International Journal of Philosophical Studies
ISSN: 0967-2559 (Print) 1466-4542 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/riph20
Between Luxury and Need: The Idea of Distance in
Philosophical Anthropology
Alison Ross
To cite this article: Alison Ross (2017): Between Luxury and Need: The Idea of Distance
in Philosophical Anthropology, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, DOI:
10.1080/09672559.2017.1320018
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Published online: 08 May 2017.
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Date: 29 May 2017, At: 21:13
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1320018
Between Luxury and Need: The Idea of Distance in
Philosophical Anthropology
Alison Ross
Philosophy Department, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
ABSTRACT
This paper ofers a critical analysis of the use of the idea of distance in philosophical
anthropology. Distance is generally presented in works of philosophical
anthropology as the ideal coping strategy, which rests in turn on the thesis of
the instinct deiciency of the human species. Some of the features of species life,
such as its sophisticated use of symbolic forms, come to be seen as necessary parts
of this general coping strategy, rather than a merely expressive outlet, incidental
to the ultimate goal of life preservation. The paper analyses the arguments used
in support of the thesis of instinct deiciency in Hans Blumenberg and considers
their implications for the status of symbolic expression in species life. It contrasts
the approach this thesis involves with one that proceeds by presenting and
arguing from biological evolutionary evidence. The contrast is used to examine
the questions: in what sense instinct deiciency is speciically anthropological, and
in what precise sense philosophical anthropology is ‘philosophical’.
KEYWORDS Hans Blumenberg; André Leroi-Gourhan; luxury; need; distance; philosophical
anthropology; instinct deficiency; the image
… it is not necessity but its contrary, ‘luxury’, that presents living matter and
mankind with their fundamental problems. (Bataille 1991, 12)
he description of the ways the species grapples with and adapts to ‘necessity’
is a constant theme in the major works of philosophical anthropology.1 here
are authorising references to necessity, for instance, in the justiication given
of the essential function of institutions in imposing distance between individuals. Institutions are required, whether at the level of social conventions like
manners or in the form of political systems in large societies. hey shield us
from the coruscating exposure to intimacy. Such an exposure is un-livable,
argue Arnold Gehlen and Helmuth Plessner, and institutions are thus defended
as an anthropological necessity (see Gehlen 1980; Plessner 1999). Institutions
ofer necessary protection for the creature; and they do so even at the highest
CONTACT Alison Ross
alison.ross@monash.edu
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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A. ROSS
level, that is, the ultimate stakes of life preservation. In Hans Blumenberg’s
account of the role played by myth in human life, he proposes that myth is an
exo-skeleton for the creature; one that lessens the constraining impact that
the environment, termed by him ‘the absolutism of reality’, would otherwise
have on this creature’s capacity to act. Like Gehlen and Plessner, the motif of
Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology is ‘distance’.2 His schema of justiication is a pseudo-evolutionary tale based on the concept of human instinct
deiciency, which propels symbolic devices into the role that the institution
plays in Gehlen (Blumenberg 1985, 8). Like Gehlen and Plessner, Blumenberg
thinks that the speciic species’ combination of human instinct deiciency with
the habitat of a hostile environment requires a strategy of ‘distance’. he strategy
ultimately preserves the creature’s life since its exposure in his account includes
reference to its status as prey for (other) predators. he claim of the speciicity
of this combination, among others, is open to question. In the Introduction to
his major opus Work on Myth, Blumenberg (1985) sets out the pseudo-evolutionary tale that grounds his position on the symbolic activities of the species.
he story emphasises the role of unknown factors in the ‘leap’ that occurs in the
transition from the tree climbing primate in the forest to the bipedal creature.
Instead of speculating on the factors involved in the transition, Blumenberg
emphasises the instinct deiciency of the bipedal creature that occurs as a result
of its upright status, and which is accentuated in the context of its new environment.3 he creature moves from the protection of the cover once provided by
the shrinking forest, onto the open savannah where it is exposed to unspeciied dangers that come from the open horizon. he formulation is akin to the
Freudian deinition of anxiety as generalised fear of the unknown. In Freud,
this fear may be displaced and stabilised in phobic obsessions, but at its deepest
level the pulse of the ‘unknown’ is the fear of death.4 Amongst the strategic
responses the creature has to this situation of exposure are: the rearing of its
young in caves, so that the risks of what ‘may come at one from the horizon’
are limited to those who venture outside the protected environment of the cave
to hunt; and the protection ofered to hunters and rearers alike by the work
of myth. In Blumenberg’s account, the work of myth sets up the horizon and
categories of a world so that these are tolerable for human existence and this
means it installs a substitutive horizon for the ‘real’ one. As the story makes
clear: the fears that myth manages, such as the threat of predation, are treated
primarily in their existential features. he work of myth treats a highly speciic
existential situation; it manages the creature’s anxiety. Crucially, the substitutive
horizon constructed in myth enhances the creature’s operability in a hostile
environment. his substitutive horizon releases the creature from the paralysing
anxiety that presses upon it in an ‘open’ horizon. he work on myth, in contrast,
is the ‘setting free of the world’s observer’ that is the result of the work of myth.5
Such work includes the skills involved in the ‘art of living’ [Lebenskunst].6 he
work on myth registers the achievement of distance; it is focused on speciic
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
3
paths of adaptation to a hostile environment, in which the pressure of this
environment, its immediacy, is lessened and paths for action are marked out.
he vocabulary of adaptation used here is intended in quite a loose sense: it is
not the evolutionary adaptation that is treated in evolutionary biology but the
adaptation achieved through the construction of a symbolic world, which is
able to deal with and efectively distance the oppressive immediacy of the real
one. Myth, we might say, is a tool in the repertoire of the species that assists
in carving out what Blumenberg calls, an ‘ecological niche’, where ‘ecological’
refers to the way a symbolic environment moderates, i.e. ‘distances’, a real one
(Blumenberg 1983). In this paper I would like to consider the arguments for
(symbolic) distance as the tool for the vulnerable, deicient creature, seeking to
ameliorate its ‘exposure’ to a hostile world. I will focus on Blumenberg’s account
because of the detail of its evolutionary story and its existential hue. his detail
allows for a comparison with other approaches, such as the account given in
the work of the French palaeontologist André Leroi-Gourhan, who also gives
weight to symbolic strategies, but embeds these more irmly in a conception
of species’ biological evolution that tracks ethnographic diferences. In the
following sections I will compare Leroi-Gourhan and Blumenberg’s treatment
of symbolic tools; analyse the plausibility of Blumenberg’s thesis of anthropological instinct deiciency; and then consider the question of what makes
philosophical anthropology philosophical.
Leroi-Gourhan: Symbolic Life as Species Deinition and
Intra-Species Diferentiation
If one were to consider what drove the evolution of the human species to take
the shape and direction it has, it is not at all clear that ‘adapting to necessity’
would be an adequate path of explanation, nor that such an explanation could
in any case be restricted to biological factors or data. Ater all, it is certain that
amongst the means of adaptation the species has at its disposal are its expressive
outlets. hese outlets distinguish the human animal from other animals in its
ability to project and inhabit a more or less comprehensive, but artiicial environment. his environment may shape the paths that accentuate certain characteristics of the species. According to the French palaeontologist Leroi-Gourhan,
this artiicial environment is the distinctive feature of human adaptation. He
understands the signiicance of this environment in speciically social terms.
Unlike Blumenberg, who deliberately classiies the causes of the leap as
unknown in order to focus on its existential ramiications, Leroi-Gourhan
draws attention to the role of biology in the species leap. Further, he transfers
the metaphor of the biological process into his analysis of the expressive outlets
of the species. In his account of the process of humanisation, Leroi-Gourhan
contests the idea that brain size was the determining factor in the species leap.
What part of the body, he asks, determines the course of species evolution? he
4
A. ROSS
idea that humanisation began with the feet and the balance the big toe provided
to the biped, is a ‘less exalting’ idea than that the anatomical partitions were
‘broken down by the sheer force of a not-yet-existent brain’ (Leroi-Gourhan
1993, 149).7 he biological criteria of the human species are: the erect posture
(bipedalism), the short face, and the free hand during locomotion
(Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 18). His claim that ‘cerebral development is a secondary
criterion’ is based on the idea that despite its ‘decisive role in the development
of human societies’ the brain size of the species is ‘a correlative of erect posture
and not … primordial’ (19). Instead, he argues that the relation between face
and hand was ‘as close as ever’ in the brain’s development: ‘Tools for the hand,
language for the face’ (20). he freeing of the hand ‘almost necessarily implies
a technical activity diferent from that of apes, and a hand that is free during
locomotion, together with a short face and the absence of fangs, commands
the use of artiicial organs, that is, of implements’ (19). In his conception of the
‘operational sequence’ Leroi-Gourhan highlights the distinctive role of externalised techniques in human evolution. His thesis is that the other members
of the animal kingdom achieve ‘inside’ through species adaptation what human
evolution achieves ‘outside’ through such externalisation. Although one might
expect him to cite in this regard the striking fact of the freeing efect of tools
as external implements for instrumental purposes, Leroi-Gourhan (235) identiies the more fundamental fact of ‘the freeing of the word and our unique
ability to transfer our memory to a social organism outside ourselves’. he
human body, he contends, ‘is enclosed and extended by a social body.’ he
‘properties’ of this social body are such that ‘zoology no longer plays any part
in its material development’ (21). he main implications of this approach to
the social body are that instead of dealing with genetic qualiiers, Leroi-Gourhan
deines the species in relation to the linguistic, igurative and material components of their collective expression (White cited in Leroi-Gourhan 1993, xxi).8
In turn, this means that a given operational sequence, itself ethnically speciic,
comes to substitute for ‘the psychozoological divisions that make certain operations and a certain physical apparatus typical of particular species of animals’
(237). In so far as this perspective draws attention to ethnic diferences, it can
be contrasted with Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology in which the fact
of such diferences is moot. here is, for instance, a presumption in favour of
the continuity of the uses of symbolic form that, in Blumenberg’s philosophical
anthropology, is held in place by the constant of ‘instinct deiciency’. Similarly,
arguments regarding the characteristics of technological as opposed to ‘crude’
societies, which absorb Leroi-Gourhan’s attention, do not afect the organising
principles of Blumenberg’s position. Just such a debate about a technological
society, as we will see, is intimately connected with Leroi-Gourhan’s broader
prognostications about the species. In contrast, in Blumenberg’s conception of
myth the generality of the conception of the species’ deining features is striking:
instinct deiciency gives rise to anxiety which is managed through myth. Any
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
5
speciic use of myth, which would be the level at which Leroi-Gourhan’s analysis
of ethnographic diferentiation kicks in, is processed according to the theory
of myth as a distancing device. Anxiety renders the real environment unapproachable, myth substitutes an alternative horizon and thus makes the ‘real’
one manageable; myth reframes the horizon that elicits the disempowering
experience of anxiety and it thereby places the source of this experience at a
distance.9 he perspective is one that relies on generalities, even at the level of
speciic case studies of the ‘work on myth’, and eschews the evaluative, teleological perspective of degradation or enhancement. In contrast, Leroi-Gourhan
gives more attention to the place of tools and expressive social techniques at
the genesis of species diferentiation and studies how these elements come to
determine intra species ethnographic diferences. On the other hand, this
emphasis on ethnographic diference needs to be reconciled with LeroiGourhan’s distinctive conception of a modern fall in the general capacity for
an aesthetic relation to an environment. An increasingly technological society
is one that operates by more highly specialised principles in the division of
labour. his division exempts the bulk of the population from the activities
involved in aesthetic perception. In the separation of the image maker from
the image consumers he observes a ‘loss of the exercise of the imagination in
vital operating sequences’.10 Further the tendencies that underpin this division
are generalising ones, i.e. they override and quash multiplicity and variety in
types of social organisation, as can be seen in the destruction of indigenous
populations as the end point of modern colonisation. his process of separation
has its roots in the partitioning of image functions from individual interpretation. He argues that the use of alphabets tended to subordinate the graphic to
the phonetic, although there is still some portion of our thought that does not
‘lend itself to strict notation’ (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 216). he auditory and
visual poles of igurative representation changed with the adoption of phonetic
scripts. Still, ‘the individual’s capacity to visualize the verbal and the graphic
remained intact’ (216). However, our ‘present stage’ merges the auditory and
the visual, which depletes the opportunities for individual interpretation; and,
it separates the social functions of ‘symbol making and of image receiving’
(216). In this situation the parallelism between technics and language, i.e. their
separation from the human hand and face (in writing) is apparent. It is because
Leroi-Gourhan binds the diferent expressive capacities of the species to the
social body and considers this ethnographic body to be an external, expressive
mechanism distinct from any zoological features that his thesis of aesthetic
degradation is possible. However, the paleontological background of
Leroi-Gourhan’s position also opens this thesis of aesthetic degradation to scrutiny. he type of thesis he pursues regarding the ethnology of aesthetic expression depends on a particular use of the paleontological evidence. here are a
number of diiculties with his general perspective on species evolution, which
Randall White has succinctly commented upon. hese range from the limited
6
A. ROSS
evidence for his thesis regarding the evolution of graphism, which is restricted
to sites from the Franco-Cantabria region. His thesis that the earliest graphism
was of an abstract or rhythmic form is based on a sample of Châtelperronian
objects that excludes relevant evidence from South German sites of animal
sculptures that are at least as old as his selected sample. he dating of the species
that his model generates is also problematic. he earliest evidence of the species
is dated to about 100,000 years ago. here is no evidence earlier than 40,000 years
ago for graphism. Hence the scholarly consensus, contra Leroi-Gourhan, is
that the biological emergence of the Homo sapiens substantially precedes the
‘irst graphic representation, personal ornaments, and so on’ (White cited in
Leroi-Gourhan 1993, xxi). Finally, the principle of chronological organisation
that moves from the ‘crude’ to the ‘complex’ is troubling for a number of reasons.
However, its most notable drawback is that it is not sensitive to the contemporaneous existence of ‘crude’ and ‘sophisticated’ images (xxi). If we step back
from the speciic context of evidence required for paleontology, these problems
can be seen in his thesis that a fundamental degradation has efected the symbolic activity of the species.11 he signiicance of this position needs to be
situated in relation to his idea that the motor of human evolution is not, as in
other animals ‘internal’ and ‘biological’, but that it occurs instead through
mechanisms that externalise memory. he model records a causal relation
between the complexity of a social organism that is enabled through external
mechanisms of memory, but imperilled in the division of symbolic labour that
this increasing complexity generates. he position can be captured in the metaphor of an organism which attains asymmetrical developmental capacity in
the one part of that organism that deals with external implements, but whose
other parts are stultiied in this process. In the civilisational logic Leroi-Gourhan
charts, this high cost path of development draws in more than the attributes of
the biological organism; it colonises the entire environment and lends itself
therefore to global statements and inferences. Since the aesthetic outlet of
expression is a species need, but the course of specialised development has
allotted the execution of these functions to a minority, the remainder of the
population is parasitic on the expression of the minority and moreover restricted
to an entirely passive or spectatorial relation to such aesthetic expression. he
‘emotional ration’ of our society is, he argues, ‘already largely made up of ethnographic accounts of groups that have ceased to exist – Sioux Indians, cannibals, sea pirates – forming the framework for responsiveness systems of great
poverty and arbitrariness’ (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 360). What is signiicant for
our purposes are the various ways Leroi-Gourhan’s relections select aesthetic
expression as both a determinant pattern for species evolution as well as a
pathway for the resuscitation of its supposed current stultiied condition. He
provides a speciic account of the relation between need and luxury in symbolic
activity that underpins this position. For instance, the idea that external
techniques of memory are the motor for human evolution is tied in a non-trivial
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
7
way to Leroi-Gourhan’s emphasis on the signiicance of the symbolic activity
of the species (413). Is such activity compatible with the idea of distance as this
is developed in philosophical anthropology? It seems to me that it is not. he
reasons for this incompatibility shine a light on some of the diiculties involved
in Blumenberg’s deinition of anthropology according to the criterion of the
species’ ‘instinct deiciency’.
Blumenberg’s Work on Myth: What makes Instinct Deiciency
Anthropological?
In his classic essay, ‘Tool, Image and Grave: On What is Beyond the Animal in
Man’, Hans Jonas complained that the inluence of Darwinian evolution came
at the high cost of the loss of any precision in the sense of anthropological
distinction: homo sapiens is not just included in the animal kingdom, but
entirely reduced to it. Jonas defends philosophical anthropology on the grounds
that it does not throw the baby out with the Darwinian bathwater. Instead, it
draws attention to the signiicant markers of homo sapiens’ distinction: in his
recounting, these are the tool, image and grave (Jonas 1996; see Ross 2016).
heir signiicance requires a philosophical treatment; that is, a rigorous analysis
of the mechanisms that warrant the claim of their species’ singularity.
his is not Blumenberg’s approach to philosophical anthropology; his
emphasis tends to fall on existential factors. Blumenberg places anxiety in the
foreground of his account of the leap in species evolution. he shit to the
bipedal posture is one that results in a loss of speed, strength and climbing skill.
Blumenberg adds that there is a shit in the topography of the environment that
causes the leap. Our apelike ancestors take the emergency exit of hominisation
to escape from the danger of annihilation. his threatening situation occurs
when they lose the dense cover of the shrinking forest and emerge onto the
exposure of the open steppe. With the shit of a weakened creature onto an
exposed topography comes the anxiety associated with anticipating what may
come from the horizon. he temporal distance involved in anticipation is, paradoxically, the origin of the desire for ways of formalising distance and in this
way building something of an exo-skeleton able, if not to pre-empt an attack,
to reassure the vulnerable creature that its exposure to the imminent threat has
been managed, reduced from an overpowering experience to a tolerable level. In
a further scenario to those of the pre bi-pedal ‘forest’ and the bi-pedal exit on the
steppe or ‘savannah’, Blumenberg mentions our cave-dwelling, image-painting
ancestors. he cave dwellers managed the prolonged rearing required of the
high dependency of the species’ infants and set up a sanctuary from the dangers
encountered by the hunters who ventured outside. he image is part of the
conception of the exoskeleton that compensates for human instinct deiciency.
In the cave the creature is able to practice the absolutism of ‘the wish’ that is
not countermanded by the ‘absolutism of reality’.12 We may ask, what is the
8
A. ROSS
speciic sense of instinct deiciency so compensated that is involved here? he
creature is deicient in comparison to what standard of instinctual abilities? If
Blumenberg intends, as he must, that the point of reference is that of the species’ pre-leap status, then, the position invites objections. Species immaturity
and the vulnerability associated with exposure are not absolute markers of
speciically human frailty nor do they amount to much as arguments for how
to install the coping strategy of distance. he conceit involved in this artiicial
construction is evident: the savannah heightens the sense of exposure whose
antidote must become the closed space of the cave and its comforting images.
What distinguishes the years of human pre-maturation from that of the vulnerability of other species’ young, such as baby chimps, or other land-dwelling
creatures unable to escape from predators to the treetops, such as the cubs of
the big cats, or the weak, though independently mobile, calves of the antelope
or the elephant, who may be slow in their evasive strategies and detection of
danger? Similarly, if the stakes are ultimately those of life preservation, and the
status of exposure on the savannah is one in which the species becomes aware
that it is prey, then this is no more a marker of the diference between homo
sapiens and other species than is the immaturity of their young. Vulnerability
to the status of prey and awareness of such dangers may just as readily be a
feature of life before the leap, as it conditions it aterwards. It is not speciic to
the savannah. And, again it does not provide the deinitive marker of species
diferentiation which Blumenberg seeks and which Jonas’ version of philosophical anthropology would require.
If the thesis of instinct deiciency seems to be wanting as a watertight
approach for philosophical anthropology, Blumenberg’s position is of considerable interest in the way it deals with the topic of signiicance. In the Work on
Myth signiicance is treated as the bulwark against the factors of dispersion,
such as time; signiicance is the result of the work that retains attention on
form. he functions of signiicance may be described in terms of their role in
establishing distance; they battle against contingency and in this way shield
the creature from the imposition of the temporal dissipation that is one way
the ‘absolutism’ of reality in its unprocessed immediacy may be experienced
(Blumenberg 1985, 68 f.). Blumenberg’s treatment of this topic provides an
instructive contrast with Leroi-Gourhan’s ethnographic approach to aesthetic
experience. Moreover, it opens up a useful path to the key question of what it
is that is ‘philosophical’ about philosophical anthropology. I will return to this
question in a moment.
Blumenberg’s claim that ‘instinct deiciency’ arises as a result of the species
leap may be assessed in terms of the vocabulary of compensation. he new
species abilities that are honed in the wake of the leap do not just replace
new for old, they also compensate for what has been lost. he metaphor of
compensation draws attention to the fact that the transaction involved is one
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
9
of incommensurable properties: instinct ability is now replaced by the ‘art of
living’ which may even relect on this lost ability and frame it within a schema
of meaning that ‘distances’ its efects, i.e. reclaims them as material for the ‘art
of living’. he vocabulary of species deiciency, in other words, is loose enough
to allow the imaginative prowess of the species to somehow act as a compensating replacement for physical strength, and to even use relection on the loss
of the latter as an instrument of containment.13
he point can be seen in the case of the images painted in the caves, which
Blumenberg sees as the space of wish fulilment. he image is one of the earliest
forms of human expression, and a core part of paleontological, archaeological
and anthropological deinitions of the species. Although it is hard to establish
the precise meaning and ritual function of particular images in pre-historical
cave art beyond scholarly conjecture (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 327), the importance these images had for the early life of the species is uncontested. he point
can be measured in terms of the continuity of the practice in particular cave
sites. According to carbon dating technology one of the walls of the Chauvel
cave in France had distinct images of diferent animals painted on it over a
5000-year period; more than double the time that has elapsed in the entire
Common Era (Herzog 2010).
Scholars in diferent ields have grappled with the evident importance of
the image for the species. Some work in philosophical anthropology uses the
presence of the image in human prehistory to build up a speculative conception of the human being. According to this research, the image distinguishes
the human animal from other animals in its unique capacity for freedom. he
image making and receiving capacities of the human species demonstrate the
disposition of the species over its immediate environment. his can be seen
in the capacity to distinguish the image as a human made form from unintentional materiality, which also requires the concept of the distinction between
appearance (the image of a bison) and reality (the bison) (Jonas 1996, 82–83).
In this approach, the image is oten compared to language, since an image, like
the naming functions of a word, presents a general type, which can both classify
a variety of cases and efectively recall them in their absence.
In Blumenberg’s perspective, the image may be seen as an artiicial site of
meaning that replaces the real environment. he environment needs to be
replaced because it is raw, or unprocessed in its complexity (see Luhmann 1990,
2006). In this respect, the replacement function of the image cannot obscure
any of the risky or dangerous aspects that inhabitants need to negotiate in their
environment. he image, however, can help deal with them by creating a new,
adaptive horizon in which actions that might seem possible but ultimately futile
against the horizon of the ‘real’ environment, are seen not just as technically
possible but also meaningful to undertake. he artiicial site of meaning provided by the image is transferrable to new situations and is a tool for managing
10
A. ROSS
them. In this perspective, it is meaning rather than (free) choice that frames
human behaviour and acts as the limiting ilter that pre-commits individuals
to speciic paths of action.
he point has signiicance for the place of aesthetics within the diferent
branches of philosophical research. he traditional categorisation of aesthetic
questions in the ield of ‘values’ overlooks the practical signiicance of form in
human life. Aesthetic form is generally categorised as what is surplus to need.
he importance of Blumenberg’s approach is that it situates form instead as one
important way of managing the vital needs of (human) life. he features of species’
speciicity that seem to be lacking in his account of instinct deiciency are found
in abundance in the functions discharged in the category of expressive form.
Conclusion: What is Philosophical about Philosophical
Anthropology?
One of the conventional ways of articulating the distinction between anthropology and philosophical anthropology is to propose a distinction between ethnographic projects and conceptual ones (see Bloch 1983, 3–8). Blumenberg seems
to it readily into this schema. One of the themes in Blumenberg’s account of the
work of myth as a stratagem of distance is the practical efects that conceptual
formations have on limiting expectations and reining in the process how the
environment is framed. Hence, if in Blumenberg, unlike Leroi-Gourhan, there
is no support for the claim of a general degradation in aesthetic experience,
then this is for the reason that the framing functions of aesthetic experience
that he has in mind play a role that is constant: they deine a horizon for the
species that limits the ‘absolutism’, which may also be understood as the raw
and unprocessed omnipresence, of ‘reality’, thus allowing projects to be experienced as coherent. What is interesting about Blumenberg’s approach is that
it sets out the personal work on such an art of the horizon, say, in the case of
Goethe’s work on the Prometheus myth14; as much as it attends to the collective signiicance of such a horizon at the level, not of an ethnographic group,
but of the species. In other words, it does not treat the topic of an ‘art of life’ at
the level of ethnographic diferences, but it does treat this topic in a number
of other respects. As such, it opens up questions that those approaches tied to
more descriptive analyses of ethnographic expressive form ignore. Departing
from Blumenberg’s approach, but not from Leroi-Gourhan’s, it makes sense to
ask about how a collective relates to an individual ‘art of life’ (e.g. to the signiicance that Goethe inds in the Prometheus myth). In Leroi-Gourhan that
question is already foreclosed by the signiicance he ascribes to ethnographic
identity. We might say, then, that philosophical anthropology is philosophical in its conceptual tendencies. he conceptual terrain that abstract concepts
reine is one that is developed away from the speciics. Biological deiciency is
used in Blumenberg as a conceptual tool; it is not deined empirically. And the
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
11
claim of speciically anthropological instinct deiciency is accordingly vulnerable to objections from empirical research on biology, not to mention common
observation. In contrast, in anthropology it is the description of diference that
constitutes the focus of attention. he debate in such ields is accordingly about
the meaning of speciic diferences. hese diferences are not for that reason
devoid of general interest (see Rappaport 1968). In philosophical anthropology
diferences are stripped back in the search for generalities. Oten, these generalities support theses regarding characteristics of the human condition. hese
theses disclose a theoretical commitment which necessarily invokes empirical
data only in the loosest of ways. Of course, the more sophisticated the philosophical anthropology, the more interesting the theoretical commitment. he
markers used can be querulous: Gehlen wants to ground institutions in some
anthropological portrait, Plessner ends up with politeness and tact as ways of
preserving respect in social relations, and Blumenberg talks more generally
about the conceptual and aesthetic stratagems involved in taking ‘distance’ from
an immediately threatening environment. hey all use the mark of ‘instinct
deiciency’ as if it were some type of irrefutable anthropological characteristic.
Using the example of Blumenberg, I have argued here that this characteristic is
less speciically anthropological, than it is a speciically philosophically determined speculation. And, pointing this out is one way to qualify the anthropological signiicance of the ideas used in philosophical anthropology.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
For an overview of the ield with an emphasis on the historicising potential of
philosophical anthropology, see Honneth and Joas 1988.
Hans Blumenberg’s early thesis placed the issues in relation to the
phenomenological conception of the life world: see Blumenberg, ‘Die
ontologische Distanz: Eine Untersuchung über die Strenge der Philosophie;
Erste Fassung’ in Blumenberg 1949. Odo Marquard (1981, 54) points out the
signiicance of distance in Blumenberg’s ‘anti-absolutist’, conceptual orientation.
For Marquard too, distance is practiced as ‘scepticism’, which he understands
as holding at bay the desire to uncover absolute truths or formulas, and a
distrust more generally of all dogmaticism: see Marquard 1991; 1989. See also
on Blumenberg, Ifergan (2015); Robert Savage’s ‘Translator’s Aterword’ to
Blumenberg 2010, 141–142.
Blumenberg follows Gehlen’s notion of anthropological instinct deiciency
[Mängelwesen] which is outlined in Gehlen 1959. he connection to managing
this situation of deiciency through distance in Gehlen [institutions] and
Plessner [politeness and tact] can be seen above all in the way Blumenberg
insists on the importance of describing myth ‘as already the manifestation of an
overcoming, of the gaining of a distance, of a moderation of bitter earnestness’
(Blumenberg 1985, 16). For this perspective the urge for the ‘critical’ unmasking
of authority is viewed with suspicion, especially in regards to its emancipatory
rhetoric: ‘One who reacts out of anxiety or in a state of anxiety has lost the
mechanism of putting forward imagined “authorities” [Instanzen]. he despised
12
A. ROSS
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
formulas of bourgeois courtesy can also be an ‘authority’ that is put forward, and
the “critical” destruction of which, while it does produce the desired “nakedness”
between people encountering one another, also deprives the weaker person, who
previously never had to be found out, of his protection’ (Blumenberg 1985, 6).
In Blumenberg’s view, anxiety is ‘never realistic. It does not irst become
pathological as a phenomenon of man’s recent history; it is pathological.’ Hence
he argues that ‘we don’t learn anything new when Freud says that anxiety
becomes neurotic as a result of its infantile relationship to danger, since, in
anxiety, reactions are produced that are no longer appropriate to the situation
of mature individuals’ (Blumenberg 1985, 6).
See Blumenberg 1985 for a description of the work on myth, 7 and for the work
of myth, 26.
Blumenberg 1985, 7: ‘he “art of living” – that primary skill, which has become
obsolete even as a phrase, of dealing with and husbanding oneself – had to
be acquired as a faculty for dealing with the fact that man does not have an
environment that is arranged in categories and that can be perceived exclusively
in its ‘relevances’ for him. To have a world is always the result of an art, even if
it cannot be in any sense a “universal artwork” …. Some of this will certainly
have to be described under the heading of “work on myth”.’
he emphasis on the ‘big toe’ rather than the brain in species evolution is also
highlighted in Bataille 1985. Many of the themes in Leroi-Gourhan’s approach
have been adopted in subsequent French philosophy of the twentieth century.
His attention to the anthropological functions of symbolic activities provides
the frame for the importance of aesthetics in many thinkers. It is the basis for
the understanding of an operational sequence in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987)
treatment of ‘faciality’ in A housand Plateaus; the framework used for Deleuze’s
(1986) view of a substantial alteration in the motor-sensory operation of the
image in his cinema books; the evaluative schema operating in Stiegler’s (2008)
assessment of the degradation in symbolic activities; and the structure used in
Derrida’s analysis of the external body of script in his account of the speech/
writing distinction in Of Grammatology (2016) and Writing and Diference (1978).
Leroi-Gourhan (1993, 156) argues that the capacity to use symbols as implements
for controlling the external environment is the basis for the steep ‘development
curve’ of homo sapiens. his ‘control is unthinkable without language’ or ‘a
complex social organization’.
he themes of unapproachability and distance are in this respect worth
comparing with Walter Benjamin’s (2003a, 255) deinition of the aura as
‘the unique apparition of a distance however near it may be’. For Benjamin
(2003b, 338), unapproachability is the experience of distance that is speciically
associated with ritual. Blumenberg’s ‘environment’ is more global perhaps, than
the sense of the auratic environment that is akin to certain states of heightened
perception treated in Benjamin, and distance is the remedy rather than the efect
for this sensation in Blumenberg; nonetheless, each accentuate the existential
dimensions of the experience of unapproachability.
Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 214: there is now a total separation between a ‘small elite
acting as society’s digestive organ and the masses acting purely as its organs of
assimilation’.
Leroi Gourhan may on this point be contrasted with the type of speculative
anthropology advanced in Walter Benjamin’s treatment of the mimetic faculty,
which is also structured by an interest in the degradation of this faculty under
modern conditions. See Benjamin’s ‘he Doctrine of the Similar’ (1999a) and
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
13
‘he Mimetic Faculty’ (1999b). And see the discussion of these essays in Ross
2015, 80–86.
12. See also Hans Blumenberg’s study of the ‘exits’ enabled by the cave metaphor:
Blumenberg 1989, esp. ch. 7. In this work he broadens the applicable functions
of the cave to other types of human settlement. He treats, for instance, the city as
a version of the cave. he city too implements a division of space with symbolic
and psychic import: it provides an ‘exit’ that manages and places at a distance
the absolutism of reality. Like the cave, the city is a substitutive space in which
the absolutism of the wish prevails; the space it demarcates acts as a protective
barrier not least in its status as an efective manner of dealing with the realities
it does not bring forth itself, which are either distanced or incorporated as the
mere materials for the production of its own reality.
13. Odo Marquard makes the argument that certain areas of modern philosophy
function as mechanisms of compensation. In the so-called ‘saddle period’ ater
1750 the philosophy of aesthetics, philosophical anthropology and philosophy
of history all emerge. hese three sub-ields are described by Marquard (1989,
41) as compensatory discourses. hey respond to an ‘impairment’ of the life
world that results from ‘overtribunalization’ and the need human beings have
to escape into ‘unindictability’: Farewell, 41.
14. Blumenberg treats Goethe as a case study in Part IV of his Work on Myth.
According to Blumenberg (1985, 398–557), Goethe’s work on myth is crystallised
in his coinage of the supposedly ‘apocryphal’ citation: ‘Against a god, only a god’,
which he uses as an abbreviated existential frame for his life.
Acknowledgments
My thanks to the referees and the editors of this Issue for their helpful comments on
an earlier version of this essay.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conlict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
his work was supported by the Australian Research Council under [grant number
FT120100410].
ORCID
Alison Ross
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5142-0695
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