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Reasons Without Persons is a well-written, ambitious work that ties disparate strands of philosophy together into a complete picture of what is required for an agent to be rational — theories of personhood and theories of epistemic and practical rationality. To my knowledge, this is something only Parfit has been successful at tackling thus far. In general, the book is knowledgeable and an interesting read. While these are certainly laudatory features of the work, still, there is room for improvement. For instance, Hedden spends a good amount of time exploring other logically possible views only to dismiss them or to show how his view is consistent with them, when instead he could be more usefully focused on exploring the underlying assumptions of the discourse, and in making tighter and clearer connections in his line of reasoning. That said, the book is recommended reading for anyone interested in the connections between rationality and personal identity, and it is written in a way that makes it accessible to pretty much anyone interested in the topic. The work itself is composed of ten chapters. In the first chapter, Hedden lays out his thesis in programmatic terms. In Chapter Two, Hedden argues in favor of his view based on critiques of theories of personal identity, and in the third chapter he develops his views further, applying his critiques to diachronic principles in general. In Chapter Four, Hedden considers the role of reflection in his own account. Chapter Five deals with an important objection to Hedden's view. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight focus on developing the view in more detail, while Chapters Nine and Ten consider applications of the view to various issues in the theory of rationality. Given length constraints, we can consider the view only in its programmatic form. For that reason, we will be concerned mainly with clarifying the proposal and its consequences. This review, then, instead of attempting to sketch the entire book and offer some general
On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic - concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic - concerned with our temporally extended behavior. Recently, however, several epistemologists have begun to question whether an account of rationality requires both types of norms. My aim in this paper is to address what I take to be the most direct and general recent attack on diachronic epistemic rationality, the arguments for so-called “time-slice epistemology” by Brian Hedden. I argue that Hedden's attempt to motivate the rejection of diachronic rational norms ultimately fails, and in particular that an independently motivated view about the nature of such norms, one on which such norms govern processes, escapes his assault unscathed.
2017 •
In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality (TSR). One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from this stronger claim.
2018 •
A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire-independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.
The Nature of Desire. Eds. Julien Deonna and Federico Lauria.
Desires without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We WantEvaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet, in fact, it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
No Exception for BeliefThis paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism.
Philosophical Studies
Irrational desires1991 •
I believe that the attempts discussed above fail to show that logically satisfiable basic desires can be rationally impotent. Obviously, this does not entail that they cannot be. Nevertheless, I think it is reasonable to accept a Neo-Humean view. Such acceptence need not be based on burden of proof arguments, about which there is well-grounded skepticism. I prefer instead to base it on a burden of introduction argument; because of the initial plausibility of the Neo-Humean view, critics carry the burden of introducing theories that entail that basic desires can be non-instrumentally irrational (in the relevant sense). Once such theories are introduced, the philosophical court can rule without imposing a burden of proof. I have tried to establish that three recently introduced theories in fact give us no grounds for rejecting Neo-Humeanism.
Philosophy Compass
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2): The Kantian Conception of Rationality and Rationalist ConstructivismIn the second half of this essay, I discuss the Kantian conception of rationality which lies at the heart of the form of rationalist constructivism laid out in its first half. Along the way, I discuss some recent arguments for a version of this view due to Michael Smith and Julia Markovits. I then discuss some of the advantages of the resulting view - focusing on metaphysical, epistemological, and motivational questions.
forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy
Uniqueness and MetaepistemologyWe defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in what beliefs to form in response to your evidence. We argue for Uniqueness by appealing to two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. First, rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others. Second, they help us formulate contingency plans about what to believe in various situations. Uniqueness vindicates the ability of rational evaluations to play these two roles, while Permissivism does not. So much the worse for Permissivism.
Kültür Mirası Yönetimi: Neden ve Nasıl Türkiye'den Deneyimler ve Tarışmalar
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Journal of Pharmacognosy and Phytochemistry
Rice bean (Vigna Umbellata) the forgotten gold: unraveling the commercial, nutritional and medicinal value2023 •
Journal of Mathematical Sciences & Computational Mathematics
Number Theory and Their Application in Computer Science and Cryptography2020 •
Diachronic Intertextualities: Falsafa, Kalām, Uṣūl al-Fiqh
Diachronic Intertextualities: Marked and Unmarked Quotations (Repeated N-Grams) in Some Key Texts of Pre-Modern Falsafa, Kalām, Uṣūl al-Fiqh2012 •
The problem of “Eurasian China”: On the article by Vladimir Datsyshen
Дмитриев С.В., Кузьмин С.Л. Проблема «евразийского Китая». К статье В.Г. Дацышена // Российское китаеведение, 2023, № 2(3). С. 133-1422023 •
Educação & Realidade
O Ocaso da Exegese: sobre a performance docente de Gilles Deleuze2024 •
2019 •
2017 •
International Journal of Genetics
Secondary Sex Ratio in a South-Western Nigerian Town2012 •
Ethnobotany research and applications
Ethnobotanical survey of anti-constipation medicinal plants used in Sikonge District, Tanzania2024 •
Frontiers in Water
FluOil: A Novel Tool for Modeling the Transport of Oil-Particle Aggregates in Inland Waterways2022 •
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Bulletin
Studies on proton pump inhibitors. III. Synthesis of 8-((2-benzimidazolyl)sulfinylmethyl)-1,2-di-hydroquinolines and related compounds1990 •
arXiv (Cornell University)
A Unified Batch Selection Policy for Active Metric Learning2021 •