Truth and Pluralism Master Course, Winter Term, A.A. 2017/2018 Dr. Filippo Ferrari Course Description We will investigate and critically assess some of the main pluralist proposals on the nature of truth—i.e., proposals that maintain, roughly, that there is more than one kind of truth. We will be especially concerned with what are the motivations and limits of these proposals. Since this is a master course, some familiarity with basic notions in the philosophies of language and logic is expected. The course will be taught in English. The history of philosophy displays little consensus when it comes to the nature of truth. Radically different views have been proposed and developed. Some have taken truth to be correspondence with reality (Russell 1912, Wittgenstein 1921, Devitt 1984, David 1994, Vision 2004), others coherence with a maximally coherent set of beliefs (Bradley 1914, Putnam 1981, Rescher 1973, Walker 1989, Young 2001). Yet others have taken truth to be what is believed at the end of enquiry (Peirce 1878, Putnam 1990), what is useful to believe (James 1907, 1909) or what remains indefeasibly justified in any advancement of enquiry (Wright 2001). Lastly, deflationists (Field 1986, 1994, Grover 1992, Horwich 1998, Kunne 2003, Quine 1970, Ramsey 1927, Strawson 1950) maintain that whatever there is to say about truth is exhausted by the (non-paradoxical) instances of the disquotational schema (“p” is true if and only if p). Truth pluralists (among others—Edwards 2013, forthcoming, Lynch 2009, Pedersen 2010, 2013, Pedersen & Wright 2013, Sher 2013, 2016, Wright, C.D. 2010, Wright C.G. 1992, 2013) appeal to more than one property in their account of truth. Propositions from different domains of discourse are true in different ways. The truth of propositions concerning the empirical world (e.g., <There are mountains>) might be accounted for in terms of correspondence while the truth of legal propositions (e.g., <Speeding is illegal>) might be accounted for in terms of coherence with the body of law. Truth pluralism provides a new, interesting way of looking at the nature of truth. The pluralist programme has attracted—and continues to attract—considerable attention. Critics have launched a wide range of objections and challenges against truth pluralism. Sympathizers have responded to these objections and challenges and have further developed and refined the view. Several kinds of issues are pertinent to an informed, proper assessment of the pluralist programme. The goal of the proposed course is thus to introduce students to the complexity of a much-debated topic and to provide them with the necessary theoretical tools to understand and critically evaluate proposals on the nature of truth. There will be a total of 14 sessions. I will dedicate the first few sessions to a general introduction to the course and a discussion of the philosophical methodology underlying some of the pluralist proposals we will discuss. The remaining sessions will be devoted to a critical discussion of specific pluralist proposals on the nature of truth. Course Requirements This is a master seminar, thus although I will lead the discussion of some of the articles in the syllabus and I will provide some introductory material for each section of the course, I expect students to take active part to the course. This means that each student is expected to conduct one session by preparing an exhaustive handout of the assigned paper and lead other fellow students through the paper. Depending on the total number of students enrolled in the course, an additional joint presentation with another student might be required. Moreover, each student is expected to elaborate two or three key questions for each session to be asked during the critical discussion of the essay. Each session I will collect handouts and questions which will be considered part of the formal requirements for admission. PART 1—Introducing Truth Pluralism Background Readings Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Nola, R. (2009) Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press: “Introduction”, pp.1-11; Burgess, A. & Burgess, P. (2011), Truth, Princeton(NJ): Princeton University Press. Künne, W. (2003) Conceptions of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.1: 1-32. Glanzberg, Michael, "Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/truth/>. Horwich, P. (1998) Truth (2nd Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.1, pp.1-14. Lynch, M. & Wyatt, J. (2016) “From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4): 323-40. Nolan, D. 2009. “Platitudes and Metaphysics”. in Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Nola, R (eds), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press:267-300. Wright, C. (1999) “Truth: a traditional debate reviewed,” in Blackburn, S. & Simmons, K. (eds), Truth, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 203–238. 1. Some Preliminary distinctions— Concept, Predicate, Property Asay, J. (2013) The Primitivist Theory of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.11-16. Edwards, D. (forthcoming), The Metaphysics of Truth, Ch.1, 6-17. Wright, C. (2013) “A Plurality of Pluralisms” in Pedersen, N.J.J.L. & Wright, C.D. (eds): 129-31. Wyatt, J. “The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism” The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(263): 366-78. 2. Against Monism Wright, C. (2001), “Minimalism, Deflationism, Pragmatism, Pluralism”, in Lynch, M. (ed.) The Nature of Truth, Cambridge(MA): MIT Press:754-59. Lynch, M. (2009), Truth as One and Many, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.6: 105-27. Ferrari, F. & Moruzzi, S. (2017), “Deflating Truth about Taste”, Unpublished Manuscript, 2-4. Lynch, M. (2009), Truth as One and Many, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.2: 21-50. PART 2—Varieties of Truth Pluralism Background Readings Wright, C. (2013) “A Plurality of Pluralisms” in Pedersen, N.J.J.L. & Wright, C.D. (eds) Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding and Wright, Cory, "Pluralist Theories of Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/truth-pluralist/>. Lynch, M. (2009) Truth as One and Many, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.3: 51-68. 3. Alethic Functionalism Lynch, M. (2001) “A functionalist theory of truth,” in M. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 723–749. 4. Manifestation Pluralism Lynch, M. (2009) Truth as One and Many, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch.4: 69-84. 5. Simple Determination Pluralism Edwards, D. (forthcoming) The Metaphysics of Truth, Ch.5. Wright, C. (2013) “A Plurality of Pluralisms” in Pedersen, N.J.J.L. & Wright, C.D. (eds): 145-52. 6. Alethic Disjunctivism Pedersen, N.J.J.L. & Wright, C.D. (2013) “Pluralism about Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism”, in Pedersen & Wright (2013), Ch.5: 87-112. 7. Strong Pluralism Wright, C. (2001) “Minimalism, Deflationism, Pragmatism, Pluralism”, in The Nature of Truth, Lynch, M. (ed.), Cambridge, (MA): MIT Press: 759-781. 8. Deflated Truth Pluralism Beall, J.C. (2013) “Deflated Truth Pluralism”, in Pedersen & Wright (2013), Ch.16: 323-38. 9. Ecumenical Truth Pluralism Ferrari, F. & Moruzzi, S. (2017) “Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism”, Unpublished Manuscript. 10. Varieties of correspondence Sher, G. (2013) “Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route from Thought to Reality” in Pedersen & Wright (2013), Ch.8 :157-79. PART 3—Against Pluralism 11. Deflationary Pressures Dodd, J. (2013) “Deflationism Trumps Pluralism”, in Pedersen & Wright (2013), Ch.15: 298-322. 12. Primitivist Pressures Asay, J. (2016) “Putting Pluralism in its Place”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12303. 13. Monistic Pressures (I) Sainsbury, M. (1996) “Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 899–901. Wright, C.D. (2012) “Is pluralism inherently unstable?,” Philosophical Studies, 159(1): 89–105. 14 Monistic Pressure (II) Tappolet, C. (1997) “Mixed inferences: a problem for pluralism about truth predicates,” Analysis, 57: 209–210. Tappolet, C. (2000) “Truth pluralism and many-valued logics: a reply to Beall,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 50: 382–385. 15 Other Objections to Alethic Pluralism Newhard, J. (2014) “Alethic Functionalism, Manifestation, and the Nature of Truth”, Acta Analytica 29 (3):349-361. Newhard, J. (2013) “Four Objections to Alethic Functionalism”, Journal of Philosophical Research 38:69-87. Newhard, J. (2017) “Plain truth and the incoherence of alethic functionalism”, Synthese 194(5): 1591–1611. Wright, C.D. (2010) “Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(2):265-283.  1