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The Annals of the Lower Danube University of Galaţi, History
THE NAVAL TERMS OF THE TREATIES BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE (241 B2011 •
After centuries in which the relations between Rome and Carthage had been regulated by mutual treaties, a war broke out between the two important cities in the Western Mediterranean Sea in 264 B. C., that ended with significant losses for both parties. The conflict ended in 241 B. C. with the victory of the Romans, who drafted the clauses of a treaty which was not so drastic and therefore was easily accepted by the Carthaginians. Naval stipulations were among the peace conditions. The Carthaginians lost important naval cities in Sicily and in the neighbouring islands and were also forbidden to sail with battleships in Italian waters. The peace did not last too long and another conflict broke out in 218 B. C., which was also concluded with the Romans' victory in 202 B. C.. The stipulations in the new treaty were harsher: the Carthaginians were forced to give up their possessions overseas, their naval force was reduced to 10 triremes and they were obliged to support the Roman fleet with ships in case of war.
Hannibal Barca, the son of Hamilcar Barca has been described by several Classical and modern authors as one of the greatest war strategists who ever lived. He fought and won several battles against the Roman State which at the time was the superpower in Italy and her environs. In spite of Hannibal’s skills and strategies, Carthage could not annihilate Rome. This paper aims to examine the rationale that instigated Hannibal’s failure to deal a decisive and crushing blow on the Roman State. The paper argues that the Carthaginian government’s unresponsiveness towards Hannibal caused his failure. It continues to state that because Carthage refused to nurture and maintain the offensive realism stance, she was not motivated to consolidate Hannibal’s victories in once allied territories of Rome now subdued by Hannibal; Carthage was also not motivated to send troops and resources to Hannibal which he needed to deal a crushing defeat on Rome. Consequently, Hannibal’s failures translated to Carthage’s doom. Thus, in 202 BC, Hannibal was defeated by Scipio Africanus. And again, after the Third Punic War of 149-146 BC, Carthage was destroyed and razed to the ground by Rome. Further studies that may examine Rome’s strategies and tactics against enemy states are recommended. Keywords: Hannibal, Carthage, Rome, unresponsiveness, failure.
Journal of Philosophy and Culture
Why Was Carthage Destroyed? A Re-Examination from an Economic Perspective2014 •
The story of Rome’s destruction of the once buoyant maritime city of Carthage in 146 B.C. has been explained by many scholars, generally, in terms of the fear and security threats posed by Carthaginian naval authority and great trade across the Mediterranean. This kind of generalization leaves little room for other intrinsic causes of the destruction and plays down the core policies that characterized Roman imperialism in North Africa during the Republican times.Adopting the political economy approach, this paper, therefore, re-examines from the economic perspective, the principles and dynamics which underlined the international relations of Rome in Africa during the stirring times of the second and third Punic wars with a view to identifying the strong economic motives that led to the eventual annihilation of Carthage. The paper shows that Carthaginian Africa was a region of great economic potential in the western Mediterranean. It reveals that Rome was a typically imperialistic st...
Reasons why Rome won the First Punic War
2019 •
In 213 BC the struggle between Rome and Carthage in the Second Punic War reached a new intensity. By this point the war spanned the entire western and central Mediterranean. In Spain the rival Roman and Carthaginian forces had fought themselves to a stalemate. Despite remarkable successes, Hannibal made little headway against Rome in Italy in 214, and there too stalemate loomed. The protagonists now searched for new vulnerabilities in their enemy; Philip V of Macedon made alliance with Carthage and attacked the Roman position in Illyris (the First Macedonian War), while Rome encouraged King Syphax of the Masaesyles to move against Carthage in North Africa. Most importantly, in 213 the contest for Sicily reached a crescendo, with Roman forces commencing the siege of the city of Syracuse. Yet, inexplicably, in this crucial year, Hannibal seems uncharacteristically inactive and almost irrelevant. Hannibal’s summer campaign in 213 in the Salento is given only the briefest mention by Livy (25.1.1). Livy only reports that Hannibal “spent the summer in the territory of the Sallentini” and that “some insignificant cities of the Sallentini went over to him”. Clearly, Livy regarded it as being of little significance. Hannibal was the architect of Carthaginian grand strategy, Carthage’s most proven general, general of the war’s most successful, veteran army. Why then did Hannibal apparently accomplish so little in the summer of 213? Thanks to the extensive efforts of archaeology and field surveys (especially the Brindisino project of the Free University of Amsterdam) the economic and political changes in the Salento from the pre-Roman to post-Roman eras are perceptible, and able to be examined. Together with careful study of the ancient sources, I propose a more complete picture of the political, economic and demographic landscape of south-eastern Italy in 213. This, in turn, provides us with greater insight into Hannibal’s goals and accomplishments in his summer campaign that year.
J. Black (ed.), The practice of Strategy. A global History, Roma
A Kind of Strategy: Carthage’s confrontation with Roman soft power during the First Punic War2024 •
At the beginning of the First Punic War, Carthage's strategy did not deviate from its usual modus operandi. However, Roman soft power caused a political bouleversement, and the enduring alliance with Syracuse and many other Sicilian cities gave the Romans a wide logistical advantage and enabled them to equip themselves with a technically advanced fleet. The threat to the heart of the Carthaginian trading empire prompted the Punic to build newly designed ships that led to the victory at Drepana and the possibility of amphibious raids in the Italic and Sicilian coasts led by Hamilcar Barca in an attempt to alienate allies. The combined Roman soft power and Syracusan know-how, however, allowed the Romans to resist and create a fleet capable of holding its own against the Carthaginian fleet at the Battle of the Aegates.
THE ARCHETYPE OF THE PELICAN. Excerpt from the book "2000 BC Science of Aegean Distillation and origins": chapters XI, XII. 205-272.
2000 BC SCIENCE OF AEGEAN DISTILLATION2022 •
Disputation (Ferdinand Klüsener)
Futurismus, Rezept und Radiokunst: La Cucina Futurista (1932) als Beleg für die faschischistischen Überzeugungen des avantgardistischen Futurismus2024 •
2024 •
Aux commencements des écritures du réel Rodolfo Walsh (Argentine, 1927-1977)
Rodolfo Walsh y la cuestión palestina2024 •
European History Quarterly
Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–19412014 •
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
Integration of visuospatial information encoded from different viewpoints2013 •
Current Diabetes Reviews
New-Onset Posttransplantation Diabetes Mellitus: Insulin Resistance or Insulinopenia? Impact of Immunosuppressive Drugs, Cytomegalovirus and Hepatitis C Virus Infection2005 •
2014 •
Escola Nacional de Administração Pública – Enap
Paving the way for implementing SDGs2022 •
Journal of Organometallic Chemistry
Regioselective addition of chalcogenol to an η3-propargyl/allenyl complex via formation of the carbon-chalcogen bond leading to new chalcogenoxyallyl species1996 •