World Structure Mark B. Salter University of Ottawa Critical IR theory engages with popular representations of global politics, particularly films, photography, and literature (Amoore 2007; Bleiker 2001; Danchev and Lisle 2009; Shapiro 2009). Gaming plays an increasingly large role in popular culture: the launch of video games, such as Halo, Call of Duty, or Gears of War, garner as much money and attention as blockbuster films. The Entertainment Software Rating Board presents the following picture of the industry: 67% of US households play video games—40% of whom are women, with sales in $10.5B in 2009 (ESRB 2011). Global sales of $40B make it equal to other entertainment industries, such as music ($30-40B) or movies ($27B). Consequently, we must take gaming to be as much a part of the imbrication of global politics into the everyday as movies, music, or literature. The taken-for-grantedness, the unremarkability of games that use tropes and figures of global politics functions to render unproblematic the common sense of international relations. Just because these games take place in the basement, the living room, or in the rec halls of Forward Operating Bases, and not the UN Security Council chambers, does not make them any less a vital part of the construction of IR. When IR theorists invoke the ‘‘rules of the game’’ or game theory as a frame for systematically separating agents from structures, and the conditions of possibility for politics, they are limiting the bounds of play—ascribing a set of primarily social conventions (rules) to an abstract structure of world politics (the game). Play and these ludological tropes are as vital to our political imagination as a self-styled ‘‘serious’’ reading of politics. We must look at gamic representations of the world and international relations—not as decision-making tools but as artifacts of popular culture (Grayson, Davies, and Philpott 2009; Höglund 2008). The language of games and gaming is rife within IR as a discipline, but because the conceit of politics is that it is serious there is a systematic focus on 454 Meaning of Play and World Structure fear, tragedy and solemnity rather than fun, comedy, and exuberant excess. In the popular—and by this I mean non-academic—imaginary, there are a lot of games that make and unmake the world. I am advancing a slightly different method than Der Derian (2003) or Klein (1989), who argue for an analysis of political discourse through intertextuality, and in particular the persistence of certain tropes or metaphors. Shapiro’s focus on the use of sports as an interpretive framework for understanding international discourse on conflict management is useful (1989); as is Der Derian’s articulation of military-industrial-media-entertainment complex that relies on Baudriallard’s notion of simulation and simulacra (2009). There is also work in ludology about the construction of war games themselves, which is very interesting but often lacks a sense of the political or engagement with IR as a field (Jahn-Sudmann and Stockmann 2008; Power 2007; Wark 2007). Between these two streams, there is a space to engage critically with games as instances of the everyday practice of world politics. I argue that pop cultural artifacts are part of those everyday practices that constitute the remaking of the world as a particular game, which in turn sets out clear, if always transgressable limits of action. What are the ‘‘rules of the game’’: ideas about contemporary politics are shaped within the playful representations of the world, and even academic genres are indebted to ludological narrative devices. Morgenthau describes Bismark: ‘‘however ruthless and immoral his particular moves on the chessboard of international politics may have been, [he] rarely deviated from the basic rules of the game which had prevailed in the society of Christian princes of the eighteenth century’’ (1948:176). Wendt echoes this trope: ‘‘the analysis of action invokes an at least implicit understanding of particular social relationships (or ‘rules of the game’) in which the action is set’’ (1987:338). In addition to the ludological trope, there is an awful lot of game-playing in international relations. Simulations are heralded as important pedagogical tools, and prisoner’s dilemma and other kinds of game theory are taken to be reasonable stand-ins for rational processes of decision making. Of course, there are explicit re-representations of the world and world politics in gamic universes: La conqueˆte du monde was created by French film director Lamorisse in 1957, and translated and popularized as Risk. The original English rules of the game for Risk offer some clues about how games might offer an insight into the popular imaginary of how the world works. Politics is reduced to war, and there is a separation between rules of the game and player strategies. Each territory must be occupied by an army; total defeat is the goal of each player; chance plays a key role in battles but the larger the army the better the chance; possession of entire continents yields more armies. The foreword to the rules insists that ‘‘no attempt has been made to teach strategy, as each player will develop his own as he becomes familiar with the game’’ (Parker Brothers 1959:1); however, by the end of the short instruction booklet, the authors suggest: ‘‘players should not spread themselves too thinly by exhausting all of their extra armies by making too many attacks…. Remember that this is a game of defense as well as offense and be prepared to protect the areas which you occupy’’ (1959:11). By 1963, a new suggestion is made: As the game progresses players will gradually build up power and strength, but one player will inevitably reach a point where he is slightly stronger than the other players. When this point is reached, the stronger player should attempt to occupy every space on the board on one turn and win the game. There is, of course, a certain chance involved, for if the player should fail by even a few territories he would be eliminated by one of his opponents very quickly. Such a play should be made with this in mind. (Parker Brothers 1963:11) Mark B. Salter 455 Between 1963 and 1975, the game stops being described as ‘‘unusual’’ in its instructions and simply becomes described as fascinating and strategic questions are directly addressed, because the idea of playing world domination has become familiar to the gaming audience (Parker Brothers 1975). By the 1993 rules, strategy hints have been reduced to three precepts: ‘‘(1) Conquer whole continents (2) Watch your enemies (3) Fortify borders adjacent to enemy territories for better defense if a neighbor decides to attack you’’ (Parker Brothers 1993:3). The fundamental rules of the game do not change, but the need for strategy does, and in particular, the strategic assumptions change. The core assumptions about the game that persist through over 50 years and five official issues of game rules: conflict, occupation, victory and indeed the game itself are all zero-sum. What this demonstrates is the degree to which ‘‘rules’’ about world politics, about how the game of Risk is to be played, have come to be part of the everyday. In terms of research design, examining the everyday, the dog that does not bark, is always a challenge; the changing rules of Risk over 40 years gives us a window into what needs to be explained and what is assumed as commonsense knowledge about the everyday international by the game designers. Risk is a game that explicitly relies on preexisting, everyday knowledge about world politics, and one could make similar analyses of Diplomacy, Civilization, and so on. Excellent work on video games is under-unexploited in IR theory (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2010; Huntemann and Payne 2010; Power 2007). The rules of these games that aim toward verisimilitude about the realm of the international can tell us what is assumed to be common-knowledge. Generating a persistent discursive field of some object called ‘‘international relations’’ requires constant work in the everyday: ‘‘there is too much, more than one can say’’ (Derrida 1978:289). Between the discourse of international relations, and the knot of ideas that separate the domestic from the international, the inside from the outside, there is not just the play of meaning (Walker 1993, 2010), but meaning of play. The everyday is a crucial part of the construction and reification of an ‘‘international,’’ and play is a crucial part of the everyday. Focusing on games allows us to trouble the common-sense division between serious politics and the trivial pursuits of the everyday. That is why the epistemological uncertainty that Derrida invokes is so important: ‘‘no longer from the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the empirical, but from the standpoint of play’’ (1978:289). We must understand the signification of international relations to be a play of meanings between the structure and the sign, but also the meaning of play as a way of instantiating the international structure and the sign of sovereignty. References Amoore, Louise. (2007) Vigilant Visualities: The Watchful Politics of the War on Terror. Security Dialogue 39 (2): 215–232. Bleiker, Roland. (2001) The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 30 (2): 509–533. Danchev, Alex, and Debbie Lisle. (2009) Introduction: Art, Politics, Purpose. Review of International Studies 35 (4): 775–779. Der Derian, James. (2003) War as Game. Brown Journal of World Affairs 10 (1): 37–50. Der Derian, James. (2009) Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Complex, 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Derrida, Jacques. (1978) Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. In Writing and Difference, translated by A. Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dyer-Witheford, Nick, and Greig de Peuter. (2010) Games of Empire: Global Capitalism and Video Games. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Entertainment Software Rating Board. (2011) Video Game Industry Statistics. Available at http:// www.esrb.org/about/video-game-industry-statistics.jsp (accessed January 11, 2011). 456 Everyday Politics and Generational Conflicts in the World Economy Grayson, Kyle, Matt Davies, and Simon Philpott. (2009) Pop Goes IR? Researching the Popular Culture-World Politics Continuum. Politics 29 (3): 155–163. Höglund, Johan. (2008) Electronic Empire: Orientalism Revisited in the Military Shooter. Game Studies 8 (1). Available at http://gamestudies.org/0801/articles/hoeglund (accessed September 15, 2010). Huntemann, Nina B., and Matthew T. Payne, Eds. (2010) Joystick Soldiers: The Politics of Play in Military Video Games. London: Routledge. Jahn-Sudmann, Andreas, and Ralf Stockmann, Eds. (2008) Computer Games a Sociocultural Phenomenon: Games without Frontiers, War without Tears. London: Ashgate. Klein, Bradley S. (1989) The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or Have you Read any Good Defense Manuals Lately? In International ⁄ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, edited by M. J. Shapiro, and James Der Derian. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948) Politics Among Nations. New York: Knopff. Parker Brothers. (1959) Risk! Parker Brothers Trade-mark for its Continental Game. Salem, MA: Parker Brothers. Available at http://www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/Risk1959.PDF (accessed November 25, 2010). Parker Brothers. (1963) Risk: Rules of Play for Parker Brothers’ Continental Game. Salem, MA: Parker Brothers. Available at: http://www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/Risk1963.PDF (accessed November 25, 2010). Parker Brothers. (1975) Risk. Salem, MA: Parker Brothers. Available at http://www.hasbro.com/ common/instruct/Risk1975.PDF (accessed November 25, 2010). Parker Brothers. (1993) Risk: The World Conquest Game. Salem, MA: Parker Brothers. Available at http://www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/risk.pdf (accessed November 25, 2010). Power, Marcus. (2007) Digitized Virtuosity: Video War Games and Post-9 ⁄ 11 Cyber-Deterrence. Security Dialogue 38 (2): 273–284. Shapiro, Michael J. (1989) Representing World Politics: The Sport ⁄ War Intertext. In International ⁄ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, edited by J. Der Derian, and M. J. Shapiro. New York: Lexington Books. Shapiro, Michael J. (2009) Cinematic Geopolitics. London: Routledge. Walker, R. B. J. (1993) Inside ⁄ Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walker, R. B. J. (2010) After the Globe, Before the World. London: Routledge. Wark, McKenzie. (2007) Gamer Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wendt, Alexander E. (1987) The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. International Organization 41 (3): 335–370. Everyday Politics and Generational Conflicts in the World Economy Leonard Seabrooke Copenhagen Business School and University of Warwick The world is getting old and so are we. Our societies are aging rapidly, presenting some new challenges to human interdependencies in both advanced and developing economies (Elias 1991). The challenges are mostly of the ‘‘everyday’’ variety, as I will clarify below, and can be seen as socio-economic, emotional-psychological, political, and conceptual. My aim here is to demonstrate why the emergence of intergenerational conflicts in the world economy is a topic worthy of attention to readers of International Political Sociology. The pitch is straightforward: scholars interested in international political sociology are concerned with changes in figurations of human interdependence. Intergenerational conflicts are fundamentally about changes to these figurations, with consequences for how we understand our societies, international relations, and ourselves. Leonard Seabrooke 457 I suggest that what is sometimes called ‘‘process’’ or ‘‘processual’’ sociology, which focuses on figurations of human interdependence and the processes behind their evolution, provides an important boost to scholars of International Relation and International Political Economy who wish to address issues of generational change (Elias 1991; cf. Abbott 2001). Such issues are not typically handled well in fields where actors’ interests are often regarded as self-explanatory from their status as an entity (states want power, firms want profit, etc.). We can talk about ‘‘intergenerational contracts’’ to understand changes between generations, but such pacts are abstractions of obligations offered by one generation to another. We can easily see the violation of such a ‘‘contract’’ by the ‘‘Baby Boomers’’ generation, who took advantage of the welfare state at its peak, with stable jobs, cheaper housing, free education, easy love, and fat pensions. While there is some truth here, such a depiction paints over issues of mobility, race, stratification, and class. Demographers inform us of some general changes on how households and families are evolving. Societies are getting older and people are living longer. There is increased disparity between ‘‘age-gapped’’ families, where there are longer lengths of time between generations, and ‘‘age-condensed’’ families, where grandparents, children, and grandchildren are born close together. Such differences correlate closely with race and class. But concepts such as class are not static categories because over time individuals and groups understand the concepts differently, including the extent to which their interests align or clash generationally. To be more specific, we should first consider some of the socio-economic challenges that are involved with intergenerational change. The most obvious matter is that in societies that have lowered welfare provision and have failed to address problems with low fertility, there will not be a sufficient supply of young taxpayers to pay for old retirees. These low fertility societies also happen to be the ones that are normally seen as having highly skilled, productive and efficient economies (such as South Korea, Japan, Germany, and Italy). In societies where the population has moved from commonly funded public pensions to individuated private pensions (Langley 2008), the potential for intergenerational conflict from heightened income inequality is great if those left behind feel cheated. The financialization of Anglophone economies has encouraged investment cultures that are generationally disruptive. Consider, for example, the financial stress experienced by first-time homeowners purchasing property in Australia at nearly six times their annual wage in 2005 compared with the 2.7 times in 1985. As demonstrated in many Anglo societies, there is no reason to believe that people who have benefited from a welfare state system will be willing to support it in their later years. This is not simply about taking the money and running. The policies that many associate with ‘‘neoliberalism’’ are part of a political drive to prioritize norms concerning individual-familial responsibility over norms of collective social responsibility. This then leads us to our second challenge, which we can understand as emotional-psychological. As Andrew Linklater (2004:4) has commented in reflecting on Norbert Elias’s contribution to International Relations, we can talk about a ‘‘civilizing process’’ where ‘‘emotional identification between the members of each society has increased.’’ This identification is not only spatial, be it domestic or international, but also generational. A challenge to many societies is a strong disjuncture between expectations and outcomes. Germany’s ‘‘internship generation’’ has delayed permanent employment and processes that often accompany it, such as family formation. Similarly, Japan’s ‘‘parasite singles’’—who rely excessively on their parents—have emerged during a period in which actual fertility is half that of what is consistently expected from women in their twenties and thirties (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2010). While these developments may be the wishes 458 Everyday Politics and Generational Conflicts in the World Economy of those concerned, disparities between expectations and outcomes are a source of intergenerational conflict. What can the ‘‘young’’ do? This leads to our political challenge. During the post-war period, formal politics in many Western societies has become more limited and interest specific, with a change from mass publics and ‘‘catch-all’’ politics to ‘‘cartel’’ politics; where parties agree on offering the same range of policies (Blyth and Katz 2005). During this process, involvement in formal politics became more specialized, with ‘‘expert citizens’’ emerging and with broad norms of political obligation, or at least obligation to the formal political process, weakening. These norms of obligation have been replaced by those of engagement on a more informal level. As Henrik Bang’s excellent work discusses, the younger are more likely to be ‘‘everyday makers’’ who engage on selected issues of concern in an informal manner (Bang 2005). And this is where we are most likely to see the emergence of intergenerational conflict that is linked to domestic and international communities—in everyday politics (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007). The process of everyday politics is in informal acts to defy authority, in contrast to ‘‘official politics.’’ A mid-way point where we see public expressions from Bang’s ‘‘everyday makers’’ is in ‘‘advocacy’’ politics (Kerkvliet 2009), where new attitudes and ideas are expressed in concerted political action, as with ‘‘social movements.’’ Intergenerational conflict exists mainly in the everyday and advocacy levels and can be seen across a range of international issues. To understand these levels, scholars in International Relations and International Political Economy need more sociologically informed analytic tools, since everyday politics in analyses of formal politics will be ‘‘off radar.’’ These tools are being developed by a range of scholars, including those who seek to understand habit-driven behavior (Hopf 2010), and how incremental socio-economic change occurs from axiorational behavior; the interaction between established norms and new ideas about how the economy should work (Seabrooke 2006). Areas such as housing, pensions, credit, and taxes are driven by this interplay that is strongly affected by intergenerational conflicts (Seabrooke, forthcoming). This leads to our last challenge, and the thorniest one: finding the appropriate conceptual and methodological tools to study intergenerational conflict. Traditional approaches tend to study generational change by cohort. To use an example from above, if we have an average age for a first-time homeowner, then the Australian cohort that bought in 1985 has been economically fortunate compared with that in 2005. But chronology is not sufficient for a sociological understanding on the variance in fortunes. We should also consider if the experience of financial hardship matters for these homeowners. Interweaving changes among cohorts, to generalize, with narratives of experience, to specify changes in attitudes and habits, is how we can best identify intergenerational conflicts. The key problem in thinking through these matters is defining what is considered to be the group of study (cohort ⁄ experience) and what their interests are. An analysis of how much individuals have been able to acquire from the welfare state is one way of doing so. But this approach doesn’t tell us about how intergenerational conflicts emerge from changes in habits and norms, from informal actions and from advocacy that is ‘‘off radar.’’ Understanding intergenerational change from the point of view of the individual operating in his or her life cycle, and seeking to fulfill a predetermined self-interest, tells us little about normative processes, or about how generations emerge to distinguish themselves from previous ones. Scholars interested in the everyday are necessarily concerned with human interdependence. Generational change is one crucial yet understudied aspect of everyday interdependencies. As our societies age and transform, understanding the social sources of changes to everyday policies, such as housing, credit, and Xavier Guillaume 459 taxation, is critical. These policies affect us all, including the accumulation and distribution of wealth and the potential for social and economic mobility. These policies are also embedded in norms that inform our domestic and international political-economic orders. Studying generational change is important for understanding the social sources of change and also provides a challenge, since it requires us to seriously look at how entities come into being as groups (Abbott 2001). There is a lot at stake. A progressive step is to place less stress on individual action and more emphasis on human interdependence, including how intergenerational conflicts will shape everyday politics. References Abbott, Andrew. (2001) Time Matters. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bang, Henrik P. (2005) Among Everyday Makers and Expert Citizens. In Remaking Governance, edited by Janet Newman. Bristol: Policy Press. Blyth, Mark, and Richard Katz. (2005) From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party. West European Politics 28 (1): 33–60. Elias, Norbert. (1991) The Sociology of Individuals. Oxford: Blackwell. Hobson, John M., and Leonard Seabrooke. Eds. (2007) Everyday Politics of the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hopf, Ted. (2010) The Logic of Habit in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 16 (4): 539–561. Kerkvliet, Benedict J. Tria. (2009) Everyday Politics in Peasant Societies (and Ours). Journal of Peasant Studies 36 (1): 227–243. Langley, Paul. (2008) The Everyday Life of Global Finance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linklater, Andrew. (2004) Norbert Elias, The ‘Civilizing Process’ and the Sociology of International Relations. International Politics 41 (1): 3–35. Seabrooke, Leonard. (2006) The Social Sources of Financial Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Seabrooke, L. (forthcoming). Time Horizons and Generational Change: The Everyday Politics of Interdependence. Unpublished manuscript, Copenhagen Business School. Seabrooke, Leonard, and Eleni Tsingou. (2010) Constructing the Low Fertility Trap: International Professional Knowledge on National Welfare Reproduction. Philadelphia: Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, June 24–26. Resistance and the International: The Challenge of the Everyday Xavier Guillaume University of Geneva The tryptic constituted by resistance, the everyday and the international does not readily fit the idealized images of the international: the realm of exceptional events conducted by states and statesmen, or their proxies (see Crane-Seeber in this forum). The international, as commonly conceptualized, was, and largely remains, not too distant from the ludic images conveyed by popular board games such as Risk or Diplomacy (see Salter in this forum). Yet, this tryptic has been at the center of a major shift in how some within the field of international studies have come to think about the international beyond reified delimitations such as inside ⁄ outside, low politics ⁄ high politics, unremarkable ⁄ remarkable, and the like. Yet, by looking at how the everyday works as a context of mobilization and as a 460 The Challenge of the Everyday locus of revendication and contestation in globalized domestic discursive or political economies (see Bleiker 2000; as well as Enloe and Seabrooke in this forum), scholars have put to the fore that the international should not solely be conceptualized and understood as an (artificially) delimited space, but as a processual phenomenon (Guillaume 2007). Whether the everyday or resistance, or their linkage, however, are not as straightforward as concepts as often the literature assumes them to be (Brown 1996; Amoore 2005; Hviid Jacobsen 2009). Resistance, for instance, does not necessarily refer to experiences and acts that are ‘‘progressive’’ or, in intent, transformative. The everyday, for its part, has been at the source of several social and sociological ‘‘myths’’ such as the ‘‘unity of the social, of [the everyday’s] inexhaustible vitality and [of] ineradicable capacities for resistance and renewal’’ (Crook 1998:537). In other words, in linking resistance to the everyday, the risk is to unreflectively and, in a sense, romantically embrace the quotidian individual outside the state apparatus by representing it, per se, as an inherent locus of resistance to global(ized) phenomena of domination and injustice. With this in mind, we can delineate a first set of distinct inflexions by which the international, resistance and the everyday have been approached in the field of international studies. This first set can be subsumed under the concept of global resistance. With global resistance, international studies have identified a locus outside the state apparatus whereby individuals and ⁄ or groups globally identify, mobilize or act around a cause, which is not necessarily global, that they see as representing forms of injustice, exploitation, and domination. The everydayness of global resistance is situated in a vibrant, and almost immanent, international public sphere where resistance is actively pursued by more or less organized individuals and groups. Global resistance thus at least implicitly refers to the idea of an emerging global civil society. The implication being that the international, as a space and as a process, now possesses a burgeoning constituency counter-acting forms of (neo-liberal) governmentalities and diluting the compartmentalized conception of the international based on a dichotomy between inside and outside, between what is familiar and home and what is strange and foreign. In the words of Roland Bleiker, dissent is in this case a transversal phenomenon as ‘‘political practice... not only transgresses national boundaries, but also questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conduct of international relations’’ (Bleiker 2000:2). These spatial logics also inform a second set of inflexions about global resistance, where resistance is not located globally but locally; resistance being the acts of usually anonymous heroes struggling against the effects of globalized political economies and hegemonic discourses (like neo-liberal governmentalities or international norms). Resistance is a quotidian act of mobilization and struggle of individuals facing the dystopic effects of a globalized world. Yet in this case, and contrary to the precedent understanding, resistance is not necessarily linked to any form of global civil society requiring global networks of mobilization. These two sets of inflexions retain, to a certain extent, a certain form of romanticism about the everyday by grounding global resistance in a fairly classical analysis of social movements (see for instance the contributions in Eschle and Maiguashca 2005). This romanticism, in the words of Kenneth M. Roberts (1997:138) analyzing the literature on social movements in Latin America, stems from an idealization of ‘‘new forms of popular subjectivity’’ that are assumed to aim ‘‘at a radically egalitarian and participatory sociopolitical order’’ thus restoring ‘‘faith in the progressive march of history.’’ Yet, studying quotidian resistance as part of the international does not limit itself to this form of analysis. This thus opens up a new set of inflexions referring to the now classical distinction Xavier Guillaume 461 established by James Scott (1985:292) between volitional and more incidental forms of resistance. The former, which he terms ‘‘real,’’ are ‘‘(i) organized, systematic, and cooperative, (ii) principled or selfless, (iii) have revolutionary consequences, and ⁄ or (iv) embody ideas or intentions that negate the basis of domination itself.’’ The more ‘‘incidental, or epiphenomenal activities’’ in contrast are ‘‘(i) unorganized, unsystematic, and individual, (ii) opportunistic and self-indulgent, (iii) have no revolutionary consequences, and ⁄ or (iv) imply, in their intention or meaning, an accommodation with the system of domination.’’ As Scott has masterfully shown in his work, quotidian resistance can rather refer to the almost daily mediation individuals have to face in their relations to diverse and diffuse forms of domination and hegemony without necessarily possessing the ability and ⁄ or will to actually fight against or transform the power relations they are enmeshed in. In other words, this new and third set of inflexions revolves around the distinction between practices of collective mobilization publicly striving for changes and those which pertain to ‘‘the familiar, taken-for-granted, common sense and trivial—in short, the unnoticed’’ (Hviid Jacobsen 2009:2). In terms of the link between resistance, the everyday and the international, the latter understanding of everyday resistance refers to what Michel de Certeau (1990[1980]) called tactics, the art de faire (art of doing) and the art de dire (art of saying) developed through time by social agents who can only deploy themselves, and their possible actions, in an environment that they cannot delimit or define ‘‘as their own.’’ Tactics, according to de Certeau, offer no gain, and do not transform, but only provide a fleeting moment of re-appropriation over an environment that is designed and that imposes signs to impress itself symbolically and ⁄ or physically on the people coming in contact with it. The form of this appropriation cannot be defined a priori; ‘‘the occasion continues to trump definitions, because it cannot be isolated from a conjuncture or an operation’’ (de Certeau 1990[1980]:60–61, 63, 124, 127).4 Instead of offering a reassuring and romanticized installment of the heroic individual in his quotidian struggle against overpowering structures and forces, the tryptic constituted by resistance, the everyday and the international, while running the risk to offer a rather dystopic vision of the quotidian, opens up nonetheless key questions for an international social and political theory of the everyday. To name but a few, from the more general to the more particular: What constitutes the quotidian or resistance when conceptualizing the international? How to consider agency in such constellation? What is the international political significance of everyday tactics, like humor at the airport, švejkism5 at the workplace (Fleming and Sewell 2002), or even silence (see Glenn 2004) in securitized sites? How to methodologically approach everyday tactics—like humor, švejkism, or silence—via ethnographic or discourse analysis methods within the field of international studies? References Amoore, Louise. (2005) Introduction: Global Resistance—Global Politics. In The Global Resistance Reader, edited by Louise Amoore. London: Routledge. 4 I have shown elsewhere with Jef Huysmans (manuscript) how everyday acts of citizenship constitute moments of unfinalizability that reinvest in securitized sites, such as the airport, a political space and temporality that is a priori taken away from such sites. While these tactics do not transform these sites per se, they participate in an analysis of the international as a political process by showing how it is not necessarily pertaining to the exceptional and the extraordinary. 5 Švejkism refers to a form of ‘‘‘disengagement,’ whereby the self is detached from the normative prescriptions of managerialism through irony and cynicism. However, disengagement of this kind is not capitulation; rather it is a re-engagement with another register of organizational life’’ (Fleming and Sewell 2002:860). 462 The Challenge of the Everyday Bleiker, Roland. (2000) Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, Michael F. (1996) On Resisting Resistance. American Anthropologist 98 (4): 729–749. de Certeau, Michel. (1990[1980]) L’Invention du quotidien. 1. Arts de faire. Paris: Gallimard. Crook, Stephen. (1998) Minotaurs and Other Monsters; ‘Everyday Life’ in Recent Social Theory. Sociology 32 (3): 523–540. Eschle, Catherine, and Bice Maiguashca. Eds. (2005) Critical Theories, International Relations and ‘the Anti-Globalisation Movement’. The Politics of Global Resistance. London: Routledge. Fleming, Peter, and Graham Sewell. (2002) Looking for the Good Soldier, Švejk: Alternative Modalities of Resistance in the Contemporary Workplace. Sociology 36 (4): 857–873. Glenn, Cheryl. (2004) Unspoken. A Rhetoric of Silence. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Guillaume, Xavier. (2007) Unveiling the ‘International’: Process, Identity and Alterity. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35 (3): 741–759. Guillaume, Xavier, and Jef Huysmans. Political Being in Securitized Sites: Everyday Acts of Citizenship (unpublished manuscript). Hviid Jacobsen, Michael. (2009) Introduction: The Everyday: An Introduction to an Introduction. In Encountering the Everyday. An Introduction to the Sociologies of the Unnoticed, edited by Michael Hviid Jacobsen. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Roberts, Kenneth M. (1997) Beyond Romanticism: Social Movements and the Study of Political Change in Latin America. Latin American Research Review 32 (2): 137–151. Scott, James C. (1985) Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.