Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2019, 9 (3–4), 98–105
DOI:10.2478/ebce-2019-0014
Ethical teachings of Classical Antiquity philosophers in the poetry
of Saint Gregory of Nazianzus
Erika Brodňanská1 & Adriána Koželová2
Abstract
The paper focuses on the ethical teachings of Classical Antiquity philosophers in the poetry of Saint Gregory of
Nazianzus, especially on the parallels between the author’s work and the Cynics and the Stoics. The syncretic
nature of Gregory’s work, reflected in the assimilation of the teachings of ancient philosophical schools and the
then expanding Christianity creates conditions for the explanation and highlighting of basic human virtues.
Gregory of Nazianzus’ legacy also draws on the teachings of such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle, but he
always approaches them from the perspective of a strictly Christian worldview. He understands philosophy as a
moral underlying basis from which one can draw inspiration for a virtuous and happy life. Gregory thinks that
philosophy cannot harm Christians in the pursuit of a virtuous life. Nevertheless, Christian teachings and God are
the highest authority. They stand above all philosophical schools or ideas advanced by specific philosophers.
Gregory’s moral poetry thus directs his readers, if they are to deserve eternal life, to follow the commandments,
which is possible only if one lives a practical and virtuous life.
Keywords: Gregory of Nazianzus, moral poetry, Cynicism, Stoicism, virtues
The Golden Age of Patristic Literature, as the 4th and 5th century CE are often referred to,
provides an abundance of material of great theological and literary significance. It is a period
in which the declining culture of pagan antiquity meets the successfully expanding Christianity.
The two cultural paradigms are also confronted in the works of St. Gregory of Nazianzus – a
theologian and one of the most important church fathers of the Eastern Christian tradition, who
also excelled as rhetorician and poet. He taught and explained basic questions of faith, provided
reading of the Scripture, expressed his opinions on education, preached and praised,
contemplated on being, offered insight into his innermost thoughts, pondered moral dilemmas,
and, in doing so, he did not hesitate to draw on the ancient pagan philosophers, selecting worthy
ideas and offering them to young Christians. Ultimately, each ancient philosophical system
comprises ethical teachings or criticism of morality, calls for a certain way of behaving and
entails life choices.
Moral education was highly regarded by the ancient Greeks. This is evidenced by the
statements of the seven sages3 gathered in Delphi in order to sacrifice the fruit of their wisdom
to Apollo in his temple. The sages’ votive offerings were the inscriptions of words recognized
today by the whole world (e.g. Know yourself, Not too much of anything).4 The inventory of
these and other maxims and adages was engraved in stone near the temple. The habit of
displaying similar inscriptions in public places, so that passers-by could always see them,
spread throughout the Greek world (Hadot, 2004, p. 21). The tradition of educating the youth
(παιδεία; paideia) in Greece had been flourishing since the time of Homer and maintained by
those who had the so-called ἀρετή (arete), an ability inherited by virtue of noble lineage, since
it pertained to members of the aristocracy. The word ἀρετή denotes something that is
appreciated, conspicuous and inspiring awe. In Homer’s times it was prowess in battle and
physical perfection. Nevertheless, the Greeks had gradually shifted from admiring military
1
2
University of Prešov, Faculty of Arts, Institute of Romance Studies, Prešov (Slovakia); erika.brodnanska@unipo.sk
University of Prešov, Faculty of Arts, Institute of Romance Studies, Prešov (Slovakia); adriana.kozelova@unipo.sk
3
Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, Periander of Corinth, Bias of Priene
Kleobulos z Lindu, Cleobulus of Lindos.
4
Cf. Plato, Protagoras 343A and Plutarch, De E 385f.
98
valor to praising mental capabilities. Thus, the meaning of ἀρετή shifted from the physical
domain to the domain of the soul that excels in knowledge, goodness and morality. For the
philosophers, ἀρετή became virtue and nobility of the soul (Hadot, 2004, p. 11).
The subject has been explicitly treated by St. Gregory of Nazianzus in two of his moral
poems. Poems I,II,265 and I,II,276 have identical names, In nobilem male moratum, implying,
that they are addressed to someone of noble descent, but lacking morals. Poem I,II,26 starts
with a reference to an exceptional man,7 who, despite being of low origin, countered ridicule
by fittingly saying Τὸ γένος ἔστιν ὄνειδος ἔμοιγε, γένει δὲ σύ.8 Gregory strongly recommends
that the addressee of the poem behave in the same way and not approve of anything but virtuous
behavior.9 According to Gregory, the evildoers, those who do not practice ἀρετή and do not
ennoble their soul are slaves. On the contrary, he calls the free aristos (the best).10 At the end
of the poem the author states that it is better to be the best offspring of vile lineage than to be
the worst of a noble one. For a rose also grows out of a thorny bush. And yet, it is a rose.
Though, if in good soil a bramble sprouts it fits only to be put on the fire.11 And he develops
this further: If you are vile and yet boast of noble ancestry, you are but a donkey with the pride
of a horse.12 The donkey and the horse also appear in the poem I,II,27. Nevertheless, compared
to the previous poem, the latter is more emphatic and articulate in the treatment of the nobleness
of the spirit: ὁ τρόπος δʼἐμοὶ γένος.13 Gregory of Nazianzus also addresses the matter marginally
in other poems. Of these, let us mention the one that precedes the above mentioned poems in
the collection Patrologia Graeca14 (PG) and deals primarily with anger (I,II,25 Adversus iram).
In it, Gregory identifies the nobility (origin) as a child’s toy,15 clearly debasing those who
capitalize on the merits of others and implying the worthiness of virtue.
The roots of the teachings on ethics can be found in works by many ancient philosophers.
Plato considered the cardinal virtues of temperance, wisdom, courage and justice16 as
prerequisites for the success of civil society (Plato, The Republic 427d–434c). The most
important objective in Plato’s Academy was to learn and adopt a philosophical way of life. Such
life then ensures the happiness and salvation of the soul (Brisson, 1993, p. 480). To live a
philosophical life means to adhere to an intellectual and spiritual life, to accomplish a
“conversion” in which the “whole soul” and all moral life are at stake (Hadot, 2004, p. 65).
However, it was Aristotle’s school that offered training in an exclusively philosophical way of
life.17 Aristotle viewed virtue as the improvement of human nature itself – i.e. reason (Störig,
1985, p. 185). According to Aristotle, it is in reason that one can find the primary type of
5
PG 37, 851–854.
PG 37, 854–856.
7
Although Gregory does not specify who the exceptional man was, we know that he reacted similarly to Cicero,
when he was advised to change his name (Cicero = Chickpeas) in the senate when he entered political life
(Plutarch, Cicero 1).
8
My family is my shame, but you are the shame of your family (I,II,26,4b–5a; PG 37, 851).
9
I,II,26,5–6 (PG 37, 851).
10
I,II,26,29 (PG 37, 853).
11
I,II,26,36–38 (PG 37, 853–854).
12
I,II,26,39–40 (PG 37, 854).
13
Ethics/morality is my family (the way of life) (I,II,27,10; PG 37, 854).
14
Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca (1857–1858). Accurante J. P. Migne. Paris.
15
I,II,25,448 (PG 37, 844).
16
According to Plato, temperance is the ability to find a true balance between enjoyment and ascetic life, wisdom
is the domain of reason and courage comes from the will. Justice is the balance of the three abilities mentioned
above.
17
Although conducting mathematical research and practicing philosophical discussions, Plato’s school had a
political agenda.
6
99
happiness,18 philosophical happiness, which is associated with θεωρία (theoria),19 i.e. the way
of life that is devoted solely to intellectual activity (Hadot, 2004, p. 80). The Greek θεωρία
means observation, exploration, knowledge (Panczová, 2012, p. 616). The Greeks sought
wisdom, that is, knowledge that originates in the perception of what is seen. Since people mostly
want to see only what they like, for the Greeks, the purpose of θεωρία was also a happy life
(Špidlík, 2010, pp. 13, 24).
The topic of philosophical happiness was also developed in the writings of St. Gregory of
Nazianzus, who approached it from the vantage point of disease.20 The issue is addressed
explicitly in three short moral poems (I,II,3521 De philosophica paupertate; I,II,3622 De eodem
argumento; I,II,3923 De fortuna et providentia). In the first two, Gregory uses the image of
disease. Its purpose is to create and confirm the stereotypes of restraint but also of justice (and
in so doing, further reinforce their overall significance in his writings). These fixed patterns and
perception of reality stem from the very nature of Gregory’s work. His moral poetry targets and
shapes the recipients. The author clearly declares his attitudes and urges the reader to follow
his example. This creates space for internal projection, which makes the reader understand
disease through comparative reflection. Gregory urges the doubtful to see the virtues in such
perspective that they understand that bliss and earthly pleasures lead to downfall. In the third
poem24 the author no longer needs the archetypal paradigms – abundance and misery –
pertaining to disease, which may affect the rich and the poor alike. Yet, the rich lose seemingly
more, since they do not fear only the loss of health or even life, but also the loss of wealth. In
the poem, Gregory divides people into two categories: those who are blissful, happy and enjoy
all things profane, and those who are moderate and guided by reason. The final verse of the
poem “An abyss of bliss is not worth as much as a drop of reason”25 reminds the reader of the
morality of fables, which is accentuated by the image of the abyss. Although of colossal
proportions, it ultimately is of lesser significance than a drop of reason. The same image
advances the idea of void, in which bliss becomes misfortune for those who fall for it.
Relegating the notion of θεωρία exclusively to the domain of what is perceptible by reason
corresponds to Platonic tradition and was later confirmed by Aristotle. However, this position
had been discredited by the Stoics. The Stoics despised philosophers who did not reflect the
acquired knowledge in their behavior (Špidlík, 2010, p. 186). Likewise, Gregory of Nazianzus,
in the poem I,II,33 Tetrastichae sententiae, asks in the very first verse: Do you prefer practice
or theory?26 J. Lemaître, as cited by T. Špidlík, states that Gregory is still a Christian of classical
18
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X, 1178–1179. Aristotle distinguished between two types of happiness. First,
happiness one finds in an active life, in politics, and that is achieved by leading a virtuous life; and, a second type
called philosophical happiness.
19
As far as Christians are concerned, the apostolic fathers did not even have this word in their vocabulary. It
appeared only with Clement of Alexandria and Origen in the 2nd century CE. It was appropriated by St. Gregory
of Nazianzus as the basis of the Greek understanding of knowledge, and it became the basis for his own approach
to knowledge (Špidlík, 2010, pp. 31, 33).
20
I,II,35: Hedonist, when you are ill, do you enjoy the riches? If you are tormented by illness, know that you have
got the cure too. On the other hand, there are those who are poor and modest. They are neither tormented nor in
need of the cure. But know that in such a case I would prefer he who is rich and weak and confused to he who is
poor, healthy and already wise.
I,II,36: Imagine somebody getting ill and in need of medication and who wants to get rid of the hardship. Imagine
someone else, who is healthy and does not need anything. Who will you say is happy? Everybody says it is he who
is healthy. He might live in great poverty, but is happier still than he who possesses gold and is sick.
21
PG 37, 965.
22
PG 37, 965.
23
PG 37, 967–968.
24
I,II,39: Once a luxury loving person said: “I would rather have a drop of luck, than a bucket full of brains”.
And a wise person replied: “A drop of wisdom is worth more than an abyss filled with luck.”
25
I,II,39,4 (PG 37, 968).
26
Πρᾶξιν προτιμήσειας, ἢ θεωρίαν; (I,II,33,1; PG 37, 928).
100
cultural heritage. His notion of θεωρία is marked by the thoughts of Aristotle and the Stoics.
He believes the knowledge stemming from θεωρία is reached through reason, but reason then
further examines the knowledge, scrutinizes it and explores (Lemaître, 1953, 1814 in Špidlík,
2010, p. 188). Nevertheless, Gregory knows of yet another form of knowledge that he deems
real, spiritual. It arises from πρᾶξις (praxis), i.e., the way people behave. Πρᾶξις was for
Gregory the sum of all virtues (Špidlík, 2010, pp. 189, 197). This view is supported by the
verses of his poem I,II,33, where he states that salvation rests more with deeds without words
than with words without deeds,27 and that grace is not given to those who speak, but to those
who do good. 28
Revisiting the teachings on virtues in individual philosophical schools, the above-mentioned
Stoics saw virtue in the ability to recognize good from evil, that is, in a kind of inner moral
strength (Störig, 1985, p. 195). It is the teachings of the Stoics that are reflected in Gregory’s
poem I,II,25 Adversus iram. The poem is all the more interesting, since it lets the reader
contemplate Gregory’s own feelings. In the poem’s prologue, the author expresses anger over
his own anger,29 and the fact that he cannot prevail over it.30 Gregory fights against anger inside
him as well as against the anger he feels towards his enemies. He intends to defeat anger by
redirecting it from the outer world against himself. The approach he takes is to stay silent, to
adopt a strategy of deeds without words. And although, like the Stoics, Gregory yearns for the
complete elimination of passions, he is content to at least tame them. He welcomes any progress
in the fight against these as he calls them, ailments or diseases. Although, he is aware that
ἀπάθεια (apatheia; state without passion), the supreme goal of human askesis, is attainable only
with the help of God.31
After the introductory remarks, Gregory delves deeper into questions on anger: where it
comes from and how to fight it. In defining anger, he relies on the writings of the men of long
ago,32 philosophers who devoted their time to seeking the origin and nature of things, in this
case, passions. Gregory, in his approach, uses three definitions. First, physiological (vv. 35–
38),33 for which anger (ἔκστασις; ekstasis) is the boiling up of blood in the heart.34 Second,
psychological (vv. 39–42),35 which understands anger as an effort to retaliate, distinguishing
two subcategories: a) ὀργή (orgé) when anger breaks out, and b) μνησικακία (mnesikakia) when
it remains in the soul and waits for appropriate opportunities. 36 Finally, the third, combined
(vv. 43–45),37 in which the willingness to retaliate causes the physiological phenomenon.38
Gregory concludes the topic and does not deem it worth further reflection. Nevertheless, he
further underlines the importance of reason. Verses 47–5339 read: For they all undoubtedly
know that reason rules everything. It is an ally in the fight against passions given to people by
27
I,II,33,21 (PG 37, 929).
I,II,33,24 (PG 37, 930).
29
The poem was written following Gregory’s experience in Constantinople in 381 (Oberhaus, 1991, p. 2), when
he was the bishop there and for some time he also chaired the then held council. He was bishop there for only
about six weeks, when he abdicated as bishop and chairman. Nonetheless, he was deeply wounded and
disappointed that 150 bishops accepted his resignation without major objections and that the Emperor accepted his
departure too (White, 1996 p. XXIII; see also Brodňanská, 2017, p. 33).
30
For more information on the poem see Oberhaus, 1991, p. 1–10.
31
I,II,25,1–30 (PG 37, 813–815).
32
I,II,25,33 (PG 37, 815).
33
PG 37, 816.
34
Cf. Plato, Kratylos 419E.
35
PG 37, 816.
36
This characteristic is provided by Diogenes Laërtius (VII 113), but also by Cicero (Tusc. disp. IV, 9, 21).
37
PG 37, 816.
38
The definition of anger as correlation between body and soul was also entertained by Aristotle (De anima
403a16–28).
39
PG 37, 816–817.
28
101
the Lord. Our houses protect us from the hail, bushes from the cliffs, bastions from abysses and
walls protect those who have to escape the battle. Likewise, reason protects us from mounting
anger. Gregory calls the reason a teacher of good things40 and one of the means of helping
people face anger.
Gregory of Nazianzus sees another means of combatting anger in the guidance of the soul
through speech,41 in which speech should enchant the mind with positive examples.
Consequently, the author uses examples taken from the Bible, but does not avoid profane
sources either, because, as he writes: it is useful to take the fruit of lesser works (i.e. pagan)
since they might hide something good and useful.42 The figures of the Old Testament – Moses,
Samuel, and David –, as well as the ones of the New Testament – the Apostle Peter and the
Martyr Stephen depicted as the embodiment of Christ’s deeds –, are complemented by the
figures of profane world: Aristotle,43 Alexander the Great, Pericles, and Constantine II, who,
meanwhile, became a Christian emperor.
Gregory does not hesitate to use exorcism in his struggle against anger, in accordance with
Socrates, who recommended it as a means of curing anger. It is the poem’s epilogue44 in which
the author refers to this method of protecting himself from the works of the demon, i.e., anger.
In his poetry, Gregory of Nazianzus constantly emphasizes the importance of knowing God.
The crucial part of knowing God was, in the Eastern Roman tradition, associated with virtues,
namely the practice thereof (Špidlík, 2010, p. 197). Gregory himself indicates in one of his
speeches that it is necessary to practise virtues because they adorn the house of the soul (i.e.,
body) until it is illuminated by the light of knowledge of the divine mysteries, for only similar
phenomena apprehend one another (Or. 39, 10). In this regard, the poem I,II,1045 De virtute
offers a more general and comprehensive lesson on virtues. It is addressed to a young man,
apparently Gregory’s nephew Nicobulo (Crimi, 1995, p. 30). In an extensive introduction (vv.
1–217), Gregory discusses the true role of man, which is to approach God. He specifies all the
things he deems superfluous in search of God and he questions the value of the things people
cherish. He also ponders the subject of the existence of wisdom among the Greeks and questions
how one could call them wise if they do not know of the existence of one God. Consequently,
Gregory references the teachings of the ancient philosophical schools pertaining to the moral
lessons not only by using allusions, but also by explicitly naming the representatives of the
individual philosophical schools. Gregory uses these devices to educate his nephew, even
though the philosophers in question were pagan. He further declares that some of these “wise”
men can place virtue first. Gregory generally refers to the wise by using a comparison, such as
in yet another poem Adversus iram: “But I will mention some of them, so that you learn about
virtues. It feels as if I was picking roses from among thorns, when I am learning the best from
the non-believers” (I,II,10,214–217).46 Pointing to the outstanding men (representatives of the
profane world as well as characters from the Bible), Gregory draws the attention of the young
man to four aspects of virtue. They are εὐτέλεια (euteleia; modesty, poverty), ἐγκράτεια
(enkrateia; temperance), ἀνδρεία (andreia; bravery) a σωφροσύνη (sofrosyne; morality,
prudence).
The first of the virtues Gregory mentions is poverty, highlighting its many faces: modesty,
simplicity, selflessness, restraint, and independence from property. Simplicity, understood as
satisfaction with the little, was practised by all philosophical schools of Antiquity, especially
40
I,II,37,364 (PG 37, 838).
Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 261A.
42
I,II,25,256–257 (PG 37, 831).
43
In his verses, Gregory speaks about a man from Stageira (birthplace of Aristotle) who has overcome his anger
and has not hit a slave. This is probably Gregory’s lapsus memoriae because the anecdote pertains to Plato.
44
I,II,25,516–546 (PG 37, 848–851).
45
PG 37, 680–752.
46
PG 37, 695–696.
41
102
by the Cynics. Of these, St. Gregory chose for his nephew the example of Diogenes of Sinope
and Crates of Thebes (I,II,10,218–258).47 Diogenes used to sleep behind the Athenian city walls
in a discarded amphora (the famous barrel), ate what he found, got rid of his property and was
said to be wandering with his wife. Gregory further praises the poverty of Cleanthes of Assa
(I,II,10,286),48 one of the Old Stoics, who is said to have come to Athens so poor that he had to
make money by drawing water and voluntarily died of hunger. The author also admires the
unselfishness of Aristid who, despite managing the Athenian treasury, had almost no money at
the time of his death and had to be buried at state expense (I,II,10,341–349).49 When addressing
moderation, Gregory recalls the wise maxim he had heard of the need to practise restraint when
eating50 (I,II,10,56–587).51 He adds that a fat abdomen does not make a sharp mind. This idea
resonates in many of Gregory’s poems, but in the above mentioned poem he wants to give
explicit examples to Nicobulo and highlights the behavior of the Cynic, Kerkides and the Stoics,
since they provide only “modest” bread and water with vinegar (I,II,10,595–611).52 Regarding
courage, Gregory asks Nicobulo who is the object of his admiration. The young man admires
the courage of Leos and his three daughters, who were sacrificed in order to save Athens53; for
the rescue of Thebes, Menoikeos54 scarified himself. He admires how Epictetus and
Anaxarchus55 could endure pain, but also the fact that Socrates drank poisonous hemlock
(I,II,10,676–696).56 Finally, Gregory highlights Xenocrates, Epicurus and Polemon, who tried
to live virtuously and were able to overcome the seduction of pleasure. He also praises
Alexander, who, although having captured Darius’ beautiful daughters, did not approach them
inconveniently (I,II,10,774–828)57 (Brodňanská, 2008, pp. 109–114).
When we examine the examples used by Gregory, we notice that he resorts mainly to the
Cynics and Stoics. Cynicism was exclusively an ethical and practical philosophical movement.
It understood philosophy as the art of life and life as philosophical practice. Its practitioners
sought to make decisions based on their own rationale so that they could freely shape their lives
(Flachbartová, 2015, pp. 11–13). Although the works of the early Cynics have not been
preserved, we have a rich doxographic and literary legacy that portrays their actions. In it,
biographical elements are intertwined with fiction. However, these texts “are important for the
understanding of the philosopher’s stance. They also display an ethical message in practical
situations” (Flachbartová, 2015, p. 30). “Cynic philosophical principles were absorbed into the
Stoic tradition in the late-first and second centuries, and became largely indistinguishable from
the Stoic agenda. As Christians absorbed Stoic models of thought, elements of Cynic thinking
became part of Christian philosophy” (Krueger, 1993, pp. 29–30).
The ethical message hidden in the stories Gregory addresses to Nicobulo – as well as other
readers – not only reveals his ideas about what makes a good life. It is a reminder that only
those who really live a virtuous and ethical life can achieve it and that it is not enough to know
about such a life. For it is πρᾶξις, not θεωρία, that is but the sum of all virtues. Πρᾶξις leads to
θεωρία, i.e., spiritual knowledge that is the real knowledge (Špidlík, 2010, p. 189).
47
PG 37, 696–698.
PG 37, 700.
49
PG 37, 705.
50
Charés, Sententiae 2, 2–3.
51
PG 37, 722.
52
PG 37, 723–724.
53
The legendary Attic figure Leos was said to have sacrified his three daughters – Praxithea, Theope and Eubule
– in order to save Athens from plague and famine (Buol, 2018, p. 30).
54
The son of Theban king Creon, who voluntarily sacrificed himself in the War of the seven against Thebes, when
the city was in danger of being defeated.
55
Anaxarchos of Abdera was a Greek philosopher of the school of Democritus and was a contemporary of
Alexander the Great.
56
PG 37, 729–730.
57
PG 37, 736–739.
48
103
Practising the four virtues that Gregory of Nazianzus presents in the poem De virtute
(I,II,10), should inspire people to lead a good life. Poverty offers him freedom, temperance
guides him on the path of good deeds, courage helps him overcome fear – the strongest weapon
of Evil –, and morality, closely related to prudence and wisdom, helps him approach God. It is
precisely the knowledge of God, that is for Gregory the purpose of every endeavor
(I,II,10,931).58 However, only knowing God is not enough. It is necessary to love, because love
is a hospitable friend of knowledge (I,II,10,984)59 and those who do not love God cannot grasp
Him (I,II,25,363).60
One of the main features of the moral poetry of Gregory of Nazianzus is not only the return
to older philosophical schools, but also the use of their means of expression. He uses practical
examples of respectable behavior, called chreiai (Crimi, 1995, p. 41), in which the emphasis is
on usefulness (Flachbartová, 2015, p. 31). These maxims held a specific place in cynicism and
we can find them in Gregory’s poetry, where they are used mainly as a means of enlivening
interpretation but didactic significance is undeniable too (Crimi, 1995, pp. 41–42). Moreover,
Gregory of Naziazus often uses the form of the so-called diatribe,61 which was originally a
witty satirical sermon preached by wandering philosophers, and turned later into critical or even
shaming writings. Diatribe was often used by cynics and stoics, and some of Gregory’s moral
poems (or parts of them) can be considered diatribes, of which De virtute (I,II,10) and Adversus
iram (I,II,25) are two examples.
Gregory of Nazianzus sought to influence young Christians by his poetry. He explained not
only moral, but also dogmatic, autobiographical and lyrical themes with the explicit intention
of advancing Christian ideology, while the poetic form was chosen deliberately as a more
pleasant and attractive means of delivering the message. Moreover, Gregory sought to write
Christian poetry that could rival and be an alternative to the appealing Hellenistic poetry. The
quality of Gregory’s poems disproved the contemporaneous polemical view that Christians
lacked education and literary works (Drobner, 2011, p. 381). Gregory viewed Ancient
scholarship (philosophy, literature, but also mythology) as a foundation upon which young
Christians could rely under condition that they think critically and choose only the good and
useful parts. He himself adopted an attitude of controlled acceptance of pagan teachings. He
embraced what is good, but did not forget or constantly remind himself that above all is Love,
Scripture (Logos in the fullest of its meaning), God. Gregory’s poem I,II,4062 De rerum
humanarum vanitate expresses this attitude in its entirety. Since the poem concludes the moral
poetry in the collection PG, it can be seen as a final reminder of the inevitability of death, for it
is then that people face God’s judgment. The ending also implies the importance of practising
virtues on the way to knowing God:
Those who mimic spider fibers
and rejoice in the delicacies in life
let them know how easy the wind will dispose
all that the spider finds pleasing.
You, whose thrones are beautifully decorated,
who are proud of the prestige that is anyway ephemeral,
beware of the final judgment
that nothing can escape.
58
PG 37, 747.
PG 37, 751.
60
PG 37, 838.
61
Diatribe typically contain elements of dialogue, rhetoric questions, shortened expressions, exclamations,
imperative mood, comparisons, the use of gnomes, examples, etc.
62
PG 37, 968.
59
104
Philosophy is, in the work of Gregory of Nazianzus and in his overall attitude to life, one of the
instruments, but not the ultimate goal of human existence. Despite its significance, it remains a
mere instrument that sets the boundaries and leads to an understanding of the virtues and their
meaning.
Translated by Ján Drengubiak
This article is a part of the results of grant VEGA 1/0114/17 Poemata moralia of Gregory of Nazianzus.
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