Buddhist Epistemology in Sixth-Century China

Buddhist Epistemology in Sixth-Century China Chen-kuo Lin (National Chengchi University) The earliest Chinese indigenous writings on pre-DignƗga epistemology are found in the Dunhuang manuscripts, S.4303 and S.613, which are identified as the works of the Dilun School (Early Chinese YogƗcƗra/TathƗgatagarbha School) of the sixth century. 1 In this paper I will examine two chapters on the topic of pramƗΧa (the means of valid knowledge) in these manuscripts to see how the theory of knowledge was elaborated by the Northern Chinese Buddhists in the sixth century. Briefly speaking, the issue of pramƗΧa in the Dilun School was contextualized within the paths of cultivation designed in parallel to the various doctrinal systems. In both S.4303 and S.613, pramƗΧa is divided into four types: (1) perception, (2) inference, (3) testimony, and (4) teaching. The specific function of each type of pramƗΧa is assigned to the different stage of practice in the path of cultivation. Accordingly, the Dilun authors did not develop epistemology as a mundane project only. On the contrary, they employed epistemology to explain how the process of cognitive development leads the practitioner to reach the trans-mundane knowledge. Moreover, as two texts under investigation show, the Dilun authors also developed a holistic theory of cognition that makes sense only from the perspective of enlightenment. Another crucial feature of these two texts is that they developed epistemology from the doctrinal perspective of Buddha-nature/TathƗgatagarbha thought, which exerted a great impact on the Sinitic mode of cognition and reasoning. In particular, a pair of notions in S.4303, “Self-Illumination” (tizhao 橼䄏) and “Dualistic Illumination” (yuanzhao 䶋䄏), have contributed to the formation of two theories of cognition in the later development of Chinese Buddhist and Neo-Confucian philosophy. Besides, an annotated English translation of the sections of “Four Types of PramƗΧa” in S.4303 and S.613 is attached as the appendix to this paper. 1 I would like to thank Professor Kim Cheonhak, Dr. Ikeda Masanori, and Dr. Ha Eugene. This research would not be completed without their kind invitation to visit the Geumgang Center for Buddhist Studies in 2013, where I obtained Changoe chinonjong munhǂn chipsǂng 啷⢾⛘婾⬿㔯䌣 普ㆸ and its continued collection, Changoe chinonjong munhǂn chipsǂng sokjip 啷⢾⛘婾⬿㔯䌣普ㆸ 临普, as the gifts. I am also grateful for Ernest Brewster’s English proofreading and valuable comments. 1 The Texts The Dunhuang manuscripts S.4303 and S.613, in which the earliest Chinese indigenous writings on the topic of pramƗΧa are found, are identified as doctrinal compendia composed by the Dilun (Early Chinese YogƗcƗra/TathƗgatagarbha School) scholar-monks during the second half of the sixth century (Aoki 2010: 63).2 Both texts are available in critical editions – the former edited by Ikeda Masanori and the latter by Aramaki Noritoshi (Aoki et al, 2012, 2013). 3 Regarding these pre-DignƗga materials of pramƗΧa in the Dunhuang manuscripts, Funayama Tƃru might be the first one in Aramaki Noritoshi’s research project to highlight the important value in terms of the study of the early reception of Indian pramƗΧavƗda in China (Funayama 2000: 145-146). In his brief remarks, Funayama points out that both of three types of pramƗΧa (Ɨgama, pratyakΙa, anumƗna) and four types of pramƗΧa-s (Ɨgama, Ɨptavacana, pratyakΙa, anumƗna) mentioned in those two texts belong to the teaching of the Southern Lineage of the Dilun School. The theory of three types of pramƗΧa was accepted by Fashang 㱽ᶲ (495-580) and developed in his Shidi yishu⋩⛘佑䔷 (Commentary on the [Vasubandhu’s] ĝƗstra on the Ten Stages). This theory was further expounded by Huiyuan ㄏ怈 (523-592) in the Dasheng yizhang ⣏Ḁ佑䪈 (Compendium of the Great Vehicle). Both Fashang’s and Huiyuan’s expositions elaborate upon Vasubandhu’s YogƗcƗra system, while the theory of four types of pramƗΧa was found only in the Dilun School. Funayama also points out the parallel of four types of pramƗΧa with four stages in the path of cultivation recorded in the Pusa yingluo benye jing厑啑䑼䎆㛔㤕䴻 (Funayama 2000: 145).4 His remark correctly pinpoints the context of mental cultivation in which the theory of pramƗΧa was conceived in the sixth-century. As shown in the following discussion, however, I will highlight another essential feature of these texts 2 Aoki identifies the dates of composition of S.4303 and S.613 to be around 560-585 A. D., the same period of Huiyuan. See Aoki 2010: 44. 3 Special thanks to Dr. Ikeda Masanori for allowing me to use the unpublished critical edition of S 603 before I obtained a copy of Changoe chinonjong munhđn chipsđng sokjip 啷⢾⛘婾⬿㔯䌣普ㆸ临普 in 2014. In this paper, my revisions will be explained in the notes. 4 Four stages: the stage of the gotra formed by learning (ƐĂŵƵĚĈŶţƚĂ۸ gotram 佺䧖⿏ỵ), the stage of the gotra formed by nature (prak‫ܐ‬tistha۸ gotram ⿏䧖⿏ỵ), the stage of the gotra formed by path 忻䧖⿏ỵ and the stage of the holy gotra (ƗU\D-gotra 俾䧖⿏ỵ). The majority of modern scholars consider the Pusa yingluo benye jing to be an apocrypha composed in the late fifth century. However, the origin of the formation of tour stages of cultivation is another issue that needs further investigation. See Funayama Toru, “ĂŝũƃŬĂŝ͗/ŶĚŽŬĂƌĂŚƻŐŽŬƵĞ” (⣏Ḁㆺ---࢖ࣥࢻ࠿ࡽ୰ᅜ̹), in Shorynj Katsura, Akira ^Ăŝƚƃ, Masahiro Shimoda, Fumihiko Sueki (eds.), ^ŚŝƌţnjƵĚĂŝũƃďƵŬŬLJƃ sŽů͘ϯĂŝũƃ ďƵŬŬLJƃŶŽũŝƐƐĞŶ ͯ΢ΰͲ⣏᷿ṷ㔁 䫔ᶱⶣ ⣏᷿ṷ㔁̯⭇嶝͕dŽŬLJŽ͗^ŚƵŶũƻƐŚĂ͕ 2011: 229-230. 2 with regard to the Chinese conception of pramƗΧa. Namely, the Dilun scholars presented a unique form of ontology to justify the four types of pramƗΧa. In other words, the unique feature of the theory of pramƗΧa-s in S.4303 and S.613 can be seen as the innovative development of the Dilun School, a proto-Huayan School in the sixth century. This uniqueness will become obvious when it is contrasted with the later development of pramƗΧavƗda in the Xuanzang School (as the orthodox transmissionof Chinese YogƗcƗra Buddhism). While the latter took a faithful stance to DignƗga’s system, the former reflects the Chinese indigenous understanding of pre-DignƗga’s theories of knowledge. 5 Synopsis of the pramƗζa chapter of S.4303 In the beginning of the S.4303, the author defines the four types of the means of valid cognition (pramƗΧa) within the dualistic framework of the mind (xin ⽫) as the subject of cognition and the dharma (fa 㱽) as the object of cognition. The pramƗΧa is classified under the category of “mind”, which further falls into four types, i.e., teaching, testimony, inference, and perception, while the dharma as the object of cognition (prameya) is further specified by four aspects: name (ming ⎵), characteristic (xiang 䚠), function (yong 䓐), and substance (ti 橼). 6 Name is taken as the object of teaching. The characteristic is taken as the object of testimony. Function is taken as the object of inference. Finally, substance is taken as the object 5 Both of Huiyuan and the authors of S.4303 and S.613 were aware of the synonymous usages of “teaching” (Ɨgama) and “testimony” (Ɨptavacana) in the Indian context. The authors of S.4303 and S.613 did not list these two terms separately without reason. In the Compendium of the Great Vehicle ⣏Ḁ佑䪈, Huiyuan clearly explains the reason why he accepts three types of pramƗΧa: “Regarding teaching (ĈŐĂŵĂ) as a means of valid cognition, this refers to those teachings by which one knows profound dharmas that it would be beyond one’s capacity to learn on one’s own…Teachings in this sense are also called ‘testimony’ (xinyan liang ᾉ妨慷). Generally speaking, these two are the same. If we analyze more precisely, ‘testimony’ refers to those words by which one is led to apprehend dharmas that are close to one’s own [knowledge], while ‘teaching’ refers to that by which one is led to know profound and unfathomable dharmas. Accordingly, some classify means of valid cognition into four types: (1) perception, (2) inference, (3) teaching and (4) testimony. Although this classification does no harm, it is not the way the scriptures and treatises define things.” (T44.671.a.26-b.6) In S.4303 the distinction between teaching and testimony is also explained: “Question: What is the distinction between the trustworthy teaching and trustworthy testimony, when both of which are regarded as the means of valid cognition? Answer: ‘Teaching’ refers to the speculative discourse, while ‘testimony’ refers to the discourse which is not apart from (ji ⌛) the dharma (truth)” (S.4303, 2012: 248). In Indian counterpart, we also find in the ELJĈLJĂ^ƻƚƌĂ 1.1.7-8 two forms of verbal testimony (ƑĂďĚĂ): (1) where its object is seen, and (2) where its object is not seen (ĈƉƚŽƉĂĚĞƑĂ૛ ƑĂďĚĂ૛ / sa૛ dvividha૛ d଑ଙଣĈĚ଑ଙଣĈƌƚŚĂƚǀĈƚ //). (Potter 1977: 222-223) In this case, the numbering of four types of pramƗΧa in S.4303 and S.613 should not be considered as purely Chinese invention. 6 To render ti and yong by “substance” and “function” is never satisfactory. It seems to me that, however, no better choice is available except retaining the original terms with further explanation. 3 of perception.7 Chart I Mind (pramƗΧa) Dharma (prameya) Teaching Testimony Inference Perception Name Characteristics Function Substance Here we have to note that the author of the S.4303 did not specifically mention the terminological dichotomy of pramƗΧa (傥慷) and prameya (㇨慷) that are adopted by the later Chinese Hetnjvidya scholars. By contrast, the Dilun Scholars employed a terminological distinction of “mind” and “dharma” as the conceptual framework. It should be also noted that the author of S.4303 did not ascribe his final position to the subject-object dualist theory of knowledge. On the contrary, as will be clarified later, his theory of knowledge is ultimately grounded in the ontology of Non-dualistic Idealism, on which view genuine knowledge can be realized only from the perspective of enlightenment.8 In S.4303 four types of pramƗΧa are defined in terms of differentiation of mental activity (cittagocara), while the mind (subject of cognition) and the dharma (object of cognition) are dynamically interrelated. It says: “The capacity of mind is increased or decreased depending on the depth or shadow of dharma, while the depth of dharma is shaped by the mind” (S.4303, 2012: 244). In accordance with the dynamic interrelationship between mind and its object, “dharma” is understood as the object of intentionality in the phenomenological sense, instead of as the existence independent of mind. For the practitioner of meditation, the object of cognition is characterized by the essential feature of intentionality, because the mind is by nature always already conscious of something as its object. Hence the object cannot be taken as that which exists independently of the mind. Conversely, the capacity of mind is also dependent on the features of the object. For instance, when the teaching of practice is taken as the object of contemplation, the various characteristics of teaching will also shape the state of mind. It is precisely within n 7 The ontology of semantics in this peculiar context needs to be analyzed further in details. In the coming section we will see the relationship of this semantic ontology with the cognition of the Buddha bodies as a religious response to the soteriological devotion. 8 S.4303: “Those [means of valid cognition] are differentiated on the basis of the feature of cultivation. In view of the matured stage of spiritual achievement, then there is no differentiation, because there is non-differentiation between mind and dharma.” 㬌䫱䘮㒂ᾖ䚠炻㓭㚱↮滲ˤ劍䚜婯⽟ỵㆸ䅇ᷳ 嗽炻⇯⽫㱽䘮圵炻䃉㚱↮滲ˤ(S.4303, 2012: 244) 4 the context of cultivation that cognition is analyzed for the purpose of awakening and liberation. Phenomenological Ontology As mentioned above, the object of cognition is divided into four categories: (1) name, (2) characteristic, (3) function, and (4) substance. Such an ontological taxonomy is not attested in anyIndic sources. 9 However, it is worthy of note that the four categories later became the hallmark of Chinese Buddhist metaphysics when the trilogy of substance (ti 橼), characteristic (xiang 䚠), and function (yong 䓐) was adopted for the first time in The Awakening of Faith in the Great Vehicle (Dasheng qixin lun ⣏Ḁ崟ᾉ婾). Regarding the enigmatic origin of this trilogy, for which scholars have long debated, this very same set trilogy was attested in a chapter of S.4303 on the Threefold Body of the Buddha. In that chapter, “Substance” is referred to as the “Principle” (li 䎮) of the DharmakƗya, which is the synonym of Truth (tathatƗ); “Characteristic” is referred to as the “Quality” (de ⽟) of the SaΥbhogakƗya, and “Function” is referred to as the “Response to the Conditions” (suiyuan 晐䶋) of the NirmƗΧakƗya (S.4303, 2012: 233-234; Aramaki 2000: 59; Girard 2010: 20-26; Ishii 2010: 49-50).10 A rather bold thought emerges when the trilogy of ti, xiang, and yong in parallel to the trilogy of BuddhakƗya is applied to the theory of pramƗΧa, meaning that the entire discussion of epistemology is squarely situated in the theological context. As a consequence, the whole epistemological discourse of pramƗΧa in S.4303 and S.613 may be understood as a religious project culminating in the final comprehension of the three Bodies of Buddha (Aramaki 2000: 50-59). This interpretation seems feasible as S.4303 and S.613 are concerned. What are exactly the meaning of “name”, “characteristic”, “function”, and “substance” as the object of cognition? In S.4303 another explanation is offered: (1) “Name” is the object which is known through “teaching” (Ɨgama); (2) “Characteristic” is the object which is known through “authoritative word” or “testimony” (Ɨptavacana); (3) “Function” is the object which is known through inference (anumƗna); (4) “Substance” is the object which is witnessed through perception (pratyakΙa). 9 10 婾㱽炻⯙䎮ẍ⼘橼ˤ婆⟙炻㒂⽟⼘䚠ˤ婾ㅱ炻晐䶋彗䓐ˤ 5 The above objects of cognition are arranged in the order according to the progressive path of cultivation. That is to say, when one first undertakes the practice, one begins at the stage of belief (xin ᾉ) to learn the teachings that are transmitted in words. Once one has learned the teachings, one enters into the stage of understanding (jie 妋), the second stage of cultivation, and one comprehends the Characteristics (xiang 䚠; *lakΙaΧa) of object. In the third stage, i.e., the stage of practice (xing 埴), one comes to know the Function (yong 䓐) of the Principle (li 䎮 = tathatƗ) through inference. In the final stage of cultivation, i.e., the stage of experiential witness (zheng 嫱), one is capable of intuitive awareness of the Substance (ti 橼), which is also identical to the Truth, i.e., tathatƗ. According to the above exposition, the various aspects of the object are cognized in sequence with the progressive stages of cultivation. In short, “Name” is taken as the object of belief, being cognized through the teaching at the first stage; “Characteristics” is taken as the object of understanding, being known through testimony at the second stage; “Function” is taken as the object of practice, being known through inference at the third stage; and “Substance” is taken as the object of experiential witness, being known through immediate perception at the final stage. It should be noted that four stages of cultivation are heuristically designed for the final realization of enlightenment. The whole story is like geometry class. For instance, when learning the axiom, “The sum of the angles of a triangles is 180°,” one starts to apprehend it by listening to teaching through belief. Then the practitioner gains a clearer understanding after he/she has realized the teacher’s demonstration (testimony). It follows that the practitioner possesses the knowledge of inference after he/she has demonstrated this axiom for oneself. Finally, the practitioner is capable of perceiving the truth of the axiom, which is independent from any particular triangle. In this exegesis, “substance” (ti) means “truth” (tathatƗ) which is taken as the object of cognition. 11 The point that needs to be added is that, as with what is attested in the Abhidharma literature, the grades of objects (dharma) presented in cognition are reflected in the various stages of meditation. Those grades of object cannot be understood as the ontic fact existing independently of mental awareness On the contrary, the various levels of dharma (object of cognition) rather exist in parallel with the various levels of mental state attained in the various stages of meditation. The epistemological analysis in these early Chinese texts can be supported by the Abhidharma theory describing the relationship between cosmology and psychology. As Rupert Gethin observes, “The This lively example to explain the four types of SUDPƗ۬a is offered by my colleague Ching Keng in a private correspondence. 6 11 key to understanding the Buddhist cosmological scheme lies in the principle of the equivalence of cosmology and psychology. I mean by this that in the traditional understanding the various realms of existence relate rather closely to certain commonly (and not so commonly) experienced states of mind. In fact Buddhist cosmology is at once a map of different realms of existence and a description of all possible experiences.” (Gethin 1998: 119-120) This observation will become more and more obvious when turn the four types of pramƗΧa in the path of meditation: Chart II: Stage of Cultivation Belief ᾉ Understanding 妋 Practice 埴 Witness 嫱 Mind (pramƗΧa) Teaching 㔁慷 Testimony ᾉ慷 Inference 㭼慷 Perception 䎦慷 Dharma (prameya) Name ⎵ Characteristics 䚠 Function 䓐 Substance 橼 PramƗζa in the Path of Cultivation As mentioned above, the Dilun authors contextualized the theory of pramƗΧa within the progressive path of cultivation. The path is also seen in a recently discovered Dunhuang manuscript, “Map of DharmadhƗtu” (Fajietu 㱽䓴⚾, P chin 2832 bis), a map of cultivation designed for practitioners. According to this map, the realm of existence is depicted in four sections: (1) Sentient Beings in the Six Destinies, (2) Special Teachings of the Three Vehicles, (3) Common Teaching of the Great Vehicle, and (4) Common Tenet of the Great Vehicle, all of which are arranged in the ascending order from the lowest to the highest level. In each section, the various levels of existence are arranged in accordance with the various levels of spiritual cultivation. Among four sections, the paths of cultivation in the Common Teaching of the Great Vehicle and the Common Tenet of the Great Vehicle are most relevant to the topic of pramƗΧa. These teachings are further classified into three categories: (1) Outer Mundane Stage(neifan ⢾↉), (2) Inner Mundane Stage (waifan ℏ↉), and (3) Super-mundane Stage of Holy Man (chushijien shengren ↢ᶾ攻俾Ṣ). The final two stages are further arranged according to four “families” (gotra): (1) the Gotra of Learning (xi zhongxing 佺䧖⿏), which practices the Ten Dwellings (shizhu ⋩ỷ); (2) the Gotra of Nature (xing zhongxing ⿏䧖⿏), which practices the Ten Practices (shixing ⋩埴); (3) the Gotra of Path (dao zhongxing 忻䧖⿏), which practices Tenfold Merit-Transference (shi huixiang ⋩徜⎹); and (4) the Holy Gotra (sheng 7 zhongxing 俾䧖⿏), which corresponds to the Ten Stages (shidi ⋩⛘ dasabhnjmi). In S.4303, four types of pramƗΧa are defined in terms of the stages of cultivation depicted in the Map of DharmadhƗtu. There are two theories of pramƗΧa in this context. (1) For those practitioners who have entered the stage of the First Stage (chudi ⇅⛘), they are qualified to activate immediate perception (pratyakΙa). For those who remain at the stage of the Gotra of Path, they are capable of obtaining knowledge mainly through inference (anumƗna). Those who reach the stage of the Gotra of Nature, gain understanding verbal testimony (trusted words). Finally, those who reach the stage of the Gotra of Learning gain understanding through the teaching. (2) Those practitioners who have attained the Buddhahood, their means of cognition are immediate perception. Those who have attained the First Stage obtain understanding through inference. Those who reach the stage of the Gotra of Path, obtain valid cognition through verbal testimony. Finally, those who remain in the stages of the Gotra of Nature and the Gotra of Learning, obtain valid cognition through teaching. When cognition is analyzed in view of the above stages of cultivation, each type of pramƗΧa can be further analyzed in terms of subject and object, truth and falsity, and acuity and dullness of cognition. Chart III A. First Theory Stages of Cultivation Means of Valid Cognition First Stage Gotra of Path Gotra of Nature Gotra of Learning Perception Inference Testimony Teaching B. Second Theory Stages of Cultivation Means of Valid Cognition Stage of Buddhahood First Stage Gotra of Path Gotras of Nature and Learning Perception Inference Testimony Teaching To be noted, this sort of analysis is not the only approach favored by the Dilun authors. On the contrary, they favor another approach which views the issue of cognition from the perspective of “non-obstructive dependent arising” (yuanqi wuai 䶋崟䃉䣁). In other words, the second approach to explain the issue of pramƗΧa is taken from the holistic viewpoint of enlightenment (i.e., the viewpoint of the 8 emptiness of intrinsic nature) in which four types of pramƗΧa are no longer differentiated due to the fact of their lacking of intrinsic nature. They are rather seen as those which arise interdependently without mutual obstruction. Cognition as such is seen as a holistic event in view of the theory of coherence. In short, there are two approaches with regard to the issue of pramƗΧa: (1) analytical approach and (2) holistic approach. The analytical approach can be found in the Indic Buddhist sources, such as the Abhidharma and YogƗcƗra literature. Nevertheless, the holistic theory of cognition seems to have appeared for the first time in the Dilun literature, which exerted wide influence in the later development of Chinese Buddhist philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. This observation helps us explain why the indigenous Chinese Buddhist thought, such as Huayan and Chan, advocate holistic view of cognition. Two Modes of Cognition: Dualistic Illumination and Self-Illumination In addition to the analytical and the holistic approaches, there are also two ways of characterizing the pramƗΧa in the path of cultivation: (1) Four types of pramƗΧa in view of Cause, and (2) Four types of pramƗΧa in view of Fruition. The categories of cause and fruition are employed here within the context of cultivation. That is, “cause” refers to the practice of cultivation which is required for realizing the spiritual goal, while “fruit” refers to the effect of cultivation. As regards four types of pramƗΧa in the stage of cause, they are further divided into two subtypes of cognition: (1) Dualistic Illumination (yuanzhao 䶋䄏), and (2) Self-Illumination (tizhao 橼䄏). “Illumination” (zhao 䄏) literally means “cognition”, which is the function of luminosity. “Dualistic Illumination” means “cognition which arises in the [dualistic] conditions”. “Self-Illumination” means “cognition as the self-awareness of Substance”. Both types of cognition occur in the stages of cause, while only Self-Illumination arises in the stage of fruition. In the stage of cause, both Dualistic Illumination and Self-Illumination are equally characterized by the duality of subject and object, while in the stage of fruition only the Self-Illumination is characterized as being beyond the duality of subject and object. For convenience, we name Self-Illumination in the stage of cause “Self-Illumination1” and Self-Illumination in the stage of fruition “Self-Illumination2”. In another section of S.4303 (2012: 217-218), the path of cause is characterized as (1) 9 the path of direct realization (zhendao 嫱忻) and (2) the auxiliary path (zhudao ≑ 忻). In the path of direct realization, there are (1-1) Dualistic Realization (yuanzhen 䶋嫱), which means realization of Truth (tathatƗ) through gradual cultivation, and (1-2) Self-Realization (tizhen 橼嫱), which means the manifestation of the DharmakƗya/tathƗgatagarbha as the Substance (ti) of sentient beings.12 In the auxiliary path, the Dualistic Illumination is taken as upƗya (methodic means) to assist the practitioner to realize the Truth, while the Self-Illumination is taken as the function of the Truth (tathatƗ) itself. An example is given to explain the meaning of those two terms. The Dualistic Illumination is like the work of metallurgical furnace to produce metal. As far as metal is produced, its musical sound shows the true quality of metal itself. 13 At this jointure, we have to pay special attention to the idea of Truth (tathatƗ) as Substance (ti) which is capable of Function (yong). According to the MahƗyƗna Buddhist philosophy, Truth (tathatƗ) is regarded as being unconditioned (asaΥskΩta), which also means to be unable to causally function by producing effects. However, in S.4303 it clearly claims that Truth (tathatƗ) itself appears to causally function (ziti xianyong冒橼栗䓐). This theoretic move exemplifies Sinitic thinking, as such a thought is not attested in Indian Buddhism. More significantly, this move forecasts the whole story of Sinitic Buddhism in the scenario of the Awakening of Faith, which is believed to have been composed during the very same period as S.613 and S.4303. This pair of terminology (i.e., yuanzhao and tizhao) was frequently used in the Dilun literature of the late sixth century. In Huiyuan’s Compendium of the Great Vehicle, which is believed to slightly postdate S.4303, “Dualistic Illumination” refers to discriminatory/conceptual cognition falling into five types of sensory consciousness, thinking consciousness (manovijñƗna), and ƗdƗna-vijñƗna (the deluded consciousness of the I as the subject-grasper), while “Self-Illumination” refers to pure cognition which belongs to the Pure Mind (jingshi 㶐嬀). 14 As the S.4303 is 12 S.4303 2010: 217-218: 妨橼嫱ˎ炻ᶨ↯䛦䓇䘮ẍ⤪Ἦ啷㱽䓴䁢橼炻Ữẍℕ嬀ᶫ嬀䄑゙央炻冒 橼ˎ栗ˤḮ⚈昌晄炻冒橼栗䓐炻⥁䳽嘃忂炻㓭㚘嫱忻ˤWhat is “Self-Realization”? All of sentient beings possess tathƗgatagarbha/dharmakƗya as the Substance (Essence), which is not revealed due to the covering of defilements caused by six types of consciousness and the seventh consciousness. As far as the hindrances are destroyed by the Illumination as Cause (i.e., correct cognition), the Substance in Itself appears to function in the way that is extremely profound and intuitively penetrating. Hence is called “the Path of Direct Realization”. 13 Also see S.613: 251-252. 14 Huiyuan, The compendium of the Great Vehicle: “Second, the distinction of authenticity and illusion. In six types of consciousness and the seventh consciousness (i.e., the I-consciousness) the conceptual cognition by the Dualistic Illumination is the illusive cognition. In the eighth consciousness the wisdom of the Self-Illumination is the authentic cognition. What does this mean? The numerous Buddha-dharmas in the tathƗgatagarbha are accumulated as the mental phenomena. This mind is pure by nature, nevertheless becomes defiled by the external defilement. So it looks like impure. Only 10 concerned, we should be cautious if we apply Huiyuan’s interpretation to the S.4303 without further qualification, even though Huiyuan could be in line with the author of S.4303. Nevertheless, Huiyuan’s interpretation can be reasonably taken as a clue to understanding the meaning of tizhao in S.4303, because in the chapter on four types of pramƗΧa, the doctrine of Buddha-nature (foxing ἃ⿏) is foregrounded as the doctrinal core, which is close to Huiyuan’s doctrinal stance as well. Hence we are safe to assume the doctrinal relationship between Huiyuan and S.4303. In Huiyuan’s Commentary on the Awakening of Faith (dasheng qixinlun yishu ⣏Ḁ崟 ᾉ婾佑䔷), both Dualistic Illumination and Self-Illumination are understood as the main cause to eliminate the fundamental ignorance, wherein “Dualistic Illumination” is referred to as “Initial Awareness” (shijue ⥳奢), “Self-Illumination” is accordingly referred to as “Ultimate Awareness” (jiujingjue 䨞䪇奢), which is ontologically identical to “Original Awareness” (benjue 㛔奢). 15 This is the reason why I interpret “Dualistic Illumination” as “representational cognition”, while “Self-Illumination” is taken to mean “non-representational cognition”. If I am right in applying Huiyuan’s interpretation of the Awakening of Faith to the PramƗΧa Chapter of S.4303, then the notion of Substance (ti 橼) of tizhao (Self-Illumination) should to taken to mean the True Mind, which is also synonymous of DharmakƗya and TathƗgatagarbha, while the illumination of the Substance should be also understood as the self-illumination of the Self/Substance (True Mind, DharmakƗya, TathƗgatagarbha) itself without the dualistic dichotomy of subject and object. In short, the ontological stance underlying this doctrine is Absolute Idealism, which means that the True Mind is the self-awareness of itself as the transcendental/ontological ground of beings. Whenever the Mind is self-aware of its nature as Reality, it no longer requires any representational cognition. after the delusive defilement has been ceased, the pure mark [of mind] manifests again. The pure consciousness newly appears to illuminate the entire DharmadhƗtu. It is called authentic cognition.” (T44n1851_p0669b04-8) ㄏ怈炻˪⣏Ḁ佑䪈˫烉ˬḴ䛇⤬↮⇍ˤℕᶫ嬀ᷕ炻䶋䄏↮⇍炻㗗℞⤬㘢ˤ 䫔ℓ嬀ᷕ炻橼䄏ᷳㄏ炻㗗℞䛇㘢ˤ㗗佑ḹỽ烎⤪Ἦ啷ᷕ炻⿺㱁ἃ㱽炻普ㆸ⽫ḳˤ㗗⽫⿏㶐炻侴 䁢⭊⠝䄑゙㇨㝻炻䚠Ụᶵ㶐ˤ⼴〗⤬㝻炻㶐䚠⥳栗ˤ⥳栗㶐嬀炻㘖䄏㱽䓴炻婒䁢䛇㘢ˤ˭ (T44n1851_p0669b04-8) 15 Huiyuan, Commentary on the Awakening of Faith: “Question: ‘What is the difference between the knowledge of the True Consciousness and the knowledge of Dualistic Illumination (empirical cognition)?’ Commentary: The Dualistic Illumination (empirical cognition) of the seven types of consciousness conceptually cognizes the illusory existents of the Dependent Arising. It also does not separate from the conditions when it conceptually cognizes the reality. As to the Real DharmakƗya, it is detached from the delusive mind. It illuminates the Pure DharmakƗya by manifesting its own origin of mind. It is called ‘knowledge’, which is not conceptual cognition.” (T44n1843_p0184a16-20) ㄏ怈炻˪⣏Ḁ崟ᾉ婾佑䔷˫烉ˬ⓷烉䛇嬀夳倆冯䶋䄏䞍㚱ỽⶖ⇍烎慳㚘烉ᶫ嬀䶋䄏幓侭炻Ữ㕤⤬ ゛䶋崟㱽ᷕ↮⇍䶋䞍ˤ⍰㕤䛇㱽↮⇍䶋㱽炻ᶵ傥暊䶋ˤ䛇㱽幓侭怈⤬゛⽫炻䄏㖶㶭㶐㱽䓴炻栗 冒⽫㸸炻⎵䁢夳倆炻朆↮⇍䞍ˤ˭(T44n1843_p0184a16-20). 11 Dharmadhātu To be sure, it might not be entirely legitimate to apply Huiyuan’s interpretation to S.4303. In other words, the notion of tizhao (Self-Illumination1) might simply mean the non-discriminative, non-conceptual cognition which intuitively perceives the Truth(tathatƗ). This interpretation is very tempting, because in that context the Truth(tathatƗ) as Substance (ti) serves as the object of perception. The only point I am not completely comfortable is that the Substance (dharmakƗya, tathƗgatagarbha, tathatƗ) of the sentient is said to manifest as Function. If the Substance is dharmakƗya or tathatƗ, it would not be capable of functioning, because Substance as Truth is unconditioned in the sense that it is incapable of causally producing anything. In S.4303, however, it clearly states that Truth (tathatƗ) is capable of functioning. That is, Truth causally exists. Truth is the cause of enlightenment (illumination). Thus it is called tizhao (illumination of Substance in itself). By these expositions we conclude that the cognition of Truth is achieved through the self-cognition of Truth. Truth is the self-illumination of Truth itself, while Truth is not differentiated from the Mind. PramƗζa Within the Classification of Teachings In this section, we will see how the theory of pramƗΧa was conceived within the doctrinal framework of the Dilun School. In the Southern Lineage of the Dilun School, all Buddhist teachings available during their times are classified into three categories: (1) the Separate Teaching of Three Vehicles (sansheng biejiao ᶱḀ⇍㔁), (2) the Common Teaching of Great Vehicle (dasheng tongjiao ⣏Ḁ忂㔁), and (3) the Common Tenet of Great Vehicle (dasheng tongzong ⣏Ḁ忂⬿), which is further divided into three sub-categories: (3-1) Graduate Teachings (jienjiao 㻠㔁), (2) Sudden Teachings (dunjiao 枻㔁), and (3) Perfect Teachings (yuanjiao ⚻㔁). The Separate Teaching includes the teachings of the Abhidharma Schools and the Satyasiddhi-ƑĈƐƚƌĂ. The Common Teaching includes the teachings of the PrajñƗpƗramitƗ Snjtras, the Lotus Snjtra, and the YogƗcƗra treatises. The Common Tenet includes the teachings of the AvataΥsaka Snjtra, the NirvƗΧa Snjtra, the VimalakưtinirdeĞa, the LaφkƗvatƗra Snjtra, the ĝrưmƗlƗ Snjtra, and the Renwang-prajñƗpƗramitƗ Snjtras (Chinese apocrypha). As the doctrinal stance is concerned, the authors of S.4013 and the other works of the Southern Lineage of the Dilun School considered the teaching of Buddha-nature/TathƗgatagarbha to be the highest one, which, of course, profoundly informs their understanding of pramƗΧa (Aoki 2012: 45-54). Their doctrinal position is also stated in the “Map of 12 DharmadhƗtu”: “In the order of entering the path of the Common Tenet of Great Vehicle, Buddha-nature, DharmatƗ, TathatƗ, and DharmadhƗtu are the tenet of the Buddhas. In this [tenet] one dharma does not exist independently from (ji ⌛) all other dharmas, while all other dharmas do not exist independently from (ji) one particular dharma. It is called “Common” because Substance (ti 橼) and Characteristics (xiang 䚠) are mutually harmonized” (“Fajietu”, 2012: 580). It is worthy of note that the theory of pramƗΧa in S.4303 and S.613 was presented by the Dilun scholar-monks from the perspective of TathƗgatagarbha doctrine. This fact subverts the popular conceptionabout the reception of Buddhist logic and epistemology in medieval China. As we learn from most of historical narratives, the reception and development of Buddhist logic and epistemology in medieval China is mainly associated with the Chinese YogƗcƗra School, the Xuanzang School in particular. According to my recent studies on Jingying Huiyuan’s theory of pramƗΧa, however, the origin of the indigenous Chinese reception of the theory of pramƗΧa is rather founded in the sixth-century Dilun School (Lin, 2014). This observationalso subverts another popular conception about the incommensurabilityof epistemology and the onto-theo-logy of Buddha-nature/TathƗgatagarbha. As a result, it is fascinating to see how the Dilun masters contextualized the theory of pramƗΧa within the framework of the Classification of Teachings. In S.4303, the theory of pramƗΧa is taken as a method to meet the various capabilities of the practitioners who follow the different teachings. For anyone who attempts to understand the early Chinese reception of the theory of pramƗΧa, she should not ignore its heuristic and hermeneutic context. In the following, I will summarize the classification of the theory of pramƗΧa in three teachings: (1) PramƗΧa in the Separate Teaching of Three Vehicles In this category of classification, the issue of pramƗΧa is explained in terms of the paths of hearing (ĞUXWD 倆), reflection (FLQWƗ ⿅), and cultivation (EKƗYDQƗ ᾖ). (1-1) Teaching is taken as a type of pramƗΧa for the practitioner to learn the holy teachings through six types of consciousness. It corresponds with the Stage of Hearing. (1-2) Testimony is taken as a types of pramƗΧa when the practitioner moves beyond the Stage of Hearing to the Stage of Reflection on the meaning of teaching. It corresponds with the Stage of Reflection. (1-3) Inference is taken as a types of pramƗΧa when the practitioner comes close to the realization (kΙƗnti) of 13 teachings. It corresponds with the Stage of Cultivation. (1-4) Perception is taken as a type of pramƗΧa when the practitioner intuitively realizes the Four Noble Truths. The above account can be taken as the textual evidence to further support the thesis of this study that the sixth-century Chinese Buddhists viewed the theory of pramƗΧa within the context of religious and doctrinal cultivation. Furthermore, pramƗΧa is also taken as a heuristic tool in the concrete situation of learning from the teacher: “When explaining in regard to the individual condition, there are four types of pramƗΧa at the specific stage. For instance, when listening to Dharma Master’s talk one does not fully understand it except for gaining some superficial knowledge, [the dharma-talk] is called ‘teaching as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a’. One might partially understand. If he is unable to verbally express [what he understands], that [cognition] can be taken as testimony. When one is able to express [the content], nevertheless unable to completely express it, [the cognition] is taken as inference. When one listens to the dharma-talk, he is able to thoroughly understand as well as to express the content of teaching, [the cognition] is called perception” (S.4303, 2012: 247-248). (2) PramƗΧa in the Common Teaching of Great Vehicle The Common Teaching includes two MahƗyƗna schools: Madhyamaka and YogƗcƗra. In this category, pramƗΧa is also conceived in terms of the cause and the fruition. In the stage of cause, pramƗΧa is divided into four types: (2-1) Teaching, which takes the Holy Teachings as the means of valid cognition; (2-2) Testimony, which takes the contemplation of dharma as the means of valid cognition; (3) Inference, which takes the comprehension of Dependent Arising as the means of valid cognition; (4) Perception, which is the immediate realization of the Emptiness of Characteristics. The author also emphasizes the difference of the theory of pramƗΧa in the Common Teaching and the other teachings. For the former, seven types of consciousness are mentioned as the subject of cognition, while for the Abhidharma, the six types of consciousness are mentioned. Further, in the stage of fruition, the practitioner realizes by authentic wisdom (i.e., non-conceptual cognition) the emptiness in the form of abstraction (ningran ↅ䃞), which is distinct from the realization of the emptiness in the sense of embodiment (suiyuan 晐䶋). In S.613 and S.4303, “suiyuan,” the essential term of Huayan 14 Buddhism, was already used to highlight the constructive meaning of emptiness embodied in the mundane world (Ishi 2000: 170). That is, emptiness as the highest truth should be realized in any circumstance. For the author of S.4303, the fundamental distinction between the Common Tenet and the Common Teaching lies on the distinction of ontology. According to the latter, the Emptiness as the abstract truth is seen as that which is inferior to the Emptiness as the dynamic embodiment. (3) PramƗΧa in the Common Tenet of Great Vehicle As mentioned above, in S.4303 cognition is divided into two types: Dualistic Illumination and Self-Illumination. First, Dualistic Illumination in the stage of cause is divided into four types: (3-1) Teaching: “When one learns [the teaching of] Buddha-nature, one knows by means of belief in the teaching.” (3-2) Testimony: “One clearly knows the fact through verbal testimony as a type of pramƗΧa that the illusory nature of life-and-death is grounded in Reality [i.e., tathƗgatagarbha] .” (3-3) Inference: “When one has been aware of illusion, he achieves the partial understanding and practice to the extent that he is able to empathetically see the Embodied Buddha. In this case, inference as a types of pramƗΧa is referred to the analogical cognition of the Real [Buddha] through [cognition of] the Embodied [Buddha].” (3-4) Perception: “As far as ignorance is partially eliminated and Dualistic Illumination is present, one has perception as like the image reflected in the mirror” (S.4303, 2012: 246). The above account of Dualistic Illumination in the final teaching clearly is presented with reference to the realization of Buddha-nature. For the practitioner, though the Buddha-nature/TathƗgatagarbha is inborn nature, it becomes manifest only by first learning from the teaching and testimony. It is different from the object of empirical cognition which can be known through perception and inference. On the contrary, teaching and testimony play a crucial role in the path of realizing the Buddha-nature/TathƗgatagarbha. This feature of the theory of pramƗΧa is also attested in Huiyuan’s Chapter on the Meaning of the Cognition of the Three Types of PramƗΧa (ᶱ慷㘢佑) in the Compendium of the Great Vehicle (dasheng yizhang ⣏Ḁ佑䪈): “Some profound dharmas, such as the path 15 of Buddha-nature, nirvƗΧa, etc., can be known through the teaching.” 16 Self-Illumination in the stage of cause is also divided into four types: (3-5) Teaching: “The teaching as a type of pramƗΧa is made possible by [the practitioner who] obtains the characteristics of the differentiation of dharmadhƗtu in the path of Ten Dwellings.” (3-6) Testimony: “The testimony as a type of pramƗΧa is made possible by [the practitioner who] obtains the characteristic of tranquility [of dharmas] in the path of Ten Practices.” (3-7) Inference: “The inference as a type of pramƗΧa is made possible by [the practitioner who] obtains the characteristic of the non-obstruction of the Dependent Arising in the path of Ten Transferences of Merit.” (3-8) Perception: “Perception as a type of pramƗΧa is made possible by [the practitioner who] obtains the characteristic of the non-discriminated reality of [the dharma] itself at the First Stage and beyond.” (Ikeda Masanori, ed., S.4303, 2012: 246) The author of S.4303 concludes: “The four types [of pramƗΧa in Self-Illumination] are arranged sequentially in terms of the stages of teaching” (ibid). That is, the issue of pramƗΧa is properly contextualized in the path of cultivation. When the practitioner has arrived at the stage of the final enlightenment, there occurs the Self-Illumination only, in which no object is cognized except for the Substance (True Mind/ Buddha-nature/TathƗgatagarbha) itself. In the stage of fruition, as the author emphasizes, since the practitioner (i.e., the enlightened one) fully realizes the dharmadhƗtu, which is non-obstructive and mutually interpenetrated, there is no need to mention inference, testimony, and teaching, etc. The author of S.4303 does clearly spell out the difference between the four types of pramƗΧa in the Self-Illumination and those in the Dualistic Illumination in the stage of cause. On this issue, Huiyuan’s distinction of two types of cognition is much clearer in comparison. 16 ㆾ㶙⊅㱽炻啱㔁㕡䞍炻⤪⼤ἃ⿏㴭㥫忻䫱 (T44n1851_p0671b28). Also see Chen-kuo Lin, “Epistemology and Meditation in Jingying Huiyuan’s Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition”, in Chen-kuo Lin & Michael Radich, eds., A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism. Hamburg: University of Hamburg Press, 2014. 16 Concluding Summary In the concluding section of S.4303, the author deliberately emphasizes the pragmatic merits of the theory of pramƗΧa. One of the merits for learning the theory of pramƗΧa is that one can obtain clear epistemic criteria to assess the degree of religious achievement. This merit of pramƗΧa is especially important in regard to the achievement of meditation. For instance, how could one judge correctly when someone else claims that she has reached at the certain level of meditative state? How can one be sure about the level of meditative state she has achieved? These questions concern most of the religious practitioners, now and then, because, as we know every well, religious scandals of inauthentic “enlightenment” often occur. To prevent the misjudgment of religious experience, the author of S.4303 emphasizes the pragmatic function of pramƗΧa: “One will be capable of skillfully knowing the contents of the Buddha’s teaching [through learning four types of pramƗΧa]. He will not slander [the Buddha’s teaching]. He will be also capable of assessing the exact degree of other practitioners’ performance without wrong judgment. As for one’s own performance, he will be able to detach from the wrong self-knowledge. He will be delighted in endlessly searching for the Buddha’s teaching. He will vigorously make progress without rest, because he knows that the merits [for learning four types of pramƗΧa] are infinite and that the merits are also infinite as mentioned above” (S.4303: 248). This shows that the Chinese Buddhists of the Dilun School in the sixth century were clearly aware of the importance of contextualizing the theory of pramƗΧa within the religious practice. They are aware of the importance of rationality, which can be assured by the practice of inference, even though they take perception as the final verdict for the experience of enlightenment. To be noted, logical reasoning should be utilized during the progress of cultivation. For the Dilun Buddhists, rationality should be due recognized for the soteriological project. We should also note that this view was not invented by Chinese Buddhists, for it is also attested in the early Indian Abhidharma and YogƗcƗra texts. What is the unique feature of the pramƗΧa chapter of S.4303? There are several significant features that are worthy of mention. The first can be seen in the critical function of pramƗΧa in the process of practicing towards the goal of religious realization. This feature is saliently different from the role of pramƗΧa played in hetuvidyƗ. It seems that the Dilun authors did not show any enthusiasm in doctrinal debate. On the contrary, they are almost fully devoted to the religious quest for the Buddhahood. It is in this religious context that pramƗΧa is employed as a means for 17 attaining the religious liberation. It is also due to this religious desideratum that pramƗΧa is viewed differently in the various stages of cultivation, including the stage of final enlightenment. As for the latter, the Dilun authors are clearly motivated by the questions like “Does the Buddha need inference to obtain valid cognition?” “What is the Buddha’s means of cognition (pramƗΧa)?” In this regard, the Dilun Buddhists show their enthusiasm for the enlightened experience. The second feature is seen in the theory of “Self-Illumination of Buddha-Nature/Pure Mind”, which represents the peculiar idealist stance of epistemology as the corollaryresult of the TathƗgatagarbha/Buddha-Nature doctrine. In the final analysis, according to this idealist interpretation, cognition is the self-cognition of the Mind itself. This notion of “Self-Illumination” is not the same as DignƗga’s notion of self-awareness (svasaΥvitti), though they look similar to some extent.17 For the TathƗgatagarbha practitioner, returning to the Pure Mind/Buddha-Nature, no matter whether the latter is understood as potentiality or actuality, is the practical consequence of the theory of Self-Illumination. On the contrary, according to the Dilun masters, DignƗga’s theory of pramƗΧa falls under the category of Dualistic Illumination. The former leads to the Sudden Path, while the later should be classified in the Gradual Path. The former has been further developed by Huayan, Tiantai, and Chan, while the latter was inherited by the Xuanzang YogƗcƗra School. To sum up, the discovery of the theory of pramƗΧa in both S.4303 and S.613 shedsnew light on the early history of the reception of the Buddhist theory of cognition in Chinese Buddhism. These concisetreatises did not pop up incidentally. They rather resulted from the intellectual efforts by a group of Chinese scholar-monks during the sixth century to pursue their religious goals. 17 For the more complicated issue with regard to the doctrinal relationship between DignƗga’s concept of self-cognition (svasaΥvitti) and Rdzogs-chen teaching, see Williams (1998) and Kapstein (2000). 18 Appendix: Translations of the Chapters on PramƗζa in S.4303 and S.613 ⺋⚃慷佑 “Elaboration on the Meaning of Four Means of Valid Cognition” in S.4303 18 ⚃慷侭炻味㗗⽫埴ᷳ↮滲ḇˤ⽫ᷳ⡆⽖炻䓙㱽㶙㶢ˤ㱽ᷳ㶙㶢炻䓙⽫⯨ㆸˤ Four means of valid cognition (pramƗΧa) refer to the distinct functions of mental 18 Four types of pramƗΧa are commonly accepted by the Dilun masters in the late sixth-century, though not all of them agreed on this issue. For example, Huiyuan (523-592) accepts three types of pramƗΧa. In the Dasheng yizhang, he is aware of the synonymous usages of “teaching” and “testimony,” while he also points out the distinction of the meanings of two terms. See Huiyuan, Dasheng yizhang: “Regarding teaching (ƗJDPD) as a means of valid cognition, this refers to those teachings by which one knows profound dharmas that it would be beyond one’s capacity to learn on one’s own. It can be further analyzed into two forms: (1) knowing the particular/thing (shi ḳ) and (2) knowing the universal/principle (li 䎮). The knowledge of the particular/thing refers to the conventional truth (saۨv‫܀‬ti-satya) which is attained through teachings. The knowledge of universal/principle refers to those universals/principles of the Twofold Truth which are attained through teachings. Teachings in this sense are also called “verbal testimony” (xinyan liang ᾉ妨慷). Generally speaking, these two are the same. If we analyze more precisely, “verbal testimony” refers to those words by which one is led to apprehend dharmas that are close to one’s own [knowledge], while “authoritative teaching” refers to that by which one is led to know profound and unfathomable dharmas. Accordingly, some classify means of valid cognition into four types: (1) perception, (2) inference, (3) authoritative teaching and (4) testimony. Although this classification does no harm, it is not the way the scriptures and treatises define things.” (T44.671.a.26-b.6) ㄏ怈炻˪⣏Ḁ佑䪈˫烉ˬ妨㔁慷侭炻㚱㱽 䌬䳽炻冒≃ᶵ䞍炻啱㔁ẍ忂炻⎵䁢㔁慷ˤ㕤ᷕ↮⇍炻Ṏ㚱Ḵ䧖ˤᶨ侭䞍ḳ炻Ḵ侭䞍䎮ˤ㕤ᶾ媎ᷕ 啱㔁䞍侭炻⎵䁢䞍ḳˤḴ媎䎮ᷕ炻啱㔁䞍侭炻⎵䁢䞍䎮ˤ㬌ᷳ㔁慷㱽ᷕṎ⎵ᾉ妨慷ḇˤ忂慳㗗ᶨ炻 㕤ᷕ↮⇍炻㱽䳓冒↮炻啱妨ℍ侭炻⎵ᾉ妨慷ˤ㱽⣏䌬䳽炻ὅ㔁䞍侭炻⎵䁢㔁慷ˤ㚱Ṣ⯙㬌↮慷䁢 ⚃ˤ䎦慷䁢ᶨˤ㭼慷䁢Ḵˤ㔁慷䁢ᶱˤᾉ妨䁢⚃ˤ㬌Ṏ䃉 ˤỮ朆䴻婾ˤ⎵佑⤪㗗ˤ˭ 炷T44.671.a.26-b.6炸According to Fazang’s (㱽啷 643-712) record, Master Yan (埵) held the theory of four types of pramƗΧa. See Fazang, Fayanjing tanxuanji 剙♜䴻㍊䌬姀: “Fourthly, according to Master Yan and others, pramƗΧa is divided into four [types]. (1) Teaching as pramƗΧa refers to hearing names in the beginning. (2) Testimony as pramƗΧa refers to the quest through teaching. (3) Inference as pramƗΧa refers to seeing [the relation of] the essential [body] (DharmakƗya) and the incarnated [bodies] (SaΥbhogakƗya, NirmƗΧakƗya). (4) Perception as pramƗΧa refers to the experiential witness of what has been said. Those four [types of pramƗΧa] are [also called] hearing, thinking, cultivation, and realization.” ⚃ὅ埵㱽ⷓ䫱↮䁢⚃慷烉ᶨˣ⇅倆⎵䫱㗗㔁慷烊Ḵˣὅ㔁⮳㯪㗗ᾉ慷烊ᶱˣ夳 ⼤ὅ㬋㗗㭼慷烊⚃ˣ倆[嫱?]⼤㇨婒䁢䎦慷ˤ㬌⚃⌛㗗倆⿅ᾖ嫱ḇˤ(T35n1733_p0456a02-05) Master Yan could be Tan Yan (㙯埵 503-581), who authored Dasheng yizhang (⣏Ḁ佑䪈). See EicŚƃ (㯠崭), Touiki dentou mokuroku 㜙➇⁛䅰䚖抬, T55n2183_p1161b22. For the biography of Tan Yan, see Yang Weizhong 㣲䵕ᷕ, Zhongguo weishizong tongshi ᷕ⚳ⓗ嬀⬿忂⎚ (Nanjing: Phoenix Publishing House, 2008), Vol. 1, 88-90. 19 activity. The capacity of mind is augmented or diminished with respect to the depth or shadow of dharma, while the depth of dharma is shaped by the mind. ⤪㚱ᶨ㱽炻Ữ⎗ᾉ䞍炻侴㛒⎗妋ˤ⍰㱽⎗妋炻侴ᶵ⎗埴ˤ⍰㱽⎗埴炻侴ᶵ⎗ㆸˤ 㚱㱽⎗埴炻⌛Ṏ⎗ㆸˤ㬌⌛⚃慷⽫埴ḇˤ㬌㗗䓙⽫⻟⻙炻㱽㚱ⶖ⇍ˤ For instance, (1) there is dharma that can only be known through belief, but is not intelligible; (2) intelligible, but not applicable; (3) applicable, but not achievable; (4) both applicable and achievable. Above [described] is the realm of mental activity of four means of valid cognition. This is due to the distinction of dharma that depends on the strength and weakness of mind. 䓙㱽㶢㶙侭炻㱽䚠㚱⚃烉ᶨ⎵ˣḴ䚠ˣᶱ䓐ˣ⚃橼ˤ Due to the depth and shadow of dharma, there are four characteristics of the dharma: (1) name, (2) characteristic, (3) function, and (4) substance. 19 ⥳⮳⎵㔁炻Ữ㚱ẘ㍐ᷳᾉ炻㛒㚱⌛㱽ᷳ妋炻㓭⎵㔁慷ˤὅ䚠䓇妋炻㓭㚘ᾉ慷ˤ䎮 䓐屯⽫炻ẍㆸ℞埴炻⎗ẍ䓐㭼橼炻㓭㚘㭼慷ˤᾖ埴ㆸ䅇炻橼嫱䎦⇵炻㓭㚘䎦慷ˤ In the beginning, one starts to learn the teaching in words with the belief (xin ᾉ) of aspiration without the immediate understanding of dharma. Thus named is “the teaching as a means of valid cognition”. The understanding (jie 妋) arisen on the basis of the characteristics [of dharma] is named “the verbal testimony as a means of valid cognition”. The inference as the means of valid cognition is named for [that by which] the Substance is inferentially cognized through the Function [of dharma], while the principle (li 䎮) of the Function [of dharma] is employed to assist the mind to accomplish practice (xing 埴). “Perception as a means of valid cognition” refers to the experiential witness (zheng 嫱) of the Substance (ti 橼) when cultivation has been accomplished. 19 In S.4303 the notions of ti, xiang, and yong are employed for the first time to characterize the body of the Buddha: “As for the DharmakƗya (Body of Truth), one reveals the Substance through Principle (li 䎮). As for the Saূbhoga-kĈLJĂ (Reward-Body), one reveals the Characteristic by virtue of Quality. As for the NŝƌŵĈ৆ĂŬĈLJĂ (Responsive Body), one clarifies the Function in terms of Conditions (晐䶋)” ˬ婾 㱽炻⯙䎮ẍ⼘橼ˤ婆⟙炻㒂⽟⼘䚠ˤ婾ㅱ炻晐䶋彗䓐ˤ˭(S.4303 2012: 233). In other words, the Substance (ti 橼) of the Buddhahood as DharmakƗya is Suchness (tathatƗ), which is also named “Principle” (li 䎮) in the Sinitic usage. The characteristic (xiang 䚠) of the Buddhahood as SaূbhogaŬĈLJĂ is Quality. The Function (yong 䓐) of the Buddhahood as NŝƌŵĈ৆ĂŬĈLJĂ is the capability of responding to the conditions. In the chapter on pramƗΧa of S.4303, though this passage is about the characteristics of existence (dharma), it should be understood in reference to the Idealist onto-theo-logy in which the Dilun thought is rooted. See Aramaki 2000: 59. 20 ˪䴻˫ᷕㆾṎ婒䁢⚃䧖ㆸ䅇烉㛒ᾉ侭Ẍᾉ炻⶚ᾉẌℍ炻⶚ℍẌ䅇炻⶚䅇Ẍ妋僓ˤ In the Snjtra [four types of pramƗΧa] are also named as four types of maturation (paripƗka): (1) to make those unbelievers believe, (2) to make those believers enter [the path], (3) to make those [in the path] mature, and (4) to make those who are matured achieve liberation. 20 㬌䫱䘮㒂ᾖ䚠炻㓭㚱↮滲ˤ劍䚜婯⽟ỵㆸ䅇ᷳ嗽炻⇯⽫㱽䘮圵炻䃉㚱↮滲ˤ侴Ṏ ⼿婒侭炻ᷫ㗗䃉↮滲ᷳ↮滲俛ˤ Those [means of valid cognition] are differentiated on the basis of the appearance of cultivation.21 If they are viewed in the mature stage of spiritual achievement, there is no differentiation, because mind and dharma are not differentiated. However, if one must inevitably say something [at this stage], then all can be said is the differentiation of non-differentiation. ⎹Ἦ㲃婒⚃慷ᷳ佑ˤ劍䘮 22㱽ỵ侴妨炻ㆾ㒂⥳栗㕤⃰晃炻ẍ㖶⚃慷炻⇅⛘⶚ᶲ䁢 䎦慷炻忻䧖䁢㭼慷炻⿏䧖䁢ᾉ妨慷炻佺䧖䁢㔁慷ˤ㒂䳪栗㕤⼴晃炻ἃ⛘ẍ䁢䎦慷炻 ⇅⛘⶚ᶲ䁢㭼慷炻忻䧖䁢ᾉ妨慷炻佺䧖ˣ⿏䧖䁢㔁慷ˤ℞ᷕ⽫㱽ˣ䛇‥ˣ⃒≋ᷳ ⶖ炻ㆾ㒂䚠⇍炻⚃慷㬟䃞炻ㆾ㒂䶋崟䃉䣁炻ᶨ⚃ᾙ圵ˤ Briefly explained above is the meaning of four means of valid cognition. For explanation in terms of the stages of dharma, the four means of valid cognition can be explained in the sequence starting from the beginning of the path. Perception [as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a] refers to what occurs at the First Stage and beyond. Inference [as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a] refers to what occurs at the stage of the Gotra of Path忻䧖. Testimony [as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a] refers to what occurs at the Stage of the Gotra of Nature⿏䧖, and Teaching [as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a] is referred to what occurs at the stage of the Gotra of Learning佺䧖. 23According to the explanation in the sequence starting from the final stage of the path, perception [as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a] refers to what occurs at the stage of Buddhahood. Inference [as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a] refers to what occurs at the First Stage and beyond. Testimony [as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a] refers to 20 For the canonical source, see AvataΥƐĂŬĂ^ƻƚƌĂ (Dafangguangfo huayan jing ⣏㕡⺋ἃ厗♜䴻), tr. Buddhabhadra ἃ旨嵳旨伭, T09n0278_p0483c23-27; ŽĚŚŝƐĂƚƚǀĂďŚƻŵŝ (Pusa dichi jing 厑啑⛘㊩ 䴻), tr. DharmakԕĈŶƚŝ 㙯䃉嬾, T30n1581_p0932c15-17. 21 “Fenqi” (↮滲) is used to render the Sanskrit terms pariccheda and pravibhƗga, meaning “accurate definition”, “exact discrimination.” 22 Due to the corruption of manuscript, the editor restore 䘮 in this place. However, I suspect that ⯙ is the correct word. 23 Cf., “Map of DharmadhƗtu” (Fajietu 㱽䓴⚾), S.4303, 2010: 571-591. For the canonical source, cf., ŽĚŚŝƐĂƚƚǀĂďŚƻŵŝ (Pusa dichi jing 厑啑⛘㊩䴻), tr. DharmakԕĈŶƚŝ, T30n1581_p0888b02-06. 21 what occurs at the stage of the Gotra of Path. Teaching [as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a] refers to what appears at the stages of the Gotra of Learning and the Gotra of Nature. The distinction of mind and dharma, truth and falsity, and superiority and weakness [of the four types of ƉƌĂŵĈΧa] can be drawn on the difference of the characteristics [of the four types of ƉƌĂŵĈΧa], which are vividly evidenced. All of four types of ƉƌĂŵĈΧa can be melted as one when they are viewed from the perspective of Non-obstructive Dependent Arising. 妨䶋崟侭炻㒂㔁婾⚃炻⚃䘮㗗㔁炻ᷫ军⯙䎦彗⚃炻⚃䘮㗗䎦ˤᶨ⌛㗗⚃炻⚃⌛㗗 ᶨ炻ᶨ⚃䃉冒炻㓭⎵䶋崟ˤỽ侭炻⣓叔㱽ⶖ⇍炻⁷䩳⼘䌬炻㚱娖⁛ᷳ佑炻⎵ᷳ䁢 㔁ˤ媠㱽⭪㹭炻⎗ὅᷳẍℍ⮎ˤ㬌⇯㗗㕡ὧᷳ䚠炻㓭㚘ᾉ慷ˤ媠㱽䶋崟炻䃉晄䣁 䓐炻⎗ẍ㬌㭼橼炻㓭㚘㭼慷ˤ⸛䫱䃉㇚婾炻橼䃉㇨晙炻㓭㚘䎦慷ˤ In view of Dependent Arising, four types of pramƗΧa can all be taken as Teaching, if they are viewed from the perspective of Teaching. By the same token, they can be viewed as Perception, if they are viewed from the perspective of Perception. One is four, while four is one. One and four are all without self-[nature]. Hence they are named “Dependent Arising”. Why? The myriad dharmas are differentiated like the images reflected in the mirror. [The mirroring] is meant for transmission and interpretation, which is named “Teaching”. Since dharmas are tranquil one is able to realize the Reality only through Testimony, which is the characteristic of upƗya (methodic means). As for Inference, it is employed to cognize the Substance itself (橼) through knowing the dharmas (phenomena), which arise dependently without the function of obstruction. [Finally,] “Perception” is named for cognition of Substance, which is without discrimination, discursive construction (prapañca), and concealment. 妨ᶨᷕ䘮⚃侭炻㒂㔁婾⚃炻⚃䘮ⶖ⇍ˤ⯙ᾉ妨婾⚃炻⚃䘮⭪㹭ˤ⯙㭼婾⚃炻⚃䘮 䃉䣁ˤ⯙䎦彗⚃炻⚃䘮⸛䫱ˤ℞䚠ḹỽ炻ⶖ⇍ⶖ⇍㗗㔁ᷕᷳ㔁炻ᷫ军⸛䫱ⶖ⇍㗗 䎦㔁ḇˤ㬌ᶨ㖊䇦炻检ᶱṎ䃞炻㚜ᶵ⊆䄑慳ˤ To say that four [types of pramƗΧa] can be found in one [type] is equal to say that four [types] are differentiated when they are viewed from the perspective of Teaching. However, if they are viewed from the perspective of Testimony, all of four [types] are transquil if they are viewed from Inference, four are non-obstructive; if they are analyzed from the perspective of Perception, all of four are not discriminated. What are their characteristics? While to differentiate the differentiation is the Teaching of Teaching, it can say that to de-discriminate the 22 discrimination is the Teaching of Perception. As the one [i.e., Teaching] can be viewed in this way, the rest of three [types of pramƗΧa] can also be viewed in the same way. Hence no need for further exposition. ⓷㚘烉⚃慷ᷳ佑炻↉㚱⸦䧖烎䫼㚘烉⣏⇌㚱Ḵ烉ᶨ侭ˣ⚈ᷕ⚃慷烊Ḵ侭ˣ㝄ᷕ⚃ 慷ˤ Question: Concerning the meaning of the four types of pramƗΧa, how many kinds are there? Answer: Briefly there are two kinds: (1) four types of pramƗΧa in the cause, and (2) four types of pramƗΧa in the fruition. ⓷㚘烉⚈ᷕ⚃慷炻⽑㚱⸦䧖烎䫼㚘烉⚈ᷕ㚱Ḵ烉ᶨ侭䶋䄏炻Ḵ侭橼䄏ˤ妨䶋䄏侭炻 媪⇅倆ἃ⿏炻ᾉ㔁㓭䞍炻㗗䁢㔁慷ˤ㫉⽑⿅ょ炻䓇㬣嘃⤬炻㖶䞍ὅ䛇炻㗗䁢ᾉ妨 慷ˤ䞍嘃⤬⶚炻妋埴↮ㆸ炻デ夳ㅱἃ炻ẍㅱ㭼䛇炻㗗䁢㭼慷ˤ䃉㖶↮䚉炻䶋䄏䎦 ⇵炻掉⁷䎦䞍炻⎵䁢䎦慷ˤ妨橼䄏侭炻媪⋩ỷᷕ炻⼿㱽䓴ⶖ⇍ᷳ䚠炻ẍ䁢㔁慷ˤ ⋩埴ᷳᷕ炻⼿⭪㹭䚠炻䁢ᾉ妨慷ˤ⋩徜⎹ᷕ炻⼿䶋崟䃉晄䣁䚠炻㗗䁢㭼慷ˤ⇅⛘ ⶚ᶲ炻⼿冒橼⸛䫱䛇⮎ᷳ䚠炻ẍ䁢䎦慷ˤ㬌ᷳ⚃䧖炻䲬㔁ỵ⇌炻㓭婒⇵⼴ˤ㒂埴 ⮎妨炻⎴㗪䶋崟炻㓭⼿⎵䁢ˬỷ㕤ᶨ⛘炻㘖㓅媠⛘˭ˤ Question: Furthermore, how many kinds are there for classifying four types of ƉƌĂŵĈΧa in the [stage of] cause? Answer: They can be divided into two kinds in the cause: (1) Dualistic Illumination, and (2) Self-Illumination. By “Dualistic Illumination” it means the following: “Teaching as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a” is so named when one learns [the teaching of] Buddha-nature and one knows by belief in the teaching. One continues to think that one clearly knows the fact through verbal testimony as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈΧa that the nature of life-and-death is illusory while the insight is grounded in the Truth (zhen 䛇). 24 When one has become aware of illusoriness, one achieves the partial understanding and practice to the extent that one is able to empathetically see the Embodied Buddha (ŶŝƌŵĈ۬ĂŬĈLJĂ). In this case, inference as a ƉƌĂŵĈΧa refers to the analogical cognition of the [Buddha] of Truth (i.e., ŚĂƌŵĂŬĈLJĂ) through [the cognition of] the Embodied [Buddha]. Insofar as ignorance is gradually eliminated and Dualistic Illumination is present, one obtains Perception like seeing the image reflected in the mirror, which is called “Perception as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a”. By ‘Self-Illumination” is meant the following: The Teaching as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a is made possible by [the practitioner who] obtains the characteristics of the differentiation of DŚĂƌŵĂĚŚĈƚƵ in the path of Ten Dwellings. The Testimony as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a is made possible by [the practitioner who] 24 Zhen 䛇 in this context could mean “DharmakƗya”. The phrase “mingzhi yizhen” (㖶䞍ὅ䛇) means the trans-mundane insight based on DharmakƗya, the Body of Truth. 23 obtains the characteristic of tranquility [of dharmas] in the path of Ten Practices]. The Inference as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a is made possible by [the practitioner who] obtains the characteristic of the non-obstruction of the Dependent Arising in the path of Ten Transferences of Merit. Perception as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a is made possible by [the practitioner who] obtains the characteristic of the non-discriminated reality of [the dharma] itself in the First Stage and beyond. The four types [of the means of valid cognition] are arranged sequentially in terms of the stages of teaching. As for the reality of practice they simultaneously arise within conditions. Hence it says that though dwelling in one stage, [one’s cognition] universally comprehends [what is cognized in] all other stages. ⓷㚘烉㝄ᷕ⚃慷炻䚠⽑ḹỽ烎䫼㚘烉㝄⯭䳗堐炻㚜䃉䶋䄏炻ⓗ㚱橼䄏ˤ晾㚱橼䄏炻 Ṏᶵ⎴⚈ᷕ橼䄏ˤ婾℞⚈ᷕ炻⮵䶋栗⮎炻㓭婒ᾖ⼿ˤ㝄ᶵ⮵䶋炻䃉ᾖ䃉⼿ˤ Question: What are the characteristics of four types of pramƗΧa in the [stage of] fruition? Answer: In [the stage of] fruition, which is beyond the mundane stages, besides Self-Illumination no more Dualistic Illumination exists. [In the stage of fruition] though Self-Illumination exists, it is distinct from the Self-Illumination which is in the [stage of] cause. In the stage of cause, the Self-Illumination discloses the reality in conditions, so that it is named “realization through practice”. In the stage of fruition, since the fruit does not [disclose] in conditions, there is neither practice nor realization. ⓷㚘烉劍ᶵ⮵䶋炻ỽ⎗婒⚃烎䫼㚘烉㱽䓴䶋崟炻㬲傥䃉慷炻ỽ⥐婒⚃ˤ㇨妨⚃侭炻 媪橼䚠⎵䓐ˤ Question: If [Self-Illumination] does not arise in conditions, how can it be classified into four types? Answer: Since the Dependent Arising of the DharmadhƗtu is infinite, it does not matter to [classify it into] four types. The four types as mentioned refer to [the objects of cognition, i.e.,] Substance, Characteristic, Name, and Function. ⓷㚘烉⤪Ἦᶨ↯䎦夳炻⤪ỽ⼿婒炻ẍ䁢ᾉ㭼烎䫼㚘烉Ữ朆ẘ㯪ᷳ㭼炻䞍㕤㭼㱽炻 ⎵㭼慷炻㬌ỽ⽑ 烎⍰⽑⤪Ἦ℟ᶨ↯䞍炻劍䃉㔁䞍炻ḹỽ⎵℟烎 Question: For the TathƗgata-s all are immediately perceived. How could his speech be taken for testimony and inference? Answer: [The TathƗgata’s inference] is not the inference for searching the superior state. 25 It is named “inference” because he 25 Because there is no teaching superior than the Buddha’s teaching. 24 knows [people’s practice of] inference. So, what is wrong with this? Furthermore, the TathƗgata is qualified (ju ℟) by omniscience. If the Teaching is not included [in the TathƗgata’s knowledge], how could he be qualified [by omniscience]? ⓷㚘烉ᶱḀ忂㔁炻Ṏ㚱⚃慷ẍᶵ烎䫼㚘烉晐⬿妋㚱炻㶢㶙䁢䔘ˤ劍忂㔁ᷕ炻ẍᶫ 嬀㘢炻奨㕤䚠䨢ˤ⇅ὅ俾㔁炻ẍ䁢㔁慷ˤ㌐㔁⿅㱽炻ẍ䁢ᾉ妨慷ˤ夳㱽䶋崟炻ẍ 䁢㭼慷ˤ㬋⼿䚠䨢炻ẍ䁢䎦慷ˤ㝄⇯ᶵ䇦ˤ䛇㘢嫱䨢ↅ䃞炻晾ᶨ䎦慷炻ㅱ䞍䄏䶋 ℟㕤⚃慷ˤ⚈⌛⚃慷⇵⼴炻㝄⌛ᶨ㗪℟嵛ˤ Question: Are there also four types of pramƗΧa in the Common Teaching of Three Vehicles? Answer: The existence are made intelligible in accord with the Fundamental Tenet (zong ⬿), which are differentiated in terms of the degree of profundity. 26 In the Common Teaching, one uses seven types of consciousness to contemplate on the emptiness of characteristics. In the beginning, one relies upon the sacred teaching as the Teaching as a means of valid cognition. It follows that one sets aside the Teaching to contemplate dharmas and takes them as the Testimony as a means of valid cognition. When one sees the Dependent Arising of dharmas, one takes it as the Inference as a means of valid cognition. [Finally,] when he witnesses the emptiness of characteristics, he takes it as Perception as a means of valid cognition. By contrast, it is not the case in the [stage of] fruition. Though one cognizes the emptiness in the abstract state (ningran ↅ䃞) through authentic cognition (zhenzhi 䛇㘢)27, that is, through Perception [of four types of pramƗΧa], one should know that all conditions of illumination are included in the four types of pramƗΧa. In the stage of cause, four types of pramƗΧa occur in the sequential order. In the stage of fruition, [all of four types of pramƗΧa] simultaneously are present in one instant. ⓷㚘烉ㅱ䞍ᶨ㗪䘮〱䎦夳炻Ṏᶵㅱ㚱㭼ˤ䫼㚘烉䞍Ṿ㭼㱽炻㓭⎵㭼慷炻ᶵ⥐䎦夳ˤ ⤪ἃḼ䛤炻Ṏ䄏Ṿ晄ℏᷳ嗽炻ẍ䁢倱䛤ˤ Question: One should know that even if [all dharmas] are perceived simultaneously in one instant, inference should not be included [in the Buddha’s cognition]. Answer: [In this case,] inference is thus named for knowing the inference practiced by others. It does not prevent [the occurrence of] perception, just like the five eyes of the Buddha, which is also viewed as the physical eyes for seeing the other sensory field 26 27 For the usage of zong ⬿ in the Dilun School, see Funayama 2000: 126. Zhenzhi (䛇㘢) refers to the self-cognition of the transcendental mind (冒⿏㶭㶐⽫). 25 covered by the hindrance. 28 ⓷㚘烉忂⬿㝄㘢炻ỽ㓭ᶵ婒ˬ䞍Ṿ㭼㱽炻ẍ䁢㭼慷˭炻ᷫ军ˬ㔁慷˭ḇ烎䫼㚘烉 忂⬿㗗䃉晄䣁㱽䓴炻冒Ṿᾙ圵炻㗗㓭ᶵ婒ˤ Question: Regarding the cognition in the stage of fruition in the Common Tenet (tongzong 忂⬿), why don’t you say that “inference is thus named for knowing the inference practiced by others” and so on up to “Teaching [as a means of valid cognition]”? Answer: They are not mentioned because in the Common Tenet both the self and the others are non-discriminated due to the non-obstruction of the DharmadhƗtu. ⓷㚘烉⇍䚠㔁ᷕ炻䚠⽑ḹỽ烎䫼㚘烉ẍℕ嬀㘢炻⇅倆俾㔁炻ẍ䁢㔁慷ˤ㌐㔁⿅㱽炻 ẍ䁢ᾉ妨慷ˤ忚ℍᾖㄏ炻Ụ㱽⽵⽫炻ẍ䁢㭼慷ˤ劎⽵ẍᶲ炻䎦夳⚃媎炻ẍ䁢䎦慷ˤ 劍䄏䶋⇍婒炻㕤ᶨ↯嗽炻䘮㚱⚃慷ˤ⤪倥㱽㗪炻倆㱽ⷓ婆炻䞍㚱侴⶚炻悥ᶵ傥妋炻 㗗䁢㔁慷ˤㆾ晾⮹妋炻⤪ᶵ傥婒炻㗗䁢ᾉ妨慷ˤㆾ晾傥婒炻侴婒ᶵ℟嵛炻㗗䁢㭼 慷ˤ劍倆婒㱽炻冱⥳䞍䳪炻婒⇯℟嵛炻㗗⎵䎦慷ˤ倥婒㖊䇦炻媠检ᶨ↯炻⎗晐佑 栆䞍炻䘮㚱⚃慷ˤ Question: What are the characteristics [of four types of pramƗΧa] in the Teaching of Distinct Character? Answer: When one hearsthe sacred teaching for the first time through six types of cognition, Teaching is taken as a means of valid cognition. It follows that he sets aside the teaching in order to speculate on the dharmas, which are taken as Testimony as a means of valid cognition. After entering into the wisdom of cultivation (EKƗYDQƗPD\ƯSUDMñƗ, xiuhui ᾖㄏ), the mind that resembles the realization (kΙƗnti) of teachings is taken as Inference as a means of valid cognition. In the stages beyond the realization of suffering, the direct perception of Four Noble Truths is taken as the Perception as a means of valid cognition. When explaining in regard to the individual condition, there are four types of pramƗΧa at each stage. For instance, when listening to Dharma Master’s talk, one does not fully understand except obtaining some superficial knowledge, [the cognition as such] is called “Teaching as a means of valid cognition”. If one is unable to verbally express what one partially understands, that [cognition] can be taken as Testimony. In the case that one is able to express [the content], nevertheless unable to completely express it, [the cognition as such] is taken as Inference. If one listens to the dharma-talk, he is able to thoroughly understand and fully express, [the cognition as such] is called 28 Five eyes: (1) the physical eye (PƗۨsa-cak‫܈‬us), (2) the heavenly eye (divya-cak‫܈‬us), (3) the wisdom eye ((prajñƗ-cak‫܈‬us), (4) the dharma eye (dharma-cak‫܈‬us), and (5) the Buddha eye (buddha-cak‫܈‬us). 26 Perception. In parallel to talk and listening, the rest of cognition can be known through the same analysis, [because] of the fact of being known through four types of pramƗΧa. ⓷㚘烉ᾉ㔁ᾉ妨炻㚱ỽⶖ⇍炻婒䁢Ḵ慷烎䫼㚘烉䌬婯ᷳ婒炻ẍᷳ䁢㔁ˤ⌛㱽侴婒炻 ẍ䁢ᾉ妨慷ˤ Question: What is the distinction between trustworthy teaching and trustworthy testimony, when both of which are regarded as the means of valid cognition? Answer: “Teaching” refers to the speculative discourse, while “testimony” refers to the discourse in accord with (ji ⌛) the dharma (truth). ⓷㚘烉⤪㬌⚃慷炻㚱ỽ⇑䙲烎䫼㚘烉㕤ἃ㱽ᷕ炻┬䞍↮滲炻ᶵ婡媿ˤ㕤Ṿ㇨埴炻 嬀℞檀ᶳ炻ᶵ⤬↮⇍ˤ㕤冒㇨埴炻暊⡆ᶲㄊ炻㦪㯪ἃ㱽炻䃉㚱⍕嵛炻⯽廱⊅忚炻 䃉㚱ẹ〗炻䞍≇⽟䃉慷䃉怲炻㚱⤪㗗䫱䃉慷⇑䙲ˤ Question: What are the benefits of four types of pramƗΧa? Answer: One will be capable of skillfully knowing the distinction of the Buddha’s teaching without slander. One will be also capable of telling the exact degree of other practitioners’ performance without wrong judgment. As for one’s own practice, he will be able to detach from self-pride (abhimƗna). He will be delighted in the endless quest for the Buddha’s truth. He will vigorously make progress without satisfaction, because he knows that the merits [for learning four types of pramƗΧa] are innumerable and the benefits as mentioned above are also innumerable. ⓷㚘烉栀㚜㊯ḳ炻Ẍ⬠侭䞍ᷳˤ䫼㚘烉劍㗗㔁慷ᷳ↮⇍炻⇯ㅱẘ㍐侴婒炻㗗ἃ⠫ 䓴炻朆ㆹ㇨䞍ˤ⤪㗗ᶵ媿炻冒䃉伒␶炻ᷫ军⊅⶙㇨婒炻㗗㔁慷↮ˤ晾⁛℞㔁炻Ṏ ㅱẘ㍐侴ᶵ㰢⭂ˤ劍㗗ᾉ妨ˣ㭼慷炻⼿℟↮⇍炻Ṏᶵ㰢⭂ˤ劍㗗䎦慷炻⼿㰢⭂婒ˤ 妨㯪㱽䃉⍕炻⯽廱⊅忚侭炻媪劍倆㶙㱽炻㛒妋ᶵ徨ᶵỷ炻⌛㚜≈≇⽟炻ᾖ℞冒↮ˤ 冒↮㖊㺧炻⼿军Ṿ↮炻⃰㇨ᶵ妋炻Ṳὧ⼿妋ˤ㖊⼿妋⶚炻⌛䁢冒↮炻 ⽑㚜㍐㯪炻䞍㚱㛒妋ᷳ嗽ˤ⤪㗗㫉䫔炻军ἃᷫ㬊ˤ㗗㕤冒埴嗽⍲ἃ埴嗽炻┬妋⇍ 䞍俛ˤ Question: Please kindly advise more for students. Answer: Regarding the analysis of Teaching as a means of valid cognition, one should say in the manner of respect: “This is the state of the Buddha’s experience. This is not what I know.” One will not commit the sin when he does not slander [the Buddha’s teaching]. Regarding the teaching which is beyond one’s own understanding, whenever one receives it, one 27 should keep it undetermined in the manner of respect. By the same token, testimony and inference should remain undetermined even if they have been analyzed. In the case of perception, it deserves the determinate claim. Regarding “the endless quest for the Buddha’s teaching and the vigorous progress without satisfaction,” it means that if one hears the profound teaching without truly understanding [the meaning of] non-regress and non-dwelling, he should make more efforts to increase spiritual strength in order to cultivate his own [realization]. When one’s own [realization] has been fulfilled, one is able to reach the other part [of realization]. Accordingly, he will come to understand what has not been understood. Since [the other part] is understood, it becomes one’s own [realization]. He continues to make progress, because he knows what he has not yet known. Following the steps as such, he would not stop until he has attained the Buddhahood. That is, one should skillfully understand the distinction between where one has reached and where the Buddha has reached. ⚃慷佑 “The Meaning of the Four Means of Valid Cognition” in S.613 ↉妨慷侭炻⮭晐↮┬䞍⤪Ἦ妨婈 29[婒]㖐嵋炻㔁攨㫉䫔炻㔯⫿䪈⎍炻⎵佑晈 栗炻悐⇍㗇伭炻⍾㌐忂⠆炻⎬㚱⬿㒂炻䎮䚖攳㖶炻侴ᶵ暄Ḫ炻㓭㚘䇚慷ˤ㕗ᷫ⎗ 媪俾㔁⚻忂炻㖐䃉ᶵ⛐炻娖㍸ 30Ḻ⼘炻㔯㔹ㆸ䔘㓭ḇˤ The means [of valid cognition] (pramƗΧa) is employed in accord with one’s intellectual capacity (suifen 晐↮) to skillfully cognize the meaning of the Buddha’s discourse, the sequential order of the methods of teaching (jiaomen 㔁攨), words and sentences, the implicitness and explicitness of semantic meaning, structure and style, writing skills for adoption, deletion, flow, and jam, all of which are made with various reasons. The “pramƗΧa” is thus named because the kinds of principle (i.e., reason) are clear and without distortion. As such, it can be said that the sacred teaching is perfectly coherent and the intent is pervading for the reason that expressions are mutually illuminated and the writings are stylishly composed. ℞㴯㷕⎴[㲊] 31炻㶭㽩㬲㳩ˤ㗗ẍ栂Ὰ䛆⮎炻妿㕗ẍ㖶ˤ恒㬋妋べ炻⚈䌮侴 㘩ˤỮ㘢朆⬌冰㱽冒Ḯ炻㓭彐㘢傥炻⮭⭄⽆⠫ˤ⠫䷩暋慷ˣ⮏⭡䠶㒔ˤ 29 30 31 婈 should be the corruption of 婒. 娖㍸ should be the corruption of 䫴巬. 㲊 is my guess for the missing word. 28 They are like the merging together of River Jing and River Wei, one clean and the other muddy. Hence, falsity and truth are exposed by that (i.e., science of pramƗΧa, analysis of knowledge). Right and wrong, understanding and confusion are also made clear by that. However, cognition does not arise alone, and dharma is not made known by itself. Accordingly, the analysis of the subject of cognition should start from [the analysis of] the object [of cognition], while the objects [of cognition] are too vast to be analyzed in detail. ⤪㒏䵙ẍ䴙炻天ⓗ㚱Ḵˤ℞Ḵ侭ỽ烎ᶨ㗗ᶾ㱽ˣḴ↢ᶾ㱽ˤ 妨ᶾ㱽侭炻媪ᶾ攻㇨䞍ˣ⬠㇨䞍㱽ˤ 妨↢ᶾ㱽侭炻媪ḴḀ厑啑㇨䞍㱽ˤ However, if [the objects of cognition are] systematically summarized, they can be divided into two [categories]. What are the two? They are (1) mundane dharma and (2) trans-mundane dharma. “Mundane dharma” refers to the dharma which is known by both the worldly [people] and those still in the path of cultivation. “Trans-mundane dharma” refers to the dharma which is cognized by the Bodhisattvas of Two Vehicles. ⍰ᶾ㱽㇨䞍夳侭炻Ḽ嬀Ḽ 32[⍲]シ嬀㇨䞍夳侭炻媪夳倆奢䞍ˤ℞ᷕㆾ夳㳭侴 䞍㶙炻夳㶙侴䞍 㳭炻夳䞍῞㶢炻夳䞍῞㶙ˤỵ䲬⋨↮炻䚠⇍㕤㬌ˤ军㫚⺋侴䨞ᷳ炻 晈栗忂⠆炻佑朆ᶨⅮ炻⁁ᷳ俾婍ˤ Furthermore, what is known and seen in the mundane dharmas, that is, what is known and seen by the five types of consciousness and thinking-consciousness (mano-vijñƗna) are what is seen, heard, sensed, and thought. Some are superficially seen, but deeply known. Some are deeply seen, but superficially known. Some are both seen and known superficially. Some are both seen and known profoundly. The characteristics [of cognition] are differentiated in terms of the stage [of cultivation]. Some of the meanings [of dharma] are concealed, some are disclosed, some are penetrated, and some are not penetrated. They cannot be measured by one standard. For those who seek to investigate broadly, the details can be found in the sacred teaching. 䃞㱽䚠㖊埮炻䎮䃉᷎昛ˤṲᷳ㇨彐侭炻媪㬊⛐↢ᶾᷳ㱽炻忂⬿ 䇚妨俛ˤ侴℞ᷕ昶 旵㳭㶙炻慷朆ᶨ㍮ˤ䔍㧁⬿天炻ỵ⇌ᶱ炻媪⥳栗㕤⃰晃炻Ḵ䳪栗㕤⼴晃ˤ劍⽆⥳ 32 Ḽ should be the corruption of ⍲. 29 栗⃰晃侴妨炻㒂ᷳↆ忋∝普炻┬㟡ㆸ⯙侭䇚ˬ㔁慷˭炻佺䧖⿏䇚ᾉ妨慷炻⿏䧖ˣ 忻䧖䇚㭼慷炻⇅⛘⶚ᶲ忂ἃ⛘䇚䎦慷ˤ⤪⯙䳪栗⼴晃侴妨炻佺䧖䇚㔁慷炻⿏䧖ˣ 忻䧖䇚ᾉ妨慷炻⇅⛘⶚ᶲ䚉慹∃䇚㭼慷炻ἃ⛘䇚䎦慷ˤ㗗ẍ媠彐㕤夳倆ˣ㖯旵ˣ ᶲᶳ炻℞䉞ᶵ栆侭炻卓ᶵ䘮Ⅾ㕤㬌Ḵ炻⌥慷䥹⑩炻ẍ䇚㊯⋿ᷳ⇯ˤ侴㔁⇍⠝㱁炻 栃Ὰᶲᶳ炻微枮忂⠆炻℞徼庤䂱⎗℟炻⭄䔍㒔⬿㱩炻ẍ堐㇨㖶炻⚃慷⤪㗗ˤ However, since the characteristics of dharmas are innumerable, which, logically speaking, cannot be completely laid out, what we want to analyze is merely limited to explaining the trans-mundane dharmas from the perspective of the Common Tenet. As regards [the trans-mundane dharmas], there is [the experiential difference of] ascending, descending, shadow, and depth, which cannot be measured by one criterion only. The essentials [of the four types of pramƗΧa] can be briefly marked for classification in terms of the stage [of cultivation]. That is, (1) [four types of pramƗΧa] can be explained in the progressive order from the beginning to the end of the path; (2) [four types of pramƗΧa] can be explained by the backward order from the end to the beginning of the path. According to the principle (1), the teaching as a means of valid cognition refers to that which was assembled at [the riverside of] NairañjanƗ as well as that which is accomplished by person with good capability; testimony refers to the stage of the Gotra of Learning; inference refers to the stages of the Gotra of Nature and the Gotra of Path; perception refers to the first stage up to the stage of the Buddhahood. According to the principle (2), teaching refers to the stage of the Gotra of Learning; testimony refers to the stages of the Gotra of Nature and the Gotra of Path; inference refers to the first stage up to the Diamond Elimination; perception refers to the stage of the Buddhahood. Hence, for those [dharmas] which cannot be classified in terms of the theories of seeing and hearing, ascending and descending, etc., they should be explained by these two principles. That is, [dharmas] should be categorized in terms of the means of valid cognition, which should be taken as the principle of compass (i.e., guidance). And since the doctrines are as innumerable as sands, which consist of the views of perversion, high and low, backward and forward, penetrating and blocked, they can be measured [by four types of pramƗΧa]. Hence it is appropriate to bring out the proper context within which the four types of pramƗΧa can be explained as such. ⍰妋⚃慷 Further Exposition of Four Types of the Means of Valid Cognition 劍㒂ね䎮ẍ↮炻⇯ね㚱↮旸炻ẍᷳ䇚慷ˤ䎮䃉↮旸炻⎵䇚䃉慷ˤ䎮晾䃉慷炻 30 䇚ね㇨⮩炻Ṏ㚱℞慷ˤ㬌⇯ね⃰㱽⼴ˤ If [the issue of pramƗΧa] is analyzed in terms of subjective condition (qing ね) and objective principle(li 䎮), the subjective condition has its limitation, which can be taken as the measure, while the objective principle has no limitation, which is named “immeasurable”. Though the principle is immeasurable, nevertheless it is confined by the subjective conditions. Hence it has its own measure. In this case, the subject condition is prior to the dharma [i.e., objective condition]. 劍㒂埴㱽ẍ婾炻⇯埴⽫䃉Ḵ炻晐㱽㓭ⶖˤ㬌㗗埴㱽炻ㅞ⾝㔁⊾ḇˤ If [pramƗΧa] is analyzed in terms of practice (xing 埴) of dharma (fa 㱽), since practice and mind are non-dual, [pramƗΧa] is differentiated in terms of dharma. This is the practice of dharma, i.e., memory and education. 劍㒂㱽䓴冒橼㘢忻ẍ婾炻㚜䃉⠫㘢ᷳ⇍ˤ㬋ẍ橼㚱⚃炻㓭⎵ 䇚⚃慷ˤ℞⚃侭 ỽ烎ᶨ侭橼ˣḴ侭䚠ˣᶱ侭䓐ˣ⚃侭⎵ˤ劍⯙ᾖℍ䇚妨侭炻ὅ⎵侴ℍ炻ẍ䇚㔁慷ˤ ⼿㕡ὧ⊊↮ᷳ䓐炻⎵䇚ᾉ妨ˤ㬌㕡ὧ䎦⇵㗪炻⎗ẍ㊯㕍侴婾炻ẍ䣢㕤⽫炻⎵ᷳ䇚 妨ˤ朆㗗䌬婯炻㓭䔘㕤ˬ㔁˭ḇˤ⇵䓐⼿䚠㭼橼炻⎵䇚㭼慷ˤ㬋 33[嫱]⼿橼㗪ˣ ẍ䇚䎦慷ˤ When [pramƗΧa] is analyzed in terms of the path of cognition qua DharmadhƗtu itself, there is no distinction of object and cognition. Precisely owing to the four aspects of the Substance (ti橼) [of DharmadhƗtu], there are four types of pramƗΧa. What are the four [aspects of dharma]? [Answer:] (1) Substance, (2) Characteristics, (3) Function, and (4) Name. As for the practice to enter [the path], one enters by relying on Name. Thus is called “Teaching as a type of pramƗΧa”. “Testimony” is named because it has the heuristic function of upƗya (pedagogical skill). 34 When the upƗya is present, it can be used to refer to something and show it in mind. Hence it is named “word”, which is distinct from “Teaching”, because it is not the speculative discourse. When the above mentioned “function” uses “Characteristics” to refer to “Substance”, it is named “Inference”. When one immediately witnesses the Substance, it is named “Perception”. 劍㒂ㆸ⯙嗽妨炻⚃慷䃉⃰⼴䞋ˤẍ⽫晐㱽炻㔁慷⛐⃰ˤ㱽晐⽫䚖炻䎦慷⛐⃰炻 33 “Zheng” 㬋 should be the corruption of 嫱. Shifen ⊊↮ is the equivalent of the Sanskrit word, Ɨvedha, which means in this context ““agitated, excited” (the form is past passive ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉůĞŽĨĈнĚŚLJĈ) 31 3434 ⌥ẍ㔁㘢䎦ㆸ䇚䎦ḇˤ There is no difference of sequential order when the four types of ƉƌĂŵĈΧa are viewed from where one has accomplished. When mind is in accord with dharma, priority is given to the Teaching as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a. [However,] when dharma is in accord with mind, priority is given to Perception as a type of ƉƌĂŵĈ۬a, because it transforms the cognition of teaching to perception. 冒橼䶩崟炻ᶨ㗪⁁⚃ˤ⚃䚠㖊圵炻晐ᶨ㭼⚃ˤ⚃⚃⋩ℕ炻橼㬋⚃俛ˤ婆℞䚠 ḇ炻㱽䓴⮎䚠炻ẍᷳ 䇚㔁ˤ⮎䚠⭪㹭炻ẍ䇚ᾉ妨ˤ䃉晄䃉䣁炻ẍᷳ䇚㭼ˤ䩖⚻⮎ 㖐炻ẍ䇚䎦慷ḇˤ When in view of the Dependent Arising of [DharmadhƗtu] itself, the four types of pramƗΧa simultaneously are present. As far as the four characteristics (i.e., substance, characteristics, function, and words) are melted without differentiation, four are present when any one is present. Four [multiplies] four are sixteen. In essence they are four only. As far as “Characteristics” is concerned, “Teaching” is predicated on the real phenomena of DharmadhƗtu. “Testimony” is predicated on the tranquilityof DharmadhƗtu. “Inference” is predicated on Non-hindrance and Non-obstruction. “Perception” is predicated on the Ultimate Perfection qua Real Meaning. Abbreviations Aoki Takashi, ed., “Fajietu” (㱽䓴⚾). In Aoki Takashi 曺㛐昮, Fan Guangchang 㕡⺋拑, Ikeda Masanori 㰈䓘⮯⇯, Ishi Kǀsei 䞛ḽ℔ㆸ, Yamaguchi Hiroe Ⱉ⎋⻀㰇 (eds.) Changoe chinonjong munhǂn chipsǂng 啷⢾⛘婾⬿㔯䌣普ㆸ “Fajietu” (Collection of the Extra-canonical Literature of the Dilun School). Seoul: Ssiaial, 2012: 539-591. S.613 Aramaki Noritoshi, ed., “Jiaoli wenxien jicheng (S. 613)” (㔁䎮㔯䌣普ㆸ S. 613), in Aoki Takashi 曺㛐昮, Aramaki Noritoshi 勺䈏℠ὲ, Ikeda Masanori 㰈䓘⮯ ⇯, Kim Cheonhak 慹⣑浜, Lee Sangmin 㛶䚠㖣, and Yamaguchi Hirroe Ⱉ⎋⻀㰇, eds., Changoe chinonjong munhđn chipsđng sokjip 啷⢾⛘婾⬿㔯䌣普ㆸ临普 (The Continued Collection of the Extra-canonical Literature of the Dilun School). Seoul: Ssiaial, 2013: 39-92. 32 S.4303 Ikeda Masanori, ed., “Jiaoli wenxien jicheng (S. 4303)” (㔁䎮㔯䌣普ㆸ S. 4303), in Aoki Takashi 曺㛐昮, Fan Guangchang 㕡⺋拑, Ikeda Masanori 㰈䓘⮯⇯, Ishi Kǀsei 䞛ḽ℔ㆸ, Yamaguchi Hiroe Ⱉ⎋⻀㰇 (eds.) Changoe chinonjong munhđn chipsđng 啷⢾⛘婾⬿㔯䌣普ㆸ (Collection of the Extra-canonical Literature of the Dilun School). Seoul: Ssiaial, 2012: 199-255. 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