MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. IX, NO. 1, MARCH 2002
THE ARROGANCE
OF
OCCUPATION
Lev Grinberg
Dr. Grinberg is a political sociologist and the director of the Humphrey
Institute for Social Research at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,
Israel.1
I
attitude towards Yasser Arafat has extremely problematic implications. If the
equating of the September 11 attacks and
Palestinian violence is uncritically accepted, the meaning should be expanded to
not only conclude that Arafat is the “local
Bin Laden,” but also that Bush is the
“global Sharon.” This superficial thinking,
which simplifies complex political situations
and the personification of historical conflicts, is the result of a conscious propaganda campaign and the unconscious
effect of uneven power relations. Israel
has been the occupier of the Palestinians
during the past 35 years. As often occurs,
the ruling side in a conflict is unable or
unwilling to see the other as an equal, as a
people with needs, dreams and dignity. This
is what I will refer to here as the arrogance of occupation.
mmediately after September 11, the
Israeli government began a diplomatic campaign aimed at convincing
the international community, and in
particular the U.S. administration, that
Israel is subject to the same types of terror
attacks as the United States. Ariel Sharon
declared that Arafat is “our local Bin
Laden.” This comparison also led to the
conclusion that Palestinian violence against
Israel is equivalent to terror.
This equation was rapidly adopted by
certain segments of U.S. public opinion
and, in particular, by New Yorkers, who,
under the leadership of then-Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani, equated New York to
Jerusalem. However, the U.S. administration did not easily accept the Israeli diplomatic effort. Such acceptance was delayed
more than two months, during which time
the Bush administration worked on the
formation of a coalition with certain Arab
regimes. Only subsequent to the coalition’s
establishment, after it became apparent
that the alienation from Israeli policies was
not necessary in the context of Afghanistan
(unlike the Gulf War), did the United States
adopt the Israeli characterization of the
Palestinian struggle as terror.
The acceptance of the official Israeli
SHARON: “THE DOG (ARAFAT) IS
CAPTURED IN HIS LODGE”
Toward the end of the first visit of the
American envoy, General Zinni, to the
region (at the beginning of December
2001), U.S. policy dramatically shifted, and
the Israeli argument that the core (and the
solution) of all problems lies with Yasser
Arafat was officially accepted. Immedi-
46
GRINBERG: THE ARROGANCE OF OCCUPATION
restraining the religious Islamic extremism
among the Palestinians is their nation’s
significant Christian minority. From the
time he was allowed to return to Palestine
in 1994, Arafat’s yearly prayers in
Bethlehem have conveyed a moderate
message with regard to Palestinian nationalism. This was precisely the message that
the Israeli government was determined to
prevent.
The question is, why does the international community, and especially the United
States and Europe, remain almost completely indifferent to Arafat’s confinement?
The argument here is that they accept the
Israeli construction that Arafat’s personality is the cause of all problems in the
region. This fabrication began in July 2000,
following the Camp David summit, and is
based on an arrogant and paternalist
discourse on the “character of Arafat.”
This discourse assumes that we, the
Israelis, are at liberty to dismiss one
Palestinian leader and appoint another in
his place. As will be analyzed below, the
arrogance in relation to Arafat highlights
the underlying dimension of the failed Oslo
peace process and the Camp David
summit. As will be suggested, there is an
intimate relationship between Israeli
arrogance and the explosion of the new
wave of violence that has almost erased
any prospects of a peaceful solution of the
conflict.
ately prior to Zinni’s arrival, Israel executed
a targeted killing of one of Hamas’s most
respected political leaders in the West
Bank, Mahmud Abu Hunud.2 A retaliatory
wave of Palestinian violence exploded,
reaching its peak in three suicide bombings
in Jerusalem and Haifa in which 25 Israelis
were killed.3
In response, Yasser Arafat was put
under military siege in Ramallah: his air
force (two helicopters) was destroyed,
along with the Dahania airport in Gaza.
Sharon declared the siege would continue
until Arafat satisfies a long list of Israeli
demands, a list that seems to undergo daily
expansions. (“The dog is captured in his
lodge, and he knows what he should do to
exit,” explained Sharon in a closed forum.4)
Confining Arafat to Ramallah is not based
upon an anti-terror logic. On the contrary,
such confinement prevents Arafat from
travelling to different areas, necessary in
order to organize and encourage his forces
to attempt to curtail extremist attacks
against civilian targets and to engage in
dialogue with different groups of political
opponents. It also presents a very weak
image of Arafat to the Palestinians of an
impotent leader unable to struggle against
Israel and to provide protection and
security to his people.
Arafat’s weak image obviously jeopardizes his capacity to make authoritative
decisions and lead the Palestinians. Hence,
by any objective standard, the real goal of
Arafat’s confinement is not to repel terror
but to prevent the Palestinians from
achieving any gains in the diplomatic arena,
the only arena that can provide them
significant progress.5 This goal was
evident when Arafat was prevented from
attending the Christmas Eve mass in
Bethlehem. One of the powers capable of
THE CAMP DAVID RESULTS:
CLINTON BLAMES ARAFAT
The discourse labeling Arafat as the
essence of the Palestinian problem did not
achieve predominance by virtue of the
campaign waged by the settlers’ leaders in
the occupied territories or the extreme
right. Rather, it is the discourse of the
47
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. IX, NO. 1, MARCH 2002
Israeli peace movement from the beginning quarter of the Knesset remained in the
of the Oslo peace process, and specifically, Coalition. Two parties, representing 32
following the failure of the Camp David
Knesset members, remained in the governsummit. President Clinton’s adoption of this ment, while four parties, representing 35
discourse, immediately after the summit,
Knesset members, withdrew from the
fatally damaged the U.S. image as an
government as a result of differences
“honest broker” between the parties. U.S.
between their views and those of the prime
impartiality was further doubted because
minister on various issues, including Camp
Arafat had argued in advance that the
David. Even the previous foreign minister,
David Levy, was neutralized: He didn’t
summit had not been sufficiently prepared
for. The fact that the United States had lost participate in the negotiations and warned
its credibility was a central step in the
of their impending failure. While the
deterioration of the peace process and the
Knesset was not in session, a mass vote of
no-confidence was expected to take place
inevitable strengthening of the intifada,
precisely because Oslo was based on the
immediately after resuming the session,
and new elections
Palestinian hope
that the United
were to be schedEhud Barak and . . . Shlomo
States would serve
uled. In light of
Ben
Ami
.
.
.
attack[ed]
Arafat
as an honest broker.
Prime Minister
Former Prime
Barak’s less-thanimmediately following the
Minister Ehud
optimal political
Camp David summit. Their
Barak and his
situation, rallying
obvious
goal
was
to
hide
their
foreign minister,
the peace supportown resounding failure from
Shlomo Ben Ami,
ers against Arafat
reaffirmed this
was the result of
the Israeli public.
sophisticated and
Barak’s political
latent strategy of
instinct. However,
narrowing a tremendous regional conflict
his resounding success was due to the
down to Arafat’s personality flaws by
enlisting of Bill Clinton to back his interpredirectly attacking Arafat immediately
tation of Camp David.
following the Camp David summit. Their
However, even when this move to
obvious goal was to hide their own rereduce the conflict to Arafat’s personality
sounding failure from the Israeli public:
can be explained by the interests of the
they created high expectations that the
actors and political conjunction, its success
summit would lead to a comprehensive
has a profound structural level. Indeed, the
agreement on all the issues in dispute and a result of this eventual development was the
Palestinian declaration of the end of the
reduction of the entire Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
conflict to the “character of Arafat,” and
Indeed the expectations created were
hence the self-evident magic-wand solution
ambitious, taking into account the very
of “removing the obstacle.” This arrogant
difficult political atmosphere that existed on discourse is reflected in the urge to enthe eve of the summit: one year after the
throne in Arafat’s place an alternative,
formation of the government only one
more “obliging” leader, and in the paternal-
48
GRINBERG: THE ARROGANCE OF OCCUPATION
istic argument that “we know what is
better for the Palestinians.”
In effect, each wing of the Israeli
government opts for a Palestinian leader
who would best serve its respective
purposes. The “moderates” prefer a
moderate dressed in a business suit who
would consent to deal in a rational Western
manner. The “extremists” fancy a Hamas
type who could justify an open and bloody
war against “the Palestinian evil,” an easy
way to show the world that we are the
avant garde of the “anti-terror war.” Both
of these camps share the same discourse
that the burden for resolving the crisis lies
on Arafat’s shoulders, while consequently
soft pedaling Israel’s own responsibility. In
fact, the government is fighting Arafat and
his forces – thus preventing him and the
Palestinian authorities from succeeding in
any potential struggle against extremist
Islam, because Palestinian extremism and
terror facilitates hiding the core problem of
occupation.
It is important to emphasize that this
discourse, which was accepted first in
Israel, and later in the United States, was
constructed by the leaders of the “Left,”
and not by the “extremist and nationalist
Right.” Indeed, they did so because of their
need to explain away the fiasco of their
term of office. However, the general
acceptance of this discourse by the Israeli
public and the U.S. administration is related
to the power relations between Israelis and
Palestinians.
ans developed similar discourses. The local
inhabitants were classified as inferior and
primitive, deserving no individual rights and
certainly no collective right to a homeland.
Such has been the state of affairs in Israel/
Palestine since the onset of the colonization; the Oslo peace accords introduced no
fundamental change in the power relationship. Oslo didn’t dismantle Israeli domination of Palestinians, but the language of
peace has hidden the continuity of Israeli
occupation. Indeed, the right of Palestinians to self-determination was recognized,
as was Arafat as their representative.
However, this recognition was subordinated to the arrogant discourse of occupation: the land belongs to us, Israelis, we are
its masters, and the Palestinians must
accept whatever we are benevolent
enough to offer them. The indignation of
the “Left” towards the Palestinians following Camp David stems from the Palestinians’ ingratitude and their refusal to accept
Barak’s “generous” offer. The support of
the United States for the Israeli attitude
caused the Palestinian despair that deteriorated into a new intifada.
The Oslo accords were shaped
according to the hegemonic arrogance of
occupation. Having been initially “granted”
Jericho and Gaza, Arafat was placed “on
probation.” If he passed the test, he would
be awarded additional territory; if not, the
process would be halted, as Rabin constantly proclaimed. When Rabin was
assassinated, the Israelis voted for a more
open and openly arrogant discourse
proposed by Netanyahu. After the withdrawal from the problematic urban areas,
difficult to rule by military forces, Israel
had no new incentive to continue the
process. It remained in control of all the
vital aspects of nationhood: borders, water,
BETWEEN OCCUPATION AND THE
“PEACE PROCESS”
The arrogance and paternalism produced by occupation are not peculiar to the
Israeli situation. European settlers who
occupied regions inhabited by non-Europe-
49
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. IX, NO. 1, MARCH 2002
upon Israeli goodwill. What guaranteed to
the Palestinians Israel’s future good will?
Two factors: Arafat’s trust that Rabin
would bring the process to its final end, and
the umbrella provided by the “honest
broker,” Bill Clinton. Rabin’s assassination
followed by the election of Netanyahu
fatally wounded the chances of bringing
the Oslo peace process to a happy end.
Clinton’s blaming of Arafat after the Camp
David summit was the kiss of death.
electricity, telephones, ports and airports,
movement between the cities, and the
Palestinian economy.6 A few thousand
automatic weapons are no competition for
Israel’s tanks, artillery, missiles, helicopters
and bombers.
Netanyahu got tough: “If they provide
results, they’ll get more, if they don’t, they
won’t.” Israel legally controls everything,
and resumption of the Oslo process
depended upon Arafat’s “good conduct,”
his grades to be determined by Israel and
signed by the principal, the U.S. president.
Arafat was expected to do what the Israeli
army had failed to do: restrain Palestinian
extremists and provide security to the
Israelis. However, he wasn’t entitled to
protect the security of the Palestinians, still
ruled by the Israeli IDF, or to struggle for
independence for his people. Hence,
Arafat’s authority was not derived from
the Palestinian people and their legitimate
rights but rather from Israel’s consent to
his presence. Hence it is also feasible to
expel him.
While the Oslo accords constrained
Arafat’s capacities and authority, they
didn’t restrain Israeli power or balance it in
any way. Israel compromised merely by
vacating the larger Palestinian towns (and
some land in their vicinity, as Israel saw
fit), thus allowing Arafat to appoint governors and policemen but not permitting
territorial contiguity or sovereignty. Israel
did not take upon itself the ceding of
military control, the creation of a Palestinian state, the granting of economic independence, withdrawal to 1967 borders, and
certainly not the resolution of volatile issues
such as Jerusalem or the Palestinian
refugees. Israel did not even halt or slow
down its colonization drive in the occupied
territories. The entire agreement rested
WILL THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY STOP SHARON?
Ariel Sharon came to power under
very peculiar circumstances. While the
majority of the Israeli public still believes
that the only viable solution to the conflict
is the creation of a Palestinian state, there
are no political forces able to lead Israel to
this end. Barak destroyed the credibility of
the peace camp as well as the status of the
Labor party in Israeli public opinion.
Sharon has no legitimacy in Israel to defeat
the Palestinians (and return to the pre-Oslo
direct occupation), so he prefers to attack
Arafat, according to the arrogant discourse
constructed by Barak.
This discourse, supported by international public opinion since the tragic events
of September 11, prevents the emergence
of significant peace forces in Israel and
Palestine that could lead a new peace and
anti-violence movement. What must be
made clear here is that the absence of an
Israeli peace movement, political forces
and leadership is deeply connected to the
“carte blanche” given by international
diplomacy to Sharon – to the targeted
killings, and to the confinement of Arafat
and the destruction of his political and
military forces. Without external pressure
on Sharon, no significant internal force can
50
GRINBERG: THE ARROGANCE OF OCCUPATION
power, the present cycle of bloodshed can
only intensify, with Arafat or – even more
so – in his absence.
From an international point of view, the
acceptance of Sharon’s claim that “Arafat
is Bin Laden” and that he is the only
obstacle to halting violence is extremely
dangerous. It could lead to Palestinian
despair as well as to expanded and uncontrolled conflict in the area. The attempt to
achieve a cease-fire and resume negotiations based on the Mitchell report is
doomed to fail. First, because Israel
continues exerting the cruelty of occupation in everyday life, a form of violence
that is usually unseen but leads to Palestinian reactions instigated by opposition
groups. Second, because no negotiations
can reach a balanced agreement given the
power relations between Israelis and
Palestinians. There is no chance for fruitful
negotiations between the jailor and the
prisoner. In order to balance this relationship, decisive international intervention to
stop Sharon is needed. The international
community must know that its latent
support of Sharon’s policies causes damage every day. Their intervention to stop
him is urgently needed for the sake of the
Palestinians and the Israelis as well.
be generated to arrest the arrogant discourse of occupation within Israel.
This is not the first time that Ariel
Sharon has clamped a siege on Arafat and
attempted to destroy his forces and impose
a new order in an Arab state. He did so in
Lebanon in the summer of 1982. Now he is
using the same logic, based on military
power, used to destroy the legitimate
representation of the Palestinian people. In
the case of Lebanon, the international
community prevented him from entering
the besieged city of Beirut. However, he
succeeded in enthroning Bashir Jumayel as
president of Lebanon. As will be recalled,
Jumayel was assassinated within days of
his appointment, while the Israeli army was
drawn into the 18-year occupation and
low-intensity war against Lebanese militias
that ended in Israel’s forcible removal from
Lebanon.
The Palestinians learned the lessons of
Lebanon well. They are weary of the Oslo
accords, which they regard as an excuse
for continued occupation. Arafat did not
instigate the new intifada, although he may
be endeavoring to direct it, so as to retain
his status as the leader of the people to
whom he is accountable. Unless we, the
Israelis, cast off our arrogant mode of
thinking and our position as an occupying
1
Shorter versions of this article have been published in Hebrew (Maariv, December 17, 2001), German (TAZ,
December 22, 2001) and Swedish (Dagans Nyheter, December 20, 2001).
2
The tactic of executing targeted killings in periods of a relative low level of Palestinian violence became one
of the dominant ways used by the Israeli government to provoke a violent Palestinian response. This is a
cynical use of the killings, based on the fact that they are accepted by the public as legitimate. They provoke
high levels of Palestinian violence, and they help the propaganda effort to show that Arafat is unable to
repress “terror.”
3
The assassination of Abu Hunud is a salient example of the political goal of the targeted killings, aimed at
creating Palestinian reaction (while writing these words, on January 14, 2002, a similar targeted killing of the
Fatah leader of Tulkarem, Karmi Raad, brought to an end a long cease-fire period declared by Arafat four
weeks before). A very striking report in Yediot Aharonot (Hebrew daily, November 25, 2001, “Dangerous
Liquidation”) by Alex Fishman, the security reporter, makes clear the awareness of the military elites of the
meaning of the killing. The article was published before the suicide attacks in Jerusalem and Haifa: “After
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MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. IX, NO. 1, MARCH 2002
raising our hats to the Shabak and the IDF for the liquidation of Mahmud Abu Hunud, . . . we again find
ourselves preparing with dread for a new mass terrorist attack within the Green Line [Israel’s pre-’67 border].
Whoever gave a green light to this act of liquidation knew full well that he is thereby shattering in one blow
the gentleman’s agreement between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority; under that agreement, Hamas was to
avoid in the near future suicide bombings inside the Green Line . . . . This understanding was, however,
shattered by the assassination the day before yesterday – and whoever decided upon the liquidation of Abu
Hunud knew in advance that that would be the price. The subject was extensively discussed both by Israel’s
military echelon and its political one, before it was decided to carry out the liquidation. Now, the security
bodies assume that Hamas will embark on a concerted effort to carry out suicide bombings, and preparations
are made accordingly . . . .”
4
Maariv (Hebrew newspaper), January 4, 2002.
5
Different politicians have declared contradicting goals for the current war against the Palestinians. However
the Israeli military officers constantly declare what the goal is. The goal, according to the military, is to
prevent the Palestinians from any gain from the intifada. This is also the reason that the military declares that
the present violent wave will continue at least five years: If Arafat cannot show to the Palestinians any
political gain, he will obviously be unable to stop the violence.
6
In an article I published immediately after the signing of the Oslo accords, I raised two crucial contradictions
in the process: 1) the Palestinian interest in the long-range results, in contrast with the Israeli interest in the
short range; 2) the contradiction between the drive for continued negotiated pacts between the moderate elites,
and the uneven power relations determined by the occupation (Lev Luis Grinberg, “A Theoretical Framework
for the Analysis of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict,” Revue Internationale de Sociologie, No. 1, 1994,
pp. 68-89).
52
Lev Grinberg