910774
CJBXXX10.1177/0093854820910774Criminal Justice and BehaviorSörman et al. / Perceptions of Mental Health Conditions
research-article2020
PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH
CONDITIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A Survey Study Involving Swedish Lay Judges
KAROLINA SÖRMAN
Karolinska Institutet
JENNIFER COX
The University of Alabama
CHARLOTTE EKLUND RIMSTEN
Ministry of Justice, Government Offices of Sweden
MARISSA STANZIANI
The University of Alabama
CLAES LERNESTEDT
Stockholm University
MARIANNE KRISTIANSSON
Karolinska Institutet
KATARINA HOWNER
Karolinska Institutet
National Board of Forensic Medicine
Perceptions of mental health conditions influence how individuals with psychiatric diagnoses are treated within the community, in the legal system, and at different institutions. We examined perceptions of mental health conditions among lay
judges (N = 643), working at district and appellate courts throughout Sweden. Participants read a web-based survey including a crime vignette in which the person charged with a crime was described as having schizophrenia (n = 186), antisocial
personality disorder (ASPD) with psychopathic traits (n = 219), or intellectual disability (n = 238). Participants’ perceptions
of schizophrenia were largely in line with Swedish legislation regarding the medicolegal concept of severe mental disturbance
(SMD). Findings were more varied for the other two conditions, however. Perceptions of individuals with ASPD with psychopathic traits were not consistent with the Swedish SMD legislation. The results highlight the complexity of legislation
addressing mental illness and criminality.
Keywords:
lay judge; mental health evidence; legal decision-making; forensic; psychiatry
AUTHORS’ NOTE: The authors thank the anonymous reviewers and the Criminal Justice and Behavior editorial staff for their thoughtful insight and recommendations in the preparation of this article. They would also
like to acknowledge the participating courts for facilitating data collection. Correspondence concerning this
article should be addressed to Karolina Sörman, Centre for Psychiatry Research, Department of Clinical
Neuroscience, Karolinska institutet, Norra Stationsgatan 69, SE-113 64 Stockholm, Sweden; e-mail: Karolina.
Sorman@ki.se
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR, 201X, Vol. XX, No. X, Month 2020, 1–24.
DOI: 10.1177/0093854820910774
Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions
© 2020 International Association for Correctional and Forensic Psychology
ogdr/.oi/p:stht
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
T
he general public’s understanding of mental illness is reported to have improved over
recent decades. However, this understanding does not seem to have been followed by
increased social acceptance of individuals with mental illness (Markowitz, 2011;
Schomerus et al., 2012). Cross-cultural research has demonstrated that the public holds
negative perceptions about individuals with schizophrenia including low social acceptance, distrust, and desire of social distancing (Durand-Zaleski et al., 2012; Vilhauer,
2016). In clinical settings, a medical history of schizophrenia is negatively associated with
expected treatment adherence and management as well as the ability to understand educational materials from treatment providers (Sullivan et al., 2015). There also seems to be a
public perception that schizophrenia is related to violence and dangerousness (Angermeyer
& Matschinger, 2004; Durand-Zaleski et al., 2012; Jensen et al., 2016; Markowitz, 2011).
This perception is partly incongruent with meta-analytical work demonstrating that,
although schizophrenia and other psychoses are associated with violent behavior, in particular homicide, this association seems to be largely driven by concurrent substance abuse
(Fazel et al., 2009).
Lay people’s perceptions of mental illness may influence how individuals with psychiatric disorders are treated within the community, and whether they seek and comply with
treatment (Corrigan et al., 2014). The past decade has seen an exponential increase in international research on the stigma of mental health diagnoses in relation to different constructs
such as “dangerousness” and incompetency (Corrigan, 2016; Corrigan et al., 2014). Stigma
broadly refers to social rejection through preconceptions and discrimination of individuals
with mental illness. It can be manifested through self-stigma (i.e., affected individuals’
internalization of negative self-images), provider stigma (i.e., health care providers’ negative attitudes toward individuals with mental illness) and structural stigma, which can
impair availability of various community resources (Sheehan et al., 2016).
PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN A CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONTEXT
Accumulated evidence of stigma associated with different types of mental health conditions prompts the need to investigate whether such attitudes also influence legal decisionmaking. Research from North America has demonstrated that preconceptions about legal
concepts (e.g., insanity defense) can substantially impact jurors’ general information processing and sentencing recommendations (Louden & Skeem, 2007). According to the attribution theory, people tend to infer attributions of others’ behavior in relation to controllability,
which then impacts the degree to which they sympathize with or want to punish the individual (Corrigan et al., 2003). Research with college students and police officers suggests
there is a higher tendency of social rejection, coercive treatment, and punitiveness when the
criminal behavior is perceived to be associated with a mental illness under the person’s
control (e.g., due to substance abuse). In contrast, offenses that are perceived to be the result
of an organic cause outside the control of the person charged with a crime (e.g., due to head
injury), are more likely to evoke sympathy and result in less punitive sentiments (Corrigan
et al., 2003; Markowitz & Watson, 2015).
In the United States, psychopathy evidence may be presented to the court to address a
variety of legal questions (DeMatteo, Edens, Galloway, Cox, Smith, & Formon, 2014;
DeMatteo, Edens, Galloway, Cox, Smith, Koller, & Bersoff, 2014; Edens et al., 2015;
although see DeMatteo et al., 2020). When introduced, this evidence appears to impact
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
3
legal decision-making (Edens & Cox, 2012). Drawing on the attribution theory, psychopathy could be used as either a mitigating or aggravating factor in court proceedings (Aspinwall
et al., 2012; Edens & Cox, 2012; Remmel et al., 2019). There is a general tendency, however, to suggest harsher sentencing based on a view of the condition as a “moral illness”
where the individual is capable of separating right from wrong and has chosen to commit a
wrongful act (Berryessa & Wohlstetter, 2019; Edens, Clark, et al., 2013). Research has also
demonstrated that lay people seem to associate psychopathic traits in people charged with
crimes with both semiadaptive (i.e., bold and intelligent) and maladaptive (i.e., dangerous
and evil) features (Edens, Davis, et al., 2013). A recent meta-analysis investigated perceptions of the psychopathy label in relation to various punishment outcomes (i.e., dangerousness, treatment amenability, legal sentence/sanction) across 22 studies (Berryessa &
Wohlstetter, 2019). In studies comparing people charged with crimes that meet criteria for
psychopathy and people charged with crimes with no such label, the psychopathy label has
been weakly, but significantly associated with stronger support for punitive sanctioning and
negative perceptions of treatment potential. In studies comparing people charged with
crimes that meet criteria for psychopathy versus those with another psychiatric label (i.e.,
conduct disorder, antisocial personality disorder [ASPD], paraphilic disorder), the effect
sizes have been weak and nonsignificant. Overall therefore, the results have demonstrated
a general labeling effect of psychiatric disorders, rather than psychopathy specifically
(Berryessa & Wohlstetter, 2019). Considering psychopathy assessments are commonly
used as part of a larger risk-assessment of life-sentenced prisoners within the Swedish legal
system (Sturup et al., 2014), these discrepant findings bolster the need to further study perceptions of the psychopathy label among lay people.
Although psychopathy may be viewed in some instances as a mitigating factor (i.e.,
when viewed as a mental illness; Aspinwall et al., 2012), research suggests it is generally
considered aggravating (Boccaccini et al., 2008; Edens et al., 2004, 2005). A meta-analysis
of simulation studies suggests jurors who perceive a person charged with a crime exhibiting
psychopathic traits also believe the person to be dangerous and evil (Kelley et al., 2018).
Jurors may also be more likely to recommend more punitive sentencing. In a recent study
specifically regarding juveniles, where study participants encompassed community members summoned for jury duty (n = 326), the fictitious young person charged with a crime
was perceived as particularly evil and dangerous when described to exhibit affective psychopathic traits (e.g., lack of remorse or guilt, shallow affect, callousness, lack of empathy;
Edens et al., 2016). Furthermore, population-based surveys have indicated that the general
public tends to view individuals with psychopathic traits as crime-prone, yet socially skilled
and interpersonally adept (Furnham et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2014). In addition, some lay
people may conflate the semantically similar labels “psychopathy” and “psychosis” (Edens
et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2014).
Although there are few studies to date which have investigated perceptions about intellectual disability (ID; Ditchman et al., 2013; Scior, 2011; Scior & Furnham, 2016; Werner
et al., 2012), the available research suggests the general public holds negative views about
individuals with ID and the ID population faces discrimination in several settings (e.g.,
health care, housing, employment; Ditchman et al., 2013; Werner et al., 2012). Regarding
ID in criminal court specifically, one Swedish study investigated court cases published
between 2004 and 2006 concerning alleged child sexual abuse when the victim had a neuropsychiatric disorder (n = 14; Lindblad & Lainpelto, 2011). The results demonstrated that
4
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
victims with ID (n = 10) were considered more credible and trustworthy because the courts
considered their cognitive capacity as precluding them from fabricating facts. The results
also suggest courts may draw conclusions about developmental aspects of neuropsychiatric
disorders in the absence of any expert testimony.
These data illustrate the complexity at the interface of law and psychiatry and also point
toward a need for an improved understanding of mental health evidence in criminal cases.
More research is needed to understand how predetermined attitudes of mental health
“labels” and associated symptoms influence legal decision-making (e.g., regarding treatment decisions and criminal responsibility; Jung, 2015).
THE SWEDISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAY JUDGES
Swedish criminal law is unique in the sense that since the enactment of the present criminal code approximately 50 years ago (1965), accountability is not an independent demand
for conviction. This means that all people charged with crimes, irrespective of mental status, in principle can be held criminally responsible for their actions. Individuals charged
with crimes who suffer from various mental disorders at the time of the crime can therefore
be convicted, provided that they meet the “normal” demands for conviction (the actus reus,
the required intent, absence of justifying and excusing conditions, etc.). In some cases, such
“normal” demands are not met because of the mental disorder (e.g., the disorder produced
a lack of intent). Since 1965, issues related to mental disorders instead are given formal
room within sentencing, including the choice of sanctions.
According to the Swedish Criminal Code (Chapter 30, Section 6; Chapter 31, Section 3),
a person who committed an offense under the influence of a serious mental disturbance
(SMD) is preferably sentenced to a sanction other than imprisonment. The court may only
impose imprisonment if there are exceptional grounds to do so. The court may not impose
a sentence of imprisonment if, as a result of the SMD, the accused lacked the capacity to
realize the implications of the act or to adapt their conduct accordingly. However, this does
not apply if the accused induced this lack of capacity themselves. If a person who has committed an offense for which a fine is considered an insufficient sanction suffers from SMD,
the court may order them to undergo forensic psychiatric care if, in view of their mental
state and other personal circumstances, it is called for that they be admitted to a medical
institution for psychiatric care, combined with custodial and other coercive measures. The
SMD concept is not linked to a particular psychiatric diagnosis, however the majority of
individuals with SMD have a psychotic condition (e.g., schizophrenia). Other conditions
include severe depression with suicidal intent, severe personality disorder with psychotic
episodes, ID with severe compulsive behavior, severe neurocognitive disorder, severe intellectual disability, and severe brain damage.
In the rare cases where there is suspicion that a crime has been committed under the
influence of SMD, court-ordered forensic psychiatric evaluations (FPEs) are conducted
before sentencing. FPEs are conducted by the National Board of Forensic Medicine
(NBFM), a governmental authority subsumed under the Ministry of Justice. According
to official NBFM statistics, approximately 500 FPEs are conducted per year. Although
the FPE provides a recommendation to the court (i.e., regarding whether the person convicted of a crime should be sentenced to forensic psychiatric care instead of prison),
ultimately the court determines sentencing. The court therefore needs to evaluate the
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
5
extensive information regarding the person’s background and psychiatric status encompassed in the FPE.
Given the involvement of lay judges in this process, it is important to understand their
knowledge and perceptions of mental health conditions in relation to the SMD concept.
In the Swedish legal system lay judges are nominated by political parties and elected in
the municipal council or county borough council. Formal qualifications for lay judges
include having Swedish citizenship, being 18 years or older, and not having a criminal
record. Some professions are also exempt including police officers and individuals working for the courts. When nominated, lay judges commonly serve for 4 years. In contrast
to the United States where eligible community members are summoned for jury duty and
selected for a specific trial, in Sweden the legal sides have no influence on who is serving
as a lay judge in any particular case. Lay judges serve together with professional judges
in criminal proceedings to decide on matters of guilt and sentencing. The vote of the lay
judge carries the same weight as that of the professional judge. The professional judge,
however, has the responsibility to present and explain the legal aspects and relevant issues
of the case to the lay judges. Although professional judges are in the majority in appellate
courts, in lower courts (i.e., the district courts), lay judges outnumber their professional
counterparts.
Although firmly established dating back to the medieval era, the Swedish system of lay
judges has been criticized (Alhem, 2012; Schultz, 2011), fueled by cases where disqualifications of single lay judges has caused a retrial of costly court proceedings (Wahlberg,
2012). In 2012, the Swedish government commissioned an inquiry that resulted in some
changes to the law including more stringent requirements regarding suitability for the
appointment as a lay judge and a mandatory introductory training program, according to the
Government Offices of Sweden (2014). This mandatory training focuses on conflicts of
interest, secrecy, and ethical aspects. However, it does not include any training on mental
health evidence.
To our knowledge, only one study has examined perceptions of mental health conditions
and the Swedish concept of SMD. Sygel et al. (2017) utilized a vignette-based study to
explore the impact of psychiatric diagnosis and gender in people charged with a crime,
when forensic evaluators deliver their opinions regarding the SMD designation. Researchers
recruited 26 evaluators (i.e., forensic psychiatrists, forensic psychologists, and forensic
social workers) conducting FPEs at the NBFM and provided a description of a fictitious
person accused of serious assault with varying psychiatric diagnoses (i.e., schizophrenia;
borderline personality disorder; substance-induced psychotic disorder; Asperger syndrome;
ASPD; intellectual disability). All cases included two versions, varying the sex of the fictitious person accused of assault. All participants considered schizophrenia to be associated
with SMD (across genders of the persons accused of assault), and no participants assigned
SMD to the condition in which the person was described as having ASPD (across genders).
In the ID case, 12.5% of participants considered ID to be associated with SMD. These
results imply that forensic evaluators have a clear understanding of differences between
psychotic disorder and ASPD in relation to the SMD concept. Data also indicate that opinions vary regarding intellectual disability, where the designation of SMD can depend on
various additional factors such as severity of the condition and low psychosocial functioning. To our knowledge however, no study has examined how Swedish lay judges perceive
different mental health conditions in relation to legal decision-making.
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
THE CURRENT STUDY
Given the stigma that is associated with many mental health diagnoses, the goal of the
current study was to evaluate if this stigma translated into differential decision-making
among Swedish lay judges. Using a web-based survey with a brief vignette, participants
were randomly assigned to three different conditions where the person charged with a crime
was described as having (a) schizophrenia, (b) ASPD with psychopathic traits, or (c) ID.1
The case vignette method is an established method to investigate potential bias in clinical
judgment (Aspinwall et al., 2012). These specific conditions were chosen based on their
different degree of association with the SMD concept in the Swedish legal system.
Schizophrenia is strongly associated with SMD, whereas ASPD with psychopathic traits is
unrelated to SMD (Sygel et al., 2017). Furthermore, the association between ID and SMD
is generally contingent on degree of severity and disability.
Based on the Swedish legislation regarding SMD, as well as previous research (Sygel
et al., 2017), we hypothesized that participants would perceive schizophrenia to be positively associated with SMD and negatively associated with comprehending the meaning of
the criminal act. In contrast, we hypothesized that participants would perceive ASPD with
psychopathic traits to be negatively associated with SMD, and positively associated with
comprehending the meaning of the criminal act. Regarding the ID diagnosis, the investigation was exploratory and no specific hypothesis was made. A secondary aim was to investigate participants’ general attitudes and perceptions about individuals with the assigned
mental health condition (e.g., regarding perceived prevalence in the community, crime
proneness and culpability, punitive sentiments). Such general attitudes and perceptions are
informative to delineate aspects of potential stigma.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Male and female lay judges in Sweden were invited to participate in this study. Participants
were recruited from six district courts and two appellate courts located in different cities
across the country. In total, 1,405 individuals were invited to participate and an overall
response rate of 51.3% resulted in 721 total participants. Of these, 89.2% passed the manipulation check (i.e., assigning the correct diagnosis to the fictitious person in the vignette,
further described below), which resulted in a final sample of 643 participants. Participants’
ages ranged from 20 to 84 years (M = 57.3 years, SD = 14.8), and the sample was relatively
evenly split between women (53.8%) and men (46.2%).
The majority of participants were either from Stockholm or Gothenburg (the two largest
cities in Sweden), and relatively well educated (47.3% had attended university or college
for more than 2 years). Regarding work experience, most participants (63.0%) had been
appointed as a lay judge for 5 years or less. The majority of participants (77.6%) had been
involved in a maximum of five court cases involving a forensic psychiatric evaluation
(FPE). About a third (33.4%) had obtained some formal education about mental health, with
the majority receiving this education outside of the court system. Furthermore, most participants (58.9%) endorsed the question “Have you/anyone in your family been subjected to a
crime?” Among these respondents, 62.3% reported to have been victimized 2 to 5 times,
and 47.9% reported that at least one of the crimes was a violent crime. For a detailed
description of participant characteristics across conditions, see Table 1.
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
7
TABLE 1: Participant Characteristics Across Conditions
Age M (SD; years)
25 or lesser
26–35
36–50
51–60
More than 60
Participant sex (female)
Highest level of education
Primary school
High school at least 2 years
Vocational education
College/University
(maximum 2 years)
College/University
(>2 years)
Time appointed as lay judge
<1 year
1–5 years
6–15 years
>15 years
City
Stockholm
Umeå
Gothenburg
Malmö
Another city
Number of FPE cases
No case
1–5
6–10
11–50
>50
Formal mental health education
Yes, through the court
system
Yes, in some other way
No
Victimizeda
If victimized, how many times
1
2–5
>5
If victimized, was the crime
violent (yes)
Entire sample
Schizophrenia
ASPD with
psychopathic traits
ID
N = 643
n = 186
n = 219
n = 238
57.3 (14.8)
3.1%
7.5%
19.1%
16.6%
53.5%
53.8%
57.1 (15.2)
3.2%
9.1%
18.3%
15.1%
54.3%
58.1%
55.9 (15.1)
4.1%
7.8%
21.5%
16.4%
50.2%
53.0%
58.9 (14.2)
2.5%
5.9%
17.7%
18.1%
55.9%
51.3%
5.8%
16.6%
19.0%
11.4%
7.5%
14.0%
19.4%
11.8%
5.9%
16.9%
21.0%
10.0%
4.2%
18.5%
16.8%
12.2%
47.3%
47.3%
46.1%
48.3%
23.0%
40.0%
30.2%
6.8%
24.2%
41.4%
26.9%
7.5%
25.1%
39.3%
30.1%
5.5%
20.2%
39.5%
32.8%
7.6%
36.9%
7.0%
31.7%
5.8%
18.7%
38.7%
6.5%
31.7%
7.0%
16.1%
31.5%
9.1%
33.8%
4.1%
21.5%
40.3%
5.5%
29.8%
6.3%
18.1%
36.2%
41.4%
13.7%
8.6%
0.2%
35.5%
40.9%
15.1%
8.6%
—
37.4%
42.9%
11.9%
7.8%
—
35.7%
40.3%
14.3%
9.2%
0.4%
1.4%
1.1%
1.4%
1.7%
32.0%
66.6%
58.9%
30.6%
68.3%
60.2%
31.5%
67.1%
60.7%
33.6%
64.7%
56.3%
25.5%
62.3%
12.2%
47.9%
26.1%
59.5%
14.4%
47.7%
25.6%
61.7%
12.8%
50.4%
24.8%
65.4%
9.8%
45.5%
Note. N is based on number of participants passing the manipulation check. ASPD = antisocial personality
disorder; ID = intellectual disability; FPE = forensic psychiatric evaluation.
a“Have you/anyone in your family been subjected to a crime”?
8
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
STIMULUS MATERIALS
Demographic Information
Participants completed basic demographic questions (i.e., age, gender, educational level,
time appointed as lay judge, city where the court is situated). This section also included two
questions about professional experience with mental health cases. Specifically, participants
reported the number of court cases in which they have been involved where an FPE was
included, and whether they have obtained any formal education regarding mental health.
Finally, participants responded to a question about victimization (i.e., “Have you or anyone
in your family been subjected to a crime?”). If the participant responded affirmatively, follow-up questions assessed the frequency and severity of this victimization.
Crime Vignette and FPE
In all study conditions, participants received the same crime vignette (104 words long;
see Appendix) adopted from previous research (Mowle et al., 2016). The case described a
street robbery, where a female pedestrian (“Mrs. K”) was approached by a stranger
(“Stenberg”) who grabbed her handbag and slashed her across the face with a pocket knife.
The vignette was followed by a forensic psychiatric statement, which indicated that the
court had requested an FPE for Stenberg. The FPE included a description of his current
mental health condition followed by a description of his behavior prior to and following the
crime (see descriptions below). Participants were randomized into one of three conditions
where the fictitious character, Stenberg, was described as having (a) schizophrenia, (b)
ASPD with psychopathic traits, or (c) ID. The statement (222–282 words long) described
personality traits and behaviors characteristic for the respective conditions. The mental
health conditions were created by three authors (JC, MK, KH) who are forensic psychiatrists or psychologists with extensive clinical experience, using criteria outlined in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR;
American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000).2 Furthermore, the vignettes were formulated to include information similar to the FPE statements delivered to the courts in the
Swedish legal system. The modeling of real-life scenarios had three important implications:
(a) the vignettes included both mental health diagnoses and behavioral effects of these diagnoses, (b) given that all people that are sentenced in the Swedish system (i.e., culpability is
not assessed during the FPE) no control condition was needed, and (c) there was a difference in the admission of guilt across conditions, which was deliberate and intended to be
consistent with how an individual with each diagnosis typically responds. As mentioned
before, in the Swedish judicial system accountability is not an independent demand for
conviction. When the individual is referred for a FPE the court has determined whether he
or she is guilty of the offense, therefore the admission of guilt is not an issue in the FPE and
does not impact the decision about SMD.
Schizophrenia
In this condition, Stenberg was described as experiencing symptoms consistent with schizophrenia, paranoid type such as being “confused,” “talking about undercover agents,” “talking
to himself,” and “suspicious.” Furthermore, he had stopped taking his prescribed antipsychotic medication at the time of the incident. In this condition, he confessed to the crime.
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
9
ASPD With Psychopathic Traits
In this condition, Stenberg demonstrated personality traits and behaviors in line with the
ASPD criteria, but also including specifically psychopathic features, loosely based on the
Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003) criteria. These included multiple previous convictions including robbery, assault, and financial fraud. Further descriptors
included “no remorse,” “stating he is a victim of circumstances,” “dominant,” “socially
bold,” “lied repeatedly,” “tried to manipulate other detainees and staff,” “arrogant,” and
“excessively friendly.” In this condition, he denied guilt.
ID
In this condition, descriptors included “never had independent housing,” “never held
normal employment,” “intellectual level comparable to an individual age 7 to 9 years,” “had
set the house on fire on a previous occasion,” and “requires supervision for many daily tasks
and reminders about personal hygiene.”
Manipulation Check
To assess whether participants attended to the crime vignette and instructions, they were
asked to identify Stenberg’s mental health condition from three options (i.e., schizophrenia,
ASPD with psychopathic traits, ID).
Mental Health and Verdict Questionnaire
Following the manipulation check, participants determined whether they thought
Stenberg was under the influence of an SMD at the time of the criminal act as well as at the
time of the FPE. Participants who endorsed this were also asked whether they thought he
“due to the SMD lacked the ability to comprehend the meaning of the act.” Participants
were also asked what sentence they would recommend: (a) prison or (b) compulsory forensic psychiatric treatment. Participants who recommended the latter were asked if such treatment should include special court supervision. Finally, all participants were asked how
prevalent they believe the specific mental health condition to be in the community.
Attitudinal Statements
Participants then responded to six attitudinal statements about individuals with the given
mental health condition. These statements, rated on a Likert-type-scale from 1 (strongly
agree) to 7 (strongly disagree), were identical across conditions and assessed perceptions of
crime proneness, legal responsibility, and general punitive attitudes.
PROCEDURE
Data collection was completed in May 2016. All participants were informed about the
study in writing, with identical study information provided to all participating courts.
Administrative contact persons at the respective courts were responsible for sending out
study information through e-mail. The study information contained a link to the web-based
survey (one separate survey for each condition), hosted through the Google docs platform.
Contact persons were instructed to send out each link to one third of the potential
10
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
TABLE 2: Frequency of Item Endorsement
Items
Person charged with a crime under the influence
of an SMD at the time of the crime (N = 643)
Person charged with a crime under the influence
of an SMD at the time of the FPE (N = 643)
Person charged with a crime unable to
comprehend the meaning of the criminal act/
adjust his behavior accordingly (n = 394)
Sentencing recommendation (N = 643)
Prison
Forensic care
If forensic care, what type? (n = 475)
With special court supervision
Without special court supervision
Schizophrenia
(%, n)
ASPD with psychopathic
traits (%, n)
ID (%, n)
95.2 (177)
47.0 (103)
50.8 (121)
89.8 (167)
54.8 (120)
46.6 (111)
79.8 (130)
44.2 (53)
88.3 (98)
8.6 (16)
91.4 (170)
48.4 (106)
51.6 (113)
17.2 (41)
82.8 (197)
71.0 (120)
29.0 (49)
76.8 (86)
23.2 (26)
43.8 (85)
56.2 (109)
Note. ASPD = antisocial personality disorder; ID = intellectual disability; SMD = serious mental disturbance;
FPE = forensic psychiatric evaluation.
participants, to ensure approximately equal numbers in the conditions. Participants received
a follow-up e-mail approximately 2 weeks following the initial e-mail. Participation was
anonymous and participants were instructed not to discuss the study with colleagues. The
study received an advisory statement3 from the Regional Ethical Review Board of Stockholm
(#2015/1786-31/5).
RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, MENTAL HEALTH, AND VERDICT QUESTIONNAIRE
Table 1 includes demographic information for the three separate conditions. No significant differences emerged between conditions. Item endorsement percentages are presented
in Table 2. When asked if the fictitious person charged with the crime met criteria for SMD
at the time of the crime, a chi-square analysis indicated significant differences between the
proportion of participants expected to determine that he meets criteria for SMD and the
proportion of participants who actually found him to meet criteria (see Table 3). Follow-up
chi-square tests directly compared each condition, however, a stricter alpha was set at .025
to reduce the likelihood of a Type 1 error. More participants in the schizophrenia condition
identified him as SMD compared with both the ASPD with psychopathic traits condition
and the ID condition (see Table 3). However, there was no significant difference between
the ASPD with psychopathic traits and ID conditions (see Table 3). Participants were also
asked if Stenberg met criteria for an SMD at the time of the FPE. A similar pattern emerged,
with the proportion of participants expected to find him under the influence of an SMD at
the time of the evaluation significantly lower than the proportion of participants who made
this determination (see Table 3). Again, this difference was driven by the schizophrenia
condition, with endorsement rates significantly different at the stricter alpha level of .025,
than either the ID condition and the ASPD with psychopathic traits condition (see Table 3).
Furthermore, there was no significant difference between the ASPD with psychopathic
traits and ID condition (see Table 3).
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
11
TABLE 3: Questions About Crime Scenario
Item
Person charged with a crime under the influence of an SMD at
the time of the crime (N = 643)
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Person charged with a crime under the influence of an SMD at
the time of the FPE (N = 643)
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Person charged with a crime unable to comprehend the meaning
of the criminal act/adjust his behavior accordingly (n = 394)
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Sentencing recommendation (N = 643)
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Forensic care with court supervision
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Prevalence rates in community
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
χ2
p
Cramer’s V
120.64
<.001**
.43
109.19
98.19
0.66
89.52
<.001**
<.001**
.42
<.001**
.52
.481
.04
.37
59.64
80.09
3.04
64.55
<.001**
<.001**
.08
<.001**
.38
.45
.08
.41
39.05
4.31
51.84
97.36
75.69
6.67
50.80
43.02
0.72
27.17
27.35
10.01
8.75
6.97
0.15
<.001**
.04
<.001**
<.001**
<.001**
.01
<.001**
<.001**
0.40
<.001**
<.001**
.007*
.003*
.008*
.70
.35
.11
.46
.39
.43
.13
.33
.30
.05
.27
.32
.13
.15
.12
.02
Note. Schizophrenia—ASPD = comparison of schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder conditions;
Schizophrenia—ID = comparison of schizophrenia and intellectual disability conditions; ASPD—ID = comparison
of antisocial personality disorder and schizophrenia conditions. SMD = serious mental disturbance; ASPD =
antisocial personality disorder; ID = intellectual disability; FPE = forensic psychiatric evaluation.
*p is significant at the .025 level. **p is significant at the .001 level.
If a participant believed that Stenberg was under the influence of an SMD at the time of
the FPE, s/he was also asked if they thought he was unable to comprehend the meaning of
the criminal act or had the ability to adjust his actions accordingly. A chi-square analysis
indicated differences between groups. Specifically, more participants affirmatively endorsed
this item in both the Schizophrenia and ID conditions, compared with the ASPD with psychopathic traits condition (see Table 2). Follow up chi-square analyses with an adjusted
significance value of .025 to reduce the likelihood for Type 1 error indicated a significant
difference between the schizophrenia and ASPD with psychopathic traits conditions (see
Table 3). Furthermore, a significant difference emerged between the ID and ASPD with
psychopathic traits conditions. However, there was no difference between the Schizophrenia
and ID conditions (see Table 3).
A similar pattern emerged with the sentencing variable in that a chi-square analysis indicated a significant difference between groups. Participants in the ASPD with psychopathic
traits condition were significantly more likely to impose a prison sentence compared with
participants in the schizophrenia condition and ID condition (see Table 3). Furthermore,
12
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
TABLE 4: Perceived Prevalence of Individuals in the Community With the Assigned Diagnosis
Schizophrenia (n = 186)
1 in 5
1 in 10
1 in 100
1 in 1,000
1 in 10,000
5 (2.7%)
4 (2.2%)
46 (24.7%)
85 (45.7%)
46 (24.7%)
ASPD with psychopathic traits (n = 219)
3 (1.4%)
21 (9.6%)
72 (32.9%)
83 (37.9%)
40 (18.3%)
ID (n = 238)
7 (2.9%)
14 (5.9%)
79 (33.2%)
90 (37.8%)
48 (20.2%)
Note. ASPD = antisocial personality disorder; ID = intellectual disability.
although participants were more likely to recommend institutional compulsory forensic
care in both the schizophrenia and ID conditions (see Table 2), there was also a significant
difference between these two groups, with participants in the ID condition more likely to
recommend a prison sentence (see Table 3).
If a participant recommended compulsory forensic psychiatric care, they were also asked
to specify if this treatment should include special court supervision (see Table 2). Significant
differences in this dependent variable emerged. Specifically, participants in the schizophrenia condition were more likely to recommend special court supervision compared with the
ID condition, but not more likely to recommend special supervision compared with the
ASPD with psychopathic traits condition (see Table 3). Furthermore, participants in the
ASPD with psychopathic traits condition were more likely to recommend special court
supervision compared with participants in the ID condition (see Table 3).
Finally, participants were asked about perceived community prevalence rates of individuals with the assigned diagnosis (see Table 4). To facilitate clear comparisons, the
response options were dichotomized into the following: 1 out of 100 or more (n = 251)
versus 1 out of 1,000 or less (n = 392). There was a significant difference between groups,
driven by differences between the Schizophrenia condition and both the ASPD with psychopathic traits and ID conditions (see Table 3). There was no difference between the ASPD
with psychopathic traits and the ID conditions (see Table 3).
ATTITUDINAL STATEMENTS
Participants were also asked to respond to six attitudinal statements about the diagnosis
for their respective condition (see Table 5). One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were
conducted to examine potential differences between subgroups, with Bonferroni adjusted
alpha levels of .0167 (.05/3) per test. For the statement regarding crime propensity, the levels
of endorsement significantly differed across all three subgroups. This difference was driven
by the ASPD with psychopathic traits and ID conditions (see Table 6). Regarding responsibility (i.e., specifically concerning whether individuals with the assigned diagnosis who
commit crimes can be fully blamed for their acts), the levels of endorsement also significantly differed across all three subgroups. Again, the largest difference occurred between the
ASPD with psychopathic traits and ID conditions (see Table 6). Regarding the statement
whether individuals can understand the difference between right and wrong, there was a
significant difference between subgroups. Specifically, participants in the ASPD with psychopathic traits condition provided higher ratings than either the schizophrenia or ID conditions (see Table 6). Regarding sentencing (i.e., in particular whether individuals with the
assigned diagnosis should be classified as SMD and sentenced to compulsory forensic
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
13
TABLE 5: Participant Attitudes Regarding Individuals With the Assigned Diagnoses
Item
Crime propensity
Individuals with ____ are more prone to commit
crimes compared with individuals in general.
Responsibility
Individuals with _____ who commit crimes can
be fully blamed for their acts.
Individuals with _____ can understand the
difference between right and wrong.
Sentencing
Individuals with _____ who commit crimes
should be classified as SMD and be
sentenced to compulsory forensic psychiatric
treatment.
Individuals with _____ who commit crimes
should be treated more harshly by the criminal
justice system than individuals that have
committed crimes but do not have _____.
If an individual has _____, we should be able to
lock him/her up to protect society, even if he
or she has not committed a crime.
Schizophrenia
M (SD)
ASPD with psychopathic
traits M (SD)
ID M (SD)
3.69 (1.61)
4.86 (1.31)
2.41 (1.34)
3.35 (1.71)
4.85 (1.59)
3.00 (1.47)
3.72 (1.65)
4.46 (1.65)
3.66 (1.45)
5.15 (1.62)
4.21 (1.77)
3.83 (1.76)
2.04 (1.48)
2.44 (1.61)
1.71 (1.14)
2.53 (1.83)
2.18 (1.62)
1.85 (1.48)
Note. Attitudinal items are coded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). ASPD = antisocial personality
disorder; ID = intellectual disability; SMD = serious mental disturbance.
psychiatric treatment), levels of endorsement also significantly differed between groups,
with the largest difference occurring between the schizophrenia and ID conditions.
Participants in the ASPD condition also supported the statement that individuals with ASPD
should be treated more harshly by the criminal justice system, compared with participants in
the ID condition (see Table 6). Finally, there was also a significant difference between groups
on participant ratings of the statement “an individual with _____ should be locked up regardless of whether he or she has committed a crime.” Participants in the schizophrenia condition
more strongly supported this statement than participants in the ID condition (see Table 6).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we choose to investigate the judicial concept SMD in the Swedish
Criminal Code, Chapter 30, Section 6. This is a complex, multiprofessional and multidisciplinary concept, applied in Sweden since 1992. It is not related to specific psychiatric diagnoses but to the character of the mental disorder and the effects on psychosocial functioning.
This means that there will be many variables that will differentiate between those with and
without an SMD. Our aim was to learn more about the perceptions of a person charged with
a crime and subject to the judgment of SMD.
This study was the first investigation of legal decision-making and perceptions of mental
illness in a large and representative sample of Swedish lay judges. This is a unique study
group, which may contribute to improved understanding of perceptions of mental illness
within a criminal justice context. Results suggest participants viewed the three mental
health conditions differently within the context of Swedish SMD legislation. Specifically,
14
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
TABLE 6: Participant Attitudes Regarding Individuals With the Assigned Diagnoses
Item
Crime propensity
Individuals with ____ are more prone to commit crimes compared
with individuals in general.
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Responsibility
Individuals with _____ who commit crimes can be fully blamed for
their acts.
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Individuals with _____ can understand the difference between right
and wrong.
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Sentencing
Individuals with _____ who commit crimes should be classified
as SMD and be sentenced to compulsory forensic psychiatric
treatment.
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
Individuals with _____ who commit crimes should be treated more
harshly by the criminal justice system than individuals that have
committed crimes but do not have _____.
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
If an individual has _____, we should be able to lock him/her up to
protect society, even if he or she has not committed a crime.
Schizophrenia—ASPD
Schizophrenia—ID
ASPD—ID
F
p
169.96
<.001
Cohen’s d
0.80a
1.85a
0.86a
85.46
<.001
0.91a
1.21a
0.22
17.26
<.001
0.45a
0.52
0.04a
31.48
<.001
0.55a
0.22
0.78a
15.05
<.001
0.26a
0.52a
0.25
9.10
<.001
0.16
0.22
0.37a
Note. Schizophrenia—ASPD = comparison of schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder conditions;
schizophrenia—ID = comparison of schizophrenia and intellectual disability conditions; ASPD—ID = comparison of
antisocial personality disorder and schizophrenia conditions. ASPD = antisocial personality disorder; ID = intellectual
disability; SMD = serious mental disturbance.
aIndicates difference is significant at a .0167 level (Bonferroni correction).
perceptions of schizophrenia were largely consistent with the Swedish SMD legislation.
However, findings were more varied for ASPD with psychopathic traits and ID.
In the schizophrenia condition, the large majority of participants perceived the fictitious
person charged with the crime to be under the influence of an SMD at the time of the crime,
at the time of the forensic evaluation and, due to SMD at the time of the crime, unable to
comprehend the meaning of the criminal act or adjust his behavior accordingly. Participants
were also very likely to recommend compulsory forensic psychiatric care with special court
supervision. This was consistent with hypotheses and corresponds with Swedish legislation
regarding SMD.
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
15
Findings from the ASPD with psychopathic traits condition were somewhat unexpected
and inconsistent with hypotheses. Specifically, almost half of the participants perceived the
fictitious person charged with the crime to be under the influence of an SMD at the time of
the crime and at the time of the evaluation. Furthermore, 51.6% of participants recommended compulsory forensic psychiatric care instead of prison. These findings suggest that
participants may have an unclear conceptual understanding of ASPD with psychopathic
traits, and its association with the SMD concept. It is possible participants placed a strong
emphasis on the “personality disorder” part of the term, which may give the connotation of
a mental illness4 and lead one to be more supportive of a forensic psychiatric care sentence.
Research indicates people think of personality disorders in general as very debilitating and
significantly impacting the individual’s daily functioning (Sheehan et al., 2016). As such,
these data suggest the participants in this study may have considered the ASPD with psychopathic traits symptoms as similarly impacting the life of the person charged with a crime,
without the pejorative effects that have emerged in other legal decision-making studies (i.e.,
Boccaccini et al., 2008; Edens et al., 2005). However, in Swedish legislation and practice,
SMD encompasses psychotic disorders. Personality disorders with antisocial and psychopathic traits should not be included unless they co-occur with psychotic symptoms, severe
mental illness, or psychotic-based impulsivity according to the Swedish Criminal Code
(Chapter 30, Section 6; Chapter 31, Section 3). Of course, severe dysfunctional social
behavior would likely impact the FPE assessors’ judgment.
Of note, data from the current study are inconsistent with a recent survey of evaluators
(n = 26) at the NBFM in Sweden which demonstrated that all participants considered
schizophrenia to be associated with SMD, while no participants assigned SMD to the ASPD
condition (Sygel et al., 2017). This suggests a disconnect between forensic evaluators and
lay judges in determining the appropriateness of an ASPD diagnosis for an SMD designation. Specific reasons for this disconnect, such as different education and training backgrounds, misapplication or misunderstanding of the legal statute, or perceptions of mental
health diagnoses, should be explored in future research.
There is no consistent association between ID and the Swedish SMD psycholegal concept. ID can range in severity and impact of symptoms on everyday functioning. In some
severe cases (e.g., when occurring in combination with psychotic symptoms), it might be
consistent with the SMD designation. However, it may also constitute a condition with
limited disabilities and, therefore, be inconsistent with the legal definition of SMD. As
such, our investigation in this condition was more exploratory. Approximately half of the
participants in the ID condition perceived the fictitious person charged of the crime to be
under the influence of an SMD at the time of the crime and the evaluation. A vast majority
of participants (88.3%) perceived him to be unable to comprehend the meaning of the criminal act or adjust his behavior accordingly and recommended compulsory forensic psychiatric care (with a relatively even number of participants suggesting with or without special
court supervision). The heterogeneity in the perceptions of ID provides a strong reason to
supply courts with psychiatric evaluations in which specific characteristics of individuals
with this condition are explained.
Some general trends emerged regarding the attitudinal statements. Overall, participants
viewed individuals with ASPD and psychopathic traits as crime prone, better able to understand the difference between right and wrong, and more culpable for their actions.
Regarding punitive sentiments, across conditions there was no strong tendency to vote for
16
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
harsh sentencing. Although participants in the ASPD with psychopathic traits condition
more heavily endorsed the statement that “individuals with the assigned diagnosis should
be treated more harshly by the criminal justice system,” the endorsements were low overall. This may be a contextual factor with a Swedish tradition of psychiatric care for individuals with mental health conditions. In contrast to the punishment-oriented culture in the
United States, there is a strong tradition within the Swedish society—and subsequently the
criminal justice system—to rehabilitate individuals who have committed crimes. Therefore,
in the Swedish context it is reasonable to expect that participants perceive compulsory
forensic psychiatric care as a more lenient “punishment” than prison.
Consistent with the strongly held, although largely debunked, lay belief that severe mental illness is correlated with violence (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Fazel & Grann, 2006), participants in this study tended to perceive individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia as crime
prone. Participants in the schizophrenia condition also provided slightly higher ratings,
compared with participants in the other conditions, for the statement “individuals with the
assigned diagnosis should be locked up to protect society regardless of whether they have
committed a crime.” Although the average rating for this item was low (M = 2.16, SD =
1.65), this marginal difference might reflect a general public perception of individuals with
schizophrenia as “dangerous.” Despite this, participants did not believe individuals with
schizophrenia should be fully blamed for their acts or understand the difference between
right and wrong.
Results across conditions indicate that there are some misconceptions concerning the
Swedish SMD statue in relation to different mental health conditions. In Sweden, the court
can summon the retained forensic psychiatrist to clarify their statements in the FPE, however, this is seldom used in practice. In the vast majority of cases the court follows the
sentencing recommendations outlined in the FPE. However, given that professional and lay
judges independently evaluate the FPE and render the final decisions, a misconception concerning implications of different mental health conditions may be problematic. Although
lay judges commonly vote in line with the professional judges, in some cases they might
dissent. Moreover, the FPE commonly includes extensive information on the psychiatric
status and diagnostics of the person convicted of a crime, which the court must evaluate.
This information can be valuable to the courts in several important ways including decisions on credibility and sentencing recommendations. Potential misconceptions among
judges regarding psychiatric diagnoses and mental illness constitutes an impending risk that
the information is disregarded or misinterpreted. For example, previous research has demonstrated that a victim’s mental illness may serve to increase or decrease their credibility
(Lainpelto et al., 2016; Lindblad & Lainpelto, 2011).
It is a fundamental problem when the court draws conclusions about mental health conditions that are not empirically founded. Lay judges’ preconceptions of mental health conditions might ultimately impact sentencing recommendations or lead to differential treatment
of people convicted of crimes. One way to address this problem could be to provide the
professional judges with better tools to interpret the FPEs (and additional mental health
evidence) so that they are better able to explain the important aspects and consequences to
the lay judges. This brings forward a more general question: should professional and lay
judges receive specialized training in mental health etiology, behavior, and treatment? The
majority of participants (>60%, across conditions) had no formal education about mental
health and had only participated in a maximum of five court cases involving an FPE (>70%,
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
17
across conditions). This is reasonable, given that cases where an SMD is evaluated in court
are rare. However, the disconnect between the reality of mental illness and perceptions of
mental illness among lay judges may be cause for concern however.
Across the Unites States and other Western countries (e.g., United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia) there are specialized mental health courts that were established with the overall
goal to decrease recidivism for people charged with crimes that have co-occurring mental
illness (Edgely, 2014; Loong et al., 2016). Mental health courts attempt to end the cyclical
pattern of individuals with mental illness in the criminal justice system by referring them to
community-based psychological and psychiatric treatment programs under prolonged court
supervision (Erickson et al., 2006). Across courts, individuals with mental illness must voluntarily decide to enter into mental health court in exchange for court mandated and monitored mental health treatment (Honegger, 2015). A fundamental aspect of the process at
these courts is that the person convicted of a crime appears before a judge several times and
that options of treatment and interventions are continuously evaluated by the court. Judges
in mental health courts are extensively involved in the planning of rehabilitation and community interventions (e.g., regarding job, housing) for the person convicted of a crime
(Edgely, 2014). In mental health courts, it is typical for the judge and the legal sides (i.e.,
prosecutor and defense attorney) to have received specialized training in mental health disorders (Watson et al., 2001), presumably improving their ability to work effectively with
people charged with crimes that have co-occurring mental illness. Research examining the
appropriateness of such training for Swedish lay judges, as well as the effectiveness of this
training in increasing knowledge of mental health disorders, is necessary.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The interface between law and psychiatry is complex and multifaceted. In addition to
cases that involve an FPE, there are more common situations where the court has to evaluate consequences of mental health conditions in a person charged of a crime. For example,
in all criminal cases the court must evaluate the credibility of a person charged with a crime
and there may also be a need to consider potential alternatives to prison sentences. To bridge
the gap between the two fields, one potential area concerns training in interpreting the written statements and oral communications from either discipline. At present, there is no real
forum for sharing knowledge and discussing the different aspects of common matters. It is
possible that Swedish courts draw from the examples posed by U.S. mental health courts in
developing better pathways of communication between courtroom players. Further, Swedish
courts may consider a broader involvement of the psychiatry field and a more dynamic
sentencing system of individuals with mental illness.
Future research may consider how lay and professional judges go about the decisionmaking process (Robbennolt, 2005). Neurobiological research has demonstrated that decisions are influenced by both fast (i.e., unconscious) and slow (i.e., conscious and influenced
by culture and education) aspects (Frith & Singer, 2008). Previous research has also demonstrated that political affiliation might impact legal decision-making (Mowle et al., 2016).
Social and cognitive psychology is ripe with theories and evidence regarding reasoning and
decision-making processes, however, the application of these theories to the study of professional judges and lay judges is lacking. Future studies on judges could unpack what elements come into play when interpreting mental health evidence (Robbennolt, 2005).
18
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
Furthermore, statistical analyses employed in this study did not allow for researchers to
make causal determinations regarding the relationship between mental health label and lay
judge decision-making. Future research should consider if the SMD designation mediates
the relationship between mental health diagnosis and legal decisions such as sentencing
recommendations. A mediation model may also consider how lay judges’ individual differences (e.g., mental health education, professional experience) may further explain the relationship between mental health label and legal decisions (i.e., SMD designation, sentencing
recommendation). A more complete understanding of any causal mechanisms may provide
insight into necessary treatment and interventions.
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
This study has several strengths including a large sample size of real world decisionmakers recruited from district and appellate courts across Sweden. The questions in the
protocol regarding SMD were phrased similarly to corresponding sections in the FPE statement delivered to courts, which adds to the ecological validity of the study. Furthermore,
participants’ age range and gender distribution were largely consistent with official statistics according to the Swedish National Courts Administration (2016). Regarding experience
of court proceedings, the vast majority of participants (75% or more, across conditions) had
only been involved in a maximum of five court cases involving an FPE. That is reasonable,
given that FPEs are highly resource-intensive and conducted only under rare circumstances.
It is worth noting that around 27% to 33% of participants across conditions had been
appointed as lay judge for more than 5 years. This is lower than the corresponding figure
(i.e., 47%) in official statistics according to the Swedish National Courts Administration
(2016). Despite this, overall, our study group can be considered highly representative of the
larger population of Swedish lay judges.
This study is also marked by several limitations that must be considered in the overall
interpretation and application of the data. The differences in the admission of guilt between
the three experimental groups could represent a confounding variable given that admission
of guilt may impact conviction rates. As noted above, criminal culpability is not a factor in
the FPE evaluation, thus lay judges should not consider the admission when making their
SMD determination. Despite this, we recognize this difference between conditions may
have inadvertently impacted lay judge perceptions of the case and the fictitious person
charged with a crime.
Participants were responding based on diagnostic labels and associated symptoms that go
along with these labels. Given that no control group (i.e., where the fictitious person charged
with a crime is not described to have any mental health condition) was included, it is not possible to conclude whether there was a “general labeling effect” of mental health conditions
among our participants (Boccaccini et al., 2008). Moreover, it was not possible to tease apart
the potential effects of labels and symptoms. The aim of this study was to model real-life scenarios where the court is presented with both diagnostic labels and symptoms. The goal, therefore, was to examine how participants apply legal statutes given their perceptions and
understanding of mental health conditions (i.e., diagnoses and adjacent symptoms), rather
than diagnostic labels per se. Furthermore, there were certain differences between the vignettes
(e.g., psychiatric medication, criminal history). These differences were deliberately included
to increase the ecological validity of the study, however, we acknowledge that such differences may explain some of the variance in lay judges’ decisions. Moreover, the vignette on
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
19
ASPD with psychopathic traits mainly included interpersonal-affective psychopathic traits,
with one descriptor reflecting antisocial traits (i.e., criminal versatility). It is possible that this
affected the perception of the fictitious character and future similar studies should tease apart
potential differences in perceptions of affective/interpersonal versus lifestyle/antisocial psychopathic traits in persons charged with crimes.
Methodologically, the response rate (51.3%), could imply a selection bias. Furthermore,
it was not possible to fully randomize the invitation for each condition at the different courts
and it is possible that lay judges from a particular court are overrepresented in a specific
condition. Therefore, participation in some conditions might be biased from individual
courts. Given the equal numbers of participants in each condition however, the risk of systematic errors in the inclusion process is considered low. Finally, given the context-specific
stimulus material, our findings are not easily generalized to other legal systems.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrated that Swedish lay judges serving at district and appellate courts
view legal aspects of schizophrenia largely in line with the Swedish SMD legislation. Their
perceptions of ASPD with psychopathic traits, however, were inconsistent with the Swedish
SMD legislation. Overall, participants did not clearly distinguish between behavioral-based
diagnoses (i.e., ASPD) and psychiatric disorders (i.e., schizophrenia). Training regarding
mental health diagnoses may be necessary for professional and lay judges. Furthermore, an
ongoing discussion between different disciplines (i.e., law, forensic psychiatry) regarding
implications of different mental health conditions, is warranted. Such ongoing discussion
may give the professional judges better tools to explain implications of mental health conditions to the lay judges.
APPENDIX
CRIME VIGNETTE
On the evening of 25 October, Mrs. K left her apartment to go shopping. On her way to
the subway station, she was approached by a man, Stenberg, who asked for directions.
Stenberg grabbed Mrs. K’s handbag and threw her to the ground. He slashed her across the
face with a pocket knife and then ran into the subway station with her handbag. A passerby
witnessed the crime from across the street and came to offer Mrs. K aid. The police were
called, and 20 min later, Stenberg was arrested. When arrested, Stenberg was carrying Mrs.
K’s wallet along with a pocket knife with dried blood on it.
Condition A
The court ordered a forensic psychiatric evaluation, completed by court-ordered evaluators. It suggested that Stenberg has antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) with psychopathic
traits. Stenberg had been released from prison a couple of weeks before the incident. He had
25 previous convictions including robbery and assault, as well as tax fraud and other financial frauds. Stenberg was a construction worker and had his own company. Stenberg showed
no remorse for his action and several times during the evaluation he kept stating that he was
the victim of bad circumstances and that he constantly had been duped by others. Throughout
the entire investigation, he claimed he was innocent and that Mrs. K had mistaken him for
20
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR
another person. At the forensic psychiatric unit, Stenberg was perceived as dominant and
socially bold. He repeatedly lied and tried to manipulate other detainees and staff. When he
first arrived to the unit, Stenberg tried to smuggle narcotics. The social evaluation revealed
that Stenberg had four children with four different women. At the time of the evaluation, he
had no apartment of his own but lived in his past girlfriend’s home. During interview sessions, Stenberg acted arrogant and superior, but could also change to suddenly being flattering and excessively friendly. In the police investigation, there was evidence indicating that
Stenberg might have tried to sell Mrs. K’s purse to another person.
Condition B
The court ordered a forensic psychiatric evaluation, completed by court-ordered evaluators. It suggested that Stenberg has schizophrenia, paranoid type. At the time of the incident,
Stenberg had been attending outpatient psychiatric treatment for several years. At his outpatient clinic, he was given intramuscular injection with long-term antipsychotics every
third week. Almost every second year, Stenberg had recurrent episodes of acute psychosis
requiring psychiatric hospitalization after determination that he was a danger to himself or
others, due to medication noncompliance. At the time of the current incident, Stenberg had
not shown up at the clinic for his two previous injections, and had therefore been unmedicated at the time of the crime. Clinical staff associated with his AOT order had tried to
contact Stenberg on several occasions, and a house visit was scheduled the same week the
crime occurred. At the time of his arrest, Stenberg was acting in a disorganized manner. He
was observed to be talking to himself and he talked about undercover agents. He was immediately taken to the psychiatric emergency unit. At the emergency unit, he appeared disheveled, laughed at inappropriate times and said he believed the room was bugged. He was
treated with medication over objection, and deemed to meet criteria for involuntary admission. After arrangements, he was later admitted to the psychiatric jail unit. On the forensic
psychiatric unit, Stenberg continued to act in a psychotic manner: he talked to himself and
was very suspicious toward the evaluation team and staff. At one instance, he required an
injection of antipsychotic medication. Following a few days on antipsychotic medication,
the severity of Stenberg’s symptoms lessened and he was able to collaborate with the evaluators. Stenberg confessed to the crime. He stated that he believed Mrs. K was an individual
sent out by the psychiatric services with the purpose of hospitalizing him. This had made
him worried, and he stated that he had acted in self-defense. Stenberg also stated that, during certain periods when he feels paranoid, he usually carries a knife.
Condition C
The court ordered a forensic psychiatric evaluation, completed by court-ordered evaluators. It suggested that Stenberg has moderate ID. Stenberg had been going to special needs
school throughout his schooling. He pertained the circle of people 1 § in the “law for support and service to handicapped” (LSS in Swedish) and never had independent housing. He
never held normal employment, however was involved in daily work in the communal
regime. Psychological evaluations demonstrated that his intellectual level was comparable
to an individual aged 7 to 9 years. At the time of the incident, Stenberg lived in a group
home with staff available 24/7. Staff at the group home reported that Stenberg was able to
perform some tasks on his own (such as toilet visits, get dressed, and go to familiar places
Sörman et al. / PERCEPTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS
21
in town) but that he required supervision for many daily tasks and reminders about personal
hygiene (e.g., brushing his teeth, washing his clothes, taking showers, and using the oven
when cooking). The day of the incident, he had run away from the group home and staff was
out searching for him. When Stenberg underwent the forensic psychiatric evaluation, he
admitted to the crime however it as unclear whether he understood the meaning of the
crime. It also appeared that he had set the group home on fire on a previous occasion. This
was detected early however, and did not lead to any legal consequences. At the forensic
psychiatric unit, the staff at several occasions had to explain to Stenberg why he was there,
and also they helped him cleaning his room and washing up.
ORCID iD
Karolina Sörman
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5552-2952
NOTES
1. The diagnostic descriptions in the questionnaire were based on the criteria outlined by the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). When the
vignettes were formulated, many professional organizations had changed their names to reflect “intellectual disability” as the
appropriate term, however, in Sweden the DSM-IV-TR was still in use. Thus, we chose to remain consistent with the accepted
vernacular while still adhering to the appropriate diagnostic criteria.
2. At the time the case vignettes were written, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM5; APA, 2013) was only recently translated into the Swedish language and the Swedish forensic system continued to rely on
the DSM-IV-TR.
3. An advisory statement is provided in cases where a study does not involve handling of personal data, and does not fall
under the Swedish law regarding research on human subjects. An advisory statement implies that the Ethical Review Board
does not oppose the proposed research.
4. Although not associated with the medicolegal concept SMD in the Swedish legislation, ASPD is recognized as a psychiatric disorder in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013).
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Karolina Sörman, PhD, is head of unit continuing education at the Center for Psychiatry Research. She is also a part-time
researcher at the Department of Clinical Neuroscience at Karolinska institutet. Her research interests focus on antisocial
development and callous-unemotional traits in youth.
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Jennifer Cox, PhD, is an associate professor of psychology at The University of Alabama. Her research interests include
judicial decision making, gender bias in the legal system, forensic assessment, and psychopathy.
Charlotte Eklund Rimsten, is a legal adviser for the Division for Criminal Law in the Ministry of Justice of Sweden. She
has worked as a judge in the district courts of Nacka and Södertörn.
Marissa Stanziani, is currently a PhD candidate in the clinical psychology program at The University of Alabama, concentrating on the interplay of psychology and the law. Her research interests include gender disparities in public policy, severe
mental illness, and death penalty litigation.
Claes Lernestedt is professor of criminal law at Stockholm University. His research interests are mainly within the area of
criminal law’s general part, including, for example, issues related to mental disorder and, generally, the construction of the
criminal law’s person.
Marianne Kristiansson, PhD is chief MD specialized in forensic psychiatry, anaesthesiology, and pain medicine. She is
professor in forensic psychiatry at Karolinska institutet, for 8 years has been head of the Stockholm Department of Forensic
Psychiatry at the National Board of Forensic Medicine in Sweden and for 10 years medical director at the same department.
She is also scientific adviser at various governmental agencies—Prison and Probation Services, National Board of Health and
Social Services, National Council of Crime Prevention. Her current research concerns risk behaviors in society.
Katarina Howner, PhD, is a post doc at the Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet. She is also a forensic
psychiatrist at the National Board of Forensic Medicine, Stockholm, Sweden. Her research interests focus on mentally disordered offenders, psychopathy and brain imaging.