Book Reviews 1131 Korean sources, it surprisingly succeeds in maintaining a sound level of objectivity and balance. The volume does have some room for improvement. First of all, it is not quite clear what exactly the author means by the “new era” and “new dynamics.” As these terms appear repeatedly in the book, they should have been more clearly defined early on. Second, as for the main argument that Sino-South Korean relations are complicated and multidimensional with multiple conduits, it makes one wonder what is really new there. Third, despite Ye’s claim that the book is not about specific events and incidents, it is somewhat ironic that chapter five focusing on the China–Korea FTA stands out as the best. This book offers a meaningful additional case of political–economic interactions in bilateral relations to the field of international politics. To the field of China studies, it also provides a useful addition to the study of Sino-South Korean relations for the 21st century. This book can be used as a textbook for undergraduate and graduate seminars on China’s foreign policy or Northeast Asian security. Of course, given that “what South Korea can select is not so much which game it is willing to play as which side (the US or China) it is willing to stand with” (p. 130), scholars and policy experts of the Asian region at large may also benefit from it. JAE HO CHUNG cjhir@snu.ac.kr India–China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order J A G A N N AT H P. PA ND A London and New York: Routledge, 2016 xx + 273 pp. £110.00 ISBN 978-1-13883359-3 doi:10.1017/S0305741017001527 Numerous books have been published on India–China relations in the last two decades employing different theoretical and conceptual frameworks, with realism being the dominant paradigm. In his book, Panda argues that India–China relations – bilateral, sub-regional, regional, cross continental and global – cannot be explicated by realism (with its focus on conflict), liberalism (with its emphasis on economic interdependence and cooperation) and constructivism (with its emphasis on culture, history, identity and ideas), the three dominant schools of thought in international relations theory. Panda proposes and employs a more holistic conceptual framework in the form of “resources, identity and authority” to explicate the multifaceted relationship. The author explores this relationship at multiple levels such as bilateral, subregional, regional, cross-continental and global. The relations manifest themselves in various ways in what can be termed as the six Cs – convergence, cooperation, collaboration, coexistence, competition and conflict (p. 1). The two countries have similar interests, and convergence can be observed over the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and also the WTO (chapter 16). They have cooperated and collaborated with respect to the above and climate change under the BASIC framework (chapter 14). Competition and coexistence are manifested in the security realm and in the quest for strategic space and influence in subregional, regional and global multilateral institutions such as BCIM and BIMSTEC Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Florida, on 13 Dec 2017 at 15:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017001527 1132 The China Quarterly, 232, December 2017, pp. 1116–1147 (chapter seven), SAARC (chapter eight), ASEAN plus 6, TPP and RCEP (chapter 11) and the UN (chapter 16), and garnering resources such as oil and natural gas, minerals and metals in Africa, Russia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia (chapter 15). In addition to cooperation and coexistence, there is also a possibility of conflict between the two neighbours – because of mistrust and historical and structural reasons leading to rivalry – over the disputed land border (chapter three), Tibet and the Dalai Lama (chapter four) and transboundary water resources in the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo (chapter five). In such cases, the countries suffer from classic security dilemmas – both deterrence and spiral. Some broad themes also emerge from the book. India and China’s ambitions, goals and objectives are different, and the tools and instruments used to achieve these are also different. For instance, India and China both use the rhetoric and the identity of developing countries to garner support for achieving a multipolar world order and for political influence. However, China relies more on economic power (hard power) and economic diplomacy which India cannot match, and the latter has to rely more on soft power and its historical links to achieve its objectives (chapters 13–16). It must be noted that India is in China’s slipstream not only in Africa (chapter 15) but also in Latin America, Central Asia (chapter nine) and Southeast Asia (chapters 11–12) and is playing catch up. In BRICS, the aims and ambitions are different, with India focusing on economic governance, but China has a more political and strategic objective not only with the reforms but also using the forum to enhance its own influence with the member countries, regionally and globally (chapter 13). China has a cogent foreign policy and a long-term strategy to achieve and maximize its national interests at all costs and also has a coherent policy regarding India. However, India lacks a coherent foreign policy not only towards China but in general. This can be explained by the difference in strategic culture, political and economic systems, histories and civilization ethos of the two countries. The present need is for India to have a nuanced foreign policy towards China. Has Panda been able to develop and employ the new conceptual framework that he proposes? The answer is no. Panda does not delve in depth either in developing the concept or in defining terms such as authority and identity. Additionally, it seems he has not understood the difference between power and authority and has used the two interchangeably (pp. 4, 9). Another issue is the classification of the levels. Sub-regional, regional and cross-continental have not been defined. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend why South Asia and the SAARC (chapter eight) is regional but One Belt One Road (OBOR) (chapter six) is sub-regional. In a similar vein, how is SCO (chapter nine) regional? Both OBOR (chapter six) and SCO are multiregional, comprising East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia. Additionally, OBOR is also cross-continental. The book also has numerous factual errors and inconsistencies and would have benefitted from editing. For instance, Panda argues that China wants a unipolar Asia and a bipolar world, with China and the US as the two poles (Introduction and also other chapters). But he later states that China wants a multipolar world (chapter 13 and other chapters). Panda argues in chapter 15 that China is more focused on Africa relative to India because of China–Taiwan diplomatic rivalry. He completely ignores or is not aware of the “diplomatic truce” between China and Taiwan proposed by President Ma in 2008 and accepted by President Hu Jintao in 2009, which led to the end of the overt competition between China and Taiwan for international recognition. Panda also argues that India, China and Russia cannot form a credible alliance (p. 207). Thus, he completely ignores or is not aware of the key tenet of Indian foreign policy of strategic autonomy and not Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Florida, on 13 Dec 2017 at 15:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017001527 Book Reviews 1133 forming military alliance with a country (or countries) against another country (or countries). The inconsistencies and errors are because the author has relied heavily on his previous work, most of which is dated. The author accepts this in the preface and also in the notes at the end of the chapter. It would have been better if Panda had employed “complex interdependence” – coined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye – as the conceptual framework to explicate India–China relationship and undertaken more rigorous research and analysis. RAJ VERMA rajneeshverma2000@gmail.com Inheritance of Loss: China, Japan, and the Political Economy of Redemption after Empire Y U K I KO KO G A Chicago, IL, and London: Chicago University Press, 2016 xxvii + 328 pp. $27.50; £20.50 ISBN 978-0-22641227-6 doi:10.1017/S0305741017001539 Koga writes elegantly in her book of the inheritances of colonialism and imperialism: loss, victimhood, betrayal, but also possibly redemption through the formal economy. In her exploration of legacies of Japanese imperialism in Northeast China, she focuses on everyday interactions between Chinese and Japanese in spaces that embody these different inheritances. While Koga’s work contributes to our understanding of how the memories of conflict with the Japanese has been used in Chinese politics and society, her main contribution is the ethnographic focus on ordinary economic interactions. This book fits a key piece into the puzzle of Sino-Japanese relations: how market interactions can thrive while mutual animosity grows. Koga’s detailed ethnography of three sites – Harbin, Changchun and Dalian, and an epilogue discussing the unsuccessful attempt of Chinese victims of war-era mustard gas to find justice in a Tokyo court – is a significant contribution to the literature on how we understand the tensions between political conflicts and economic exchange in China. Koga argues that loss and redemption are translated and experienced by Chinese and Japanese through economic interaction. Northeast China’s imperialist past serves as reminder of loss, and at the same time is an instrument of economic revival and growth. As Chinese use sites redolent with imperial memories for economic opportunity, they are also forced to confront the past. The building of a new industrial site digs up old chemical weapons, severely injuring young Chinese. Old imperial buildings are used for commerce and museums, pulling in foreign capital through investment or tourism. Economic growth thus serves as a mechanism for redemption between Japan and China, even as it forces the two countries to confront the negative inheritance of colonialism. Political scientists, in particular, should pay attention to the micro-level mechanisms of how economic interactions can simultaneously bring mutual benefits and unearth animosity, discomfort and the unsettled past. Much has been written about similar tensions at high levels of politics, where the Chinese state at once tries to attract inward Japanese investment and inflame anti-Japanese sentiment. The rich data and insights in this book should be brought to bear upon the high politics issues that are usually their focus. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Florida, on 13 Dec 2017 at 15:18:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017001527