Imperial Ideology

imperial ideology The last flowering of Ottoman miniature painting occurred in the first half of the 18th century during the reign of Ahmed III (r. 1703–30), with artists such as Levni and Abdullah Buhari leaving their mark on this period. Foremost among the paintings by Levni, whose work was extremely influential, are the 137 miniatures in the Surname-i Vehbi (Vehbi’s book of festivities), an account of the celebrations for the sons of Ahmed III by the poet Vehbi. Other major works of the period were also illustrated by Levni, such as an album depicting men and women of the period in the dress of various classes and callings, and a genealogical album containing portraits of the Ottoman sultans. The pieces from this period follow the conventions of traditional Ottoman miniature painting and aspire to three-dimensional form through detail, while non-Muslim Ottoman artists of the period tended to follow Western aesthetic norms. Towards the second half of the century Western influence steadily increased throughout all the painters of the empire until Ottoman miniature painting was entirely superseded by works of a Western character. Zeynep Atbaş ilmiye See ulema. iltizam See tax farming. imperial ideology The Ottoman state grew out of a small tribe without inheriting any major claim of imperial legitimacy. Rather, the imperial ideology of the Ottomans took shape through their own historical experience and interaction with a variety of political traditions. Founded at the frontier of the Islamic world and expanded toward both Muslim and Christian lands, the Ottoman Empire came to rule over a people embracing diverse faiths and ethnic communities. Ottoman imperial ideology formed out of, and reflected, this diverse heritage of the lands it ruled. Ottoman rulers viewed themselves as the rightful successors to past empires that once ruled the lands they conquered, including those of Alexander the Great, the Byzantines, the Abbasids, and even the kingdom of Solomon. Drawing on Byzantine, Iranian, Arab, and Turkic imperial traditions, they appropriated existing imperial titles such as caesar, padishah, sultan, khan, and caliph. Much of what may be identified as imperial ideology in the 16th century was shaped by the experience of the Ottomans during their early history. The peculiar conditions of the Ottoman principality turned them into a major player with more power than their military strength should have warranted, a fact that profoundly affected their self-perception. Rising in the wake of the 273 Mongol invasion that left few political structures intact the east of Nile, the Ottomans found themselves on practically equal footing with every other dynasty in the Islamic world. Concomitantly, their advances against the shrinking Byzantine territories, then known as the Roman Empire, gradually established the Ottomans as the rightful successors to the Romans. Furthermore, because of their location at the crossroads of maritime trade they were able to forge propitious relations with major powers of the Mediterranean basin such as Genoa and Venice. Thus their skills in state-building, helped by the favorable circumstances of location and timing, transformed their self-perception, leading them to percieve themselves as moral leaders of significant grandeur. Bolstered by a steady stream of conquests, this sense of grandeur became an undistinguishable part of imperial Ottoman self-image that stayed in effect until the end of the empire. Accompanying this was a ghazi (see ghaza) or Ottoman warrior ethos formed out of the Ottoman ruler’s leadership in protecting and extending the realm of Islam against that of the infidels. Even when the conquests ended, Ottoman rulers retained the title ghazi (referring to their role as defenders and expanders of the realm of Islam) as their most praiseworthy honorific and were frequently reminded by religious reformers to act as such. By the 16th century, the Ottoman dynasty had become a self-legitimating institution that manifested itself in a venerated genealogy and something verging on a cult of ancestors. As part of this genealogical obsession, the Ottomans sought to further legitimize their power by crafting a noble genealogy suitable to their imperial visions. The Ottomans lacked any connection to the two most prestigious lineages in the post-Mongolian Islamic world, those of the Prophet Muhammad and Genghis Khan (r. 1206–27, the founder of the Mongol Empire). To remedy this, Ottoman literati—especially in the 15th and early 16th centuries—busied themselves crafting impressive genealogical connections for their forbears. As a result the Oghuz genealogy came to be an official exposition of Ottoman lineage showing that the Ottoman rulers were the descendants of Oghuz Khan, who was also identified as the biblical Japhet or in some expositions as the Quranic Alexander the two-horned. Presenting Oghuz Khan as a believer who is praised in the Quran made the Ottoman genealogy superior to that of Genghis Khan. However, this genealogy gradually lost its appeal toward the end of the 16th century and was replaced by the selfjustifying lineage of the Ottoman sultans starting with the founder of the principality, Osman I (d. 1324). With a sense of triumphalism, the Ottoman lineage itself came to be considered superior to any other contemporary noble lineage. Dynastic historians, geomancers, chancellors, mystics, political thinkers and apologetics of the 16th 274 imperial ideology century gave imperial ideology a new and powerful twist, emphasizing the uniqueness of the Ottoman dynasty and the empire. By comparing the Ottoman dynasty to other great dynasties, historians accorded the crown title to the Ottomans in their grandeur and righteousness. With the claim of having materialized the most perfect form of political union promoted in Greco-Islamic political theory, the Ottoman ruler was declared to be a just ruler and his domains “virtuous cities.” Further, certain Ottoman rulers were perceived as “ruler of both temporal and spiritual worlds,” “renewer of religion” (müceddid), “pole of the universe” (kutb), and “the awaited savior” (mehdi). Esoteric interpretations showed the Ottoman lineage as the chosen one foretold in the Quran and by the Prophet. As inherited from Turco-Mongolian steppe traditions, the right to rule was vested in the dynastic family where all members were equally qualified to succeed. The royal blood was considered sacred and shedding the blood of members of the dynastic family was strictly avoided. Thus when fratricide was practiced, Ottoman princes were strangled. Rulership was believed to be a grace from God and the ruler was considered to be God’s choice. Conceptions of divine appointment inherited from three major imperial and religious traditions fused together in the Ottoman ideology and created a broad basis for the ruler’s legitimacy. Accordingly, the Ottoman ruler was conceived to have received “fortune” (kut) as in the Turco-Mongolian tradition, “divine light” (farr) as in the Persian tradition, and “good turn of fortune” (devlet) as in the Islamic tradition. During the first three centuries of the Ottoman dynasty, almost all successions took place through violent struggles among the candidates, with the expectation that only the most competent and the recipient of God’s favor would win. In later centuries, because of increasing public outcry and extensive institutionalization, fratricide was largely abandoned and the principle of primogeniture typically prevailed. By the time Ottomans came into power in the early 14th century, the concept of the caliphate had already lost its exclusive meaning as the universal leadership of the Muslim community. Although the Ottomans adopted the title of caliph from the beginnings of the 15th century, it was used more consciously after 1517 when the empire incorporated much of the Arabic-speaking Islamic world. By unifying the central lands of the Islamic world and becoming its largest and most powerful organization, the Ottomans found that they were the supreme rulers of, and spokespersons for, the entire Islamic world. A novel development resulting from this position was the fusion of the hitherto distinct juristic and mystical conceptions of the caliphate. The juristic conception of the caliphate referred to the successors of Muhammad in political terms as the universal leaders of the Muslim community, a concept that also embraced the historical caliph- ate institutionalized following the Prophet’s death and continued through the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. The mystical conception of the caliphate regarded the reigning caliph as God’s deputy on earth. Using the title with both associations, the Ottoman rulers viewed themselves both as God’s deputies on earth and as successors to the Prophet Muhammad’s political leadership. Akin to this authority and unique to Ottoman rulers was the jealously guarded title of Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn or “Servant of the Two Noble Sanctuaries,” referring to their custodianship over the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. With their sovereignty extending also over Jerusalem, their control of the three principal pilgrimage sites of Islam gave the Ottoman rulers unsurpassed prestige over other Muslim dynasties as well as responsibility for the Muslim community in general. For unlike other religious or secular titles, which were subject to dispute and challenge because of their abstractness, the Ottoman protectorate over these holy cities made their rulership more tangible and therefore implied a superiority over, and loyalty from, all Muslims. Although the early Ottoman ruling elite may have been somewhat eclectic in faith and more accommodating of different strands of Islam, as the state grew, they grew more conscious of Islamic orthodoxy. In line with the prescriptions of sunni Islam, upholding religion in public life and applying the sharia became primary objectives of the dynasty as well as the very foundation of its legitimacy. Stipulated by prevailing notions of legitimacy, in principle, all actions of the government had to be in conformity with the precepts of Islam. The ancient Iranian maxim, also attributed to the Prophet, that religion and state are twins, came to be a consensual and formulaic expression of this relationship. Because religion and government were inextricably intertwined, religious controversies had a tendency to turn into political problems, and vice versa. Thus the Ottoman ruler came to enjoy both political and religious power, a status best formulated in a statement from a 17th-century law book by jurist Hezarfen Hüseyin: “The leader of the religion alone is the grand mufti. The leader of the state alone is the grand vizier. The leader of both is the victorious ruler.” Political developments of the 16th century led the Ottoman ruling elite to further refine their religious identity and incorporate it into the imperial ideology. The rise of the Safavid dynasty in the east, with its claim of superiority, relentless propaganda in favor of Shia Islam, and ambitions to expand, challenged both the unity and the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire. To counter this threat, the Ottomans considered themselves champions of Sunni Islam and redefined their rulership on the basis of a distinctly Sunni theory of government. Amidst this complexity, it was justice that gained a prominent place in political discourse and became the imperial ideology single most important governing principle of Ottoman imperial ideology. In its official expositions, the empire’s subjects were considered a trust from God and it was the sultan’s foremost responsibility to protect them and dispense justice. Ottoman rulers thus believed that they needed to be harsher in their treatment of the ruling elite in order to protect the ruled from mistreatment. Both the continuity of the state and God’s favor toward the sultan were thought to be dependent on the sultan’s observance of justice. Injustice was the most frequently cited reason to dethrone sultans in the 17th and 18th centuries. Ottoman society was considered to have formed out of four main classes that comprised men of sword, men of pen, men of agriculture and husbandry, and men of crafts and trade. Keeping these classes in their respective spheres was thought to be the foundation of imperial justice. As part of this overarching concept of just rule, the Ottoman state from its very beginnings seems to have been no stranger to the idea of ruling by law. According to the Turco-Mongolian legacy, the ruler had the right to issue laws and was expected to abide by them unless he abolished or replaced them. Ottoman chronicles and writers of advice literature often accorded the highest esteem to the rulers who passed just laws and observed the existing ones while severely criticizing outright violations of law. By the mid-16th century, the concept of “ancient law” (kanun-i kadim) came to enjoy a constitutional authority among the ruling elite. This ancient law referred to the body of promulgated laws or well-established customary practices that were deemed to have constituted the foundations of the Ottoman state. Secular laws formed the basis of universal justice throughout the empire, while religious communities were accorded the autonomy of applying their own laws. Corporate bodies, such as guilds, could have their internal regulations recognized as laws by the Ottoman ruler. In the economic sphere, the Ottomans had three main principles: provisionalism, fiscalism, and traditionalism (see economy and economic policy). Provisionalism meant to make goods and services accessible, ample, and affordable for the empire’s subjects. Under this principle prices were kept under state control, exports were discouraged, and imports were encouraged. Fiscalism meant maintaining or increasing the revenues for the treasury with the aim of bolstering the state’s financial power. Traditionalism was the maintenance of ideal structures and balances in the economy that formed over time but had come to be thought of as immutable. Ottoman authorities, were uneasy with economic changes and consistently tried to achieve through reform a return to the economic status quo. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the imperial ideology of state building and expansionism of previous centuries proved increasingly untenable. The governing 275 idea of the imperial ideology in this period ruled that as long as laws, conventions, and institutions that were believed to be genuinely Ottoman were maintained, the empire would last forever. During this period the historical sultans—Mehmed II (r. 1444–46; 1451–81), Selim I (r. 1512–20), and Süleyman I (r. 1520–66)—were perceived as the ultimate role models, and institutions and laws established during their reigns were regarded as genuinely Ottoman, to be preserved as benchmarks for later reforms. In the meantime, political power accorded to individual sultans decreased while bureaucratic institutions such as the military, the government administration, and religious functionaries impressed their own identities and visions onto the imperial ideology. The notion of “eternal state” (devlet-i ebed müddet), a laudatory phrase that conventionally referred to God’s permanent grace for the ruler in political discourse, evolved to mean the continuation of the Ottoman Empire with its laws and institutions until the “end of days.” Thus the sacredness of Ottoman institutions and traditions surpassed those of individual sultans who continued to receive their legitimacy from their noble lineage and the idea of divine appointment. By the 19th century, traditional forms of legitimacy needed to be inflected to accommodate new developments in state and society. While religious and traditional components of imperial ideology were redefined and reinvented, modern political ideas and devices were integrated as well. Imperial ideology in this period, despite its radical turns at times, encompassed both tradition and modernity at the same time. With the advent of modern means of publicity, political symbolism gained a new emphasis to shape and promote imperial ideology. This symbolism was geared to enhance the sultan’s image as well as the legitimacy of the Ottoman state. While such royal ceremonies as coronation and sword girding were reinvented to serve dynastic needs of legitimacy, such novel means as a national flag and coat of arms were introduced in order to give a sense of national unity in a newly emerging territorial state. Besides making Islamic doctrines a part of imperial ideology, the Ottoman leadership also adopted secular ideas from Europe to bolster and complement its legitimacy. As a result, the caliphate came to be dissociated from the sultanate. While the Ottoman ruler inculcated a new image as the universal leader of the Islamic world, he also promoted himself as the secular leader of all Ottoman subjects exercising his authority in both capacities. Thus while Islam was more politicized than it had been before, Ottoman government also grew more secular. Toward the late 18th century reformism weighed in as the dominating component of imperial ideology. The sense of decline that pervaded the minds of the Ottoman elite from the late 16th century onward became more acute in the 19th century with closer interaction 276 intelligence with Europe. Traditionally, every Ottoman sultan succeeded with a claim and expectation of a new era of justice. Sultans in this period attempted to turn their reigns into ages of reform. Most of these reforms were modernizing initiatives intended to update Ottoman law, government, and the military either to address contemporary needs or to make them comparable to the ones emerged in Europe. All these modernizing reforms were promulgated for public consumption with an appeal to returning to past ideals or applying Islamic principles. As the state appeared to be the chief engine of modernization in the 19th century, one key aspect of this reformist ideology was centralization. But from the late 16th century onward, the Ottoman Empire was gradually decentralizing as imperial institutions turned into autonomous structures while provinces came to be ruled by provincial magnates. Ottoman rulers and the elite observed that this situation was not tenable and made incessant efforts to regain political power at the center. The question of who would control this power led to a series of crises between the sultan and ruling elite. Despite continuous demands from below to share power and initiate constitutionalism, the underlying imperial ideology was that political power should be wholly vested in the sultan. In the cases of Mahmud II (r. 1808– 39) and Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), this amounted somewhat to a cult of personality. During the 16th century, the concept of the caliphate was to a large extent limited to domestic concerns of legitimacy. With the decline of other Muslim political powers and the advent of colonialism, however, the Ottoman state increasingly appeared to be the principal authority over Muslims around the world. With the contraction of Ottoman borders during the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ottoman ruler maintained his moral authority over the Muslim populations outside the physical boundaries of the empire. During the latter half of the 19th century, the caliphate became the core of PanIslamism as official ideology. In response to demands from outside Muslim communities, and in order to counter colonial aggression by European powers, the Ottoman ruler fashioned a new image of himself as the supreme authority not only of Ottoman or former Muslim subjects but of all the Muslims in the world. While Pan-Islamism governed foreign policy, in the domestic sphere, Ottomanism took shape as the defining component of imperial ideology in the 19th century. It was envisioned as a universally unifying identity among the diverse ethnic groups and religious communities in the empire. It centered on the dynasty and the sultanate rather than the caliphate and aimed to create one nation living in Ottoman territories. Although the society was organized around religious communities in the millet system, inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims were removed to create Ottoman citizenship. The Ottoman dynasty and its history, which had been the basis of the legitimacy of the Ottoman state, now became part of a common identity of the newly envisioned Ottoman nation. Hüseyin Yılmaz Further reading: Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli, 1541–1600 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986); Colin Imber, Ebu’ssu‘ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age (London: Phoenix, 1973); Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). intelligence Following the example of medieval Muslim states and their Seljuk predecessors in Asia Minor, the Ottoman government placed a great emphasis on the collection of information both at home and from abroad. Mustafa Ali, a prominent Ottoman intellectual and historian at the end of the 16th century, contended that “if a prospering monarch does not use spies secretly, if the sovereign of the realm does not investigate the conditions of the state and people, if he contents himself with only questioning and believing his ministers, if he only sporadically commands that his aghas, who are privy to his secrets, keep him informed, then he forfeits justice for himself, integrity for his ministers, awe and dread for his army, and peace of mind and comfort for his subjects.” Domestic intelligence was collected by, among others, the Janissaries, the elite soldiers of the sultan’s standing infantry corps. They also acted as the military police and played an important role in domestic surveillance. Under the supervision of lower-rank Janissary officers, agents were sent out in plain clothes to patrol the markets, bazaars, coffeehouses, and taverns of Istanbul and other major cities, following which they prepared daily reports for the grand vizier. Similarly, central and local Ottoman authorities employed a large number of informers. The division of labor between the provincial and district governors (beylerbeyis and sancakbeyis) on the one hand, and the judges (kadıs) on the other, not only balanced the power of local Ottoman officials but also helped the central government verify the validity of incoming information. Incoming intelligence from the provinces covered a variety of issues that ranged from political issues (insubordination and rebellion of officials and garrisons, overtaxation, abuse of authority) to religious and moral ones (heresy, apostasy, religious sectari-