Candidate Number 178151 How and why has Migration become understood as a security issue? Introduction International migration has been progressively perceived as a security issue and so it has been included in the discipline of Security Studies. Focusing on state actors, International Relations and Security Studies scholars have dealt with Migration as a security threat in the aftermath of the Cold War, specifically after 9/11 and the rise of International Terrorism. In this work, I will address two main issues: “why” and “how” migration has been understood as a security issue. I will consider three different schools of thought (Samuel Huntington’s theory on the Clash of Civilisations; the Copenhagen School of International Relations; the Paris School of International Relations), and I will view migration to be a matter related to the concept of what these scholars defined as “societal security”. I would take as the initial cornerstone the notion that migration has become a security issue because of the social construction of the migrant as a threat. Through a couple of case studies, I seek to prove why migrants have been included into the security sphere of the state, so providing the distinction between the locals (i.e. the “us”) and the external threat (i.e. the “them”). So, I will firstly consider the cases of “vigilantism” in the Mexico – US border and secondly the case of the Mexico – Guatemala border. This discussion would supply the answer to the first question (the question of the “why”) which I expect to prove throughout the first part of this work. 1 Candidate Number 178151 Differently, answering the “how” problem entails an explanation of the process of securitisation. In this context, to be selective is a must, since opting for broader examples could result in vagueness. Thus, I will confront the securitisation process within the European Union. Jeff Huysmans interprets the securitisation of migration in the European Union as a spill-over effect from an internal economic need to a security threat. In fact, after the European Enlargement of 1973, Member States started to put limits on migration flows, taking advantage of the fact that Migration Policy had stayed in the sphere of national prerogatives, so denying the possibility of a supranational, centralised response to the Migration Crisis as we had later (2011). Member States’ inadaptability in responding to the challenge has turned Migration into a security threat. To prove this, I wish to focus on two specific factors: Welfare Chauvinism and the Paradox of the Schengen Agreement. The literature defines “Welfare Chauvinism” as the fear of the migrant as a threat to the locals’ economic advantages provided by the State. Instead, the Schengen paradox is the purely European pattern of closing external borders while eliminating internal barriers. The Operation Mare Nostrum and its suspension is the final example to illustrate how South-North Migration has been securitised in the European Union. 2 Candidate Number 178151 Part 1: Why has Migration become understood as a security issue? 1.1 Migration as a Security issue In this section, I discuss the aetiological side of the question I wish to answer. In this context, the use of the term “aetiology” concerns the reasons by which Migration could (or must) be conceived as a security issue. First, I need to clarify two crucial aspects: what is a migrant and which kinds of migrant are involved in the securitisation process. To address the first issue, I will use the definition described by the International Organization for Migration. The IOM (2017) defines a migrant as: “Any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is”. Amongst the wide range of definitions of migrant, I rate the IOM definition as the most comprehensive one, since it considers all the relevant sub-factors. Which are the kinds of migrant involved in the securitisation process? There are four Migration flows: North-South, South-North, North-North and South-South. However, in the first part of this work, I am taking into account only the South-North flow. As I will show in the following sub-sections, this choice is due to the fact that the South-North migrants can be considered as fully securitised. 3 Candidate Number 178151 Geographically, the South-North Migration flow corresponds to the movement between the Southern and the Northern Hemisphere of the World. Typically, migrants who move from the South to reach the North are unskilled people, with limited levels of literacy and evident cultural differences. As argued by Castles and Miller (2009, pp. 207-220), there are quite a few factors triggering the South-North migration flow. Amongst all the factors underlined by the authors, I would consider poverty, wars and famine as the most relevant to my research. A further element necessary to understand why has migration become a security threat is to identify those who perceive such a threat, who are able to choose whether migrants are a security matter. Not just the public sphere (i.e. the state) but also the private sphere must be considered as the subjects able to insert migration in the security discourse. This suggestion will be clarified in the following paragraphs. Having defined all the terms helpful to answer the question on why migration has become understood as a security issue, I will now enter into detail of the different arguments related to that answer. I believe a comprehensive answer to the question can be given only after having analysed all the arguments related to it. 1.2 Migration as a Cultural Clash The first sub-argument on the motives of Migration as a security issue can be found in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations article (1993). In this work, the author sees that during the Cold War, and beyond the military crises, a shocking conflict has emerged between the “West” and “the East” (Huntington,1993). 4 Candidate Number 178151 However, I wish to stress what the author claims about the conflicts of the future. In fact, Huntington observes that (if any) future conflicts would be triggered by the differences between what he defined as the “major civilisations” (Huntington, 1993, p. 25), where these differences concern history, language, culture, tradition and religion (Huntington, 1993, p. 25). Thus, in this perspective migration can be seen as a security issue. In fact, the securitisation of the migrant can be thought as a part of what Huntington views as a “cultural clash”. The differences between the locals and the migrants involve all the factors which Huntington defined as the causes of the Clash of Civilisations. Then, in the previous section, I have suggested three elements which trigger South-North migration flows (i.e. poverty, wars and famine) and it was pointed out that Huntington’s theory blames multiculturalism as the cause of societal fragmentation (Huysmans, 2000, p. 757). Moving forward in my discussion, I want to demonstrate that one reason for the securitisation of migration is the misuse of these factors by the recipient countries to label the migrant as a security threat. 1.3 The border between Mexico and the United States Migration from Mexico to the United States provides an exemplary case study for examining the South-North flows. In the South of the United States, some groups called “vigilantes”, have been organized to help the local police to arrest illegal migrants. These groups work as “border patrols” seeking to reduce the number of illegal arrivals. In the United States, these groups have increased in number and size, becoming a consistent civilian force (Lynn Doty, 2007). It must be noted that 5 Candidate Number 178151 their role is unclear. De iure, vigilantes operate as civilian-composed voluntary forces, auxiliary to the local authorities whereas, de facto, these groups are related to the antiimmigrants’ movements. Their proliferation could be a symptom of the state’s inability to manage independently the migration flows. Two further considerations can be made about this example. First, the presence of vigilantes raises a question of sovereignty (i.e. able to enforce the law) since these groups operate both as auxiliary to local police forces, and, at the same time, their acts can be seen as a substitute to the role of the State as the enforcer of societal security (Lynn Doty, 2007, p. 118). Second, the ideological position of vigilantes is blurred: it is not clear whether the vigilantes are linked or not to xenophobic organizations. Therefore, their presence could be a risk since, potentially, they could trigger social unrest within the local communities by helping to erect ideological barriers against the acceptance of migrants. This example could possibly bear out Huntington’s thesis: “vigilantism” could signal that a cultural clash between the locals and the migrants is already in place. Furthermore, both the presence and the actions of vigilantes could be a security risk: they can fuel antiimmigration positions within the local community and hype up illegal migration phenomena (which are only a little part of the whole migration process) as a security threat. 1.4 The border between Mexico and Guatemala Another relevant example concerns illegal migration between Mexico and Guatemala. The US have demanded the Mexican authorities to deter illegal migration more efficiently. Because of this pressure, the border between Mexico and Guatemala has been increasingly 6 Candidate Number 178151 secured over time. As a result, illegal migrants’ pathway increased in difficulty. Galemba (2017, p. 2) points out that the inhabitants of the Mexico-Guatemala border have fostered the network of human smugglers (i.e. coyotes or polleros) by assuming the role of mediators between illegal migrants and human smuggling networks. The author then considers that such a process has produced two different labels: the criminal smuggler and the criminalised migrant ‘other’ (Galemba, 2017, p.2). This pattern has aggravated the problem of illegal migration in Mexico since it has provoked violence and fear in two distinct ways: on the one hand, these two labels caused a legal ambiguity between the locals, who help migrants to cross the border, and the actual criminal smugglers. It seems that the locals have been enmeshed in the security discourse since they became implicitly involved in the movement of illegal migrants willing to cross the border. On the other hand, the criminal networks operating through human smuggling continue their activities of kidnapping and extorting the illegal migrants crossing the border between Mexico and Guatemala (Alba and Castillo 2012, p. 5; Paley 2014 in Galemba 2012, p. 3). The case of the Mexico – Guatemala border shows that the locals (the inhabitants of the borders) risk being involved in the recognition of migration as a security threat. Why so? Due to this indirect collaboration between borderland residents and human smugglers, Galemba asserts another detrimental consequence, that the confusion of roles and the labelling of criminal smuggler and criminalised migrant has made Mexico use ethnicity for considering migration as a national security threat. (Hernández Castillo 2001 in Galemba 2017, p. 6). 7 Candidate Number 178151 1.4 Reflexions on the two case studies Is the complexity of this example explainable fully by Huntington’s hypothesis about the Clash of Civilisations? Before giving a final answer on that question I need to specify why did I choose these two examples: the first reason is that I thought both examples as referring to what I have emphasised about Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations article, or rather the cultural clash. In fact, in both cases I have shown why migration has become understood as a security threat. Moreover, both examples have underlined that the borderland’s local inhabitants directly contribute to the securitisation of migration. About the first case study I would put the accent on the fact that migrants might be securitised by local civilians whereas, in the case of the border between Mexico and Guatemala, I would highlight that it is the categorisation of migrants which turn them into a security threat. Better said, the securitisation of migration happens due to its social construction as a threat. In brief, down to both examples, it can be argued that the cultural clash (e.g. between the locals and the migrants) is a valid explanation to assess why migration has become understood as a security issue. Nonetheless, as the second example has shed light on the “social construction” of migration as a security issue, I would now analyse the theory behind this further interpretation and provide more case studies on it. 8 Candidate Number 178151 1.4 The securitisation of Migration: a different explanation Another explanation considering Migration as a security issue has involved two schools of thought of Security Studies: the Paris School and the Copenhagen School. The first interpretation of the answer saw the cultural differences between the local population in the recipient countries and the migrants as the cause of the securitisation of Migration. Although, such interpretation is not enough. The example of the borderland between Mexico and Guatemala highlighted that another explanation exists. With a focus on the European Union, the securitisation of migration results in a more complex process whose roots can be traced in Paris and Copenhagen School’ works on the matter. Both the Copenhagen both the Paris School understand the securitisation of migration as a “societal security matter” and, if combined, their interpretation responds to the vexed question on the securitisation of migration. Copenhagen School gives relevance to the role of society in Security Studies. Referring to Copenhagen School, McSweeney explains that: “Society is conceived as a social fact, with the same objectivity and ontological status as the state” (McSweeney, 1996, p. 90). Copenhagen School answers to the question placing the role of society as a reason why migration enters the security sphere. Copenhagen School assesses that the menaces to identity – of which Migration is a consistent part – are not anymore a concern of the state but rather of society (McSweeney, 1996, p.93). This assumption confirms what emerged from the case studies; Migrants have been portrayed as threatening by two specific layers of society: by the borderland’s inhabitants and by vigilantes. 9 Candidate Number 178151 The Paris School confirms this assumption: what Tsoukala defines as the “Problematisation of Immigration” consists in seeing the migrants as “a serious threat to the internal security and the well-being of the host societies” (Tsoukala, 2005, p.163). Bearing in mind the case of the European Union, the author blames politicians as partly responsible for this process. In fact, she observes that, seeking to foment their electorates towards extreme, antagonist positions, political parties have been tending to identify the migrants as a security threat (Tsoukala 2005, p.162). Also, in the European Union Migration has been portrayed as the cause of more unemployment, auxiliary to organised crime and menacing to the European identity (Tsoukala 2005, p.164). To stress the gravity of migration’s securitisation, Tsoukala compares it to McCarthy’s “hunting for Communists” of the 1950s in the United States (Tsoukala, 2005, p.166). In the 1950s, Communism in the US was considered as a national enemy. The incessant expression of worry, of fear, of terror by policy-makers and media put Communism at the centre of National Security; this led to a massive prosecution of all the suspected or affiliated people to the ideology. In brief, Communism was the “internal enemy” that disturbed the status quo and which had to be removed. Tsoukala observes that even in the case of the EU during the 1990s, the social construction of migration as a security threat was part of a wider strategy: “The fact of turning migrants into social enemies enables the community to be defined and to recognise itself as such, by simple opposition to the figure of the foreigner” (Tsoukala, 2005, p.167). So, such a strategy consisted in the differentiation between an internal and an external subject of the state. The social construction of migration consisted in highlighting the external subject as a threat. 10 Candidate Number 178151 In the case of the EU, the externals (i.e. the migrants) were explicitly used as menacing the Welfare of Europeans, the sovereignty of the Member States and the stability of the Single Market’s employment system. Finally, Tsoukala qualifies the perception of migration as a security threat by the European citizens an additional factor for the strengthening of the community’s internal cohesion (Tsoukala, 2005, p.167). 1.5 The securitisation of Migration: the why Considering only the S-N flow as the secured kind of migration, any of the three case studies has proved that it is society that turns migration into a security threat. In the first place, migrants are rejected as part of the community by the locals. It was then underlined that this “exclusion” involves several actors from the public or the private sphere, who intervene mainly at the ideological level by portraying the migrants as a security threat. In a logic of isolating their “enemy”, security actors blame migrants as harmful to economic development, to be a factor in criminal smuggling networks, to be a threat to the sovereignty of the state and to the order of its society. So, migration can be thought as a security threat since, for the locals, it represents a menace to their status quo. This explanation completes what it has been defined as the cultural clash by Samuel Huntington’s theory of the Clash of Civilisations. In fact, all the case studies showed that South-North illegal migration facilitates the securitisation of migration as a whole since it permits the security professionals to turn migration into a security matter. The following part of the essay would answer the question on how migration has become understood as a security issue. 11 Candidate Number 178151 Part 2: How has Migration become understood as a security issue? 2.1 The securitisation of Migration: explaining the how By answering to what I defined as the “aetiological” side of the matter, the first part of the essay has assessed the securitisation of migration as a cultural and societal security matter. The other question is how has migration become understood as a security issue. To address this question, I will analyse some European Governance mechanisms which evidently turned South-North Migration into a security issue. This point has been analysed by the scholar Jeff Huysmans, who explained the securitisation of Migration in Europe through a “spill-over” effect involving the European Single Market and its governance mechanisms. This Eurocentric perspective demonstrates how, due to some “structural” factors the European Union has implicitly turned migration into a quest for security. 2.2 Securing migration in the European Union: an historical pattern Previous research on the topic has addressed this question by considering the European governance of Migration as inefficient and unresponsive to the challenge of Migration. Initially, the European Union accepted Migration as a source of economic development. In fact, until the end of the 1960s, European Member States recognised migration as a source for extra workforce supportive to the expansion of the Single Market (Huysmans, 2000, p.753). However, after the European Enlargement of 1973, Member States desire to implement a Migration Policy took off; it was then that Member States made no distinction between asylum seekers and migrants (Huysmans, 2000, p. 755). 12 Candidate Number 178151 Progressively, the demand for cheap labour from outside Europe dropped. In the late 1970s Member States changed their attitude towards migrants into a restrictive one (Huysmans, 2000, p.754). Huysmans (2000, p.754) explained that this radical change involved two main elements: on one hand, he argues that Member States aimed at the adoption of protectionist legal measures for the sake of European workers and Member States’ welfare systems. On the other hand, the author noticed a sort of reification of the migrant as a threat by the public sphere, particularly by European Political parties. One way or another, Member States’ reluctance to accept further external workforce within their borders, turned Migration as a matter of internal security. As explained by Huysmans (2000, p.760) migration became a liability due to a spillover effect: this provoked a general disentanglement amongst European citizens to the migrants. Such a process has been triggered by three distinct “policy-areas”: Welfare, Economic integration and the Legal system. So, how has the securitisation of Migration become essential to European Politics? Huysmans (2000) illustrates that the European Integration process is implicated in the securitisation of migration for two reasons. The first one is the protectionist stance of Member States (particularly in Northern Europe) which has depicted Migration as an obstacle to the Single Market and internal workers’ rights. The second one is the European legal framework concerning Migration, whose delays and inefficiency furtherly complicated an appropriate response to Migration Crisis in 2011. 13 Candidate Number 178151 2.3 Welfare Chauvinism The first factor to explain how Migration in the EU has become securitised is what has been defined as “Welfare Chauvinism”. This term refers to the diffident attitude of a state to give equal benefits to migrants and local citizens, what Mewes and Mau (2013, p. 228) simply consider as: “Native citizens’ unwillingness to grant social rights to foreigners”. Member states, particularly in northern Europe, have continuously been “jealous” of their welfare provisions. The case of the Netherlands is the archetype of how Welfare Chauvinism triggers Member States’ restrictive stance towards Migration: here the state has undertaken an utilitarian approach to qualify Migration as threatening the welfare of its citizens (Paraschivescu, 2013, p.405). Based on a cost-benefit analysis, Dutch authorities found out that Ghanaian workers represented an economic loss for the state since their remittances did not balance out the money they spend in the host country (i.e. the Netherlands) (Mazzuccato, 2008, p.200). Examples as such show that Migration is blamed by European Member States as an obstacle for their Welfare Systems. Furthermore, policy responses in this framework have been poor since the EU has a low or extremely restricted policy involvement in Welfare (Nugent, 2010, p.282). Overall, Welfare Chauvinism remains one of the factors to explain the securitisation of Migration in Europe, it is essentially one of the reasons to explain how, still nowadays, Member States perspective on Migration diverge, leaving little or no possibility for a centralised European response to the matter. 14 Candidate Number 178151 2.3 The Schengen Paradox The second factor to explain the securitisation of Migration in Europe concerns its legal system. Over time, European law has responded inefficiently to the regulation of Migration flows. The first piece of evidence for this hypothesis is the Schengen Agreement of 1987, signed by EU Member States to launch the free movement of people within the EU. However, the Schengen Agreement did not offer the right of movement to externals but restricted it. As argued elsewhere (Huysmans, 1995, p.62) the Schengen Agreement implicitly constrained Migration phenomena by hardening the procedures of border controls for the non-Europeans. With regard to migration there is a paradox concerning the Schengen Agreement. The EU was conceived as an economic area with no barriers to the free movement of people, capitals, services and goods. However, the project was restricted to its geographical boundaries with no consideration on the migration phenomena. It must be stated that the elimination of barriers “inward” went hand in hand with a rise of barriers “outward”. Overall, the Schengen Agreement ended up by easing the free movement of people between European States but restricting the arrivals of non-European people. The Schengen Agreement affected particularly S-N Migration phenomena in Europe. Since then, more and more the EU adopted a “protectionist” stance through the enhancement of further border controls at its boundaries. 2.4 The suspension of the Mare Nostrum Operation The explanation why Migration has become a security issue is still incomplete: the previous paragraphs underlined how this happened through a “spill-over” effect from the 15 Candidate Number 178151 internal market to internal security. The two underlined elements concerning Welfare Chauvinism and the Schengen Agreement contributed to demonstrate how the EU has turned South-North Migration phenomena into a security issue. A final example on the Migration Crisis of 2013 clarifies how the spill-over effect emerged fully. Mare Nostrum Operation was the climax of the Migration crisis. The Operation was launched in 2013 after the shipwreck of a ship bridging 368 migrants to the Italian Coast. It has been the response of the Italian Government aiming at both rescuing migrants and arresting criminal smugglers in the attempt of avoiding future disasters as such (Musarò, 2016, p.12). The Operation has unquestionably been a success both in contrasting criminal smuggling and in saving human lives across the Mediterranean Sea. However, due to an exorbitant monthly cost of about $12 million, the Italian Government, was forced to end the Operation (Tassinari and Lucht, 2015). The suspension of Mare Nostrum Operation shows that, even European governance, due to the spill-over effect, has been involved in the securitisation of migration. Overall, member states reluctance to build cohesively a common solution to the Migration Crisis in 2011 has provided further evidence to show how migration has become securitised. 2.5 Addressing the final answer Finally, it can be argued how migration has become understood as a security issue with a full analysis of the European Union as a case – study, it has emerged that migration has become understood as a security issue throughout the European Integration process. Then, through the three examples considered it can be assessed how migration has become secured in Europe. The first element concerns the negative economic prospects in 16 Candidate Number 178151 recipient countries which have framed South-North Migration as an economic liability for the Single Market. The second point related the legal system: the peculiarity of the Schengen Agreement, constructing borders externally while eliminating internal barriers, served as an archetype to show how, even the legal system in the EU has contributed to securitise Migration. Finally, the case of Mare Nostrum Operation served as a proof of how even European governance turned on the surface Member States’ inadaptability to respond cohesively to Migration, in other words, despite its positive results, the Operation confirmed that the spillover effect has not finished yet. Conclusion This work has dealt with the securitisation of migration in its two sub-questions: the why and the how. The first part of this work started by providing definitions without which to assess the first question would have been unfeasible. Therefore, it was argued what a migrant is and, most importantly, it has been explained the choice to perform this analysis under the assumption that, when talking about “migrants”, this work would have meant only the SouthNorth Migration flow. The point of start to answer the question was to re-interpret Huntington’s theory on the clash of civilisations as a gateway to this answer. Actually, it emerged that it is through multiculturalism that migration has become a security issue. The first part then examined the notion of migration and its security implications under two cases. The first one concerned the border between Mexico and the United States, one of the most crowded migration flows. This case showed how some actors in-between the public 17 Candidate Number 178151 and the private sphere (e.g. Vigilantes) contribute to insert migration as a security threat, both by labelling the migrants as “others” both by hyping the menace of migrants as threatening the survival of culture and society. It was finally found out that, by supporting the State in the fight against illegal migration, Vigilantes tent to match illegal migration as a threat to state survival. The second example affected the Mexico-Guatemala border. The analysis showed that here the securitisation of migration can be thought as an ideological clash between the borderland inhabitants and the migrants. The former is often accused to nourish the criminal smugglers’ network just because they offer help and support to migrants in crossing the border. Furthermore, since the second example showed that migrants are portrayed as part of a societal clash, the analysis contemplated the example of the European Union and a further interpretation on the matter. It was then assumed how Copenhagen and Paris School arguments, if matched together, agree to a focal point concerning the answer on the why: in the case of South-North Migration flows migration is a societal threat. This last example linked the first to the second part by discovering how migrants become securitised in Europe. The second part of the essay related to the answer on how migration become a security issue. The case of the European Union is a perfect application to respond properly to this answer. In Europe, the securitisation of migration followed hand in hand the European Integration process. it has been possible to demonstrate the veracity of this hypothesis through the analysis of three sub-arguments. The first consideration is Huysmans central claim: through a spill-over effect migration has turned from a need to the European Single Market to a security question tackling Humanitarian security and Criminality during the Migration Crisis. 18 Candidate Number 178151 The first matter tackled has been Welfare Chauvinism, since it has proved to be a consequence of some member states’ reluctance inserted S-N migration effects to their home economies and Welfare systems. The second matter described has been the paradox coming from Schengen Agreement, one of the founding treaties of the EU which shed the light on how Europe has favoured the free movement of people “internally” and shut the borders “externally”. It was argued how this pattern certainly did not stop the spill-over effect. Finally, the interruption of Mare Nostrum Operation illustrated how migration has entered into the security sphere due to an inappropriate, decentralised response in managing the Migration Crisis. Word count: 4827. Bibliography Castles, S. and Miller, M. (2010). The age of migration. Basingstoke [Fourth Edition]: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 207-220. Galemba R. B. (2017) ‘He used to be a Pollero’: the securitisation of migration and the smuggler/migrant nexus at the Mexico-Guatemala Border. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies pp. 1-17. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1327803. (Accessed: 20 December 2017). Huntington, S. (1993). ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs, 72(3), pp.22-49. 19 Candidate Number 178151 Huysmans, J. (2000). ‘The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), pp.751-777. Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/doi/10.1111/1468-5965.00263/pdf. (Accessed: 26 December 2017). Huysmans J. (1995) “Migrants as a security problem: dangers of ‘securitising’ societal issues”. in Miles R., Thränhardt D. (1995). Migration and European integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion. London: Pinter. International Organization for Migration (2017) Who is a Migrant? Available at: https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant. (Accessed: 20 December 2017). Lynn Doty, R. (2007) ‘States of Exception on the Mexico? U.S. Border: Security, "Decisions," and Civilian Border Patrols’, International Political Sociology, 1(2), pp.113-137. Available at: https://doi-org.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2007.00008.x. (Accessed: 20 December 2017). Mazzuccato V. (2008). ‘The Double Engagement: Transnationalism and Integration. Ghanaian Migrants’ Lives Between Ghana and The Netherlands’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34(2), pp. 199-216, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830701823871. (Accessed: 27 December 2017). Mewes J., Mau S. (2013). ‘Globalization, socio-economic status and welfare chauvinism: European perspectives on attitudes toward the exclusion of immigrants’. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 54(3), 20 pp. 228–245. Available at: Candidate Number 178151 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0020715213494395. (Accessed: 27 December 2017). Musarò P. (2016) ‘Mare Nostrum: the visual politics of a military-humanitarian operation in the Mediterranean Sea’, Media, Culture & Society, 39(1), pp. 11-28. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716672296. (Accessed: 28 December 2017). Nugent N. (2010) ‘The Government and Politics of the European Union’ [7th Edition]: Palgrave Macmillan. Paraschivescu C. (2013). ‘Is Migration a problem for the EU Welfare States? What role can the EU play in ‘Managing Migration’?’. Revista Română de Sociologie / Romanian Journal of Sociology, Volume 5, pp. 402-409. Available at: http://revista.acadsudest.ro/pdf-uri/nr.5-62013/05-CParaschivescu.pdf. (Accessed: 27 December 2017). Tassinari F., Lucht H. (2015) Fortress Europe. Behind the Continent’s Migrant Crisis. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1114393. (Accessed: 27 December 2017). Tsoukala A. “Looking at Migrants as Enemies” in Bigo D., Guild E. (2005). Controlling Frontiers: Free movement into and within Europe. Available at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/suss/detail.action?docID=4860484. Chapter 5, pp. 161192. Downloaded: 20 December 2017. 21