ABSTRACT
Figure 1: David Willburg's the Leon Lagoon. The painting has been
subject to numerous object-oriented ontological analyses
What is it about objects that can really define how an
individual is seen and constructed? This paper
engages Kopytoff’s (1986) ideas on objects,
commodities, and commoditization with Lacan’s
theories of language, mind, and objects to synthesize
a new understanding of objects, commodities, and
how these translate into the ontological semiotics of
an individual that Kopytoff explores in relation to the
socio-cultural structures from an anthropological
perspective. Bringing in psychoanalytic perspective of
Lacan provides an alternative and contrasting view of
not just objects, desire, and commodities but also of
the individual which is object-ified in making objects
a subject of his/her desire.
Kopytoff’s Commodities &
Lacan’s ‘Sujet du Désir’
Engaging Anthropological Perspectives with
Psychoanalytic Critical Theory
UPADHYAY, NISHANT
Graduate Proseminar – Professor Martha Selby
1. Introduction
The study of objects has been at the core of the analysis of social shifts through centralizing
discourse on materiality and production. The centrality of production in analysis of the society has
been a key to the schools of thoughts that developed understanding of social systems, institutions,
and the shifts and tumults which progressed along.i However, the study of objects has been an
equally crucial and transformative phenomenon in the study of mind, language, and individual.
The objects are not merely described as an outcome of ‘production’ but the translation of internal
psycho-linguistic semiotics of mind into something external, tangible, and definitive. One of the
aims of this paper is to assess Kopytoff’s analysis of objects and commodities as definitive factors
of social structure in contrast with Lacan’s synthesis of objects as entities carved out of desire and
the order of subconscious imposed on material externality.
The central aim of this paper is to contrast Kopytoff’s definition of objects, commodities, and the
subsequent process of commoditization with Lacanian theorization of objects, desire, and the
construction of objects as the subject of desire. The importance of such contrasting lies in
highlighting the limits of assessing commoditization as a socio-cultural semiotic and not
accounting for a subject’s corporeality in the due process. In contrast to Kopytoff’s approach, a
Lacanian approach provides us with alleys to substantiate this limitation and analyze objects and
commodities as something which are a translation of semiotics of the sub-conscious, which Lacan
argued, is structured like the language (Fink, 1995). Thus, putting the commodities in the culturallinguistic order transforms both how and why commodities are constructed and exist in the world.
To undertake this analysis, this paper will engage Lacan and Kopytoff on three key points: the
subjectivity of the object, translating object through cultural-linguistic semiotics in commodities,
and a theoretical engagement on translating ‘objects’ from material to psychoanalytic realm. To
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proceed, this paper will first highlight Kopytoff’s (1986) understanding of object, commodities,
and commoditization, followed by Lacan’s (1963) theorization of objects, desires, and the structure
of mind, briefly. Following the discussion, this study will engage Kopytoff and Lacanian
theorizations and analyze how Kopytoff’s work does not consider cultural-linguistic dimensions
and the outcomes of omitting such paradigm in detail.
2. Kopytoff’s Objects: Singularization, Individualization, and Commoditization
Kopytoff (1986) outlines a commodity in a set of frameworks that are distinct and commoditized
in different stages – from infinite to terminal commoditization; singularization and
individualization – which marks it distinct from how economists have assumed commodities to be
(Kopytoff, 1986). Yet there exists a notion of perfect commodity, which Kopytoff (1986) defines:
…commodity is a thing that has use value and that can be exchanged in a discrete
transaction for a counterpart, the very fact of exchange indicating that the counterpart has,
in the immediate context, an equivalent value… The perfect commodity would be one that
is exchangeable with anything and everything else, as the perfectly commoditized world
would be one in which everything is exchangeable or for sale. By the same token, the
perfectly decommoditized world would be one in which everything is singular, unique, and
unexchangeable (Kopytoff, 1986, pp. 68-9; emphasis mine).
In abstract, the underscoring notion is essential-ness of commoditization – a process which
Kopytoff asserts as having a universal and persistent – which may vary in its structural form and
content but remains consistently true to a transcultural and objective meta-form of itself (Kopytoff,
1986, p. 68). From pre-colonial to capitalist societies, commoditization persists through a stretch
of the history which determined and regulated not just the object’s value but its relationship with
the societies. Highlighting the socio-cultural constant, an individual of Kopytoff’s commodities
seems to be an embedded and ingrained product of the socio-cultural constructs (Kopytoff, 1986,
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pp. 69-72). Questioning this constant brings us to an essential problem that Kopytoff (1986) does
not cover: if commoditization is such a universal and transcendental truth, what agency does an
individual or a set of individuals have?
There are two given explanations. In the first, Kopytoff (1986) argues about the tendency of human
mind to impose an order, and thus, it appears as a role an individual might have in complex cultural
web (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 70). Secondly, Kopytoff puts forward that,
…this clash between culture and individual is inevitable, at least at the cognitive
level. The world of things lends itself to an endless number of classifications, rooted
in natural features and cultural and idiosyncratic perceptions. The individual mind
can play with them all, constructing innumerable classes, different universes of
common value, and changing spheres of exchange. Culture, by contrast, cannot be
so exuberant, least so in the economy, where its classifications must provide
unambiguous guidance to pragmatic and coordinated action (Kopytoff, 1986, pp.
76-7).
It is difficult to resolve this conundrum in context of a dialectic relationship that Kopytoff (1986)
envisions between an individual and the culture. On the one hand, the subsumed individual is
constructing and imposing an order within a cultural framework, while, on the other hand, the
person might rebel against it in an inevitable clash. In this scenario, how absolute does the realm
of an objective-looking commoditization? To address the absolute-ness of cultural forces of
commoditization, Kopytoff (1986) highlights individualization and singularization. The question
of the corporeality and corporeal ownership is framed in a debate between the polar of
individualization and singularization. In this context, Kopytoff (1986) suggests that
Commoditization, then, is best looked upon as a process of becoming rather than
as an all-or-none state of being. Its expansion takes place in two ways: (a) with
respect to each thing, by making it exchangeable for more and more other things,
and (b) with respect to the system… by making more and more different things
more widely exchangeable… In the sense that commoditization homogenizes
value, while the essence' of culture is discrimination, excessive commoditization is
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anticultural - as indeed so many have perceived it or sensed it to be (Kopytoff, 1986,
pp. 73-4).
While the idea of commoditization as homogenizer of value seems like a self-evident fact, it is a
partial consideration of how the objects acquire values. Ingham (1996), drawing on Kopytoff’s
work on individualization, treats the idea of object’s commoditization as not just as a sign of how
the value of object transforms in some objective or object-subjective regard but with the alienation
of individual from the familial, social, and psychological structures that govern the space of
individuality (Ingham, 1996, pp. 126-7). Such traits, as Ingham (1996; 1998), are not a symptom
of commoditization of the objects but the objectification and commoditization of the individual
Self in a capitalist economic structure (Ingham, 1996 & 1998). In this scenario, the
individualization represents a process of the alienation simultaneously linked with alienation of
the Self with the material object(s) as a unified Other.
3. Lacan and Object as the Subject of Desire: Object, Desire, and Commodities
An object can be realized in a different theoretical light than in its conventional and colloquial
understanding. Lacan, in his writings, recognizes any object as an entity of substance; however,
he also suggests that there is more to the external objects’ relation to the perceiver (Žižek, 2009).
In other words, the external object exists but so does a relation of desire which is embedded in the
order of the language.ii In this light, Lacan proposes the existence of objet petit a which represents
a non-physical, non-empirical object. The relation of objet petit a to an object is of its manifestation
in the order of language and it is an alterity to the other physical objects, which the subject identifies
distinct from itself (Unknown, 2019).
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The objet petit a is different from any other object not just in materiality and its place in the order
of language but also in its intentionality. Lacan does not see the objet petit a as the root cause of
desire but a mere instigator of it.iii Lacan (2016) describes the relation between an object, objet
petit a, and désir as,
The [objet petit] a, desire’s support in the fantasy, isn’t visible in what constitutes
for man the image of his desire… To set our target, I shall say that the object a —
which is not to be situated in anything analogous to the intentionality of a noesis,
which is not the intentionality of desire — is to be conceived of as the cause of
desire… the object lies behind desire (Lacan, 2016, pp. 35, 101).
In proclaiming that ‘the object lies behind desire’, Lacan describes objet petit a not as a functional
spot but as a void. Instead of having any real or virtual core, it represents a lack that is substitutive
of the object itself, and therefore, a site that enables the construction of désir in form of want, need,
and/or absence. Despite the absence, the order of language pervades in the void and is capable of
defining both the negation of the object and its absence simultaneously (Fink, 1995). A discussion
on these aspects remains important because it highlights the gaps in what Kopytoff (1986) suggests
as a commodity and the process of commoditization. Žižek (2009) explains the connection between
objet petit a and désir:
In what precise sense is objet petit a, the object-cause of desire? The objet petit a is
not what we desire, what we are after, but, rather, that which sets our desire in
motion, in the sense of the formal frame which confers consistency on our desire:
desire is, of course, metonymical; it shifts from one object to another, through all
these displacements, however, desire nonetheless retains a minimum of formal
consistency, a set of phantasmic features which, when they are encountered in a
positive object, make us desire this object — objet petit a as the cause of desire is
nothing other than this formal frame of consistency (Žižek, 2009, p. 53)
Like commodity’s singularization to an extent, the objet petit a functions in a paradoxical category
which is lost at the point of its emergence.iv This ‘loss at emergence’ has two major implications on
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the désir. First, the emergence and coincidental loss leaves us imposing objet petit a on the physical
object with incomplete jouissance.v Second, the incomplete jouissance is not the end of désir at any
point but a reminiscent drive that leads to the continuous existence of désir. It is through this
incomplete jouissance that existence is upheld. Having discussed objet petit a, it is important to
consider the concept of désir. In Lacan’s sense, désir represents the metonymic shifts in signifiers
– the same signifiers which provide the sense of want to a subject over the object – in a process
which continues endlessly (Lacan, 2016, p. 32).
A désir remains a désir as long as it is not fulfilled, and it is embedded in two conditions that define
it. First, the function of désir is not to cross the boundaries of jouissance. Secondly, it is a quality
of désir to not be achieved; its endlessness and constant shifts are its symbolic strand. To define the
second quality of désir, Muller and Richardson (1982) explain it as,
Desire as such proceeds out of this radical finitude or lack and seeks to cover it by
generating an endless metonymic chain of substitute signifiers, an endless displacement
(Muller & Richardson, 1982, p. 321)
The désir relates to an object in terms of semiotic construction of it in the void of objet petit a.
Essentially, an object translates as an unachievable désir in the mind of the subject through the
intermediation of the order of language (Žižek, 2009). Therefore, if an object is a subject of désir
of the perceiving-subject, it is constructed in the symbolic order of language, alienated in the order
of semiotics and reflecting on the material object. In other words, the désir constructed in objet petit
a, which subjects the material object to désir, is nothing but a semiotic translation of an incomplete
jouissance elucidating how an object becomes sujet du désir.
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4. The Objects in Between: Commoditization and Desiring
With establishing an understanding on objects in Kopytoff and Lacan, this study will now discuss
the three key points of engagement as mentioned in the introduction (see section 1) and outlined
as: the subjectivity of the object, translating object through cultural-linguistic semiotics in
commodities, and a theoretical engagement on translating ‘objects’ from material to
psychoanalytic realm. Kopytoff’s objects lie between subjectivity of socio-cultural construction
and their ritualistic and utilitarian values. These objects are commoditized not independently but
in relation to the subject and its ‘cultural’ gaze, which is part of the same socio-cultural apparatus,
and thus, defining the commodification in these structures. What remains of the subjectivity of the
object then? Is the object subjective to the subject’s gaze because if it so, it becomes objective in
the structure that Kopytoff considers?
Considering this scenario in Lacan’s perspective, objet petit a gives a broader realm to how the
object might be ‘subjectified’ irregardless of a socio-cultural structure’s presence. Let us consider
an example of a famous artwork. This artwork is fundamentally an object of desire for a specific
class in society that sees or attaches a value, thus, commodifies it. In this context, how individuals
of a specific class ‘desire’ the painting as an object is primarily, subjective to an understanding of
what they commodify about the painting (read: how its value is formed as objet petit a) along with
how is jouissance perceived and reflected in semiotic level. This perspective illuminates something
unique about ‘commodification’: while, commodification might appear to be a process attached to
specific socio-cultural structures and classes, it is still subjective to an individual in how and to
what extent is it desired.
If the process of commodifying is more subjective than what Kopytoff elucidates, how can one
explain the role that cultural-linguistic semiotics play in the process of commodification,
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individualization, and singularization?vi In Kopytoff’s (1986) view, the culture homogenization
eliminates the cleavages, ending ‘discrimination’ between objects in the process and equalize the
commodity values for exchange (Kopytoff, 1986, pp. 73-74). As an extension to this argument,
Kopytoff suggests that while the cultural homogenization makes commodities more exchangeable,
it does so by constructing individuals (as cultural subjects) with similarly lesser ‘discrimination’
cognitively. Kopytoff (1986) suggests further that,
…the human mind has an inherent tendency to impose order upon the chaos of its
environment by classifying its contents, and without this classification knowledge
of the world and adjustment to it would not be possible. Culture serves the mind by
imposing a collectively shared cognitive order upon the world which, objectively,
is totally heterogeneous and presents an endless array of singular things… what we
usually refer to as "structure" lies between the heterogeneity of too much splitting
and the homogeneity of too much lumping (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 70)
Contrary to the idea of human mind imposing order on the chaotic environment, Lacan’s
perspective presents an equally plausible alternative. While, human tendency is to structure things,
such structuring comes out of the order of language, imbibed in the human mind, its structure, and
thus, defining how the objects are ‘desired’.vii Since there is pre-existence of an order and this is
the order of how the reality is perceived through the order of the language, the homogenization of
‘objects’ and their ‘values’ cannot be an external, but instead, an internal projection on the external
object through a framework of désir. Therefore, the way the semiotics of mind is translated into
the object’s ontology is not a product of cultural homogenization but of désir which is a product
of objet petit a. In simpler terms, the cultural-linguistic semiotics of what an object is, are not a
product of singularized and homogenized norms. Had this been the case, the essential distinction
of the Other will collapse, which is fundamentally at the core of désir. As Lacan (1965) suggests,
The object of man’s desire, and we are not the first to say this, is essentially an
object desired by someone else. One object can become equivalent to another,
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owing to the effect produced by this intermediary, in making it possible for objects
to be exchanged and compared. This process tends to diminish the special
significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view
the existence of objects without number (Lacan, 1965, p. 14).
The necessity of commodity, therefore, does not solely lie in the existence of the Other
ontologically but the existence of Other to formulate a desire equally. If cultural homogenization
as a process seeks to eliminate such differences in desire of the Other, it eventually eliminates how
semiotics of commodities will be imposed on objects through désir. Having discussed the aspect
of the semiotic translation of material objects into commodities, this paper now will address the
reminiscent issues of translating the object from material to psychoanalytic realm. Regarding the
forces of commoditization and individualization, Kopytoff (1986) discusses how objects can be
translated as something of a biography of not just culture and objects but also of individuals and
societies which enable such transaction (Kopytoff, 1986, pp. 87 - 89). To be more elaborate,
Kopytoff (1986) suggests that
…how the forces of commoditization and singularization are intertwined in ways
far more subtle than our ideal model can show… how one breaks the rules by
moving between spheres that are supposed to be insulated from each other, how
one converts what is formally unconvertible, how one masks these actions and with
whose connivance, and, not least, how the spheres are reorganized and things
reshuffled between them in the course of a society history… One can draw an
analogy between the way societies construct individuals and the way they construct
things. In small-scale societies, a person's social identities are relatively stable and
changes in them are normally conditioned more by cultural rules than by
biographical idiosyncrasies… lies in the conflicts between the egoistic self and the
unambiguous demands of given social identities, or in conflicts arising from
interaction between actors with defined roles within structured social system
(Kopytoff, 1986, pp. 88 - 9).
Essential issue with constructing biography of an individual as an extended analogical account of
the society is that it creates a paradox of values. More than being a difference of approach, the
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issue exists in how an individual is defined and how cultural rules are constructed? Had cultural
rules been such a significant and ingrained aspect of human psyche – at least with an assumed
uniformity – would one expect to see a deviant behavior? Elucidating this aspect, a Lacanian idea
of ‘unsaid law’ describes what entails in the paradox of individual and society. Unsaid laws are
those aspects of human behavior that might or might not be socially acceptable but certainly are
behavioral aspects constructed against society’s said law and civility (Fink, 1995). Re-considering
Ingham’s (1996; 1998) argument about alienation of the Self in capitalist-consumerist society, the
collapse of materialism into something unified and undifferentiated Other presents an existential
and ontological challenge to the consumer Self as well, which might not appear as a symptom at a
societal level (Ingham, 1996; 1998).
5. Conclusion: Objects and the Subject of Desire
This paper engages in a lengthy discussion on Kopytoff and Lacan’s theoretical approaches on
object, commodities, and the semiotic translation of objects into reality. While, Kopytoff (1986)
discussed the connection between individual(s) and societal relations with material objects as
commodities in anthropological framework, whereas Lacan with his method explored a connection
with language and mind. Despite taking anthropological and psychoanalytic approaches
respectively, both Kopytoff and Lacan presented objects in distinct sense – from cultural to
manifestation of language in material form. Engaging Kopytoff with Lacan produced aspects of
how individual(s) engage with objects and commodities not just on a pragmatic, social sphere but
in deeper psychoanalytic and ontological spheres. The theoretical distinctions highlighted how
ontology of individual is not just based on the socio-cultural Other but also on ontological Other.
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Endnotes
There remains an ambiguity in what consists of ‘material’ through the history of socio-political and philosophical
thought. Both in the eastern and western thoughts, the idea of ‘material’ and ‘object’ has been one of the defining
differences and factor in shaping intellectual and philosophical thought. The dialectical materialism is one of the few
which focuses on the phenomena of production and its role in defining ‘history’.
i
ii
Order of the language are three registers of language/mind as outlined by Lacan: unconscious (the Imaginary),
subconscious (the Symbolic), and conscious (the Real). It is based on Lacan’s famous thesis ‘mind is structured like
the language’ (Fink, 1995).
iii
I will further elucidate what desire means for Lacan. Wherever I used the idea of desire in a Lacanian sense further,
I would employ the French term désir.
It is lost but then, it is false to assume that we ever possessed it. The objet petit a is lost – it is lost in a void that
existed prior to its emergence and its emergence is just the emergence of semiotic construction within the order of
language (Lacan, 2016; Žižek, 2009).
iv
v
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the term jouissance represents two separate but interconnected meanings. As a first,
it represents pleasure beyond the limits of what is ‘allowed’, and thus, a transgressive fantasy of pleasure in any
realm (Lacan, 1997) and as a second, excess life or ‘superabundant vitality’ (Lacan, 2016). The theory discussed here
is concerned with the first meaning.
vi
Refer to section 2 of the paper for discussion on the interrelation between these processes, their meaning, and
outcome according to Kopytoff (1986).
vii
Fink (1995) is a great introduction into this subject. Fink (1995) argues how the idea of ‘the language’ being
structured like mind defines semiotic translation in Lacan’s phenomenon of mind (Fink, 1995)
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Word Count (without cover page, endnotes, & bibliography): 3,400 Words in 10 pages
Word Count (with cover page, endnotes, & bibliography): 3,962 Words in 13 pages
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Nishant Upadhyay