23.05.2017 Mehmet Emre Yılmaz İstanbul 29 May University Political Science and International Relations THE EFFECT OF THE RUSSIAN IDENTITY OVER THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING PUTIN'S PERIOD -THE CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH- Introduction Constructivism has been becoming an alternative to the rationalist theories with the identity policies, intersubjectivity, the rules, the emphasis of the ontological determination of language and culture as from 1990s. As well as the description claim of the changing world in the field of International Relations (IR) is so. In this point, other factors aside, the identity and the determination of the identity occupy a very prominent place in the constructivist approach. The identity has an esteemed effect on the relations among the states and the foreign policy making process of the states. Jülide Karakoç, “Konstrüktivizmde Dış Politika ve Etnik Kimlikler,” Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 2, v. 28 (2013): 132-37. However in here, the role of the identity on the foreign policy making process of the states is just discussed. This article examines how the effect of the Russian identity which was gotten base the culture, the religion or sect, the ethnicity, the geography, the tradition, the state structure, family structure and so on, over the Russian Foreign Policy during Putin’s period specifically by highlighting the determination of the identity. In other words, it analyses that the Russian identity how forms the Russian Foreign Policy during Putin’s period by taking cognizance of the dynamics and components of the Russian identity. The Russian Identity and The Russian Foreign Policy The land-based power, in almost every period of history, Russia has kept a step ahead and has pushed to be strong. Because a state-owned land ‘the territory’, demonstrated that its influence area in a sense. Russia is the largest country all over the world today as the soil limit. Russia is described as ‘continental type of state feature’ because of this situation. Çağdaş Duman, “Putin Dönemi Aktif Rus Dış Politikası: Sıcak Denizlere İnme Politikası Perspektifinde,” Anka Enstitüsü, May 5, 2017, http://ankaenstitusu.com/putin-donemi-aktif-rus-dis-politikasi-sicak-denizlere-inme-politikasi-perspektifinde/. (Access 16.05.2017) In this point, in the framework of geopolitical approaches of Alexandr Dugin, I think the detection can be made that Russia is a land state, also is ‘continental land power’. Actually, it is obvious that the concept is built on the great power (derjava) perception of the USSR. I think about it can be said like a heritage. At the same time, I think it can be said that the centralism of the state as an authoritarian, is given the importance sufficiently. Actually, this case shows us that the understanding of the geographical identity of Russia. Erhan Büyükakıncı, “Vladimir Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasına Bakış: Söylemler, Arayışlar ve Fırsatlar,” Jan 1, 2004, https://www.academia.edu/2076633/Vladimir_Putin_Dönemi_Rus_Dış_Politikasına_Bakış_Söylemler_Arayışlar_ve_Fırsatlar, 6, 8. (Access 16.05.2017) This understanding causes a strong and central state. Moreover, Russia have to behave like this. The Putin’s words are the reflection of this heritage which was taken over by him that “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.” Dmitri Romanovski, “How Central Is The Question of Russian Identity (or Identities) In Determining The Course of Russian Foreign Policy?,” https://www.academia.edu/7185110/How_central_is_the_question_of_Russian_identity_or_identities_in_determining_the_course_of_Russian_foreign_policy, 3. (Access 16.05.2017) I think this reflection can be congregated for the Russian foreign policy under Imperial and Post-Soviet Identity during Putin’s period. It would not be wrong to say that its ‘land-gathering’ (sobiranie zemel’) feature, multi-ethnic structure, hosting many different people, cultures (like European and Asian cultures) and traditions are the results of this view. The perspectives of universalism and ‘national cohesion’ (drujba naradov) are the effects of this situation. Ibid. 3-7. Besides, Alexandr Dugin talks about it that “The finding of the pure blood is difficult in us who the Russians. This is not a our disease, this is the guarantee of our supremacy and our being unique, universal.” Alexandr Dugin, Rus Jeopolitiği Avrasyacı Yaklaşım (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2015), 363. However, I think the question have to asked and examined in this point that which extent to this idea reflects the main Russian identity? As a powerful leader, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has been within this continental power land. Putin is seen like an authoritarian leader, and that is trusted and stayed silent by his peoples as the virtue which ascribed holiness. Duman, “Putin Dönemi Aktif Rus Dış Politikası,”. I think it might be interpreted as the moral or religious influence. Furthermore, there is a kind of political group which generally consists of Putin’s close friends and acquaintances. The mostly backgrounds of these new vacancies which is created in Putin's period, based on the military and intelligence units. On the one hand, it shows the different aspect of the state centralism. Büyükakıncı, “Vladimir Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasına Bakış,” 9. On the other hand, it shows that there is a powerful elite stratum with Putin in Russia. Besides according to Putin, KGB (Committee for State Security)-FSB (Federal Security Service) is the elite group of Soviet Union and Russia. So I think it can be put forward that there is a kind of the elite culture at this point. Moreover, in here can be mentioned from patriotism, the military culture and also the victory culture, due to have a private position of the army which based on this situation in Russia. In the framework of these elites, some names come out in front of me that Vladislav Surkov who is one of the Putin’s advisor and organizes youth movements. Alexandr Bortnikov has been in the Directorship of FSB since 2008; Aleksandr Bastrikin is the Chairman of Russia Investigation Committee, Putin’s very old friend and a criminologist. Igor Sechin is the chairman of the board of director of Rosneft oil companies and also very close to Putin from St. Petersburg. Yuri Kovalchuk is an important person in banking and media sectors; Vladimir Yakunin had made the presidency of Russian Railways Company until August 2015. The Minister of Defense is Sergey Shoygu, and Dmitry Rogozin who played an quite active role in Ukrainian Crisis and is Deputy Prime Minister related to the military industry. The famous filmmaker is Nikita Mikhalkov and finally, the priest is Tikhon Shevkunov that the confession of Putin. Shevkunov is the abbot of Sretenski Monastery which is located in the center of Moscow. But also, he is a quite influential guy. Some of them are called as Siloviks who had served in the military, the police and the secret services, and moreover most of them from St. Petersburg like Putin. Michel Eltchaninoff, Putin’in Aklında Ne Var? (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), 14-16, 19, 21-22. In fact, all these datas put forth that there is a strong structure which consists of a powerful leader and the various and powerful elites in Russia. So I think it can be said that the Russian Foreign Policy is formed by them. In other words, the Russian Foreign Policy objectives have become the elite’s tools in this period. Romanovski, “How Central Is The Question of Russian Identity,” 2. But at the same time, they include the dynamics of the Russian identity within their bodies. So I think it may be claimed that there is not a difference between this top stratum and the public-peoples as the Russian identity obviously in here. I think that the aggregation of the dynamics of the Russian identity under the six hoods is better for the explanation of the issue. Firstly, almost the eighty percent of the Russian population is Orthodox. The prevalence of the Orthodox faith affected the politics. Putin glorifies the special role of the Orthodoxy which has unified the Russian communities under one state since when Russia was baptized by Prince Vladimir, in national history (from his speech at the Seliger Youth Forum, July 31, 2012). Moreover, Putin declares the Russian Orthodox Church as the natural ally of the government. Secondly, Russia visualizes itself as the conservative savior of the Europe in the context of the Christian values (from the Internet site of Russia People’s Front, August 18, 2014). Eltchaninoff, Putin’in Aklında Ne Var?, 10, 57, 58, 60. Thirdly, it defends to re-establish the ties among the Slavic societies through the traditional Russian policy and Russian nationalism. Büyükakıncı, “Vladimir Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasına Bakış,” 9. The fourth dynamic is the family structure and relations. There is an understanding that every family can join the national secret with the giving birth to one Russian baby. Dugin, Rus Jeopolitiği, 91. Furthermore, Putin perceives the Internet as an immoral tool for this point. His aim is to protect the children from the pornography, the violence, and the depraved and obscene behaviors (Krasnodar, September 12, 2012). Besides, he stresses the struggle with ‘gay culture’ which can provide to unite all conservative Europe. The fifth is the doubt against the West and the opposition of the West. Actually, the main factor is the insecurity against the West’s double standard. In this framework, the Russian culture and the Russian national identity which composes patriotism, the Christian values, the traditional family, have to be protected from the attacks, the infectious diseases from the West and the foreigners. Eltchaninoff, Putin’in Aklında Ne Var?, 60-62. In other words, this status can be perceived as the protection of ‘the spiritual and cultural heritage’. Greg Simons, “Nation Branding and Russian Foreign Policy,” UI Occasional Papers 21 (2013): 14. The sixth is the authoritarian character. The authoritarian character is for a strong central state in my point of view. The character can be seen in Putin’s discourse that “A weak state harms more the democracy from a despotic power.” (from the meeting with the representatives of the non-governmental organizations, RFE/RL Newsline, June 13, 2001). Büyükakıncı, “Vladimir Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasına Bakış,” 1. Conclusion When these dynamics of the Russian identity are matched with together the applications of the Russian Foreign Policy, I think it can be made some inferences obviously. NATO made the military intervention to Serbia and Kosovo in 1999. NATO’s military intervention caused that Russia felt humiliated itself. Furthermore, the events irritated the Russian people and managers. It can be said that the part of Putin’s career focus on the revenge and the sanctions of NATO’s military intervention. Eltchaninoff, Putin’in Aklında Ne Var?, 26-27. At the same time, Russia have not withdrawn its traditional support for the policies of the Belgrade management which based on Serbian nationalism so. Büyükakıncı, “Vladimir Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasına Bakış,” 3. I think it is understood that there is the forceful Slavic brotherhood and the Slavic-Orthodox cooperation in the context of the identity. According to my viewpoint, the Slavic identity, Slavophilism and the Russian nationalism are wanted to come forward in here. I think another reflection of this situation as the framework of Eurasianism and Slavophilism, can be seen that in the Chechen Wars, the Georgia Issue and the Crimea Crisis. Especially the nationalistic determinants are seen to increase with the Chechen Wars. Ibid. 5-6, 8. Therewithal, the Crimea Crisis is a cornerstone in this topic. According to Putin whose stresses the emotional side of his discourse about it, ‘In the Russian people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has been the heart of Russia in every time’. This rhetoric such as ‘Kosovo is the heart of Serbia (Kosovo je srce Srbije)!’. At this point, Putin undertake the roles of the ‘land-gatherer’ and the fighter by returning Crimea to Russia in the contexts of the historical background and ‘continental land power’. Romanovski, “How Central Is The Question of Russian Identity,” 7. Moreover, the same case and the aggressive attitude can be observed in the Georgia Issue. I think about the attitude would not be wrong to say that like the octopus, in the context of the historical tradition. As a result of all these events and phenomenons, as a powerful and authoritarian leader, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin follows up a pragmatic foreign policy under the Russian identity which depends on the Orthodox faith, the Christian values, the Slavic brotherhood, the family relations, the insecurity against the West’s double and the authoritarian character. Ibid. 2. Based on that, I think telling a few things about Putin is the proper that he is the realist who can always adapt his speeches to the conditions and requirements. He settles himself in the right places because he wants to hold the initiative and the responsibility in his hands. Eltchaninoff, Putin’in Aklında Ne Var?, 12. Lastly, in the interview with the Russian television and Associated Press in August 2013, Putin said that “I am a conservative-leaning pragmatist” (Novo-Ogarevo, September 4, 2013). Ibid. 64 (from footnote). REFERENCES Büyükakıncı, Erhan, “Vladimir Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikasına Bakış: Söylemler, Arayışlar ve Fırsatlar,” https://www.academia.edu/2076633/Vladimir_Putin_Dönemi_Rus_Dış_Politikasına_Bakış_Söylemler_Arayışlar_ve_Fırsatlar, Jan 1, 2004. (Access 16.05.2017) Dugin, Alexnadr, “Rus Jeopolitiği Avrasyacı Yaklaşım,” İstanbul; Küre Yayınları, 2015. Duman, Çağdaş, “Putin Dönemi Aktif Rus Dış Politikası: Sıcak Denizlere İnme Politikası Perspektifinde;” Anka Enstitüsü, http://ankaenstitusu.com/putin-donemi-aktif-rus-dis-politikasi-sicak-denizlere-inme-politikasi-perspektifinde/, May 5, 2017. (Access 16.05.2017) Eltchaninoff, Michel, “Putin’in Aklında Ne Var?” İstanbul; İletişim Yayınları, 2017. 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