Viet Nam – The Geneva Conference of 1954 NGUYEN NGOC Chau Many have heard of the Geneva Accords of 21 July 1954 which put an end, for the Vietnamese, to the war of independence they had waged since 1858 against the French colonizers, and for the French, to the Indochina War, which began in 1945 to recover the Indochina lost to the Japanese on March 9, 1945. Few, however, know the true content. A doctoral thesis on The Orange Agent1 presented to a jury of the University of Bordeaux in 2015 indicates that the Americans who wanted to stop the communist spread and who were opposed to elections scheduled for future reunification, «had not signed the Geneva agreements in contrast to France.» The belief that these agreements were signed by all the powers present except the United States and the State of Viet Nam is a well-entrenched mistake among many. The following text, which presents this conference, is an excerpt from my book "Vietnam - The Political History of the Two Wars - War of Independence (1858-1954) and Ideological War (1945-1975)", prefaced in the French version by the historian Pierre Brocheux https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wAjGtHC4jEfRBtUywxkPcbuf9oMy6ba6/view?usp=sharing and the English version by Professor Janet Hoskins (USC, LA, USA) https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tdD3mnUaVPZUNVzTemtFJcqdUpSWBsDi/view?usp=sharing 1. The road to the Geneva conference A consequence of the discussions between the four allied powers (25th January 1954) The rearmament of West Germany, which could be a bulwark against possible aggression by the USSR, had to be done within the framework of a treaty establishing a European Defense Community called the CDE (or EDC, European Defense Community) Treaty, i.e. the creation of a European army with supranational institutions, under the supervision of the Commanderin-Chief of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This treaty had already been signed by six countries on 27th May 1952 and ratified shortly thereafter by the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In November 1953, the USSR announced in a letter to the three Allied countries occupying Germany (France, UK and USA) that it accepted the proposal made six months earlier for a four-party conference on Germany, provided that another one, a five-party conference, the fifth country being the People's Republic of China (PRC), was organized afterwards. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault realized at the four foreign ministers' conference in Berlin on 25th January 1954 that his Russian counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov was interested in exchanging an honourable exit of France from Indochina against its non-involvement in the CDE treaty that the USSR did not want. Finally, it was decided to hold another conference in Geneva in April 1954, with the presence of the PRC as proposed by the USSR, and the two subjects treated were Korea and Indochina. 1 A defoliant poured in large quantities on the trail of the Americans in the 1960s to reveal the convoys going from north to south Viet Nam. 1/11 And of course, France agreed not to ratify the CDE Treaty, forcing the United States to use the solution of bringing Germany into NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), a politicalmilitary organization in which member countries had security obligations and collective defence. The positions of Hồ Chí Minh and France Hồ Chí Minh always clearly wanted to resolve the conflict through negotiations: « If the French government, learning from the war of recent years, wants to go to a truce by negotiation and resolve the problems of Việt Nam by peaceful means, the Vietnamese people and the government of the RDVN are ready to accept it [...] It needs only for the [French] government to stop its invasion war so that there will be a ceasefire. The basis of the ceasefire in Việt Nam is the respect for the true independence of Việt Nam [...]2. » This was the meaning of his statement of 29th November 1953 to the Swedish newspaper Expressen. Speaking of the necessary conditions for the negotiations, he said: «Korea's experience shows us that we have to fight until the imperialist is down. Knowing that it can no longer fight, it will agree to negotiate [...]We must also fight so that France is on its knees. At that time, we negotiate if there are negotiations, it is not by offering to negotiate that it will immediately negotiate. Let's not have any illusions. Its purpose is to invade us. If it has 1% hope after losing 99%, it will continue to fight. We have to put it down so that it accepts to negotiate. »3 Regarding France, after eight years of wanting to build a French Union worthy of a great world power, it changed its position. On the military front, it was beginning to be bogged down with a few defeats and a war that had become difficult. Financially, the war was costly despite the heavy aid of the United States: 556 billion francs in 1953 including this aid, and 3.2 billion francs in 1945. The waltz of successive governments started to exhaust everyone. In November 1953, by taking Điện Biên Phủ to make it an entrenched camp, General Navarre merely implemented his plan4 adopted by the French government on 24th July 1953 (and approved by the United States), whose objective was to lead the opponent to negotiate on acceptable terms allowing France to withdraw “in honourˮ5. The aim was to destroy the communist army in the north by way of a victory at Điện Biên Phủ, which controlled the road to Laos and from which the campaigns of recapture of the northwest territories could be carried out. In a nutshell, the two antagonists shared the same vision on the peace negotiations. They could only be done once the opponent was on his knees, everything that happened before was pure tactics to save time. And the secret modus vivendi of 14th September 1946 was one which the French could not fail to realize. 2 Hồ Chí Minh (2009), Toàn tập (Hồ Chí Minh (2009), Complete), pub. Chính trị quốc gia, Hà Nội, t.7, pages 10. Quoted by Trần Hoàng in his Hồ Chí Minh với việc triệu tập Hội nghị Genève năm 1954 về Đông Dương (Ho Chi Minh with the convening of the 1954 Geneva Conference to Indochina). https://nghiencuulichsu.com. 3 Hồ Chí Minh (2009), Toàn tập (Hồ Chí Minh (2009), Complete), pub. Chính trị quốc gia, Hà Nội, t.7, pages 112-113. 4 See 9.3. The strategy of Generals de Lattre de Tassigny (1950-1951) and Navarre (1953-1954). 5 Hoạt động đối ngoại của Chủ tịch Hồ Chí Minh trong kháng chiến chống thực dân Pháp (External activities of President Hồ Chí Minh in the resistance against the French colonizers), Đặng Văn Thái (2004), pub. Chính trị quốc gia, Hà Nội, page 228. 2/11 The Treaties on Full Independence and Relationship (4th June 1954) On 3rd March 1954, Bửu Lộc, representative of the State of Việt Nam, arrived in Paris with a delegation to negotiate with France, based on the Laniel government's declaration of 3 rd July 1953 to grant “full independence and full sovereignty to the associated Statesˮ. The negotiations stalled; the French remained in expectation of the Geneva conference. On 25th April 1954, a day before the start of the Geneva Conference (26 th April 1954), the secretariat of Bảo Đại in Paris issued a statement saying in essence that despite France's promises, Việt Nam still did not have the effective guarantees of its independence and unification of which it was entitled as a free and equal state. On unification, it said that there were several projects whose consequence was the division of the country, that this would give short-term diplomatic benefits to those who would advocate them, but whose implementation would bring significant inconveniences and dangers for the future. It stated that Viet Nam would not accept the results of France's negotiations with the enemies of the Vietnamese people, thus sacrificing the interests of its ally. The Head of State and his government did not consider themselves bound by decisions that went against the independence and unity of Việt Nam, which would violate the right of the people to decide, and which would be in opposition to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the democratic ideal. It was only on 28th April 1954, two days after the start of the Geneva Conference, almost two months after the start of the negotiations (3rd March 1954), and probably in response to the statement made on 25th April by Bảo Đại, that the delegation of Bửu Lộc and the French side were able to agree on the issuance of a joint declaration on the « full independence » of Việt Nam. Two treaties, one on independence («France recognizes Việt Nam as a fully independent and sovereign state»), and the other, on future relationships between the State of Việt Nam and France, were finally signed on 4th June 1954, almost a month after the end of the battle of Điện Biên Phủ (7th May 1954). 2. The Geneva Conference (26th April – 21st July 1954) It was the first time that the People's Republic of China attended an international conference as a great power. Its delegation led by Prime Minister Chou En Lai was 200 people strong, including many seasoned diplomats. From the beginning, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the former right-hand man of Stalin (Stalin had died on 5th March 1953) insisted that the Việt Minh be represented at the conference. Invited after intense discussions, a delegation led by Phạm Văn Đồng arrived on 4th May. The discussions on Indochina began on 8th May 1954, a day after the fall of Điện Biên Phủ. Many hindrances due to the difference in the positions of the Việt Minh and Western countries caused discouragement and irritation in some attendees. Thus, Pierre Mendès-France told the Americans that if a ceasefire was not accepted on 20 th July 1954, he would approve the sending of conscripts to Indochina and introduce a law in Parliament effective 21st July. His government would not resign until this law passed. About the division of the country, from a partition into two territories with enclaves in each (the French thinking of Hải Phòng and positions in the catholic areas, and the Việt Minh of 3/11 certain territories in the South), it came in the end to a division of the country at a certain level of parallel. On Laos and Cambodia, for the Việt Minh, the Khmer Issarak and the Pathet Lao were equivalent to the Việt Minh and had to be recognized by France and should possess territories, like it. The delegations of Laos and Cambodia considered that they were rebels supported by the Việt Minh who had put “volunteersˮ in their ranks and that it was enough to withdraw the foreign forces, those of the Việt Minh included, for the problem to be resolved. Chinese and Russian documents later indicated that the PRC and the USSR had already agreed to push for negotiations on a cease-fire in Việt Nam, without consulting the Việt Minh. In mid-March 1954, Chou En Lai sent a message to Hồ Chí Minh telling him to prepare to come to Geneva and to think about dividing the country after a cease-fire. He also invited him to come to Beijing and then to Moscow to discuss with the Russians. On 18th May 1954, in a dinner with the military specialist of the French delegation Jacques Guillermaz and the French Ambassador to Switzerland, Paul Boncour, Vương Bình Nam, the deputy of Chou En Lai, clearly declared: « We have not come to defend the position of the Việt Minh, but to do everything we can to achieve peace.» The position of the United States, expressed by J.F. Dulles to journalists, was that the primary responsibility for decisions made at the conference fell to France and Việt Nam on the one hand and the Việt Minh on the other. « The United States is of the opinion rather to not interfere in what they want to do [...] If necessary, the United States will refuse to accept the results which will be against American interests. » The Russians, still reeling from the death of Stalin, despite the presence of Molotov, did not react when the Chinese wanted to drive the Việt Minh out of Laos and Cambodia. Wasn’t the Indochinese Communist Party baptized with this name by the Comintern itself in 1930 with instructions to activate the Marxist-Leninist revolution in these two countries? On 25th May, Phạm Văn Đồng proposed a ceasefire and a regrouping of each of the two sides in a well-defined area. On 23rd June 23, Chou En Lai, who met Mendès France in Bern, insisted that the main objective was a cease-fire. Concerning Laos and Cambodia, he believed that troops regrouping territories were needed and that the unification of countries was the responsibility of the royal governments. Finally, he insisted, as he had already done to Eden, that under no circumstances could there be American bases. Chou En Lai met Hồ Chí Minh and Võ Nguyên Giáp in Liễu Châu (Liuzhou), in Guang Xi in China from 3rd to 5th July 1954 to discuss Geneva. Three agreements on Chinese economic aid to the Việt Minh for the year 1954 were signed during this period. Did the signing of these agreements influence the acceptance of the position proposed by Chou En Lai? In any case, The French Ambassador Jean Chauvel was informed during a dinner on 9th July with Chang Wen Tien, the Chinese ambassador to the USSR, that Chou En Lai « had had a very good meeting with Hồ Chí Minh and that the consequences would be of great help to the French. » Jean Chauvel had the impression that the Russians and the Chinese had left the Việt Minh free to negotiate until they had to intervene when its requests could not be accepted by the French. 4/11 On 20th July 1954, after strong direct pressure from Molotov himself during a meeting in his villa Le Bocage with Chou En Lai, Eden and Phạm Văn Đồng (Bedell Smith and the representatives of Bảo Đại were not invited), Phạm Văn Đồng accepted the 17th parallel as a border and two years before the general elections for the unification of the country. A week before, on 13th July 1954, Phạm Văn Đồng was adamant on the 13th parallel and the six-month delay before the elections when he came to meet Trần Văn Đỗ, the head of the nationalist Việt Nam delegation and to discuss the general elections with him. The Geneva conference (figure 16) ended on 21st July 1954. Only the three cease-fire agreements in Laos, Cambodia and Việt Nam were signed by the military representatives of the countries concerned. The political solution was expressed by a “final declarationˮ in thirteen points that no one signed because the United States and the State of Việt Nam refused to do it. Unsigned, this statement could not engage anyone, in the literal sense of the word, and could only be regarded as a mere statement of intent. Figure 16. Geneva Conference on Indochina (26th April – 21st July 1954). Việt Nam would be divided in two at the level of the 17th parallel, the Việt Minh regrouping its forces in the north, and the French and Vietnamese from the State of Việt Nam in the south. The importation of new weapons was limited to replacements. For 300 days the population could move to settle where they wanted. An International Control Commission (ICC) with representatives from India (non-aligned Third World block), Canada (Western block) and Poland (Communist block) would oversee the cease-fire arrangements. The general elections for the unification of the country enshrined in the declaration were scheduled to take place in 1956 with preliminary discussions beginning in 1955.6 Geneva Conference on Indochina (26th April 1954 – 21st July 1954) Country USSR USA UK France PRC Việt Nam Cambodia 6 Negotiators Vyacheslav Molotov General Walter Bedell Smith, U. Alexis Johnson Antony Eden Georges Bidault, Jean Chauvel, Pierre Mendès-France Chou En Lai, Chang Wen Tien, Li Ke Nung Nguyễn Đắc Khê, Trần Văn Đỗ Tep Phan, Sam Sary The population of 25 million in the country finally was divided into 13 million in the North and 12 million in the South. 5/11 Laos Phoui Sananikone Việt Minh Phạm Văn Đồng - Khmers Issarak and Pathet Lao, supported by the Việt Minh, not admitted to the conference - 3 ceasefire agreements in Việt Nam, Cambodia and Laos signed by the countries concerned. - A 13-point statement on the political solution (dividing the country at the 17th parallel level and holding general elections in two years) unsigned (signed by none of the states). Dr Trần Văn Đỗ, the head of the delegation of the State of Việt Nam, asked to add in the conference report, his government's disapproval of the partition of the country, and the way used by the conference to achieve the ceasefire-fire, and he added that his government reserved the right to react, promising that force would not be used against the cease-fire. Ngô Đình Diệm who did not want to have the country divided with the loss of Hà Nội and Hải Phòng presented his resignation to Bảo Đại on 22nd July but was not approved. He was asked to stay at his post. The big winner of the conference was undoubtedly China, which had been able to impose its views on Indochina. It did not want Việt Nam to have a hold over Laos and Cambodia, thus becoming a strong power on its southern borders, and it wanted the war to stop so as not to see the United States threaten its borders in intervening in Việt Nam or establishing bases in the other two countries. It wanted to be able to devote itself entirely to the economic development of its country after the turbulent period of the war against the Japanese, then against Chiang Kai Chek. On 22nd July 1954, Chou En Lai invited all delegations from the countries of the former Indochina to a meal. He placed the two Vietnamese delegations at his table. Ngô Đình Luyện, the brother and also representative of Ngô Đình Diệm, the new Prime Minister of the State of Việt Nam, was next to Tạ Quang Bửu (Việt Minh) whom he had known from the time when they were both students in France. Ngô Đình Luyện remarking that the Văn Miếu (Temple of Literature) of Hà Nội had suffered from the war, Chou En Lai invited him to come to Beijing to visit that of China still intact. Then to his interlocutor who asked him in what capacity he could go to Beijing, without hesitation, he replied: «Why would you not set up a mission in Beijing? ». Seeing Phạm Văn Đồng (Việt Minh) leaping into his chair, he added: «Of course, Mr Đồng is closer to us ideologically, but that does not prevent South Việt Nam from having a representation there. Anyway, aren't you all Vietnamese and aren't we all Asians? » 7. 3. The consequences of France's return: 400,000 to 450,000 victims? The French finally had to go home in 1954, after nine years of having come back to Việt Nam for nothing. Whatever the reasons and the responsible of this useless return to Việt Nam, what were the consequences in human lives and financial cost? Michel Renard states in Études coloniales, Revue en ligne (Colonial Studies, Online Review), Friday, March 16, 2012: « In his book, History of the Indochina War (Denoel, coll. The Colonial Adventure of France, 1992), General Yves Gras claims that the casualties of this conflict are not known “exactlyˮ». « They can reasonably be estimated at 500,000 people, of 7 Nhìn lại Sử Việt (The history of Việt Nam reconsidered), Lê Mạnh Hùng, Ed. THXBMDHK, 2013. 6/11 whom 100,000 to 150,000 were murdered by the Việt Minh. Of this total, the expeditionary force had 59,745 dead and missing, including 2,005 French officers, and the Vietnamese armed forces 58,877 killed and missing » (p. 578-579). He specifies concerning the expeditionary force that a distinction should be made: « 26,923 natives, 12,997 French officers and soldiers and 17,810 African and North African legionnaires and tirailleurs» (p. 579). There are other different estimations but without any mentioned sources (Denise Bouche, Histoire de la colonisation française (History of French Colonization), Fayard pub., 1991, p. 451). » With about 177,000 casualties among the Việt Minh and 100,000 to 150,0008 Vietnamese who died as a result of their actions, the total would result in between 400,000 and 450,000 victims (killed or missing). 3 trillion former francs had been spent, including 614 billion by the USA as part of their aid to France in recent years9. And there, all the tears of the mothers, wives, children and loved ones of those who fell in this war were not counted. 8 9 Une guerre de trente-cinq ans, Indochine-Vietnam, 1940-1975 (Thirty-five Years' War, Indochina-Vietnam, 1940-1975), Raymond Toinet, Ed. Lavauzelle, 1998. La piastre et le fusil, le coût de la guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954 (The piastre and the rifle, the cost of the Indochina War, 1945-1954), Hughes Tertrais, Committee for the Economic and Financial History of France. 7/11 8/11 9/11 10/11 11/11