Social Dialogue in the Context of Informal Workers’ Survival in Indonesian Industrial Relations A Report for FNV Mondiaal, 2018 Hizkia Yosias Polimpung Contents Executive Summary ..........................................................................................................................................................................2 1. Background ......................................................................................................................................................................................3 1.1. Socio-Political Context of IWs ................................................................................................................................4 1.2. Legal framework ...........................................................................................................................................................6 1.3. Profile of Informal Workers ....................................................................................................................................8 1.4. SERBUK...........................................................................................................................................................................11 2. Social Dialogue Processes......................................................................................................................................................14 2.1. SBKI ..................................................................................................................................................................................14 2.1.1. Negotiation and Strategy.......................................................................................................................16 2.1.2. Outcomes and Way Forward...............................................................................................................18 2.2. SPLAS ...............................................................................................................................................................................19 2.2.1. Negotiation and Strategy.......................................................................................................................20 2.2.2. Outcomes and Way Forward...............................................................................................................21 3. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................................................................23 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................................................................26 Official Documents .........................................................................................................................................................................27 Annex ....................................................................................................................................................................................................28 List of interviews & FGDs...............................................................................................................................................28 1 Executive Summary Indonesian informal workers (IWs) face an uncertain condition in their everyday life as workers precisely because of the prevailing legal system. The existing regulation fails to recognise the unique character of IWs who, in reality, are forced to be involved in non-contractual work relations. In order to seal the job relations, what the most IWs get is nothing more than just handshakes. This character of work relations has denied them access to the legal system that recognises only those whose work relations are sealed formally with a legally-binding contract. The IWs endeavour to find a way around the legal system has brought them to experiment with non-conventional, and often violent negotiation strategy with their employers. This setting and the resulting strategy IWs came up with, shed light on the existing reality and the possible future of Social Dialogue (SD) in the context of informal economy. The informal sector plays a crucial role in Indonesian economy. It is the sector who absorbs the majority of workers in comparison to other sectors. In terms of contribution to GDP, the informal sector is among the top four sectors. But there are also a significant amount of informal workers in the formal sector. This report will zoom in on informal workers within the formal construction and electricity sector because it is in these two sectors that the report found two examples of effective unionisation strategy. The examples are regarding the Serikat Buruh Konstruksi Indonesia (SBKI; Indonesian Construction Workers Union) in Yogyakarta and Serikat Pekerja Listrik Area Solo (SPLAS; Electricity Workers Union in Solo Area). Both unions are working closely, and have benefited a lot from the aid of Federasi Serikat Buruh Kerakyatan (SERBUK). The way the three unions experience informality and navigate through uncertain work relations are instructive for future efforts of to improve work relations and SD process in informal settings, be it in Indonesia or elsewhere. Taking heed of the lessons learned from the experience of SBKI, SPLAS and SERBUK, the enabling condition for a prospective and fair SD comes from the union itself, and not from the wisdom of the government or from the charity of the employer. Only a solid union with fair number of members can force the employers to sit in the bargaining table. The failing legal system results in failing mainstream SD mechanism that pushes the workers to creatively improvise the mainstream advocacy strategy. In the context of IWs, the usual maxims of SD turn into something else completely alien to the standard courtesy of modernist dialogue dear to big unions, the government and the NGOs: the old peaceful depiction of collective bargaining mutates into a collective intimidation of workers against the employers; the multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanism becomes a tactic of workers to attack their adversary by using someone else’s hand—a strategy SERBUK’s Secretary General calls ‘carambola strategy’; the pretext of good will among the SD partners uncovers its true face as an irreconcilable antagonism of workers interest of decent work and higher pay versus the employers interest of even more work and lower pay. The findings of the report should serve as a wake-up call that another more realistic approach to implement SD must be devised in order to fully recognise IWs situation and interest. 2 1. Background To utilize one useful analogy, the informal workers (IWs) in Indonesia have yet to be granted their full “industrial citizenship.”1 In fact, one will find no difficulty to establish sufficient reasons to say that they are somehow more akin to denizens in Indonesian industrial relations (IR).2 Indeed, there are laws in place, but nonetheless they do not function the way they should—that is to protect the workers, to make the state “present” for workers, or at least just to effectuate legal certainty in IR settings. In effect, IWs become unrecognized by the legal justice system, while on the other hand, the business and industrial world can go unchecked whenever they mistreat IWs. The Social Dialogue (SD) framework—dear to the ILO—then is believed to be the way to “emancipate” these industrial denizens to embark on collective bargaining, to have themselves represented by trade unions (TUs), etc. Unfortunately, the picture is not so bright for IWs as these mechanisms presuppose the industrial citizenship status of the IWs without which there will barely be a harmonious dialogue as depicted by the concept of SD. Seen from the legal-institutional, state-centric and NGO-advocacy perspective, the industrial future of IWs are reasonably bleak. However, as the writer of this report has experienced during the process of research, seeing the matter from the IWs’ perspective is arguably far more useful—for factual understanding, for policy recommendation and most importantly for the attainment of workers’ interest themselves. Aware of the fact that their status as workers is not fully represented by the law, by the justice system, and sometimes by their fellow workers representatives (i.e. TUs) who happen to be unfamiliar with IWs status in IR, the IWs have been having to “creatively improvise” their everyday strategy of survival beyond the clout of the state’s law. This creative improvisations in themselves might shed a brighter light to the real IR system and dynamics in the context of IWs, to the nature of IWs’ organisation and unionisation, and finally to the very concept of the SD itself. The report presents findings of the many ways in which IWs in Indonesia are navigating through the failing justice system to secure their mediocre living in the insecure work relations they must face every day. It particularly it focuses on how their unionisation strategy (that is, collectively forming a union) can in no way be separated from their social dialogue strategies—along with their creative improvisations. Two figures of Indonesian IWs worth looking at are those working in the sector of construction and electricity. The construction sector is an important area to find a case study for Indonesian IWs due to its character as on the one hand being one of the key achievements for the ruling president (that is infrastructure), and on the other hand as having one of the largest percentages of workers who are not certified. Since certification appears almost to be the only way to a formal work relation, so 94% of uncertified Indonesian construction workers must survive in a precarious industrial relation. Outsourced electricity workers promise another telling case study. The case of electricity IWs present a case of how the theme of IWs can become a political commodity. After being disappointed by the fact that the previous administration failed to deliver the promise of granting them permanent contracts, the electricity IWs must work their way around to find another source of work security, other than from the government empty promise. 1 David Jordhus-Lier, “Claiming Industrial Citizenship: The Struggle for Domestic Worker Rights in Indonesia,” Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift 71, no. 4 (2017): 243–52. 2 Guy Standing, The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury Academic, 2011). 3 Particular attention is given to the role of the Federasi Serikat Buruh Kerakyatan (SERBUK) in facilitating and escorting the unionisation process of IWs in the two sectors. However crucial and significant the role of SERBUK has been, the reader must not fail to take heed of the organic processes through which the IWs collectively form and further solidify their consciousness of the need to organise even before they were first acquainted with SERBUK. Failing to seriously attend to these organic processes might stray our perceptiveness away from the antagonistic reality of Social Dialogue in the context of informal labour economy. The report structures the discussion as follows: it will first start with the wider context of the labour movement, trade-unionism and the way the discussion of IWs fit in. It also discusses the background of SERBUK as one of the very few trade unions (TU) that give serious attention to IWs; two Member Trade Unions (MTUs)3 whose birth were facilitated by SERBUK are also introduced in this section. The second section describes some of the notable cases acquired from the fieldwork in and with Serikat Buruh Konstruksi Indonesia (SBKI; Indonesian Construction Workers Union) in Yogyakarta and Serikat Pekerja Listrik Area Solo (SPLAS; Electricity Workers Union in Solo Area) to illustrate the way SD dynamics have been actually taking place. It analyses the composition of each’s bargaining powers that make up their respective position and strategy in the processes and also expounds their respective position in the industry and work relations that shape their perceptions and expectations. The last section concludes the report by extrapolating several implications pertaining to the enabling condition of SD, the disabling condition of SD, but also furthermore to the conception of SD itself. Some lessons learned are written down to guide further practical reiteration of the information contained in the report. 1.1. Socio-Political Context of IWs The government of Indonesia is relatively quiet about IWs. One will scarcely, if not at all, hear highlevel governmental officers say things about IWs. Rarely one finds government’s take on the issue of IWs or their livelihood. The majority of discussion about industrial relations in the mainstream media always concern the formal labour. That is not yet to mention that as interlocutors the government is in dialogue with mostly leaders of big unions or confederations. The minister of manpower has once talked about the IWs in the context of ILO’s recommendation of transitioning the informal sector to the formal sector and to improve the IWs working conditions and protection. The minister said that the recommendation will be carried out by the LKS Tripartit Nasional (National Tripartite Cooperation Body)—i.e. the nation’s high-level SD mechanism.4 However, in the 2018 working agenda of LKS Tripartit Nasional, the IWs could not find one room in its 9 points agenda. From the author of this report’s own personal experience with the ministry of labour, government’s perception toward informality is rather enthusiastic and even endorsing it.5 However, one serious note to take is that when talking about the informality of work, what the government has in mind is the informality of gig-style of work dear to high-skilled workers in the creative sectors and of typical start-up entrepreneurs who do not like to settle with formalised relations that they find to be demanding and 3 SERBUK uses the term ‘Serikat Buruh Anggota’ (SBA) rather than the usual expression of ‘Pimpinan Unit Kerja’ (PUK), ‘Working Unit Leadership’. 4 “Transisi Pekerja Informal ke Formal Dilakukan Bertahap,” Berita Satu, June 10, 2015, https://www.beritasatu.com/ekonomi/281498/transisi-pekerja-informal-ke-formal-dilakukan-bertahap. 5 In 2019, I was appointed as one of the reviewers of the grand design and academic draft of the revision of the existing Labour Law (UU 13/2003). 4 curbing their freedom.6 The government is trying hard to mainstream this kind of working “culture,” following the relatively global trend of industry 4.0 that spawns new kind of high-skilled, digitalsavvy works that it deems to be able to boost Indonesian economy.7 Hence, the enthusiasm. the type of IWs that this report is about is largely omitted from the government discourse. However, in stark contrast with the abovementioned omission, the Informal workers (IWs) are a crucial component, sustaining the Indonesian economy in general. In terms of the absorption of the workforce, according to the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics’ (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) estimate, the amount of IWs in Indonesia have been dominating the employment world since at least the last five years. In 2012, it was 37,3%. In 2018, the percentage reaches 56,84%—that is as many as 70,5 million people. This includes five types of workers defined by the BPS: those who are selfemployed/entrepreneurs (helped by non-permanent/unpaid labour), those who work freely (i.e. without contract) in the farm, those who work freely in non-farm, and who work in a family, or simply unpaid workers. With regard to gender variability, while the latest data has not been issued yet, from the 2017 edition of BPS report one can find the number of women in informal sector comprises 42,48 percent from the total of 124,54 million workers. IWs have also potentially been the backbone of the Indonesian industry. One of the most controversial figures of IWs in Indonesia are the outsourced workers, especially those who are working in the manufacturing sector. This industry sector contributes the largest cake of the GDP (21,8% in 2018), and 48,6 percent of the workers in the one of the most vital centres of Indonesia’s industrial zone—Bekasi—consist of outsourced workers.8 Indeed, the industry sector also includes the oil and gas sector which has other dynamics.9 However, again as the BPS’ statistics testifies, even though if one subtracts the oil & gas sector contribution of 4,87% from the number, the GDP contribution of non-oil and gas (i.e., manufacturing) sector are still at the top of the rank at 17,63%. This number still leaves the trade sector at 13,02% quite far behind.10 Another group of IWs that is also much discussed today are the construction workers. Even though not as contributive to GDP as the manufacturing workers, the construction sector contributes 10,53% of Indonesia’s GDP, itself being among the top four. The Ministry of Public Works and Housing estimates the number of IWs in the construction sector are as much as 8,14 million people. That is more than 10% of the total number of IWs in Indonesia (the rest of them are precariously scattered in the multitude of SMEs).11 The ministry’s concern, however, is on the fact that only 5,96% of them that have been certified. The lack of certification is arguably one of the factors that put IW in their disadvantaged position thereby pushing them even further to the margin of the flexible labour market regime. As also recognised by the minister, certification is not only a proof of working skills, Recently, this attitude can be related to the latest World Bank report endorsing the flexibility to recruit and to fire workers for the sake of good business climate needed for national growth. See World Bank, World Development Report 2019, p. 17. 7 Ministry of Industry, Making Indonesia 4.0, 2018. 8 Alih Aji Nugroho, “Relasi Industrial Pada Pasar Tenaga Kerja Fleksibel Dan Perjuangan Buruh Menuntut Upah Layak Serta Jaminan Kerja Di Kawasan Industri Bekasi” (Gadjah Mada University, 2016). 9 Especially in the context of wage, the outsourced workers in the oil & gas industry are usually paid super well. This is due to their expertise and special skill. 10 Badan Pusat Statistik, Indikator Pasar Kerja Indonesia Februari 2017, p. 52. 11 "Kementerian PUPR sertifikasi 12.000 tenaga kerja konstruksi," Kontan, Oct 28, 2018, https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/kementerian-pupr-sertifikasi-12000-tenaga-kerja-konstruksi. 6 5 it also is the only way for IWs to escape the informality of work relation with no contract. Without contract, the IWs’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the employers will be severely limited. Having said that, one can safely conclude that most of Indonesian IWs are uncertified and dwell in the informal zone of industrial relations world. This also holds true for the IWs working for outsourced electricity works for the PLN. The lack of certification—and not the lack of skill and competence—has been hindering them from accessing better amount of salary and a more agreeable working facility. Another context worth noting with regard to electricity workers is the fact that most of these workers are in the mental state of demoralisation. This is due to the political turn of the event after 2014 that did not favour them. In 2013, these outsourced electricity workers are given promise of a permanent contract. The media blew that up, one of which provocatively saying “Is it true that 16.000 PLN’s outsourced workers are going to be granted permanent contract?”12 Unfortunately, the decision was political in nature and therefore was tied to the personality of the minister (Min. of State-Owned Enterprises). When the president changed in 2014, all the ministers left their post, so was the promise of permanency. The issue has since been swept away by national issues such as election, infrastructure, global politics, etc., and the workers had to start over again. Not many of them could. Some remained, some went away. 1.2. Legal framework The informality of the IWs is seen from their industrial status. Indonesian Labour Law (no. 13/2013) recognizes only two types of work status: PKWT (Perjanjian Kerja Waktu Tertentu, or Employment Agreement for a Specific Period) and PKWTT (Perjanjian Kerja Waktu Tidak Tertentu, or Employment Agreement for an Indefinite Period). PKWTT workers are guaranteed for compensation if they are dismissed by the employers; their compensation is calculated based on the length of working duration. On the other side, PKWT workers are excluded from this compensation, thus are more susceptible to dismissal. In many cases, PKWT workers are excluded from bonus, uniform, and personal protective and safety equipment. In other sections of the law, outsourcing is recognised as one possible work relations with a bold note that the only work posts that can be outsourced are those that are not considered core works. However, it does not specify further its relations to either the PKWT or PKWTT. Consequently, a heated debate emerges as to deciding whether outsourcing contracts are PKWT or PKWTT. Furthermore, when it comes to IWs, we need to take into account the quite unique nature of industrial relations. While almost all outsourced workers are PKWT, not all of IWs are outsourced workers. In fact, most IWs fall outside these categories of PKWTT and PKWT for their lack of contract. In other words, with regard to the construction workers and outsourced electricity workers covered in this report, the two type of IWs face rather different situation. If the outsourced electricity workers are close to having a PKWT contract, the majority of construction workers are still far away from acquiring any of these contracts. The major difference is in the usual practice that while the construction workers are tied (however weak) with the foremen personally, the outsourced workers 12 “Benarkah 16.000 Outsourcing PLN Diangkat Jadi Pegawai Tetap?” Detik Finance, Nov 28, 2013, https://finance.detik.com/berita-ekonomi-bisnis/d-2426679/benarkah-16000-outsourcing-pln-diangkat-jadi-pegawaitetap. 6 are tied to the labour-broker institutionally. By the rule of thumb, it should be easier to put pressure on an institution in public than it is to a person. However, in the electricity sector, even though the outsourced workers do core works, they could not be able to acquire permanent contract, even after today when the law has reached 15 years of age. While the protest and debate are inconclusive, the IWs must struggle in their day-to-day work relations as a consequence of this indecisiveness. With regard to Trade Unions (TUs), the Law 13/2003 (article 104 jo. Article 5, Law 21/2000) has specified the prerequisites to form a union. The TUs are also recognised here as the platform for workers to advance and champion their interest to secure and fulfill their rights. A group of at least ten workers can together form a union so long as they write their constitution and send that to the Regional Labour Office (Disnaker) for TU registration. In the context of IWs, the Law 21/2000 has actually recognised the possibility of forming a non-factory/company-based union (SPLP, Serikat Pekerja di Luar Perusahaan). This means, any IWs as little as ten people could register their union as SPLP. However, due to the lack of knowledge, most IWs are not aware of this possibility. The laws have actually accommodated the idea of social dialogue (SD). The law admits that in order for good industrial relations to exist, there must be a harmonious relation between workers and employers. Good industrial relations are believed to have a positive impact to the growth of the company. That is why the idea of LKS Bipartit (Lembaga Kerja Sama Bipartit, or Bipartite Cooperation Body) and LKS Tripartit (Lembaga Kerja Sama Tripartit, or Tripartite Cooperation Body) are endorsed and regulated in the law. An enterprise employing as many as 50 people must form an LKS Bipartit. So is for LKS Tripartit, a big enterprise is compulsory to form one.13 Be that as it may, the existence of law is one thing, its enforcement is completely another story: Indonesia has around 65.000 mid-cap and big-cap companies, but only 16.000s that have had LKS Bipartit.14 When it comes to industrial relations dispute settlement, Law 13/2003 has regulated the mechanism. The parties in dispute are given time to settle the case through a bipartite process. If the mechanism still does not yield a win-win solution, then one or all of the parties could involve a mediator from Disnaker. The Disnaker will conclude the mediation with a recommendation concerning the case in dispute. However, the recommendation is not legally binding. The dissatisfied party could then file for trial in the Industrial Relations Court (PHI, Pengadilan Hubungan Industrial). Again, if still there is one party that could not accept the verdict, the last chance is through the Supreme Court (MA, Mahkamah Agung). However, then again, as the research finds, the reality is not as smooth as imagined by the law. For example, one SERBUK organiser noticed that often times the Disnaker’s recommendation is 1800 in converse to the verdict in the court. He suspects that usually the recommendation favours the labour. However, the seemingly pro-labour recommendation is allegedly done to simply make the persistent labour/TU to stop their storming the office, and hurriedly hand over the case to the court. This is, among many others, what contributes to SERBUK being apathetic with using the legal system to 13 In general, a big company has capitalisation of asset above Rp 10 Billion (around € 625.000), while the middle capitalisation ones have between RP 500 Million to Rp 10 Billion. 14 “Pakar Hukum Ketenagakerjaan Ini Ingatkan Pentingnya Dialog Sosial,” Hukum Online, Nov 27, 2018. https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5bfd146f9cf57/pakar-hukum-ketenagakerjaan-ini-ingatkanURL: pentingnya-dialog-sosial. 7 champion workers interest. Instead, they are trying to avoid the legal process while maximising the non-legal and informal processes outside the courtroom. Another option for workers who meet a deadlock of dispute settlement with their employers are to hold strike. The right to strike is enshrined in the Labour Law 13/2003, article 139 and 140. The law recognises strikes as the basic right of workers. Accordingly, it regulates the lawful way of striking: the strike must be because of deadlock of negotiation, and the labour or TUs planning to hold a strike must inform their employer at least seven days before the D-day. The law even pre-emptively warns against the employers who try to threat or to replace the labour going on strike. However, if the labour/TUs go on strike fail to meet the criteria, then by law they can be considered as absent. A strike can be done by slowing down the working process, or to stop working at all. For the IWs in this report, strike is one of the most effective methods to advocate their interests against the employers. 1.3. Profile of Informal Workers Informal outsourced electricity workers and construction workers are two groups that the present report discusses. Actually, the labour outsourcing system has been in practice for quite long time. However, it was only after the Labour Law (UU 13/2003) that the term ‘outsourcing’ was widely recognised and used in conversations. To outsource a labour is to use the help of labours outside one’s own company to do set of tasks on a limited period of time. The law maintained that the core works cannot be outsourced; only supporting works that can be. The outsourced labours are actually having work relations not with the company they are working or being outsourced for even though their orders are coming from it. Instead, its work relation is with the labour-broker/outsourcing company who distribute them. In the context of outsourced electricity workers, the outsourced labour is hired through outsourcing company (or “vendor” as it is usually called). The PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara, State’s Electricity Company) is nationally divided into area. An area is again divided by chapters. The area of Solo, for example, are divided into 11 chapters. One outsourcing company can supply for more than one chapter. Two type of labour in the sector that are hired the most from outsourcing supplier are the job of technical services (“yantek”) and meter reading (“baca meter”). Unlike the outsourced electricity workers, IWs in construction setting are involved in a different work relation that is not mediated by labour-broker. Instead, they are recruited by the foremen. The foremen him/herself is hired by the employer in the first place. The relations between the labours and the foremen are usually based on social proximity. Sometimes, one foreman could contact other foremen when they need more workers to work in his/her site than he/she could him/herself gather. A labour does not have direct connection to the employer; only through the foremen that the labour could talk to his/her employer. In fact, the workers’ money is paid via the foremen. In general, there are several job positions in the construction works: the lowest in term of pay is a helper (“laden”), and then the worker, foreman, and contractor. Most construction workers started their “career” as helpers, just as almost all foremen were former workers. The next stage is the contractor who manages and executes a construction project by employing foremen and, through the foremen, workers. This kind of relations are the most dominant form in the sector, although for some big construction companies, they usually use outsourcing company that supply outsourced construction workers. However, the latter are minority in number compare to the construction workers in general and that most of them are certified. 8 One thing to note with regard to the labour-brokers’ and foremen’s existence in the context of IWs work relations is that actually, according to the labour law, all work contracts do not involve the role of foremen and or labour-broker. The law is clear: the relations are between a job giver and a job taker; there is no foremen or labour vendor involved in the report. If the history of outsourced system was started in 2013 when the Labour Law issued, there has been no study on the birth of the foremen “system” in construction sector. Be that as it may, the labour conditions experienced by the IWs are affected both the foremen system and labour broker. The labour broker and foremen system contribute to the uncertain work relations because the workers are usually not able to check the them. This is precisely due to the lack of written relations between the labour and the foremen. In fact, often times, the foremen run away with the money from the workers. This proves that the role of a foreman plays a significant factor in determining labour condition. Historically, there has been no union for construction workers, let alone the IWs of construction. In general, Indonesian construction workers work in non-formal settings, without contracts. This fact has become a common sense among Indonesians, culminating in the worn-out figure of tukang (literally “doer”) who does work to build houses and buildings. This figure of tukang is strongly associated to the imagery of a male construction worker working acrobatically, climbing building’s skeletons, lifting heavy materials with bare hands, and sweating under the heat of Indonesian sun of around 30s0 Celsius. It is quite difficult to imagine construction workers forming a union, as it is to imagine women working in this sector.15 A trade union typically belongs to the formal labourers. SBKI breaks this stereotype and proves that they can have union consciousness. Turning to the case of outsourced electricity workers, the tradition of unionisation exists since 2012 when they came together in a massive movement demanding permanent contracts. Many big TUs supported their cause. The movement was massive enough to pressure the member of parliaments to promise permanency. However, the promise could never see its day since those who said the promise had to leave their office after the 2014 election. Many of the demoralised workers stopped believing in unions, and left them. Only a small number of workers have kept their faith in the union; SPLAS is an eventual, rare example. The SBKI in Yogyakarta is a union whose 103 members are construction workers who have been working almost all of their life under informal work relations. The SPLAS in Solo is a union of 200s electricity workers hired by the State Electricity Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara, PLN) under the scheme of outsourcing. Both are two of many Member Trade Unions (MTUs) under the Federasi SERBUK. SERBUK itself is one of the federations under the confederation of KPBI (Konfederasi Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia; Confederation of Indonesian Labour Struggle). Before joining SERBUK, the two unions have had a long history of struggle—individually, collectively or with other TUs—to secure their living in an industrial relations world that obeys not the law of the state, but the “law of 15 An exceptionally few exceptions, among other, is the report from Vice on women working in the sector. According to the report, there has been a surge in the number of females working for construction in Bali, especially after Donald Trump vended billions of rupiah in Bali’s tourism sector. Like their male counterparts, they work under informal work regime; but much worse than the boys, these ladies are paid way lower. See “Buruh Bangunan Perempuan Penopang 'Surga' Pariwisata Bali,” Vice, September 11, 2017, https://www.vice.com/id_id/article/xwweda/buruh-bangunan-perempuan-penopang-surga-pariwisata-bali. 9 the jungle” (hukum rimba)—to use the usual expression these people use to depict the legal labour system they are in. The expression of the “law of the jungle,” instead of the law of the state, pretty much captures the informality of the IWs’ conditions and positions in the context of industrial relations. Compared to other workers who are not informal and not working in the informal sector, IWs are compelled to work under an uncertain work regime. This uncertainty determines their ethos of survival. Khamid, the Secretary-General of SERBUK, speaks of this in the context of construction workers that “if they do not struggle, then they could not live.” Khamid refers to the fact that as the consequence of the uncertain work regime, their earning is also uncertain. Most of the IWs organised by SERBUK have more than enough of experiences of being conned by the foremen, by the job owners, or by the labour-broker/recruitment agencies (that they call “vendor”), that their wage was paid so late, even not at all. On the other hand, the workers are rendered helpless since legally they do not have anything to prove that they are really working for those bosses. Often times, the work relations are “sealed” just by plain talks and handshakes. But whenever they tried to protest and fight back, they sometimes had to face difficulties ranging from intimidative foremen, HR managers, and even gangsters hired by those bosses. Indeed, the informal foremen-labour relations have long existed that it is generally accepted as normal that the foremen are always sneaking some amount from the labours’ money out for himself. Without contract papers or alike to the authority, they could never rely on the justice system. Thus, so long as this piece of paper is not granted to these workers, their work condition deteriorates even worse since no one can seriously check the employers. As a result, all they can do was to resort to power; more comrades mean more powers, and more powers mean more work security. Their conditions as being the stark exception of prevailing labour law have also made them rather unrecognised by the majority of TU. The mainstream TUs’ mindset are tightly bound to the existing labour law’s paradigm that presupposes that all workers are working in a written contractual-based relation, with a specific boss, in a specific office or factory, and having similar needs and interests just like the rest of formal labour. Everyone in SBKI and SPLAS know that the law fails to understand their “dangerously unique” position in industrial relations. The resulting effect is that all of these mainstream TUs have been unable firstly to understand the IWs’ situation, and therefore to respond to and advise on the situation. Both SBKI and SPLAS have histories of working with another TUs before joining SERBUK, and they expressed gratefulness that those days are gone now. These failures are not yet to mention how all relationships with other mainstream TUs working with SBKI and SPLAS in the past backfired: both unions experienced being used by the first; being kept uninformed about the outcome of their negotiations with the bosses; even suspected of extorting them. Tri of SPLAS even recalled way back how after five years joining with this TU, he found that when he was by chance talking to the central committee in Jakarta he was told that the committee has no record at all of Tri’s union being one of their members in Solo. That means Tri and his union fellows were being lied to by the TU who were supposed to protect them, and this also means “five years of paying monthly union contribution, by no less than 600 people, are vanished without a trace.” With this trauma with mainstream TUs, the fact that SERBUK can convince the two unions to join their wagon must be taken seriously into account. What makes SERBUK so different from the others? 10 1.4. SERBUK “SERBUK is different. Besides outsourced contract workers, they even organise and advocate those who do not work in any company!" ~ One of the wives of a SERBUK member Federasi Serikat Buruh Kerakyatan (Popular Worker Union Federation, F SERBUK) was declared on 11 December 2013 by nine factory-level unions in Krawang, Western Java. Two prominent factorylevel unions in this formation were SERBUK PT Siamindo Concrete Products and SERBUK PT Fuji Seat Indonesia. SERBUK Siamindo managed to change the contract status of 206 workers from casual to permanent after two days strike. Meanwhile SERBUK Fuji Seat also managed to prevent union busting through a strike.16 Other factory-level unions formed by SERBUK since its declaration were: SERBUK PT Bukit Muria Jaya, SERBUK Pako Akuina, SERBUK SJE Global, SERBUK Toyodies, SERBUK Bestin Hotel, and SERBUK Ineru. In September 2016, SERBUK with other federations such as Federasi Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia (Indonesia Worker’s Struggle Federation, FPBI), Federasi Serikat Pekerja Pulp dan Kertas Indonesia (Pulp and Paper Worker Union Federation, FSP2KI), Federasi Buruh Transportasi Pelabuhan Indonesia (Dock Transportation Worker Federation, FBTPI), and Serikat Pekerja Kereta Api Jabodetabek (Train Worker Union of Jabodetabek, SPKAJ), became founders of Konfederasi Persatuan Buruh Indonesia (United Indonesian Worker Federation, KPBI). Also, since 2016, SERBUK began its effort to organise informal workers by initiating Serikat Buruh Konstruksi Indonesia (Indonesian Construction Worker Federation, SBKI) and approaching Serikat Pekerja Listrik Area Solo Raya (Electricity Worker Union in Greater Solo Area, SPLAS). At present, the two IWs unions have joined SERBUK. Today SERBUK has more than twenty affiliated unions in Java and Sumatra, comprising of around 6000 members of workers from various sectors. Compared to other TUs, even to other TUs in the confederation of KPBI, SERBUK possess several different traits, especially when it comes to the method of organising. Two notable differences are worth mentioning. First is that it is flexible in selecting the method of organising and approaching a given situation. SERBUK is not bound by the mainstream method, for example, of organising workers based on factory. They tried it before but failed. And failed again. After taking lessons from that failure, they experimented with another basis of organising, that is through community and workers’ residence. They applied the first to SBKI and the second to SPLAS. Organising through community means approaching the workers not as a worker, but as a member of the community. As a member of the community, they help each other’s back and give hands whenever their friends are in need. Community approach does not see the workers as a legal-institutional union entity, but more as a friend, even family. SERBUK targets social trust among the workers in the first place because they know a strong union is glued by a strong social bond. That is why the entry point to organising using a community-approach is through social issues, and not necessarily normative or political issues. “If we come to them with the traditional issues of TUs like the raise in wage, holding a national strike, 16 Union busting is the act done by the company to disrupt or to prevent workers to form a TU or to engage in TU-related activities. The act often manifests in threats of wage reduction, mutation, replacement, and even firing with just any made-up causes. 11 etc., they would never welcome us,” said Khamid of the apolitical and apathetic nature of workers SERBUK organise. With regard to the approach through social issues, Khamid from SERBUK recites how he first met some of the early members of SBKI when he helped people in the community on the issue of landgrabbing. Accidentally, some of the people in the community are working daily as informal construction workers: to build individual homes of individual clients, sometimes company offices, sometimes government buildings, etc. They work alone, and are not mediated by labour-brokers. This condition made them close with each other, into forming a community of sharing of information of the job. When one of them knows about a job but is not able to handle it, they pass it to their friends in the community. It is through this community that Khamid start to build a dialogue, trying to convince them into pushing their community to become a TU. Another reason why a community-approach has proven to be more successful in organising IWs is because of the nature of the work. Construction workers work only when they are called for. After they finish one working order, they would move to another project, and so on. This means, organising based on the construction site is not a wise option, in fact futile. Some projects even use different workers for every different phase of the building process. In a large building project, Khamid gave an example: for the phase of flattening the ground, they use some workers; and then when they move to pile the foundation pole, they use other workers; when they start cementing, other workers; and so on, in a way that one will meet different persons in the site every two or three months. That is why they turned to organising based on the community, to where every worker belongs, regardless of their working sites. Organising based on residence is the method they use to work with SPLAS in Solo. Outsourced electricity workers are divided according to areas and then divided again according to chapters. In the Solo area, there are 11 chapters. All those chapters employ outsourced workers provided by some labour-brokers. The first time SERBUK observed these workers, as Khamid recalled, they predicted that it would be useless to organise based on the labour brokers since they could just “stop” using the workers and find another after their one-year contracts ended. The duration of the contract with the labour brokers is only for a year; after that, the workers must expect the kindness of the labour brokers to keep using them. “That means, we have to feel nervous annually!” said Pur of SPLAS. SERBUK’s idea was to approach them based on their place of residence, because they know that the labour brokers are highly likely to recruit those living in the vicinity. Moreover, in order for their plan to organise based on place of residence to succeed, they would need to make the PLN to employ the workers regardless of the labour brokers. So that was the strategy: they pushed the PLN, instead of the labour brokers, to have whichever of their labour brokers to employ the same person in the area. So, in case one labour broker stops supplying for the PLN, the PLN will use another labour broker, but with the same workers. That being said, they pushed the PLN to compel the vendor to use available workers. However, the strategy did not fully work, and instead of securing the labour brokers, the outcome was that PLN made their labour brokers hire their workers not for just one year, but for five years. That meant Pur and his comrades in SPLAS could relieve a bit because, since 2016, they only have to feel nervous once every five years. After that small victory, SPLAS worked even more closely with SERBUK and eventually joined it. 12 Back to the discussion of SERBUK’s difference to other TUs. The second difference is related to the issues they use to organise. If other TUs use issues like wages, working time, overtime compensation, and other normative rights, SERBUK is rather more flexible. They will use any issue they see potential in achieving their goals. Khamid calls this strategy, a “Carambola Strategy” after the board game of carambola billiard. The strategy amounts to using one issue that can ricochet to another issue that is being targeted in the first place. In other words, the first issue is just a proxy, not to use ‘bait,’ to the main target. For example, when SERBUK tried to approach and organise workers with the asbestos issue in Karawang (the core of Indonesia’s industrial city-zone), they did not approach the worker directly. Instead, they help one of the workers’ wives who had a problem with migrant workers supplied by labour brokers. They truthfully helped the lady until she won the case. As expected, it was that wife who opens the high way to the targeted workers. Another example is how at the moment this report is written, SERBUK makes use of KPK (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Commission of Corruption Eradication) to achieve their ultimate goal in Solo (that is to compel PLN to have its labour brokers to recruit the same workers). SERBUK is currently seeking for closer cooperation with KPK to build its case on SPLAS. SERBUK not only saw the problematic contract status of SPLAS workers as merely labour relation issue, but also as corruption issue. Pension fund (Dana Pensiun Lembaga Keuangan, DPLK) that cannot be accessed by outsourced electricity workers in Solo and surrounding area is also another issue that is used by SERBUK to build its case. SERBUK purposefully conducted investigations of corruption suspects among the labour brokers. They want to blow it up, invite KPK so that the issue would go national, and along the way freely broadcasts their ultimate demand to whole Indonesia. Indonesian public is at the moment very concerned about corruption issue in public sectors, such as PLN as the national sole provider of electricity. In 2018, PLN records Rp 18 trillion losses despite its monopoly raised the public suspicion about corruption. If SERBUK manages to draw national attention to the PLN, it might hopefully make people remember that the PLN still owe the outsourced workers a permanent contract (the promise of the then ministry, that has now been forgotten). With regard to the future success of this tactic, Khamid is optimistic that it will increase the bargaining power of SPLAS workers against the PLN as the national attention will put pressure on the nation’s electric company. With the carambola strategy, SERBUK targets the core interest of worker’s struggle by using seemingly un-TU-like issues. Besides this grand plot, SERBUK also does smaller scale SD initiatives. SERBUK has for quite some times been advocating asbestos workers within the OSH (occupational safety and health) framework. The initiative involves filing a demand to the Manpower Ministry, cooperating with Perdoki (Perhimpunan Spesialis Kedokteran Okupasi, Occupational Medicine Indonesia), and raising the issue to the international level. SERBUK also often discusses the issues of IWs they are organising with their friends inside the Ministry of Manpower. From the experience of the fieldwork, it seems that SERBUK tries to maintain strategic partnership with the government, apparently with a fair success. The author was once invited to the federation’s meeting, and to the author’s surprise it was held in the government’s sub-district office (Kantor Kecamatan). This partnership is consistent with Khamid’s depiction of carambola strategy: SERBUK needs to “borrow hands” from many authoritative proxies to hit its main target. Another upcoming agenda SERBUK has with SBKI and SPLAS is the agenda of certification. At present, SERBUK is looking for partners to discuss and to work with in their effort to certify all of their members. Khamid himself was aware that by having the workers certified will not only increase their income, but also both of their individual and collective bargaining power. Being a certified worker 13 means that the worker has standardised skills. Meaning, the foremen cannot pay them just like before he or she has not been certified. Actually, based on the regulation, certification is mandatory for professional construction workers. This regulation was enshrined in UU No. 2/2007. Among seven million construction workers in the country, only six percent are certified.17 This certification process is provided by Badan Nasional Sertifikasi Profesi (National Board of Professional Certification, BNSP). Certification is also relatively costly. The cheapest level of certification (Early Level) costs about Rp 250,000 (€15). That amount is deemed expensive from the perspective of average SBKI workers who earn Rp 70,000 to 80,000 (€5) a day—provided they get to work every day, which is somewhat a rare case.18 Another thing to note is that most of informal construction workers are not well-informed about this certification. SERBUK’s effort to inform the IWs in its federation about the importance of certification is in fact successful. It has since become the union agenda in both SBKI and SPLAS to have their respective members certified. 2. Social Dialogue Processes 2.1. SBKI Serikat Buruh Konstruksi Indonesia, or SBKI, has its history in the solidarity of people facing land grabbing issues by one of the big contractors for the New Yogyakarta International Airport (NYIA) construction project, backed by the Sultan, in Kulon Progo Village, Yogyakarta. Since then, they have continued the solidarity. Having said this, social bonds proceed SBKI’s institutional bond as a union, which was declared only recently on March 10, 2017. In other words, what brought them together has not been an industrial relations issue, but social ties. The poor condition of the workers, with no proper education, let alone expensive certifications or licenses, have been compelling them to work in the informal sectors of construction work. Indeed, their lack of education is one significant factor, other than money, that hinders them to apply for certification that requires High School certificate at minimum. Almost all of them are non-formally educated men, with the youngest age at 17 and the oldest one at the 50s of age. Most of them dropped school at Middle High School, some of them even stopped at Elementary School. The SBKI leadership centers around one figure: Sigit (age 50s). Sigit arose organically as, to use Khamid’s words, a “natural leader.” As a person living in a semi-feudal culture of Java, however egalitarian he could go, being the oldest contributes to Sigit’s cultural capital. What perhaps contributes the most to people’s respect to Sigit is the fact that he walks the talks. Sigit is the centre of the union not without practical reason. He is one whom everyone would resort to whenever they had a problem in the field. Even though when Sigit was away, his comrades might still call him via phone everytime they need Sigit’s insight. Sigit also is the one who often times relays information regarding job offers. He is the one who distributes the information, and “informally” acts as a worker supplier to construction projects. He is well known among the foremen as one who has integrity, both in words and in actions. His work is of such good quality that many foremen and job owners would “Begini Cara Pekerja Konstruksi Bisa Dapat Sertifikat,” Detik Finance, October 19, 2017, https://finance.detik.com/infrastruktur/d-3690858/begini-cara-pekerja-konstruksi-bisa-dapat-sertifikat. 18 "Biaya Membuat Sertifikat Keterampilan Konstruksi Rp 250.000", Kompas.com, Feb 17, 2016, https://properti.kompas.com/read/2016/02/17/163822421/Biaya.Membuat.Sertifikat.Keterampilan.Konst ruksi.Rp.250.000. 17 14 still call him and his friends for projects even though Sigit had ever fought them in the past (for a good reason). SBKI is a relatively small union consisting of around 103 workers. Small in numbers does not stop them from confidently forming a worker’s union. They feel the urge to form a union because otherwise, their position will be too weak to face the foremen and the bosses. In the construction work setting, a foreman is the workers’ daily supervisor. A foreman is employed by the company, while the workers are also indeed employed by the company, but they are recruited through the foreman. Practically, the workers get the job from the foremen. Traditionally, foremen come from the same background as the construction informal worker, but have more experience, skill, and leadership. The company, or the boss, gets to know everything happening in the construction/project site from the foremen. One of the traumas driving the unionisation was that in the past some of the workers have for some times been tricked by the foremen that the foremen were running away with their three months wage. Another misfortune was experienced by one worker who when sent to Borneo, he was conned by the foremen who, again, ran away with his money. At that time, the worker not only had no money to eat; he did not have money to go back to Yogyakarta. He had to knock around begging for money and food just to be able to go back home. For this and other bitter lessons, they concluded that they needed to join forces in solidarity so that they could be stronger and acquire more bargaining power against the foremen and bosses. Joining SERBUK boosted, even more, their power and confidence. One interesting example of this confidence is related to the decision to wear SERBUK’s shirt on certain days. Husen, one of the SERBUK’s organiser in Yogya, said, “The narrative that has been developed among them is that having a union can boost up their bargaining power. Because they have comrades in solidarity watching each other’s back. [..] It even came to their mind that they agreed two particular days—Monday and Saturday—that they will wear SBKI’s t-shirt together simply to deter the foreman. So, when the foreman asked them ‘why do all of you wear reds (the SBKI shirt)?’ they can intimidatingly reply, ‘indeed sir, because we are all part of the central union network.’” One thing to note with regard to the context of the workers’ T-shirt deterrence to the foreman in the quote above. The t-shirt can serve as an effective deterrence when the workers are able to relate it to the idea of the central. This is so because hermeneutically, ‘central’ (pusat) carries an intimidating meaning, since in the mind of the people in the provinces, ‘central’ always denotes greater power, greater capital, and greater force. (Similar to the meaning of provence in French).19 While Indonesian provinces are as many as 33, but saying that somebody is from or with the ‘central’ will put the noncentral interlocutor at a discursively disadvantageous position. But why using SBKI shirt only on Monday and Saturday, one might ask. Monday is the first working day; usually, new recruits work on Monday “so it is a good time to show them force so that they do not mess around with us,” said Sigit. While Saturday is the paying day. The target is the foreman: “he would know whom he will mess with if he plays around with our money,” again said Sigit followed with proud laughter. 19 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, New Ed. (Princeton University Press, 2007). 15 2.1.1. Negotiation and Strategy When discussing the theme of social dialogue in Indonesia, the majority of people—academics, activists, government—often refer to the putatively Indonesian heritage of decision-making culture: the process of musyawarah/mufakat (deliberation/consensus) according to the principle of kekeluargaan (family). However, a critical account would not take these principles for granted. Many have shown how the Indonesian authoritarian past cemented its power through this cultural and symbolic strategy.20 However, there is still little exploration on the effect of these ideological construction in the context of social dialogue, or industrial relations in general, from the perspective of workers’ everyday life, let alone IWs’. As this report finds, the often-cited pride of the principle of musyawarah/mufakat does not find a realistic soil to grow in the setting of IWs. Moreover, the principle of kekeluargaan has been used by the foremen, employers, and government as a pretext to suppress these IWs’ demands and protests. Having shared similarity with the conception of social dialogue, one is justified to question the continuing relevance of social dialogue in the context of IWs. Throughout the interview processes with both organisers and members of SBKI in Yogyakarta, the author finds difficulty in relating their stories of consolidation and negotiation with the traditional maxims of social dialogue. It is as if the two are in a different world of industrial relations. What separates the two are seemingly pretty modest: the existence of a piece of paper stating that the workers are working in a project. Simple as it may seem, but the consequence of its absence might lead to a whole lot of series of implications with regard to the way these workers (self-)organise and the options these workers have at hand when negotiating with their counterparts. As has been mentioned, SBKI started off as a community sharing information of job opportunities and helping each other whenever they are in need. The last point includes applying each others’ skill to help renovate their own houses, to help to repair villages’ infrastructure (bridge, post, mosque, etc.), but also help their friends whenever they have a difficult situation with their foremen and employers as Agus of SBKI recalled once when one of his fellow IWs got his pay cut without both prior notification nor explanation from the foremen. Moved by solidarity, Agus and other friends, who at that time were also working in many different sites, stopped working wherever they were and went to this fellow’s construction site to show some support. When they got there, they searched down the foreman and surrounded him while “nicely” asking for their fellow’s discounted money. The foremen have always been the usual suspect and the most frequent source of conflict faced by the workers. The work relation between the foremen and the workers is as simple as short talks and a handshake. When a foreman needs a worker, he usually offers it verbally: “do you want to work with me? The pay is Rp 70.000 (€ 4)” to which the worker reply “Okay!”, And that is it. The law 13/2003 is actually recognizing this type of verbal agreement of work relation (article 51), in so far there is a consensus from both parties with regard to the scope of work, the time and the salary. However, leaving aside the blunt fact that most of the IWs do not know this and do not know where to get the information, the IWs would still have to prove their work relations if they would like to bring their cases to the legal system. The foremen and employers are always at the upper hand: they could lie that they did not hire this IW, or even that they did not know the worker at all. This is so 20 Verena Beittinger-Lee, (Un)Civil Society and Political Change in Indonesia A Contested Arena (Routledge, 2009); Paul J. Carnegie, The Road from Authoritarianism to Democratization in Indonesia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2910); John R. Bowen, “On the Political Construction of Tradition: Gotong Royong in Indonesia,” The Journal of Asian Studies 45, no. 3 (May 1986): 545, https://doi.org/10.2307/2056530. 16 since the workers could never prove their occupation if all they get is just a memory of a verbal agreement. On the other hand, both Agus and Sigit from SBKI confirm that all foremen they met would never want to make a written contract. This is because, as their suspicion goes, “they do not have the willingness to properly regard us as workers.” However, the matter is not so simple, when asked if someday a miracle happens that the government would strictly enforce the law and compel them to always write a work contract with the threat of a fine of a big amount, they did not express happiness. They are afraid that a written contract in place, will allow the foremen and employers to press them even more since everything is written in the contract. The loose negotiation process and the “solidarity pressure” method they often exert would cease to be effective, in fact, that could backfire against the workers themselves as these methods are outside the law. This dilemma is not likely to find a solution in the near future, while it continues to shape the contour of social dialogue in informal settings. There is some notable event worth mentioning to give a more vivid picture of how this informal setting sets the contour of an informal social dialogue. The most legendary one was when Sigit and his friends, less than ten people, working for Bank Mandiri (one of the top national bank) chapter in Yogya. The pay was three days late, and when they looked for the foremen, he was not there. Sigit and co were furious and ready to do almost anything to get their rights as quickly as possible. So, it went that Sigit decided to sabotage the bank’s genset (electricity generator set), tying it down with chains of steel, and called the foreman: “if you do not transfer our money by 2.15 pm, then we are the ones who will transfer you back … with the money we get from selling your genset and after subtracting from it our wages.” That was his threat, and it worked: the foreman went to the site immediately with their money. Another heroic act was when Sigit and 6 of his friends were working for Yogyakarta’s Regional Public Works Office’s renovation of the building’s park. Again, the pay was late more than a week, even after the work was done and was scheduled for an official ceremony. Knowing that in the day of the ceremony the minister and many important people will come, Sigit and friends see that day as the right moment to collect their invoice. So, this was what happened: when the guests are coming, there were about 60 people as Sigit could recall, he and his friends quickly intercept the employer and drag him to the side of the building by the back of his nice shirt, telling him “if you do not pay now, then we will destroy everything we have worked for!” At that time, police were quick to gather, and all the guests are watching. That method worked. In front of the polices and the guests, the employer calls all his foremen by phone to quickly transfer Sigit and his friends’ money. This is not the first time Sigit and friends use the threat of violence to struggle for their rights against the deceitful officer in that public works office. Before that, they have also worked for constructing the garden inside the building. When their pay was late, Sigit locked all the doors connecting to the garden and told the other officers working there that they will open the door when they get their money. However, the officers pleaded, “the plants will die out if they are not watered for a day; they are expensive.” To which Sigit replied, “I do not want to know that; what I know is that when we get our money, then the doors will be unlocked.” That way, Sigit cleverly made those officers place pressure on the foremen to pay. These three stories pretty much sum up SBKI’s portfolio in the social dialogue processes. None of which are as harmonious as depicted in the SD books and brochures. He even had to face a hoodlum 17 with a long sword when he sabotaged Bank Mandiri’s genset. However, Sigit and co outnumbered this lonely swordman. Sigit’s friend was quick to throw in front of the hired hoodlum, a sack full of machetes. No blood shed, the swordsman retreated, and the sabotage continued. Nonetheless, violence and threat were not always the selected method. Sometimes they could just sit around and refused to work when their weekly pays were not paid yet. “They did not even know that what they were doing is called a ‘strike’; they just refused to work and sat around ignoring their foreman,” said Husen, a SERBUK organiser in Yogyakarta. Reflecting on the social dialogue processes that SBKI’s have gone through, Serbuks’ organisers declared that almost no formal negotiations had taken place when it comes to SBKI. Almost all of the processes were informal, happened with the involvement of at least refusal of work, collective intimidation (instead of collective bargaining), and at the most threat of violence. The threat could even be very personal, as Sigit himself admitted when he threatened the safety of one foreman (right in front of his 4-years old kid!) who did not want to be responsible of an accident happened to Sigit’s brother when he was working for the foreman. These strategies all happened spontaneously. All only involved short planning and collective coordination, thanks to the social trust and solidarity they already have. As SERBUK’s Husen recited, “since they are not bounded to any factory or company, so it has also become a tradition that the conflict settlements are done by ‘creatively improvise’ in the field.” One thing to note, these creative improvisations also include force and threats of violence. 2.1.2. Outcomes and Way Forward With this kind of “culture” of industrial relations, part and parcel of the lack of a permanent contract, little can one expect that a clearly defined boundary of work and harmonious process of social dialogue might take place for SBKI’s members in any near future. To add more uniqueness of the relations, sometimes the aftermath of the social dialogue processes—if this term is relevant—is not as antagonistic as it might be expected. Returning to Bank Mandiri’s sabotage, after the event, Sigit was appointed as a supervisor of the bank. He even got to supervise the foreman! Quite expectedly, the later communications between the labour and the employer had become less violent and more “peaceful.” With the (in)famous solidarity of SBKI and Sigit’s leadership, the workers in this union acquired the reputation of being among the best quality and with good integrity. These reputations attracted even more jobs for the workers (although still under informal relations). Having said this, what strikes the author of this report as remarkable is that in the place far away from Jakarta and from big megaprojects, the precarious and informal relations of work are regarded as normal by both workers and employers. It is as if the becoming normal of this relation gives birth to a kind of unwritten social convention of work relations outside the lawful industrial relations, whereby the workers and the employers know the limit of what they can expect from each other. From the case of Sigit’s being recruited by the employer, one can conclude that an important driver to transgress this norm is likely coming from a succesful unlawful manouvre from the workers against the employer. In other words, it is most likely that a peaceful SD in the context of IWs will stem from violent/antagonistic industrial relations. This is what one has to include in his or her consideration for future improvement of work relations and work conditions in this setting, at least when it comes to SBKI. 18 2.2. SPLAS Serikat Pekerja Lintas Area Solo, or SPLAS, is an outsourced workers union in the electricity sector working in the area of Solo, Central Java. SPLAS’ history began in 2007 when a number of workers felt the need to strengthen their position as outsourced worker of PLN and formed an association (paguyuban). As Joko of SPLAS remembered, if they face the labour broker (outsourcing company) individually, then they would only get ignored. The outsourced labours’ relation with the PLN is mediated through the labour-broker/labour outsourcing company that hired them in the first place. Different from the permanent PLN employee, the outsourced labours do not have direct relation to the PLN in the context of industrial relations. From the report of PLN Statistics 2017, one can learn that there 54,820 people working for PLN. However, there is no official release with regard to the exact number of outsourced workers in PLN. What one can safely guess is that the portion of outsourced workers are bigger than the permanent ones working in office. Being an outsourced worker at that time was almost the same with what has been experienced by SBKI’s members: almost “paperless.” When a worker was offered or accepted a job position by one of PLN’s outsourcing companies, they were given contract papers to sign, and after that they took the contract right away even without giving a chance for the worker to read it, let alone have a copy of it. Without a firm prove of work relations, the individual workers could only obey whatever policy (or order) the vendor issued for them. Being aware that working individually would always put them at a disadvantage, the initiators of the association got together and decided to consolidate themselves together as Solo’s outsourced electricity workers. The basis of their organisation was (and has been) domicile or through place of residence. The consideration was that if one worker is fired by his labour broker, he or she would stay at his or her rented house or apartment while looking for another job. Since all the members of the association had been working for quite some time in the sector, then there was only little chance that they would leave the sector. Another reason is that their specific working skills that have been shaped by the job would make them more difficult to adjust to a new requirement of skill sets in another sector. The positions they often work in are technical support (pelayanan teknis, “yantek”) and meter reading (baca meter). So, place of residence was a reasonable basis for organising. The association was transformed into a worker union in 2010 when a new problem emerged. They often had to spend quite a sum of money to hire a lawyer whenever they faced industrial relations problem with the labour brokers. After knowing that according to the labour law a union can advocate and legally represent their members in the court, thus freeing them from the obligation to spend much money for lawyers, they registered their association as a union. Right after registering themselves to the Disnaker office, they joined one federation union. At that time, the number of workers in the union was about 600 people coming from all eleven PLN chapters (rayon) in Solo. Nevertheless, after a series of events that made them disappointed with the federation, they decided to leave the union on 2015. This time, they became an association again. In 2016 they got acquainted with Khamid from SERBUK and have since maintained a good communication. In 2018 they decided to join SERBUK. However, the number of workers that stayed with SPLAS when this union joined SERBUK was only 200s. About 60% of the member of association had left the union or simply ignored it. This was due to the terrible demoralisation experienced by almost all State-Owned Enterprise (SoE)’s outsourced workers, PLN included, as late as 2013. At that time, the special working committee of the House of Representative (Panja DPR) required all the SoEs to change the status all of their outsourced workers to permanent workers. Political in nature, the policy was not able to 19 survive a regime change in 2014 when all the committee members and ministers involved in the policy finished their duty. The policy was suspected only to gain popular support for one particular party whose members were involved in escorting such populist policy. That left all SoE workers, including PLN’s, and especially in our case the SPLAS’ workers in despair and uncertain future. The majority of the workers in the union lost the reason and appetite for unionising. Those who stayed tried to convince their fellow workers to also stay, although with limited success. They insisted, as recalled by Tri, “even though our grand target (i.e. the permanent contract) is not achieved, but without a union we are exposed to even greater risks of being fired at any moment.” These workers know very well that being an outsourced worker without solidarity back-up from a collective would render them unrecognised by the justice system. Even when asked about how a social dialogue might possibly mitigate the situation, they dismissed such idea altogether. Once again, not without reason: “Let a dialogue be a dialogue. But if what we get are promises, and promises, and promises, then what is the use for us?” so is the cynicism of one of SPLAS’ coordinators, Dar. Now, since they have a union, and since they joined SERBUK, their knowledge of the legal system and of the unionist strategy to defend and advance their rights are improving. They even could now demand the HR managers to let them read the whole contract, and keep one original copy of it. Having a union has leveraged their position in front of the labour brokers and employers. This possession of a written contract is valuable for their job security. It will prevent the then indeterminacy they used to face when they had problems with the PLN. Usually, the PLN “ping-ponged”21 them with their labour brokers: when it came to addition of work items beyond the agreed upon ones, the PLN insisted that they are its workers; but when it came to the workers’ protest, they would passed the workers to the labour brokers saying that they are the labour brokers’ employee. With the contract in hand, the worker would not need to face the ping-pong situation anymore. In short, in social dialogue context, having a union is the basic and fundamental strategy, without which there would be no dialogue at all. 2.2.1. Negotiation and Strategy For SPLAS members, the quest of industrial relations began after they have consolidated themselves in a union. The collective solidarity is their bargaining power whenever they have to face their industrial relations’ counterpart: the labour brokers, the HR managers, the PLN/vendor’s lawyers, the policemen, and even the gangsters hired by their employer. Collective solidarity in the context of IWs struggle, just as has been illustrated regarding SBKI, often manifests in the show of force, mass power, collective intimidation, and even violence. Again, the precarious condition of IWs limits their options, keeping them from the harmonious and “modern” depiction of social dialogue. The most striking example for the author of this report is the incident of spitting of an HR manager. The incident was sparked by the manager’s new policy at that moment. He ordered all the workers to report their GPS location to the headquarters every time they reach 100 customers. However, the implementation was not as smooth as the manager would have expected as the gadgets held by the workers often did not function correctly, and that most of them did not know how to use the new technology. They have been very busy doing all the workload to achieve the target that they only have little to no time to learn to do it. In short, many workers failed to meet the manager’s order. The sanctions from the manager follow suit. However, since the workers had already created a union, 21 The game of table tennis; a sport game usually played by SPLAS workers in their spare time. 20 they answered the manager’s move collectively. They piled their working instruments in one place, then took the portrait of it, and sent the picture to the HR manager: they are telling him that they are on strike. They gathered all workers from all eleven chapters in the PLN office’s yard, they held a massive strike. The multitude of furious workers summoned the manager to the yard; they demanded him to apologise before they back to their posts. Faced with so massive pressure, the once arrogant manager had no option other than fulfilling the repeated call from many microphones downstairs. Poor manager, he had no idea how furious workers with a strong union bond could possibly be. He accidentally walked to the podium prepared by the workers not through the back side of the stage, but by walking past through the middle of the sea of protesting workers. All of a sudden, the workers started spitting on him. “It's his fault! Who told the bald HR manager to walk past through the middle of angry workers of all 11 chapters! So, all of us spitted on him altogether.” Soaked with the mixture of saliva of 11 chapters’ workers, the manager apologised. (But the workers did not). Not so long after the incident, the manager resigned. Another example of how a harmonious and kekeluargaan (family) principle of social dialogue did not work for SPLAS was when they decided to blockade a protocol road in Purwosari, Solo, on 2013. Such action resulted in a serpentine of congestion, complete with super noisy horns from the vehicles. The strike was triggered by three years of futile negotiation with the PLN. The case in dispute was that the labour brokers did not pay the Religious Holiday Allowance (Tunjangan Hari Raya, THR) for three years. The labour broker said that it was the duty of the PLN, but the PLN said vice versa. The workers pushed the PLN to compel the labour broker to pay it, for which the PLN “promised to chastise the labour broker. But after three years of tiresome waiting, there was no sign that our demand was heard. So, we did it (the blockade).” Actually, the SPLAS workers never refused good intentions from the company, if there were any. But for them, it is the company who never showed a good will. Every time the company asked for negotiation, “it was just to suppress down our anger,” as Pur suspected. He continued, “it is as if we, outsourced workers, are second class citizens that they could just do whatever they like. No, we fight back!” Tri added, “actually the spitting incident would not have happened if the management were willing to talk about it nicely and procedurally. But they never showed good will!” Even at the moment the author met them, after almost 5 years, they could not hide their resentful face when talking about the arrogancy of the “bald manager.” 2.2.2. Outcomes and Way Forward The experience of deception and mistreatment by the labour brokers and employers, with the pretext of courteous dialogue, has crystallised their distrust towards the social dialogue mechanism. Dar declared, “even though now we have started to learn the law, the thing is that we have to be always ready to present the company with violent aggressions.” This is what one can expect from the fact that the employers rarely respect the law. Nonetheless, the now relatively secure job relations, however informal, have somewhat detrimental effect to the unionisation. With five-year contracts with the labour brokers, the workers’ interest in the union is rather diminishing. As Pur lamented, “now that they are more secure now, they are less engaged with the union activity. They think the union’s function has finished. Just wait until the company finds another way to oppress, they would look for the union again.” This fact testifies an unexpected outcome of unions’ success in advancing the workers’ interest. Not that the union become stronger, the opposite turns out to be the reality. In SPLAS case, a successful social dialogue strategy has not been in function of a positive outcome for the union. 21 2.3. SBKI and SPLAS after joining SERBUK There are some notable changes in the way SBKI and SPLAS organise themselves as a union and how these two unions engage on a social dialogue processes after the two joined the SERBUK federation. In both unions, before organising with SERBUK, their methods of negotiation are quite rampant, short-fused and dominated by emotional judgement. Now that they are onboard with SERBUK, they themselves noticed that the way they react to the mistreatments from the employers and the way they formulate response against it are way more considerate. This was confirmed both by SBKI’s Sigit and SPLAS’ Pur. They both, albeit with different words, credit SERBUK for educating them about how to assess a situation, how to calculate every possible manoeuvre, and how to anticipate all the possible outcomes of a manoeuvre. This is relatable to Khamid’ recalling how he and other SERBUK executive committee members held discussion with SBKI members to reflect upon what the latter have done in the case of sabotaging Bank Mandiri’s asset (i.e. the electricity generator set). The purpose of the discussion was not to dismiss such action, but to remind the SBKI members how that action was unlawful and might risked all of them of criminal charges. However, and this is the interesting part, SERBUK did not discourage them from repeating such legally risky method. Instead, it suggested them to use such method with caution and with rational calculation. It was the method of situation assessment that SERBUK taught them to do. The same discussion was also held with SPLAS members. This time they talk about the act of blockading Solo’s protocol road in 2013. In short, SERBUK’s involvement in these two unions’ struggle can be measured in their becoming more mature in the way they formulate strategies. Not only on the matter of strategy and tactics in the field, SBKI’ and SPLAS’ members concurred on the decisive role of SERBUK in upgrading their knowledge of the labour law and the industrial relations judicial system. This knowledge has been proven useful when they have to negotiate with their foremen/employers. Actually, as SBKI’s Agus told the author of this report, the knowledge has been useful not exactly for its substance—that they know now what part of their rights that is violated by their employers, etc. The knowledge has been more useful in performative sense: that is the sheer fact that they know the law and can quote exact articles when arguing against the foremen. It is simply the possession of this legal knowledge that Agus took to be the most beneficial aspect of knowing the law. This is so because usually it is simply the workers’ lack of knowledge that put them at disadvantage when their foremen/employers started to scare them about legal sanctions in retort of the workers’ protest. Now that they know the law, “we can snarl back at them,” said Agus. Simply by knowing the law and can iterate it verbally, “the foremen will treat us with much more respect. They will think, ‘these tukangs are no ordinary ones, I cannot do as I please to them,’” added Agus. One can safely conclude from this example that the mere possession of knowledge of the law might increase the bargaining power of IWs in social dialogue processes. Another benefit worth mentioning from joining SERBUK is related to the issue of central (pusat) and province (daerah). Joining SERBUK, which is a federation at the national level, and which bases in Jakarta (the central capital), enforces the valour and the confidence among SBKI’s and SPLAS’ members. This is true especially in the provincial setting where the word ‘central’ carries the connotation of being more powerful, more abundant, more developed, and more modern.22 As One can trace this connotation back to the Java-centric development during the past New Order administration of Suharto that centered on Jakarta. See Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, Third ed. (Routledge, 1998). 22 22 mentioned earlier, it was precisely for this purpose why all SBKI members scheduled to wear red SERBUK t-shirt at the same time while working. Because when they were asked why, they may reply that the t-shirt indicates that they are part of the central union network. This way, the foremen will be deterred into treating them appropriately. SBKI’ members manage to compel their bosses to engage a social dialogue by borrowing the power of the discourse of the central inherent in their joining SERBUK. It seems to be clear now that in the context of IWs, a textbook-like social dialogue can only occur when the workers succeed in counterbalancing the unequal power relations that favour their employers. The inequality stems from the contradictory facts that on the one hand the workers desperately need the job without which they could not eat, but on the other hand, the employers do not really need that one particular worker since they could just pick other workers available in the market that are cheaper, more docile, and more loyal. In other words, the degree of the dependency among the two parties inclines more to the workers than to the employer. Hence, inequality. Closing in the unequal gap is prerequisite of any “polite” social dialogue between the workers and the employers. After a successful show of force by gathering the outsourced workers of eleven chapters in the PLN main building in Solo, SPLAS’ committee are frequently in communication with the HR department. Also, after the demonstration, SPLAS’ members could since then keep a copy of their contract previously made unavailable to them. SERBUK itself are often invited by the managers of the companies in which it has Member Trade Unions to discuss policies the management would like to enforce in the factory, for example. 3. Conclusion Concluding all the findings from the SERBUK, SBKI and SPLAS experiences with the social dialogue in the context of informal workers, there are some notable similarities in the process of unionisation, the method of working around the failing legal system, and the perception towards SD. First, the process of unionisation is pushed by the excesses of the failing legal system the workers have to deal with in every day live as IWs. The experiences of deception, of being ignored due to their lack of contract, and of indecisiveness in the part of the government with regard to their status before the law are what convinced them to self-organise so that they can struggle for their interest autonomously. Second, this fact of a failing legal system to recognise the IWs has also brought them to creatively improvise the methods usually used in the context of formal labour that the legal system assumes. Since legalistic methods are proven ineffective, they resort to informal and, often times, intimidative methods to work around the legal arrangement. SERBUK itself emphasises more on the social strategy and social issues in organising SBKI and SPLAS workers; instead of demanding workers’ normative rights like wage and working hours, they use social security and work safety environment; instead of using the factory as the basis of organising, they use community and residential patterns. Thirdly, their perception towards a peaceful and harmonious SD is sceptical and distrustful. They also believe that that peaceful dialogue with the employers can only happen when they successfully counterbalance the power that their employers have over them. This counterbalancing often manifests in the resort to violent and intimidation as mentioned above. The failure of mainstream TUs’ approach to IWs also serve as another factor of their self-unionisation and creative negotiation strategies. Not only that the mainstream TUs’ are not able to understand the “unique” position of IWs granted by their lacking of formal contracts, the big unions are somehow 23 disinterested by the relatively small amount of union members the IWs can organise. Often times, big unions are driven by political motives to accumulate power by using massive numbers of union membership. Their lack of commitment to IWs are also what drove SERBUK to fill in the void to organise IWs. Taking lessons from the ineffective mainstream strategy they have learned from the big unions to the context of IWs, SERBUK managed to find their own formulation of way of approaching IWs: that is through social issues and community-based strategy. One can hope that someday, from SERBUK, there can emerge a big and solid IWs union that can effectuate a proper sector-wide SD in construction and electricity sectors. This is an effort that no mainstream TUs find to be important, not to mention lucrative politically. Furthermore, there are at least three topical conclusion that can also be made from the discussion. Firstly, on the topic of the enabling conditions for a successful social dialogue. According to the prevailing formulation of an effective social dialogue, four criteria must exist: a strong TU with relevant technical and knowledge capacity, the political will of all partners/parties involved, respect for workers’ right, and lastly functioning institutional support.23 From all the four criteria, the three unions’ experiences point to the fulfilment of only one of the four conditions. The three unions have relatively strong unions whose strengths derived from a long-time social trust and most importantly clever strategic and tactical experience of dialogue. In other words, the bargaining power of a TU in informal setting stems only from the collective solidarity of its members. There is no political will to expect from the part of the employers. There is only a hypocritical respect to workers’ right and freedom to unionise. And, the failing legal system. For the last point, when asked to scale their trust to the legal system from one to ten, Joko of SPLAS responded, “zero!” The only reason why the other three conditions could not have been met, nor would be in any near future, is due to the unclear work relations between the IWs and their employer. The clarity of work relations is actually as simple as a written contract that the worker could refer to whenever they need it. Especially in the legal, advocacy setting, failure in proving the existence of work relations might cause an ignorance for the workers, and deny the workers’ access to the justice system. So as long as the informal workers are dispossessed of their access to a clear work relation, they would always be denizens in the industrial relations world. The only way for these industrial denizens to be respected and to gain equality with their citizen counterparts is through force. When they are able to effectively assert their influence violently (i.e. outside the prevailing legal frameworks), only then did they can obtain chances to engage in peaceful SD processes. Be that as it may, drawing the conclusion further to the conception of social dialogue itself, the experiences of the three unions might prompt one to reflect the core assumptions of the social dialogue itself. To make explicit these assumptions, one should only reconsider the criteria of a successful social dialogue as mentioned above. Not only that the criteria conceive a bias of industrial and formal work relations, they are almost totally disconnected from the reality of informal workers’ struggle to survive the industrial relations world. For the context of IWs, the assumption that there is somehow a harmonious, comfortable luncheon meeting between the workers and their employer to discuss both the prosperity of the worker and the future growth of the company is unpretentiously outlandish. The IWs stand no chance in bargaining with their employer should they not form a union. See ILO, Social Dialogue, URL: https://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-work/social-dialogue/lang-en/index.htm)%20%20a. 23 24 In other words, the employer must be threatened first to make them take heed of the workers’ existence. Besides the bias and the disconnection to the reality of IWs, the conception of social dialogue itself has neglected and forgotten the historical existence of trade unions. As has been persuasively argued by many, the TUs would never have had to exist if the company respects and humanises its workers.24 In other words, the sheer existence of TU should be taken as a constant reminder that there will always be an antagonistic clash of interest between the workers and their employers. Having said this, a harmonious depiction of social dialogue is simply anachronistic, let alone unrealistic. Many have found that in reality, the social dialogue serves only to mask and to “humanise” the exploitative face of the employer towards the labour.25 It is the antagonism that separate the workers and the employers that will forever prevent any truthful social dialogue to fruition. If there would be any realistic social dialogue, then it must take into account this antagonism. It must content with the bitter fact of the irreconcilability of the interest of the workers and the employers: the workers’ interest is a decent living and less work, while conversely the interest of the employer is cheaper labour cost and more work. In this context, SERBUK's success cannot and must not be discounted, decoupled and deprived of this antagonism. Their strategic and tactical choices arise from this antagonism; it is this embrace of the irreconcilability of workers' and employer's interest that fuels their creative spontaneity to strategise. However, this is not to say that the term social dialogue is not useful at all. Only, in order to be useful, some definitions of key issues in it must be reconceptualised. First, the notion of social in social dialogue must not be discriminative of any putatively non-social form of dialogue. The social in social dialogue must stop privileging the depiction of harmonious negotiation, and must start include the possibility of other, perverse forms of social interactions like the ones showed by SERBUK, SBKI and SPLAS: collective intimidation, sabotaging employers’ assets, and including the “social” punishment of being spitted by workers of eleven chapters. Of course, this does not mean to endorse such actions. But acknowledging the diverse forms of the social is a right step towards a realistic social dialogue. Second, the only realistic goal of social dialogue that acknowledges the antagonism of workers and employers is when the workers can bargain equally with their employers. The sources of workers bargaining powers, then, are what should be given treatment as it has been the rule of thumb that employers have more power compared to the workers. A realistic intervention to achieve a successful social dialogue must help the workers to acquire technical, strategic, tactical and legal knowledge of 24 Guglielmo Meardi, “Labour Movements and Labour Unions,” Sociopedia.Isa, 2010, 1–10; Jens Thoemmes, “Industrial Relations, Trade Unions and Social Conflict in German Capitalism,” La Nouvelle Revue Du Travail 2, no. 2013 (2013): 1–15. 25 Miguel Martínez Lucio, “Unhinging Social Dialogue: A Review of the Politics of Pacts and the Diverse Uses and Transfor Mations,” in Employment Relations in an Era of Change: Multi-Level Challenges and Responses in Europe, ed. Valeria Pulignano, Holm-Detlev Kohler, and Paul Stewart (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2016), 207–27; Karin Astrid Siegmann, Jeroen Merk, and Peter Knorringa, “Positive Class Compromise in Globalized Production? The Freedom of Association Protocol in the Indonesian Sportswear Industry,” International Labour Review 156, no. 3–4 (December 2017): 345–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/ilr.12036; Shaianne T. Osterreich, “Precarious Work in Global Exports: The Case of Indonesia,” Review of Political Economy 25, no. 2 (2013): 273–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2013.775826. 25 the industrial relations. It must also support the workers to successfully organise members. It is only then that the workers can stand equally with their employers. To operationalise the second point by drawing a lesson learned from the three unions covered in this report, then the best method to organise IWs are through community and communality. If one would like to find a true kekeluargaan, then it is in these kinds of community. Informal work relations are the function of workers uncertainty. However, even though their work is uncertain, what is certain is their living place. That is why the three unions here succeeded in organising their member by using community and residence-based approaches. A mindful intervention could be done by boosting the TUs capacity to organise the community. The activity of community could be economic in nature, such as developing a collective business together. A generous support for the community’s collective business will have connection with the success of the TU. Bibliography Beittinger-Lee, Verena. (Un)Civil Society and Political Change in Indonesia A Contested Arena. Routledge, 2009. Bowen, John R. “On the Political Construction of Tradition: Gotong Royong in Indonesia.” The Journal of Asian Studies 45, no. 3 (May 1986): 545. https://doi.org/10.2307/2056530. Carnegie, Paul J. The Road from Authoritarianism to Democratization in Indonesia. Palgrave Macmillan, 2910. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. New Ed. Princeton University Press, 2007. Jordhus-Lier, David. “Claiming Industrial Citizenship: The Struggle for Domestic Worker Rights in Indonesia.” Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift 71, no. 4 (2017): 243–52. Lucio, Miguel Martínez. “Unhinging Social Dialogue: A Review of the Politics of Pacts and the Diverse Uses and Transfor Mations.” In Employment Relations in an Era of Change: Multi-Level Challenges and Responses in Europe, edited by Valeria Pulignano, Holm-Detlev Kohler, and Paul Stewart, 207–27. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2016. Meardi, Guglielmo. “Labour Movements and Labour Unions.” Sociopedia.Isa, 2010, 1–10. Nugroho, Alih Aji. “Relasi Industrial Pada Pasar Tenaga Kerja Fleksibel Dan Perjuangan Buruh Menuntut Upah Layak Serta Jaminan Kerja Di Kawasan Industri Bekasi.” Gadjah Mada University, 2016. Osterreich, Shaianne T. “Precarious Work in Global Exports: The Case of Indonesia.” Review of Political Economy 25, no. 2 (2013): 273–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2013.775826. Siegmann, Karin Astrid, Jeroen Merk, and Peter Knorringa. “Positive Class Compromise in Globalized Production? The Freedom of Association Protocol in the Indonesian Sportswear Industry.” International Labour Review 156, no. 3–4 (December 2017): 345–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/ilr.12036. Standing, Guy. The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class. Bloomsbury Academic, 2011. Thoemmes, Jens. “Industrial Relations, Trade Unions and Social Conflict in German Capitalism.” La 26 Nouvelle Revue Du Travail 2, no. 2013 (2013): 1–15. Vatikiotis, Michael R. J. Indonesian Politics Under Suharto. Indonesian Politics Under Suharto. Third ed. Routledge, 1998. Official Documents Badan Pusat Statistik, Indikator Pasar Kerja Indonesia Februari 2017. Ministry of Industry, Making Indonesia 4.0, 2018. Perusahaan Listrik Negara, Statistik PLN 2017. World Bank, World Development Report 2019 27 Annex List of interviews & participants of FGDs 1. Jakarta: a. Interview: SERBUK i. Khamid, SERBUK’s Secretary General ii. Britha, SERBUK Central Executive Committee, Legal Division 2. Yogyakarta a. Interview: SBKI Organiser i. Hepy, SERBUK Yogyakarta b. FGD: SBKI Members i. Agus ii. Sigit iii. Triyo 3. Solo a. Interview: SPLAS Organiser i. Husen, SERBUK Central Java b. FGD: SPLAS Members i. Tri, chapter Palur ii. Pur, chapter Sukoharjo iii. Dar, chapter Grogol iv. Joko, chapter Manahan 28