Critical Horizons A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory ISSN: 1440-9917 (Print) 1568-5160 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ycrh20 Institutional Agonism: Axel Honneth’s Radical Democracy Odin Lysaker To cite this article: Odin Lysaker (2017): Institutional Agonism: Axel Honneth’s Radical Democracy, Critical Horizons, DOI: 10.1080/14409917.2017.1275168 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2017.1275168 Published online: 01 Feb 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 4 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ycrh20 Download by: [Universitetsbiblioteket i Agder] Date: 04 February 2017, At: 02:42 CRITICAL HORIZONS, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2017.1275168 Institutional Agonism: Axel Honneth’s Radical Democracy* Odin Lysaker Department of Religion, Philosophy, and History, University of Agder, Norway ABSTRACT KEYWORDS Axel Honneth may be criticised for reducing political philosophy to moral psychology. In what follows, I argue that if his theory of recognition is reframed as one of democracy, quite another picture will appear. To do this, I systematically reconstruct Honneth’s stance as a multidimensional version of radical democracy. The question I discuss is the manner in which this framework combines the three dimensions of democratic deliberation, culture, and conflict. I then discuss Honneth’s picture from both a deliberative and agonistic viewpoint. How one understands the way in which he combines the abovementioned dimensions is dependent upon which one of these two approaches one may choose. I claim that when taken together, these three dimensions form the grounding of a radicaldemocratic understanding of a struggle for recognition, which I term institutional agonism. Axel Honneth; recognition theory; radical democracy; institutional agonism Introduction In the contemporary discourse, Jürgen Habermas maintains that there are three different normative grounds for democracy: liberal, republican, and deliberative.1 In her development of his framing, Seyla Benhabib holds that a fourth position should be added, namely an agonistic.2 These deliberative and agonistic stories are represented by Habermas and Chantal Mouffe, among others.3 In spite of a number of differences between their approaches, both Habermas and Mouffe define their position as ‘radical democracy’.4 One way to define the concept of radical democracy is that it contributes to the realisation of the equality of political rights and freedoms in liberal democracies.5 Such a radical bid for a democratic society accordingly purports to take the liberal democracy more seriously than do liberal positions.6 It is nonetheless not clear whether Habermas’ and Mouffe’s positions are mutually exclusive or if they are instead complementary. In that the understanding of the radical democratic position appears to span a relatively broad spectrum − from deliberation to agonism – an issue arises regarding what is ‘radical’ about a radical democracy.7 One thought-provoking approach is found in Axel Honneth’s recognition-based theory of democracy.8 Moreover, in keeping with the early Honneth’s positioning between Habermas and Michel Foucault, also his democracy theory can be read as a position in CONTACT Odin Lysaker odin.lysaker@uia.no * This is an expanded version of an article that was originally published in Norwegian Journal of Philosophy in 2011. © Critical Horizons Pty Ltd 2017 2 O. LYSAKER between respectively Habermas’ deliberative and Mouffe’s Foucaultian-agonistic position.9 If this assumption is reasonable, it also becomes of interest to determine whether Honneth’s democracy model represents a deliberative or agonistic variant of the radical model of democracy. To put this differently: it is relevant, then, to identify where on the continuum from Habermas to Mouffe it is reasonable to position Honneth. And further, if Honneth’s understanding of democracy constitute a middle way between Habermas and Mouffe, it includes both deliberation and agonism. Keeping the above background in mind, I will in what follows address the following question: What is radical about Honneth’s radical democracy theory? I will investigate this question in two steps: in the first step, I will systematically reconstruct his recognition-based and radical theory of democracy. As a means of making it possible to consider his recognition theory as a contribution to political philosophy, I will in the following systematically reconstruct what I assert is a reasonable interpretation of the framework for what Honneth himself calls a radical democracy.10 Here, I interpret Honneth’s theoretical stance on democracy as multidimensional, and will accordingly – in keeping with his comprehensive recognition theory – present it in light of three distinctive yet interrelated dimensions.11 In the second step, I will evaluate two different answers to the question regarding what it is that constitutes the radical element in Honneth’s democracy theory. The purpose of this step is to clarify whether his democracy model is solely based on a democratic culture or ethical life (‘demokratischen Sittlichkeit’), and whether it implies Habermas’ deliberative or Mouffe’s agonistic democracy. Here, my hypothesis is that Honneth puts forward what I term as institutional agonism, which can be conceived as ways in which democratic institutions ‘channel’ (Habermas) or ‘tame’ (Mouffe) agonist (or even antagonist) politics.12 Honneth’s multidimensional framing of radical democracy Honneth’s radical democracy theory can be interpreted as multidimensional, as it comprises three different yet interrelated dimensions which can be termed, respectively, a psychological, politological, and sociological dimension. This multidimensionality corresponds with the tripartite sphere division of Honneth’s recognition theory. Here, he distinguishes between recognition as, respectively, love (in the private sphere), rights (in the state sphere) and solidarity (in the civil sphere).13 In the following I will systematically reconstruct Honneth’s theory of democracy according to these dimensions. The psychological dimension The first dimension in Honneth’s radical and multidimensional democracy theory can be termed a psychological dimension.14 This dimension corresponds with the primary sphere in his comprehensive recognition theory, specifically, the private sphere of recognition as mutual love and caring relations. This can be a matter of relations between children and biological or psychological parents, spouses, or other close relationships between adults, including friendship. Within this psychological dimension the actor is an individual, which presupposes moral-psychological development.15 Here, I am referring to Honneth’s focus on what it is that socialises and motivates a person to take political action. According to Honneth, a political agent’s involvement in CRITICAL HORIZONS 3 close relations with significant others is crucial. The reason for this is that a political agent must first develop a moral identity and the motivation to take action, along with practical judgment and a sense of responsibility for their own actions before she or he can participate in political deliberation at all. The private sphere and its caring relations do not thus solely involve a separate private space for identity formation and self-realisation. In addition, according to Honneth, these relations constitute a necessary, although not sufficient, foundation for the development of an individual’s political autonomy. Honneth’s theory of democracy argues, in other words, for a close connection between politics and psychology. Still, his political thought is grounded in more than moral or political psychology. The point here is to say that it is always an individual who is motivated or not to act, even – as in Honneth’s democratic approach – in cases of cooperative problem-solving. Thus, democratic recognition struggle in the politological and sociological dimension, respectively, is always depending on the individual’s motivation in the psychological dimension. Honneth distinguishes between different sources of motivation for action. He maintains that the experience of cooperation and problem-solving between members of society is one of the most important sources of motivation for political participation.16 Cooperation occurs in a number of different arenas and through many different types of practices. For example, it can be a matter of the cooperation of parents in the raising of their own children (in the psychological dimension) and cooperation between members of society on volunteer work in the local community (in the sociological dimension). In accordance with John Dewey, Honneth asserts that every democratic practice constitutes both a kind of reflective, or social, cooperation as a way of living together, and a collective problem-solving with other agents that are motivated by an ethical ideal; accordingly, every member of society is always already an affected party and thereby a democratic, interacting participant. Political motivation to take action is, however, not only based on mutual cooperation but also depends on a subjective factor, what Honneth refers to as a person’s ‘inner freedom’.17 This form of freedom is about the absence of different types of disrespect that can lead to personal suffering. The term disrespect must here be understood as an absence of recognition. Honneth speaks about three such forms of disrespect: bodily violation, loss of rights, and social degradation.18 These types of disrespect, or what he also refers to as social pathologies, can have consequences for an individual’s relationship to her- or himself by reducing the person’s self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. Further, disrespect can, thereby, contribute to reducing the individual’s actual opportunities as well as motivation and will to participate in the democracy.19 For example, if a person cannot trust her- or himself, the likelihood of that person being able to trust others will be correspondingly diminished, as will their ability to cooperate with others in democratic processes. An experience of political disrespect can also be a source of motivation in triggering feelings of injustice (‘Unrechtsbewuβtsein’), in other words, an affective and indignation-based reaction to political injustice.20 Political disrespect – such as exclusion from participation in political elections or being denied a voice in the democratic public sphere – can simultaneously motivate individuals on the basis of a ‘moral grammar’.21 This is due to the fact that the contrast between the negative disrespect, on the one hand, and the positive moral grammar, on the other, can provide insight regarding 4 O. LYSAKER what is or is not just. This type of both experiential and normative insight can, according to Honneth, motivate the disrespected party to fight a political struggle for recognition and inclusion, which he describes as “the moral logic of resistance”.22 The politological dimension The second dimension of Honneth’s democracy theory can be understood as politological, bearing an affinity to the legal sphere of his recognition theory. The understanding of legality as a social sphere entails recognition in the form of equality in the designation of legal status. Accordingly, this politological dimension has a focus on citizenship and public deliberation, understood as legal subjects’ mutual freedoms, and rights.23 Moreover, a democratic constitutional state consequently establishes the politological dimension’s institutional arrangement. In Honneth’s radical democracy model there is thereby a mutual connection between the constitutional state and democracy that plays a double role.24 First, it is to safeguard the freedoms and rights provided by the constitutional state. This means that citizens will have their private autonomy, or, negative freedom, protected from intervention in their personal lives. Such a private autonomy is to safeguard the space that I above termed as a psychological dimension. Such a legal recognition within a democratic constitutional state includes an extensive catalogue of rights covering economic, social, and cultural – in addition to civil and political – rights. Through receiving legal recognition, each citizen is also granted a legal status, including human rights, ensuring that she or he is respected as a morally responsible person.25 Secondly, the mutual connection between the constitutional state and democracy is to secure a democratic principle, safeguarding the members of society’s public autonomy, or positive freedom. It is, in other words, both an equal and actual opportunity for participation in the public opinion- and willformation. The politological dimension also entails that the state should – in compliance with the catalogue of rights – ensure a minimum of welfare schemes. Thus within Honneth’s radical democratic framework, the state cannot be understood only as a constitutional one. In addition, he understands it also as a welfare state. Accordingly, true political participation and influence – the core of a radical democracy – can only be secured through redistribution.26 Society must in consequence ensure a sufficient degree of distribution and redistribution of economic and intangible resources, such as money and knowledge. As a consequence, without an economic redistribution the democracy will potentially end up as some sort of post-democracy, namely politics controlled by private or state-based agents with great power and money interests rather than a common social purpose.27 The reason for this is that economic inequality can function as a limitation in terms of who discusses and what is being discussed in the public space. A personal or group-based contempt for the political system can then develop. This in turn can compound the situation of already marginalised individuals and groups, possibly contributing in turn to reinforcing a specific dominant rhetoric or symbolic power, defining who is to have influence over what in the political exchange of views. Organisational efforts within civil society, through volunteer organisations, demonstrations and grassroots movements – or what I below call a sociological dimension – play according to Honneth an important role in a radical democracy. Nonetheless, such CRITICAL HORIZONS 5 activity cannot fully compensate for exclusion from participation parity in the formal democratic institutions, he claims. One reason for this is that not all politically marginalised individuals or groups possess sufficient capacity for political organisation. The act of joining an organisation or founding one’s own in itself requires resources. However, executing influence on democratic decision-making processes requires even more resources. A political economy must then understand recognition and democracy in light of each other so that the tangible and intangible conditions of possibility for inclusion and exclusion are analysed in context. This is according to Honneth’s democracy model a necessary though insufficient condition for ensuring that a formal right to political participation can be realised as true democratic participation parity. The sociological dimension The third, and final, dimension that I will reconstruct as a part of Honneth’s radical theory of democracy can be termed sociological in that it refers to society’s common culture and values as democracy’s pre-political grounding.28 This dimension corresponds with the solidarity-based and ‘civil’ sphere in his recognition theory.29 The understanding of civil society as a social sphere with relevance to democracy theory entails for Honneth a mutual recognition of the citizen’s esteem within a common democratic culture. The civil society here constitutes a democratic society’s culture in the establishment of a common arena for ‘cultural’, or, rather, morally motivated, recognition struggles.30 According to Honneth, there is a connection between morality and culture in that the source of political norms are society’s already established practices. He maintains as such that what is of interest for a theory of democracy is not universal principles but rather the social norms that are at all times being contested or serve to direct actions. The abovementioned moral conception of the struggle for recognition can be understood, politically speaking, by way of an analysis of what makes it possible for marginalised individuals and groups to organise – and to thereby criticise, influence, and reform the democratic society’s non-democratic and excluding dynamics. On the background of all three dimensions, the social members’ political participation can be understood in at least three ways. First, a social member is a private individual, a point which refers to the psychological dimension of Honneth’s theory of democracy. Secondly, a social member is a legal citizen within the politological dimension, a fact which implies that the individual has a legal citizenship and thereby a legal status. And third, a member of a democratic society can be defined as a social citizen, which corresponds with the sociological dimension.31 One key difference between an individual as legal citizen and social citizen is that the former is in a more passive role in that one is solely the recipient of a legal status (in the form of civil and political freedoms and rights). The role of social citizen is a more active role since the individual participates in civil society of own volition (such as in volunteer organisations, interest groups as well as media and democratic public spheres). The social citizen role therefore describes how a person is socially integrated in and feels an affiliation with the democratic culture within which she or he lives. Although that which can be interpreted as a sociological dimension in Honneth’s theory of democracy has an emphasis on a political agent as a social citizen, the dimension appears to be more deeply grounded than a merely social role would imply. Honneth’s radical democracy model originates in what can be called a social-ontological condition.32 6 O. LYSAKER Here I am referring to Honneth’s assertion – which I touched upon in the explanation of the psychological dimension – that reflexive cooperation is a condition of a democratic society. The members of society then solve common tasks and problems through a practical and institutional division of labour.33 Democracy as cooperation must, according to Honneth, be understood as a social, or, ethical, ideal, in other words in a broader sense than formal political institutions.34 This ideal is about political participation by virtue of simply being a member of society. In this sense, Honneths seems to support the socalled all affected principle rather than the all subjected principle.35 Instead of legitimising politics as being subjected to some particular institutions, as in the case of the all subjected principle, the all affected principle states that all social members that are affected by the society’s politics should be granted a voice in those political processes that result in policy. Further, this social-ontological condition states that the rational self-interest of members of society can be channelled through the democracy’s reflexive cooperation allowing the reconciliation of self-interest and the interests of the greater good. Such reconciliation with respect to freedom and the community requires that all social citizens are communicatively free. According to Honneth, being in possession of communicative, or, social, freedom, entails that the citizens have gone through a mutual and recognitionbased socialisation process.36 Such an experience of recognition has led to each individual understanding that one’s individual freedom is contingent upon everyone mutually limiting their self-interest in meeting with the correspondingly fundamental need for recognition of others. Yet another important aspect of the sociological dimension can be called socio-ethical or a political morality. Honneth maintains that democratic practice requires that interacting parties possess a formal community of shared values. Here, he has in mind social norms that Honneth holds to be so fundamental that they can be shared by all members of society. This minimal socio-ethical, or, ‘post-traditional’, foundation constitutes a normative frame of reference, he claims, which must be shared in order to enable the coordination of society’s democratic participation.37 A distinction must be made here between individual values and common values. While individual values are about a person’s perception of ‘the good life’, by my use of common values, I am referring to normative conditions that will ensure democratic institutions. How these common values are to be understood at any given time or whether they must, due to the prevailing development of society, be replaced by other values, are, however, questions which Honneth leaves open. The purpose of this socio-ethical part of Honneth’s theory of democracy is to explain how all members of society must be free to develop themselves on the basis of an institutionally secured equal opportunity to contribute in the political community of shared values.38 If the opposite was the case, basic shared values could undermine the personal ones. A final point in my reconstruction of the sociological dimension of Honneth’s radical theory of democracy concerns social criticism. As I have already explained, Honneth understands democracy as depending on a political culture − the purpose of which is to function as a problem-solving mechanism. A central social realm for democratic execution is the public sphere and civil society. This is due to the fact that these arenas also constitute common, social spaces for the articulation and practice of political critique. In Honneth’s view, such a political critique has a double function, as both critique in and critique of the public sphere. On the basis of his multidimensional theory of democracy, CRITICAL HORIZONS 7 Honneth maintains that political exclusion and invisibility should be analysed within formal as well as informal institutions. This double political criticism is to be carried out within the psychological as well as the politological and sociological dimensions. Abuse of power and political exclusion can take place within both the formal political system (in other words, the parliament, legislative power, and bureaucracy) and the informal democratic public sphere. But in addition to this, Honneth proposes that democratic social criticism must also investigate whether political exclusion occurs even prior to the articulation of critique in the public sphere (i.e. in the psychological dimension).39 In effect, the above mentioned shared values are always undergone a critical investigation in order to be accepted or not by the citizens ongoing struggles over the interpretation of such values contributes to avoiding value-based essentialisation.40 Radical democracy between deliberation and agonism It can be stated that Honneth’s radical theory of democracy, as I have explained in the first step, contains three dimensions: psychological, politological, and sociological. Further, it can be argued that this multidimensional model stipulates three conditions for a radical-democratic framework: political conflict, democratic deliberation, and democratic culture. I would claim that these three elements and the dialectic constellation between them imply the following: Honneth’s psychological dimension can be understood as the basis for political conflict. The reason for this is that he claims that a person’s political motivation for action is founded on a specific understanding of socialisation and identity formation as a result of the individual being part of different relations of recognition (in other words love, respect, and esteem). But in spite of the social citizens’ common, recognition-based socialisation process, Honneth claims, as explained above, that there will always be political conflict regarding how the social norms are to be interpreted. Honneth’s political psychology is thus a description of the fundamental basis for potential conflict between the citizens’ motivations for democratic action and thus the ongoing interpretation of the political culture’s norms. Further, the politological dimension is the institutional framework for democratic deliberation, or the social and discursive space in which citizens come together in their joint opinion- and will-formation. Democratic deliberation can take place within both formal and informal institutions. Finally, the sociological dimension constitutes that which can be described as the society’s democratic culture or ethical life. It is a matter here of different forms of social trust and solidarity among social citizens, which in combination establish the democracy’s pre-political basis. On the basis of the three dimensions’ role, the answer to my question – namely, what is radical about Honneth’s radical theory of democracy? – would of necessity have to combine these three dimensions. But what type of combination does Honneth’s model of democracy entail? It is not only Honneth personally who claims that his theory of democracy belongs to the radical tradition, as many influencing readings of his political philosophy argue that it represents such a position.41 There is however disagreement about how radical his democracy theory actually is. In this second step, I will therefore discuss two perspectives on the degree of radicality in Honneth’s radical democracy theory that point in opposite directions. The first alternative claims that Honneth’s radical democracy theory is not 8 O. LYSAKER sufficiently radical. This critique represents an agonistic reading of Honneth’s position and makes the argument that his radical democracy theory contains a conflictual deficit. If this is correct, it means that one of the three components that Honneth’s democracy model apparently endeavours to combine – democratic conflict, deliberation, and culture – de facto is missing. His democracy model must, in other words, be radicalised in order to be called radical. The second reading stands for that which can be called a deliberative approach, claiming that Honneth’s radical democracy theory already contains a dimension for political conflict and that as a result of this, his position is too radical. This proposed solution thereby implies a moderation of Honneth’s radical democracy theory through a greater emphasis on the deliberative and pre-political elements in its politological and sociological dimensions, respectively. Honneth’s agonistic deficit A leitmotif in Honneth’s political philosophy is how a society can comprise a democratic culture that avoids the establishment of conflict-based counter-cultures through a recognition-based inclusion of disrespected individuals.42 Upon assuming an agonistic perspective on the degree of radicality in Honneth’s picture, it can be claimed that it is not radical enough. In addition to the politological dimension for democratic deliberation and the sociological dimension regarding democratic culture, the argument can be made that Honneth’s theory lacks a sufficiently psychological dimension as a basis for political conflict. Also, the politological and the sociological dimensions can both be said to be contingent upon a certain degree of common values. The agonistic understanding of democracy, however, opens for a stronger element of disagreement in relation to these values. This criticism corresponds to a large extent with what I by way of introduction referred to as Mouffe’s agonistic version of radical democracy. According to what she terms as conflictual consensus, “consensus beyond hegemony (…) [is] unavailable”, which implies a “struggle between different interpretations of shared [liberal-democratic or institutional] principles”.43 Here, what Mouffe has in mind is a situation in which the citizens agree upon a certain set of basic principles that are supposed to be serve as an organising basis for society’s political institutions, and that they disagree to the point that their different personal identities, values, and interests implies struggles over the interpretation of these principles. In effect, this way of addressing what I call institutional agonism deals according to Mouffe’s viewpoint with ways in which to “transform antagonism into agonism”, that is, ensures that political conflicts are “tamed” due to “the establishment of [democratic] institutions”.44 On the background of this Mouffian reading of the term consensus, it seems to be the case that her account is fairly close to the Honnethian version of institutional agonism, namely a model of democracy which attempt to institutionally channel and transform agonism into the formal democratic and legal system. In the debate about the degree of radicality in Honneth’s democracy theory, such a critique is forwarded by among others Jean-Philippe Deranty and Immanuel Renault.45 Their agonistic, or, Mouffian, critique of Honneth’s democracy theory appears first and foremost to be directed at its psychological dimension. Deranty and Renault claim that in order for Honneth’s democracy theory to be truly radical, he must revise his original insight regarding recognition. One of the key concerns of his recognition theory is to CRITICAL HORIZONS 9 explain how political conflict and the struggle for recognition are most frequently morally motivated and thereby legitimate. Deranty and Renault claim that Honneth’s democracy theory results in a conflictual, or, agonistic, deficit, and that it must therefore be subjected to what they call ‘politicising’. The controversy between Honneth on one side, and Deranty and Renault, on the other, seems therefore to be about the nature of political conflict. Democratic conflict can be understood here in at least two ways. First, an external, namely as forms of action that undermines the possibility of establishing a democratic channelling institutions based on deliberation and founded in a democratic culture. And secondly, an internal, which conceives conflict as a potential democratic resource that motivates the members of society to take part in a political recognition struggle (e.g. civil disobedience).46 If the latter interpretation is reasonable, political conflict in a democratic society will potentially constitute a moment for true democratic equality of participation as a result of the citizens’ morally motivated recognition struggle. The agonistic critique of Honneth’s radical democracy asserting that it is not radical enough appears to be grounded in what can be designated an ontological level.47 The element of conflict in a democracy is according to this perspective something more fundamental than merely an ascertainment of empirical facts, for example, that conflict exists in a society.48 This objection appears instead to understand political conflict as a constitutive moment of a democratic society. The idea that conflict is fundamental for society implies that it is a characteristic that cannot be removed. A democratic society, and by extension also theorising about it, must instead address or even be based on political conflict as a given of society. This does not mean that conflict cannot be resolved; nonetheless, it entails that countercultures or other forms of social fringe groups can be understood as necessary, albeit insufficient, democratic ‘safety valves’ for agonism as well as antagonism. Moreover, it implies that different forms of political conflict can compensate for established – and potentially conformist and oppressive – forms of recognition, in addition to constituting a real condition of possibility for marginalised persons’ or groups’ means of protest within the framework of a democratic culture. In short: while Honneth in his recognition theory understands political conflict as a means for the establishment, reproduction, or further development of democratic institutions – in what seems, then, to result in a rather affirmative practice – the agonistic understanding of radical democracy would appear to imply that conflict can be an objective in its own right. Such an affirmative outlook seems to be present in Honneth in the sense of being contingent upon already established, practiced, and reproduced social and political values and institutions.49 Still, as I have already pinpointed, even Mouffe’s agonistic account of radical democracy, presupposes to some degree an affirmative regards to society’s formal institutions. Yet another possible explanation of why Honneth’s radical democracy theory cannot be held to be sufficiently radical is found in Renault’s understanding of the term ‘struggle for recognition’. This is a central concept, not only in Honneth’s recognition theory in general but also in his understanding of democracy in particular. Renault here proposes that a distinction be made between a struggle of and for recognition. While a struggle of recognition is focused on cooperation and consensus, a struggle for recognition is instead agonistic and conflict-oriented.50 Renault claims that Honneth in his democracy theory is more interested in a ‘deliberative struggle of’ rather that an ‘agonistic struggle for’ recognition. Further, Renault contends that Honneth’s recognition theory-based model of democracy 10 O. LYSAKER and its understanding of the term recognition struggle only succeed in giving already established political institutions legitimacy. In consequence, Honneth seems to reject agonist activism within the sociological dimension as central in a democratic society. Struggles of recognition thereby run the risk of reproducing and thus being affirmative regards to already established political institutions in contrast to struggles for recognition, which must essentially be understood as existential struggles for survival with the intention of ensuring individual self-realisation. Along with Deranty, Renault also makes the argument that a recognition struggle understood agonistically in a democracy makes possible a requisite potential for transcending the already affirmed normativity of democratic institutions. Renault raises in this context the question of whether it is the case that “when struggles of recognition lose their consensual strive, they also lose all their normative content”?51 According to Renault, this is not a requisite implication: Agonistic recognition struggles can certainly employ illegitimate means, but without this necessarily resulting in a rejection of a ‘consensual’ objective of recognition. Renault maintains that both consensual and deliberative recognition struggles, on the one hand, and agonistic and non-consensus-based recognition struggles, on the other, can be motivated by experiences of disrespect and injustice. Nonetheless, he believes that Honneth to far too great an extent understands the recognition struggle teleologically, whereby the objective (‘telos’) is oriented towards communicative, or, social, freedom. Deliberative deficit in Honneth Thus far I have presented an agonistic perspective of the degree of radicality in Honneth’s radical democracy, and will now describe in greater detail an alternative solution. On the basis of what can be called a deliberative view, this degree of radicality can also be understood as being too radical. The reason for this is that it appears difficult to reconcile the three components in the radical democracy framework – political conflict (in the psychological dimension), democratic deliberation (in the politological dimension), and democratic culture (in the sociological dimension) – within the same theoretical framework. While political conflict entails more or less disagreement about which values a democratic society is to be ruled, the idea of a democratic culture is to a large extent contingent upon a type of formal community of shared values. This can, for example, be a matter of historical reference to a state’s institutionalisation with regards to its constitution or the struggles of different social movements for achieving equal democratic voice. If a radical democracy is to be able to ensure that all three dimensions are provided for, it must be able to create some form of channelling between democracy’s formal community of shared values, on the one hand, and the citizens’ conflictual interpretations of the same, on the other. This critique corresponds to a large extent with that which I by way of introduction referred to as Habermas’ deliberative version of radical democracy. Still, it is – particularly after having visited what is reasonable to look upon as Mouffe’s nuanced account of the interconnection between democratic institutions (i.e. consensus), on the one hand, and agonistic politics (i.e. conflict), on the other – worth recalling that the Habermasian deliberative outlook, too, seems to defend a variant of what I thus far have coined as institutional agonism, namely as Habermas states the following: “When CRITICAL HORIZONS 11 we examine moral disagreement, we must include affective reactions into the class of moral utterances”.52 In the discussion of Honneth’s contribution to democracy theory, both David Owen and Simon Thompson, among others, claim that the radical aspect of Honneth’s democracy theory comprises solely a combination of the politological dimension for democratic deliberation and the sociological dimension for a democratic culture, respectively.53 The agonistic perception of the degree of radicality in Honneth’s democracy theory appears to stress an ontological understanding of political conflict as something constitutive for a democratic society. However, in the deliberative reading democratic conflict emerges as something normative. Understanding political conflict as normative has at least two implications. First, it implies that political conflict is something that should resolved through a deliberative procedure in the democratic public sphere, to be subsequently channelled into what Habermas calls the democratic circulation of power. This can be called democratic recognition struggle’s socio-therapeutic moment. Secondly, it implies that political conflict is an articulation of democratic recognition requirements in spe. The latter understanding hereby assigns a potential role to political conflict in a corrective social critique of the democracy’s current form of rule. Rather than assuming that utterances of moral disagreement necessarily represents an non-reconcilable feature in democracies, the latter view suggests that through the public space as a mutual learning arena, conflicts may if not be solved so at least be tamed in the sense of achieving a better understanding among the conflicting participants. What these socio-therapeutic and social-critical dimensions have in common is that both perceive political conflict as a democratic resource. However, if this is the case, it is contingent upon – in an extension of the deliberative approach – viewing conflict as somewhat transformative, for example, something that motivates and contributes to creating participation parity. In extension of this deliberative approach to radical democracy, a member of society’s personal values within the psychological dimension, and these values’ potential conflict with other social citizens’ values or the society’s formal community of shared values in the form of a democratic culture, are thereby viewed as a conflicting as well as transformative contribution to the society’s democratic institutions and its cooperative processes. If value diversity creates a lack of consensus about and conflict between individual values and the shared values of the group, such a non-consensual democracy can nonetheless contribute to a requisite dynamic and resource, which in turn enables the society and its members to evolve in a democratic direction.54 The reason for this is that disagreement and conflict will as a matter of fact be discussed publicly so that one will at least clarify where there is and is not consensus in a civilised fashion. It can also contribute to marginalised or excluded individuals and groups actually being recognised and heard in the public sphere. In extension of the sociological dimension, the public sphere and civil society function accordingly as a common social arena for political conflict reduction and problem solving.55 A question that nevertheless arises regarding the moral motivation of conflicts in Honneth’s radical democracy model is whether or not a prerequisite for such an understanding of motivation is a normative objective that must be commonly shared by all members of society. As stated, Honneth claims that in a democratic society there are some basic common values, which in combination constitute what he holds to be a democratic 12 O. LYSAKER formal community of shared values. Further, Honneth holds, as stated above, that these shared values are so fundamental that they will not come into conflict with the citizens’ personal perceptions of the good life. But is Honneth’s outlook here in danger of becoming too radical, in the sense of being illiberal or paternalist? Through undertaking a deliberative approach to Honneth’s version of institutional agonism, it can appear to be either, democratically speaking, unnecessary, or practically speaking impossible prior to democratic deliberation, to assume any specific values whatsoever. Viewed from a deliberative perspective, the citizens’ diversity of values is a far too specific basis for the establishment of a common democratic standard. The legitimisation of democratic institutions must therefore occur through a formal, deliberative procedure. Honneth however argues according to what he calls a ‘teleological liberalism’, which means that a democratic society must satisfy some socio-ethical conditions in order for each citizen to be free in a communicative, or, social, sense.56 On the basis of the deliberative perspective of Honneth’s democracy model, the attempt to connect a socio-ethical teleology and a specific understanding of freedom can appear problematic. One reason for this, if one concurs with Thompson, is that such a version of a radical democracy model can “legitimate the non-recognition of those individuals and groups whose conceptions of the good are incompatible” with some of the asserted common social values.57 This objection implies that the type of community of shared values that Honneth is advocating is actually too thick, or, substantial. Stated differently: Honneth’s radical democracy model can appear too radical because it is in opposition to modern society’s value diversity, and the need for both formal procedures for the channelling as well as handling, and perhaps even taming, of value conflicts and the legitimisation in its own right of a democratic way of life. A political culture and its values are, however, in Honneth’s democracy theory not synonymous with something ethical in the ordinary sense of this word, in other words, the different and particular values of the members of a society that are in conflict with one another. The normative basis for Honneth’s democracy model is instead founded on a diverse societal life and hereby escapes being equated with pluralistic or identity political positions.58 Conclusion Radical democracy in general and Honneth’s institutional-agonist version of it in particular can, as explained throughout this paper, be positioned along a continuum with liberal democracy, on the one end, and agonistic pluralism, on the other. The advantage of Honneth’s vision can be said to be that it takes conflict seriously without passing over into violence, in the manner of agonism setting institutional boundaries in relation to antagonists. Simultaneously, his view of democracy is deeply indebted to not only formal institutions but also society’s democratic culture that has evolved through historical recognition struggles. In which manner and to what extent it can be claimed that Honneth combines the three radical-democratic elements – political conflict, deliberation, and culture – as potentially complementary aspects of the democracy’s normative infrastructure depends – as I explained in my previous discussion – on whether one employs a deliberative or agonistic reading strategy. Here, my attempt was to identity a variant of what I term as institutional agonism in Honneth. By which I refer to the compatibility between democratic institutions, on the one hand, and agonistic politics, CRITICAL HORIZONS 13 on the other, as well as ways in which to both channel and tame agonism into more formal political arenas. Here, it should be further noted that the way in which Honneth ascribes relevance to agonism, which is, at least if one accepts my line of argumentation, something different from both the Habermasian and Mouffian picture regards to what I in the second step termed as the psychological dimension. To recall, Honneth is here preoccupied with phenomenological aspects (e.g. the body, senses, and emotions), as well as conceiving subjective experiences as both a source to moral insight and a type of agentic motivation. According to Honneth’s view, this is particularly so when subjects experiences disrespect. Hence, the Honnethian radical democracy provides a valuable framework regards to analysing ways in which institutional agonism is practiced. Nevertheless – precisely because the psychological dimension of political conflict appears to constitute the salient point in Honneth’s imaginary – it should be asked what can constitute a normative criterion for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate political conflict? According to him, normatively speaking, a recognition struggle can be assessed by its positive or negative contribution to the realisation of intact recognition intersubjective relations as well as democratic institutions. This means that a struggle for recognition can only be evaluated normatively in the ultimate sense after it has actually taken place. But Honneth simultaneously claims that the objective of a recognition struggle is to enable reinstatement of the dignity of disrespected individuals.59 An argument can thus be made for a democratic recognition struggle being legitimate as long as it results in the reinstatement of persons’ embodied dignity, hereunder citizens’ political autonomy.60 It must thereby – in line with the multidimensional framework of Honneth’s recognition theory – be possible to rule out political conflicts that undermine citizens’ political autonomy as well as their bodily integrity on the grounds of being morally as well as democratically illegitimate. It is exactly this which is the radicality, or, rather, the institutional agonism, in Honneth’s radical democracy. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” 239–52. Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 7–9. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Mouffe, On the Political. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, xlii–xliii, 373, 471; Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 9 ff., 103. The term ‘radical democracy’ is often associated with Mouffe, but Habermas used the term before her (Habermas, “Dialektik der Rationalisierung,” 167–208, 181; Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, xv–xviii, 176–94). It can, however, be claimed that it is John Dewey who launched the term ‘radical democracy’ as early as in 1937, which he defined in the following way: “The end of democracy is a radical end. For it is an end that has not been adequately realized in any country at any time” (Dewey, “Democracy is Radical,” 296–9, 298–9; my italics). 5. Tønder and Thomassen, Radical Democracy, 5; Trend, Radical Democracy, 2–3. 6. The term liberal democracy refers in Habermas to the tradition coming from John Locke (Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 549, endnote 10), and in Mouffe to, among other things, the hegemony of principles such as liberty and equality (Mouffe, On the Political, 32–3). Surely, ‘liberal’ has many other meanings than in Habermas or Mouffe. 7. Adrian Little and Moya Lloyd claim that the term radical democracy it represented by two main positions: a deliberative position (i.e. the Frankfurt School’s critical theory represented O. LYSAKER 14 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. by, for example, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, and Seyla Benhabib) and a post-structuralist position (represented by e.g. Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière, and Claude Lefort) (Little and Lloyd, The Politics of Radical Democracy, 1–2). In spite of Honneth’s engagement regards to the development of his recognition theory for more than 20 years, as well as my attempt in this paper to draw on insights from all of his authorship, the following publications can be argued to be among the most relevant when it comes to this stance’s democratic-theoretical implications: Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition; Honneth, Freedom’s Right; Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation,” 218– 39; Honneth, “Education and the Public Sphere,” 17–32. Honneth, The Critique of Power. Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation.” What I call multidimensionality corresponds with Honneth’s description of his own framework as ‘plural’ or ‘differentiated’ (Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition,” 110–97, 113, 126, 159–60, 170, 175, 177, 183; Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 129. For such an account of radical democracy, see Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, xv, 78, 85, 157–8. For Habermas’ use of the term ‘channeling’, see: Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 181–3, 277–8, 383; and for Mouffe’s use of the concept of ‘taming’, see: Mouffe, On the Political, 20–1. Honneth, Struggle for Recognition, 92–130. Honneth has later expanded his recognition theory terminologically with the notions of care (for the private sphere), respect (for the state sphere), and esteem (for the civil sphere) (Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition,” 138–9, 140–1, 147–8, 180–2). In the following I will use these terms interchangeably. Honneth can be said to argue for a gradual distinction between these different dimensions and accordingly between the public and private sphere. Historically he holds that the distinction between these two spheres has not been constant. And normatively speaking he holds that it is legitimate for society to have the possibility to criticise certain practices within private life. This is due to the members of society’s need to be able to freely withdraw from group membership (a so-called exit option) and that private individuals shall be free to seek help from one of the other dimensions in the event of disrespect (Honneth, Disrespect, 156, 258). Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 71–91, 95–107. Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation.” Honneth, Pathologies of Reason, Chap. 9. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 131–9. Honneth, Pathologies of Reason, 146–56, 157–64. Honneth, The Fragmented World of the Social, 231–46, 209 ff. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 165–6. Ibid., 135–6, 139, 143, 154, 160–1, 163, 165, 170. Ibid., xv, 115. Ibid., 114–17. Ibid., 119. Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation,” 234–5. See also: Honneth, Disrespect, 86–7; Honneth, Freedom’s Right. Crouch, Post-Democracy. Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation,” 225–6, 231–2, 234–5. Honneth does not refer to the third sphere in his recognition theory as civil society. The closest one comes to such a reference is ‘the bourgeois society’ in his reconstruction of Hegel. Instead Honneth uses among other terms the word ‘esteem’ (in German: ‘Leistung’), and makes reference to the labour market (Honneth, Freedom’s Right). Although Honneth is critical of a concept of radical democracy that is exclusively based on the civil society, this notion appears to play a key role in his democracy theory (Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation,” 237, endnote 2; Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 163). Also given Honneth’s elaboration of Hegel’s concept of recognition, I will here use the term regarding a sociological dimension to describe what I interpret as being the civil sphere in Honneth’s CRITICAL HORIZONS 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 15 radical democracy theory (Honneth, The Pathologies of Individual Freedom, 75). This reading is also in accordance with the role that the civil society is often assigned in other contributions to the radical democratic tradition that Honneth can be read in light of (Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 345, 411, 451–2, 474). Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 126–7, 162–5. Honneth adopts a rather wide definition of the term culture (Honneth, The Critique of Power, 303). Honneth does not make a distinction between legal and social citizenship but I nonetheless will argue that this division is consistent with my multidimensional interpretation of his democracy theory. Honneth also bases his recognition theory to a large extent on Thomas H. Marshall’s seminal contribution to the concept of citizenship (Honneth, The Struggle for Recogniton, 115–18). Habermas proposes a similar tripartite division for a political individual in a democratic society (Habermas, “Hat die Demokratie noch eine epistemische Dimension? Empirische Forschung und normative Theorie,” 138–91, 140). For Honneth’s social ontology, see: Ikäheimo and Laitinen, Recognition and Social Ontology. Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation,” 220, 227, 232, 234–5. Ibid., 236. For a definition of these two principles, see: Fraser, Scales of Justice, 95–6. Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation,” 221. See also: Honneth, Freedom’s Right. Honneth, Disrespect, 254; Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition,” 172, 174–5, 181. Honneth, Disrespect, 225, 233–4, 261. Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition,” 114, 117. Honneth, Struggle for Recognition, 121–2. Deranty, “Critique of Political Economy and Contemporary Critical Theory,” 285–317, 288; D. Owen, “Self-Government and ‘Democracy as Reflexive Co-operation’,” 290–320, 305; Thompson, The Political Theory of Recognition, 139. Honneth, Disrespect, 78. Mouffe, On the Political, 107, 109. Furthermore, Mouffe explains that “[d]emocratic consensus can be envisaged only as a conflictual consensus”, which indicates that “agonistic [politics] channels for the expression of conflicts” (Mouffe, On the Political, 52, 68 (see also: 17) (my italics)). In fact, Mouffe argues for the “important part played by the parliamentary system in the transformation of antagonism to agonism and in the contestation of a we/ they compatible with democratic pluralism” (Mouffe, On the Political, 23 (my emphasis)). According to Andrew Schaap, “agonistic democrats tends to presuppose the existence of institutions” (Schaap, “Agonism in Divided Societies,” 255–77, 270). John Dryzek comments the same point as follows: “[Mouffe] scorns consensus as a cover for power, but at least consensus implies that decisions can get made.” Moreover, “[w]hen agonistic pluralism does attend to collective decisions, it is only to point to the need for them to be open to further contestation.” (Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies,” 218–24, 221). Mouffe, On the Political, 20–1. Deranty and Renault, “Politicizing Honneth’s Ethics of Recognition,” 92–111. Mouffe, On the Political, 31, 121; Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization. The term ‘ontology’ here refers to Mouffe’s Heidegger-inspired distinction between ‘the political’ (i.e. on an ontological level) and ‘politics’ (i.e. on an ontic level) (Mouffe, On the Political, 8–9). Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, xvii. Lysaker and Jakobsen, “Introduction,” 147–68, 9 fn. 32. Renault, “What is the Use of the Notion of the Struggle of Recognition?” 195–205, 196–201; cf. Deranty and Renault, “Politicizing Honneth’s Ethics of Recognition,” 107–8. Renault, “What is the Use of the Notion of the Struggle of Recognition?” 200. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 4. Additionally, Habermas claims that bodily and emotional experiences are significant regarding morality: “Feelings form the basis of our perception of something as moral (…) [, and] provide us with orientation in judging morally (…) [, which implies that] moral feelings clearly play an important role not only in the application of moral norms but also in their justification.” (J. Habermas, Justification and Application, 16 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. O. LYSAKER 174–175, see also: 75–76 (original italics); Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 45, 47, 50, 182. See also: Neblo, “Impassioned Democracy.” Furthermore, Habermas talks about different agonistic contexts of disagreement and conflict: “the risk of dissension increases with the scope for taking yes/no positions on criticizable validity claims” (Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 25) (my italics); “claims are open to criticism and contain, together with the risk of dissent, the possibility of discursive vindication as well” (Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 322) (my abbreviation); “Insofar as (…) compromises come about under fair bargaining conditions, they must be acceptable in principle to all parties, even if on the basis of respectively different reasons” (Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 108) (my italics); “[agents’] ability (…) to announce their disagreement (Neinsagenkönnen)” (Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” 421–61, 445) (my italics); “an ever-present risk of disagreement [for society’s consensus-oriented processes]” (Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, 208, 236–7, 405) (my abbreviation); “if complete agreement (…) were the normal state of (…) communication (…) bringing about agreement [would not be of importance]” (Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction, 23) (original italics). Furthermore, throughout the development of his philosophical project for over 60 years, Habermas has thematized power and conflict through such notions as ‘refeudalization’ of the public sphere, ‘ideology’ (or, ‘interests’), ‘systematically distorted communication’ (or, ‘pseudocommunication’), ‘communicative pathologies’, ‘legitimation crisis, ‘colonization’ of the lifeworld (and its personal, institutional, and cultural pathologies), ‘strategic’ action (in contrast to communicative), as well as ‘injustice’ (as constraint of democratic freedom) and ‘violation’ of human dignity). In line with the above notification, there are several attempts at agonistic readings of Habermas, see: Thomassen, Deconstructing Habermas, 27, 29, 55, 56; Allen, The Politics of Our Selves; Larsen, The Right to Dissent; A. J. Norval, Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Also, several of the postHabermasian thinkers within the tradition of Critical Theory (or, the Frankfurt School) – such as Axel Honneth, Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, and Iris Marion Young – combine insights from both Habermas and ‘post-structuralists’ (e.g., Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault). For a recent publication, see: Honneth and Rancière, Recognition or Disagreement. Owen, “Self-Government and ‘Democracy as Reflexive Co-operation’,” 290, 305; Thompson, The Political Theory of Recognition, 139. See also: Zurn, Axel Honneth, Chap. 1.2.4. Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition,” 129; Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation,” 234; Young, “Communication and the Other,” 120–36. Honneth, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation,” 234. Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition,” 178–9. Thompson, The Political Theory of Recognition, 145. Zurn, “Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy,” 89–126, 96–9. It appears, however, possible to further substantiate this objection if one accepts the premise that in today’s transnational world value conflicts arise not only within a state, but just as often between states and across state borders. For an analysis of Honneth’s recognition theory within the framework of a methodological transnationalism and as a cosmopolitan justice theory, see: Heins, “Realizing Honneth,” 141–53; Seglow, “Rights, Contribution, Achievement and the World,” 61–75. On the background of Honneth, I term this as the compatibility criteria, which maintains that social action, also in the case of agonism, must, as a moral minimum, be in agreement with protection of individuals’ political autonomy (Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 178). Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 107; O. Lysaker, “Democratic Disagreement and Embodied Dignity,” 147–68. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Simon Thompson and Jonas Jakobsen, as well as the journal’s coordinating editor Danielle Petherbridge and its anonymous referees, for comments. CRITICAL HORIZONS 17 Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Notes on contributor Odin Lysaker is Professor of Ethics at the University of Agder, Norway. He is PhD in Philosophy from the University of Oslo, Norway. Lysaker is co-editor (with Jonas Jakobsen) of Recognition and Freedom: Axel Honneth’s Political Thought (Brill 2015). His research interests are primarily Ethics, Political Philosophy, and Social Philosophy. Bibliography Allen, A. The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Benhabib, S. Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Cohen, J. L., and A. Arato. 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