918831
TVNXXX10.1177/1527476420918831Television & New MediaMayer
research-article2020
Article
The MAAFiA Mystique
Television & New Media
2020, Vol. 21(6) 616–620
© The Author(s) 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476420918831
DOI: 10.1177/1527476420918831
journals.sagepub.com/home/tvn
Vicki Mayer1
Abstract
What would a manifesto look like for media and creative workers in the twenty-first
century? How would we account for decades of the transformation of work to fit
the political economies of labor and data? This essay for the twentieth anniversary of
Television & New Media attempts to answer these questions.
Keywords
data economy, creative labor, media labor, labor, political economy, work
Imagine media studies were to write a counternarrative of creative labor in the twentyfirst century. It might begin something like this:
The problem lay buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of workers. It was a
strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that they suffered in the beginnings
of the twenty-first in the digital economy. Each college-educated worker struggled with
it alone. As they made informational interviews, shopped for online credentials, matched
LinkedIn profiles, drank crafted cappuccinos and cocktails with the team, managed
professional networks, lay beside their cell phone at night—they were afraid to ask even
of themselves the silent question—“Is this all?”
The answer to the question posed here is one media studies must offer urgently.
We all know it’s cool to work in Hollywood, Silicon Valley, Broadway. All of these
index a “hot” creative industry that exerts world dominance over intellectual property.
As such, creative industries both advertise themselves and control the means for the
production and distribution of advertising through media (Neff et al. 2005). The refrain
to “be creative” has been repeated to young people today almost as much as “Love
1
Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Vicki Mayer, Department of Communication, School of Liberal Arts, Tulane University, 1229 Broadway,
New Orleans, LA 70118, USA.
Email: vmayer@tulane.edu
Mayer
617
Yourself” on a Spotify playlist. It is trumpeted through popular media that celebritize
their own executive elites and piped like muszak through educational programs
focused on employability. What creativity actually means, however, is a form of endless precarity for workers in these industries, which rely on tightly clustered networks
of largely contract workers. This songbook for exploiting creative workers materially
and ideologically has passed from media industries of yesterday to the new media data
robber barons of today.
Media studies has had long truck in tracking the salience of creativity in corporations. It began, at least in the United States, with the slow transformation of intellectual
property law, which reassigned the value of creative ideas from a producer’s control to
what the consumer market would bear. Over the nineteenth century, this allowed corporations to replace labor as the arbiters over their workplace knowledge with themselves
as the arbiters for what the final product is worth. Corporations could rationalize the
creativity a product demands and hire a workforce that ceded their ideas as corporate
property. “By the second decade of the twentieth century, middle class independence
connoted steady and respectable corporate employment rather than entrepreneurship,
and freedom to consume rather than produce” (Fisk 2009, 8). Then, another series of
cultural transformations ceded the locus of creativity from the worker who sold it as
property to the corporation to an individual as a business that entered a service agreement with the corporation. The change, effected over the booms and recessions of the
digital era, signaled the difference in the valence of creativity, from a property the
employee traded in return for long-term stability, to a service that helped employees
become their own businesses. Writes the cultural sociologist Ilana Gershon (2017),
[W]hat companies are supposed to do under this new model is become good places to
leave—to allow people to cycle in and out of their tenure at the workplace, supposedly
improving the business while they are there, and in turn having the business improve
them.
Work became performative of new identities for the workers. Young women flocked
to the dry outposts of early film studios not just to pay the rent, but to achieve freedom,
class status, and perhaps even stardom (Stamp 2000). The Internet was created by
computer programmers working in a culture of romantic individualism, in they were
both protagonists and proselytizers of nerdiness as a heroic masculinity (Streeter
2011). Creative workers today assume an autonomy, individuality, and originality that
can be marketed to add to their own value as an enterprise and to a property owned by
their employer. Yet each creative field is itself hierarchized internally according to
social identities. Creative workers participate in these strategic identity performances.
As independent enterprises, they are competing with each other even as much of creative work involves collaboration with team members or coordination across geographies. Media studies has shown how the balancing between personal and group success
has relied on a reputation-based economy (Hearn 2010) that perpetuates the success of
those already in and excludes those not in—a recipe for racism, sexism, homophobia,
ableism, and classism in creative industries.
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Television & New Media 21(6)
Those in a creative job find little rest for the weary. Maintaining creative networks
becomes a part-time profession in itself, a continuous self-performance that is “always
on-call” (Gregg 2011) from grade school until the social-media afterlife. Anxiety is
endemic because no one ever can feel they’ve completely “broken in” to creative
industries, which then can demand more from the surplus pool of aspirants. “Work
becomes akin to a romantic relationship,” as young people reprioritize friendships and
family below the ongoing conquest of a creative career (McRobbie 2016, 3). To
achieve, the creative working-self is assertive yet compliant, a leader yet a teamplayer. Each person is uniquely (over)qualified yet imminently flexible to retrain,
reskill, and reboot. The medicalization of a condition known as “burn-out” has spurred
another industry to help workers cope with this schizophrenic personality project and
the sadomasochism involved in foregoing sleeping or physical movement in order to
make a deadline.
The cartelization of data among a handful of high-tech industries has brought creative work to these ignoble ends. As ever more human minds are replaced with artificial intelligence and creative inspiration with algorithmic knowledge, the desire to
work in the industrial complex ending regular employment continues unabated.
Critiques of workplace surveillance, mandatory sociality, and toxic masculinity in The
Circle and The Social Network have done little to tarnish the image of a career in the
MAAFiA (Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Alphabet). In the Netherlands, a
hub for the European high-tech investment in data and platforms, the lure of MAAFiA
membership exacerbates labor market shortages everywhere else. At a career fair in
Utrecht in 2018, I met one conflicted recruiter who was guaranteeing work–life balance with normal work hours and no weekends. Meanwhile, a video above his head
streamed images of dudes playing foosball at the office, a reference to the subsumption of work-as-play branded by Silicon Valley (Turner 2009). After his pitch to me, I
showed him the free career fair magazine which listed the results of a national survey
of Dutch students and first-time workers. Among “the best workplace to start your
career,” his company was on the list, but well below the top four: Google, Apple,
Booking.com, and Microsoft (First Employers 2017). “That makes sense,” he
responded off-script. “Everyone wants to work for Google.”
In under a decade, the MAAFiA has captured the myth of the mediated center
(Couldry 2003) for the future of work, becoming the source for information about the
symbolic value of their own creativity aka “innovation.” Apple animated its new technologies through exuberant performances by Steve Jobs, a prelude to what would
become a rite of entrepreneurial passage through TED (Cornfeld 2018). Facebook
promises applicants “the most meaningful work of your career” on, unsurprisingly,
Facebook, which now boasts more users than the population of China and the United
States combined. The Google mystique has been confirmed in popular media through
an array of insider guides, such as How to Get a Job at Google, The Google Resume,
and Are You Smart Enough to Work at Google? Celebrity coverage of Amazon’s Jeff
Bezos—his wealth, his sex life, his philanthrocapitalism—have coincided with the
company’s highly publicized contest for the location of its next administrative headquarters. Cities raced to the bottom to win the 50,000 “high-paying” jobs that work to
Mayer
619
rationalize the entire global supply chain. And Microsoft is basically the mascot of
every office workplace application. Silicon Valley successfully took a page from the
Hollywood playbook. MAAFiA executives have colonized the term “innovation”
much as Walt Disney managed to occupy the term “magic” to obscure the factory-like
conditions that characterize both animation and amusement parks.
Locating alternative sources for information about innovation work are increasingly hard to come by. Much like the blurbs found in trade magazines, there are no
unmediated performances in creative workers’ production cultures (Caldwell 2008).
Beyond the pressures to self-promote or put a positive face on your own alienation, the
MAAFiA ensures they can control the narrative. Google is under investigation for the
anti-competitive practices they use in job search boards to direct employment traffic
and collect worker data. The widespread use of nondisclosure agreements to blanket
not just creative workers, but everyone in the innovation sector, squelches all potential
critique among workers. On the Internet, PR shils act as proxies for happy workers at
Amazon. Even the burnout therapy these companies provide to workers may be monitored to enforce total compliance with corporate confidentiality rules.
Instead there is just the malaise, the feeling that something is not right. In diagnosing the condition, media studies offers an answer to the question “Is this all?”—just as
it did nearly 60 years ago. In 1963, a college graduate began talking with fellow alumnae after her employer forced her into a condition of stay-at-home motherhood:
The problem laid buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of American women. It
was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the
middle of the twentieth century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with
it alone. As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate
peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay
beside her husband at night—she was afraid even to ask herself the silent question—“Is
this all?” (Friedan 1963, 1)
The Feminine Mystique captured the malaise women felt who strived to be the ideal
worker in a space overdetermined by scientific explanations and mediated paths to
fulfillment. The book helped them recognize the span of contradictory emotions that
supported patriarchy around the most invisible and unpaid labors. It helped them name
a solution in feminism.
The media studies version for creative and innovation workers is similarly needed
for a politics of solidarity today. Like Friedan, it begins with our own workplace identities. Like the women’s movement, it depends on mediation. Publicized beyond the
conference paper and unshackled by the laws of academic metrics and citation manuals, media studies has stories about creative labor the field should tell before our software apps do. Beyond the cell phone or Alexa, who knows who might be listening?
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
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Television & New Media 21(6)
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
References
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Author Biography
Vicki Mayer is professor of communication at Tulane University. Her research encompasses
media and communication industries, and their political economies, infrastructures, and organizational work cultures. Her publications seek to theorize and illustrate how these industries
shape workers and how media and communication work shapes workers and citizens. Her theories inform her work in the digital humanities and pedagogy, most recently on ViaNolaVie and
NewOrleansHistorical.