Asian Economic and Financial Review 2(7):795-812
Asian Economic and Financial Review
journal homepage:http://aessweb.com/journal-detail.php?id=5002
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Hadhek Zouhaier1
Mohamed Karim KEFI 2
ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to study the effect of institutional factors on economic growth of a set
of 37 developed and developing countries for six successive periods of five years, from 1975 until
2000, using a static panel data model. The key findings generated by this empirical test stipulate a
dominant effect exerted by economic institutions on economic growth of the total sample of
countries and developed countries.
Key Words: political institutions, economic institutions, static panel data, economic growth.
JEL:O43, O47, C23.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between institutional and economic performance has been the subject of several
theoretical and empirical works.Since the pioneering work of NORTH (1991) attention is drawn to
the importance of institutional factors in achieving good results in terms of growth and economic
development.
In empirical work, to study the relationship between institutional and economic growth, a sound
institutional environment is able to provide a positive climate that encourages economic agents,
both domestic and foreign, to invest more in activities with high added value.On the contrary,
institutions of poor quality can increase uncertainty, unpredictability, instability, corruption and
transaction costs.In an institutional setting like this, private enterprise is discouraged especially in
terms of tangible and intangible investment.The result is certainly vulnerable economic
performances, as the growth mechanisms are blocked and the country's potential is limited.
1
Superior Institut of Gestion (ISG) of Gabès- Tunisia ISG Gabès rue Jilani Habib 6002 Gabès- Tunisia
2
ISTEC Business School, Paris, France.
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To investigate the relationship between institutions and economic growth we will proceed as part of
3
this work, a model of static panel data. On a sample of 37 countries, developed and developing for
six successive five year periods from 1970 to 2000, then divided into two groups: 17 developed and
20 developing countries. Before starting the econometric studies, it should begin with a review of
the empirical literature on the relationship between institutions and economic performance in the
first section. The second section of this work will be devoted to the choice of variables, the
determination of their sources, theinterpretations of results.
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
While theorists are still far from complete work on the issue that focuses on channels through
which institutional variables influence and can influence the economic sphere. Several empirical
studies have emerged, with the aim to provide additional arguments to the controversial association
between institutions and economic performances. Indeed, many historical evidence also shows that
the countries' economic growth has been associated with the establishment of a sound institutional
framework. This finding was supported by sound empirical evidence, which showed the negative
effects of institutional infrastructure failing (low respect of law, lack of credibility and corruption,
political instability among others) on investment and growth.
However, these studies suffer from a range of issues, the most important are the qualitative aspect
of institutional variables, hence the problem of measuring these variables, the reliability of sources
and the subjectivity data. I will, in what follows, move to a review of the empirical literature on the
subject.
Civil Liberties, political rights, and economic growth
Kormendi and Meguira (1985) are among the first researchers who are interested in studying the
impact of institutions on economic performance of nations. In fact they have examined the effect of
civil and political liberties, among other factors, on economic growth and investment for 47
countries during the period from 1950 to 1977. The result that they obtained is that countries that
have a high level of civil liberties are most successful. Subsequent studies made by Scully (1989)
and Tullock (1987) found a positive association between civil liberties and economic growth for a
large number of countries.
3
Brazil,
Belgium,
Canada,
Chile,
Colombia,
Costa
Rica,
Democratic
Congo,
Denmark,
Ecuador,
Egypt,
Finland,France,Germany,Ghana,Greece,India,Indonesia,Ireland,Italy, Japan, Malaysia,Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, New
Zealand,
Pakistan
,
Philippine,
Singapore,
South
Africa,
Spain,
Sweden,
Syria,Thailand,Tunisia,Turkish,
UK, United States
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Studies conducted in the 90s to test the relationship between regime type and economic growth
have interpreted the index of civil and political liberties published by "Freedom House" as a
measure of democracy. Barro (1996) and Helliwell (1994) found that these indices are positively
related to economic growth only when some explanatory variables are omitted from the
relationship such as: education and investment rate.
Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett (1997) analyzed the impact of the quality of governance on the
performance of a hundred projects funded by the World Bank in some developing countries during
the period 1974-1993. They found good performances in nations with high levels of civil liberties,
as measured by the index of "Freedom House". The fact that a one point increase in this index is
associated with an improvement of one point in the rate of return of the project. The civil unrest,
approximated by the frequencies of riots, strikes and protests are also negatively associated with
performance of projects. Barro (1996), Helliwell (1994), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) have all
concluded that the positive relationship between income and democracy is widely attributed to the
effect of income on democracy and not vice versa.
In general, the effect of democracy on economic growth is far from being clear since the results
that studies of this relationship led are very heterogeneous. Although attempts to measure
democracy have begun since the 80s, notably with the database Bollen (1980) which put at the
disposal of statisticians comparable indicators of democracy (available in over 110 countries)
established from the indices of political rights and freedoms listed by Banks (1979) and Taylor and
Hudson (1972). Because this indicator was not available but for two years, the variable most used
today is the Gastil (1986), available for most countries and covers indicators of electoral process,
freedom of association and political expression.
So, although these indicators are relatively old, they could not contribute to the elucidation of the
role of democracy in the growth process. As a result, we are now witnessing a multitude of results
concerning this relationship. Indeed, according to Alesina and Perotti (1994), democracy has no
effect on economic growth. They also point out the heterogeneity of the group of authoritarian
countries in terms of economic performance.
Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995) have identified three empirical studies leading to a positive
relationship between democracy and economic growth, from three in the opposite direction and ten
which identify no conclusive relationship.
In another study, Barro (1996) sought to test the hypothesis of a nonlinear relationship. He found
that a nonlinear relationship between economic growth and these indices are better able to cover all
the data, than a linear relationship. The conclusion drawn from this study is that promoting
democracy is conducive to growth when the initial level is low and negative when this level is high.
Other researchers have resulted in contradictory effects: according to Tavares and Waczairg (2001),
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democracy on the one hand, increases the accumulation of human capital and reduces income
inequality, which accelerates growth. On the other hand, it reduces the accumulation of physical
capital and increases public consumption which decelerates growth. Striking result, fertility rates
are much lower in democracies, regardless of income level, and they fluctuate in one direction or
the other in case of transition from dictatorship to democracy or vice versa. This observation
means, as observed Przeworski et al (2000), that even if democracy does not affect GDP growth, it
would have on the GDP per capita.
Another conclusion proved: if the economic performance of dictatorships ranging from excellent to
disastrous, those democracies tend to be located halfway between these extremes. It is often under a
dictatorial regime that the fastest growing were recorded, but no democracy has ever recorded
performance as bad as the worst dictatorships (Przeworski et al, 2000). The same goes for poverty
reduction. It seems that, in economic, democracy preserves the worst, but it does not guarantee the
best.
Frequency of Political violence and Economic Growth
The classic study of the determinants of growth of Barro (1991) tested the effect of indicators of
political instability, which it considers detrimental to property rights. The two measures of violence
used by Barro are: the average number of revolutions (or coups) and political assassinations. The
result which leads this work is that these two variables are negatively and significantly related to
the growth rate and the share of private investment in GDP between 1960 and 1985.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) also found that political instability weakens the share of investment in
GDP. Generally, empirical studies have been conducted to test the said relationship agree, despite
the diversity of samples and indicators, on the adverse effects of political instability on economic
performance of the country concerned. Thus, studies of Barro (1996), Azam et al (1996) showed a
direct negative impact of political instability on economic growth. Guillaumont. P et al (1999) have
shown that political instability is a key variable to explain the systematic underperformance of
African countries over the period 1970-1990. De Haan and Siermann (1996) do not contest the
effect of instability on growth, but state that this happens mainly by the investment variable. Fosu
(1992) emphasizes the variable of human capital as a channel of influence. The addition of
interactive variables allows to deduce that it is through the fall of the latter factor productivity
(human capital), that growth is permanently affected by political instability.
However, in addition to the heterogeneity of sources of impact, there are some dissenting voices in
this empirical consensus. If the study of Londregan and Poole (1990) is the only one that finds a
non-negative effect of instability on the level of economic growth, Levine and Renelt (1992), on
their part, emphasize the small robust aspect of the results concerning the impact of institutional
variables on the economic performances.
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The Aggregate Index of governance and economic growth
In their study, "Governance Matters," Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido Lobaton (1999) studied the
correlation between the six aggregate indicators of governance "voice and accountability",
"political stability and violence", "effective government", "weight regulation, "" rule of law "and"
fight against corruption "and economic performance measured in terms of per capita income, infant
mortality and literacy rates. They found that each indicator is positively correlated with the
logarithm of GDP per capita and the literacy rate and negatively with the rate of infant mortality.
The analysis goes beyond the simple correlation and considering a study that traces the
interrelationships between governance and the growth rate of income through a series of crosssectional regression between this rate and each indicator of governance.Taking as reference the
approach set out by Hall and Jones (1999) in which the difference between GDP per capita across
countries is attributed to the level of "social infrastructure" in each country which, according to
Kaufmann et al, express aspects of governance already mentioned.
Hall and Jones measured the social infrastructure as the average of several indicators of governance
from PRS (Political Risk survey) and a variable measuring trade openness constructed by Sachs
and Warner. For their study, Kaufmann et al, using the same approach used several indicators of
governance, gathered from many sources, to define the nature of the relationship may exist between
governance and economic growth for a large sample of countries. They establish a regression
between the three dependent variables: the logarithm of GDP per capita, infant mortality and
literacy rates and the six governance indicators. The essential conclusion, this study found, is that
"good governance is crucial for economic performance. The estimate shows that an increase in
standard deviation for one of the indicators of governance leads to an increase of 25 (for "voice and
accountability") to 4 times (for "political instability and violence" ) per capita income and a
decrease of 2.5 to 4 times the infant mortality rate and an increase of 15 to 25 times of literacy.
CHOICE OF VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
Choice of Variables
The theoretical work that attempted to study the relationship between institutional factors and
economic growth suggest the existence of a close link, direct and indirect, between institutional
quality and economic growth:
- The institutions that provide an environment that protects property rights and equal opportunity
are able to offer economic agents, domestic and foreign, the incentive to invest and accumulate
skills.
- Optimal use of human capital needs of institutions guaranteeing property rights, contract
enforcement and civil liberties, which can hinder the development of rent-seeking activities and
corruption.
- Democracy has an indirect effect on growth by boosting the level of education.
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- Referring to some indicators of institutional quality, such as the functioning of legal rules,
political instability, corruption and bureaucratic quality, some studies were able to show that
efficient institutional framework promotes the most productive investments and, eventually,
growth.
-The efficient institutions are able to prevent the persistence of bad policies.
-On the contrary, a poor quality of institutions leads to a risky environment, a high transaction
costs, lack of investor confidence, lack of predictability and transparency and promotes corruption.
Hence a decline in investment and blockage of economic mechanisms.
-Weak institutions lead to a misallocation and waste of resources and lead to a bias in the choice of
individuals. However, the proper functioning of these mechanisms is possible only when favorable
conditions are met. Indeed, previous work on the study of the relationship between quality
institutions and economic performance have agreed on the existence of three types of effects of
political institutions on economic growth. The first is a direct effect on productivity, the second
effect operates through the accumulation of capital, and the third through the quality of economic
institutions. Political institutions are important "that" as determinants of the efficiency of economic
institutions.
Our model incorporates several measures used to control variables. Previous studies have shown
that they account for a significant share of national differences in growth rates in recent decades.
Thus, the variables used in this study are: Y: the growth rate of real GDP per capita.YI: the
initialgrowth rate of real GDP per capita. INV: the ratio of gross capital formation in GDP. OPEN:
the ratio of the volume of trade in GDP: (X + M) / GDP. GY: Government expenditure,
approximated by the share of government consumption in GDP.HK: the stock of human capital,
approximated by average years of schooling in the total population. Inflat: the inflation rate,
measured by changes in the GDP deflator.FDI: the ratio of net foreign direct investment in GDP.
The political rights(PR): defined by the degree of government control by individuals. Civil
liberties(CL): it is the freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, free of political organizations,
free trade unions, religious institutions free and independent judiciary. Both indicators are
measured on a scale of 1 to 7. 1 being the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest.
Economic Freedom(EF): a composite index determined by five main factors: the size of
government, legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom of
trade at the level International and regulations of credit, labor and business.
This indicator is rated on a scale of 1 to 10. 1 being the lowest degree of economic freedom and 10
the highest.
All variables are for the period 1975-2000 because of data availability for all countries in the
sample.
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All economic variables are taken from the report on development in the world [2005], variables
related to political rights and civil liberties are taken from the annual report of Freedom House
Freedom in the world while the variable "economic freedom" is removed from the site of the Cato
Institute.
The variable "human capital" is extracted from the database of human capital in Barro-Lee (2000).
Estimation Methodology
The econometrics of panel data seems to be an avenue of research most relevant to the estimation
of growth factors that take into account two dimensions: individual and temporal, provides insight
into the various factors that might explain the growth.
Specification tests of the individual effects
In a study of static panel data, it should first check the specification of homogeneous or
heterogeneous data.
However, when working with aggregate series, it is relatively unlikely that the growth function is
strictly identical for all countries studied, especially when the sample of countries under study, is
heterogeneous (different development level), that is the case in our sample. If the assumption of
complete homogeneity is rejected, and if it turns out that there is a similar relationship between
growth and explanatory variables for all countries, the source of heterogeneity may come from the
model constants αi.However, there is no guarantee that the countries studied have the same level of
structural productivity. In contrast, structural factors can cause structural differences in productivity
levels between countries.
It should then test the hypothesis of a constant common to all countries:
H
H
0
a
: i i 1, N
: (i, j )1, N / i j
With F
SCR1 SCR2 /( N 1)
SCR2 /[ N (T 1) K )]
F
(0.274311 0.194746) / 36
1.986
0.194746 /[37(6 1) 10]
Which SCR1 is the squared residuals sum of the model: yi,t= αi + β Xi,t +εi,t(individual effects
model) and SCR2 the squared residuals sum of the constrained model (model perfectly
homogeneous):
yi,t= α+ β Xi,t +εi,t
Fischer statistics for the hypothesis H0, denoted by F is equal to 1,986 (F= 1,986). This value is
compared to a threshold Fischer (N-1) and N * (T-1)-K degrees of freedom, that is to say by a F
(36, 175). The p-value (1.48) is below the threshold of 5%.
For this threshold, we reject the null hypothesis H0 of equality constants αi. Our model is therefore
an individual effects model, the question here is how these individual effects must be specified:
should we adopt the assumption of fixed effects or rather the hypothesis of random effects?
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However, for panels of limited time dimension (typically the case of macroeconomic panels), there
may be substantial differences between the achievements of both GLS and Within
estimators(Hausman (1978)).
Therefore, beyond the economic interpretation, the choice of the specification, and thus the
estimation method, is particularly important for such panels.
The whole strategy of specification test of individual effects is then based on the comparison of two
estimators (GLS and Within), whose divergence reflects the presence of a correlation and the
adoption of the fixed effects model and the Within estimator is imposed.
Otherwise the two estimators give essentially identical results, the adoption of the random effects
model is recommended.
Specification test of Hausman
The specification test of Hausman (1978) is a general test that can be applied to many problems of
specification in econometrics. But its most common application is the specification tests of the
individual effects in panel. It thus serves to discriminate between fixed and random effects.
Hausman recommends to base the test on the following statistic:
1
^
^
^ ^
H ( 1 2 ) var( 1 2 ) ( 1 2 )
^
^
(1)
The first estimator (indexed par1) is an estimator between (MCG), while the second (indexed by 2)
is an estimator Within.Under the null hypothesis of correct specification, this statistic is
asymptotically distributed according to a chi-square (K-1) degrees of freedom, where K is the
number of variables in the model.
The hypothesis tested concerns the correlation of individual effects and explanatory variables:
H0 = E(αi / Xi) = 0 versus Ha= E(αi / Xi)≠ 0
(2)
Under H0 the model can be specified with individual random effects and we must retain the GLS
estimator (BLUE estimator). Under the alternative hypothesis Ha model must be specified with
individual fixed effects and we must adopt Within estimator (unbiased estimator). Thus, if the Hstatistic (Equation 1) is greater than the threshold β%, we reject the null hypothesis and it favors the
adoption of fixed effects to specify the model. Otherwise, the null hypothesis is accepted and the
adoption of the random effects model is needed.
Note that the Hausman test is degenerate when the sample’size T tends to infinity. Indeed, in this
case, the GLS estimator converges to the Within estimator, which implies that the numerator and
the denominator of the Hausman statistic tend to zero.Hence, the fixed effects models and random
effects are indistinguishable and are perfectly similar.Henceforth, the question of the specification
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of these effects is irrelevant.
Application
The completion of the test statistic of Hausman is 0 for the three samples. Since the model contains
eleven explanatory variables including the constant (k = 11), this statistic follows a chi-square with
9 degrees of freedom.Thus, adopting a random effects model is preferred and the GLS estimator is
chosen for the three samples.By the very construction of our sample, it was not possible to estimate
the fixed effects model because we have country-specific variables that were invariant over time,
this is the case of the initial GDP variable per head.Perform a fixed effect regression would have
led to this variable arbitrarily out of all explanatory variables. We must therefore focus on the
results of the GLS estimator with random effects.
ESTIMATION RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS
According to the above, our equation is of the form:
(log Yi, t log Yi ,t 1 ) i X i ,t INSi ,t i i ,t
(3)
Where Xi, t: control variables defined above, INSi, t: institutional variables already defined, μ i:
individual heterogeneity, [μ i ~ iid (0, σ2μ)] and the error term νit [νit ~ iid ( 0, σ2ν)].
The estimation results of this equation for the three samples are given as follows:
*Case of total sample:
The estimation results of our model for the total sample are satisfactory both econometrically as
that of the economic interpretation. Indeed, most variables that are either control or institutional
seem to have had an effect on economic growth. The estimation results of our model for the total
sample, shown in table 1(see Appendices), are therefore expected given the empirical and
theoretical considerations already mentioned:
Note that the coefficients are elasticities that are interpreted as relative changes that provide
information on the variation in growth rate of GDP / capita (real) following a unit change in the
variable in question.
- The coefficient of initial GDP per capita is negative in all equations and statistically significant in
most cases. Suggesting a convergence of the sample countries, that growth is accelerating away
from the stationary state is slowing and in reasonable proximity thereto.
- Public expenditure does not exert an effect on economic growth of countries considered, the fact
that the coefficients of this variable are not statistically significant, despite their still positive signs.
- Investment positively influences economic growth in these countries, because its coefficient is
always positive and statistically significant indicating a dominant effect on economic growth.
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- The coefficient of the variable "trade openness" is sometimes positive, sometimes negative but
still not statistically significant indicating a lack of association between this variable and economic
growth in these countries.
- The effect exerted by foreign direct investment on economic growth in these countries is
statistically significant when the two political variables namely "political rights" and "civil
liberties" are introduced.
This can be explained by the fact that a healthy political environment attracts foreign investors as it
contributes to the profitability of their projects. In the other equations this variable is not
significant statistically, despite the sign of its coefficient is always positive.
- The coefficients associated with the variable inflation are negative and statistically significant,
because this variable is considered a measure of "financial repression", where most studies have
shown its negative impact on economic growth.
- The effect exerted by the human capital is ambiguous because this variable changes sign an
estimate to another.
In practice, the effects of human capital on growth is far from obvious and may even be negative.
Thus, Casselli et al (1996), using panel data, found a negative relationship between human capital
and economic growth. Islam (1995) found the same negative relationship between these two
variables. Hojo (2003) found a significant positive effect of education on productivity despite its
negative effect on economic growth.
The study of Alfaro et al (2004) led to a disconnect between education and economic growth in two
of four cases. In general, the belief that human capital constitutes a socially productive investment,
first confirmed by a series of works, now faces an unexpected empirical finding: the most careful
estimates, those who dismiss the best potential biases, are unable to demonstrate that education is a
productive factor in the aggregate (Gurgand, 2002). Measurement errors could, in theory, be the
cause of this result, but this explanation remains highly inadequate.
- The "economic freedom" has a major effect on economic growth. Indeed, the coefficient of this
variable is always positive and statistically significant.
Indicating that the protection of property rights and contractual rights and a sound legal structure is
likely to promote economic growth through stimulating investment.
These observations are comparable to Borner, Bodmer and Kobler (2004) who found almost the
same coefficients [0009 (3.61), 0.012 (4.11) and 0009 (2.92)] and the same degree of significance
and robustness for a variable close to ours called "quality of economic institutions" closely related
to the security of property rights as is the case for the variable we used.Alfaro et al (2004) have
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introduced a variable called "institutional quality" related to the security of property rights and
found almost the same coefficients as our [0005 (2.62) and 0011 (2.82)]. Among 32 empirical
studies that tested the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth, thirty have
used the same as ours and have adopted three five-year intervals, as is our case, the conclusion,
almost as common to all these studies is that this variable is positively related to economic growth.
- The "civil liberties" and "political rights" do not seem to be correlated with economic growth in
these countries. Result, which can find an explanation which states that on the one hand, the
political institutions will have an indirect effect on economic growth, an effect that passes through
investment and human capital in particular.
On the other hand, political institutions are important "that" as determinants of the efficiency of
economic institutions. Once these are positively correlated to economic growth, political
institutions of the mission is accomplished.
* Case of developed countries
The key observations that we can identify the table2, in the appendices, representing the results of
estimating the group of developed countries, are:
- The coefficients of initial GDP per capita are still negative and statistically significant. This
confirms the idea of convergence between these countries.
- The coefficients of "spending" are small but they are statistically significant with signs always
positive. Hence, a positive but low, spending on economic growth in these countries. This result
reinforces the idea that public spending positively affect economic growth when used to finance
investments directly where indirect cost that is the case of investments in basic infrastructure,
education, health ... etc..
-"Trade openness" has a positive effect on the robust economic growth in these countries.
- Inflation keeps the same negative and statistically significant effect, already noted for the total
sample of countries.
- "Foreign direct investment" does not appear to be correlated with economic growth given the non
significance of the coefficients of this variable.
This same result was reached by the study of Alfaro et al (2004) who used the same variable to test
the effect of FDI on economic growth of a set of developed and developing countries. Indeed, in
three out of four coefficients of this variable are not significant, with different signs [-0076 (-0.25)
0.16 (0.48) and 0063 (0.27)].
-The investment always has a major effect on economic growth.
- The variable "civil liberties" does not appear to be correlated with growth, despite the positive
sign of its coefficient.
- Political rights have no effect, it seems, on economic growth in these countries that the sign of
this variable is still negative but not statistically significant. This result is to reinforce the idea that
the relationship between measures of democracy and economic performance is far from clear
(Barro, 1996, 1997; Durham, 1999) because on the one hand, economic growth in the long term
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implies a state of rights and protection of civil and political freedoms, as stated North (1995), and
secondly, as noted by Olson (1982), political freedom promotes the requirements of groups special
interest for redistributive policies.The efforts of these groups may produce a legislative deadlock
and
political
sub-optimal,
and
thus
affect
growth.
In a literature review, Brunetti (1997) compared 17 studies finding a positive correlation, negative
or not significant between growth and democracy.
-Human capital has a positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth.
However, once the variable of economic institutions is introduced in the regressions, the
coefficients of "human capital" become statistically insignificant while keeping a positive sign.
This result can be justified by the fact that the productivity of human capital improves with the
presence of an enabling policy environment that stimulates private initiatives by guaranteeing
political rights and basic civil.
* Case of developing countries
The estimation results of our model for developing countries (table 3 in the appendices) are
expected:
-The coefficient of initial GDP per capita is negative (expected) but it is not always statistically
significant, meaning that the convergence between these countries is transient.
-The same applies to the variable "government spending" which has a positive sign, but statistically
insignificant. This means that public spending does not contribute to economic growth in these
countries.
-"Trade openness" has a negative effect on economic growth in developing countries.
This result can be justified by the fact that most of these countries suffer from a dislocation
between the industries where the lack of dissemination of positive externalities of export industries
to other branches.
- Foreign direct investment has no influence on the economic performance of these countries in
most cases. Indeed, the coefficient of this variable is always positive but is statistically significant
only when the two political variables namely "political rights" and "civil liberties" are introduced.
This can be explained by the fact that a healthy political environment attracts foreign investors as it
contributes to the profitability of their projects, because the conditions inside the host country may
appear predetermining both in the ability to attracting FDI with a chance to transform the
specialization of the host country and the implementation mechanisms of overflow in the local
production (Mouhoud, 1998).
Indeed, with, among others, inadequate basic infrastructure, a poorly qualified workforce,
industries disarticulated, FDI only amplify the dependence of these countries to strangers.
- The effect of human capital is not statistically significant, despite the positive signs of the
coefficients of this variable.
- Inflation has a negative effect on economic growth in these countries, the expected result that
these countries suffer from several problems in their economic policies in general, and especially
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monetary policies, which results in rates inflation rates in these countries, which adversely affect
economic growth.
-The investment still has a significant effect on economic growth in these countries.
- Political institutions do not seem to be correlated with economic growth of developing countries.
This is expected since the institutions of these countries are vulnerable. Hence, the impossibility
that they can influence economic performance.
- These bad political institutions will generate economic institutions will fragile, unable to
influence economic activity. Indeed, with property rights and contractual rights poorly protected
and a legal structure unhealthy, it is impossible to stimulate economic activity, and so make good
economic performance.
CONCLUSION
As part of this research, we focused on a very important and very controversial question.
It is the nature of the effect exercised by the institutions of a country on its economic growth.
To answer this question, at least partially, we proceeded in this work to the following methodology:
select variables, set the estimation methodology and finally test the validation of an empirical
relationship, using a static panel data model.
The key findings generated by this empirical test stipulate a dominant effect exerted by economic
institutions on economic growth of the total sample of countries and of the developed countries.
The "civil liberties" and "political rights" do not seem to be correlated with economic growth in
these countries. Result, which can find an explanation which states that on the one hand, the
political institutions will have an indirect effect on economic growth, an effect that passes through
investment and human capital in particular.
On the other hand, political institutions are important "that" as determinants of the efficiency of
economic institutions. Once these are positively correlated to economic growth, the mission of
political institutions is accomplished. As for developing countries, the political and economic
institutions do not seem to be related to economic growth. This is expected since the institutions of
these countries are vulnerable. Hence, the impossibility that they can influence economic
performance.
These bad political institutions will generate weak economic institutions, unable to influence
economic activity. Indeed, with property rights and contractual rights poorly protected and a legal
structure unhealthy, it is impossible to stimulate economic activity, and so make good economic
performance.
In general, the heterogeneity of the results of these countries in terms of link between institutional
807
Asian Economic and Financial Review 2(7):795-812
factors and economic growth strengthens the conclusion arrived at by the empirical studies in this
area, since a clear relationship between institutional sphere and economic sphere is far to be found.
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Appendices
Table-1. Estimation results of institutions and growth: dependent variable real per capita GDP
growth
(GLS panel data estimator)
Total Sample
Variables (1)
C
0.026
(1.25)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
0.0058
(0.18)
0.0097
(0.32)
-0.05**
(-1.96)
-0.05
(-1.46)
-0.03
(-1.34)
-0.048
(-1.45)
810
Asian Economic and Financial Review 2(7):795-812
YI
-0.0094
(-3.42)
-0.008*
(-2.32)
-0.008*
(-2.64)
-0.005**
(-1.74)
-0.005
(-1.48)
-0.006*
(-2.39)
-0.005
(-1.84)
GY
3.61E-05
(1.06)
5.82E-03
(0.97)
-3.77E-03
(-3.57)
0.039**
(1.70)
0. 22
(4.88)
0.0032
(1.53)
-
6.61E-06
(0.2)
-4.45E-03
(-0.80)
-3.14E-03
(-4.95)
0.025
(1.55)
0. 19
(4.73)
-0.0013
(-0.56)
-
-
-
0.0005
(0.21)
0.013
(3.71)
1.02E-05
(0.33)
-2.90E-05
(-0.60)
-3.17E-03
(-5.40)
0.025
(1.57)
0. 19
(4.75)
-0.0015
(-0.68)
-0.0015
(-0.83)
-
EF
4.08E-05
(1.29)
6.64E-03
(1.09)
-3.83E-03
(-3.99)
0.036
(1.46)
0.23
(5.09)
0.0029
(1.42)
-0.0062*
(-1.39)
0.005
(0.95)
-
6.39E-06
(0.19)
-4.36E-03
(-0.87)
-3.12E-03
(-4.93)
0.025
(1.59)
0. 19
(4.72)
-0.0014
(-0.60)
-
CL
3.91E-05
(1.23)
7.13E-03
(1.27)
-3.78E-03
(-3.95)
0.037**
(1.67)
0. 23
(5.15)
0.0025
(1.21)
-0.0029**
(-1.76)
-
1.19E-05
(0.38)
3.16E-03
(-0.61)
-3.22E-03
(-5.39)
0.023
(1.37)
0. 19
(4.68)
-0.0011
(-0.49)
-0.004
(-0.97)
0.004
(0.80)
0.012
(3.41)
Open
INFLAT
FDI
I
HK
PR
-0.00057
(-0.27)
-
0.013
(3.84)
0.012
(3.49)
**: Significant at 10%. *: Significant at 5%. t-student in parentheses.
Table-2. Estimation results of institutions and growth: dependent variable real per capita GDP
growth
(GLS panel data estimator)
Developed Countries
Variables (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
C
0.49
(11.4)
0.48
(10.20)
0.47
(9.72)
0.40
(10.05)
0.41
(8.98)
0.40
(9.58)
0.41
(8.63)
YI
-0.06
(-9.36)
-0.059
(-9.22)
-0.059
(-9.74)
-0.053
(-9.94)
-0.055
(-8.46)
-0.054
(-9.03)
-0.054
(-8.95)
GY
1.26E-04
(5.1)
1.25E-04
(5.08)
1.25E-04
(5.20)
1.09E-04
(5.76)
1.09E-04
(5.5)
1.10E-04
(5.73)
1.10E-04
(5.67)
Open
0.038
(5.38)
0.038
(5.38)
0.039
(4.95)
0.03
(5.42)
0.032
(5.08)
0.033
(5.34)
0.032
(5.06)
INFLAT
-0. 11
(-4.02)
-0.011
-0.11
(-6.87)
-0.012
-0.11
(-3.83)
-0.013
-0.095
(-8.26)
-0.014
-0.092
(-5.98)
-0.012
-0.088
(-3.51)
-0.014
-0.089
(-3.45)
-0.013
FDI
811
Asian Economic and Financial Review 2(7):795-812
CL
(-1.80)
0.19*
(2.43)
0.0037*
(2.63)
-0.0012
(-0.25)
-
EF
-
I
HK
PR
(-1.5)
0.18*
(2.6)
0.0038*
(2.48)
0.00037
(0.11)
-
(-1.38)
0.19*
(2.45)
0.0038*
(2.57)
-0.002
(-0.30)
0.0014
(0.29)
-
(-1.62)
0.18
(3.03)
0.0013
(0.93)
-
(-1.29)
0. 19*
(2.86)
0.0010
(0.76)
-
-
-0.0017
(-0.53)
0.0071*
(2.02)
0.0066**
(1.96)
(-1.59)
0. 19
(2.78)
0.0011
(0.83)
-0.002
(-0.44)
0.0069**
(1.86)
(-1.27)
0.19
(2.7)
0.0010
(0.73)
-0.0017
(-0.27)
-0.0008
(-0.20)
0.0071*
(2.02)
**: Significant at 10%. *: Significant at 5%. t-student in parentheses.
Table-3: Estimation results of institutions and growth: dependent variable real per capita GDP
growth
(GLS panel data estimator)
Developing Countries
Variables (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
C
0.0066
(0.20)
-0.016
(-0.40)
-0.015
(-0.39)
-0.033
(-0.88)
-0.033
(-0.89)
-0.059
(-1.29)
-0.051
(-1.33)
YI
-0.01*
(-2.01)
-0.01
(-1.85)
-0.01*
(-2.02)
-0.0079
(-1.58)
-0.008
(-1.65)
-0.007
(-1.47)
-0.008**
(-1.78)
GY
3.5E-04
(1.18)
4.17E-04
(1.52)
4.61E-04
(1.65)
2.86E-04
(0.85)
2.98E-04
(0.91)
3.61E-04
(1.25)
4.04E-04
(1.45)
Open
-0.017
(-1.62)
-3.27E03**
(-4.07)
0.39**
(1.76)
0.33
(6.55)
0.0035
(1.23)
-
-
-0.015**
(-1.72)
-3.07E03**
(-5.44)
0.23
(0.89)
0.27
(4.92)
0.00025
(0.08)
-2.59E-05
(-0.012)
-
-0.020*
(-1.99)
-2.91E03
(-5.39)
0. 3
(1.20)
0.28
(4.84)
0.0009
(0.29)
-
0.0027
(1.00)
-0.017**
(-1.79)
-3.34E03**
(-4.32)
0.42*
(2.00)
0.34
(7.15)
0.0029
(1.04)
-0.006
(-1.25)
0.0094
(1.32)
-0.015**
(-1.73)
-3.04E03**
(-5.35)
0.24
(0.93)
0.28
(5.07)
0.00030
(0.095)
-
CL
-0.012
(-1.29)
-3.38E03**
(-4.32)
0.32
(1.43)
0. 32
(7.29)
0.0026
(0.9)
-0.00079
(-0.42)
-
0.0035
(1.15)
-0.020*
(-2.21)
-3.01E03**
(-5.46)
0.34
(1.39)
0.29
(4.98)
0.0007
(0.26)
-0.005
(-1.04)
0.009**
(1.25)
EF
-
-
-
0.0083
(1.45)
0.0084
(1.36)
0.009
(1.50)
0.007
(1.31)
INFLAT
FDI
I
HK
PR
**: Significant at 10%. *: Significant at 5%. t-student in parentheses.
812