Practical Action
Practical Action
Wittgenstein, Pragmatism
and Sociology
By
Albert Ogien
Practical Action: Wittgenstein, Pragmatism and Sociology
By Albert Ogien
This book first published 2018
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Copyright © 2018 by Albert Ogien
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the copyright owner.
ISBN (10): 1-5275-1391-2
ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-1391-4
CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
A Blueprint for a Theory of Practical Action
Chapter One ................................................................................................. 9
Pragmatism’s Legacy to Sociology Re-specified
Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 25
Pragmatisms and Sociologies
Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 37
Obligation and Impersonality: Wittgenstein and the Nature of the Social
Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 55
Garfinkel Reading Mead: What should Sociology do with Social
Naturalism?
Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 73
Inquiry as Practice
Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 87
Fleshing out Dewey’s Conception of Democracy
Acknowledgements ................................................................................. 101
References ............................................................................................... 103
INTRODUCTION
A BLUEPRINT FOR A THEORY
OF PRACTICAL ACTION
This book intends to delineate a pluralist and dynamic model of
practical action which would thoughtfully take into account the reflexive
conception of agency that is by and large prevailing in current social
sciences research. Making such a model available might help challenging
the one the cognitive sciences have rather successfully imposed on our
understanding of the relationship between knowledge and action. In order
to give a brief idea of what an integrated theory of practical action
grounded on a fully contextual conception of human individual and
collective behaviour may look like, this book will tentatively compare
Wittgenstein’s theses on knowing with the pragmatist outlook on inquiry
and the analysis of action in common promoted by interactionist sociology.
The correspondence between the perspectives on action offered by
ordinary language philosophy, pragmatism and sociology will be studied
through an investigation into the key notions of forms of life, inquiry and
situation which will be related to the theory of knowledge each of these
three ways of reasoning advocates. The relevance of such a rapprochement
has already been evoked by Stephen Toulmin in the introduction he wrote
to Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty:
“Whereas Dewey spoke in rather broad terms of knowledge as rooted in
“action,” and did not give us a technique for analysing action in any
systematic way […] Goffman’s dramaturgical model for the analysis of
human conduct gives us a way of dissecting out and describing the
individual "forms of life" which enter into human social life and learning.
In all these areas of research (we may say) John Dewey’s insistence on the
active character of human knowledge is now bearing fruit, and the
combined heritage of Dewey and Wittgenstein is giving us a new
command over psychology and social theory.” (Toulmin, 1984: xiii-xiv)
The affinity between Dewey and Wittgenstein has been finely highlighted
by Christiane Chauviré (2012) who, in her commentary on Dewey’s
2
Introduction
Experience and Nature, has suggested that Wittgenstein must have been,
without admitting it, a fervent reader of Dewey. I will therefore go along
the path traced by Toulmin and Chauviré in order to demonstrate that the
notions of “forms of life”, “inquiry” and “situation” account, each in its
appropriate way, for the very fact that practical knowledge bears within
itself the conditions of its objectivity (i.e. the fact that it is immediately
shared by others even if only approximately). This introduction will briefly
outline the kind of analytical framework which may allow to contend that
knowing is a social activity through and through and not a purely cognitive
mechanism.
Forms of life
Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life (in the plural) is directly linked
to his conception of understanding based on his famous adage: “meaning
is use” (denying thereby the soundness of defining an object in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions). Use only amounts, according to him,
to the way anyone employs the words of a given language–whether natural
or vernacular–to denote something while one acts or speaks. In such a
view, the intelligibility of what is done or said entirely depends on the
context in which an action in common takes place and the function that the
words play within an uttered proposition. In short, use is the very material
of what Wittgenstein calls “grammar”. But that is not it according to him.
In order to account for the use of such ordinary grammar, it is necessary,
says Wittgenstein, to refer each one of them to the “language game”
within which it occurs, that is to say, the lexicon and the syntax proper to a
specific kind of practical activity. These language games have two
features: they exist prior to the involvement of individuals in an action in
common and set limits to the acceptability of what may be done or said in
it.
One has to take a step further though. For Wittgenstein (1958), each of
these language games is part of a “form of life”, that is to say, a set of
ordered practices that are structurally interrelated and convey a rough idea
of the sequences of an action in common which should regularly proceed
in a given circumstance. On this account, forms of life constitute the
background on which coordination of action does relentlessly emerge.
Wittgenstein adds: “it is in language [and not by means of language] that
men agree. This agreement is not a consensus of opinion, but in forms of
life” (ibid.:§241). Accordingly, the sheer possibility of mutual understanding
lies in the fact that partners in interaction know at once that they act within
the same form of life–a kind of knowledge individuals cannot but be
A Blueprint for a Theory of Practical Action
3
familiar with. Says Wittgenstein: “What must be accepted, the given–it
could be said–are forms of life” (ibid.: 316). And this given is what he
refers to as “the natural history of human beings.”
I thus contend that the notion of forms of life cannot be conceived of
outside the inextricable “epistemic compound” which binds together uses,
language games, forms of life, agreement in language and the natural
history of human beings. This compound constitutes what may be called
the “ordinary logic of intelligibility” which allows for coordination of
action in a given practical activity to prevail. Now one has to account for
the nature and function of this compound. To do so, referring to Peirce’s
experimental theory of meaning (Deledalle, 1979) may prove useful.
We know that, dismissing all essentialism and attentive to the
particular role of language in our relationship to reality, Peirce argued that
“reality is what signifies something real,” adding that the attribution of this
meaning is always accomplished in the context of a given ongoing action.
Hence the famous 1878’s pragmatist maxim: “Consider what practical
effects we think can be produced by the object of our conception. The
design of all these effects is the complete design of the object.” Here,
knowledge is not exclusively contemplated in the purity of its relation to
truth, but is apprehended through its actualization as it is realized in the
many ways it happens to give birth to (in common sense as well as in
scientific activity).
The key element of Peirce’s standpoint is the primacy he assigns to
doubt as the origin of the movement of thought, which leads him to
contend that “it is not the particular that is the most natural, but the vague,
the general these two forms of the real and irreducible undetermination.”
In other words, knowledge should never be indexed to truth, but to what is
predictable or acceptable in such or such context. This leads Peirce to
assert that since the grasp we get of things is irremediably doomed to be
vague and incomplete, and as it always serves a practical aim, knowing
only consists in fixing satisfactory beliefs–i.e. beliefs which temporarily
fulfil the conditions required for the activity in which an individual is
engaged in to be properly accomplished. Fixing such a belief is at the heart
of what Peirce calls “inquiry”, which he thus presents as a procedure
aiming at putting a provisional end to doubt. It must of course be
remembered that Peirce holds belief to be a “habit of action,” neither a
disposition nor an instinctive reaction but an “active rule in us”. Which
raises a new question: who is the subject of an inquiry?
An element of answer can be found in the way Pierce reformulated his
maxim twenty years later. Chauviré (1995) has shown that, in its new
version, the maxim stipulates that “a proposition is endowed with meaning
4
Introduction
if, and only if, it has conceivable practical effects and, among these
effects, a conceivable scope for the conduct to adopt.” According to her,
this reformulation gives the maxim “a pragmatic twist; it is no longer a
matter of content of propositions alone, but has to do with the statements
formulated by a speaker who conveys intentions toward the listener and is
responsible for what he says before a community of interpretation.” This
raises three general questions about knowing as practical action: where do
the intentions of the speaker proceed from; how does she assess the
responsibility of her partners; and how does a “community of interpretation”
exercise its control on a speaker?
It seems that, for Peirce, these three questions are encapsulated in the
third. According to Chauviré, Peirce’s approach is “driven by a doublefaced, ontological and logical thesis (the irreducibly triadic character of
the sign-relation), and by the thesis of radical indeterminacy of the
meaning implied by the indefinite opening of the semiotic process.” These
two theses highlight the practical and dynamic nature of the inquiry people
undertake to carry out in order to solve, while acting together, the
problems arising from triadicity and interpretation. To delve deeper into
this phenomenon one may turn to Dewey’s theory of inquiry.
Inquiry
Dewey (1989) anchors Peirce’s logic in the practices that constitute
human action. In his theory of inquiry he takes up the idea that knowledge
is an activity that takes place within a natural setting and only serves
practical purposes. We know that Dewey’s naturalism is unbounded.
According to him, the environment covers the entire universe in which
human beings evolve and which they confront by using the faculties that
their constitution allows them to mobilize to act in common and ensure the
survival of the species. Two of these faculties are essential: language and
reasoning, which both lead individuals to conceive of a series of external
constraints in terms of “problematical situations” and to engage in an
inquiry in order to find a solution to them.
Dewey’s model of inquiry unfolds in three stages: 1) an undeterminate
situation is “had”; 2) a problem is created, i.e. relevant elements are
selected, endowed with specific attributes and ordered for their use in and
for action; and (3) a solution to the problem is elicited that is collectively
seen as satisfying. The entire procedure is carried out by implementing an
experimental form of reasoning, through testing the robustness of the
outcomes resulting from the provisional steps taken during the
accomplishment of the process. Any inquiry therefore obeys its own logic
A Blueprint for a Theory of Practical Action
5
and has two dimensions to which the people involved must constantly pay
attention: the first one is applying the rules of the experimental method;
the second one is ensuring the continuity and fluidity of gestures, words
and the sequence of events that constitute the action in common which
aims at achieving the expected determination. Knowing is thus an activity
which can be thought of as accomplished simultaneously on these two
fronts, allowing for the emergence of a collective intelligence prone to
take in account the fallibility of the transient solution elaborated and
implemented to cope with the problematic situation.
One has to notice that the social sciences have some difficulty in
endorsing such an open conception of inquiry. Most generally, inquiry is
seen as a rational investigation aiming at solving a problem posed by a
clearly identified state of uncertainty and which is led by individuals who
possess the necessary “skills” to find the most appropriate solution to it.
When endorsing such a conception, the researcher may feel her task is to
define by herself the problem people took up and describe how it has been
solved according to the best foreseeable outcome.
This way of conceiving of inquiry is doubly reductive in relation to the
spirit of pragmatism. On the one hand, because the latter pays little
attention to the nature and effectiveness of actor’s skills, but gives a
prevailing place to the context–may it be a system, an experience or the
environment–within which a belief is fixed or a situation determined. On
the other hand, because the end result of inquiry–the one collective
intelligence eventually reaches–is less important for pragmatism than the
process through which it has been reached, namely the practices people
have made use of to carry out an inquiry at each of its stages. In short, for
pragmatism, analysing the process of “determination of the situation”
serves less to demonstrate the success of such an endeavour than to pay
attention to the way in which the “radical indeterminacy” of knowledge is
temporarily overcome. It is at this point that the analogy between the
notions of forms of life and situation proves to be instructive.
Situation
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein (1969) clarifies his conception of mutual
understanding, which he affirms to be totally confused with the fact of
behaving adequately in a given circumstance of social life, without the
need for the mediation of any representation. In other words, there is a
“direct relationship” between being engrossed in a “form of life” (and
handling the “language game” that goes with it) and acting appropriately.
Wittgenstein does not admit that an individual can doubt whether he is
6
Introduction
doing what he is actually doing or proclaim publicly that she does. Thus,
in his style of grammatical demonstration, he points out that a person who
would say “I know that I am giving a lecture” while pronouncing it, or “I
know that I am sitting under a tree” when being there would have every
chance to raise questions about her mental health.
For Wittgenstein, forms of life appear to fulfil a function: to be the
reservoir of a particular system of “direct relations” which systematically
links knowledge to action within a given framework of practical action. A
countless number of such systems exist each of them serving as guide for
individual action and allowing for coordination with others. This leads us
to Goffman’s conception of the notion of situation.
For him, it must be seen as a “membrane”1 that isolates a fragment of
the social world and operates like a filter that selects from among all the
obligations that weigh on individuals engaging in interaction those that are
relevant to the here and now of an ongoing action in common (Ogien,
1999). In other words, a situation defines the social organisation of a form
of practical activity bestowing on it a pre-given intelligibility. Examples of
situations are crossing a crossroads, attending a ceremony, consulting a
doctor, having a meal with friends, or joining a street demonstration. Only
the number and complexity of the constraints a type of situation requires
actors to comply with distinguish them. Such “acceptability constraints”
inhere in the material and conceptual properties specific to a particular
form of practical activity. And since there is every reason to believe that
the members of a same social grouping have to deal with a multitude of
similar practical activities, it can be assumed that they share, even if only
very roughly, a mutual knowledge about a wide range of situations. One
can then conjecture that they are sufficiently aware of the constraints each
of these situations imposes on their individual action to secure the
adequacy of the moves and statements they express in order to foster their
coordination.
To sum up, for Goffman, the notion of situation names a typical and
stabilized kind of environment a priori providing public and impersonal
criteria according to which intention and responsibility attribution is
framed. To be sure, all the rules of correctness which apply to a given
situation are not entirely codified: behaving appropriately in a situation
remains an individual’s concern and has to be accomplished in the very
1
The first occurrence of this notion can be found in one of his early articles: “I
have argued in this paper that any social encounter, any focused gathering, is to be
understood, in the first instance, in terms of the functioning of the “membrane”
that encloses it, cutting it from a field of properties that could be given weight”.
(Goffman, 1961: 79/81)
A Blueprint for a Theory of Practical Action
7
sequentiality of actual exchanges. But the situation is constantly drawn on
to make sense of the moves made and the words spoken. So if someone
acts inaccurately, she might be able to figure it out by merely considering
others’ reactions and find a way to repair her misconduct right away, as
long as she does not want to pass for an impostor or worse. In short, just
like forms of life, situations are loaded with instructions allowing for
coordination of action in common.
Thus, in Goffman’s perspective, which is the one I call “realistic
interactionism”, any individual conduct must necessarily express itself in
correspondence with a pre-given set of expectations that each of the
partners engaged in a particular undertaking has to meet. Where does the
mastery of situations that people demonstrate in their daily activities stem
from? Does it purely and simply derive from the native belonging to a
singular social world? Both Wittgenstein and Goffman contend that such
mastery should be conceived of as a practical knowledge acquired in the
sheer familiarity with the countless “forms of life” or “situations” in which
individuals are regularly engrossed. One can then assume that most people
“naturally” know how to appropriately make use of the criteria which
allow for the adjustment of their conduct to the circumstances in which
they happen to find themselves.
Knowledge as action
A working hypothesis underlies the six chapters of this book, namely
that there is a de facto convergence between the standpoints of
Wittgenstein, pragmatism and realistic interactionism since all three hold
that a theory of knowledge cannot be divorced from a theory of action.
Hence, this book aims at substantiating a claim: knowing should be
apprehended as a practical activity people have to accomplish for they are
compelled to elicit mutual intelligibility about “what is going on” in order
to secure the smooth flow of the course of action they are involved in.
Accordingly, I will try to expound three methodological tenets on which
the analysis of knowing as practical activity should rest: radical
indeterminacy (i.e. admitting the essential incompleteness of action and
the ceaseless reframing of meanings); the contextual nature of experience
(i.e. considering that any social activity is totally and unavoidably part of
its environment); the emergence of the “facticity” of objects and events
during the sequential accomplishment of an action in common (i.e. giving
up the a priori cause/effect distinction).
Though sticking to these three tenets is no small challenge for analysis,
I surmise that it would help preventing social scientists from drifting
8
Introduction
toward essentialism, foundationalism or determinism and firmly endorse
an open, dynamic and pluralistic perspective when considering the
relationship between knowledge and action.
In that sense, this book sends out an invitation to social scientists and
philosophers to keep on working jointly in devising an articulate model of
practical action.
CHAPTER ONE
PRAGMATISM’S LEGACY TO SOCIOLOGY
RE-SPECIFIED
Although referring to Pragmatism has become a common practice in
the social sciences over the last decade, it has developed somewhat
confusingly. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that, rather than
being a clearly defined doctrine the principles of which one might adhere
to, Pragmatism is first and foremost an attitude and a method. On the one
hand, Pragmatism refers to a typical American predilection for adventure
and the discovery of uncharted territories, a particular fondness for risktaking, an awareness of the sway of contingency and uncertainty on
individual behaviour (Wahl, 2005). The pragmatist attitude invites one to
acknowledge the infinite openness of the world we live in and the fact that
human beings are integral parts of their physical and material environment.
It commands to be mindful of the “creativity of action” (Joas, 1997). In the
social sciences, this attitude translates into the priority of action over thought
and a specific sensitivity to the incapacitated state in which science finds
itself when it tries to explain what occurs when people act together.
On the other hand, Pragmatism is “a method for the practical evaluation
of ideas, concepts, and philosophies, not from the point of view of their
internal coherence or rationality, but from the point of view of their
"practical consequences"” (Lapoujade, 1997: 10). Pinkard (2007) has
singled out two determining aspects of this method. The first is that
knowledge (construed as the fixation of beliefs) should be conceived of as
an aspect of the evolutionary process whereby life (and the human species
at large) subsists and grows. The second concerns normativity. From a
pragmatist perspective, individuals select the norms to which they confer
authority and decide to abide by or not (which means that individuals are
capable of subjecting norms to criticism) in view of the satisfaction of
their practical needs2.
2
One should remember that the pragmatist conception of satisfaction is not
utilitarian but directly linked to what is required for the appropriate
accomplishment of an action in a given circumstance.
10
Chapter One
The spirit of this brand of philosophy is conveyed by both this attitude
and this method. One of the problems the reception of Pragmatism in the
social sciences is confronted with is that one tends to confuse its spirit
with its letter – that is a reputed finite corpus of theoretical propositions.
This confusion is all the more complicated than the label Pragmatism in its
academic uses accommodates at least five different strands of thought:
1. First the original – and already deeply divided – Pragmatism of the
four founding fathers: Peirce (philosophy of logic and mathematics
and theory of signs); James (radical empiricism); Dewey (theory of
inquiry and experience); and Mead (social behaviourism).
2. “Analytical pragmatism”, formulated in connection with Vienna
Circle’s logical empiricists, especially Carnap.
3. “Democratic pragmatism”, which appeared when C.W. Mills,
following Dewey, endorsed the social critique developed by the
Frankfurt School proponents who emigrated to the US in the
1940’s (Adorno, Horkheimer, Neuman, Marcuse) (Horowitz,
1966).
4. In the mid 1970s, Apel’s interpretation of Peirce and Mead
alongside Habermas’ theory of communicative action gave birth to
an inter-subjective version of pragmatics that, strangely enough,
became annexed to Pragmatism (Kreplak & Lavergne, 2008).
5. Eventually, a revival of Pragmatism occurred under the lead of
contemporary American philosophers (Putnam, Rorty, Brandom)
who have rediscovered its unique legacy on the two opposing sides
of community and democracy.
Thus, looking for a canonical definition of the letter of Pragmatism and
striving to adhere to it seems to be a misleading endeavour. The best
contemporary sociologists should do, I would argue, is retrieving a series
of basic methodological orientations by browsing through the pragmatist
literature and ascertaining how they might eventually be made use of by
the social sciences. Bernstein has mapped out a path to proceed:
“For all their differences, there are common themes running through the
works of the "classical" pragmatists. There is a persistent questioning of
the very idea that philosophy (or any form of inquiry) rests upon secure,
fixed foundations which can be known with certainty. More radically, the
pragmatists challenge the tacit presupposition of much modern philosophy
that the rationality and legitimacy of knowledge require necessary
foundations. Inquiry neither has or needs any such foundations. The
pragmatists did not think that abandoning all foundational claims and
Pragmatism’s Legacy to Sociology Re-specified
11
metaphors leads to skepticism (or relativism). They stressed the fallibility
of all inquiry. Every knowledge claim is open to potential criticism. It is
precisely because of this intrinsic fallibility that, beginning with Peirce, the
pragmatists focused their attention on the community of inquirers to test
and criticize all validity claims […] The classical pragmatists shared a
cosmological vision of an open universe in which there is irreducible
novelty, chance, and contingency. They rejected doctrines of mechanical
determinism which were so popular in the late nineteenth century.”
(Bernstein, 1992: 814-815)
Following this lead, this chapter aims at demonstrating that, rather than
its letter, it is the spirit of Pragmatism which justifies claiming its affinity
with analytical philosophy and realistic interactionism. To do so, I will
rely on Putnam’s qualification of this spirit, which he has defined by four
main features: a) antiskepticism, that is, doubt must be seen as the origin
of knowledge and as a positive factor since it calls for inquiry; b)
fallibilism, that is no metaphysical guarantee exists which immunizes any
belief against revision; c) a rejection of the fact/value dichotomy
(objective facts cannot be thought of as totally separated from the value
which people immediately attribute to them); and d) the primacy of
practice over theory (action is the irremediable setting in which ordinary
lives unfold) (Putnam, 1994: 152). According to Putnam, the key idea
Pragmatism has brought to theoretical reasoning–philosophical or social–
is that fallibilism does not necessarily lead to scepticism. Or, in other
words, that doubt does not compel renouncing the quest for truth or
denying the possibility of a valid description of reality. Jacques
Bouveresse has given, unwillingly, a good illustration of the use the social
sciences might make of such blending of fallibilism with antiskepticism.
“What we should try to understand is precisely how the use of language
can be, in certain respects, so systematic and expected and at the same
time, in a different way, so unpredictable and innovative” (Bouveresse,
1987: 14). The same idea has been endorsed by realistic interactonists who
analyse action in common by taking into account the fact that social
behaviour is by and large foreseeable (our expectations and the forms of
practical action in which they make sense are well-known to us) and, at the
same time, absolutely unpredictable (no one knows what might exactly
happen in the course of an interaction). In a certain way, the method of
Pragmatism as defined by Putnam enables the social sciences to serenely
accept that as ordinary people regularly “do things together”3 they are able
to adequately deal with two principles which seem to be contradictory, that
is a priori determination (having a view of what can be expected from
3
To quote the title of one of H. Becker’s books (1986).
12
Chapter One
others in a host of situations) and its opposite (facing the versatility of
their partners’ reactions in changing circumstances).
Nowadays, social sciences scholars are prone to admit the notions of
uncertainty, plurality of worlds, and meaning-dependence on context.
Many are attentive to the changing details of the circumstances in which
practical activities ordinarily unfold, reject any separation between
knowledge and action, and seriously take into account the forms of
reasoning which inform and guide individual action. Such an analytical
stance can be viewed as part of the legacy of Pragmatism to the social
sciences. Yet the nature of this legacy is still disputed and can be traced in
many different directions. It is thus important to review the nature and
relevance of some presumptive sociological heirs of Pragmatism.
Goffman’s definition of the situation
Doubt and indeterminacy are two major mainstays of the pragmatist
standpoint. Taking these essential properties of human life into account is
compelling since it calls for acknowledging that people have to ceaselessly
and ingeniously overcome the innumerable uncertainties social
interactions are rife with. Endorsing such a standpoint definitely rules out
any attempt to explain action in common by reducing it to a mere
mechanism. Hence one can contend that the causalist, culturalist and
cognitivist twists given to pragmatism by Gross (2009) are totally at odds
with the pragmatist attitude (which favours anti-foundationalism, antitheoreticism, anti-mentalism, pluralism and holism). His claim is founded
on an analysis of the key notion of habit which portrays it as a culturally
stabilized way of behaving which is stored in the brain and guides
individual action in an automatic mode. It surprisingly ignores the basic
assumptions which define the pragmatist method: infinite openness of
inquiry, duality of habit, experimentalism, indeterminacy, uncertainty. A
more genuine–yet challenging–use which has been made of the legacy of
Pragmatism is, or so do I claim, the one offered by Goffman’s sociological
stance.
When one ponders over the current relationship between Pragmatism
and sociology, four notions come immediately to mind: definition of the
situation; taking the place of the other; plurality of worlds; and the Self. In
Frame Analysis, Goffman (1974) has straightforwardly dispensed with
some of them. Let us first consider his qualification of the first notion:
“There is a venerable tradition in philosophy that argues that what the
reader assumes to be real is but a shadow […] A current example of this
tradition can be found in the W.I. Thomas dictum: "If men define
Pragmatism’s Legacy to Sociology Re-specified
13
situations as real, they are real in their consequences". This statement is
true as it reads but false as it is taken. Defining situations as real certainly
has consequences, but these may contribute very marginally to the events
in progress, in some cases only a slight embarrassment flits across the
scene in mild concern for those who tried to define the situation wrongly
[…] Presumably, a "definition of the situation" is almost always to be
found, but those who are in the situation ordinarily do not create this
definition, even though their society often can be said to do so; ordinarily,
all they do is to assess correctly what the situation ought to be for them
and then act accordingly.” (Goffman, 1974: 1-2)
Furthermore Goffman’s conception is connected to a pluralistic
outlook on society as he contends that:
“one finds, in modern societies at least, is a nonexclusive linkage-a "loose
coupling"-between interactional practices and social structures, a
collapsing of strata and structures into broader categories, the categories
themselves not corresponding one-to-one to anything in the structural
world, a gearing as it were of various structures into interactional cogs.”
(Goffman, 1983a: 11)
For Goffman, the strength of this loose coupling is constantly put to a
test in the ceaseless flow of action in common in everyday life. He is then
led to endow individuals with an epistemic capacity to make an operative
use of two kinds of frames: primary and secondary. Primary frames turn:
“what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into
something that is meaningful […] each primary framework allows its user
to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of
concrete occurrences defined in its terms. He is likely to be unaware of
such organized features as the framework has and unable to describe the
framework with any completeness if asked, yet these handicaps are no bar
to his easily and fully applying it.” (Goffman, 1974: 21)
Once primary frames have been projected (an “operating fiction
temporarily accepted” says Goffman), “transformations” take place to
monitor the adjustments individuals have to make to suit the constant
changes occurring in the unpredictable course of interactions. Goffman
asserts that:
“in many cases, the individual in our society is effective in his use of
particular frameworks. The elements and processes he assumes in his
reading of the activity often are ones that the activity itself manifests - and
why not, since social life itself is often organized as something that
individuals will be able to understand and deal with. A correspondence or
Chapter One
14
isomorphism is thus claimed between perception and the organization of
what is perceived, in spite of the fact that there are likely to be many valid
principles of organization that could but don’t inform perception.” (ibid.:
26)
Such permanent ordering and reordering of social reality during
interaction occurs according to the multiple and unpredictable ways
individuals are able to associate primary and secondary frameworks. These
frameworks afford impersonal (they apply to all) and binding (their use is
compelling, as far as one wants to make one’s action intelligible to others)
criteria of judgement that all those who are engaged in a situation should
employ. This phenomenon is empirically substantiated and it is seen as
demonstrating that everyone knows how to adequately make use of these
criteria since they are fixed in ordinary language and are inherent to each
normative order appropriate to a given practical activity. Hence Goffman
surmises that:
“whenever we come into contact with another through the mails, over the
telephone, in face-to-face talk, or even under merely through immediate
co-presence, we find ourselves with one central obligation : to render our
behaviour understandably relevant to what the other can come to perceive
is going on. Whatever else, our activity must be addressed to the other’s
mind, that is, to the other’s capacity to read our words and actions for
evidence of our feelings, thoughts and intent. This confines what we say
and do, but it also allows us to bring to bear all of the world to which the
other can catch allusions.” (Goffman, 1983b: 51)
Goffman denies that a mutual agreement reached through rational
deliberation is required for action in common to take place in a smooth
and coordinated way since, generally, the appearance of coordination is
enough for people to guess that it is actually working. That is why
Goffman claims that defining a situation must be conceived of as a neverending endeavour which requires uninterrupted involvement by all those
who take part in an interaction:
“the process of mutually sustaining a definition of the situation in face-toface interaction is socially organized through rules of relevance and
irrelevance. These rules for the management of engrossment appear to be
an insubstantial element of social life, a matter of courtesy, manners, and
etiquette. But it is to these flimsy rules, and not to the unshaking character
of the external world that we owe our unshaking sense of realities.”
(Goffman, 1961: 81)
Pragmatism’s Legacy to Sociology Re-specified
15
Goffman has later revised his too optimistic statement about our
“unshaking sense of realities” insisting next on the vulnerability of social
reality–a vulnerability that unavoidably affects even the natural or
corporeal features of human life.
“By definition, we can participate in social situations only if we bring our
bodies and their accoutrements along with us, and this equipment is
vulnerable by virtue of the instrumentalities that others bring along with
their bodies. We become vulnerable to physical assault, sexual
molestation, kidnapping, robbery and obstruction of movement, whether
through the unnegotiated application of force or, more commonly,
"coercive exchange" […] Similarly, in the presence of others we become
vulnerable through their words and gesticulation to the penetration of our
psychic preserves, and to the breaching of the expressive order we expect
will be maintained in our presence.” (Goffman, 1983a: 4)
To sum up, to a construal of the notion of definition of the situation
which acknowledges that acting together requires reaching an explicit
agreement on “what is going on”, Goffman substitutes the view that social
reality is irremediably submitted to vulnerability. He therefore recommends
that sociological attention be directed “on what it is about our sense of
what is going on that makes it so vulnerable to the need for these various
re-readings [...] I am not addressing the structure of social life but the
structure of experience individuals have at any moment of their social
lives.” (ibid.: 13)
The second mainstay of Pragmatism that Goffman objects to is Mead’s
foundational notion of “conversation of gestures” (Mead, 1922) which,
according to him, begs the social nature of “naturalness”. Considering the
bearing of the mere presence of bodies on interaction, Goffman contends
that:
“Mead’s distinction between "significant" and "nonsignificant" gestures is
not entirely satisfactory here. Body idioms involve something more than a
nonsignificant "conversation of gestures" because this idiom tends to
evoke the same meaning for the actor as for the witness, and tends to be
employed by the actor because of its meaning for the witness. Something
less than significant symbolism seems to be involved, however: an
extended exchange of meaningful acts is not characteristic; an impression
must be maintained that a margin of uncalculating spontaneous
involvement has been retained in the act; the actor will usually be in a
position to deny the meaning of his act if he is challenged for performing
it.” (Goffman, 1963: 34, note 2)
16
Chapter One
In a certain way, one could argue that Goffman is more committed to
the pragmatist notions of doubt and indeterminacy than Mead. Whereas
the latter asserts that an act can be complete whenever the appropriate
response of the other has been picked out among those which the
environment makes available, the former suspects that individuals may at
all times wonder whether the given response is satisfying or not. For
Goffman, uncertainty always prevails and has constantly to be done away
with. To do so, individuals rely first on the situation in which they find
themselves. According to his definition, a situation is a typical and
stabilized fragment of the social world which controls beforehand
individual action that comes to be engaged in it at any given point in time.
As situations pre-exist encounters and survive their termination, they
operate as an institution which provides individuals with impersonal
criteria to ascertain “what is going on” and “what to do next” in current
interactions. In Goffman’s words, situations socially organize experience,
i.e. the immediate apprehension of social reality.
Now what about the notion of “taking the place of the other” that
Pragmatism has bequeathed to sociology? The notion derives from Mead’s
naturalistic account of the primitive order commanding the exchanges
between “organisms” (among them human beings) which are set up to
react in an adjusted way. Contrary to the use Blumer has made of Mead’s
notion of “conversation of gestures” by emphasizing the interpretative
process involved in social intercourse and overvaluing the notion of Self,
Goffman focuses upon the situational rather than the “symbolic” nature of
interaction (Denzin and Keller, 1981). He states:
“I assume that when individuals attend to any current situation, they face
the question: “What is it that’s going on here ?” Whether asked explicitly,
as in times of confusion and doubt, or tacitly, during occasions of usual
certitude, the question is put and the answer to it is presumed by the way
the individuals then proceed to get on with the affairs at hand.” (Goffman,
1974: 8)
The difference between Mead and Goffman in this regard is easy to
explain. Goffman substitutes the notion of “role” to the notion of “place of
the other”. Whereas the latter is socially undifferentiated, the former refers
to a socially defined position in an organized form of practical activity.
“Taking the role of the other” implies being able to endorse the
perspective of the partner in interaction while “taking the place of the
other” only requires opting for the right response. What is crucial here is
the importance both Mead and Goffman attribute to the Second Person as
key condition for coordination of action to be accomplished (in Goffman’s
Pragmatism’s Legacy to Sociology Re-specified
17
perspective), or for an act to be completed (in Mead’s perspective). Also
of note is that behind Goffman’s role theory lies a sociological model of
practice (i.e. situated action in common) which denies, just as Dewey
(1984) did, any separation between knowledge and action. This model
combines three features:
1) everyone has prior knowledge of the approximate practical
meaning attached to objects that populate the environment and to
unpredictable events that may arise in a situation;
2) everyone presumably assumes that such a knowledge is also the
one their partners in an interaction possess; and consequently
3) everyone aligns their action on the particular “normative order”
which allegedly sets what kind of judgements others might elicit
according to the situation they find themselves in.
This model is based upon the assumption that each situation specifies a
series of roles individuals have to play according to the position they hold
in it, that is expectations that one had better to abide by in a given
interaction provided that others exercise immediate and constant control
over one’s performance. The model extends to all social life. Since
individuals experience many situations and endorse a multitude of
different roles, one can assume that they share, even if approximately, a
common knowledge about a huge array of such role obligations and get a
satisfactory enough sense of the correctness of the moves they can make in
each situation they are engrossed in. This leads to the third sociological
amendment to Pragmatism.
Pluralism in a sociological perspective
A crucial aspect of the spirit of Pragmatism is pluralism. The question
then turns out to be: pluralism of what? In the analysis they offer, Talisse
and Aikin draw a distinction between
“two general styles of pursuing [its] meliorist aim. According to what we
called inquiry pragmatism, conflicts are to be resolved by the
thoroughgoing application of proper methods of inquiry; this would
require not only processes of ongoing experimentation but also efforts to
maintain the conditions under which inquiry could continue. According to
what we called meaning pragmatism, conflicts are to be dissolved by a
pragmatic reconstruction of the terms in which the conflict is cast; this
means that, when confronted with apparently interminable disputes, we
ought to revise our vocabularies in ways that, as William James advised,
18
Chapter One
"bring in peace".” (Talisse and Akin, 2005: 145)
Talisse and Aikin do contend that pragmatist pluralism amounts to “a
principled commitment to admirable habits of openness, inclusion,
tolerance, anti-hegemony, and experimentalism in all aspects of moral,
political, and intellectual life.” (ibid.) They decry the irresoluteness of
such a principled commitment as it fails to engage the so-called modus
vivendi version of pluralism–i.e. the relativist stance according to which
any justification of an action can be taken as valid. Mysak has elaborated
upon Talisse and Aikin’s distinction by differentiating “meaning
pluralism” from “inquiry pluralism” (Mysak, 2005) on more conceptual
grounds. According to Mysak, whereas meaning pluralism has to do with
the notion of truth (as personified by Peirce), inquiry pluralism is just a
matter of standpoints adopted to solve ethical conflicts (as personified by
James, Dewey, and Rorty). Mysak’s differentiation aptly disentangles two
strands of pluralism: moral and methodological. The latter is what
sociology is concerned with4.
Goffman, Durkheim, and Garfinkel have devised a sociological version
of pluralism which acknowledges the existence of a plurality of normative
orders–meaning that individuals regularly make use of as many situated
normative orders as needed to sequentially adjust their involvement in the
situated action in which they take part (Ogien, 2018). From the perspective
of what Mysak calls “inquiry pragmatism”, pluralism concerns the relation
to truth. Sociologists would rather consider that it affects normativity and
the regulatory function it fulfils in coordination of action in common. To
get the difference, let us consider first the way Goffman disallows James’
view on pluralism:
“I try to follow a tradition established by William James in his famous
chapter "The Perception of Reality", first published as an article in Mind
in 1869. Instead of asking what reality is, he gave matters a subversive
phenomenological twist, italicizing the following question: Under what
circumstances do we think things are real? The important thing about
reality, he implied, is our sense of its realness in contrast to our feeling that
some things lack this quality. In his answer, James […] made a stab at
differentiating the several different worlds that our attention and interest
can make real for us, the possible subuniverses, the "orders of existence"
(to use Aron Gurwitsch’s phrase), in each of which an object or a given
kind can have its proper being: the world of the senses, the world of
4
According to Weber, methodological pluralism is perfectly appropriated to the
social sciences, since social phenomena are not reducible to one causal factor only
and have to be tackled from as many perspectives as necessary.
Pragmatism’s Legacy to Sociology Re-specified
19
scientific objects, the world of abstract philosophical truths, the world of
myth and supernatural beliefs, the madman’s world, etc. Each of these
subworlds, according to James, has "its own special and separate style of
existence" and "each world, whilst it is attended to, is real after its own
fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention". Then after taking this
radical stand, James copped out: he allowed that the world of the senses
has a special status, being the one we judge to be the realest reality, the
one that retains our liveliest belief, the one before which the other worlds
must give way […] James’ crucial device, of course, was a rather
scandalous play on the word "world" (or reality). What he meant was not
the world but a particular person’s current world – and in fact as will be
argued not even that. There was no good reason to use such billowy
words. James opened a door; it let in wind as well as light.” (Goffman,
1974: 99)
Goffman, Schütz and Garfinkel acknowledge that all the “provinces of
meaning” are on a par. The sociological approach to pluralism they
advocate rests upon two facts. First, the world in which we live is
fragmented and each organized practical activity is a social world in itself.
Second, people know how to shift from one social world to another in
their everyday life involvements without any major problem. Sociologists
have focused upon this capacity to permanently adjust to the changing
circumstances of situated action in common and demonstrated that
individuals master a multitude of normative orders since observation
shows that they regularly succeed in acting appropriately in most of their
commitments. Some pragmatists share the same concern when they refer
to Dewey’s notion of “valuation” (Dewey, 1939) in order to account for
the fact that people discover what they care about in the course of
achieving the “ends-in-view” they collectively aim at in a given context of
action (Frega, 2014).
Endorsing the perspective of normative pluralism has led sociologists
and pragmatists to share the view that individuals may select the norms
which they provisionally reckon valuable and decide to abide by or not
according to the unfolding circumstances of each action in common.
Hence, these sociologists and pragmatists agree to confer two features
upon norms. First, they are known to individuals-i.e. they do not operate
as purely external constraints as traditional sociology pretends they do.
Second, they supply a host of ready-made justifications to explain what is
happening here and now and what exactly people are doing. In a certain
way then, one could claim that the notion of plurality of normative orders
offers a sociological version of one of the provisions of Pragmatism that
Putnam advanced: the collapse of the fact/value dichotomy.
20
Chapter One
Convergence
The general propositions that exemplify the spirit of Pragmatism are
theoretical constructs which, according to Mustafa Emirbayer and Douglas
Maynard (2011), lack empirical verification. They argue that three of its
basic elements are shared by the sociological approach they champion,
namely ethnomethodology:
1) the necessity to get back to the practices themselves to account for
what the experience of the social world is made of;
2) the idea that problematic situations compel people to engage in a
practical activity aimed at their resolution and prompting the
constitution of a collective intelligence; and
3) the conception of language use as an order of practices by which
the naturalness of social life is accomplished.
On these grounds, Emirbayer and Maynard contend that the sequential
analysis of practical activities promoted by Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) has
empirically substantiated the pragmatist outlook. This way of doing
sociology pays critical attention to the practical dimensions of action in
common in order to produce detailed accounts of the sequentiality of
ongoing interactions to demonstrate how action in common step by step
takes the shape it eventually displays. One could then argue that such a
sociological analysis amount to offering an empirical description of what
an inquiry is made of and how it proceeds in time.
Accordingly, endorsing this analytical approach leads sociologists to
follow three methodological rules which can be traced to Pragmatism: 1)
never explain what is happening by using the abstract categories of a
theoretical model; 2) forget the separation between external and internal
factors, and postulate that external factors always inhere in the way people
act together and do not determinate it from outside; and 3) renounce the
fact/value dichotomy. For some theorists (such as Latour or Rorty), these
rules justify the preference given to the singular over the general. This is a
position which is sometimes complemented by a petition of principle to
the effect that there is no science but of the particular, that is, no
generalization is ever possible. From this controversial perspective, order
always appears to emerge from scratch–as if it were a contextual and
circumstantial production created in a social vacuum. For others,
following these rules allow endorsing a holistic approach according to
which the ways individuals apprehend the social world, talk about it, and
act together in it are irremediably and completely informed by the
Pragmatism’s Legacy to Sociology Re-specified
21
countless situations they are involved in and by the relationships they
sustain with the relevant others they happen to act with in everyday life
circumstances.
A further qualification is needed. Realistic interactionism is divided
into two brands. Whereas Goffman sees the social world as an endless
succession of contingent states brought about in a ceaseless stream of
experience (hence the focus he places upon framing procedures), Garfinkel
holds that, while acting together, individuals have to invariably produce a
mutually acknowledged order to get along. Hence his programme which
consists in identifying and describing the “ordinary methods” people make
use of to constitute and maintain an operative order allowing for the
accomplishment of coordination of action. But if we put this difference
aside, we can pretend that Goffman’s and Garfinkel’s realistic approach
which somehow calls to mind the spirit of Pragmatism might fruitfully be
extended to sociology at large. Three steps should be taken to move
forward in this direction.
The first is to offer a methodological critique aiming at adding to the
toolbox of sociological ethnography sound and appropriate techniques to
analyse the data which are usually collected during fieldwork (interviews,
observations, informal conversations, records, documents, files, etc.). A
current instruction should be reiterated: always relate the collected data to
their proper context of emergence (i.e. taking indexicality into account)
and in direct relation to the dynamics of the action in common in which
they have been collected (i.e. paying attention to the reflexivity of action).
Proceeding in this way should avoid two pitfalls: endorsing a kind of
hyper-constructivism on the one hand, and stalling analysis in endless or
tautological narratives about what happened on the other hand.
The second consists in turning the sociologist’s conceptual apparatus
into an object of sociological investigation by applying the notion of
reflexivity to its own forms of reasoning (Pollner, 1991). This approach
usually develops, at best, as a devastating refutation of sociology’s claims
that it is a scientific discipline and, at worst, as a quite inconsistent selfabsorption of sociologists in their own work (Woolgar, 1988).
The third way a realistic twist would upgrade sociology derives from
its anti-mentalist vein. It consists in turning the detailed description of the
methods individuals necessarily make use of when they mutually
accomplish an action in common into an analysis of the ways practical
reason materially operates. Coulter (1989) has given the name “epistemic
sociology” to this kind of fieldwork, assigning to it the task of analysing
what he calls the “grammars of conventional conceptualization”. Such a
methodological framework leads him to admit that “knowing what people
22
Chapter One
are doing (including oneself) is knowing how to identify what they are
doing in the categories of a natural language, which requires knowing how
to use those categories in discursive contexts, which in turn includes
knowing when to utter them.” (Coulter, 1989: 16) Another formulation of
this statement can be found in Lynch’s proposal to investigate what he
defines as “the primitive structures of accountability that make up the
instructable reproducibility of social actions.” (Lynch, 1997: 299) The
kind of fieldwork he recommends to engage in aims at analysing what he
names “epistopics”, a neologism he has forged to account for practical
activities like observing, measuring, or representing that are locally
accomplished in the daily work in laboratories. Lynch claims that such
epistopics frame all forms of practical reasoning, whether in scientific
practice or in ordinary action.
This realistic stance opens up a new domain of empirical inquiry, that
is, the ways epistemic operations are implemented to give practical
contents to the concepts and principles individuals make use of in and for
action in common. Those who are ready to engage in such a domain
should endorse a postulate: the natural mastery of ordinary language
endows individuals with a vernacular language which is matched to a
particular type of action, and such mastery signals an acquaintance with
acceptable ways of behaving in the circumstances of an ongoing action in
common (provided one has experienced it once). We can thus suppose that
individuals acting in common in a familiar context already know what
they are supposed to do together (even if this knowledge is incomplete or
defective), how each role specifies the expectations one can have about the
way others might behave (even if these specifications, and the role
endorsed, can change during the course of interaction), and what kind of
anticipation should guide one’s action (even if this anticipation is
ceaselessly revised in the sequentiality of exchanges).
On this account, one can assume that mutual intelligibility is a
contextual phenomenon that fires up (in a quasi-physical sense) in and for
the accomplishment of an activity and comes to a halt once the activity
ceases. In other words, acting is not a matter of cultural transmission,
interiorization of social norms, learning, or information computing. It is a
social phenomenon through and through. Practical reasoning stems, as
Durkheim claimed a century ago, from the natural fact that human beings
are bound to live and be raised in groups. Subsequently, they can be taken
to share a prior and unstated agreement about what the requirements of
coordination imply in a vast number of current circumstances of action.
Here is how sociology would empirically demonstrate the social nature of
the activity of knowing while avoiding any drift towards psychologism
Pragmatism’s Legacy to Sociology Re-specified
23
and mentalism. This is, or so do I claim, the decisive contribution realistic
interactionism offers to a renewed sociological theory of knowledge.
One last upshot of connecting Pragmatism to sociology is a renewed
conception of the background, i.e. of the grounds upon which humans rely
when they engage in an action in common. There are several ways to
figure this background: generalized trust, collective representations,
internalized value systems, habit, common sense knowledge, practical
knowledge, forms of practical reasoning, frames, formal structures of
practical actions, certainty, or direct perception. Behind each of these
notions stands a way of looking at the relationship between knowledge and
action and a conception of human agency as pre-set or as dynamic.
The notion of inquiry offered by Pragmatism belongs to the second of
these two perspectives as it focuses upon the way doubt and indeterminacy
are dealt with in the course of an investigation process. Yet this approach
raises a compelling question: would resorting to the notion of inquiry lead
the analyst to favour an inter-subjective and rationally agreed upon view
of action, or should inquiry be studied as a practical activity which unfolds
within the limits of given social frames? This question echoes a
controversy between Putnam and Rorty. According to the former, the gist
of inquiry lies in the implementation of an experimental method by a
“community of inquirers” which find themselves able to solve problems
by relying upon pre-given shared criteria of “rational acceptability”. For
the latter, “there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones, no
wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the
mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the
remarks of our fellow-inquirers. This way of characterizing pragmatism
focuses on a fundamental choice which confronts the reflective mind, that
between accepting the contingent character of starting-points, and
attempting to evade this contingency.” (Rorty, 1982: 165-166)
The social sciences are at pains to fully endorse the fallibilistic stance
advocated by the pragmatist conception of inquiry. This is evidenced when
one considers the way the notion of inquiry is quickly reduced by social
scientists to its substantial content and viewed as analogous to a
procedural investigation that aims at devising a solution to a practical
problem. Inquiry remains largely conceived of as carried out by
individuals who are endowed with qualified competences enabling them to
master the proper “skills” to discover the right answer to a technical or
political issue. Such an outlook usually leads the researchers to frame their
own definition of the “problematic situation” a community of inquirers is
supposed to solve without worrying about what enables them to do so as
they are not practically engaged in what is happening.
24
Chapter One
This empirical approach to inquiry is doubly reductive. First, because it
generally gives precedence to the framework-system of norms, power
relationships, individual experience, environmental pressures-within
which individuals construe a problematic situation. Second, because it
ignores the issue of emergence and pays little attention to the efforts
deployed by a community of inquirers to sequentially manage and complete
their task together.
A pragmatist-oriented sociology should consider the openness and
contingency of inquiry as topics that need to be empirically investigated
since they are essential aspects of any action in common. Research is this
area would aim at demonstrating how individuals acting together mutually
solve problems which their common endeavour unrelentingly raises. Such
a standpoint is pragmatist in spirit as it takes doubt to be the onset of
inquiry. Moreover these problems should be apprehended as only
provisionally solved since any development might re-open inquiry at any
time. When endorsing a fallibilist perspective, sociologists should pay
particular attention to the ingenious ways in which three features of action
in common are overcome in practical activities: indeterminacy (descriptions
are never complete and individuals have constantly to make sense by
themselves of the unavoidable shortcomings of communication); contextuality
(renouncing any kind of essentialism and adhering to Wittgenstein’s
ordinary grammar perspective according to which the meaning of a word
is its use); and emergentism (apprehending action in common holding that
it irremediably unfolds sequentially and that no pre-assigned ending can be
attributed to it before it has been accomplished).
These three features must be seen as analytical guidelines the accuracy
of which has to be empirically substantiated by data collected in fieldwork.
Sociologists who profess their proximity to Pragmatism should keep in
mind that its spirit conveys the idea that uncertainty is seldom completely
wiped out and that indeterminacy, contextuality and emergentism
irremediably call for correction. Hence studying the ways doubt is dealt
with in everyday practices looks like being an essential contribution to the
development of a sociological theory of knowledge. This should ultimately
be the best part of the re-specified legacy of pragmatism to sociology.