The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
ISSN: 0308-6534 (Print) 1743-9329 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fich20
Jewish Refugees in Cyprus and British Imperial
Sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean,
1933–1949
Alexis Rappas
To cite this article: Alexis Rappas (2019) Jewish Refugees in Cyprus and British Imperial
Sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1933–1949, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 47:1, 138-166, DOI: 10.1080/03086534.2018.1539729
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2018.1539729
Published online: 25 Oct 2018.
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THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
2019, VOL. 47, NO. 1, 138–166
https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2018.1539729
Jewish Refugees in Cyprus and British Imperial
Sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1933–1949
Alexis Rappas
Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS
This paper focuses on the use of the British Colony of
Cyprus as a clearing ground for Jewish refugees on route to
Palestine before, during, and after the Second World
War. While acknowledging the historiographical consensus
underscoring Cyprus’ renewed strategic importance in the
context of British post-Second World War imperial retreat in
the East, the article argues that Jewish transmigration
revealed new potential uses for the island which in turn
contributed to confirm British sovereignty in that
possession. Drawing on British and Cypriot sources, the
article further shows the transformative impact of Jewish
transmigration for Cyprus politics as it induced British
authorities, who had established an authoritarian regime in
the island in the 1930s, to invoke Cypriot reactions in order
to stem the flow of refugees to the island. This paved the
way for future policies meant to redefine the relations
between rulers and ruled. As the management of refugees
coming to Cyprus during the period under scrutiny relied
on ever more refined instruments of classification, the
paper finally highlights the contribution of Empire to the
crafting of official categories to designate people on the
move—‘refugees’, ‘illegal immigrants’—which still inform
European migration policies.
Cyprus; Palestine; Jewish
refugees; imperial
sovereignty; strategy
Introduction: Empire and Refugees in the First-Half of the Twentieth
Century
When is a migrant a refugee, an asylum seeker, an illegal immigrant? As recent
events remind us, such designations are of crucial importance as they entail
different treatments for people on the move and reveal the political priorities
of those using them. Numerous scholars have shown that they were first
codified as administrative categories involving different sets of rights by governments and international organisations in the context of the unprecedented,
massive population displacements caused by the two world wars. Armenians
fleeing massacres in the Ottoman Empire, White Russians seeking refuge after
CONTACT Alexis Rappas
arappas@ku.edu.tr
Department of History, College of Social Sciences and
Humanities, Koç University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, Sarıyer, İstanbul 34450, Turkey
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
139
the Bolshevik Revolution and the Russian Civil War, Muslims and Orthodox
Christians officially ‘exchanged’ between Greece and the new-born Republic of
Turkey or Jews escaping Nazi persecution: each new mass displacement of
people in the interwar period and after the Second World War forced
Western governments, operating under the scrutiny of domestic and international public opinion, to devise a legal, institutional, economic but also discursive framework meant to guide and legitimize their reactions to the challenges of
these new migratory flows.1 Such frameworks were also intended to establish a
common language between, on the one hand, governments and, on the other,
both public opinion and the growing number of international organisations—
governmental and nongovernmental- involved in the management of migrants
and refugees, from the League of Nations to the United Nations, and the Red
Cross to the American Joint Distribution Committee.
In the context of this broader discussion, few studies have focused on the use
of European colonies as potential places of temporary or permanent settlement
for displaced people, an issue entirely separate from those of settler colonialism,
of the establishment of penal colonies, or of the creation of internment camps in
the colonies for prisoners of war or civilians considered as enemies.2 Because of
its numerous and important political ramifications, the British Mandate of
Palestine represents an exception to this general rule of relative academic
neglect: indeed the topic of Jewish migration, legal and illegal, to Ottoman
and then British-controlled Palestine brings together very broad themes such
as those of European anti-Semitism, nationalism -in its Zionist form- Holocaust
studies, and the debate over the origins of the ongoing Middle East conflict.3
This article proposes to further explore the role of colonies in the management
of interwar European migratory flows by focusing on the case of the reception
of Jewish refugees in the British colony of Cyprus from the 1930s to the
late 1940s.
From the Nazi takeover of power in 1933 to the creation of Israel in May 1948
and beyond, Cyprus, a British colony since 1878, was recurrently considered as a
place of temporary settlement for Jews fleeing persecution in Europe. In the
1930s, British authorities considered Jewish migrants as ‘refugees’, but for political reasons—which will be examined later in the article- were averse to granting them asylum in Cyprus. By contrast, following the Second World War, the
island became, much against the will of the local colonial administration, a clearing ground for Holocaust survivors and other European Jews en route for Palestine. Since the adoption of the 1939 White Paper, Jewish immigration to
Palestine, still under Britain’s control, had been drastically curtailed4; as a consequence, the greatest part of that migration was clandestinely organised. In the
official nomenclature, Jewish migrants were labelled ‘illegal immigrants’ and
Cyprus was no longer a place of refuge but one of detainment for those
among them intercepted at sea or picked up on the shores of Haifa. Between
August 1946 and February 1949, 53,510 men, women and children transited
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A. RAPPAS
through one of the three Cyprus camp sites before being allowed to enter what
became the state of Israel.5
Jewish migration to and through Cyprus is by no means an unexplored topic.
In a seminal study, Stavros Panteli offers a longue durée perspective on Jewish
and Cypriot entanglements. While this is a nuanced and carefully documented
survey, the long-term approach it adopts is beset by a degree of essentialization
in its implicit assumption of the coherence over time of the social groups under
scrutiny, the ‘Cypriots’ and the ‘Jews’.6 Yossi Ben-Artzi authored ground-breaking work on the experience of Jewish settlers in Cyprus from the late nineteenth
century to the mid-1930s, a period during which the island was considered by
Zionist organisations as a substitute for Palestine or at least a temporary solution
to the anti-immigration quotas implemented there by the British.7 A recent collective volume edited by Giorgos Kazamias and Giorgos Antoniou provided a
useful synthesis of the state of the art on the question of Jewish migration to
and through Cyprus from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century.8
Finally in her Master’s thesis drawing on the archives of the British government
and of various Jewish organisations, Branka Arrivé focused on the internment of
Jewish ‘illegal migrants’ in Cyprus between 1946 and 1949.9 All of these studies
highlight the continuities and changes in terms of the institutions, the organisations and the people involved in relocating European Jews in Cyprus within
differing frameworks, whether that be the creation of agricultural colonies in
substitution to immigration to Palestine, or temporary settlement in the
context of heightened persecutions in Europe, or detainment in camps. Yet
most of these works concentrate on the relations between British authorities,
international organisations and Jewish stakeholders, leaving out of their scope
of inquiry both Cypriot reactions to, and the involvement of the broader
British empire in the management of Jewish migrations.10
This article aspires to weave together these different threads of inquiry:
namely to propose a multidimensional analysis of the specific question of
Jewish migration to Cyprus and that of the function of European colonies in
the context of interwar and post-war mass displacement. Drawing on British
official archives and articles in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot press, this
paper will be primarily concerned with the manner in which Jewish settlement
in the island gave rise to competing notions of territorial sovereignty. In principle, in the context of Cyprus, a British colony, this resided in the British
state through its local representative, the colonial governor. Yet in attempting
to ward off or closely control Jewish migration to the island, British administrators in Cyprus often invoked the rights and the needs of the Cypriot people
which, as the latter’s trustees, they were bound to protect. Implicit in the
island’s administrators’ position was the notion that, especially in the wake of
the Second World War, British sovereignty on the island could only be preserved
by refraining to treat Cyprus as territorium nullius where populations could be
freely transplanted regardless of the locals’ feelings.11 Crucial to this redefinition
THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
141
of British imperial sovereignty on Cyprus was the island’s organic link with
Mandatory Palestine throughout the 1930s and until the final evacuation of
Cyprus’ Jewish camps in February 1949: so called Jewish ‘illegal immigrants’
landing in Palestine or intercepted at sea were transshipped to Cyprus’ camps
whence they were released back to Palestine in conformity with the rate
fixated by the 1939 White Paper of 750 refugees per month. In this equation
then, stateless persons, Jews coming from various locations in Europe, aspired
to reach a territory of transitional international status, Palestine as a League of
Nations Mandate, and ended up detained in a territory, Cyprus, whose status
as a British colony was confirmed in this very process. While Cypriot reactions
shared the fact that they were overwhelmingly negative, they pointed, through
the differing nature of the rights they invoked and the different ways they
claimed these rights would be trampled by the detention of Jews in the island,
to divergent representations of Cyprus as a polity.
In following these lines of inquiry, this article aims to make two broader historiographical contributions. It seeks, first, to highlight the importance of
postwar (First and Second World War) forced population displacements in
redefining imperial sovereignty. It intends, secondly, to revise the historiographical consensus regarding Cyprus’ function in the British Empire. Most historians agree that Cyprus only became gradually ‘useful’ to the British Empire after
the Second World War, following each wave of imperial retreat from India and
Palestine (1947–1948) to Egypt (1956).12 Instead, the argument is here made
that the use of the island as a clearing ground for Jewish refugees, disconnected
as it was from its projected use as a military base, played a considerable role in
ingraining the impression in official circles that Cyprus was an important link
within the British imperial structure. In turn, this impression, or new ethics of
tutelage, contributed to enhance the image of the island’s strategic indispensability. Incidentally, a close examination of the official terminology employed to
characterise Jewish migrants in the 1930s and the 1940s highlights the contribution of European colonial empires in the making of official categories applicable
to migrants to this day. The article follows a chronological progression: After a
brief survey of the debates generated by the arrival of refugees in Cyprus before
the First World War, the paper will contrast the experience of Jewish refugees
in the 1930s and throughout the Second World War to that of the so-called
‘Jewish illegal immigrants’ detained in the island between 1946 and 1949.
Refugees in Cyprus in the Context of Pre-First World War Ottoman
and European Upheavals
When under Ottoman rule, Cyprus often functioned as a place of forced or selfimposed exile for dignitaries who had fallen from grace with the Sublime Porte:
famously, the island hosted the Young Ottoman Namık Kemal between 1873
and 1876.13 But it was when the British took over the administration of
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A. RAPPAS
Cyprus in 1878 that the island became, in earnest, in the eyes of a number of
endangered European and Anatolian communities, a ‘place of refuge’, in the
words of Stavros Panteli.14 Lying at ‘about 600 miles east of the Greek mainland,
only 40 miles south of the Anatolian coast, and about 100 miles west of
Lebanon’15, Cyprus more than once served as a haven for refugees escaping
the convulsions shaking the Ottoman Empire and, later, Central and Eastern
Europe. The following brief review will only focus on two cases from the early
period of British rule—the Armenian and early Jewish migrations to Cypruswhich can reasonably be considered to involve refugees, namely persons
fleeing active persecution.16 It will leave aside foreign settlement schemes such
as the failed 1878–1880 project to create a Maltese colony in the island.17
The case of Armenian refugees is here quite exemplary. Armenian refugees
and survivors landed in Cyprus after each new wave of persecution in the
Ottoman Empire, from the Hamidian massacres of 1895 to the 1915 genocide
through the 1909 Adana massacre.18 Susan Pattie thus points out that the
1891 census shows 280 Armenians living in Cyprus, but that by 1901 that
figure had nearly doubled, to 517 as a result of the 1895 pogroms in Diyarbekir,
Aintab, Kilis, and elsewhere. Cyprus was chosen, Pattie argues, because it was
under British rule and as a result thought to be a safe haven close enough to
Cilicia, where refugees hoped they would return once tensions subsided.19
However as Pattie and Andrekos Varnava observe, many of these refugees
merely transited through Cyprus. Varnava reports that the British census of
1911 registered 511 Armenians, a number which merely doubled by the 1921
census peaking at 3,337 in the 1931 census.20 Armenian immigration to
Cyprus elicited strong reactions from Greek Cypriots particularly in the
context of the Greek defeat in Asia Minor in late 1922. Indeed British authorities
only authorised those Asia Minor refugees to settle in Cyprus who were British
subjects, demonstrably Cypriots or Armenians.21 ‘Greeks were only allowed to
land if persons were found willing to vouch for all their expenses.’22 In these conditions, the local press began to denounce alleged British plans to establish
Armenian colonies which would set off the ‘ethnological transformation of the
island.’ The weekly Alitheia [Truth] thus went on to assert that ‘[a]bove any
feeling of philanthropy must prevail and dominate that of self-preservation
and the feeling of racial security which revolts itself against this large-scale
Armenian colonization.’23
Before the First World War, Cyprus had also been considered as a place for
temporary and sometimes permanent settlement for Jewish refugees escaping
persecution in Europe. Yossi Ben-Artzi thus maps out the three attempts
made by different groups to settle Jews in rural sites between 1882 and 1935.
The first one was a short-lived attempt (1883–1884) by the Syrian Colonization
Fund (a Christian Protestant philanthropic organisation) which organised the
transfer of thirty-five Russian Jewish families (163 people) near the village of
Kouklia, in the Paphos district. This was followed by a 1897–1900 effort
THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
143
coordinated by the Rothschild-supported Ahavat Zion (London-based Russian
and Polish Jewish organisation) involving fifteen handpicked families to
develop a farm in Margo (Nicosia district). Finally, building on this latter
attempt, a plan was devised and supported between 1898 and 1935 by the
Jewish Colonization Association to develop farms in Margo, Kouklia and Cholmakchi: this involved 162 people in thirty-five farms but it eventually petered
out as the gates of Palestine were opened following the Balfour Declaration
and the British takeover of Palestine.24 Ben-Artzi argues convincingly that the
proximity of Palestine doomed these early attempts to failure as the island
could only truly serve as a ‘springboard’ to the Promised Land.25 And yet
their mere recurrence and the efforts invested by Jewish settlers in the island’s
economy—Jewish entrepreneurs are credited for being the first to establish
large mechanised factories in Larnaca and for developing the citrus industry
in Famagusta and Limassol26- imprinted Cyprus in the institutional memory
of Jewish organisations as a fallback location in the event of a closure of the
route to Palestine. It is then not surprising that, in the critical context of the
1930s marked by the Nazi takeover of power in Germany and British restrictions
on Jewish immigration to Palestine, these organisations would seek to reroute
Jewish refugees to the island.
From Jewish ‘Refugees’ to ‘Illegal Immigrants’, 1933–1945
In the 1930s Cyprus became a place where, for reasons both local and international, British imperial anxieties crystallized. In October 1931, Greek Cypriots,
motivated both by economic difficulties and political frustration revolted against
the British colonial administration in several parts of the island, a movement
that culminated with the burning down of the governor’s residence in Cyprus’
capital, Nicosia. British authorities used this event as a pretext to completely
reverse their policy in the island and worked to restrain and eventually eradicate
Greek but also Turkish nationalism. The ten alleged ringleaders of the revolt
were deported for life while immigration laws were tightened to pre-empt the
return of diaspora Cypriots considered politically subversive (nationalists and
communists). Representative politics was abolished as local authorities (municipal councils, village authorities) were thenceforth to be directly appointed by the
governor. Finally the press was subjected to draconian censorship while public
assemblies of more than five people without prior official authorisation were
prohibited.27 The severity of the measures adopted in Cyprus is symptomatic
of a broader sense of threat among British authorities regarding their Mediterranean possessions. Italy in particular aggressively challenged British supremacy
in the Middle Sea.28 At the same time as the British government sought to
enforce law and order in their Mediterranean possessions, the Nazi government
in Germany escalated their anti-Semitic policies thus swelling the number of
Jewish refugees.
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A. RAPPAS
The British government was officially in charge, since 1920, of the Mandate of
Palestine, where many European Jewish refugees aspired to settle. Given the stiff
opposition of Palestinian Arabs to Jewish settlement, Britain began accepting a
limited number of Jewish refugees in the metropole itself, and contemplated
relocating Jewish refugees throughout their Empire (Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, British Guiana).29 Cyprus was also considered, although British authorities reiterated, wary of the politically volatile situation in the island, that
this was in no way meant to become systematic policy. Jewish organisations
were receptive to the temporariness of this solution, themselves considering
Cyprus as a ‘stepping-stone to Zion’.30 Thus several delegations of German
scientists and public figures representing various international Jewish organisations visited the island throughout the 1930s to examine the possibility of establishing small settlements of Jews meant to exploit the untapped economic
potential of the island, particularly through the cultivation of citrus for
export.31 Crucial to these considerations was the fact that in Cyprus, land,
labour and water were cheaper than in Palestine and the island, being a
British colony, benefited from Imperial Preference.32 A major argument for
settlement in Cyprus was of course the proximity to Palestine.33 The passport
control officer of the British Embassy in Warsaw thus reported in September
1934 that he had received a very large number of applications from ‘Polish
Jews’ to emigrate to Cyprus but that, ‘after careful inquiries’, he was ‘convinced
that about 90% of the applicants applying to [him] … are only concerned in
using the Island as a stepping-stone to gain admission to Palestine’.34
Although the explorations were carried out by various organisations, they
were for the most part coordinated. This is salient in the involvement of
Norman Bentwich, who had officiated as Attorney-General for the British
High Commission in Palestine and who later on worked as an intermediary
between the Colonial Office and the Jewish organisations interested in
Cyprus. In the 1930s, he was thus writing on behalf of the United Jewish
Appeal, the American Joint Distribution Committee, and the American Palestine Campaign to the colonial secretary of Cyprus to inquire about the possibility
of settling a few Jewish families on the lands acquired by the ‘Jewish bodies’.35
Lands were purchased through intermediaries, for example in the Larnaca district (Perivolia, Meneou, Softades and Kiti for a total of 856 and 5/8 of
dönüm36). In 1934, Governor Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer reported that
‘two colonisation and plantation companies were formed (The Cyprus Palestine
Plantation Company LtD and the Cyprus Farming Company), which proceeded
to purchase large plots of land of orange groves near the towns of Larnaca,
Famagusta and Limassol.’ The total number of settlers at the time was estimated
at 200 near Famagusta and fifty around Larnaca.37
Reactions among Cypriots to the arrival of Jews was occasionally positive but
overwhelmingly negative, particularly in the politically repressive context of the
1930s when they felt that their views were ignored by the British government.
THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
145
Among the few positive reactions one can evoke the position of the inhabitants
of Paphos, the island’s westernmost and poorest district. Opposition there,
according to the district commissioner, only came from the Orthodox
Church, as other Paphiotes contemplated the economic opportunities which
citrus growing could represent for their district.38 On 11 August 1933, the
mayor of Paphos, Nicolaos Nicolaides and his council sent a letter to the president of the Pan-Israelitic Congress in Prague to encourage Jews to come and
settle in his district, which enjoyed ‘the best climate of all the island’ and
‘where the soil is fertile and suitable for all kinds of agriculture’.39 The Cyprus
Government supported such local initiatives provided they did not ‘deprive
existing inhabitants of their means of livelihood’.40 The Acting Director of
Land Registration and Surveys opined that an eclectic migration of Jewish
farmers experimented in scientific farming ‘would give a stimulus to orange
tree planting and w[ould] secure quick and cheap means of transport to all European markets where the Jews of Palestine have established most competent
agencies. Cypriot orange cultivators w[ould]profit by co-operation’.41
More often and elsewhere in the island however, the Greek Cypriot religious
and professional elite opposed Jewish immigration on the grounds that this was
part of a British demographic engineering policy meant to destroy the movement for enosis [the political project aiming at unifying Cyprus to Greece]. A
particularly virulent example of such disposition is illustrated by the following
extract from the 26 September 1933 editorial of the Nicosia-based newspaper
Protevousa [Capital]:
Jews as reported daily in the press flock together into Cyprus and purchase or negotiate
for the purchase of thousands of donums (sic) of land and that with the knowledge and
approval of Government. (…) The Government have expressly declared that they are
determined to make us understand that we are British citizens. They have omitted
though to tell us that they have also a plan for changing us into serfs of the Jews.42
Reflecting a rather typical form of anti-Semitism, part of the press welded economic concerns with racial bias, with a September 1938 article in Paratiritis
[Observer] suggesting that
Jewish brains and capital which have terrorized the Garman [sic] nation might just as
well be kept out of Cyprus because this small Island realizes that it cannot resist such a
powerful weight of cleverness, skill, ability and material force (…).43
Less strident criticism of Jewish migration, focusing on its potential economic
impact and stressing the island’s limited resources, was widely shared among
Greek Cypriots, from the Orthodox clergy to communist activists and from
the elites to the villagers.44 Hence on 19 March 1933, Archbishop Cyril III
sent a memorandum to the governor opposing Jewish migration on the
grounds that this would put a strain on the local economy and alter the
island’s demographic balance.45 The press reported constantly on the size of
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A. RAPPAS
the lands purchased by prospective Jewish settlers or settling agencies. Thus on
20 August 1936, the influential, Nicosia-based daily Eleftheria [Freedom] published a very detailed and district by district breakdown of immovable property
purchased by Jewish interests including land, trees, vineyards and orchards,
houses, wells, warehouses, as well as the price of all these purchases.46 Eventually, resistance to Jewish immigration became organised. On 18 August
1938, Eleftheria thus reported that professionals carried a petition—prepared
by Joannis Shoukouroglo, wholesale merchant of Nicosia- to the Nicosia
Municipal Council to ‘frustrate the infiltration and establishment of Jews in
Cyprus’ which received up to 200 signatures.47 In April 1939, a petition to the
Cyprus government against Jewish settlement gathered 5,000 signatures.48
What seems to be the undeniable common ground behind all these reactions
to Jewish immigration, beyond the differing levels of stridency in which they
were publicly enunciated, is a feeling of frustration against the colonial administration’s tendency to take decisions without consulting the local population.
This, in the eyes of these journalists and commentators, was another illustration
that Cypriots had been deprived of sovereignty over their island.
Paradoxically enough, the question of Jewish migration became the one issue
over which the views of the local elite and those of the Cyprus government converged. Striving as they were to restore their own vision of order in Cyprus,
which entailed the island’s depoliticisation, the colonial administration
remained attentive to these local reactions. They were wary lest this issue
might federate discontent and become a matter of local political fermentation.
British authorities therefore consistently turned down requests by various international Jewish agencies to consider large settlements in the island, although the
arguments they used to do so were always economic rather than political. And in
this, colonial authorities in Cyprus merely reproduced locally what
A. J. Sherman calls the ‘reigning economic wisdom in the 1930s [which] still
saw immigrants as unwanted competitors in drastically shrunken labormarkets rather than potential national assets (…).’49 In October 1934, an
official at Cyprus’ Colonial Secretariat wrote that:
[i]mmigration of Jewish labourers, even on a restricted scale, is not advisable as it
would prejudice local labour and cause illfeeling between the two elements [i.e. Jews
and Cypriots]. Whilst a small number of industrialists with sufficient capital behind
them would be rather helpful towards the industrial development of the colony and
would provide work to native labour.50
In other words, to settle in Cyprus, Jews, just like all foreigners wishing to
migrate to the island in the 1930s, needed to be not only self-sufficient, but
capable of improving the island’s economy. Indeed, foreigners needed to have
a minimum of £20 of allowance with them in cash or credit, be travelling first
or second class, or have a non-transferable ticket to some other country, or
possess a permit to enter Cyprus.51 In addition, in 1934, the Cyprus government
THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
147
began drafting a Land Law prohibiting the transfer of land to non-Cypriot aliens
without the authorisation of the Governor.52
For pauper Jewish refugees fleeing Europe, the treatment was significantly
different. At all times, the Cyprus Government attempted to keep track of the
number of Jews employed in Cypriot industries and the way in which Jewish
labour might constitute a threat to Cypriot labour. In late 1938, the Commissioner of Larnaca was thus asked to inquire into the Button Factory in
Larnaca which employed Jewish workers and where Cypriot workers had
recently been fired.53 Migration to Cyprus became even more difficult once
the Great Arab Revolt began in earnest in Palestine in 1936 as British authorities
tightened their immigration laws to the Mandate but also to Cyprus, anticipating
the possibility that the island might be used as a fallback destination.54 Notably,
the possibility of Jewish settlement in Cyprus constituted a major factor for the
evolution of the notion of British nationality as applicable to Cypriots. Law 14 of
1939 thus defined ‘native of the colony’ in the following way:
any person who is a British subject and (a) was born in the Colony or of parents who at
the time of his birth were ordinarily resident in the Colony; or (b) obtained the status
of a British Subject by virtue of the Cyprus (Annexation) Orders in Council 1914 to
1929, or by reason of the grant by the Governor of a certificate of naturalization
under the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, or (c) is the wife of a
person to whom any of the foregoing paragraphs applies not living apart from such
person under a decree of a competent court or of a deed of separation, (d) is a
child, step-child or adopted child having been adopted in a manner recognized by
the law, under the age of eighteen years, of a person to whom any of the foregoing
paragraphs applies.55
Under these conditions, around 400 handpicked European Jews only had found
sanctuary in Cyprus between 1933 and 1939.56 Hence in a somehwat deviated
way, Jewish migration became the one issue over which British authorities
restored some say in the conduct of public affairs to Cypriot opinion makers.
This would change drastically during the Second World War which forced the
British government to refine its language referring to migrants and the rights
associated with the new administrative categories designed to refer to them.
Two important events shifted British policy regarding Jews seeking refuge in
Cyprus: the May 1939 British ‘Palestine Statement of Policy’ (White Paper)
which, following the Great Arab Revolt (1936–1939) imposed stringent quotas
for Jews migrating to Palestine; and of course the beginning of the Second
World War which swelled the number of Jewish refugees.57 As the numbers
of Jews attempting to flee Europe for Palestine further increased at the time,
one consequence of the 1939 White Paper was that a greater number of them
began to be considered no longer as ‘refugees’ but as ‘illegal immigrants’.58
This discursive shift was very significant because it almost immediately conditioned British views on the possibility of providing temporary shelter to
Jewish refugees in Cyprus. Commenting on the governor of Cyprus’ resistance
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to pressures by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, an official at the Colonial
Office thus stated in June 1939 that:
I am entirely on the Acting-Governor’s side in this matter, if only on the ground that
we owe a greater duty to our Cypriot citizens than to alien Jews many of whom are not
even attempting to escape from persecution. If disease breaks out on these ships it will
no doubt be a terrible thing, but presumably the crew will dump their cargo into the sea
and I cannot see that any responsibility can be attached to us because the immigrants
fail to survive what they well know to be a dangerous adventure.59
Such characterisations were insensitive to the fact that Jews attempting to escape
from Europe had fallen prey to what Michael Marrus calls a ‘black market in
refugees, often run by Greek or Bulgarian gangsters, encouraged by the Nazis
who were then trying to make Europe Judenrein [free of Jews according to the
Nazi terminology].’60 They were all the more crude in view of continuous
reports from different sources on the dramatic conditions in which Jewish refugees were travelling from Southeast Europe. In July 1939, Professor Irene
C. Soltau of the American University of Beirut, wrote that 750 passengers
crammed in a tiny coastal collier named Frossoula with a Greek crew and carrying a Panama flag, with little food, and brackish water had been held for more
than fifteen days in quarantine in Beirut.61 However British authorities, convinced that ‘[n]ews travels very quickly in Jewish circles’, did not waiver: they
believed that a single exception made to their draconian prohibition of Jewish
immigration to Cyprus would mark the beginning of an uncontrollable flow.62
This uncompromising attitude loosened somewhat with the beginning of the
Second World War as the number of European refugees, Jews and non-Jews,
fleeing the Nazi advance in different parts of the continent increased exponentially and the British government busied itself to find for them places of temporary settlement. In November 1942, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
informed the governor of Cyprus of his intention to use Cyprus ‘as a clearing
area for Jewish refugees’ in groups of 400–500 people at a time to be removed
elsewhere every time that quota was reached.63 In 1942 Jews fleeing Axis-occupied Europe had few choices in terms of destination: Many fled to Turkey and
the British government unofficially adopted the policy of allowing those among
them who made it to Istanbul to proceed to Palestine.64 Conditions for Jews in
Turkey were difficult at the time following the German-Turkish Non-Aggression
Pact compounded by discriminatory measures adopted against non-Muslim
minorities such as the 1942 capitation levy (varlık vergisi).65 Concurrently, by
March 1943, 4,650 Greeks had found refuge in Cyprus after the Nazi invasion
in Greece in April-May 1941.66 Colonial authorities feared that a heightened
presence of Greek refugees in Cyprus would encourage enosis while at the
same time ‘the provision of asylum to large numbers of non-Greek refugees,
when Greece itself is in such dire straits, would equally tend to cause disturbing
political reactions-particularly if the refugees are Jews. In Cyprus there is very
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149
strong popular sentiment which is hostile to Jews’.67 The situation became more
complicated after 1943 when operations in the then German-held Dodecanese—
an Italian possession between 1912 and 1943- forced Greek residents, particularly from Kastellorizo, to migrate.68 By early December 1943, Cyprus had
received 2,400 Dodecanesian refugees.69 A tense exchange ensued between the
Colonial Office and Cyprus on the one hand trying to convince the High Commissioner of Palestine on the other to accept them all on both political and
humanitarian grounds as Cyprus was said to be overwhelmed with refugees in
spite of the assistance of the United Nations Middle East Relief and Refugee
Administration (MERRA).70 Palestine eventually had to oblige and accept
some 8,350 of Dodecanesian refugees although it protested that ‘[a]ny delay
on the admission of [Jewish] refugees from Egypt to Palestine owing to the
admission of ‘Aryan’—i.e. mostly Polish and Dodecanesian- refugees is bound
to have the most unfortunate reaction on the Jewish community … ’.71
British authorities took pains to ensure that the numerous refugees transiting
through Cyprus were properly identified and assigned to categories which it was
felt should under no circumstances mix. This intense classificatory exercise followed a number of rationales and had to take into account the predicament of
refugees often bereft of papers. If distinguishing Poles was done on the basis of
nationality, it was the special circumstances of the arrival of Jews that set them
apart from what British authorities problematically called (although always in
quotation marks) ‘Aryan’ refugees. In the case of Greeks, a distinction was fleetingly envisaged between ‘Dodecanesians’, legally Italian subjects some of whom
were suspected of fascist sympathies, from ‘free Greeks in existing MERRA
camps’ which in essence designated all Greek citizens.72 In establishing these categories of refugees, British authorities were first and foremost seeking to preserve
as much flexibility for themselves as possible in settling the future of the territories under their control. This was one way in which they outlined a
fledgling typology distinguishing between territories which it was understood
would only be temporarily occupied, such as the Aegean islands including the
Dodecanese,73 and others whose future would be discussed within the frame
of the general peace settlement, namely Cyprus and Palestine. Cyprus
however, in the management of the refugee crisis, had already proven to the
Colonial Office what George Horton Kelling calls its ‘utility as an outwork of
the Levant’.74 In effect, Cyprus would continue to be instrumental in managing
the flow of Jewish refugees and Holocaust survivors en route to Palestine for
some years after the end of the war.
The Time of the ‘Detainees’, 1946–1949
In August 1946, still bound by the official quota of Jewish migrants to Palestine
they had defined before the Second World War, the British government designated Cyprus as the place for the temporary internment of Jewish refugees
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seeking to clandestinely reach the Mandate.75 As Arieh J. Kochavi and Branka
Arrivé write, this decision intervened right after, and in the context of, the
bombing in Jerusalem of the King David Hotel by the Jewish paramilitary organisation Irgun on 22 July 1946, which cost the lives of 91 people, most of them
British officials.76 On 12 August, the Cyprus Government passed a law authorising the Governor of Cyprus to detain any person designated as an ‘illegal
immigrant’ and giving him the right to set up and run the camps or delegate
the setting up and management of the camps.77 Plans were laid out for the construction of camps with the help of military authorities the cost of which, it was
decided, would be borne by the Government of Palestine, to the exasperation of
the Palestinian Arab leadership.78 Detention camps were opened on 14 August
1946 for illegal Jewish migrants to Palestine at Karaolos near Famagusta and
Xylotombou in the Larnaca district. Here again the power of categorisation is
illustrated in the fact that treatment of these migrants was a natural consequence
of their designation as ‘illegal immigrants’. Hence British authorities refused to
consider alternative characterisations such as the one enjoined by the British
Chief Rabbi’s Emergency Council of ‘displaced persons under British care’.79
Complications around the detainment of Jews in Cyprus arose from the fact
that it touched on four major policy issues. The first such issue concerned the
magnitude of the movement as official figures for the number of refugees had
to be constantly revised upwards. Intimately connected to this was the
concern of Cypriot reactions to the setting up of camps in the island. Another
difficulty had to do with the political cost for Britain of detaining in camps refugees who for the most part had spent extensive periods of time in, and survived,
Nazi camps. Consequently and fourthly, there arose the question of how to
officially designate the detainees. Most of them originated in one of the camps
which were set up for ‘Displaced Persons’ according to the official postwar terminology crafted by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
(created by 44 countries in 1943),80 and were considered as such by the
United Nations, at least until the moment they took to sea. But once they set
out clandestinely to travel by sea to Palestine, they became ‘illegal immigrants’
in the eyes of the Colonial Office likely to threaten the political balance
British authorities were trying to preserve in the Mandate between the conflicting priorities of the Arabs and the Jews: such differences of nomenclature were
consequential as they conditioned, as mentioned before, official responses to
refugees’ claims for entitlements.
It was made clear from the outset that Jewish refugees would not be held
indefinitely in Cyprus but that the island would serve as a clearing ground,
authorising each month 750 of them to head on to Palestine.81 While this
quota reinforced the organic link between the Mandate and Cyprus, it also provoked a bottleneck in that it proved too low with regard to the ever-expanding
number of arrivals in the island. By November 1946 there were already 7,000
refugees.82 In March 1947, officials believed that the Cyprus camps capacity of
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151
20,000 would be quickly overrun as an estimated 30,000 Jewish refugees were
concentrated near ports of embarkation in Europe (mainly in France and
even more so in Italy).83 In addition, Aliya Bet, the organisation of clandestine
Jewish migration to Palestine, was said to have at its disposal 30 ships (25 ready
and 5 being prepared) with a capacity of 24,700 passengers.84 By April 1947 the
number of Jewish refugees thought to be seeking ways to migrate to Palestine
had reached 35,000, most of them concentrated in Italy (an estimated
minimum of 22,500), France (8,000) and Belgium (4,000).85 By 1948, Cyprus
had three sets of camps, each comprising 12 camps, mostly tented but also
hutted, able to host a ceiling figure of 34,000 persons.86
The local press unanimously decried the detention of Jews in Cyprus,
although newspapers did so along rationales which reflected their different political inclinations. The Greek Cypriot right and the Orthodox Church argued
that whatever capacity Cyprus had to welcome refugees needed to be reserved
for Greeks and that Jews should only be allowed to stay in the island for the
time necessary to make arrangements for them to proceed to Palestine.87 This
line of argument sometimes reactivated an anti-Semitic rhetoric, as when the
nationalist lawyer Savvas Loizides wrote in March 1946 that the ‘wandering
Jews’ were an ‘exploitative and destructive’ force.88 Although obviously not
sharing the Greek nationalist articles’ feelings about the necessity to welcome
Greeks in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot press was also very critical of Jewish
settlement in the island. It voiced concerns about the economic pressure this
would bring to bear on Cypriots and often did so reactivating anti-Semitic
tropes. Dr. Fazıl Küçük, founder of the newspaper Halkın Sesi [The People’s
Voice] and of the Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus
(Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlık Kurumu-KATAK) thus opined in March 1947
that ‘there has never been a local community which had benefited from the presence of Jews’, as the latter formed a ‘selfish tribe working and toiling only for its
own interest’.89 A year earlier, one of Halkın Sesi’s regular contributors, writing
under the nickname Yavuz, asked ‘[w]hat can we [the Cypriots] be if not a snack
for the Jews who managed to economically destroy the Germans, one of the
wisest nations of them all’?90
Reactions also came from the left, although they were motivated by different
concerns. Anexartitos (the Independent), an influential Nicosia-based Greek
Cypriot daily close to the island’s communist party AKEL (the Progressive
Party of Working People), usually adopted a moderate tone.91 One of the
party’s most prominent members, Fifis Ioannou, suggested however that
official declarations as to the temporariness of the Jews’ stay in the island
should not be taken at face value. The exiguity of the quota of those refugees
allowed to proceed to Palestine was such that some of them were bound to
remain in Cyprus. Such a prospect, the author went on, would put tremendous
stress on the Cypriot population as ‘our land, with its poor agricultural production, and the almost complete absence of any industry worthy of that
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name, cannot cover the needs of thousands of Jews whom one fine morning it
was decided, without our people even being consulted, that they should be
shipped to Cyprus.’ Adopting what could be termed an Arabophile position,
Ioannou put the question of Jewish refugees in a broader context, suggesting
that their migration to Palestine should be stopped, that Palestine should gain
its independence as a unitary Arab and Jewish state and that conditions
should be made viable for Jews to remain in Europe.92
Aside from common concerns regarding the economic impact of the detainment of Jews in Cyprus and the occasional overlap of anti-Semitic biases, what
fundamentally bound reactions in Cypriot newspapers of different political persuasions was a preoccupation with sovereignty and concretely with the right to
decide who could be authorised to live in the island. Again as in the 1930s, this
was a concern the legitimacy of which the colonial administration tacitly rather
than explicitly, acknowledged. As a result they constantly pressed the Colonial
Office to involve other British colonies in welcoming Jewish refugees.93 The
camp of Athlit, twenty kilometres from Haifa in Palestine itself, was reopened
in March 1947 with a capacity of 2,250.94 British authorities considered this
an unsatisfactory solution as it basically allowed Jewish ‘illegal immigrants’ to
set foot in the Mandate. Yet the governors of all other colonies resisted calls
from the British government to accept Jewish ‘illegal immigrants’, bringing up
arguments which ranged from the dangers of increasing Zionist activism in
regions where Jews were already settled, the possibility of political and racial tensions with the local population, and, in almost all cases, the scarcity of resources.
The governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, was emblematic in this respect, characterising the Secretary of State’s request that some of the migrants be relocated
in his colony as ‘exceedingly unwelcome’ and worrying that he might have to
‘exhibit to the African population (which has had quite enough to digest)
these people, who are after all the drags of the ghettos of Europe’.95 Instead,
Mitchell proposed to dispatch the immigrants in the islands of the Pacific:
‘You can put the whole lot on Vanua Levu in Fiji’ because ‘[d]istance is of no
real importance; once people are on ships they can go on steaming’.96 The Colonial Office further envisioned the possibility of ‘borrowing’ an Italian island—
Lampedusa or Pantellaria were mentioned- as a temporary landing ground for
Jewish illegal immigrants. But the Foreign Office argued that this was only practicable if the guarding duties were assigned to Italian officials because they were
‘anxious to avoid having to … keep British troops in Italy after the 90 day period
[as] this will only encourage the Russians to look for an excuse to keep their
troops in the Balkan countries.’97 Facing the urgency of the matter, Cyprus
and its extension, the Palestinian camp of Athlit, were retained as the only
viable solutions.
Another strategy British authorities deployed was that of attempting to
control the flow of Jews upstream, namely by putting pressure both on Jewish
organisations which managed the illegal passages to Palestine and on the
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153
European countries where the traffic originated.98 Yet most immigrants when
embarking were in possession of correct passports and visas valid for entry
into such countries as Costa Rica and Panama while the ships were registered
under the flags of these countries. This in effect made it legally impossible to
deport back the immigrants to the countries they came from. Those refugees
who did not have the proper documents destroyed the ones in their possession
once on board one of the ships making it impossible to trace their place of
origin.99
While all costs related to camp life in Cyprus were covered by the High Commission of Palestine, organising daily life in the camps still raised three major
challenges for British authorities: ensuring the material, intellectual and spiritual
welfare of the detainees; obtaining sufficient guards and providing them with the
appropriate prerogatives; and finally, developping a public relations policy. 2,200
troops were recruited from the British army to take up guarding duties, while the
sustenance of detainees was ensured by British authorities in collaboration with
Jewish organisations, such as the Jewish Agency or the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC). By March 1948, 120 workers of the AJDC were
working full-time in the camps, assisted by 1,800 detainees and were able to dispense a daily diet of 2,500 calories per adult.100 Education of the youth was
entrusted to the Rutenberg Foundation of Haifa. Spiritual welfare, in the form
of ritual and religious services, was provided by the British Chief Rabbi’s Emergency Council and the Government of Palestine.101 While practically collaborating with British authorities, Jewish organisations, were in fact, as Arrivé
points out, preparing detainees for life in the future state of Israel.102
The issue of the prerogatives given to the camp guards was closely related to
that of public relations. On the one hand British authorities were adamant in
considering Jews in Cypriot camps as detainees, people who broke the law by
attempting to illegally migrate to Palestine and therefore as deserving a
different, and harsher, treatment than the one meted out to other ‘displaced
persons’. On the other hand, aware that most of them were Nazi camp survivors,
British authorities were particularly concerned about damaging accusations of
ill-treatment at a time when world opinion was trying to grapple with the magnitude and the atrocity of the genocide of European Jews. This dilemma became
particularly acute when the question was raised of the amount of force guards
were entitled to use against potential escapees. Would the use of deadly force
be allowed? Initially reluctant to authorise it, the British government yielded
to pressure from the governor of Cyprus and the military authorities who
made the use of force the uncompromising point of their involvement in the
management of Jewish refugees.103 Considering how damaging Jewish casualties
could be for their image, the British government decided however to precede
their decision with a public announcement which, it was hoped, would contextualise it and make it more acceptable. Hence on 13 August 1946, the British
Prime Minister issued a public declaration condemning the clandestine
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organisation of the mass arrival of Jews in Palestine, known colloquially as the
‘underground railway to Palestine’ and referring to ‘evidence that the terrorist
element among the Jews has been reinforced from the ranks of the illegal
immigrants’.104
Military authorities charged with guarding the camps were constantly monitoring acts of open or tacit resistance among detainees and commented on
them in terms that highlighted their own frustration with what they perceived
as ungratefulness on the part of the detainees. In November 1946, Major
General Atkinson of the War Office thus described the refugees as being of
‘an extremely low type’, who ‘remained surly and uncooperative’. He resented
their policy of ‘passive resistance’ which resulted in ‘transforming what was
originally a clean and well found camp into an insanitary eyesore detrimental
alike to health and comfort’. This in turn, he opined, provided ‘material for
anti-British propaganda’.105 The fact that British officials preferred to attribute
such attitudes to the alleged cultural and moral shortcomings of their hosts or
ill-will on their part, may be illustrative of the limitations of their training as
civil servants, constantly preoccupied with performance. Rarely would they
acknowledge that such acts of passive resistance resulted from the dejection
of persons who saw no end to their condition as captives, bouncing from
one camp to another. But while instances of passive resistance could be frustrating, British authorities were much more concerned with the militarisation
of the camps in Cyprus.
Atkinson thus went on to report that the ‘immigrants’ were mostly ‘healthy
young adults’, who organised themselves in groups by nationality, with each
group appointing a leader and with group leaders then electing a camp
leader.106 Later reports highlighted the organic connections between acts of
open resistance in Cyprus and in Palestine. On 13 August 1946 a Kol Israel broadcast called for the Jews of Haifa to break the curfew and proceed to the port to help
the immigrants, an initiative which resulted in several arrests made and one death
and several injuries in Hadar Hacarmel.107 A June 1947 report stated that:
[t]he Hebrew and Zionist flags fly side by side above the tents and an assault course is
in daily use: the immigrants openly practice grenade throwing, various forms of drill as
well as visual signaling to and from the other camp. The place is, in fact, a kind of training base for the terrorist groups in Palestine and drafts of trained terrorists leave every
month under the 750 arrangement after successfully completing the course (I believe
the arrangement is that the 750 are chosen to some extent by the various Jewish authorities and not entirely in accordance with the “first in, first out,” arrangements).108
In an insightful article, Daniel Cohen shows how humanitarian agencies and
Jewish organisations contributed, willingly and unwittingly, to developing
among refugees and Holocaust survivors grouped in camps a ‘Zionist collective
consciousness’.109 In Cyprus, by October 1948, the situation had become tense
enough to lead to the shooting of nineteen-year-old escapee Schlomo
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155
Chaimsohn by British guards. This immediately led to a twenty-four hour
hunger strike in all Jewish camps in Cyprus.110
As this latter incident illustrates, things came to a head between the time
when the British government decided in February 1947 to take up the question
of Palestine to the United Nations and the declaration of the state of Israel on 14
May 1948. Upon learning of the British referral of the Palestine issue to the UN,
Jewish organisations (the Jewish Agency, Revisionist organisations such as the
Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe led by Peter
Bergson, the Zionist Organization of America) decided to double down on
their efforts to exfiltrate European Jews to Palestine.111 At that time the ‘illegal
immigration organization’ was said to be close to having at its disposal a
grand total of 37 ships with a capacity of 42,450.112 To tackle this challenge,
British authorities in Cyprus and in London appointed in September 1947 a
retired Indian Civil Service official, Sir Godfrey Collins, as ‘Commissioner,
Jewish Camps’—or ‘Comjew Famagusta’ according to the ungainly name of
his telegraphic address- with privileged access rights to the High Commissioner
of Palestine, the General Headquarters Middle East Land Forces, the relevant
departments of the Cypriot government (Medical and Health Services, Passport
Branch, Customs, Post Office), Jewish organisations and finally the Secretary of
State for the Colonies.113 This can be considered as the moment when the detention of Jews in Cyprus is externalised or outsourced, in any event officially
acknowledged as temporary in view of the pending independence of Palestine.
Indeed from that moment on, the priority of British authorities in the Cyprus
camps was to make sure that their gradual release of Jewish inmates did not fuel
the growing conflict between Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Particularly, a UN
Security Council Resolution on 29 May 1948 called explicitly on all governments
not to introduce fighting personnel, namely men of fighting age, in Palestine,
Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen.114 But
with the progression of the Arab-Israeli war, more and more British government
departments began to call for the termination of the Cyprus camps. Anxious to
release the soldiers employed in the Jewish camps, military authorities questioned the use of keeping the ‘illegal immigrants’ in Cyprus while Jews were airlifted from Europe, particularly Czechoslovakia, to Israel where they
immediately integrated combat units without any apparent opposition from
the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte.115 Writing at a time when debates
over the establishment of constitutional government deeply polarised the
island,116 the Governor of Cyprus was quick to agree, highlighting that the continued presence of Jews in Cyprus ‘raise the cost of living and prevent a return to
normal price levels’ and ‘constitute a constant threat to the political tranquility
of the island’. He ventured to add that the British government should not ‘worry
too much about what the Arabs would say’ as they had ‘lost out any way and the
Jewish State ha[d] come to stay’.117 On 18 January 1949, the British Cabinet took
the decision to authorise the full release of all inmates in Cyprus; the last inmates
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were evacuated on 11 February of that year.118 One of the deeper, if implicit,
meanings of the evacuation of the camps was that while Palestine fought its
way towards an uncertain future but one independent from Britain, the
British government was adamant in confirming its sovereignty in Cyprus.
Conclusion: Jewish Refugees, Cyprus and the Cyclical Lives of
European Migration Policies
On 2 March 1943, shortly before he retired from his post as British Ambassador
to Greece, Sir Michael Palairet wrote to the Colonial Office that he believed the
British occupied Dodecanese should be handed over to Greece at the end of the
war as ‘a reward on which Greece has set her heart and to which her gallantry
and fidelity to her allies seem to entitle her’. He further added that ‘the eventual
cession of Cyprus to Greece would be an act of generosity and wisdom which
would (like our cession of the Ionian islands) ensure us the undying gratitude
and friendship of a very gallant ally’.119 If Palairet’s views on the Dodecanese
were unanimously shared at the Foreign Office, the idea of ceding Cyprus as
well was then fast receding among officials of the British government, particularly at the Colonial Office. Indeed, by the end of the war the island’s fate had
very much been sealed. This was due not so much to any official declaration
to the effect that Britain would not cede the island; such a statement, in 1949,
was still six years away.120 Rather this was related to the fact that during the
war Cyprus had acquired what may be termed a new imperial function linked
to its geopolitical position, not yet as an operational military base but more as
a convenient hub in transnational migrations and resettlement of refugees
within and without the Empire. These wartime and post-war experiences were
then the crucible where a new ethics of tutelage for Cyprus was developed.
The historiography rigthfully highlights that the relaxation of the post-1931
authoritarian regime in the island had been made necessary by the ideals in
the name of which the Allies claimed to be fighting and the Greek war effort
at the sides of Britain. But this paper suggested that crucial to this change of
policy was also Jewish transmigration in Cyprus which colonial authorities
sought to stem by invoking the rights of Cypriots. In doing so, the Cyprus government were not advocating for the restoration of constitutional liberties in the
island; as has been pointed out in the historiography of Cyprus, colonial officials
in Nicosia, as opposed to some of their couterparts in London, systematically
opposed such a prospect.121 Rather they were concerned not to create for themselves additional problems in an island in which they knew the political context
to be tense. But by regularly transmitting to the Colonial Office press clippings
illustrating local opposition to Jewish transmigration in Cyprus, they unwittingly
legitimated the islanders’ political views, at least those which served their interests. As we have seen, Cypriots by and large decried the detention of Jews in their
island. In doing so they invoked a wide array of arguments, from the Greek
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157
Cypriot right’s ethnological preoccupations to those, more economicallyminded, of the communists which in turn revealed different, and potentially
competing, visions of territorial sovereignty in the island. Beyond their differences however, such visions were almost always rooted in autochthony, a fact
all the more interesting considering that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot right were irredentist and defended the union of Cyprus with Greece
or Turkey respectively.
Invoking the rights of Cypriots was also meant for colonial authorities—
however paradoxical this may seem- to reassert British sovereignty on the
island. Before the opening of military bases in the island was decided, Cyprus
had demonstrated its indispensability in the defence of British interests in the
Levant. This clarification must be seen as emerging, to some extent, through
the Jewish refugee question and the organic link it created between Cyprus
and Palestine. Throughout the periods under scrutiny in this article, from the
interwar period to the post-war, the terms of migration of Jews in Cyprus
were constantly redefined but always in a direction increasingly underscoring
its temporariness: the island, a British colony, would never be but a stopover
for Jews on their way to Palestine, a British mandate teetering towards an unpredictable future.
Crucial to this confirmation of sovereignty was the crafting of ever more
precise instruments of classification separating people entitled to remain in
the colony from those clearly pinned down as merely transiting through it. As
was mentioned, the redefinition in 1939 of British nationality as applicable to
Cyprus must be seen in connection not only to the local political context but
also to the arrival of Jews in the island who were briefly viewed as refugees
seeking asylum in the interwar period before they were designated as ‘illegal
immigrants’ who had to be detained. The way this categorisation of people
affected Cypriots became obvious during the Second World War, when
Cyprus hosted Greek and other European refugees in addition to Jews.
If official classifications may be seen as statements of policy—here the
decision of the British government to retain Cyprus after the war- then this
article also wanted to highlight the crucial importance of Empire for their elaboration. While the entire European continent was affected by mass refugee
movements during and after the Second World War, the terminology used to
characterise people on the move was there, as opposed to the colonies, relatively
simple. Colonies became the crucible where more refined distinctions were made
and technologies were invented which would later be used in Europe itself. It is
in effect remarkable to notice the permanency of the entire framework applicable
to this day to forcibly displaced people. To ward off Jews from coming to their
colonies, the governors of Cyprus, Kenya, Tanganyika, or Fiji made a point of
referring to them as ‘illegal immigrants’ who would bring an unbearable pressure
to bear on their limited economic resources. Occasionally they highlighted the
alleged links between Jewish refugees with the terrorism of paramilitary
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organisation such as Irgun or the Stern Gang. In devising their policies they
remained at all times wary of both local reactions and their image with the international opinion, perhaps more sensitive to the predicament of refugees. The
determination of refugees themselves to escape such predicament was then, as
it is now, neatly illustrated in some of their practices, such as the destruction
of their identity papers. Finally Jewish clandestine migration to Palestine in
the immediate post-war, draws the contours of a still relevant geography of
detainment of migrants, with the debate about using Lampedusa being here particularly striking. It is precisely by highlighting such permanency that this article
aimed to situate not only the beginning of Cyprus’ use to the British Empire, but
also its importance to the broader post-war history of migration.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, 300.
Smith and Stucki, “Concentration Camps,” 427 and 431.
For example, Hadari, Second Exodus and Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics.
Marrus, The Unwanted, 274.
For a very interesting discussion contrasting the designations used by British authorities on the one hand, Jewish refugees and organisations on the other, see Arrivé,
“Les camps d’internement,” 18–25.
Panteli, Place of Refuge.
Ben-Artzi, ‘Jewish Rural Settlement’ and ibid., “Historical Perspectives.”
Kazamias and Antoniou, Historical Perspectives.
Arrivé, “Les camps d’internement.”
This is the case in Branka Arrivé’s work. See also Ofer, “Holocaust Survivors,” and
Zalashik and Davidovitch, “Measuring adaptability.”
A definition of territorium nullius in Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property, 271–301.
On the hopes of the British government to convert Cyprus into a strategic base upon
their occupation of the island, see Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II, 8; Lee, Great
Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy, 77; Hill, A History of Cyprus, 272; Brunswik, Traité de Berlin, 122; Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of
Cyprus, 5–6; Markides, The Rise and Fall, 1. See also Medlicott, The Congress of
Berlin, 21. On the disillusion over Cyprus’ real usefulness to the British Empire
which swiftly replaced previous high expectations, see Varnava, British Imperialism
in Cyprus, passim. In the same vein see Georghallides, History of Cyprus, 13–4 and
Dodd, The History and Politics, 3. Heraclidou partly challenges this impression of
utter uselessness in her “Cyprus’s Non-Military Contribution,” 194–7. On Cyprus
regaining imperial value following the Second World War and in the context of
British imperial retreat, see Stefanidis, Isle of Discord, 117; Louis, The British
Empire in the Middle East, 211, 213 and 223; Holland, Britain and the Revolt in
Cyprus, 15; ibid., Blue-Water Empire, 280, 308; ibid., “Never, Never Land,” 150;
ibid., “NATO and the Struggle for Cyprus,” 35; Holland and Markides, The British
and the Hellenes, 208; Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 72, 80; Stergiou, “British Military Bases in Cyprus,” 288. On Cyprus strategic value nowadays owing to its two
Sovereign Base Areas, see Constantinou and Richmond, “The Long Mile of
Empire,” 78.
Çiçek, Young Ottomans, 43.
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159
14. Panteli, Place of Refuge.
15. Markides, The Rise and Fall, 1.
16. Danny Goldman offers a useful review of the different refugee groups that sought
refuge in Cyprus during British rule, “Famagusta’s Historic Detention and Refugee
Camps.”
17. Hook, “Mr. Fenech’s Colony” and Georghallides, History of Cyprus, 39.
18. Demetriou, “Struck by the Turks.” See also Pattie, Faith in History, 44.
19. Pattie, Faith in History, 47, 54, 60. See also Loizos, “Ottoman half-lives,” 248.
20. Varnava, “Imperialism First, the War Second,” 535. See also Pattie, Faith in
History, 55.
21. Πατρίς [Fatherland], 10 October 1922, Πατρίς, 24 October 1922, Αλήθεια [Truth], 12
November 1922.
22. Georghallides, History of Cyprus, 231, footnote 1.
23. Αλήθεια, 22 February 1924.
24. Ben-Artzi, “Jewish Rural Settlement.”
25. Ben-Artzi “Historical Perspectives,” 8.
26. Mathopoulou “Pioneers,” 32–4.
27. Rappas, Cyprus in the 1930s, 1–4.
28. Mussolini, “Discorso”; Rappas, “The Transformation,” 482–3.
29. Sherman, Island Refuge, 173.
30. Panteli, Place of Refuge, 115. See also Ben-Artzi, “Jewish Rural Settlement in Cyprus,”
361.
31. Norman Bentwich, United Jewish Appeal, Joint Distribution Committee and the
American Palestine Campaign, to AB Wright, Chief Secretary’s Office, Cyprus, May
1st, 1935; Colonial Secretary to Norman Bentwich, 1 June 1935; Norman Bentwich,
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from
Germany, London, 28 June 1935, to Colonial Secretary, Cyprus, FCO 141/2389, The
National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA).
32. Arthur Dawe, Colonial Office, to AB Wright, 11 July 1933, FCO 141/2389, TNA. Land
prices in open market ranged between £5 to £120 per acre according to soil conditions
and availability of water. Same file, Brochure for Visitors and Settlers, GPO, Nicosia,
February 1934, p. 3.
33. The Lloyd-Triestino weekly service connected Jaffa to Brindisi and Trieste via Cyprus
(Larnaca), Brochure for Visitors and Settlers, GPO, Nicosia, February 1934, p. 1, FCO
141/2389, TNA.
34. L. Hamilton Stokes, Passport Control Office, British Embassy, Warsaw, to The Commissioner for Migration and Statistics, Government of Palestine, 24 September 1934,
FCO 141/2389, TNA.
35. Norman Bentwich, on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal of the Joint Distribution
Committee and the American Palestine Campaign, to AB Wright, Cyprus, 1 May
1935, FCO 141/2389, TNA.
36. Commissioner of Larnaca’s report, 19 July 1933, FCO 141/2389, TNA. One Ottoman
dönüm equals 919.3 square metres, see Kark and Frantzman, “Abdülhamid’s Heirs,”
127–8.
37. Panteli, Place of Refuge, 110–1.
38. Acting Governor to British Consulate, Smyrna, 14 August 1933, FCO 141/2389, TNA.
39. Nicolaos Nicolaides, Mayor of Paphos and his council, letter to the President of the
Pan-Israelitic Congress, Prague, 11 August 1933, enclosure to Commissioner of
Paphos to Colonial Secretary, 14 August 1933, FCO 141/2389, TNA.
40. Illegible minute, 12 January 1934, FCO 141/2391, TNA.
160
A. RAPPAS
41. Acting Director of L.R.and Surveys, minute, 24 August 1933, FCO 141/2391, TNA.
42. Editorial extract from the daily Nicosia Greek newspaper ‘Protevousa’ of 26 September
1933 entitled “A rush of Jews,” FCO 141/2389, TNA.
43. Extract from the Press Officer’s Report Dated the 2nd September 1938 (Paratiritis
1.9.38 “The Jews”), FCO 141/2618, TNA.
44. K. Siakallis, Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ [New Cypriot Guardian], 8 September 1938;
Κυπριακός Τύπος [Cypriot Press], 28 March 1935; Petros Liberis, Εσπερινή
[Evening Standard], 25 August 1935.
45. Φωνή της Κύπρου [The Voice of Cyprus], 25 March, 1933.
46. Ελευθερία, 20 August 1936. An article of the same vein was published by the left-wing,
Nicosia-based daily Anexartitos on 21 April 1939.
47. Extract from the Press Officer’s Report dated 18th August 1938 Eleftheria (18.8.38)
‘The Jews’, FCO 141/2618, TNA.
48. Petros Liberis, Εσπερινή, 20 April 1939. During the interwar period, and more specifically the 1930s, Cyprus hosted not only European Jews but other people fleeing the
tumult of the European interwar period. It is interesting in this regard to note the
absence of Cypriot reactions regarding a group of Cretan political leaders who
sought refuge in the island after they led a failed coup d’Etat in 1938 against the
Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas. Facing the death penalty in Greece, the coupists
were allowed by British authorities to remain in Cyprus provided they signed a
declaration pledging their non-involvement in politics. See Governor to Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 3 November 1938, FCO 141/2614, TNA.
49. Sherman, Island Refuge, 6.
50. Illegible minute, 20 October 1934, FCO 141/2391, TNA.
51. Passport Guidance for Police Officers, brochure, GPO, Nicosia, 1933, p. 2, FCO 141/
2389, TNA.
52. Memorandum on possibilities of Jewish settlement in Cyprus, enclosure to Governor
Palmer’s confidential dispatch to Parkinson, 2 February 1934, FCO 141/2389, TNA.
53. OR Arthur, Commissioner, Larnaca, to Colonial Secretary, 18 November 1938, FCO
141/2618, TNA.
54. Mathopoulou, “Pioneers,” 38.
55. The Statute Laws of Cyprus No. 14 of 1939: A Law to Amend the Immigration Laws,
1936 to 1938, 24 July 1939, FCO 141/2552, TNA.
56. Panteli, Place of Refuge, 117.
57. Sherman, Island Refuge, 222.
58. Memorandum dictated by Mr. J.G. Hibbert, Colonial Office, 26 May 1939, CO 67/302/
14, TNA.
59. Minute Colonial Office, D. and A., 8 June 1939, CO 67/302/14, TNA.
60. Marrus, The Unwanted, 275. See also Sherman, Island Refuge, 235–6.
61. Irene C. Soltau, American University of Beirut, letter to Lady Astor, 25 July 1939,
Enclosure to said letter: Daniel Oliver, Director of the Daniel and Emily Oliver Orphanage, Ras el Mten, Roger Soltau, professor of History, American University of Beirut,
Irene C. Soltau, vice-president of the Child protection society, “Memorandum on the
Frassola Refugees, Beirut, July 1939,” CO 67/302/14, TNA.
62. JG Hibbert CO minute, 8 July 1939, CO 67/303/1, TNA.
63. Secretary of State for the Colonies, Cypher Telegram, N° 508, Secret, to Governor of
Cyprus, 28 November 1942, “Problem of Jews attempting to reach Palestine as
illegal immigrants,” CO 67/328/3, TNA.
64. Panteli, Place of Refuge, 119. See also Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 58.
65. Aktar, “Tax Me to the End of My Life!,” 213–4.
THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
161
66. G. Eastwood, Colonial Office, Note on ‘Cyprus Refugees’, 29 March 1943, CO 67/328/
3, TNA. Michael R. Marrus writes that by mid-1943, ‘there were about 5,000 Greeks in
Egyptian camps, 4,600 in Cyprus and others scattered about Africa and the Eastern
Mediterranean. Marrus, The Unwanted, 272.
67. G. Eastwood, 29 March 1943, Note on “Cyprus. Refugees,” CO 67/328/3, TNA.
68. Governor of Cyprus, Cypher Telegram, Most Secret N°505, to Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 20 October 1943, CO 67/328/3, TNA.
69. Governor of Cyprus, Cypher Most Secret Telegram N° 592, to Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 4 December 1943, CO 67/328/3, TNA.
70. CO 67/328/3 Possibility of Providing Refuge in Cyprus for Refugees from Europe,
1943–1944. Minister of State, Cairo, Immediate Cypher telegram No. 45 to Secretary
of State for the Colonies (repeated Jerusalem & Cyprus), 18 December 1943.
71. High Commissioner of Palestine, Cypher Telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 December 1943, CO 67/328/3, TNA.
72. Minister of State, Cairo, to Foreign Office, 23 October 1943, CO 67/328/3, TNA.
73. Carabott, “British Military Occupation,” 287, 293.
74. Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, 15.
75. Major-General Atkinson (?) in charge of Administration to the undersecretary of state,
the War Office, Secret, 4 November 1946, CO 537/1808, TNA.
76. Arrivé, “Les camps d’internements,” 20; Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, 66.
77. Supplement No. 2 to the Cyprus Gazette No. 3257 of 13 August, 1946: The Statute
Laws of Cyprus No. 15 of 1946: A Law to Make Provision for the Detention of
Certain Persons in Certain Cases, 12 August 1946, CO 537/1807, TNA.
78. Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, to C.S. Key, War Office, 7 September 1946, CO 537/
1810, TNA. For the reactions of the Palestinian Arab leadership to this decision,
High Commissioner, Palestine, Telegram to SSC, 24 December 1946, CO 537/2387,
TNA. The initial cost of setting up the camps was estimated at £100,000 in September
1946, although that rapidly escalated to £617,370 for the period up to 31 March 1948 to
which £250,000 was to be added for works services and then £1,900,000 for the period
up to 31 March 1947. See Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, to C.S. Key, War Office, 7
September 1946, CS Key, War Office, to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, 12 September,
Secretary of State, to the Governor of Cyprus, repeated to High Commissioner of
Palestine, 5 December 1946, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the High Commissioner of Palestine, 21 December 1946, CO 537/1810, TNA.
79. Notes for an interview with the Right Hon. Arthur Creech-Jones Secretary of State for
the Colonies, Friday 13th December 1946 (by Dr. Grünfeld), CO 733/467/5, TNA.
80. Cohen, “Naissance d’une nation,” 57; Ballinger, “Impossible Returns,” 129 and
Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, 318.
81. Secretary of State for the Colonies Top Secret and Personal Immediate Cypher Telegram, to High Commissioner, Palestine, 2 March 1947, CO 537/2385, TNA.
82. Major-General Atkinson (?) in charge of Administration to the undersecretary of state,
the War Office, Secret, 4 November 1946, CO 537/1808, TNA.
83. Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, 302.
84. Secretary of State for the Colonies, Top Secret and Personal Immediate Cypher Telegram, 12 March 1947, to High Commissioner, Palestine, CO 537/2385, TNA. As
Arrivé points out, the clandestine immigration of Jews in Palestine was coordinated
by the Mossad le-Aliya Bet (a branch of the Palestine-based Jewish paramilitary
force Haganah) which was funded by the Joint Distribution Committee and the
Zionist Organization. From 1944 onwards, emigration was facilitated by the Bricha
162
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
A. RAPPAS
(flight) network created by Polish Jewish resisters. See Arrivé, “Les camps d’internement,” 12 and Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, 336–7.
Top Secret. D.O. (47) 35 Cabinet Defence Committee, Palestine-Illegal Immigration,
Note by the Minister of Defence, 14 April 1947, Cabinet Office, Annex to the above:
Jewish Illegal Immigration. Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 10
April 1947, CO 537/2385, TNA.
Governor of Cyprus, telegram to SSC Confidential 9 March 1948 transmitting report
on conditions of illegal immigrants, Undated, typescript report by the Commissioner
of Jewish Affairs attached to the telegram titled “Jewish Refugee Camps in Cyprus,” CO
733/490/3, TNA.
Κυπριακός Τύπος, 19 August 1946.
Savvas Loizides, Εσπερινή, 8 March 1946.
Dr. Fazıl Küçük, Halkın Sesi, 7 March 1947.
Yavuz, Halkın Sesi, 9 March 1946.
Anexartitos, 16 August 1946.
Fifis Ioannou, Anexartitos, 21 August 1946.
Cabinet: Illegal Immigration Committee: Accommodation for Illegal Immigrants: Top
Secret Memorandum, 9 May, 1947, signed J.D. Highman, secretary, CO 537/2385,
TNA.
High Commissioner Palestine to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Immediate Top
Secret Telegram, 20 March 1947, repeated Cyprus CO 537/2385, TNA.
Governor of Kenya top secret and personal telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 October 1946, CO 537/1807, TNA.
Governor of Kenya, top Secret dispatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21
November 1946, CO 537/1808, TNA.
Top Secret. D.O. (47) 35 Cabinet Defence Committee, Palestine-Illegal Immigration,
F.D.W. Brown, Foreign Office, to J.D. Higham, Colonial Office, Secret Personal
letter, 7 May 1947, CO 537/2385, TNA.
Sherman, Island Refuge, 239.
Palestine. Illegal Immigration Detention in Cyprus. Part I 1947, Top Secret. Cabinet
Defence Committee: Minutes of a Meeting held at No. 10, Downing Street, on Wednesday, 12 March 1947, CO 537/2385, TNA.
Governor of Cyprus, Saving Confidential telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 March 1948 transmitting report on conditions of illegal immigrants, Undated,
typescript report by the Commissioner of Jewish Affairs, CO 733/490/3, TNA. In 1946,
a Colonial Office memo stated that the daily calorie intake of inmates was 2,667, see
Notes for an interview with the Right Hon. Arthur Creech-Jones Secretary of State
for the Colonies, Friday 13 December 1946 (by Dr. Grünfeld), CO 733/467/5, TNA.
Solomon Schonfeld, Executive Director, Chief Rabbi’s Religious Emergency Council
(London), dispatch to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office 21 August 1946, and High Commissioner Palestine, Cypher Telegram, 23 August 1946, to Secretary of State for the
Colonies, CCO 733/467/5, TNA.
Arrivé, “Les camps d’internements,” 54–5.
Top secret telegram From Commander-in-Chief Middle East Land Forces D.T.O. 13
August 1946 to Cyprus sub-district, CO 537/1807, TNA.
Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner Palestine, repeated Cyprus,
11 August 1946, CO 537/1807, TNA.
Major-General Atkinson (?) in charge of Administration to the undersecretary of state,
the War Office, Secret, 4 November 1946, CO 537/1808, TNA.
Ibid.
THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY
163
107. High Commissioner Palestine to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Immediate telegram, 13 August 1946, CO 537/1809, TNA.
108. Top Secret Minute by (illegible) to Fitzgerald, Colonial Office, 28 June 1947, CO 537/
2385, TNA.
109. Cohen, “Naissance d’une nation,” 62 and 75. See also Ballinger, “Impossible Returns,”
137–8.
110. Governor of Cyprus, Most immediate telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1
October 1948, CO 733/490/3.
111. Top Secret. D.O. (47) 35 Cabinet Defence Committee, Palestine-Illegal Immigration,
Note by the Minister of Defence, 14 April 1947, Cabinet Office, Annex to the above:
Jewish Illegal Immigration. Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 10
April 1947, CO 537/2385, TNA.
112. Top Secret. D.O. (47) 35 Cabinet Defence Committee, Palestine-Illegal Immigration,
Note by the Minister of Defence, 14 April 1947, Cabinet Office, Annex to the above:
Jewish Illegal Immigration. Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 10
April 1947, CO 537/2385.
113. Acting governor of Cyprus, Secret Saving Telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 July 1947, forwarding “Commissioner, Jewish Camps, Cyprus-Draft Directive”
of 23 July 1947, and Governor of Cyprus, Secret telegram to Secretary of State for the
Colonies, repeated Palestine, 25 September 1947, CO 537/2386, TNA.
114. 50 (1948). Resolution of 29 May 1948 [S/801]: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/
unispal.nsf/0/6B76F035CD9C4A36852560C200599BB7. Last accessed 23 April 2018.
See also CO 537/3947, Top Secret Saving Telegram No. 125, SSC to Officer Administering the Government of Cyprus, 30th September 1948.
115. CO 537/3947, Governor of Cyprus, Secret Telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 August 1948.
116. Katsiaounis, Η Διασκεπτική.
117. Governor of Cyprus, confidential telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16
August 1948, CO 537/3947, TNA.
118. Secretary of State for the Colonies, Secret telegram to Governor of Cyprus, 18 January
1949, FO 371/75412, TNA.
119. Ambassador to Greece, dispatch to Foreign Secretary 2 March 1943, FO 371/37224,
TNA.
120. Holland, “Never, Never Land.”
121. Hadjiathanasiou, “British Council in Cyprus.”
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
ORCID
Alexis Rappas http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2743-6117
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