The Turn to Anzac
A Critical Discourse Analysis of Prime Ministerial
Anzac Entrepreneurship, 1972-2007
Nicholas James Bromfield
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Science
The University of Sydney
2016
This thesis is dedicated to the most cherished women of my life:
To Susan Bromfield, whose treasured memory I endeavour to honour every day.
To Dominique Beth Wilson, with whom I create new precious memories every waking moment.
i
CONTENTS
CONTENTS.................................................................................................................................. ii
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................. iii
FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................... v
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER 1 - I t odu tio : A za s E t ep e eu s ................................................................... 2
CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review and Methodology: A Survey of Prime Ministers, Nationalism,
and Critical Discourse Analysis................................................................................................. 13
CHAPTER 3 - The Prime Ministerial Turn to Anzac: Exploring the Shift .................................. 35
CHAPTER 4 - From Contestation to Reconciliation: Anzac Under Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke,
1972-1987 ................................................................................................................................ 64
CHAPTER 5 - Hawke and Anzac as Ideograph: Economic Reform, Multiculturalism and
Foreign Policy ........................................................................................................................... 90
CHAPTER 6 - Keating: Success and Failure in Anzac Entrepreneurship................................. 120
CHAPTER 7 - Keating and Manifold Memorialisation: War Remembrance Outside of Anzac
Day ......................................................................................................................................... 147
CHAPTER 8 - Howard: Anzac and a Unified Mainstream....................................................... 176
CHAPTER 9 - Howard: Anzac in the Age of Terror ................................................................. 201
CHAPTER 10 - Co lusio : A za s E t ep e eu s in Retrospect ......................................... 229
APPENDIX............................................................................................................................... 237
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................... 241
ii
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A thesis is the work not of one individual, but many. In no particular order, I would like to
acknowledge and thank the following people who, through their support, guidance, mentorship, and
wisdom, have helped me achieve the goals and dreams I had for this thesis:
Fi stl , I ould like to tha k P ofesso ‘od e “ ith,
p i a supe iso . ‘od e s i flue
e is
pervasive throughout this thesis, and it is safe to say that it would never had been completed had i t
not been for his encouragement, insight, wisdom, and experience in creating academic work.
Rodney demonstrated to me that I could do better, and my work is forever in debt to his dedicati on
and mentorship.
I would also like to thank Professor Ariadne Vromen, my secondary supervisor. Ariadne never fail ed
to offer incisive editing advice, and a kind word to go with it. Her mentorship has been priceless,
and I am grateful for it.
My colleagues and peers in Government and International Relations, The University of Sydney, have
also offered support, mentorship, and guidance, in ways that they may not even realise. The
collegial atmosphere of the department, and the sincere interest and support of its staff and fe l l ow
students in my work, has been a delight of my doctoral studies. Dr Diarmuid Maguire offered warm
and unfaltering support when I asked naive questions about nationalism, and mentorshi p wi th my
teaching. Dr Bob Howard was an invaluable source of insight regarding the empiricism of the thesis,
and he has influenced my work in ways that I cannot adequately acknowledge. Associate Professor
Benjamin Goldsmith ran excellent methods classes, and even managed to convince me of the
usefulness of the quantitative method. Dr Peter Chen kindly offered to share his offi ce space , and
penetrating insight into my own work and academic life. Dr David Smith shared useful sugge sti ons
and much needed encouragement. Dr Anna Boucher, Associate Professor Anika Gauja, and Dr
Stewart Jackson all offered mentorship regarding my teaching, and support, ki nd words, and
encouragement regarding my thesis, for which I am truly indebted. Dr Peter Chen, Associate
Professor Anika Gauja, Dr Stephen Mills, Dr Bob Howard, and Dr Thomas S. Wilkins all kindly offered
to read earlier versions of my work, and their suggestions have been deeply influential . Profe ssor
Colin Wight, Professor Rodney Smith, Dr Betsi Beem, Associate Professor Adam Kamradt-Scott, and
Professor Ariadne Vromen all served in the thankless task of PhD Coordinator, and the i r hard work
and advocacy on our behalf was sincerely appreciated.
iii
I must also acknowledge my fellow students, past and present – Dr James Young, Dr Shazia Lateef,
Dr Thomas Wynter, Dr Christopher Neff, Dr Benjamin Moffitt, Dr Sung-Young Kim, Dr Caroline
Yarnell, Dr Yelena Zabortseva, Dr Adam Lockyer, Martin Kear, Luke Mansillo and Lisette Collins have
all at different times been the support network I needed to get this thesis finished! If the y happe n
to read this, I wish them well in their future endeavours – I know that they will excel. Shazia, Jame s,
Martin and Stewart Jackson also all took time to edit my work, and I wish to acknowledge their
kindness in taking the time to do so, and their sharp editing and comments.
I would like to thank my friends who I have neglected during this time. It has been a very difficu lt
few years and I would not have made it without them. I am truly grateful. In particular, I would l i ke
to thank Michael McGillion, Luke Fomiatti and Andrew McWilliams, all poor souls who were
subjected to my writing. Their editing suggestions were gratefully received and incorporated.
My family has been the rock upon which I have built my life. The influence of my pare nts Don and
Susan Bromfield has guided me to this point. They instilled intellectual curiosity and a love of
learning in me, never wavered in their support of my questionable life decisions, and I am si nce re l y
thankful. Mum, I miss you every day. Dad, I will always be there for you. Maybe we can finish your
truck now? To my sister Sophie – I am not sure why you followed me into post-graduate studies
afte
e a ple, ut k o that it a a tuall
e fi ished! You a d Aa o s suppo t o e the l ast
few years has been sincerely appreciated by all the family – we could not have made it without you.
Finally, and most importantly, I wish to thank my wife Dr Dominique Beth Wilson. For being my
sounding board for all my half-baked ideas, frustrations, doubts, and fears. For always and
unquestioningly being there. For all the times you helped me to be a better version of me. This
thesis would never have been started, let alone finished, without your encouragement to ful fi l my
dreams. I love you – if we can beat two theses, we can beat anything.
iv
FIGURES
Figure 1 – City Attendances at Anzac Day Marches, percentage of city population. ........................ 43
Figure 2 - City Attendances at Anzac Day Dawn Services, percentage of city population.................. 44
Figure 3 – The Aust alia Pu li s Co fide e i the A
ed Fo es,
- 2012 ............................ 45
Figure 4 – Federal Government Funding of War Remembrance, 1981/82 – 2004/05 ...................... 48
Figure 5 – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses by Time of Day, 1973 - 2007 .............................. 50
Figure 6 – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency, 1973 - 2007 ...... 50
Figure 7 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address Location by Period, 1973 - 2007 ............................ 51
Figure 8 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Mentions pe r Spe e ch
to Anzac and Digger Traditions, 1973 - 2007................................................................................. 55
Figure 9 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency of Named War,
1973 - 2007 ................................................................................................................................ 58
Figure 10 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency of Name d Si te of
Anzac, 1973 - 2007 ..................................................................................................................... 59
Figure 11 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Gendered Nouns
Mentions per Speech, 1973 - 2007............................................................................................... 60
Figure 12 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Service Type
Mentions per Speech, 1973 - 2007............................................................................................... 61
Figure 13 – List of Ha ke s A za Da Add esses a d Media “tate e ts ......................................104
Figure 14 – List of the F e ue
of Me tio s of the Att i utes of Age ts of A za i Ha ke s A za
Day Addresses...........................................................................................................................106
Figure 15 - List of Keati g s A za Da Add esses a d Media “tate e ts......................................128
Figure 16 - List of the F e ue
of Me tio s of the Att i utes of Age ts of A za i Keati g s A za
Day Addresses...........................................................................................................................130
Figure 17 - List of Ho a d s A za Da Add esses a d Media “tate e ts .....................................184
Figure 18 - List of the F e ue
of Me tio s of the Att i utes of Age ts of A za i Ho a d s A za
Day Addresses...........................................................................................................................186
Figure 19 - Support for Australian Military Action aginst Iraq, 2003 - 2006. ...................................215
v
ABSTRACT
Australian Prime Ministers in the 1970s and early 1980s did not incorporate Anzac into their
discourse of national identity.
However, since 1990 Australian Prime Ministers and their
governments have increasingly engaged with Anzac in a manner that has supplanted the tradi ti onal
role of the Returned and Services League as custodians and drivers of Anzac. This has involved
them consistently giving Anzac Day addresses during the last twenty-five years, both at home and at
significant sites of Australian war remembrance overseas. But this has not always been the case.
Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac in the past was primarily as a participant, not as a
custodian, and was more sporadic, more suburban, and less spectacular.
The thesis explains this shift by tracing the increasing use of Anzac discourse by Australian Prime
Ministers from 1972-2007. It will be argued that these Australian Prime Ministers have increasingly
sho
A za e t ep e eu ship – su essfull ide tif i g the pu li s desire to engage wi th Anzac
a d fa ilitati g A za s esu ge e
e plo i g the po e
esou es of the state i o de to
amplify Anzac. Critical discourse analysis is adopted to analyse the integration of Anzac discourse
into Prime Ministerial language. Such an approach points to the socially embedded nature of
language, whilst simultaneously analysing the linguistic construction of this language.
The thesis identifies that Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac in order to both consti tuti ve ly
renovate Anzac as a central Australian identity and for instrumental policy ends. These twin
developments have pertained especially to the processes of domestic economic reform in a
globalising world and the deployment of Australian troops during the War on Terror. Such a study is
i po ta t, as e e t s hola l i te est i Aust alia politi ia s ole i the esu ge e of A za f o
political scientists and historians has not seen systematic investigation of Prime Ministerial Anzac
Day addresses that analyses the evolution of these addresses over time or closely examines their
language on a sustained basis.
1
CHAPTER 1
I troductio : A zac’s Entrepreneurs
The Sydney suburb of Liverpool is located in the it s south-west, about 30 kilometres from the
central business district (CBD). Liverpool was once an agricultural satellite of Sydne y, re pl ete wi th
market gardens that supplied the city and its surrounds. During the middle of the 20th century,
urban sprawl had begun to engulf the area, and vast state-funded Housing Commission estates were
built in the areas nearby to house inner-city slum dwellers who had been shifted west after slum
clearances. The area had, and continues to have, a strong working-class and immigrant presence. In
the centre of Liverpool is the Edmondson VC Memorial Club, and a few blocks away from there is
Bigge Park, where the modest mid-century brick and concrete Liverpool District War Memorial is
located. Nearby is a cairn of large bush rocks, topped with a small white cross, evoking the image ry
of a battle site grave. A 2009 refurbishment of the site added two low walls, engraved with Lest We
Forget, which back onto the local tennis courts (warmemorialsregister.nsw.gov.au).
Such a humble location seems an unlikely site for Prime Ministerial commemoration of Anzac Day . 1
We have become accustomed over the last quarter century to the spectacular ceremony associ ated
with the commemoration of the 25 April 1915 landings of the Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps, along with the forces of the Allied Powers, at the Gallipoli Peninsula in mode rn day Turke y.
This commemoration has been located at the sites of battle and remembrance in Australia and
overseas that act as markers of Aust alia s a histo . A o e all, e ha e e o e a usto e d to
the image of the Australian Prime Minister at Gallipoli, standing in the gloom of the dawn wi th the
inky vastness of the Aegean Sea to one side, and the cliffs of the peninsula rising sharply up into the
sky on the other. Here they deliver missives, laden with the weight of the collective memory of the
nation, on the importance of Anzac for the present generation, all beamed live to an audie nce back
home. A dawn service ceremony in Liverpool seems unlikely to compare to the spectacular and
evocative dawn service at Gallipoli, and even more unlikely to draw Prime Ministerial attention.
Nonetheless, this location in south-west Sydney was where Prime Minister Gough Whitlam marke d
the dawn service on Anzac Day 1974 (Whitlam 1974a). Although this section of Liverpool now sits in
the neighbouring seat of Hughes, Liverpool was firmly in Whitla
s seat of Werriwa in the 1970s.
1 Following convention, Anzac has been used in the thes is, rather than the capitalised acronym of Aus tr alian a nd
New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). See Lake and Reynolds (2010, viii).
2
Scant details of the service exist, save for a handwritten note on the commitment in the Prime
Mi iste ial Dail P og a
fo
Ap il
, lo ated i the Whitla
I stitute s digital olle tio
(Whitlam 1974a). The newspaper reports of the day did not report on it, instead oti g Whitla
s
attendance at the Sydney Cenotaph later that morning where he wore his World War II me dal s for
service, laid a wreath before the march, and chatted with the participants (Cunningham 1974, 2; 9).
No speech was given by Whitlam, and he mixed freely with the crowd, part of the milieu of the day,
not its focus. The Daily Program notes that Whitlam later that day attended the Anzac service at the
Masonic Club in Parramatta i “ d e s
est, again, far from the CBD and its customary sites of
Sydney war remembrance at the Martin Place Cenotaph or nearby at the NSW ANZAC War Memorial
in Hyde Park.
Contrast the relaxed and suburban commemoration of Anzac Day 1974 with Anzac Day 2007. On
this occasion, Prime Minister John Howard too saw it fit to attend the dawn service in a suburban
electorate far from the usual significant battle and remembrance sites, like Gallipoli or the Australian
War Memorial (AWM) that he usually preferred. But this was not in his own seat of Bennelong in
“ d e s o th. Instead, he appeared at a dawn service at Greenslopes Repatriation Hospital,
Brisbane - in the inner southern Brisbane electorate of Griffith, held by the increasingly popular
opposition leader Kevin Rudd. Rudd, having made plans to attend the dawn service at the AWM i n
Canberra, sent his daughter Jessica to stand in for him at Greenslopes (Karvelas, Parnel l, and Dodd
2007). Later that day, Howard returned to Canberra to attend the parade, which was also atte nde d
by Rudd. A a o
as t i g to pla
ous Coalitio sou e as said to ha e e a ked I do 't k o
ith ‘udd's
i d. But it o ked a
a
hethe the PM
Ka elas, Pa ell, a d Dodd
.
Anzac here was a forum for partisan electoral competition, which the media enthusiastically
reported upon.
Unlike Whitlam in 1974, Howard made a speech during his attendance at the Greenslopes dawn
service. It was something that he had done often as Prime Minister on Anzac Day. In this speech he
marvelled:
It has undoubtedly been one of the most warming experiences of the Australian nation,
particularly of those generations who fought in the wars in which this country has been
involved to see over the last 10 or 20 years a resurgence of affection for and observance of
ANZAC Day. The extraordinary scenes of thousands of young Australians going to Gallipoli
Peninsula on ANZAC Day, the growing numbers of young people attending ANZAC Day services
sends a very powerful message of reassurance to all generations of Australians that this most
special of all Australian days will always be at the centre of our national life (Howard 2007).
3
Ho a d s ad i atio of the esu ge e of A za ta itl a k o ledged that this had ot al a s e e
the case. During the intervening period et ee Whitla
s da
se i e i Li e pool a d Ho a d s
dawn service in Greenslopes, Anzac had changed. Anzac had evolved from being worryingly in
decline and contested, to a resurgent and increasingly essential, incontestable, and unpolitical,
discourse of Australian national identity. Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac had changed
too, beyond the differences elicited by the occupation of the office of Prime Mi ni ste r by di ffere nt
personalities operating in different temporal circumstances. Where Prime Ministers had once be e n
pa ti ipa ts i A za s o
e o atio , taki g pa t at the leisu e of the ‘etu ed a d “e i es
League (RSL) who governed Anzac Day, they were now drivers (Holbrook 2014, 6). Prime Mi ni ste rs
took centre stage on Anzac Day with speeches of national significance, where once they had not.
Thei go e
e t s now used the resources of the state to fund war commemoration, whe re once
they had not. And the media focused their attention on the actions of Prime Ministers on Anzac
Day, where once they had not. The institution of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac had
been seemingly irrevocably altered. The question then becomes how much of this change in Anzac,
and change in Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, can be attributed to Australian Prime
Ministers? And how and why has that change occurred?
Prime Ministers as Anzac Entrepreneurs
The answers to these questions can be explained within the framework of nationalism
entrepreneurship. Astute actors working within the context of nationalism have the potential to
create new markets for nationalist feeling by identifying the desire for national ist se ntiment and
fulfilling that desire. Not every nationalist will be an entrepreneur – nationalism entrepreneurs can
be distinguished by their ability to seize the opportunity to promote their new form of nati onal i sm
when older forms of nationalist practice become unstable and unsustainable.2 In doing so,
nationalism entrepreneurs disrupt, alter, and even destroy, old patterns of nationalist practi ce . As
such, this process of contestation makes nationalism entrepreneurship an inherently political
p o ess, e e though atio alis
s te de
to present itself as essential and perennial may
obscure this fact. The degree to which such an actor will be successful in the endeavour of
nationalism entrepreneurship will depend on them fulfilling certain criteria, which will be of varyi ng
importance in differing circumstances:
1. Nationalism entrepreneurs need to be sensitive to the socio-political context that the y are
working within and respond to the local and particular nationalist symbols, traditions , and
2 See Kingdon (1995, 165-195) and Mintrom and Norman (2009, 650), who both apply the idea of entr epr eneur s
seizing the opportunity to promote new policy avenues in the context of public policy.
4
beliefs of this context (see Smith 2001, 57-61). Further, they must be wary of resi stance to
their version of nationalism that may arise from this socio-political context.
2. Leading on from this, nationalism entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful if the y are
perceived as nationalists themselves. If a nationalism entrepreneur can demonstrate the i r
commitment to a genuinely felt nationalist end, they will be seen to be signalling their
authenticity with their sympathetic, altruistic, or ideational, commitment to the good of the
broader nation. If nationalism entrepreneurs fail to do this, they may ope n the mse l ves to
accusations of employing nationalism as a strategy for personal gain, and be met with
suspicion or rejection.
3. Nationalism entrepreneurs can potentially come from any sphere of society, but their
degree of success will depend on their ability to mobilise power resources. Nationalism
entrepreneurs can draw upon individual power resources (e.g. wealth, prestige, personal
acumen and popularity) or collective power resources (e.g. group or ethnic identification,
solidarity-based organisation, pooling of power resources) 3 to create and spread the
internalisation of new forms of nationalist sentiment. Political and cultural elites are actors
who frequently possess these power resources. On balance then, elite possession of the se
resources will make them more likely candidates for nationalism entrepreneurship than the
average individual who cannot mobilise these resources.
Nationalism entrepreneurship is a useful approach to the study of actors working within the context
of nationalism because it accounts for the role of both structure and agency in the reproducti on of
nationalism. Nationalists are neither wholly determined by the socio-cultural context that they fi nd
themselves in, and nor are they able to wholly define this socio-cultural context and manipulate the
populace for instrumental ends. An account of actors working within a nationalist context ne e ds to
take account of both of these elements of structure and agency, and take account of how each
element of power may be more or less important in varying circumstances.
As such, nationalists are profoundly influenced by their context, so much so that national identity
becomes internalised. But they also retain the ability to influence and shape that context, to de fi ne
it in their own nationalist terms if they can acquire the consent of their fellow nationalists by
working within the elastic boundaries of national identity. The goal for nationalism entrep reneurs,
therefore, is not an instrumental political end divorced from nationalism (Brubaker 1998, 292) . For
3 See Wrong (1979, 124-145) regarding individual and collective power resources.
5
nationalism entrepreneurs, the nationalist goal is the end in of itself. Instrumental political or pol i cy
ends may be bound up in this nationalist end, but they are not exogenous to that nationalist end.
This thesis argues that Australian Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating, and Howard, were nationalism
entrepreneurs. All
e e p oud Aust alia
atio alists, a d all had a affi it fo Aust alia s
a
history. All worked within the changing times – a globalising world had led all three of these men to
conclude that Australia needed to respond with neoliberal economic reform (or economic
rationalism, in the local parlance). Changing political and cultural demographics and attitudes
amongst the Australian population had meant that old forms of Australian national identity based
upon British race patriotism had become unstable (Curran 2006; Curran and Ward 2010), with Anzac
itself especially suffering from its association with these forms of Australian identity. Responding to
these twin developments, Hawke, Keating, and Howard, tu ed to Aust alia s
a histo
a d
redefined Anzac.
Anzac was an ideograph – a nebulous and elastic rhetorical signifier with a loose, but re cogni sable,
meaning that allowed a degree of transformation (McGee 1980). A za s e t ep e eu s used the
ideographic nature of Anzac to incorporate contemporary neoliberal values, and later, martial
meaning centred on the War on Terror and contemporary Australian Defence Force (ADF)
deployments. They were able to promote their versions of Anzac successfully by using the power
resources of the institution of the Prime Minister and the state, replacing the role of the RSL in
A za s o
e o atio . And the Australian public responded enthusiastically to Prime Ministeri al
promotion of Anzac, as Prime Ministers successfully delivered a form of nationalism that aligned
ith the pu li s own sense of national identity.
The Unpolitics of Anzac
Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating, and Howard were successful Anzac entrepreneurs because they
succeeded, to varying degrees, in creating an unpolitical form of Anzac. In order to define what the
thesis ea s
u politi s, e ust fi st ade i to the diffi ult te ai of ho
politi al . Follo i g Ha
,
e
a de fi e the
-64), the political may be narrowly or broadly defined al ong axes
of political conduct and spheres of political context. Armed with this insight into the voluminous
definitions of the political, the thesis thus rejects classifications of the political that are restri cte d to
the formal institutional sphere of government, or that only narrowly countenance certai n forms of
conduct as political, such as self-interest or ensuring good governance. Instead, politics can be
defined expansively and is encompassed by certain features, rather than solely spheres or conducts:
6
politics as choice – where politics can only occur when there are choices to be made; politics as the
capacity for agency – where the choices made have the potential ability to make a difference and
are not simply subject to fate; politics as deliberation – where the choices of politics and the
potential for agency is interrogated and contested; and politics as social interaction – as politics is
relational, in the sense that it affects others, even if decisions are made alone (Hay 2007, 65-70).
Realms that are not subject to these conditions, where human agency is null, and choices and
deli e atio a e i possi le, a e thus o -politi al Ha
,
.
The choice to use the term unpolitical thus seeks to convey the way that these features of politics
can be discursively organised out of relations and instead be presented as incontestable, e ssential,
a d outside o a o e politi s see “ haap
,
-21). It does not imply that there is an actual
absence of politics or apathy towards politics. Crucially, decisions that affect others are sti l l made ,
even if the agency and deliberation of politics remains latent (see Lukes 2005, 29). It is a purporte d
state of being in which certain modes of political conduct are deemed inappropriate and spheres for
the political are demarcated. Relatedly, the unpolitical may be the result of established practice or it
may be an active process. The process of depoliticisation is evident when the unpolitical is
instigated by the active exercise of agency (Hay 2007, 78-87; Flinders 2008); when unpolitics is the
result of established practice and tradition it is commonsensical, essential and taboo, and politics
remains latent.
Thus, whilst depoliticisation may describe the active process of unpolitics, it does not ful l y capture
the meaning behind the unpolitical. When social relations are established as commonsense and
essential, it does not make sense to describe the state of being as a verb (despoliticisati on). Nor i s
the past participle (depoliticised) appropriate if the unpolitical state of being has not been
acknowledged as political in the past, and thus gone through the process of depoliticisation. Othe r
related synonyms, such as anti-politics and post-politics, are also inappropriate. Anti -poli tics, that
ei g he … politi s as a ea s of o du ti g pu li affai s is o de
ed a d so e alte
ati e
a s of o du ti g those affai s is p oposed i its pla e Hindess 1997, 21) again captures the active
process when it describes the rejection of politics, but fails to directly account for the purported
essential state of being of the unpolitical. Post-politics also only refers to the process, rather than to
an essential state of being, with its emphasis upon managerial and technocratic forms of
governance:
Post-politics refers to a politics in which ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles
are replaced by techno-managerial planning, expert management a d ad i ist atio … Doi g
politi s is edu ed to a fo of i stitutio alized so ial a age e t a d to the o ilizatio of
7
governmental technologies, where difficulties and problems are dealt with by administrative
and techno-organizational means (Swyngedouw 2010, 225).
Post-politi s e phasis upo te h o a
a d
a age ialis
also e plo s a la guage a out late
capitalism that fails to appropriately capture the primordial essentialism of nationalism and Anzac.
To sum up, the unpolitical has been employed in the thesis in order to capture the discursi ve re al m
that is professed to be outside or above politics. It is a purported state of being that may be
signalled by an active process of depoliticisation or it may be an essential form of established
practice that has not yet been politicised. Importantly, it does not claim that there is an actual
absence of politics, but instead seeks to convey the manner in which politics is denied. Whilst othe r
forms of demarcating the political and unpolitical are established in the literature, they do not ful l y
capture the meaning of the unpolitical that the thesis seeks to convey. To reiterate, Australian
Prime Ministers have encouraged, sanctioned and helped establish an unpolitical version of Anzac.
This was undertaken by Hawke, Keating and Howard with varying degrees of commitment, active
participation and success. However, as will be shown, all of these Prime Ministers have made some
attempt to respect and encourage the unpolitics of Anzac.
The Scope of the Thesis
Having set out the general argument and scope of the thesis, it is important to note what the the si s
will not do. Whilst the thesis provides an analysis of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and
thei ole i A za s esu ge e, it does ot propose to provide a holistic account of that resurgence.
Accounts of the Gallipoli campaign that began on 25 April 1915 have been manifold - beginning with
C.E.W. Bea s offi ial histo
of the Aust alia I pe ial Fo e du i g Wo ld Wa O e, the o k of
historians like Bill Gammage, and a plethora of contemporary popular histories. Histori ans l i ke K.S
I glis a d Ca ol
Hol ook ha e also e a i ed the e olutio of A za i Aust alia s atio al life
over time. Whilst the theory of nationalism entrepreneurship is sensitive to the context that
entrepreneurs find themselves in, and the thesis pays considerable attention to that context, the
thesis does not propose to examine the breadth of that socio-cultural context like Inglis (2008) doe s
with his history of the war memorial, or Holbrook (2014) does with her history of Anzac
remembrance. Nor does it make a comparative study with other countries and their reme mbrance
of war. Especially relevant here is New Zealand – whilst this may seem like an oversight, given
Aust alia s a d Ne
)eala d s sha ed
Ministers in exclusive Australian te
neglected
a histo , A za i Aust alia has ee defi ed
s, a d Aust alia s elatio ship
ith Ne
Pi e
)eala d has ee
Aust alia s A za e t epreneurs.
8
Instead, the thesis focuses on the language of Prime Ministers themselves. In doi ng so, the the si s
has taken a particular approach to Prime Ministerial language. Firstly, it assumes that Prime
Ministers ultimately animate their speeches and are solely responsible and accountable for the
words they are speaking, despite the issue of authorship in an age of speechwriters and media
officers (Wodak et al 2009, 71). Secondly, the thesis has deliberately chosen to analyse the archi val
evidence of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac during their time in office, rather than to
conduct post-term interviews. Such an approach trades off the potential insight interviews may
offer in favour of avoiding issues that may arise from Prime Ministers projecting their bias or seeking
to protect their legacy.
The thesis will progress as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and explains the
methodological approach of the thesis. In it I survey the literature on Prime Ministerial engagement
with Anzac from political scientists, historians, and sociologists. I find that whilst considerable
attention has been paid to the topic of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, it lacks sys tematic
and sustained analysis. The chapter further conducts a critical survey of the nationali sm l i terature
and proposes that the entrepreneurship literature offers greater theoretical insight into the
operation of actors working within the context of nationalism than has been offered by this curre nt
literature. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of the methodology employed i n the the si s critical discourse analysis (CDA). Here the thesis argues that CDA offers both a qualitative and
quantitative approach to the study of discourse that demands both a focus on the textual
production of language and the social and political context that produces these discourses, a
method that has not yet been applied to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the period under examination by conducting two tasks. Firstly, i t
employs process tracing to sketch the causal reasons for the adoption of Anzac by Australi an Pri me
Ministers. Whilst several explanations for this shift exist in the literature, I propose that no one
account wholly explains what is happening by itself. Instead, the cumulative effects of the di stance
in time from the original Anzacs, the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with Australian body po liti c,
the tradition of Anzac in Australian cultural life, and Prime Ministers nationalism entrepreneurship ,
provide necessary, but by themselves insufficient, causal reasons for the Prime Ministerial adoption
of Anzac. The second section of Chapter 3 establishes the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day
addresses. It does this by applying corpus assisted discourse analysis, a quantitative approach to
CDA, to e plo e the f e ue
a d dist i utio of the ge e s featu es. As su h, it ide tifies the
9
various thematic and characteristic features of these addresses, including where and when the
addresses have been delivered, and for what purpose; representations of Anzac; the themes
invoked; where Anzac is located by the speeches and which battles it is associated with; and who
A za s age ts a e. The hapte
depe de t G u e
o ludes that A za has i
easi gl
e o e heto i all path
o e the pe iod u de e a i atio .
Chapter 4 begins the finer grained analysis of the individual Prime Ministers and their e ngage ment
with Anzac by looking at the period from 1972-1987. Anzac was contested by social movement
activists and demonstrably in decline during the terms of Whitlam and Fraser, though its importance
in national life was never extinguished as counter-narratives of resistance, renovation, and
recognition, played out. The chapter notes that whilst Whitlam and Fraser never stopped e ngaging
with Anzac during their terms in office, they were primarily participants in that process , and that
their participation was less spectacular and more local than what we have become accustomed to i n
more recent years. Things began to change with Hawke, however, who demonstrated some of the
above tendencies, but also initialised greater engagement with Anzac in the lead up to the
reconciliatory welcome home parade for Vietnam veterans in 1987. The chapter further argues that
the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body politic was a crucial tipping
point in the engagement of Prime Ministers with Anzac, as it instituted an unpolitical form of Anzac
that was essential and taboo to contest, and was as such suitable for Prime Ministerial engagement
and instrumental use.
Chapter 5 e a i es the e ai de of Ha ke s ti e i offi e f o
-1991. Here I argue that
Hawke demonstrated the pote tial of A za e t ep e eu ship, o e tl ide tif i g the pu li s
desire for Anzac and responding to it, especially with the unprecedented state i nvol ve me nt i n the
70th a
i e sa of the Gallipoli la di gs a d Ha ke s t ip the e fo Ap il
. A za offe e d a
unpolitical platform from which Hawke espoused his message of consensus, and hi s go e
commitment, and by extension the people s o
e ts
it e t, to the p oje t of eoli e al e o o i
reform. This lesson had been taught from experience, as the contested nature of the Bicentenary i n
1988 had made the delivery of this message less successful than it had been on Anzac Day 1990.
More prosaically, Hawke also used Anzac Day to deliver speeches that closely resembled familiar
partisan policy addresses, demonstrating that the sacredness of Anzac had not yet fully coalesced
around Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.
10
Chapter 6 analyses Keati g s engagement with Anzac Day. Where Hawke been cautious with Anzac
by honouring its traditional tenets centred on the Gallipoli campaign of World War I, Keating
atte pted to elo ate Aust alia s u de sta di g of its a histo , a d its o se ue nt me aning, to
World War II and the War in the Pacific. This was part of his wider political project that attempted to
reorganise Australian political and cultural life around neoliberal principles of e conomic re form i n
response to globalisation, and engagement with Asia in order to succeed in this endeavour.
U de pi
i g this poli
di e tio
as Keati g s elief that Aust alia s histo i al ties
ith G eat
Britain and Empire were damaging its future prosperity, and the consequent need for Australia to
abandon such connections by becoming a republic, and embracing an Asian future. Keating
reflected these tendencies in his engagement with Anzac, visiting Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the
Kokoda Track, sites of significance during the War in the Pacific and for the defence of Australi a, for
his first Anzac Day. Keating argued that it as he e that the t ue sig ifi a e of Aust alia s
history lay. The o
a
i atio of Keati g s politi s, and his attempt to relocate Anzac, caused
considerable controversy and was opposed conservative critics. Whilst the contestation that his
version of Anzac attracted meant that he less successful in keeping his version of Anzac unpolitical, it
was an ambitious and precedential engagement with Anzac that demonstrated both the possibilities
and limits of such engagement.
Chapter 7 explores the increase in
e o ialisatio that su ou ded Keati g s te
occurred outside of Anzac Da , pa t of the i te atio al
e o
oo
i offi e that
of the late
th
century
(Winter 2006). The chapter analyses the opening of the Australian Vietnam Forces National
Memorial, the interring of the Unknown Soldier, the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings, and the
Australia Remembers program of events that commemorated the end of WWII. I argue that Keating
had both success and failure in this arena of memorialisation – success because these forms of
e o ialisatio
e t ed o his p efe ed e sio of Aust alia s a histo that e phasi sed WWII
and played down the significance of Gallipoli; and failure because he largely refrained from
referencing his political style and honoured the strictures of the Anzac tradition in order to be
unpolitical, and in particular, failed to dislodge the place of Gallipoli in the national psyche . It al so
makes the point that state involvement in memorialisation was increasing, with the Australia
Remembers program particularly employing the funding and policy resources of the state.
Chapter 8 explores the fi st ea s of Ho a d s te
as P i e Mi iste , f o
996-2001. In this
chapter I a gue that Ho a d s e sio of A za epudiated Keati g s atte pted ei agi atio of
A za s lo atio
a d
ea i g, a d atte pted to ei state a u politi al, o se ati e , and
11
traditional, reading of Anzac. This repudiation emphasised a
ai st ea
eadi g of A za that
stressed the Anglo-Celtic heritage of Anzac, the centrality of Gallipoli, and tended to emphasise unity
over reference to the diversity of Australian society. Howard also actively policed this version of
Anzac, and refused to countenance critiques of his vision. Finally, Howard filled Anzac with new
eoli e al alues that efe e ed the i di idualis of his go e
e t s poli age da , de spi te the
olle ti ist te de ies of A za s t aditio s.
Chapter 9 analyses Ho a d s latte
a Ho a d alig ed A za
ea s i offi e, f o
ith his go e
e tsi
-2007. In particular, it examines the
easi g te de
to a ds i te e tio , a d
participation in the international War on Terror. I argue that it was during this period that Howard
esta lished hi self as A za s ost su essful e t ep e eu . Whilst Ho a d s e gage e t as just
as politically motivated as Keati g s, his st i t adhe e e to a o
e tio al a d o se ati e eadi g
of the Anzac tradition helped to successfully keep his version of Anzac unpolitical. It further
i stituted a h pe -A za – a turbo-charged version of Anzac that was more spectacular, more stateorientated, more chauvinist in its patriotism, more rapturously received, and therefore harder to
contest, tha Ho a d s p ede esso s a aged to a hie e. I fi all a gue that Ho a d s e si o of
hyper-Anzac has made it difficult to reimagine Anzac in politically progressive terms.
I conclude by surmising the argument presented above and proposing some avenues for further
investigation. If, as I propose, Anzac has been reimagined in an unpolitical manner that has been
most successfully realised in conservative and neoliberal terms, how does this compare to the e l i te
realisation of other days of Australian national significance, such as Australia Day? Can nati onal i sm
entrepreneurship be fruitfully realised as a generalisable, mid-level theory of nationalism? And how
might the trend towards Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac fit within the changing
institutional context that Prime Minsters find themselves within, and their seemingly growing
power? I believe that this thesis will offer some fruitful avenues for investigation re gardi ng the se
questions, in addition to providing an original and illuminating insight into Prime Ministerial
engagement with Anzac.
12
CHAPTER 2
Literature Review and Methodology: A Survey of Prime Ministers,
Nationalism, and Critical Discourse Analysis
Introduction
This chapter surveys the breadth of academic inquiry into Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and
engagement, nationalism, and entrepreneurship, before making an argument as to why critical
discourse analysis has been adopted as the methodological approach to the research que sti on. As
will be shown, Prime Ministerial Anzac Day rhetoric has not seen detailed examination by schol ars.
This seems somewhat surprising given the amount of attention Anzac has received from researchers
working in political science, history, sociology and cultural studies. This gap in the literature
warrants scholarly attention in order both to shed light on the shift in Prime Ministerial narratives of
national identity and to provide a more comprehensive and systematic analysis than has been
attempted before. The chapter will further demonstrate that whilst the theoretical literature on
nationalism literature is vast, it does not adequately capture the operation of structure and age ncy
in the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and that the entrepreneurship literature offers a fruitful
avenue of theoretical insight. Finally, the chapter demonstrates why CDA is an appropriate me thod
to effect this analysis.
CDA points to the socially embedded nature of language, whilst
simultaneously analysing its linguistic construction. CDA therefore looks at the poli ti cal and soci al
forces that produce discourses of national identity, whilst also pointing to the ways that these
discourses simultaneously produce and reinforce these forces. This dual approach to the study of
Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac has not been attempted previously, and its adoption in
this thesis offers a fuller view of the process.
Prime Ministers and Anzac in Political Science
The study of Prime Ministers in political science is a broad field, hi h “t a gio, t Ha t a d Wal te
(2013) have admirably surveyed. Following their assessment of the literature, studies of the
institution of the Westminster Prime Minister have centred on historical approaches; area and
comparative studies (usually institutional in approach, and somewhat lacking in behavioural
analysis); biography and autobiography (of sometimes questionable quality); and rhetorical and
o
u i ati e a al ses “t a gio, t Ha t a d Walte
, - . “t a gio, t Ha t a d Walte
iti ise the alue of politi al iog aph , asse ti g that it ofte
,
…does little to o pa e a d
13
contrast its subject and the circumstances in which that prime minister governed with other holders
of the offi e a d thei
o te ts. Biog aph a d
e oi s do, however, provide rich and valuable
insight into the workings of particular Prime Ministers, and, on occasion, brief contextuali sati on of
their engagement with Anzac (see, for instance, Watson 2011; Howard 2010). Historical, area and
comparative studies have tended to focus on the trend towards greater power centralising with and
around the institution of the Prime Minister. Such a shift has from some quarters been termed
p eside tialisatio , the de elop e t of a i
easi g leade ship po e esou ces and autonomy
within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly leadership ‐centred
ele to al p o esses
Pogu tke a d We
,
. “u h a app oa h has
ee
o tested,
principally regarding the institutional basis for the claim that the centralisation of power in the
institution of the Prime Minister is mimicking the powers of presidents, especially US presidents
(Dowding 2013a; also see Kefford 2013a; Kefford 2013b; and Dowding 2013b for this debate in an
Aust alia
o te t . “u h a de ate a
adopti g the
e t a s e ded, “t a gio, t Ha t a d Walte
o e e e uti e app oa h to the po e of the P i e Mi iste ,
Ministers are enmeshed in relationships with othe politi al a to s, a d a
e assu ed to ha e a dete
i i g i flue e fo ea h issue that
,
l ai ,
he e P i e
ot the e fo e …si pl
osses thei ta le. The o e
executive method informs their approach to the study of Prime Ministers, which examines the
interplay between social and political context and relations, political institutions, and Prime
Mi iste s pe so al ha a te isti s “t a gio, t Ha t a d Walte
,
.
Most ele a t fo this thesis is the last atego of P i e Mi iste ial studies that “t a gio, t Hart and
Walter (2013) identify – studies of Prime Ministerial rhetoric and communicative strategies. In
political science, recent generalist works on Australian political rhetoric have examined topics such
as the development of political rhetoric over time, current trends in political speech, and have
theorised the institution of Prime Ministerial language. Importantly for this study, these works have
paid little or no attention to Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, despite its prominence as a
feature of Aust alia politi al heto i . G u e s e e t pu li atio s o Aust alia pol iti al he to i
ha e fo used upo the
heto i al path depe de
oad i stitutio of the heto i al p i e
,
i iste
Gu e
a d its
he e P i e Mi iste s … a e aught between the desire to utilise
fresh and engaging rhetoric in order to better explain a new policy direction and the reality that they
a t e see to e o t adi ti g the sel es G u e
,
. Uh a d Walte s
edited
collection collates papers on a range of topics in Australia political language, focusing broadl y upon
language and political behaviour, the standards of rhetoric, and also upon the content of Austral i an
political rhetoric, but it does not address Anzac. Dyrenfurth (2010, 41) has noted that the study of
14
political language in Australia has been understudied, and has touched upon the role of Anzac in the
language of Prime Minister John Howard (Dyrenfurth 2007). Kane and Patapan (2010, 386) examine
the a tless a t of politi al heto i , a gui g that de o ati s ste s of go e
e t …i pose a
difficult burden on their leaders, expecting them to have special abilities to lead even while
de a di g the
loak those a ilities i a au a of o di a i ess , hi h leads to plai , i fo
a l, and
calculated political rhetoric. Finally, McCabe (2013) surveys the development of Australian pol itical
speech from the beginnings of the 20th century to the present, noting the role of technol ogi cal and
cultural change in bringing about transformations in political language.
The study of the political language of individual Prime Ministers in isolation and comparison has also
ee u de take . B ett
,
;
; B ett
e a i es the ole of A za i Ho a d s
language as she explores the political traditions of the Liberal Party of Australia (LPA), but l i ke the
other authors mentioned above, does not make this the focus of her analysis. Her e arl i e r work on
the language of Robert Menzies similarly does not examine Anzac (Brett 2007). Johnso n has
conducted extensive work in the field of Prime Ministerial language and discourse. The Labor Legacy
(Johnson 1989) studied the rhetoric and ideology of Labor governments and Governing Change:
Keating to Howard (Johnson 2000) adopted an approach strongly influenced by discourse the ory to
compare the Australian identity narratives of Keating and Howard in the context of economic
reform, globalisation, and neoliberalism. Later work by Johnson (2007) focused upon the i nte rpl ay
et ee Ho a d s politi al language, identity politics, and public policy. None of this work by
Johnson touches upon the role of Anzac in Prime Ministerial language or discourses of identity.
Finally, Greenfield and Williams (2003, 291-292) briefly address the role of Anzac in what the y te rm
Ho a d s autho ita ia populis
, ut do ot situate thei stud i the
oade o te t of P i e
Ministerial discourses of Anzac.
In addition, there is a small literature that can be located within political science and i nte rnational
relatio s that add esses politi ia s e gage e t ith A za . I this ould, the edited olle tio of
Sumartojo and Wellings (2014) contains studies into memorial diplomacy, that being, the political
interaction of national leaders surrounding major war anniversaries and sites (Graves 2014). In the
same collection, Wellings (2014) argues that resurgent Anzac nationalism is a product of
globalisation, and contends that the national identity narratives of Australian politicians of the l ast
thirty years have been a reaction to these globalising forces. Whilst outside the time peri od of thi s
thesis, Beaumont (2015a; 2015b) has analysed the role of memory in the reproduction of Anzac
during the centenary of the Gallipoli landings, pointing to the enormous financial backing by the
15
state, ut also o te di g that it is … o lo ge ade uate to a gue that the
e o of a is e ti el
shaped by the state, which imposes a Gramscian-st le hege o i ideolog
population that accepts this as natural and beyo d iti ue Beau o t
a,
fo
a o e o a
. Ho e e , su h
studies have been relatively rare in political science, and they do not directly addresses Prime
Ministerial language in a sustained and systematic manner. As such, I contend that a substantial gap
exists in the field of Australian political science regarding the study of Australian Pri me Mi ni steri al
narratives of, and engagement with, Anzac.
Prime Ministers and Anzac in History
Moving beyond political science reveals that historians have naturally shown considerable interest in
A za , a d also i politi ia s e gage e t ith A za du i g the ti e pe iod u de e a i atio .
Histo ia Ke I glis
o k has had o side a le i pa t i this ega d, egi
i g ith his se i al
investigation into the work of C.E.W. Bea , the offi ial histo ia of Aust alia s Wo ld Wa O e
commitment, and his role in the conceptualisation of Anzac in Australian society (Inglis 1965).
Further work by Inglis on Anzac was published in his impressively conceived and detailed hi story of
Australian war memorials, first published in 1998, and with a significant update in 2008 to include
further reflection on the continuing memorialisation of Anzac after 2000 (Inglis 2008). Wove n i nto
this history is the role of Prime Ministers and the state in the process of memorialisation in Australia,
especially in the updated epilogue of the 2008 edition. Similar themes are examined by Inglis (1999)
in his examination of the interring of the Unknown Soldier and the role of Prime Minister Paul
Keating. I glis
esea h age da does ot, ho e e , i lude detailed e a i atio of P i e
Ministerial language, or seek to explain how and why Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac.
Holbrook (2014, 166-206) also devotes considerable space to Prime Ministerial engagement with
Anzac in her history of Anzac remembrance, interviewing former Prime Ministers Fraser, Hawke,
Keating and Howard for her study, and providing valuable insight into their post-career assessments
of their engagement and contribution to Anza . Hol ook s app oa h does te d to the efo e fo us
upo the P i e Mi iste s o
hat the did, o
assess e ts of thei e gage e t, as opposed to e a i atio of
o e sig ifi a tl fo this stud , e a tl
(2006) stud of Aust alia P i e Mi iste s a d Aust alia
hat the said a d ho . I Cu a s
atio alis , P i e Mi iste s e gage e t
with Anzac is put it in the context of their wider rhetoric on national identity. Unlike Holbrook,
Curran tends to focus on the biography of Prime Ministers to explain their views on national identity
du i g thei te
s i go e
e t, as ell as upo
hat the said. Cu a s o k does ot, ho e e ,
attempt a systematic examination of all speeches, and nor does it attempt linguistic anal ysis of the
16
addresses. From a more critical perspective, Lake and McKenna have both pointed to the role of
politicians and governments in supplanting the Returned and Services League as custodians of Anzac
a d thei
ole as the
ele ato
e
p o ote s of A za
E a i atio of pa ti ula P i e Mi iste s e gage e t
la guage, a
e fou d i Nelso s
Lake
; M Ke
a
0).
ith A za , a d so e a al sis of thei
e a i atio of Keati g at Kokoda, a d M Ke
a s iti al
work on Howard (2007). But like other studies, these works do not offer detailed examination of the
linguistic construction of language, or systematic analysis of the development of Pri me Mi ni steri al
engagement with Anzac. McKenna (2010) does offer an insight into the role of politicians in his
more general exa i atio of A za s esu ge e, ut agai , does ot o du t a s ste ati o
linguistic analysis.
A ade i histo ia s ha e also e gaged ith A za a d Aust alia s a histo
taki g a
o e ge e all , ofte
oadl so ial histo app oa h. ‘ussel Wa d s The Australian Legend (1993) epitomised the
radical nationalist tradition of interpretation of Australian identity, and argued that the figure of the
la iki digge
as a o ti uatio of Aust alia s ush
tholog . “eal
fou d si ila the es to
be persuasive when he examined the folk traditions of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), but al so
poi ted to the i stitutio alisatio of a o e offi ial a d statist t aditio of A za too. Ga
age s
(1974) work, The Broken Years, presents a history of the AIF by examining the letters and di ari e s of
1000 soldiers, and Thomson (2013) presents an oral history of Anzac and its evolution by
interviewing these soldiers in the twilight of their lives. More critical historians, such as Lake (1992)
and Bongiorno (2014) have pointed to the ways that Anzac reproduces dominant forms of masculine
and Anglo-Celtic identities respectively. Conservative historians publishing in Quadrant have
challenged what they see as the anti-I pe ial a d ihilist ie of Aust alia s war history that argues
that Aust alia s pa ti ipatio i WWI
as a iole t aste of life of little st ategi i po ta e to
Australia (Bendle 2014; Moses, Santamaria and Hirst 1992). Recent edited collections have also
analysed the history of the effects of war upon returned soldiers (Crotty and Larsson 2010) and have
challenged the mythologising and inaccurate historical assumptions that arise in interpre tations of
Aust alia s
a histo
“to ki gs
. Despite ot add essi g the esea h uestio u d er
examination in this thesis as such, such works provide valuable insight into the origins and
reproduction of Anzac in Australian history and society.
Prime Ministers and Anzac in Sociology, Anthropology and Cultural Studies
Scholars working broadly within sociological, anthropological, and cultural studies frameworks have
also engaged in analyses of Anzac, though their disciplinary focus tends to lead them to investigation
17
of the broad societal level processes that produce Anzac, rather than to examination of the actor
centred production of Anzac via Prime Ministers. Donoghue and Tranter (2013, 5-6) present data
from the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, and find that 90% of Australians regard Anzac as
being associated with Australianness to some extent, and that Anzac is more important for older,
boomer aged citizens. They regard the resurgence of Anzac as being attributable to positive medi a
coverage, the promotion of Anzac by political leaders, and the symbolic representation and cul tural
performance of Anzac in Australian life (Donoghue and Tranter 2013, 9-
. Kapfe e s eth og aphi
work compares Australian and Sri Lankan nationalism, and contains significant analysis of Anzac. He
argues that the egalitarian ethos of Australian nationalism is reproduced within the commemoration
of A za , i te sio
246-
ith the state Kapfe e
o tai s a al sis of the do i a t fo
. Elde s o k o Aust alia ide tit El de
,
s of A za s ep ese tatio , a d o t asts this wi th
h potheti al app oa hes to A za that a ou t fo Aust alia
a histo
s
a
a
iguities
regarding the mental health of returned service personnel, the wars of settlement against
indigenous peoples, and violence perpetuated against women during war and by veterans when
they returned home. She also has provided an important account of the Women Against Rape
(WAR) activists who contested Anzac during the 1980s (Elder 2005). Finally, Nicoll (2001) takes a
cultural studies approach to the history of Australian national identity, also analysing the ambiguities
of the iole e of Aust alia s a histo i sites like the Australian War Memorial, and mediums like
visual art. As noted though, these approaches do not examine the Prime Ministerial reproduction of
Anzac.
As has been demonstrated, while much research has been conducted on Anzac, a substantial gap
exists in the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. As of the present moment, no
author has attempted to systematically address Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over time,
hilst also pa i g atte tio to P i e Mi iste s li guisti
o st u tio of Anzac, and placing that
within the political and social context of their times in office. I contend that addressi ng thi s gap i n
the literature is an important endeavour, as it contributes to the understanding of the institution of
Prime Ministerial language, in addition to a deeper understanding of Prime Ministerial narrati ves of
national identity.
Nationalism and Entrepreneurship
As was introduced in the first chapter, the thesis proposes that Prime Minsters Hawke, Keati ng and
Howard were nationalism entrepreneurs. To employ the market metaphor, these Pri me Mi ni ste rs
were significant and powerful actors who correctly identified the public sentiment for Anzac, met
18
that need, and in the process helped to create a new market for Anzac that replaced the ol d forms
that had do i ated A za s o
e o atio . This e t se tio
e ie s the atio alis
l i te atu e
and demonstrates that existing explanations of actors operating in the context of national i sm have
been under-theorised. Further, it demonstrates why the entrepreneurship literature can help to
explain the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac.
A Survey of Some of the Dominant Approaches to Nationalism
The nationalism literature can be divided into four rough categories, entailing differe nt ontologi e s
on the emergence and reproduction of nationalism – the primordial, modernist, ethno-symbolic, and
discursive approaches. The primordial school sees natio alis as a p odu t of the
a d a ie t oots a d t aditio s of the atio
Özkı ı lı
. The te de
atu al , de e p,
of p i o dialists to
see the nation as a natural product of humanity has been largely discredited as a casual explanati on
for nationalism by scholars working in the other three schools of nationalism theory. The y poi nt to
the lack of e pi i al e ide e to suppo t these lai s Özkı ı lı
,
, a d suggest that these
seemingly natural attachments are indeed construed or constructed. As will be explored in the
thesis, there is little in the way of empirical evidence to suggest that Prime Ministerial e ngagement
with Anzac has been natural or given, and, as such, primordialism is an inadequate explanation for
this shift. A milder form of primordialism is perennialism, which observes the long, pre -modern
history of nations, back to the Middle Ages, or even antiquity (Smith 2001, 50). However, such a
ie
still sha es the gi e ess of atio alis
ith p i o dialis ,
t a s itted f o
o e ge e atio to the e t
ith thei
Özkı ı lı
, hi h, like p i o dialis , a
ot e suppo ted
,
esse tial
he e atio al ide tit is
ha a te isti s u ha ged
the e pi i al e ide e i the
observation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac.
Mode is , o the othe ha d, te ds to sees atio s, a d thus atio alis , as p odu ts of
specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialism, the emergence of the bureaucratic state,
u a izatio , a d se ula is
Özkı ı lı
,
. Gell e
,
, i pa ti ula , is a i po ta t
foundational figure in this respect, who defined atio alis as p i a il a politi al p i iple,
holds that the politi al a d the atio al u it should e o g ue t. Natio alis
fo Gell e
hi h
as a
function of modernism, where a universalising national high culture was imposed upon pre viousl y
multiple local and folk low cultures via schooling and bureaucratic means (Gellner 1983, 57). This
as a
oadl so iet le el p o ess, a ha a te isti that also defi es A de so s
o st u ted i agi ed o
u ities . A de so
,
fa ousl
att i butes changing culture during the
enlightenment as the casual reason for the shift towards nations – the challenging of sacred
19
la guages, like Lati , the de li e of the a solute
o a h, a d the ollapse of a o eptio of
temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the worl d and of
e esse tiall ide ti al. The de elop e t of the p i ti g p ess, i the o te t of the se ha ge s,
provided a means for the imagination of the national community to replace these cultural
certainties. Whilst these two authors certainly do not represent the breadth of scholarship on
modernist approaches to nationalism, they do point to the primarily top-down and broadly soci e tylevel focus of the school, where nationalism is largely a phenomenon imposed upon a society by
societal forces outside the control of the vast majority of a nation.
The next school, ethno-symbology, rejects primordialism and attempts to strike a balance be twe e n
the perennialist and modernist position (Smith 2001,
otes that [ ]eithe pe e
ialis
o
; Özkı ı lı
,
-169). Smith (2001, 60)
ode is sought to e te the o ld of atio alis … a d, as
such, failed to account for the historically contingent (perennialism) and often pre -modern basi s of
ethnic identity, myth, memory and symbol (modernism). Smith argues that this position is necessary
because nations are neither wholly continuous nor wholly recent functions of modernity. Inste ad,
the roots of the nation lie in its symbols, a bottom-up society-level process. Whilst such an approach
acknowledges the role of elites in the reproduction of nationalism (Smith 2001, 57), its focus on the
reproduction of the symbols of a nation tends to take the ir reproduction for granted, and fails to
explain why some symbols are chosen, why others are ignored, and the role and motivations of
actors who do the reproducing (Calhoun 1997, 49-50). As such, ethno-symbolism, like mode rnism,
makes an important contribution to the understanding of the structural framework that elites like
Prime Ministers must work within, but it does not explain their role in the reproduction of
nationalism. The socio-cultural focus of modernism and ethno-symbolism therefore creates a blind spot regarding the agency of particular actors in the reproduction of nationalism. As such, both
approaches are inadequate to the analysis of the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac, as the
research question of this thesis is less about the socio-cultural processes that produce nati onal ism,
but instead how and why actors working within this context choose to engage with nationalism.
The final approach to nationalism is the discursive or postmodernist school, a loose collective of
approaches characterised by the rejection of what they view as the reducti onist causal explanati ons
of nationalism already surveyed here, and a commitment to the study of nationalist di scourses. A
study of nationalism that entails a discursive approach therefore adopts a theoretical viewpoint that
contends that no one theory of atio alis
a e plai all i sta es of atio alis
Özkı ı l ı
,
226-28; Calhoun 1997, 22). Further, study of particular nationalisms cannot be reduced to a singular
20
and essentialist understanding of that nation, as many competing and contested vers ions of the
nation are at play within nation-states Özkı ı lı
,
. Dis u si e app oa hes to atio alis
argue that what is common to differing forms of nationalism is the discourse of national ism, whi ch
lai s, fi stl , the p i a of the atio s values and interests over any other compe ti ng cl ai ms of
interest based upon sub-national identifications such as class, gender or sexuality; secondly,
discourses of nationalism view the nation as the essential and only source of legitimacy; and fi nal l y,
nationalist discourses are mobilised with binary disti tio s su h as us a d the
Özkı ı l ı
,
230). Added to this is the dialectical relationship between discourse and the social structures,
practices and institutions that make up the day-to-day of nationalism (De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak
1999, 157). So, whilst at different times the bottom-up cultural explanations of ethno-symbolism or
the top-down explanations of modernism may offer insight as to the casual factors of a particular
nationalist discourse, the dialectical relationship insight points to the conclusion that neither
operates in isolation. Nationalist social practices are influenced by the situatedness of their cultural
and political setting, but these nationalist practices in turn influence the cultural and political setting
in which they are embedded. Finally, then, the effectiveness of nationalism lies in its routine,
regular, and every-day reproduction – its inclusion in school curricular, its visible presence in the
architecture of the landscape, the national flag and anthem, the observance of national days and
anniversaries, its reproduction in high and pop culture etc. see Billig
; Özkı ı lı
,
-32;
Calhoun 1997, 50).
Such an approach has had a great influence upon the thesis, and I have adopted its insights into how
the discursive reproduction of nationalism occurs in its analysis. However, much like the above
approaches, it does little to explain why actors adopt nationalism or to provide a theoretical
framework to analyse and distinguish between the varying degrees of agency and influence of
particular actors in the reproduction of nationalism. So whilst the discursive approach to
nationalism builds upon the previous insights of the other schools and has much to o ffer a
researcher regarding the reproduction of nationalism, it leaves the role of particular agents of
nationalism under-theorised.
Not all approaches to nationalism are theoretically insensitive to the role of actors in the
reproduction of nationalism, with some researchers in the modernist school focusing on the age ncy
of elites in the emergence of nationalism, broadly organised into a sub -school known as
instrumentalism. Brass (1979, 41) epitomises this view:
21
[Nationalism is] the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select
aspe ts of the g oup s ultu e, atta h e
alue a d ea i g to the , a d use the as
symbols to mobilise the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups. In
this process, those elites have an advantage whose leaders can operate most skilfully in
relation both to the deeply-felt primordial attachments of group members and the shifting
relationships of politics.
“i ila se ti e ts u de pi Ho s a
s i
e ted t aditio s ,
he e ationalism, via emerging
innovations like primary education, national days and public monuments, became a substi tute for
social cohesion, and buttressed the interests of the ruling elite in the context of a threat to those
interests in emerging mass democracies in Western liberal countries from 1870-1914 (Hobsbawn
1983, 270-271; 303). As such, when certain modernists do focus upon political actors in the
literature, they tend to see the adoption of nationalism by elites as narrowly instrumental. This
instrumental focus has been criticised as being overly rationalist (Smith 2001, 56-57; Brubaker 1998,
291-292). As Brubaker (1998, 292) identifies:
Of course 'interests' are central to nationalist politics, as to all politics, indeed to social life
generally. The elite manipulation view errs not in focusing on interests, but in doing so too
narrowly, focusing on the calculating pursuit of interests taken as unproblematically 'given'
(above all politicians' interest in attaining or maintaining power), and ignoring broader
questions about the constitution of interests, questions concerning the manner in which
interests - and, more fundamentally, units construed as capable of having interests, such as
'nations', 'ethnic groups' and 'classes' - are identified and thereby constituted. Elite discourse
often plays an important role in the constitution of interests, but again this is not something
political or cultural elites can do at will by deploying a few manipulative tricks. The
identification and constitution of interests - in national or other terms - is a complex process
that cannot be reduced to elite manipulation [emphasis in the original].
And therein lies the problem with the instrumental focus of scholars who analyse the role of elites in
the production and reproduction of nationalism. Nationalism is not solely, or even primarily, a
strategy to pursue particular political ends. Instead, the interplay of identity and interest means that
nationalism is the end in of itself. The realisation and maintenance of a national identity ce ntral to
o e so
ide tit is the efo e i e t i a l li ked to the pu sua e of atio alis
a to s. Fi all ,
this nationalist end, and its potential success or failure, is profoundly influenced by the situatedness
of the actor – they develop these ends within, and for, the context they find themselves in.
As such, the nationalism literature, especially the di scursive approach to nationalism, provides
important theoretical insights into the emergence and reproduction of nationalism. Re l e vantl y to
this study, however, the literature is weaker when considering the role of elites i n the producti on
and reproduction of nationalism, and this has seen this aspect of nationalism left under -the ori sed.
The next section suggests that the entrepreneurship literature has much to offer regarding the
22
theorising of the role of elites in the contemporary reproduction of nationalism, and to the Prime
Ministerial engagement with Anzac, as it accounts for the role of individual actors in the emerge nce
of particular norms, and sees their role as being a function of ideational, altruistic, or empathetic
reasons, instead of narrow instrumentalism.
A Survey of Some of the Dominant Approaches to the Entrepreneurship Literature
Entrepreneurship, as a concept, developed as a descriptor of behaviour in the market place, and has
since then been fruitfully applied to multiple political and social contexts. The following section
briefly outlines this development, some of the areas that the term has been applied to, and make s
the case for why entrepreneurship is a useful theoretical framework to describe Pri me Mi ni ste rial
engagement with Anzac. Mintrom (2000, 86) surveys the theorisation of entrepreneurship as a
market process from the 18th e tu , a d o ludes that the figu e of the e t ep e eu is est
thought of as a market maker. The entrepreneur attempts to respond to unmet needs , or to me e t
needs that are currently being met, but to do so in a way that leads to greater satisfaction at the
sa e ost, o the sa e le el of satisfa tio at lo e
ost. I the p o ess, ho e e , su essful
entrepreneurs change previous patterns of trade, which might attract a counter-response from
rivals. Note, however, that due to imperfect knowledge, there is always the possibility of failure.
The successful entrepreneur must be sensitive to such developments and work with their te am and
network to advance their trade (Mintrom 2000, 111).
This entrepreneurship literature has been employed by political scientists working within the area of
public policy to explain actions of certain prominent and influential actors in th e policy process.
Kingdon (1995,
ide tifies these a to s as poli
e t ep e eu s, those … illi g to i
est thei
resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future
gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits. Poli e t ep e eu s a t du i g pol i
i do s - those moments when the opportunity to address a pet issue or push a pet solution opens
up (Kingdon 1995, 165-168). Mintrom and Norman 2009, 650-654) further develop the concept of
policy entrepreneurship by identifying certain characteristics they must display in order to be
successful. Whilst the following may not always be equally important in differing circumstances,
these attributes include possessing good social acuity by making use of policy ne tw orks and be i ng
sensitive towards, and responding to, the motives, beliefs and ideas of those within the policy
context; effective problem definition to organise in certain perspectives and options, and organi se
out others; the ability to work within teams and employ networks to canvass multiple skill and
23
expertise resources and garner support for proposals; and finally, leadership by example to signal
their genuine commitment to a proposal (Mintrom and Norman 2009, 652-654).
Entrepreneurship has also been applied by scholars in areas such as the law (Sunstein 1997) and
international relations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Young 1991), particularly in regards to the
emergence of norms. Norms for Sunstein (1997, 38-39) are systems of approved and prohibited
behaviour, sustained by social sanction and the law. Norm entrepreneurs can exploit situations
he e o
s e o e halle ged o u
ia le, a d eate o
a d ago s , he e people ho do
not believe in a norm, but comply with it due to sanction, support the actions of norm entrepreneurs
and effect change (Sunstein 1997, 47-48). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) apply some of the se i de as
to the realm of international relations, and theorise the life cycle of international norms: norm
e e ge e → o
as ade → i te alisatio of the o
easo s of e path , alt uis
e ause the
a d ideatio al o
all atte tio to issues o e e
inte p ets, a d d a atizes the
Fi
e t ep e eu s f a e issues fo
it e t, a d a e … iti al fo
eate issues
e o e a d “ikki k
f o app op iate a d st ategi platfo
. No
,
s to eate a tippi g poi t
o
e e ge e
usi g la guage that a es,
-898). Norm entrepreneurs work
he e a iti al ass of ati o -
states adopt new norms and become norm leaders, which leads to a norm cascade, where the norm
is increasingly adopted by the rest of the world, who then become norm followers (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, 899-902). After this point, international norms may become internalised, and assume
a take fo g a ted alue status (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 904). As such, norm theory provides
a finer grained description of the role of entrepreneurs and their role in the adoption of certain
social and political norms. Finally, Young (1991) has applied the entrepreneurship literature to the
study of political leadership in the international sphere, identifying entrepreneurial l e ade rshi p as
part of a schema that also includes structural and intellectual leadership. Entrepreneurial leaders
set agendas, popularise ideas, devise innovative solutions to problems, and broker deals (Young
1991, 294).
The entrepreneurship literature is relevant to the analysis of Prime Ministerial engagement with
Anzac because it provides a more nuanced perspective on the engagement of elites wi th national ist
discourses. Such an observation has been implicitly advanced by Brubaker (1996; 1998), who
ide tifies politi al e t ep e eu s
ho ha e e gaged ith atio alis i the e t ep e eu ial se se
identified above in former-Soviet states. However, Brubaker does not develop this observation
further in order to flesh out the theorisation of the role of these actors in the operation of
nationalism. I advance that the entrepreneurship literature offers a deeper insight. It re ve al s that
24
the actors working towards change (whatever that change may entail) are not simply cynical
manipulators working towards instrumental ends like power, prestige, or wealth accumulation, that
are exogenous to their purported cause. Instead, entrepreneurs display a since re commitment to
the normative end they are pursuing. They are astute observers, sensitive to their context and
willing to work with, and respond to, the desires and beliefs of others. Finally, entrepre ne urs work
towards the adoption of new ways of doing things, whether that be the creation of new markets,
policies or norms. In the process, they alter, or even destroy, old ways of doing thi ngs, whi ch may
create resistance, and may be unsuccessful. As has already be sketched in the introduction, and wil l
be demonstrated throughout the thesis, such a perspective is analogous with the Prime Mi ni sterial
e gage e t ith A za , a d the ole the ha e pla ed i A za s esu ge e.
Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis
This chapter now turns to addressing why critical discourse analysis is a fruitful methodological
approach to the research question. The following section provides an overview of CDA, and sets out
why this methodological approach addresses the gap in the literature regarding Prime Ministerial
engagement with Anzac. As has been shown, previous studies of Anzac and Prime Ministerial
language do not simultaneously address the social and political context of Prime Ministerial
engagement with Anzac and provide systematic linguistic analysis of their language. Nor do the se
studies apply an analysis over time in order to identify trends and make comparisons between Prime
Ministers. CDA researchers, especially those informed by the work of Fairclough (see Fairclough
1995; Fairclough 2005; and Fairclough, Cortese and Ardizzone 2007), pay close attention to both the
textual representation of language and discourse and to the social and political context which
produces those texts. It is a primarily qualitative approach, but has also been supplemented with
quantitative corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach that adopts some of the quantitative
methods of corpus linguistics, particularly lexical frequency and distribution, in order to explore a
corpus and reinforce the validity of findings (Bayley 2007; Duguid 2007). This epistemological
approach is informed by an ontology that views language as socially constructed. As such, CDA
provides the thesis with a novel and insightful approach to the study of Prime Ministerial
engagement with Anzac, as it addresses both the linguistic features of their textual representation of
Anzac and the social and political context that influences this textual representation.
The Variety of Discourse Analysis
There is a wide variety of approaches to discourse analysis, with CDA being one amongst many.
Phillips and Hardy (2002) have organised these approaches into four broad categories, organised
25
according to their relative focus on context vs. text and constructivism vs. criticism. The cate gori e s
are interpretative structuralism, social linguistic analysis, critical linguistic analysis and critical
discourse analysis. Very briefly:
Social linguistic analysis is constructivist and text- ased…I te p etati e st u tu alism focuses
o the a al sis of the so ial o te t a d the dis ou se that suppo ts it…C iti al dis ou se
analysis focuses on the role of discursive activity in constituting and sustaining unequal power
elatio s… iti al li guisti a al sis also fo uses o individual texts, but with a strong interest
i the d a i s of po e that su ou d the te t… Phillips a d Ha d ,
, 22-7).
CDA has been chosen as the approach to this thesis from amongst these options because it
combines the study of the social and political context and examination of the texts that produce and
are produced by this context. As shown earlier in this chapter, there has been a lack of study into
the textual representation of Anzac and Australian national identity by Australian Pri me Mi n i sters,
with examination of the social and political context dominating. When textual analysis has been
conducted in the study of Australian political language, it has tended to focus upon the rhetorical
patterns and strategies of political actors, to the neglect of the structural patterns that influence
these patterns. CDA has been chosen for this thesis because it offers a way to tackle the research
question that is lacking in the identified literature, leading to a fuller account of Prime Ministerial
engagement with Anzac.
Defining CDA
The e a e a u
e of fo
s of CDA. This a iet is ha dl su p isi g o side i g the dis ipli e s
commitment to a diversity of approaches and theoretical perspectives. In fact, an interdi sci pl inary
and multi-method approach has been championed by many of the major figures within the discipline
(see Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough, 2005; Van Dijk 2001; Wodak 2001a; Wodak and
Matouschek 1993). Wodak argues that the critical commitment of the approach rende rs it
i he e tl i te dis ipli a : [p] o le s i ou so ieties a e too o ple to e studied f o a si gl e
pe spe ti e Wodak,
, 199). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) follow a similar line of thought
when they contend that to formalise the approach would impede the ability of CDA to effectively
analyse a wide variety of changing social practices and their operation. This commitment to
diversity and interdisciplinary cooperation involves adapting the approach to the research probl e m
and rejecting the compartmentalised nature of disciplines within academia.
An institutionalised or classic definition of CDA is therefore absent from the literature, a result of the
diversity of influences and methodological approaches, and the stated desire to make the me thod
interdisciplinary. Despite this, the general aims of CDA are fairly set, with the manne r one tackl e s
26
the research question being more contentious than the actual aspirations of the approach. CDA
aims:
…to s ste ati all e plo e ofte opa ue elationships of causality and determination between
(a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations
and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are
ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the
opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power
and hegemony (Fairclough, 1995, 3).
The connection between the first sphere of soci al practices and the social world, and the second
sphere of text, and the commitment to the critical investigation of the interaction of these two
elements when exploring power relationships, helps to explain the nature of CDA.
CDA s app oa h to po e is sensitive to the interplay between agency and structure. As Fai rcl ough
(2005, 8-
a gues, …te ts ha e ausal effe ts upo , a d o t i ute to ha ges i , peopl e
attitudes, et . , a tio s, so ial elatio s, a d the
ate ial
eli efs,
o ld . Ho e e , this causal effect is
contingent – the success of texts in bringing about social change is dependent on any number of
context specific processes, events, and actors (Fairclough 2007, 10-14). As such, a reductively
constructivist view of language that sees texts as constituting politics is rejected by CDA the ori sts.
Fairclough (2005, 8-9) contends that we need to distinguish here between construction and
construal; whilst actors may be able to construe the social world via discourse, they cannot
automatically construct it. To construct the social world would not only require control over
do i a t dis ou ses
ut othe fa to s like people s a epta e a d i te alisatio
of su h
discourses. Thus, this view rejects simplistic reductivism regarding the structural power of discourse,
and instead argues that in order to understand the power of language and discourse, a researcher
must pay attention to the agency of those who attempt to mobilise such discourses.
Such insight is crucial to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. Whilst Prime
Ministers have enormous agency regarding the construal of discourses surrounding Anzac vi a the i r
access to the power resources of the state, they do not inevitably constitute the social and pol i tical
world. Nor can they construe their Anzac discourses as they please – the socio-political situation
that Prime Ministers find themselves in means they have a limited repertoire of textual and
discursive tools at their disposal if they are to successfully engage with Anzac and avoid sanction.
CDA s o tolog a d episte olog thus o pels the esea he to pa atte tio to the i te pl a of
agency and structure in the relationship between Prime Ministerial Anzac Day texts, discourses, and
the social and political context that this occurs within.
27
A Methodological Approach to CDA
As noted, CDA is a heterogeneous method. Wodak et al (2009) identify four broad schools of CDA:
the Dutch, German, Vienna, and British schools. The Vienna and British schools are of particular
relevance to this study. The Vienna School is centred on the work of Ruth Wodak and has a strong
basis in sociolinguistics. It has developed a methodology which they have described as the
discourse-historical approach (Wodak 2001b). This approach is quite intensive and seeks to
i o po ate …s ste ati all all a aila le a kg ou d i fo
atio i the a al sis a d i te p etati o
of the many layers of a written or spoke te t… Fai lough a d Wodak
s ste of t ia gulatio has ee e plo ed
of … a ious i te dis ipli a ,
esea he s i the field, i
, 266). To this end, a
ol i g the i o po ati o
ethodologi al a d sou e -specific approaches to investigate a
particular discourse phenomenon De Cillia, ‘eisigl a d Wodak
, 157). Although triangulation is
not a formal model with a consolidated approach, it does suggest that superior findings will be
obtained if a research question is approached from more than one theoretical or methodological
angle. Leading on from this, the discourse-historical approach utilises a four-layered conce ption of
o te t
hi h takes i to a ou t g a d theo ies,
iddle -level theories, discourse theory and
linguistic analysis when examining texts (see Wodak 2001b; Wodak 2004). Its areas of investigation
have included studies of racism and anti-Semitism, and analyses of national discourses in Austria and
the European Union (Wodak 2004; Wodak et al 2009). The discourse-historical approach of the
Vienna school has been adopted by this thesis, as its emphasis upon the historical root of di scourse
accounts for trends, continuities, changes and comparisons in the study of Prime Ministerial
engagement with Anzac. In addition, its all fo t ia gulatio has guided the thesis adoptio of a
variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the research question.
The British School of CDA has been enormously influenced by the work of Fairclough. Areas of
research for this school ha e i luded a al sis of the la guage of Ne Capitalis
a d i pa ti ul a ,
the discourse associated with Tony Blair and New Labour (see Fairclough, 2000). The Briti sh school
uses a three-dimensional model of CDA based on the following:
Discourse, and any specific instance of discursive practice, is seen as simultaneously (i) a
language text, spoken or written, (ii) discourse practice (text production and text
interpretation), (iii) sociocultural practice. Furthermore, a piece of discourse is embedded
within sociocultural practice at a number of levels; in the immediate situation, in the wider
i stitutio o o ga izatio , a d at a so ietal le el… The ethod of dis ou se a al sis i ludes
linguistic description of the language text, interpretation of the relationship between
(productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the social process (Fairclough 1995,
97).
28
Fairclough has been particularly interested in using CDA to study the discursive nature o f social
change (see Fairclough 1992; Fairclough, Cortese and Ardizzone 2007), and has argued that many of
the social changes that have occurred during recent decades, especially those associated with the
i t odu tio of Ne Capitalis
(Fairclough 1992,
, ha e also i
ol ed atte pts to e -e gi ee language practi es
. Fu the , …it is pe haps o e i di atio of the g o i g i po ta e of l a guage
in social and cultural change that attempts to engineer the direction of change increasingl y i nclude
attempts to change la guage p a ti es
Fai lough 1992, 6). It is therefore important that a
component of the study of social change should include a focus on discourse and its evolution.
Fairclough has also been particularly interested in developing CDA as social research me thodol ogy
and promoting it as a viable research method for writers outside linguistics (Fairclough 1995;
Fairclough, 2005). This has involved a shift away from a Foucauldian tendency to consider the
content of a discourse without considering its textual basis. Fairclough contends that:
[t]he premise of this argument is that the sorts of social and cultural phenomena that such
analysts are orientated towards are realized in textural properties of texts in ways which make
them extraordinarily sensitive indicators of sociocultural processes, relations, and change.
Social and cultural analyses can only be enriched by this textural evidence, which is partly
linguistic and partly intertextual – partly a matter of how links between one text and other
texts and text types are inscribed in the surface of the text. At issue here is the classical
problem of the relationship between the form and content. My contention is that no analysis
of text content and meaning can be satisfactory which fails to attend to what one might call
the content of texture (or, the content of its form) (Fairclough, 1995, 4-5).
Fai lough a gues that the e should e o eithe /o
et ee esea h hi h fo uses o the te tual
features of a discourse, but is relatively ignorant of social theoretical issues, and a methodology
which may engage with these issues, but fails to address the linguistic features of a text (Fairclough,
2005). This view has had a profound influence upon the thesis, and has informed its concern to
examine both the textual representation of Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac, and the pol i ti cal
and social forces that have influenced these texts.
This desire to promote CDA as a viable methodology for researchers interested in social the ory and
change has led Fairclough to be one of the few figures in CDA to attempt to enunciate a detailed
methodology for the lay reader (see Fairclough, 2005). A summation of the methodological
considerations a researcher might take into consideration in textual analysis is as follows (Fairclough
2005, 191-194):
29
Social events
“o ial e e ts
o stitute
hat is a tual Fai lough
,
.
The a e i flue ed
so ial
structure, practices and actors. Texts constitute part of social events, and are influenced and
mediated by social structure and actors, though not in an automatic manner.
Genre
The ge e of te ts is … ealized i a tio al ea i gs a d fo
s of a te t a d the
a
a i te
s
of their institutionalisation and stability (Fairclough 2005, 66-67). Genres can link together in genre chains (the linking together of various genres such as the press release and the interview) and the i r
degree of fixity or hybridity with other genres.
Difference
Fairclough is here interested in how social difference is textually represented. Is it open to
difference; does it emphasise difference and conflict; does it attempt to overcome difference; or
does it close off or deny/supress difference in favour of a focus on consensus or solidarity
(Fairclough 2005, 41-42)? Analysis of difference can shed light on the politics of identity and how
particular forms of politics claim universality (Fairclough 2005, 40-41).
Intertextuality
Intertextuality involves having some qualitative awareness of what other texts and voi ce s may be
relevant to the text under analysis. Having this awareness allows the researcher to pay attenti on to
which texts and voices are included or are excluded and absent in a text (Fairclough 2005, 47).
Assumptions
Assumptions pervade texts, as meaning is communicated via shared understandings. Assumpti ons
can also be ideological and value-based, and can thus reveal much about the politics being conveyed
in a text (Fairclough 2005, 55).
Semantic/grammatical relations between sentences and clauses
In this instance, Fairclough (2005, 87-89) especially notes semantic and grammatical relations that
re/produce power, legitimation, and equivalence or difference, at the level of sentence and cl ause .
Semantic relations between sentence and clause may be causal, conditional, temporal, additi ve,
elaborative, or contrastive/concessive. Grammatical relations may be paratactic, hypotactic or
embedded.
30
Exchanges, speech functions and grammatical mood
Exchanges refer to the typology of speech interaction between actors; speech functions reveal
pu pose of the spee h su h as state e ts of fa t, e aluatio , p edi tio et . ; a d a te t s to e
(declarative, interrogative or imperative) is conveyed by its grammatical mood (Fairclough 2005,
105-116).
Discourses
This involves identifying the discourses, and the features of discourses, being drawn upon in texts, in
particular, identifying the main themes of the discourse, and the perspective (or point of view) of the
discourse. This may also involve textual analysis which notes semantic relations, grammatical
features, metaphors, assumptions etc. (Fairclough 2005, 193).
Representations of social events
Linked to the analysis of discourse is the examination of how social events are represented. This
involves both textual analysis and examination of social events. It pays attention to what is included
or excluded regarding the social and political sphere, and how this represented (Fairclough 2005,
193).
Styles
“t le is …the dis ou sal aspe t of a s of ei g, ide tities Fai lough
,
. They may include
features such as body language, pronunciation, vocabulary etc.
Modality
Modality is the examination of what people commit themselves to in their texts, the degree to which
they commit themselves, and how that is represented textually (Fairclough 2005, 165-171).
Evaluation
Finally, by evaluation Fairclough (2005, 171) means the values the text producer communicates and
is committed to.
Not all of these features of the method of CDA will be drawn upon equally in the thesis. For
example, the focus of the thesis is upon Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and statements,
where the speech act is conducted by a single actor to an audience that does not interact with the
speaker. Thus, speech exchange analysis is redundant. But with that exception, these elements al l
31
feature at some point throughout the thesis, though they will receive varying levels of emphasis at i t
progresses and deals with different social events, actors and practices.
The Corpus and Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis
The approach to CDA outlined so far has been qualitative in nature. In keeping with the stated
commitment to triangulation, the thesis applies quantitative analysis as well. This takes the form of
corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach to CDA informed by corpus linguistics (Bayley 2007).
Co pus assisted dis ou se a al sis lai s …that a sele tio of te ts a fi st e studied th ough
concordance software which provides information on, for example, lexical frequencies and
distributions, egula ities a d i egula ities i
ollo atio patte s a d thus patte s of
ea i g
(Bayley 2007, 55). As such, corpus assisted discourse analysis can be used usefully in conjunction
with CDA as it offers, firstly, an introductory insight into the corpus before conducting finer grai ne d
qualitative analysis; and secondly, it serves to offer further empirical verification of qualitative
analysis. Corpus assisted discourse analysis has primarily been used in Chapter 3 to introduce the
genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and statements with frequency and distribution
a al sis, ut also featu es as the P i e Mi iste s A za add ess st le is i t odu ed.
Regarding the corpus itself, it consists of 23 speeches and 10 media statements or releases,
conducted by Prime Ministers between 1973 and 2007. It consists of over 15000 words, which
makes it a small corpus, but to the best knowledge of the author, it represents ev ery Prime
Ministerial Anzac Day address and statement given during this period. Thus, we are de al i ng wi th a
population and will employ descriptive statistics, as the need for inferential statistics is void. The
collation of this corpus is an endeavour that has not been attempted before in the literature, and i t
contains speeches and addresses that have received little or no attention from scholars.4 Source
material has been derived from the PM Transcripts Archive hosted by the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet, the Prime Ministerial libraries of Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke and Keating, the
P i e Mi iste s
e site at p .go .au, the PANDO‘A
e a hive, the National Archives of
Australia, material hosted at aph.gov.au, and from collated speech publications (see Appendix). The
corpus has been cross-checked with newspaper reports regarding Anzac Day in order to ensure
comprehensive coverage of these materials.
The selection of sources required a degree of judgement. The necessity of the selection of most
sources was clear, as their delivery was on Anzac Day and their subject matter was primarily on
4
This is primarily associated with the early speeches – Fraser (1979), Hawke (1986a), and Hawke (1989).
32
Anzac and its meaning. Others were not given on Anzac Day, but directly addressed Anzac the me s,
and their close proximity to the date of 25 April has thus also seen their selection (see Hawke 1989;
and Keating 1993a). Speeches and media releases given on Anzac Day, but not directly and
substantively on A za , ha e ee o itted, as ha e spee hes su sta ti el o Aust alia s
a
remembrance delivered on dates other than Anzac Day, such as Remembrance Day or anniversari es
of significant war dates like Victory in the Pacific Day.
Conclusion: CDA and the Study of Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac
This thesis draws upon the methodological approach of CDA, especially that of Fairclough (1995;
2005), as the basis for the investigation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. The
methodological approach has been adopted for ontological and epistemological reasons. The
ontological assumption of the thesis, subsequently empirically demonstrated, is that the producti on
and reproduction of Prime Ministerial language regarding Anzac has not been a natural ly or
organically occurring phenomenon. On the contrary, it has been a political process, whereby Pri me
Ministers have actively construed language for ends aligned with their agendas of government. But
this process has not occurred in a vacuum, and simplistic assumptions regarding the ability of e l i tes
to hegemonically impose their views upon the Australian public fail to account for the very real limits
on such courses of action. As such, CDA demands an epistemological approach that exami nes both
the textual reproduction of Anzac and the social and political context that this production occurs i n,
in order to more fully account for the interplay between agency and structure surrounding Prime
Ministerial engagement with Anzac.
Fu the , CDA s e phasis upon triangulation encourages a variety of theoretical and methodological
approaches to the study of language. This approach has been adopted in the thesis in order to
address the research question more systematically than has been attempted by researchers before .
Regarding methodology then, the thesis augments the method of CDA outlined above by Fairclough
with the discourse-historical approach to the development of Prime Ministerial engagement with
Anzac, in order to better account for change over time and differences between Prime Ministers. It
has also collated a comprehensive corpus of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and media
statements and supplements the primarily qualitative textual analysis method of Faircl ough (2005)
with quantitative corpus assisted discourse analysis, an approach which enhances the validity of
claims made regarding the evolution of Prime Ministerial narratives of Anzac. I argue that such an
approach, given the gap in the literature regarding the study of Prime Ministerial language
surrounding Anzac, provides an appropriate method that accounts for the interplay between soci al
33
and political forces, discourse, and text that make up Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and
provides compelling empirical evidence and data to back the analysis.
34
CHAPTER 3
The Prime Ministerial Turn to Anzac: Exploring the Shift
This chapter serves as an overview of the thesis by firstly sketching the causality be hi nd the Anzac
entrepreneurship of Australian Prime Ministers, and secondly, by outlining the broad textual
characteristics of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over the time period of 1973 - 2007.
This approach is informed by the discourse-historical method outlined in Chapter 2, and seeks to
incorporate a rich and as inclusive as possible analysis of the relevant background and context to
Anzac entrepreneurship by Prime Ministers.
In the first section, I examine the broad socio-political context that Prime Ministers e ngagi ng wi th
Anzac have operated within. Process tracing (see Bennett 2010; George and Bennett 2005; Robe rts
1996) is employed to examine four potential hypotheses for the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac.
These hypotheses are:
1. Distance in time: this explanation posits that the increasing distance from the confl icts and
horrors of the original Anzac Day cleared the air enough for Prime Ministerial adoption of
Anzac.
2. Vietnam reconciliation: this hypothesis suggests that the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac i s a
consequence of the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian community afte r
the bitter divisions of the Vietnam War.
3. Nationalism as tradition: this account of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac draws upon
ethno-symbolism, and explains the turn as a product of Australian national myths, symbols,
values and memories (Smith 2001, 57).
4. Nationalism entrepreneurship: this explanation characterises the Prime Ministeri al shi ft to
Anzac as a function of the nationalism of the Prime Ministers and the efficacy of nationalism
as a political strategy.
Having considered the persuasiveness of these potential accounts, I conclude that none can sol e l y
explain the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac. The explanations are cumulative, meaning that the
shift towards Anzac can only be explained as the outcome of the aggregation of these factors.
35
The chapter then provides an overview of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, 1973 – 2007. It doe s
so by exploring the changing characteristics of that engagement and providing an assessment of the
genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. This section of the chapter employs corpus assisted
discourse analysis of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses from 1973 (in particular, analysis of
frequency and distribution) in order to sketch its imprecise, but increasingly institutionalised and
consistent, genre boundaries. In doing so, it seeks to identify the situation and themes of these
addresses and how they have changed over time. Since 1990, Australian Prime Ministers and the i r
governments have increasingly engaged with Anzac in a manner that has supplanted the tradi ti onal
role of the RSL as the custodian of Anzac (Lake 2010, 139; Inglis 2008, 554-555). This has involved
them consistently giving Anzac Day addresses, both at home and at significant sites of Australian war
remembrance overseas, in a form that is often characterised by high rhetoric and nationalism. But,
as will be shown, this has not always been the case. Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac in the
period prior to 1990 was more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular. Further, Prime Ministerial
Anzac Day addresses have not always been solely, or even primarily, about the significance of Anzac
i Aust alia s atio al life,
ith so e
o e losel
ese
li g a policy speech. Over time, the
conventions of these addresses have coagulated, and have begun to demonstrate a significant
degree of rhetorical path dependency (Grube 2014).
The chapter aims to preface the analysis of the individual Prime Ministers that follows in the
remainder of the thesis by conducting these two tasks. Having established the causal reasons
behind the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac, and having sketched the characteristics of the genre
of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, we can more clearly see the operation and evolution of
both these features. Such a task is crucial because, as has been identified in Chapter 2, the e xi sti ng
literature on Anzac has not included systematic qualitative and quantitative analysis of either of
these elements.
Tracing the Prime Ministerial Adoption of Anzac
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, the casual explanation for the emergence of nationalism is a
contested field see Özkı ı lı
; Dah ou
. The o peti g e pla atio s fo the e e ge
e
of nationalism as caused by the bottom-up socio-cultural processes of ethno-symbolism, the top
down functionalism of modernism, or the discursive representation of nation of fer i mportant, but
incomplete, insights in the case of Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac. In this case, nati onal i sm i s
operationalised by entrepreneurs – politi al a d ultu al elites
ho a e og isa t of the pu li s
desire for unifying symbols of nation and who utilise their access to the power resources the i r e l ite
36
positio s offe to suppl a d e ou age that desi e. E t ep e eu s easo s fo doi g so a
e
characterised as partly motivated by the instrumental possibilities that such an adoption of fe rs and
partly due to genuine identification with the form of nationalism they are promoting. The followi ng
section will outline competing hypotheses regarding the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac, and
will demonstrate that whilst a combination of bottom-up and top-down factors were at play, it is the
combination of these factors in the context of nationalism entrepreneurship that is crucial.
This first section of the chapter argues that certain insufficient, but necessary, causal precondi ti ons
needed to be met before Anzac became an acceptable political discourse fit for use by Prime
Mi iste s. ‘o e ts
,
o ept of u ulati e olligatio
ill e e plo ed to e plai the
o ki gs of the ultiple h potheses, that ei g [t] a i g the [ u ulative] steps by which change s
i the st u tu e of so iet
o e a out ,
ultu al dis u si e a tio s. Ma kie s
,
he e st u tu e is take to
ea
epeated so ial a d
; e phasis i the o igi al INU“ o ditio ,
he e a
ause is …a insufficient, but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient
fo the esult
ill e e plo ed to de o st ate the i ade ua ies of the e pla ati o s i i sol atio ,
but their explanatory power in conjunction. Noting that political elites are constrained in their
ability to mobilise forms of nationalism that fail to gel with the community, this section argue s that
the distance in time, Vietnam reconciliation, and nationalism as tradition explanations, all needed to
be fulfilled as necessary bottom-up conditions before Prime Ministers could adopt Anzac and
employ nationalism entrepreneurship after 1990.
Distance in Time
It has become a common explanation for the more general rise of Anzac to be attributed to the
increasing temporal distance from the original Anzac Day (see Seal 2004, 4; McKenna 2010, 118;
Inglis 2008, 413). Whilst none of these authors deal directly with the question of whether this
influenced Prime Ministers in their use of Anzac, a plausible summation can be made – the
increasing distance from the original landings at Gallipoli has tempered the bitter memories
associated with WWI. The memory of the 60 000 men killed during the war is lessened as they
become names on memorials rather than lost loved ones. The broken diggers wh o made it home
have passed on and have taken their painful memories with them, and the bitter partisan di vi sions
over the conscription referendums have become historical facts, rather than lived memories.
Perhaps more importantly, the temporal distance from the tensions and hostility of the Vietnam e ra
has similarly lessened the rawness of that conflict as well. Finally, as the diggers have passe d, the
RSL has lost much of its raison d'être as a lobby group, and much of its power. This has lessened the
37
impact of their oftentimes conservative lobbying and has attracted less opposition as a
consequence. The tempering of these bitter hostilities has left a relatively uncontroversial, even
sacralised, version of Anzac, uncontentious to those young enough to never to have experienced the
above, and free for the taking by political elites.
Whilst plausible, the distance in time explanation fails to adequately explain the steps between
creating a space to reincorporate Anzac and Anzac being hegemonic. There is nothing inherent
about the ageing of ex-servicemen and women or the increasing distance from the original Anzac
Day that suggests that Anzac will increase its hegemonic place in conceptions of Australianness. It i s
just as plausible that as diggers faded into history, their central place in nationalist hi story, offi cial
public life, and thus reproduction in nationalist discourse, would fade as well. In fact, the possibi li ty
that Anzac would die out was noted by those who aligned their sense of self with Anzac, and those
who opposed it, during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s (Curran and Ward 2010, 197; Macleod
2002). The parades were smaller as diggers aged and passed away, and the crowds watching
became thinner too. For example, the Canberra Times reported in 1979 that the small NSW town of
Gu da oo fo got to o
e o ate A za Da , as the e as o o e left i te ested i keepi g the
tradition alive (Canberra Times 1979, 1), and The Age noted the thin and quiet crowd of 20000 at the
1975 Melbourne Anzac Day parade while 77000 watched football (Lewis 1975, 4). As such, the
distance in time hypothesis fails to sufficiently explain how the reinscription of the centrality of
Anzac in the national lexicon occurred and why Prime Ministers subsequently adopted it.
On its own, then, the distance in time explanation remains an insufficient explanation of how the
reproduction and re-imagination of Anzac evolved from a problematised state during the period
around and after the Vietnam War, to one of hegemonic and uncritical celebration, suitable for
engagement by entrepreneurial Prime Ministers. Having said that, temporal distance remains a
crucial element in the reinscription of Anzac - distance from the original horrors of WWI and the
divisiveness of the Vietnam War tempered the pain and acrimony of those conflicts as citi ze ns who
never experienced these divisions began to take their place in the public sphere. This temporal
distance created the necessary space for reconciliation, healing, and reincorporation of Anzac i nto
Australian nationalist discourse.
Vietnam Reconciliation
The second plausible and cumulative causal explanation for the increasing engagement wi th Anzac
by Australian Prime Ministers rises out of the questions raised above regarding the problematisation
38
of Anzac during and after the Vietnam War - the Vietnam reconciliation explanation. It argues that
the hostility to militarism that was demonstrated in the campaign against the Vietnam War
continued among the new-left social movements and their sympathisers during the 1970s and
1980s, and consequently also began to affect Anzac. Anzac Day attendances were down, the
imperial link that Anzac represented was being over-taken by the independent and somewhat
pa o hial e
atio alis
of the Whitlam government (Curran and Ward 2010; Alomes 1988), and
by the early 1980s radical feminists, and sporadically, other movements, were staging protests at
Anzac Day parades and ceremonies (Twomey 2013). Anzac fell out of favour with the public, and
with the go e
e t, as the atio s se se of atio alis e ol ed.
As a consequence of these changes, Vietnam veterans were largely ignored by both the publ i c and
by the government, and little was initially done to memorialise their failed war (Inglis 2008, 363).
Doyle (2002, 78) notes that for the veteran community this was tantamount to betrayal:
[T]he Aust alia [Viet a ] ete a s status as a ge ui e ete a , a authe ti digge , had
ee
ade o ti ge t o the a the atio had o e to ie the histo of its e gage e t
i Viet a afte the fa t…this histo had o ed the of thei ightful pla e as alidated
third- a e A za s…
From the early 1980s onwards, however, veteran anger at this marginalisation led them to pressure
the government for recognition of their sacrifice and continued suffering. In response , a we l come
home parade was staged in 1987 and a national memorial to Vietnam veterans was completed in
1992. Whilst these acts represented reconciliation between the veteran community and the wi de r
public, this reconciliation was unpolitical (Schaap 2005), as its form of restoring veterans to their
rightful place in the story of Anzac meant that contestation of Anzac, as had occurred in the 1960s –
1980s, was no longer acceptable. To do so would open old wounds and dishonour the sacrifi ce and
suffering of the veterans who had served. As such, Anzac becomes incontestable, sacred , e sse nti al
and unpolitical – ripe for the taking by entrepreneurial Prime Ministers prone to instrume ntal use s
of nationalism, and also applying bottom-up pressure on Prime Ministers from the veteran
community to include their story into a newly reinstated Anzac nationalist narrative (see Chapter 4,
and Schaap (2005), for discussion of unpolitical reconciliation).
The Vietnam reconciliation casual explanation is again a necessary element of the Prime Mini sterial
turn to Anzac, but not a sufficient explanation of this shift. It is necessary as it is the tipping point
where Anzac shifts from being contested to being unpolitical. Without the unpolitical reconciliation
of Vietnam veterans and the body-politic, Anzac would have remained a hotly contested and divisive
39
form of Australian nationalism, unsuitable for the unifying discourse of nationalism that l e aders of
liberal-democratic states find so useful (Norman 2004, 87). To put it another way, the uni fyi ng and
cohesive discourse of nationalism provides leaders with a language to mollify the competing
interests of a pluralistic society and mobilise support for policy action. Attempts by Prime Ministers
to use Anzac in this manner have been more or less explicit, and have been more or less
controversial, but have only become common, since reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. This
event therefore represents the moment in time when a new norm regarding an unpolitical Anzac
emerged and began to become internalised.
However, Vietnam reconciliation is not a sufficient explanation of causality, as the focus of Prime
Ministerial Anzac Day addresses has remained the Gallipoli campaign. The Vietnam War, and the
difficulties Vietnam veterans faced upon their return home from war (Doyle 2002; Ross 2009),
e ai ed a little
e tio ed featu e of P i e Mi iste s A za Da add esses,
infrequently in their speeches. Whe Viet a
ei g ited
as e tio ed, it appea ed p i a il i a he k-list
of Australian war commitments to be honoured, along with WWI, WWII, Korea and contemporary
deployments. Thus, the reconciled and unpolitical Anzac ushered in by Vietnam veterans did not
accompany a reimagining of Anzac that placed these veterans at its centre. Liberal-democratic
leade s desi e fo a u if i g dis ou se of atio alis
is i st u ti e he e (Norman 2004) – despite
reconciliation, the divisions of Vietnam still remained fresh in the living and popular memory of the
body politic and thus served as a poor tool for cohesion by leaders.
In sum, the Vietnam reconciliation explanation demonstrates how Anzac became unpolitical and
sacralised, as reconciliation was necessary if Prime Ministers were to engage with Anzac
entrepreneurially. However, it remains an insufficient causal explanation as to why they chose to do
so – the reconciled Anzac as utilised by Prime Ministers has not seen the honouring of Vietnam
veterans as a primary or significant element of their engagement with Anzac. As such, it is one more
cumulative element in the bottom-up and essential INUS preconditions of why Prime Ministers
adopted Anzac after 1990.
Nationalism as Tradition
The third cumulative causal explanation for the increasing use of Anzac by Australian Prime
Ministers is nationalism as tradition. This explanation draws heavily on the nationalism l i terature,
especially ethno-symbolism, and emphasises the cultural role of public myth, memory, values,
symbols and occasion (Smith 2001, 57-
,i
o t ast to the
ode ists e pla atio of atio alis
40
as being a functional or instrumental expression of modernism. It argues that nationalism is a
product of the everyday expression and reproduction of the nation in the discourse of the public
(Billig 1995), and that elites, such as Prime Ministers, are powerfully constrained in their ability to
mobilise or shape forms of nationalism that sit uncomfortably with popular understandings of
nation. In this
ould, Kapfe e
,
A za Da is the da of the atio . Mo e o
otes Aust alia Da is the da of the state,
he eas
etel , the nationalism as tradition explanation points
to the extraordinary rise of Anzac and its observance amongst the public, and especially young
Australians, since about 1990 - the i
easi g atte da es o A za Da , the a kpa ki g pi l g i s
to Gallipoli, and the explosion of memorial construction after 1990 to an extent unseen since the
1920s (Inglis 2008, 471). All these factors point to the rise of Prime Ministerial engagement with
Anzac as being their response to the cultural pressure to include the story of Anzac in their
narratives of Australian identity and nationalism.
The nationalism as tradition explanation, like the previous explanations, is a necessary, but not
sufficient causal reason for the adoption of Anzac from 1990. It is a necessary explanation of Pri me
Ministerial adoption of Anzac for the reasons outlined above – if nationalism entrepreneurs wan t to
successfully evangelise their version of nationalism, then they are much more likely to succeed if
they do so in a manner that resonates with the community. The Bicentenary and the Ce nte nary of
Federation, where political elites attempted to mobilise the nation around a national occasi on and
largely failed, provide instructive contrasting cases. Both these occasions either failed to exci te the
pu li s i agi atio
i the ase of the Ce te a of Fede atio
o failed to p o ide a u i f i g a d
politically neutralised discourse of nation (the Bicentenary) and have thus failed to resonate with the
same sense of genuineness that Anzac appears to have for those Australians who attend Anzac Day
parades, pilgrimage to Gallipoli for the dawn service, or play two-up at the local pub on the April 25t h
pu li holida . Kapfe e s o se atio
ega di g the offi ial, state -led nature of Australia Day can be
employed to help explain much of this failure - overtly civic forms of nationalism remain largely
devoid of meaning for an Australian form of nationalism that emphasises values based upon
egalitarianism and anti-authoritarianism. The Bicentenary, as an attempt at state national i sm, was
thus doubly condemned – endorsed, and largely planned, by the state, it fail ed to resonate with
those dist ustful of atio alis
s state ased e esses, a d as also halle ged a d o tested
Indigenous protesters and their supporters, who rejected a simple, neutral or triumphant expression
of nationalism with the catch-
White Aust alia has a Bla k histo
Tu e
,
. A za at
least since reconciliation with Vietnam veterans) has not suffered from the same problems, al i gned
as it is ith Aust alia s hege o i t aditio s of atio al selfhood.
41
However, nationalism as tradition remains an insufficient explanation for the Prime Ministerial turn
to Anzac. Crucially, the chronology of renewed public engagement with Anzac does not align to the
nationalism as tradition explanation, as the enormous response by the public to Anzac occurs after
1990, not before. Some embryonic public revival of interest in Anzac was being generated in the
1980s via cultural icons like the film Gallipoli o Bill Ga
age s ook The Broken Years, but this
interest failed to translate into greatly increased crowd attendances to Anzac Day dawn services and
marches during this period. The real explosion of interest occurs from 1990 onward after
reconciliation with Vietnam veterans and, crucially, as the government becomes an entreprene uri al
actor i
the p o otio
of A za ,
ith the p e ede tial Ha ke go e
e t s ole i
the
memorialisation of the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1990. This can be see n from the
following graphs, which show Anzac Day parades and dawn service attendances in Sydney,
Melbourne and Canberra from 1960. 5 The g aphs epo t the pe e tage of the it s populatio that
has turned out to attend the dawn service or the march. This method has been chosen as it
accounts for population change over time, and it therefore more accurately reflects shifts in
attendance than the raw figures. World Values Survey data similarly reflects this trend in atti tude s.
Whilst ot a di e t
easu e of the Aust alia pu li s e do se e t of A za , the
Aust alia pu li s o fide e i the a
easu e of the
ed fo es se es to einforce the idea that public had a
more ambivalent view of the military before 1990, and that this view of the military began to
improve after this point in time, and was especially ingrained by 2005.
A few notes regarding the attendance graphs. Firstly, the attendance figures have come from newspaper reporting
on Anzac Day. Importantly, these are estimates of the crowd attendance, and a degree of caution should ther efor e
be exercised when interpreting the figures. Crowd estimates from these sources were reported to have come fr om
police estimates, organiser estimates, or reporter estimates . The figures were taken from The Sydney Morning
Herald (for Sydney), The Age (for Melbourne), and the Canberra Times (for Canberra) in the first instance. If fi gur es
were not reported in those sources, then The Australian was consulted. Again, if figures were not r epor ted i n The
Australian, the the it s ta loid e spape s e e o sulted e t. “o eti es o d figu es ha e ot ee
reported in any of these sources, and gaps are therefore present. The problem of missing data especially a ppear s
during the years when Anzac was problematised and contested during the 1970s and 1980s, when crowds were not
newsworthy, or perhaps too embarrassingly small, to report. The percentage figure has been obtained by di viding
the reported attendance figure by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2014
(catalogue number 3105.0.65.001) population figures for the relevant year.
5
42
Sydney March Attendances, 1960-2007
Melbourne March Attendances, 1960-2007
0.1
0.045
0.09
0.04
0.08
0.035
0.07
0.03
0.06
0.025
0.05
0.02
0.04
0.015
0.03
0.01
0.005
0
0
Canberra March Attendances, 1960-2007
0.25
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
0.01
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
0.02
Figure 1 – City Attendances at Anzac Day Marches, percentage of city population.
Anzac Day march attendances dropped from highs in the early 1960s in all
locations. Note that Melbourne newspapers stop reporting the march
0.2
attendances after 2000, as the dawn service becomes the preeminent
0.15
Anzac Day event. Both Sydney and Melbourne show signs of recovery
especially from the mid-1990s, when considerable government
0.1
investment in the promotion of war remembrance began. Canberra
0.05
shows flatter attendances from the 1970s, as they decline from highs that
represented over 20% of the population. Please note the use of different
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
0
percentage scales in the graphs to more clearly represent the change in
attendance over time.
43
Sydney Dawn Service Attendances, 19602007
0.01
0.009
0.008
0.007
0.006
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.001
0
0.007
0.006
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.001
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
0
Canberra Dawn Service Attendances, 19602007
0.09
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
0.008
Melbourne Dawn Service Attendances, 19602007
Figure 2 - City Attendances at Anzac Day Dawn Services, percentage of city population.
Dawn service attendances demonstrate considerable growth duri ng thi s
period, as they have a self-replenishing sources of attendees, unli ke the
0.08
0.07
march which depends more significantly on service-people who have
0.06
aged and passed on (Inglis 2008, 550). This growth once again begins
0.05
0.04
during the 1990s, and especially after 2000. However, in all locations this
0.03
growth does not match the march attendance highs of the 1960s. Ple ase
0.02
note the use of different percentage scales in the graphs to more cl e arl y
0.01
represent the change in attendance over time.
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
0
44
Confidence In Armed Forces, 1981 - 2012
World Values Survey
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1981
1995
2005
2012
A great deal
22
14
25
32
Quite a lot
44
52
57
55
Not very much
28
27
14
11
None at all
5
4
2
1
No answer
1
0
2
2
Don´t know
0
2
0
0
A great deal
Quite a lot
Not very much
None at all
No answer
Don´t know
Figure 3 – The Aust alia Pu li s Confidence in the Armed Forces, 1981 - 20126
Note the increase in confidence in the military over time, and the considerable drop in those reporting a lack of confidence in the military.
6
This graph has been generated using the World Values Survey Data Analysis Tool (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp).
45
The quantitative evidence regarding the improvement in public sentiment towards Anzac sugge sts
that 1990 was the point where the new norms surrounding Anzac had started to become
internalised by the public, and that the public was responding to the promotion of these new norms
by political and cultural entrepreneurs. This demonstrates that Prime Ministers were not passi ve ly
responding to public pressure, but were instead engendering this response by acting as
entrepreneurs – recognising a public desire for symbols of nation and fulfilling it to massive succe ss.
This point can be further demonstrated by the fact that Hawke decided to go on the precedential
Gallipoli trip in 1990 on the basis of the recommendation of Defence Minister Kim Beazely, who had
in turn based his suggestion upon a single conversation with a veteran (Holbrook 2014, 173-174).
This was not a case of the government responding to sustained pressure from the RSL, or the publ i c
generally. Thus, the nationalism as tradition hypothesis is the final bottom-up condition ne ce ssary
for the adoption of Anzac by Australian Prime Ministers. It explains why a genuine feeling of
nationalism amongst the public is a necessary precondition for leaders who seek to successfully
employ a nationalist discourse, but it does not sufficiently and fully explain why Prime Ministers
adopted Anzac. The answer to why Prime Ministers adopted Anzac is addressed by nationalism
entrepreneurship.
Nationalism Entrepreneurship
The final, and necessary, explanation for the increasing engagement with Anzac by Prime Ministers is
nationalism entrepreneurship. Critics of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, like those
authors associated with What s W o g With A za ? (2010), point to the role of the state in the
resurgence of Anzac, and see political agendas behind the form that this state involvement has
taken. Such a view is supported by parts of the nationalism literature, like Brass (1979) and
Hobsbawn (2005), who view nationalism instrumentally, and tend to also see national i sm as be i ng
invented and accepted by a public unproblematically. However, as the discussion so far has
demonstrated, Anzac has not developed in isolation from the public and been presented as fait
accompli by elites. As Norman (2004, 94) notes, leaders and elites in liberal -democracies draw upon
nationalist discourses in order to appeal to diverse and plural groups within a nation -state, but the y
cannot do so at will:
Political leaders in modern democracies obviously do not have the power to shape the national
ide tities of itize s at ill… The a ot o t ol sou es of i fo atio ; politi al oppo e ts
and political commentators may react immediately to explicit signs of thei pla i g the
atio alist a d ; a d the e a e eal li its o the e te t to hi h the a oe e a d
ai ash la ge po tio s of the populatio s… [I] de eloped Weste de o a ies toda the
po e to i flue e people s eliefs a d se ti e ts i any eal …is u h o e dispe sed a d
de e t alised .
46
Australian Prime Ministers from Hawke onwards have acted as Anzac entrepreneurs, where
nationalism has been used instrumentally, but that instrumental motivation has involved more than
the pursuance of particular policy or power ends. These instrumental goals have al so be en bound
up in the nationalist identities of these Anzac entrepreneurs – they wish to see their particular
versions of national identity realised via these polices. This entrepreneurship has been se nsi tive to
the context that it has operated within, and has responded to the desires of the public even as it has
promoted Anzac. Prime Ministers have thus personally promoted Anzac at the textual level of
national identity with their speeches, and enacted government policy to promote Anzac at the
discursive and social practice level.
The increase in Anzac entrepreneurship at the textual level by Prime Ministers can be measured
simply by noting the increase in Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses after Anzac becomes
increasingly presented as unpolitical, following the reconciliation and reincorporati on of Vi etnam
veterans (see Chapter 4). From 1989 - 2007, at least one speech or media statement has been made
on every Anzac Day. In contrast, from 1973 – 1988 only two speeches and one media release were
given by Prime Ministers. These speeches have provided a unifying discourse of nation, rich in
meaning for the present, and leading from that, an instrumental discourse for bolstering supp ort for
policy action. Anzac is a powerful unifying discourse because of its unpolitical nature after
reconciliation with Vietnam veterans and because of its strongly felt resonance within the
community and therefore has been employed effectively to appeal to unity, a sense of purpose, and
serve as a lesson for the present.
There is much evidence to support the nationalism entrepreneurship explanation in relation to
government policy that promotes Anzac at the discursive and social practice level. The first is the
largess of government funding for memorial construction and the increase in activity which has
occurred in that regard, beginning in the 1980s (Inglis, 2008, 381-389), and before the public began
to respond to Anzac en masse (see Chapter 4). The se o d is the go e
memorialise significant anniversaries – Ha ke s t ip to Gallipoli fo the
th
e ts
illi g ess to
landing anni ve rsary of
the landings in 1990, the Australia Remembers program of the mid-1990s marking the end of the
Second World Wa , a d Ho a d s isits to Gallipoli fo the
th
and 90th anniversaries. The third is
the increased funding of those federal agencies and departments that play a key role in
memorialisation, as seen in Figure 4.
47
Government funding of war remembrance
$00,0007
Australian War
Memorial9
Department of
1981-828
1984-85
1989-90
1994-95
1999-00
2004-05
6,2
15,2
20,5
33,3
106,5
38,8
5,4*
6.1*
10,4*
11,5
36,6
31,6
Veterans Affairs10
Figure 4 – Federal Government Funding of War Remembrance, 1981/82 – 2004/05
As can be seen, government funding of the Australian War Memorial increased significantly over the
time period, including significant funding for redevelopment. Government funding of the
Commemorative Activities budget of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) also saw si gni fi cant
increase over time, and an expansion of its commemorative role beyond its original function of
maintaining Australian war graves. Finally, there is the education programs for schools that the DVA
funds, sending educational materials on Anzac and Gallipoli to schools nationwide (Lake, 2010). Al l
these factors provide evidence for the extensive government promotion of Anzac, whi ch provi ded
the regular and ongoing reproduction of nationalism which i s essential to the maintenance of
conceptions of nationality. This promotion by political elites has helped to further i nternal ise the
norms of Anzac.
Prime Ministerial discourses of national identity, and their linked policies of Anzac promotion,
illuminate the final cumulative, and necessary (but not in itself sufficient) causal reason be hi nd the
Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac as being a function of their nationalism entrepreneurship. Thi s,
combined with the cumulative preconditions of the previous explanations, comprehensively
demonstrate the causal reasons behind the Prime Ministerial adoption of Anzac as a central
nationalist discourse post-1990 – the ground had been set by distance in time, Vietnam
Figures have been adjusted for inflation to 2005 terms, using the Reserve Bank of Australian Inflation Ca lculator
(http://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/).
8
This start date has been chosen as the Australian War Memorial Act 1980 and the War Graves Act 1980 introduced
the contemporary governance, reporting, and funding arrangements, for both these institutions.
9
Figures from the Australian War Memorial Annual Reports. The spike in funding 1999 -00 can in part be ex pl ained
by major capital works carried out at the AWM, including the Bradbury Aircraft Hall and the ANZAC Hal l ex hibition
facility.
10
Figures from the Department of Veterans Affairs and Repatriation Commission Annual Reports. Figures mar ked *
come from the Office of Australian War Graves Annual Reports, and reporting of commemoration in these
publications was limited to the maintenance of Commonwealth war graves. From 1994-95, commemorative
activities were added, in addition to the maintenance of war graves, which was part of the Aus tr a lia Remember s
p og a see Chapte . The Offi e of Aust alia Wa G a es epo ti g as olled i to the DVA s A ua l Report i n
1994-95 too. The commemorative function was kept as a responsibility by the DVA, and is declared in s ubsequent
reports.
7
48
reconciliation, and nationalism as tradition. Nationalism entrepreneurship explains the causal
reasons why, given these conditions, Prime Ministers turned to Anzac as a central discourse of
Australian national identity – Anzac was part of their sense of national identity, they promoted that
sense of national identity, and they consequently aligned their political visions and pol i cy age ndas
with that sense of identity. An overview of how Prime Ministers have engaged with Anzac is
provided in the next section of the chapter.
An Overview of the Genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses using Corpus Assisted
Discourse Analysis
The second section of the chapter provides an overview of the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day
addresses and media releases from 1973 –
. I doi g so, it seeks to follo CDA s e phasis upo
paying attention to the socially embedded nature of language production. It also aims to clarify
some aspects of the literature on Anzac by employing corpus assisted discourse analysis to provide a
quantitative assessment of Anzac Day addresses. As such, it identifies the various thematic and
characteristic features of these addresses, including where and when the addresses hav e been
delivered, and for what purpose; followed by Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac, the themes
i
oked, he e A za is lo ated a d hi h attles it is asso iated ith, a d ho A za s age ts a e .
As will be shown, whilst Australian Prime Ministers may stick closely to the traditions of Anzac wi th
their addresses, they subtly renovate understandings of Anzac in alignment with their policy
agendas.
Anzac Day: The Speech Setting and Frequency
In his brief parsing of the of the role of Prime Mi nisterial rhetoric on Anzac Day, Grube (2013, 55)
asse ts: [f]o Aust alia p i e
i iste s, it has ee a o siste t dut of the heto i al p i e
ministership to speak at a dawn service on ANZAC day – to encompass everything that the day
means for Australia s histo a d the de elop e t of its atio al ide tit . G u e is e tai l
o et
in his assessment of the content of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, but how much truth is
there to both the consistency of their addresses over time, and the frequency of their dawn se rvice
speeches, as opposed to other Anzac Day ceremonies?
Figure 5 reports the frequency of Prime Ministerial dawn service addresses, Anzac Day addresses
falling at a time other than the dawn service, non-Anzac Day addresses, and one recorded me ssage
to the nation. During the period under examination, dawn service addresses were demonstrably
outnumbered by other forms of Anzac Day speeches by two to one. So, whilst dawn service
49
addresses may be prominent in public memory due to their publicity and stirring imagery, they have
not been the most frequently employed platform for making an address on Anzac Day.
Anzac Day Address Time
Other Anzac Day Ceremony
12
52%
Dawn Service Ceremony
7
31%
Non-Anzac Day Ceremony
3
13%
Recorded Message
1
4%
Figure 5 – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses by Time of Day, 1973 - 2007
Further, as Figure 6 shows, it is only since 1990 that Prime Ministers have begun to consistently
address an Anzac Day audience. This is not to say that Prime Ministers did not engage with Anzac
prior to 1990, but that engagement was as primarily as a participant, rather than as the focus or the
d i e of the e e o
. Fi all , P i e Mi iste s A za Da pa ti ipatio
as ofte
o e lo al,
rather than national or international, as Prime Ministers marked Anzac Day in their local electorates,
state capital cities, or wherever they may have found themselves on Anzac Day as they conducted
the business of government.
Anzac Day Address Frequency
3
2
1
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
0
Speech
Media Release
Figure 6 – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency, 1973 - 2007
Over time, Prime Ministers have increasingly moved away from a more localised commemoration of
Anzac and marked Anzac Day at a significant site of Australian war remembrance. As demonstrate d
50
i Figu e , Gallipoli e a e a p o i e t site, ut this o l
The Aust alia Wa Me o ial i the atio s apital Ca
ega
e a has i
ith Ha ke s t ip the e in 1990 11.
easi gl epla ed the su u a
setting of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day remembrance too, with the addresses that have be e n gi ve n
there occurring after 2000. 12 Trips to World War Two sites were conducted in the 1990s by Keating
to Papua New Guinea in 1992 and by Howard to Thailand in 1998, but notably dropped off after
2000.
Site of Anzac Address
5
4
4
3
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
Prior to 1990
1990-1999
2000-2007
Figure 7 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address Location by Period, 1973 - 2007
As can be seen in the trends in the frequency and location of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses,
Prime Ministers have moved away from the local roots of Anzac as it was memorialised by the RSL i n
the past. Instead, Anzac Day has been increasingly marked at significant Australian war sites
overseas, or at the AWM. Critical discourse a al sis e phasis o the so iall e
edded atu e of
discourses compels us to examine these shifts and the way they reveal the increasing
institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship. The genre of Anzac Day Prime
Ministerial addresses has a physical setting, and this setting is relevant as it activates a frame that
distinguishes it from other genres (Frow 2006, 9-10). The physical setting of a genre is therefore also
a social event, constituting what is actual about the genre (Fairclough 2005, 223). Regarding the
shift from the local to the national or international stage, the audie nce that consumes these
11
Hawke made the Gallipoli trip in 1990. Howard followed in 2000, and again in 2005. Nota bly, Kea ting did not
make the trip, with his reticence towards its imperial connotations being conspicuous (Holbrook 2014, 179-192).
12
Prime Ministerial addresses at the AWM have been given in 2001 and 2003.
51
addresses is being called upon to note the evolution of this social event, with the replacement of the
‘“L as A za s ustodia , the g o i g sig ifi a e of A za i Aust alia
atio al life, a d the e t al
role of the Prime Minister and the state in its remembrance. This lesson is reinforced by the
frequency of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses.
Genre Chains and Hybridisation
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses have linked in chains with other genre forms. Promi nently,
this has included the media release and the interview. This linking may seem innocuous, but the
regular linking of these forms demonstrates both the concern of Prime Ministers to engage the
media in reporting their Anzac Day addresses and activities, and their confidence in the media to
epo t this e s to a audie e eage to o su e this sto . A e a ple of this as Ho a d s t i p
to visit the troops participating in the Iraq War on Anzac Day 2004 when two addresses were made ,
along with two media releases regarding Anzac Day itself, two media releases on the awarding of
edals fo se i e, a d fi all , a doo stop i te ie o
Ap il, a d a i te ie
ith ABC adi o s
AM Programme on the morning of 26 April (Howard 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2004e; 2004f;
2004g; 2004h). This burst of activity ensured the maximum positive coverage of the trip (Grattan
,
, a d of Ho a d s e t al essages of suppo ti g a d tha ki g the t oops fo thei se i e
and reinforcing the necessity and importance of Australia s I a
o
it e t see Chapte
. The
linking of these genres provides evidence of how Prime Ministers have actively engendered the
coverage of their Anzac Day activities and messages.
P i e Mi iste s A za Da add esses also de o st ate a high degree of hybridisation of various
categories of their rhetorical responsibilities. Grube (2013, 43) identifies six rhetorical genre
categories that Prime Ministers might fulfil - world leader, party leader, local member, policy
advocate, national representative, and relationship builder. The role of Prime Minister as nati onal
representative is most obviously present in their Anzac Day addresses, but to a greater or lesser
extent, all these genre forms are evident across the breadth of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day
addresses under examination here, mixing together two or more genre categories in speeches.
Hawke, in particular, combined categories – mixing policy advocacy, leadership on the worl d stage ,
and reaching out to groups whose support he relied upon, in combination with speaking on behalf of
the nation. So for example, on Anzac Day 1986 Hawke spoke in Athens and recalle d the sacrifice and
comradeship of Greeks and Australians during World War Two:
52
These shared experiences from the darkest and most bitter days of defeat have, however, left
lasting benefits.
For the Australians and other allies who fought alongside their Greek comrades it is the
staunch friendships which were forged then.
These friendships were tested to the utmost limits and have endured. They endure not only
among those who fought but have been passed down to the men and women of succeeding
generations (Hawke 1986a, 2).
Here Hawke takes on the role of national leader, speaking on behalf of the nation and imbuing Anzac
with meaning for the Australian people – f ie dship
et ee allies. “i ulta eousl , though,
Hawke was inhabiting the role of world leader, representing Australia to the world and buildi ng the
elatio ship
do
ith G ee e,
ith the f ie dship et ee the atio s e du i g a d ei g passed
. Fi all , Ha ke was alluding to his role as a policy advocate and relationship builder to
sections of the domestic audience in Australia, as the Greek diaspora in Australia was an i mportant
constituency for the Australian Labor Party during the 1980s (Jupp 2000).
Such genre hybridity did sometimes attract dissension when the political intruded via policy
ad o a . I
, fo e a ple, Keati g att a ted o t o e s
Asia e gage e t ith Aust alia s
POWs
a histo
alli g the
he he li ked his go e
th
e ts
Division held as Prisoners of War
Japa ese fo es i Wo ld Wa T o … the first pioneers of Australia in Asia. The
f o tie s e
Keati g
a, 2). The RSL and the Opposition both responded by condemning the
Prime Minister for introducing a partisan element to Anzac Day (Brough 1993, 1; see also Chapter 6).
Ho a d s I a trip on Anzac Day 2004 also attracted criticism when it became clear that the trip was
as much about shoring up support for the contested deployment as it was for thanking the troops
(Grattan 2004, 17).
Over time, instances of genre hybridisation that included overt partisan policy advocacy have
become less frequent. Howard in particular took an active role in engendering this norm. This is
certainly not uniform across the corpus, but policy advocacy of the type that saw Keating provoke
controversy in
Ha ke
, o Ha ke sp uik his go e
e ts e odo
o the La o Pa t s defe e White Pape i
epat iatio
Ha ke
e efits i
as g aduall
replaced by Howard with speeches that primarily conformed to the genre category of nati onal
leader, with allusions to world leader if the address was being hosted by a foreign government i n an
overseas location. This change over time reflects the growing coalescing of the genre boundaries of
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, and their increasing conformity to the sombre and
nationalistic rituals of Anzac.
53
Thematic and Tonal Representations of Anzac
The next section will examine the tone and themes evident in Prime Ministerial representations of
Anzac. Following Seal (2004, 3-6), it will argue that Anzac can be viewed as a spectrum with the
A za t aditio
at o e e d a d the digge t aditio
at the othe . D a i g upo the i age of
national identity expressed in the Australian legend (Ward 1993), the digger tradition is
characterised by the bottom-up values of the soldiers who fought in World War One - mateship,
anti-authoritarianism, larrikinism, racism, sentimentality, pity and fear (Seal 2004, 2). The Anzac
tradition, on the other hand, consists of the top-down values of officialdom and the state,
emphasising:
… a set of attitudes a d alues ithi
hi h otio s of ho ou , dut , a e , sa ifi e a d
salvation are central, located particularly within a militarist context. Overarching these are the
imperatives of commemoration and remembrance linked with an overpowering aura of
nationalism, emphasising unity, sameness, heritage, patriotism and loyalty (Seal 2004, 4).
Whilst Prime Ministers have made reference to the digger tradition, especially to mateship, the
state-centric themes of service and nationalism that characterise the Anzac tradition fit better wi th
their project of presenting Anzac as a unifying discourse of nation and thus have dominated their
representations of Anzac. This has important consequences for the rhetorical function and tone
ep ese ted i P i e Mi iste s A za Da add esses.
Figure 8 reports the coded frequencies of key elements of the di gger and Anzac traditions and
o fi
s “eal s ha a te isatio . Offi ial ep ese tatio s of A za
P i e Mi iste s st o gl
reference the service and sacrifice of servicemen and servicewomen, their bravery, honour and
heroism, and lessons for the nation state regarding national unity rather than national diversity.
These lessons are reinforced by frequent calls to remember and by the sacralisation of Anzac by
reference to its sacredness. Further, after 1990, the high rhetoric of the Prime Ministerial A nzac Day
address genre has increased. The employment of the Anzac tradition has an important rhetorical
function. It asks the audience to remember the values of service, sacrifice and unity, and is
frequently employed in conjunction with lessons for the present. These lessons for the present
ofte i lude a e pli it o i pli it poli
poli
spee hes i se i e of his go e
age da, su h as Ha ke s h
idisatio of A za Da a d
e t s poli , age da, Ho a d s alig
e t of A za
ith
justifications for the deployment of Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq, and neoliberal ism and
economic reform, which was mobilised by Hawke, Keating and Howard.
54
Rate of Reference to Anzac and Digger Traditions per Anzac
Day Address
6
5
4
3
5.71
5.07
2
4.25
1
1.29
1
0.93
0
Prior to 1990
1990-1999
Anzac Tradition
2000-2007
Digger Tradition
Figure 8 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Mentions per Speech to Anzac and Digger
Traditions, 1973 - 200713
The digger tradition is not completely absent - the two traditions are linked on a spectrum, not
separate. However, the two features that dominate representations of the digger tradition in the
corpus, mateship and generalised Australianness, only weakly represent the Australian l e gend that
the digger tradition draws upon in the contemporary context. Australianness now has a more plural
a d o ple
ea i g, ith Pea so a d O Neill
, fo i sta e, a gui g that ep ese tatio s of
Australianness on Australia Day present and celebrate this plurality of contested meanings.
Regarding mateship, both parties have employed this value, despite its traditional associ ation wi th
Labor politics, weakening its connection to the Australian legend. Dyrenfurth (2015, 201) has
poi ted to the
a s that Ho a d s e sio of
ateship … see ed to de ouple its
ea i g f o
state interventionis i aid of a o e egalita ia a d e ual so iet i fa ou of a o e o se ati e
a d e o o i all li e al i te p etatio of its ea i g. F ase s
o e of the g eat ualities of A za i
, 5) invocation of mate shi p as
, ho e e , e eals that conservative engagement with
mateship also has a longer history. These facts reinforce the point that the digger tradition is weakly
represented by Australian Prime Ministers.
13
Where the Anzac or digger traditions have been identified, this has been coded in the corpus. This has c rea ted a
population of coded mentions, with the rate of mentions of these traditions over time, and per speech, being us ed.
The Anzac tradition themes n=7: remember; s acrifice; bravery/courage/valour; duty/service; honour; unity;
sacredness/soul. The digger tradition themes n=7: mateship or mates; generalised Australianness ; humour;
egalitarianism/fair-go; larrikinism; anti-authoritarianism; fear.
55
The tone of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses reinforces the rhetorical f unction outlined above,
with the employment of the Anzac tradition again playing a crucial role. The digger tradition, with its
informality, laconic humour, and ambivalence towards the heroism of death, all serve as poor
foundations upon which to construct the necessary sombre and reverent tone that Australian Pri me
Ministers have employed on Anzac Day to augment their themes and policy agendas. The Anzac
tradition, on the other hand, is replete with signifiers of appropriate tone – calls to remember duty ,
honour, and sacrifice invites reflection and reverence, not light-heartedness regarding the l arri ki n
exploits of diggers or bitter cynicism about the legacies of war.
The reverence invoked by the tone of the Anzac tradition is also helped by frequent reference to the
sacredness of Anzac by Prime Ministers. Sacredness, pilgrimage and spirituality are frequently
employed as themes by Prime Ministers, ensuring the sanctity of the tone of Anzac. These
references are primarily secular, though allusions to the Christian faith also appear. Such references,
i
o
i atio
ith
o e se ula efe e es to the atio s soul, pilg i age to the sa ed site of
Gallipoli, or the spirituality of the day, all echo the reverent and authoritative tone of the se rmon.
Further, though, the reference to the Christian faith reinforces the Anglo-Celtic hegemony that
characterises Prime Ministerial Anzac Day speeches.
On rarer occasions, the tone is not reverential, but patriotic and celebratory. In particular, McKenna
has noted calls by Howard after 2001 not only to commemorate Anzac, but also to celebrate it
(McKenna 2010, 126-127). Such rhetoric invokes nationalist sentiment, calling upon the audience to
e el i A za s e p essio of Aust alia
Ho a d s la guage afte
,
ith his
ess. Calls to ele ate Anzac are certainly evident in
add ess, fo i sta e, a gui g that A za : … is a out
the celebration of some wonderful values, of courage, of valour, of mateship, of decency, of a
willingness as a nation to do the ight thi g,
hate e the ost. Ho a d
a). But calls to
celebrate Anzac also have a longer history. It is evident in the language of Hawke (1989, 4) - Ne t
year, we will be celebrating the 75th anniversary of [A za ] - and Keating (1993b, 59) - This isit
toda [to Kokoda] is a ele atio of ou f eedo
ele ate A za is thus ha a te isti
a d ou f ie dship [ ith PNG] … The call to
ot o l of Ho a d s A za Da add esses, ut of the to e of
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses more generally, as part of the patriotic sentiment which
Prime Ministers ask audiences to embrace.
The thematic and tonal characteristics of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses serve particular
purposes. Over time, the campaigning and politicking purpose of the hybridised national leader and
56
policy advocate Anzac Day address has been replaced by more singularly national leader rhetoric. As
they have done so, the speeches have changed, drawing upon the Anzac tradition to structure the
thematic and tonal representation of Anzac. But this does not mean that the policy agenda has
disappea ed f o
P i e Mi iste s add esses. Though Ho a d e a e
o e u de stated i his
presentation of policy than his predecessors, his representation of Anzac often subtly renov ated
Aust alia ide tit i li e ith his go e
e t s poli p io ities. “u h e dea ou s ha e ee ai ded
by the reverential, sanctified, and patriotic themes and tones of the Anzac tradition that make
challenges to Prime Ministerial representations of Anzac blasphemous.
Locations of Anzac
The next section examines where Prime Ministers see Anzac being located and their conservative
i te p etatio of Aust alia s
a histo . The fo us has ee upo the t o Wo ld Wa s a d thei
associated battles, and the honouring of the participants in contemporary Australian Defence Force
deployments. Of these factors, Gallipoli has dominated Prime Ministerial interpretation of
Aust alia s a histo . “u h a i te p etatio has a i po ta t heto i al fu tio a d contributes
to the su ess o failu e of P i e Mi iste s spee hes. Figu e sho s the a ed f e ue
of the
war or conflict Prime Ministers associate with Anzac.
World War One, the war that established contemporary patterns of remembrance, is mention e d as
f e ue tl as Wo ld Wa T o, although Wo ld Wa T o s e tio s p edo i ate du i g the
s,
the decade that saw the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, the Australia Remembers program of
commemoration, and an attempt by Keating to relocate the meaning of Anzac to Kokoda.
Contemporary troop deployments in the Iraq conflict of 2003-2011, East Timor, Afghanistan, the
Solomon Islands, and the War on Terror feature prominently in the 2000s, and the Gulf War features
in the 1990s. Prime Ministers have honoured the service of the contemporary Australian Defence
Force in their speeches, have linked them to the Anzacs of the past, and have sought to use Anzac as
a platform to legitimise Australian participation in contemporary conflicts (McDonald and Merefi e ld
2010, 195-197). Prime Ministers have not been bold enough to use Anzac Day as a platform to
acknowledge and commemorate the wars between Indigenous Australians and white se ttl ers that
established the modern Australian state, reflecting their general reluctance to incorporate
Indigenous Australians into their interpretation of Anzac (see below). 14
See Inglis (2008) 501-504 for an account of this issue vis a vis the AWM a d Ho a d s eje tio of the i
this aspe t of Aust alia s histo i the AWM.
14
lusio of
57
Frequency of Named War in Anzac Addresses
14
12
3
10
8
6
11
7
12
4
2
5
3
2
4
1
3
2
1
1
1
3
0
Prior to 1990
1990-1999
1
1
2
2
0
2000-2007
Figure 9 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency of Named War, 1973 - 2007
Figure 10 reports the named frequency of the site of Anzac for sites with three or more mentions.
Gallipoli clearly dominates where Prime Ministers see Anzac originating from, with more than four
times the mentions of the nearest ranked sites of France and Kokoda. The most significant si tes of
Anzac are also strongly associated with the two World Wars, with the Battle of Kapyong duri ng the
Korean War and the Battle of Long Tan during the Vietnam War being the only named exceptions.
Qualitative analysis of the appearance of the mid-century wars of Korea and Vietnam and their
associated battles of significance in the corpus reveals that they received little atte ntion by Pri me
Ministers, as they mostly feature in a list of wars and battles to be commemorate d, rather than as
the focus of commemoration. An exception to this was Hawke (1989) who, soon after the
reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian polity, recalled the controve rsy of Vi e tnam
a d Viet a
ete a s diffi ulties he the etu ed from that failed war.
Only one Prime Minister attempted to relocate understandings of Anzac away from Gallipoli.
Keati g atte pted to shift Aust alia s u de sta di g of thei
a histo f o Gallipoli a d Wo l d
War One to the Pacific and World War Two (Curran 2006, 294-295; Holbrook 2014, 179-180) and he
was responsible (though not solely) for many of the mentions of World War Two and its associ ate d
58
battle sites during the 1990s. This shift was intimately connected to his political project - an
Australian republic, an outlook to Asia and a rejection of the deferential conservatism that he argued
ha a te ised the Coalitio s e gage e t
ith E pi e a d e e
a e of
a . The pa tisa
nature of this shift attracted significant controversy and was contested by conservati ve oppone nts
and the RSL.
Frequency of Named Site in Anzac Addresses
45
40
35
13
30
25
20
21
15
10
5
0
7
2
4
2
1
5
1
6
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
Prior to 1990
3
1
2
1
1
1990-1999
1
3
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
3
1
2000-2007
Figure 10 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Frequency of Named Site of Anzac, 1973 - 2007
The location of Anzac is a crucial element in the rhetorical fu tio of P i e Mi iste s A za Da
add esses. If, as this thesis a gues, P i e Mi iste s spee hes o A za Da se e a poli
fu
ti o ,
as well as a commemorative one, then the structure of implication of an address becomes cruci al to
the spee h s hetorical role.15 In other words, if Prime Ministers wish to employ Anzac for policy
ends by associating those policy ends with the positively perceived traditions of Anzac, then they
must focus upon those aspects that invoke positively perceived background k o ledge; the good
wars and battles of the World Wars, and especially upon Gallipoli where the nation is se e n to have
According to Frow (2006, 9) the structure of implication is the assumed background knowledge that a genre
expects the audience to understand.
15
59
been born. It comes as little surprise that the conflicts where Australia is interpreted by large
enough numbers to have committed wrongs (the wars of settlement and Vietnam) are ignored or
marginalised, as their inclusion would hinder the rhetorical function. The fact that Keati ng ran i nto
such controversy for a relatively conservative reinterpretation of the location of Anzac demonst rates
just how crucial adherence to the traditions of Anzac are if rhetorical success is to be ensured.
A zac’s Age ts
Who ha e ee A za s age ts i P i e Mi iste ial A za Da add esses? “u h a a al sis is li ke d
to CDA s o e
to a al se the st uctural relations that produce discourses and texts, and reinforce
these st u tu al elatio s. A u
e of fa to s ill e e plo ed he e, i ludi g the ge de of A za s
agents, instances of named ethnicity, and the general level of incorporation and ackn owl edgement
of diversity in the addresses. It will be shown that despite considerable academic criticism of the
hegemony of masculine and Anglo-Celtic identities in Anzac, and activism from the community to
ameliorate these factors by incorporating difference into representations of Anzac (Bennett 2014;
Bongiorno 2014), Prime Ministers continue to speak of Anzac in terms that reinforce notions of
national unity and are negligent of difference.
Beginning with gender, Figure 11 shows the frequency of representations of gender per spee ch and
edia elease i P i e Mi iste s A za Da add esses. “t iki gl , o e a e e e ide tified
i th
a gendered noun in isolation in Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses and media releases. The
ph ase
e a d o e is used frequently, but men are primarily the agents ide nti fie d by Pri me
Ministers.
Rate of Gendered Nouns In Anzac Day Addresses
Men
Men and Women
Women
1.42
1.00
0.00
Figure 1116 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Gendered Nouns Mentions per Speech,
1973 - 2007
Service type can also serve as an imperfect proxy for gender, as nursing is historically associated with
women and frontline engagement in battle with men. Such gendered roles, and analysis of how thi s
16
Where an agent of Anzac has been identified with a gendered noun, this has been coded in the corpus. Thi s has
created a population of coded mentions, with the rate of mentions of gendered nouns per speech being us ed. The
same process has been applied to service type in Figure 12.
60
privileges masculine identities, have of course evolved over time, and Prime Ministers have generally
referred to contemporary agents of Anzac with the conjoined gendered nouns of men and women.
However, given the historical focus of many Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, service type can
still demonst ate the ge de ed atu e of P i e Mi iste ial ep ese tatio s of A za s age ts. Thus,
Figure 12 reports the frequency per speech of coded instances of service type in the corpus.
Rate of Service Type In Anzac Day Addresses
Infantry
0.42
Navy
0.21
Air Force
0.12
Nurses
0.00
Figure 12 - Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Address and Media Statement Rate of Service Type Mentions per Speech, 1973 2007
Like the gendered noun woman, nursing is never mentioned as a service type. As such,
ep ese tatio s of the ge de of A za s age ts i P i e Mi iste s A za Da add esses ha e
changed little since WAR activists and academics (Lake 1992) began to challenge the gendered
nature of Anzac in the 1980s. For the Prime Ministers under examination in this thesis, the ce ntral
national identity discourse of Anzac remained masculine.
Indigenous Australians fared little better than women, featuring in one named mention of ethnicity,
by Hawke (1991). In 1991, Hawke was paying tribute to a small group on indigenous people who
had served during WWII, but had not been formally enlisted, and consequently had not received
payment for their service. In contrast, Liberal Prime Ministers have not included reference to
Indigenous Australians in their Anzac Day addresses. Regarding diversity more generally, Prime
Ministers have not tended to use Anzac Day to emphasise the diversity of the nation during this
period. This stands in contrast to the competing and contested plurality of meanings and ide nti ti es
ele ated o Aust alia Da
Pea so a d O Neill
. Ho a d espe iall te ded to e phasise
national unity over diversity, repeatedly utilising the refrain that Anzac represented na ti onal uni ty
and common purpose 17. Other Prime Ministers have been less reticent. Keating argued that the
POWs of Wo ld Wa T o …fou d i all so ts of i u sta es that the sha ed o
o hu a
“ee, fo i sta e, A za Da
: It [Anzac] has remained relevant not to glorify war or to paint some r omantic
pi tu e of ou histo ut to d a upo a g eat e a ple of u it a d o
o pu pose o A za Da
: We
come to draw upon thei sti i g e a ple of u it a d o
o pu pose Ho a d
a; Howard 2002a).
17
61
ground with people they had, for cultural and historical reasons, been inclined to patronise or
despise a d that the e
as a lesso i that fo Aust alia s as the e gaged
ith Asia Keati g
1993a, 3).
These e a ples de o st ate ho
A za s e t ep e eu s had a
i ed e o d ega di g the
expansion of the identity boundaries of Anzac. Whilst Anzac has largely remained a nationalist
discourse associated with the hegemony of Anglo-Celtic and masculine identities, it did not re mai n
exclusively so. However, the extent to which Prime Ministers present diversity has largely continued
to be dependent on outsider groups conforming to the hegemonic strictures demanded by Anzac,
and the attendant compliance with its values of service, sacrifice and duty to the state.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview to the remainder of the thesis.
Following the discourse-historical method, it has done so in order to provide as much detailed
background to the analysis as possible to Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship. In the proce ss,
it has demonstrated the cumulative causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and set out
the situation and themes of the genre of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. Having done so
allows us to more clearly observe the operation of causality, and the evolution of the add resses,
behind Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship.
In doing so, the chapter has attempted to establish both the causality behind the Prime Mi ni ste rial
turn to Anzac, and the nature of that engagement once the turn had been made, in a more
systematic manner than has been attempted in the literature before. It has done so by applying
both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the available evidence. Some conclusions can be drawn
having conducted this analysis:
1. The causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac is multiple and difficult to sort
through. Nationalism entrepreneurship captures the multi-causal reasons behind thi s shi ft
by taking account of both the social processes and structures that Prime Ministers must
operate within, and the enormous agency they have as political elites with access to the
power resources of the state. In the end, and despite their power, Prime Ministers have
only been successful (and not always consistently successful) in their Anzac
entrepreneurship because they have delivered a form of nationalism that the Australian
people have identified with, and the Australian people have accepted as essential, taken for
granted, and unpolitical.
62
2. Quantitative analysis of these changes confirms some theoretical assumptions in the
lite atu e. Fi stl , “eal s
A za /digge t aditio has ee
o fi
ed i a al sis of the
corpus, with the state orientated Anzac tradition being strongly evident. Secondly, critics
who have pointed to the masculine and Anglo-Celtic hegemony of Anzac also have their
suspi io s o fi
ed, as a al sis of the A za s age ts has sho
a ge e al la k of di e sit .
3. Quantitative analysis has also shown some deficiencies in the literature. Firstly, the fact that
march and dawn service attendances tend to rise after governments begin to promote
Anzac from 1990 suggests that the public is responding to their nationalism
entrepreneurship, rather than the other way around. Also regarding attendances, we should
exercise caution when it is clai ed that e o d o ds ha e atte ded A za Da , as e e t
dawn service attendances have not matched the early 1960s highs of the marches.
Secondly, analysis of the corpus reveals that some of the features that Prime Ministerial
Anzac Day addresses that have been attributed to particular agents (especially Howard),
such as celebration of Anzac and co-option of the Australian legend, have longer histories.
The analysis in this chapter of the causality behind the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and the
genre of their Anzac Day addresses, provides a base for us to observe in more detail the evolution of
these factors in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
63
CHAPTER 4
From Contestation to Reconciliation: Anzac Under Whitlam, Fraser
and Hawke, 1972-1987
Anzac was in a state of flux from 1972 to 1987. At the beginning of this period, the divisions of the
Vietnam War, the election of the reformist Whitlam government, and the move away from Bri ti sh based expressions of Australian identity all presented challenges to the public expression of Anzac.
As Holbrook (2014, 121) notes:
By the 1970s, the gulf between the meaning that the old diggers attributed to the Anzac
legend and that imputed by younger people seemed impossible to bridge. A martial
nationalist ideology, anchored in ideas of racial supremacy and Empire, had stoked the Anzac
legend for half a century. As the pillars of this ideology were dismantled, so the legend itself
collapsed.
This process had begun before the 1970s (see Holbrook 2014, 117-120; Macleod 2002), but by the
beginning of the decade, an apathetic public was increasingly uninterested in the annual
commemoration of Anzac. As shown in Chapter 3, the number of Australians turning out to Anzac
Day parades and dawn services began to dwindle appreciably by the middle of the decade and thi s
trend continued throughout most of the 1980s. The legacy of the Vietnam War, and then new
tensions regarding the conduct of the Cold War and nuclear weapons during the 1980s, me ant that
militarism was a hotly contested issue in the public sphere. The prominence of social movement
contestation of Australianness and the national interest contributed to a public discourse that was
antithetical to the values that Anzac had been traditionally associated with – Empire, militarism,
conservatism, masculinity, violence and whiteness. These factors contributed to the re l uctance of
political elites to place Anzac at the centre of conceptions of national identity. But by the late 1980s,
the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body politic saw ne wl y e merging
o
s ega di g A za s o
e o atio that easse ted the e t alit of A za a d sa tio ed the
o testatio of A za s o se ati e ea i g.
This chapter seeks to explore this shift in Anzac, and the Prime Ministers changing role in
commemoration, by tracing the thread of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac through the
period from 1972 to 1987. It does so in four parts that examine the social context that was dri ving
ha ges to A za , P i e Mi iste s e gage e t ith A za , and their Anzac Day speeches:
64
1. The fi st se tio sets out the atu e of A za s de li e as a e t al atio al a ati e f o
the 1960s until the 1980s. The Vietnam War, changing conceptions of the Australianness,
evolving senses of the political influenced by new social movements, and these social
o e e ts di e t o testatio of A za ,
e e all fa to s that p o le atised A za , a d
contributed to poor Anzac Day attendances and concern about A za s o ti ued ele a e.
2. Here the chapter acknowledges that despite these challenges, Anzac never disappeared, and
that it was supported by a range of actors. This section examines the counter-narratives
that supported Anzac – resistance to challenges to the traditional, conservative, and marti al
version of Anzac that was championed by the RSL; renovation of Anzac by cultural agents,
such as historians and film makers, who reimagined Anzac with a new assertive
Aust alia
ess that pla ed do
A za s traditional British and martial origins, and
emphasised new nationalism, tragedy and trauma; and recognition, where disowned and
ignored Vietnam veterans pushed their claim to be included in the story of Anzac, which was
accommodated with reconciliation.
3. The hapte the sets out the e gage e t of P i e Mi iste s ith A za s o
e o atio ,
a d thei i f e ue t spee hes. ‘efle ti g the ole of the ‘“L i A za s o
e o atio ,
a d A za s o tested atu e, P i e Mi iste ial pa ti ipatio
ith A za du i g this time
tended to be more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular than it has been in more recent
ti es.
P i e Mi iste s did still pa ti ipate i
A za s e e
a e, ho e e , this
commemoration was primarily as a participant, rather than as an instigator, of the occasi on.
Significantly, whilst Hawke displayed some of these tendencies with his participation at thi s
time, he also displayed early signs of Anzac entrepreneurship, especially regarding Vi etnam
veterans and their agitation for recognition.
4. Finally, the chapter explores the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider
Australian body politic, represented by the welcome home parade in October 1987. I argue
that the fo
that this e o iliatio took
as esto ati e justi e “ haap 005, 13-15),
which restored the place of Anzac in Australian cultural and political life, but had the e ffe ct
of limiting contestation of Anzac and the form that it took. This is the crucial tipping point
where Anzac becomes unpolitical, as to contest Anza s ea i g a d e t alit
ould e to
reoffend. Once reconciled, Anzac increased in prominence as an ideograph:
An ideograph is an ordinary language term found in political discourse. It is a highorder abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal
and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behaviour
and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and
guides behaviour and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as
a epta le a d lauda le… M Gee
, 15).
65
The unpolitical reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian public interacted wi th Anzac
to create an unpolitical ideograph that presented Anzac as essential and incontestable. This
demarcated Anzac as a sphere where the politics of deliberation and contestation was not to occur.
A za s status as a u politi al ideog aph ea t that P i e Mi iste s ould e gage ith A za , i f
they were skilful enough to do so, in a manner that aligned Anzac with new, contemporary meanings
that were depoliticised, and difficult and taboo to contest.
Building upon the process tracing of Chapter 3, I argue that the progression of these trends is crucial
to an understanding of the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac, and the form of Anzac that Prime
Ministers engendered after 1990 that will examined in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
Anzac in Decline
The post-war period had seen the slow decline of Anzac as a central nationalist narrative, with
publically expressed concerns regarding the proper and continued observance of Anzac Day being
evident as early as the 1950s (Holbrook 2014, 116-
. The de ut of Ala “e
ou s pla The One
Day of the Year in 1961 caused controversy with its critical treatment of the sentimental and
unquestioning acceptance of Anzac Day and its drunken commemoration. By 1965, and the
egi
a
i g of Aust alia s i
i ale e i the
ol e e t i the Viet a
o fli t, Ma leod
,
otes a e tai
edia o e age of that ea s A za Da a d e a i atio of hethe the da
would continue to hold the same significance.
Australia in the 1960s was, however, largely conservative (see Jordens 2009, 75-76; Cochrane 2009,
165), despite popular memory of the decade as one of radicalism and social change ce ntre d on the
opposition to the Vietnam conflict and the radicalisation of university students. In particular,
Jo de s
a gues that Aust alia s outh had a defe e tial attitude to a ds autho it , e fle ted
in opinion polling on the question of the Vietnam conflict and conscription. Further, the
conservative Liberal/Country Coalition won four elections during the decade, in 1961, 1963, 1966
and 1969. During this time, Australians were largely happy to allow Anzac Day to be se l f -gove rne d
by the RSL and watch respectfully (if sometimes uncomfortably) from a distance (Macl eod 2002,
150).
Opposition to Anzac Day and its memorialisation began to become more entrenched as the war in
Vietnam continued and hostility towards conscription began to grow. Inglis (2008, 358-361) notes
several, largely sporadic, instances of defacement of war memorials during the se cond hal f on the
66
s, up u til the e d of Aust alia s i
ol e e t i Viet a . I pa ti ula ,
the sole gua d of Mel ou e s “h i e of ‘e e
P.E.A.C.E.! o the olu
a e
u k o
sa the ashi g of
assailants before the y pai nted
s alo g the f o t of the “h i e. “po adi , s all s ale p otests o A za
Day were also evident (Curran and Ward 2010, 198), though dwarfed in size and significance by the
larger Moratorium marches. One protest also occurred during the return of Australian se rvi cemen
f o Viet a , he a
ea old Nadi e Je se , doused i
ed pai t, s ea ed a hi g sol di e s
uniforms in 1966 (Curthoys 1994, 129). Save Our Sons, a women-led movement, staged a silent
protest on Anzac Day 1966 at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance and led other such protests at
events when conscripts left for Vietnam (Jordens 2009, 79). More generally, the anti -war movement
that sprang up surrounding the Vietnam War, the well-attended and publicised Moratorium
marches, and the increasing pessimism surrounding the conflict after the 1968 Tet Offensive and M ỹ
Lai Massacre, all helped to problematise Anzac as a central national discourse (Curthoys 2009, 156;
Curran and Ward 2010, 197-198; Donaldson and Lake 2010, 88-90).
By the time the ALP had been elected to government in 1972, the observance and acceptance of
Anzac Day as a central national commemorative date had been challenged.
This decline was
reflected in government policy during the 1970s. The British race patriotism that had dominated
Aust alia politi al life u til this poi t as ei g epla ed ith e
atio alis
Cu a a d Wa d
2010) and the beginnings of multiculturalism. There was little place for Anzac in the mul ti cul tural ,
post-Vietnam nationalism of the Whitlam government, and as symbolic policy changes, such as the
favouring of an Australian honours system over the traditional imperial honours system, the
changing of the national anthem, and funding Australian arts and cultural programs, were in stituted.
Further, whilst the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975 saw the return of the Coal i ti on to
go e
e t, it did ot see a o espo di g easse tio of olde fo
s of atio al ide tit . F ase s
abandonment of some of the symbols of new natio alis , fo e a ple, e e ti g to the use of God
“a e the Quee
as the atio al a the
ho ou s, sat alo gside the etai
a d etu i g to e o
e t of ele e ts of Whitla
e di g Aust alia s fo i pe ial
s efo
ist go e
e t, p o i e tl ,
multiculturalism and its associated identity discourses (Brett 2003, 157-185; Curran 2006, 173-175).
Fraser, like Whitlam, grappled with the political need to develop a more inclusive and distinctly
Australian identity, following the post-war influx of immigration and the collapse of British forms of
identity. By the time Hawke was elected in 1983, these changes had become entrenched, and a
return to the British race patriotism that had sustained Anzac up until this period of time seemed
more unlikely than ever.
67
Attendances at Anzac Day parades declined during this period as Anzac became a neglected, and
sometimes contested, feature of Australian identity and national discourse. Dawn service
atte da es also de li ed du i g this pe iod, though Ca
e a s atte da
es remained more robust
tha “ d e s of Mel ou e s see Chapter 3). Curran and Ward (2010, 197) note that this period
saw newspapers reflect upon the decline, with The Australian
e e
,
usi g is it that e a e
e i g a a a h o is ? a d the Canberra Times and The Sydney Morning Herald both
epo ti g upo the s all to
of Gu da oo that fo got to
a k A za Da a d had left the lo al
memorial unattended and choked by weeds (Canberra Times 1979: 1; Ellercamp 1979, 2).
Further challenging Anzac in the 1970s and early 1980s was the evolution of social movements,
moving beyond the anti-war movement into newly political spheres of social life. For exampl e , the
Tasmanian Wilderness Society had campaigned successfully against the damming of the F ranklin
River and had contributed significantly to the placing of environmental issues onto the national
agenda and to the spread of like-minded groups (Papadakis 1990, 343-4). The Sydney Gay and
Lesbian Mardi Gras evolved from a protest in 1978 to a celebratory parade in 1981 and signalled the
increasing prominence and success of the gay rights movement (Marsh and Galbraith 1995, 301306).
Both movements challenged previously held conceptions of Australianness and the
boundaries of political action. Further, the period saw continued contestation and questioning of
militarism, along with increasingly radical and confrontationist opposition from some groups
regarding these matters. The early 1980s was a time of heightened Cold War tension, and the
peace, anti-nuclear and environmental social movements were active in contesting previously
settled o eptio s of the atio al i te est a d Aust alia s defe e postu e Elde
,
. The
Palm Sunday anti-nuclear rallies of the early to mid-1980s saw a peak of support in 1985 as 170,000
marched in support in Sydney (Smith 2001, 43). Popular culture also supported these move me nts,
with bands like Midnight Oil promoting a broadly radical environmental, anti -nuclear, and peace
message through the 1980s and 1990s, and Red Gum releasing their anti-war ballad to the returne d
Viet a
ete a , I Was O l
,i
.
In addition to these more generalised social movement activities, Anzac Day saw direct contestati on
and protest action by activists (Twomey 2013, 100-101). The radical feminist group Women Agai nst
Rape conducted a number of protests on Anzac Days in the early to mid-1980s at several capital ci ty
locations around Australia. Their purpose was to challenge the mythology of Anzac Day by
emphasising rape in war, militarism, and male violence, as part of a broader radical feminist acti vi st
age da to e phasise …the
a
ape has ee used i
a a di
pea e to keep o e u de
68
o t ol
Ho e
,
. Ho e
,
a gues that WA‘ a ti is
o A za Day was not
particularly concerned with deconstructing and analysing the peculiarities of the Australian
experience of wartime and the way the Anzac narrative privileged masculine understandings of
Australianness, and instead attempted to broaden the meaning of the day to include:
…the u i e sal e pe ie e of o e i
a . I stead of fo usi g o the atio hood
(manhood) myth enshrined in the Anzac Day tradition, women participating in Anzac Day
marches have sought to reclaim the day as a day of mourning and, at the same time, to
broaden the meaning of Anzac Day to include women of all nations who have suffered in
a ti e…
Feminist protest activity on Anzac Day had origins as early as 1977 (Twomey 2013, 98), and by 1980
and 1981, WAR activists in Canberra had sought to join the Anzac Day parade, and were bl ocke d by
police and some were arrested (Elder 2005, 71-
. The
o ds DEAD MEN DON T ‘APE
ee
sprayed onto a wall near the Sydney cenotaph in time for Anzac Day 1983, and 168 WAR activists
were arrested in Sydney that year after attempting to join the march, in defiance of a court order
(Odlum 1983, 3). Marches and vigils were conducted on Anzac Days in other capital cities during this
period too (Inglis 2008, 440-441). WAR activity began to decline in the late-1980s as disagreeme nts
about the effectiveness and appropriateness of these protests drained the impetus to follow
through with continued action (Inglis 2008, 441-442), due in part to WAR activists falling prey to
nationalist sympathies when criticising Australian personnel (Elder 2005, 78).
Less prominently, there was also disquiet from gay activists regarding Anzac during thi s pe ri od. In
1982, the Gay Ex-Service Persons Association (GESPA) advertised a meet-up on Anzac Day in a
Melbourne newspaper and asked the Victorian RSL for permission to lay a wreath at the Melbourne
Shrine of Remembrance, which was ostensibly granted by the president of the Victorian RSL, Bruce
‘u to
Hi st
,
. Ni oll
,
a gues that …alo g ith o e a d thei h ste i al
shell-shocked counterparts, homosexual diggers were excluded from the [Australian War]
Me o ial s ele atio of atio al ide tit . This e lusio
as also p ese t i Mel ou e i
,
as Ruxton himself prevented GESPA representatives from laying a wreath on Anzac Day. Citing
GE“PA s failu e to la thei
eath at the allotted ti e as the easo fo thei e lusio , ‘u to
e t
on to note:
I do t i d poofte s i the a h ut the
ust a h ith thei u its. We did t a t them
to la a
eath e ause e did t a t a thi g to do ith the . We e tai l do t
recognise them and they are just another start to the denigration of Anzac Day (Ruxton, as
ited O Callagha
, .
69
Note the sublimation of difference by Ruxton here – gay ex-service personnel could not be excluded
from the parade itself due to their war service, but the acceptance of their presence was only
extended if they remained silent and unrecognisable. Actions that promoted difference and stepped
outside the a epta le li its of o du t e e a ti el p ohi ited
A za s gua dia , the ‘“L. Elde
(2005, 73) notes the difficulty of protesting on Anzac Day, as the nationalistic nature of the occasi on
emphasises homogeneity over heterogeneity, and the sacralised composition of Anzac rituals invites
introspection and silence over contestation and protest. For their part, GESPA expressed their
disappointment at being prevented from laying a wreath on this occasion and denounced Rux ton as
a e
igoted
a
O Callaghan 1982, 3). In following years, GESPA representatives were
reportedly permitted to lay a wreath at the Shrine of Remembrance in 1983, but were again refuse d
permission in 1984 (Humphries 1984, 4).
Further protest activity was undertaken by a ti ists he flou
a d that
as
a hi g i “ d e o A za Da
,
as th o
ith a
o the p iso offi e s
la desti e g oup alled the
P iso e s U ited Milita t A ti ists lai i g espo si ilit . A spokespe so said: To ha e s e s
marching alongside world war veterans is the ultimate hypocrisy. The wars were supposed to ke e p
us free and yet internal oppression continues and the police and screws are the cause of the greatest
a d
ost i sidious loss of f eedo
‘o e ts
,
. Whilst t e ated by police as a minor inci de nt,
the act further demonstrated the breadth of radical activism that was associated with Anzac Day
during the period.
In sum, the challenge to Anzac during this period was profound, with Anzac being challenged directly
and indirectly in a radical manner in the public sphere by a range of new social movements and
activist organisations. The challenge to Anzac had moved from largely isolated and small scale
actions, in the 1960s and 1970s, to a more frequent, more collective, and very public, confrontation.
Not only that, but the public was responding to this new environment by continuing the trend of
turning out to Anzac Day parades and dawn services in smaller numbers. Anzac, and its primacy in
the national narrative, was being contested head on. A process of politicisation had intruded into
the previously essential nationalistic sphere of Anzac and introduced politics and contestation.
Holding the Line: Counter-Narratives of Resistance, Renovation and Recognition.
Despite the challenges that Anzac faced during this period, it did not die out. Resistance, renovation
and reconciliation were all themes that sections of Australian culture and politics mobilised in
support of Anzac. The RSL resisted change, fulminating against the subversive social movements
70
that sought to halle ge the ‘“L s p e iousl hege o i e sio of atio al ide tit . Cultu all , Bi l l
Ga
age s ook The Broken Years a d Pete Wei s fil
Gallipoli reimagined the British race
patriotism of the Gallipoli campaign by viewing the operation with a critical eye regarding the
failures of British command, imbuing Anzac with fresh meaning for Australian new nationalists (Inglis
2008, 415-417; Holbrook 2014). Finally, Vietnam veterans who felt aggrieve d by their treatment
after their return from war and from their exclusion from the pantheon of Anzac pressed for
recognition, which the state and the Australian body politic accommodated with steps towards
reconciliation. These changes were occurring in a social context where the trauma of war was
increasingly recognised medically and discursively in the local and international sphere. This change
had the effect of challenging the martial and heroic former basis of Anzac, and assisted the
reimagination of Anzac (Twomey 2013).
Resistance
The RSL, as the custodian of Anzac, resisted its decline. Holbrook (2014, 118) demonstrates that the
RSL had been warning against what it viewed as complacency regarding Anzac as early as the 1950s,
as the generation who had fought WWI began to pass away. By 1965, Macleod (2002, 151-152)
notes a newspaper interview with the NSW president of the RSL for Anzac Day, and his failure to
recognise, when prompted, that many people saw Anzac Day as a glorification of war. When a fl are
as used to ig ite
eaths i a appa e t p otest at “ d e s A za Da i
, the ‘“L s N“W
p eside t Coli J. Hi es ful i ated It as a i sult to the e o of those ho pai d the sup e e
sacrifice to keep this country free, and to every man,
,
Morning Herald
. The hege o
atio al ide tit is e ealed
o a a d hild i Aust alia The Sydney
of A za i the ‘“L s e sio of u ified a d ho oge ous
Hi es de la ati e g a
ati al ood, ith his asse tio that e e
Australian was insulted by these actions, as if contestation of Anzac by any person was unthinkabl e.
“u h heto i also p o ides e ide e fo the ‘“L s self-perceived role as a defender of conse rvative
vision of Australian national identity during this time (Donaldson and Lake 2010, 79-80).
As has al ead
ee
oted, o e of the ‘“L s
ost ehe e t a d o se ati e defe de s of A za
du i g this pe iod as Vi to ia s B u e ‘u to . ‘u to ofte fou d hi self at the e t e of a A za
Day controversy during the early 1980s, resisting the social movement activism that Anzac Day was
attracting. As a further example, the denigration of Anzac Day was a theme that Ruxton had
warmed to in an interview with The Australian newspaper published on Anzac Day, 1982, whe re he
saw Anzac as being under threat from many of the new social movements noted above:
71
I think it [GESPA] could be a concerted effort by anti-he itage g oups to dest o the a h… I
just think there is a fair bit of heritage bashing at the moment. We had Women Against Rape
i Ca e a last ea , the e is so e t ou le i “ d e , the e s ga s i Mel ou e a d o
e
are having trouble with some of the ethnics in Victoria. I certainly believe there is a deliberate
campaign by some people in this country to destroy Anzac Day (Ruxton, as cited by Hirst 1982,
13).
‘u to s lai
that the e
as a o e ted effo t to oo di ate a u ified a paig agai st A za
during the early 1980s (as opposed to the actions of individual activist groups seeking to pursue their
individual goals see s pa a oid, ased upo the a aila le e ide e. Ho e e , ‘u to s ie s
efle t the ‘“L s te de
du i g this pe iod to e a fo e fo o se ati e esista e agai st the
social and political forces that were challenging Anzac. Whilst the passage of time has prove n that
the RSL largely failed to defend its conservative view of Anzac and Australian national identity, it
e ai ed a po e ful a d p o i e t oi e i A za s defe e du i g this pe iod, a ti el poli i g i ts
boundaries.
Renovation and Re-imagination
Several scholars have pointed to the cultural reimagining of Anzac that was occurring during the late
1970s and early 1980s (see Inglis 2008, 415-417; Curran and Ward 2010, 247-248; McKenna 2010,
116-117; Holbrook 2014, 126-142, Twomey 2013). Whilst some social movement activists of the
period rejected Anzac, more sympathetic cultural agents renovated Anzac for a time that could no
longer countenance ideals of British race patriotism and overt militarism, and instead emphasised a
more ambivalent, traumatic, and tragic version of Anzac. Particularly influential agents in this
process were academic and lay historians, and filmmakers.
Historians played an important role in providing an empirical basis for this renovation of Anzac, wi th
academic Bill Gammage being particularly prominent in this process. His book The Broken Years:
Australian soldiers in the Great War (1974) was a social history, drawing upon the diaries and letters
of the soldiers who had fought on the frontline. Gammage (1974, xiii; emphasis in the original) was
at pai s to poi t out that his
as i po ta t, as Ga
ok
as …not a ilita histo
of the Fi st AIF. “u h a disti tio
age s p oje t as less a out e hoi g the he ois a d a tial ati o al is
that had cha a te ised C.E.W. Bea s ilita histo , a d that had p e iousl sustai ed A za , a d
instead emphasised tragedy as its theme (Inglis 2008, 416; Holbrook 2014, 133). Gammage was al so
fa k
he dis ussi g the AIF s less he oi deeds a d the pe ei ed de ficiencies of the British
(Holbrook 2014, 133), providing a more ambivalent reading of Anzac. Also reinforcing this social
history renovation of Anzac was a small body of lay history, produced by family historians who we re
72
keen to explore their family mem e s e pe ie e of a . This as a t e d that as p ote a i the
first half of the 1980s, but exploded especially after 1990 (Holbrook 2014, 145). These historians
helped reimagine Anzac, engendering a more personal and tragic empirical basis for Anzac.
This newly renovated basis for Anzac was employed by Peter Weir and David Williamson in the fi l m
. I glis
Gallipoli
,
otes that Ga
age s Broken Years se ed as a i spi atio a d
guide fo the fil , a d he o ked as a histo i al onsultant during its production. Weir played with
the possi ilities that Ga
age s
o k had ope ed up, a d he seized upo the oppo tu it to
reimagine Anzac for a contemporary audience (Curran and Ward 2010, 247-248; Holbrook 2014 138139). This involved …dista i g the A za Co ps f o
its p i a fu tio
killi g Tu ks, e ti el
absent from the film), and turning the culture of imperial loyalty on its head so that the British
e e ged as the p i iple foe Cu a a d Wa d
,
. I Gallipoli, the AIF is not an Imperial
force displaying heroic deeds and sacrifice against a racially imagined Turkish enemy. The Anzacs are
instead tragic figures, sacrificed by the callous and incompetent British, with the story servi ng as an
allegory for an audience enamoured with new nationalism. Similar anti-British themes were also
adopted
othe fil s a d TV p og a s of the pe iod that dealt ith Aust alia s a histo
Cu a
and Ward 2010, 248).
In sum, there was a cultural renovation of Anzac during the period, as cultural agents working within
the context of the decline of British race patriotism and new nationalism reworked Anzac for a
contemporary audience. Caution needs to exercised regarding causation here – as has been shown,
Anzac was still very much a contested national narrative during this period, neglected and
sometimes rejected. However, the protean renovation of Anzac during this time helped create a
basis for a new Anzac, more suitable for the times, and one that has proved to have the potential to
resist decline.
Recognition
By the early 1980s, and in the context of continued narratives of contestation and resistance
surrounding Anzac, Vietnam veterans began to organise politically, seeking recognition and
reconciliation.
Some veterans had expressed dissatisfaction with the widespread apathy,
indifference, and even hostility to their experience demonstrated by successi ve gove rnments and
the wider public after their return from war. In particular, they emphasised the traumatic
experience of their participation in war, and their position not as agents of failed Western
73
imperialism in South East Asia, as they had been discursively portrayed by the anti -war move ment,
but as victims of the horrific physical and psychological impact of war.
Vietnam veterans were further unhappy that they had been excluded from the story of Anzac. As
Dixon (2010, 127) notes:
…i
a
espe ts, hile Viet a
ete a s ha e stood outside the A za
tholog , a d ha e
presented their claims in terms of the unique nature of their experiences and (mis)treatment,
their experiences, their stories, and even their grievances, constitute a quest for incorporation,
and attempt to contribute to and become part of the Anzac legend.
This experience was not universal amongst Vietnam veterans. Some veterans experienced few
problems upon their return and continued on their lives much as they had before active se rvi ce, or
even resented the image of the broken and sick Vietnam veteran (Ross 2009, 197). Importantly,
however, the wider discourse has been one where Vietnam veterans had been discursively omi tted
from the story of Anzac during the 1970s and 1980s (Doyle 2002, 78; Dixon 2010, 135). The public
and the state had begun to lose interest in Anzac, no memorials were erected in the landscape to
a k the sa ifi e of Viet a
ete a s, a d the state a d the ‘“L see i gl a ed little fo ete a s
concerns about the ongoing effects of Agent Orange or their damaged mental health. So, whilst the
Australian public went about their lives largely ignorant or ambivalent about the experience of
Vietnam veterans, a significant number of veterans were left feeling betrayed and neglected. As one
veteran interviewed in the late 1980s expressed:
It s ot that I as asha ed I as i Viet a , ut I d ee gi e the feeli g I should e
ashamed. I mean it was obvious at that time we were going to lose, so you had no comeback.
For a man that was a dedicated Australian, and thought I was doing the right thing, it was very
hu tful…
We were fighting a war that was not only unpopular, no one had a clue where we were. Young
blokes of twenty were dying for their country through no choice of their own, and the people
did t k o a d ould t a e less B ett a d Mo a
,
.
The divide between veterans and the wider community was exacerbated by the socio-economic and
political gap between the two groups who drove conceptions of the Vietnam War. The mostly
conservative, rural and lower-middle class and working-class veterans, and the urban, mi ddl e-class
anti-war movement participants did not generally interact or mix socially (Curthoys 1994, 130), so all
the opposing groups were left with were impressions and stereotypes about the experiences,
politics and emotions of each other.
74
To respond to the neglect of government, the failure of the RSL to address their agenda, and
especially to press for an investigation into the effects of exposure to Agent Orange, the Vietnam
Veterans Association (VVA, and formerly the Vietnam Veterans Action Ass ociation) began to
coalesce as a pressure group in 1979-80 (Ross 2009, 195). It was successful in presenting itself as the
voice of veterans, despite differences amongst veterans regarding the need for political
representation. The normal avenue for such representation would have normally been the RSL, but
veterans had fallen out with this avenue of policy access over two main concerns. Firstl y, Vi etnam
veterans clashed with the RSL over the course of action on Agent Orange and the need for a Royal
Commission into its effects and, secondly, many veterans felt unwelcome or unwanted i n l ocal RSL
branches or had openly clashed with RS League and club members over their ostracism (Ross 2009,
197).
The VVA was an active pressure group, and was successful in lobbying the federal government to
take action on veteran health problems, including both mental and physical trauma, in pre ssi ng for
studies i to ete a s health o plai ts a d fo a ‘o al Co
issio i to the effe ts of Age t
Orange, which the Hawke government instituted. However, the Royal Commission did not find in
fa ou of the VVA s o e s a out the effe ts of Age t O a ge. I additio , a p oposal to o ti ue
research into veteran mortality, after a pilot study, was declined funding by the federal government
(Doyle 2002, 84). So, pressure group activity by the VVA during the first half of the 1980s had seen
some success, but the full agenda certainly had not been recognised by government. As Ross (2009,
a gues, ete a s of the Viet a
Wa
… a t e og itio , e o iliatio ; the
community to be grateful to ex-se i e e a d espe t the
VVA s lo
i g a tio s du i g the fi st half of
s
a t the
fo ha i g se ed i Viet a . The
e e the e p essio of a desi e fo e og i ti o
from the government and the public that had ignored their sacrifice and had failed to incorporate
them into national narratives of Anzac.
Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac, 1972 – 1987
It was in this ambivalent context that Prime Ministers engaged with Anzac during the 1970s and
early 1980s. What frequently characterised the nature of their role in the commemoration of
Aust alia s a histo du i g this pe iod as a te de
to e a pa ti ipa t i that o
e o atio ,
with the focus of the day on the diggers themselves during the dawn service and march. This stands
in contrast to later engagement, when the numbers marching declined as the diggers aged and
passed away, and which tended to see Prime Ministers play a more prominent role as they drove
and led the commemoration of Anzac Day. As such, Prime Ministers engagement with Anzac use d
75
to tend to occur more infrequently, and to take the form of being local, and of being understated
and less spectacular. The few speeches that were made by Prime Ministers reflected these
tendencies, and Anzac Day was sometimes ignored as the business of government and partisan
politics continued as per usual. Whitlam and Fraser both consistently reflected this pattern, though
Hawke began to demonstrate both these elements, and early signs of Anzac entrepreneurship, with
his engagement with Anzac during this period.
Prime Ministers as Participants
Prime Ministers frequently took part in Anzac Day from 1973 to 1987, but this contribution was
usually as a participant in the proceedings, rather than as a driver or focus of the comme morati on.
As has been noted, the RSL remained the custodian of Anzac during this period, and the organisation
of the day reflected the RSL s o e
to see that the fo us of the da s o
e o atio
ould
remain upon the ex-service personnel whom the day honoured. The Prime Ministers role, then,
was frequently to serve as one of the dignitaries of the occasion, lending the endorsement of t he
state to the proceedings. For example, Whitlam marked Anzac Day 1973 in London, at the Cenotaph
at Whitehall and listening to the sermon at Westminster Abbey that referenced Anzac Day, wi th hi s
only two active duties that day being laying a wreath at Whitehall and reading one of two lessons at
Westminster Abbey (AAP 1973, 9). Similar patterns are revealed by Whitlam in 1974, when he laid a
wreath at the Sydney Cenotaph during the march, and then shook hands with members of the
crowd (Cunningham 1974, 2; 9).
Fraser played a similar role, laying a wreath at the AWM in 1976 ( The Australian 1976, 3),
participating in an April 24 sunset service at the Sydney Cenotaph in 1977 ( Canberra Times 1977, 11),
and participating in the dawn service at the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne in 1980, 1981,
and 1982, along with marching in the parade in 1981 and 1982 (The Age 1980, 9; Fraser 1981a;
Murdoch 1982, 3). Correspondence between the Victorian RSL and Fraser in 1981 reveals that he
was invited by the RSL to attend Anzac Day that year in Melbourne (Fraser 1981b), rather than to
give a speech or to be the focus of the commemoration, as has become the norm in more recent
years. This exchange demonstrates that, in this instance at least, the RSL was firmly in con trol of the
go e i g of A za s o
e o atio .
Hawke started to become more actively involved in war commemoration (see below), but he also
reflected the tendency to be a participant in Anzac Day, laying wreathes in Sydney in 1984 ( The
Australian 1984, 3) and at the AWM in 1985 (Canberra Times
,
. The P i e Mi iste s
i o
76
role in commemoration is also revealed by news coverage of Anzac Day during this period, with their
attendance frequently being conveyed as secondary to the reporting on the marchers, the RSL, the
crowd, and other dignitaries in attendance, or as part of this milieu (see, for instance Cunni ngham
1974, 2; The Australian 1976, 3). As such, it can be seen that the Prime Minister frequently playe d a
secondary, participatory, role in Anzac Day during this period.
Local Commemoration
Another distinguishing feature of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac during thi s pe ri od was
its more local and suburban commemoration, far away from sites of Australian war remembrance
like the AWM o Gallipoli. The lo al atu e of A za s o
e o atio
as a efle tio of the ‘“L s
custodianship of Anzac and their concern to honour the diggers they represented. This emphasis on
the ex-service personnel themselves was mobilised via the local RSL branch, and on larger scale , the
state branches of the RSL in state capital cities (see Inglis 2008). This tendency was demonstrated by
Whitlam in 1974, as he marked the day with a dawn service at the Edmondson VC Memorial Cl ub i n
Liverpool in south-west Sydney, before laying a wreath at the Sydney Cenotaph duri ng the march,
and then attending an afternoon Anzac service at the Masonic Club in Parramatta (Cunningham
1974, 2; Whitlam 1974a).
Fraser tended to be present at Anzac Day ceremonies around the country, as he both
commemorated Anzac and simultaneously conducted the business of government. Fraser appeare d
at the AWM in 1976, Sydney cenotaph in 1977, Alice Springs in 1978, Esperance in 1979, and
Melbourne in 1980, 1981, and 1982. In Alice Springs, Fraser attended the local service, then chatted
with ex-servicemen at the RSL afterwards (The Australian 1978, 3). Finding himself in Esperance,
Western Australia in 1979, after having attended the dawn service in Albany, Fraser delivered an
Anzac Day address that was not reproduced in the east coast newspapers (see The Australian, The
Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, and the Canberra Times for April 26 1979). Instead, The Australian
(1979, 1) decided to report that Fraser was embarrassed to learn that his staff had not organised a
wreath for him to lay at the Esperance ceremony, and The Sydney Morning Herald (1979, 2) reported
that The P i e Mi iste , M F ase , spe t $
gold i e s to go a k to
o d i ks esterday trying to persuade striking
o k. He failed. “u h epo ti g illust ates the lo al atu e of P i e
Ministerial engagement with Anzac, conducted almost as an afterthought to the business of
government. It also demonstrates how little focus was placed upon the Prime Minister and his
actions as they pertained to Anzac Day at this time. Materials in the Fraser Library Archives also
77
reveal that Fraser frequently liaised with the local RSLs in his electorate and helped to organise guest
speakers or to have naval vessels visit local ports on Anzac Day (Fraser 1981b).
Whitla
s A za Da i
sa hi
o ga ise his o
it e ts i a si ila
a
e , ith the da
service in Liverpool taking part in his seat of Werriwa. Ultimately, even Prime Ministers are in offi ce
at the pleasure of their local constituents, and Anzac Day presented an opportunity to e ngage wi th
them. Anzac Day for Prime Ministers therefore often drew them back into the local politics of the i r
electorates, in addition to demonstrating the understated and suburban nature of their participation
during this period.
The Speeches of Whitlam and Fraser
Despite the fact that Prime Ministers were primarily participants on Anzac Day during this time, they
did occasionally make Anzac Day addresses. Regarding frequency, only two speeches were made by
Prime Ministers regarding Anzac Day between 1972 and 1987, in 1979 and 1986, and one media
release was distributed, in 1984. This stands in contrast with Prime Ministerial engagement after
1990, when a speech or media release has been provided every year without exception. Often,
instead of a Prime Ministerial missive being given on the lessons and values of Anzac, the business of
partisan politics continued as usual, with Prime Ministers making speeches, releasing media
statements, and conducting interviews regarding policy and politics unrelated to Anzac Day.
Whitlam released a statement on national heritage policy in 1974, and gave a speech and press
conference in Peru on Anzac Day 1975 (Whitlam 1974b; Whitlam 1975a; Whitlam 1975b). The 1975
speech briefly alluded to Anzac Day, with Whitlam (1975a, 1) saying:
This morning I laid a wreath at your national shrine. Some of you may know that today is also
the anniversary of a battle with historic, indeed sacred, significance in the minds of the
Australian people. Of course our military annals have little in common, but I was reminded by
this concurrence of events of just how closely the histories of our two countries are linked with
Europe.
This brief allusion echoed some of the elements of later Prime Ministerial speeches with its
reference to the sacredness of Anzac. Having said that, Anzac was not mentioned directly, and the
date was not employed as an opportunity to discuss the significance of Anzac Day. Whitlam inste ad
used this as a platform to launch into a longer, and somewhat speculative, speech upon the
historical and cultural links between Australia and Peru.
78
Fraser also practiced everyday politics and policy on Anzac Day, releasing materials for the media on
Anzac Day in 1976, 1977, 1978 (Fraser 1976; Fraser 1977a; 1977b; Fraser 1978). 1978 was a
prominent example of the business of government continuing, despite it being Anzac Day, with
Fraser in Alice Springs primarily to address policy matters regarding indigenous disadvantage. His
Anzac Day commitments of attending the local Anzac Day ceremony was part of a busy schedule that
also included two addresses regarding indigenous policy (Fraser 1978), meeti ng with indigenous
La d Cou il ep ese tati es a d lo al i dige ous people, a d late fl i g to Kathe i e O Neill
,
3). The reporting on this trip in The Australian also e phasised F ase s a ti ities as the pe tai ed
to i dige ous poli
Mi iste s s hedule i
O Neill 1978, 3). Clearly, Anzac Day was only a small part of the Prime
. This sta ds i
o t ast to the s hedules that late o upied P i e
Ministers on Anzac Day, which are full of Anzac Day commitments, especially on a significant
anniversary date.
Speeches were infrequently made on Anzac Day, with only two being made, in 1979 and 1986.
Fraser had wondered about the continuing significance of Anzac Day earlier in the decade , i n radi o
broadcasts to his electorate of Wannon. In 1972, he pondered:
These days, when so many of our traditional values are being called into question, Anzac Day is
perhaps a suitable time for us to consider whether those values still have application to our
contemporary society.
Is patriotism an outdated concept? Or the willingness to fight for freedom for our families,
ourselves and our fellow men?
Thousands of Australians have died for those principles and today we remember them.
I firmly believe those principles are as valid in today's changing world as they ever were, and
may the memory of those who have fallen constantly remind us of that (Fraser 1972, 3).
The odalit of F ase s spee h is ota le. ‘efle ti g ha gi g pu li attitudes to a ds A za a d
the values that underpinned it, Fraser felt co pelled to defe d A za s a tial ati o al is
face of social change with his high level of commitment – I fi
l
i the
elie e . But, su h a desi e to
defe d A za s t aditio al o se ati e ea i gs as a a do ed the follo i g ea , he i stead
Fraser reconceptualised Anzac with Liberal Party values for a changed Australia:
In the old terminology, Australians fought for God, for Queen and for country, but I think if
these words were analysed, it really means the people fought for the right to choose t he kind
of society in which they wanted to live. People fought for the right to determine their own
government, for a right of choice. They fought for their families, for their wives, for their
children. They fought for a better society (Fraser 1973, 1-2).
79
Here Fraser recognises and grapples with the datedness of Anzac. To solve this problem, he imbue s
A za
ith hat it eall
ea s – new ideas for changing times. As such, Fraser falls back upon the
traditions and philosophy of his party, filling Anzac with meaning regarding the spirit of individualism
and liberty to replace its problematised traditions of God, Queen and country.
Fraser was not an Anzac entrepreneur. Instead of embracing Anzac and grasping the opportunity to
fill it with new meaning for the nation, as his successors did, Fraser was reluctant to deliver Anzac
Day addresses and envisage Anzac in line with either his policy agenda or a new age. Such a
reluctance was unsurprising given the contestation that surrounded Anzac in the af termath of the
Vietnam War, when Fraser had been both Army and Defence Minister in the Holt and Gorton
governments. Only one Anzac Day address was given by Fraser, in 1979, but its location in
Esperance in Western Australia was far away from the most significant shrines of Anzac on the e ast
oast, a d it e ei ed little atte tio f o the edia. The spee h is full of … hat e e to e o e
the sto k idio s of A za dis ou se G a es
,
– Gallipoli, freedom, mateship, courage,
sacrifice and remembrance - ut its i pa t as i i al. ‘ega di g poli , F ase s spee h affi
Aust alia s o
ed
it e t to its allies:
…this da , a o e all, is ou t i ute
To those who died
Doing a job that had to be done,
Doing a job to make our world safe for decent people,
A d letti g it e k o ,
ou a tio s, that Aust alia sta ds
down when the going gets tough.
its f ie ds a d does t a k
In this commemoration we remember, too,
The allies who fought at Gallipoli, where the Anzac legend was born (Fraser 1979, 2).
Here Australians are pragmatic stoics, who had fought heroically, and did not back down when the
going got tough. The e phasis upo allies as sig ifi a t gi e the AN)U“ elatio ship, F ase s
hostility towards the Soviet Union (Curran 2006, 185), and continuing superpower tension during the
period. Nonetheless, the single speech given during his term, and the location of the speech far
a a f o a sig ifi a t site of A za s o
the e t e of his o eptio
go e
e t s poli age da i a
e o atio , illust ates that F ase ha dl pla ed A za at
of Aust alia
ess, o alig ed Aust alia s
a histo
ith his
sig ificant manner.
80
Hawke and the Beginnings of Anzac Entrepreneurship
I
o t ast to his p ede esso s, Ha ke ega to e gage ith A za a d Aust alia s a hi sto
i a
more substantive manner. This was fairly protean in nature in the first half of the 1980s, but
significant steps were taken towards Anzac entrepreneurship. In particular, this engagement
o u ed ithi the f a e o k of Ha ke s o se sus politi s, he e Ha ke atte pted to e o
ile
the competing groups and interests of Australian politics wi th his political style and institutional
framework, and especially with the Prices and Incomes Accord (see Johnson 1989, 102-108; and
Jaensch 1989, 161; Moore 2003). This political style was employed towards the objective of
neoliberal economic reform, but it was also applied to other spheres of public policy (Economou
1993), including Vietnam veterans. Importantly for the VVA, Hawke tended to negotiate directly
with the heads of interest groups and peak bodies (Moore 2003, 112).
To begin with, Hawke responded to the policy and recognition demands of the VVA via the RSL,
using their national conferences to address the concerns of Vietnam veterans. The addre sse s both
engaged the veteran community as a perceived important lobbying constituency, personali sed the
policy process, and helped Hawke set the policy agenda. Hawke had confronted the demands of the
Vietnam veteran community soon after the tabling of the findings of the Royal Commission into the
effects of Agent Orange, telli g the ‘“L s
ational conference:
The epo t s e t al fi di g is that the he i al age ts, a d la ge, had o ad e se effe ts o
Australian personnel. The government accepts that the case for a link between Agent Orange
and health problems among Vietnam Veterans has not been established.
However, both the government and the RSL need to be aware that the physical and
psychological sufferings of the Vietnam veterans are real enough, whether or not they were
caused by Agent Orange. Mr Justice Evatt is clearly stating that the main task, caring for
Vietnam veterans, is still continuing.
I a assu e all of ou he e toda that e ill e looki g e
a efull at the epo t s
e o
e datio s i the light of this go e
e t s de o st ated o
it e t to p o idi g
optimum care for the veterans of all wars (Hawke 1985, 6-7).
At this point, Hawke was largely reactive to the challenges being posed by the VVA.
Having
instituted the Royal Commission into the effects of Agent Orange early in his term as Prime Minister,
there was a need to respond to its findings. However, there was also the need to manage
expectations – the ‘o al Co
issio s fi di gs e e ot hat the VVA had a ted, a d Ha ke as
addressing criticism of these findings and was urging policy restraint.
go e
By pre senting the
e t s positio to the leadi g etu ed se i epe so s o ga isatio , the ‘“L, the VVA oul d
e kept at a
s le gth a d the age da o t olled.
committal modality from Hawke –
e
ill
Thus
e looki g
e see athe u spe ifi a d o e
a efull
at the
epo t s
81
e o
e datio s - athe tha spe ifi poli
i itiati es that di e tl add essed the VVA s o e s
regarding Agent Orange and its effects. Hawke presumably chose to present this here, as the RSL
had opposed the Royal Commission in the first place (Ross 2009, 195-197) and could plausibly be
considered to be more sympathetic than a hostile VVA audience. However, there was an e conomi c
imperative too - Hawke could hardly announce new spending when his government was ti ghte ni ng
a ess to ete a s disa ilit pe sio s i a li ate of e o o i u e tai t , a issue he add e sse d
earlier in this speech (Hawke 1985, 2).
Ha ke s o se sus politi s
as i effe t i this i sta e – Hawke was interacting with a peak
representative body, with the dissident VVA being marginalised. It was too dangerous to include the
VVA when consensus was a stake. However, it was not all negative for Vietnam veterans in this
period, as the seeds of recognition and reconciliation were being sown during these e arl y ye ars of
the Ha ke go e
e t. As Ha ke a k o ledged, ete a s lai s of suffe i g e e eal e ough ,
and he cautioned against the RSL or government treating it as anything but. This emphasised the
Viet a
ete a s t au ati e pe ie e of
atte da t eed fo
ar, their position as victim (Twomey 2013), and their
a e . The ha ge i to e f o F ase s
spee h, he e A za s age ts had
fought heroically, is stark.
The state also began to engage with remembrance in a more substantive manner. Beginning with
s all steps o
A za Da
, the go e
e ta
ou ed that it
ould take up the ‘“L s
suggestion that the Australian government petition the Turkish government to rename Ariburnu, the
section of the Gallipoli peninsula where Australian forces landed in 1915. The Anglicised Anzac Cove
was chosen as a replacement, in time for the 70th anniversary of the landings in 1985 (Hawke 1984).
The government returned the favour by using the name Gallipoli Reach to title part of the shore l i ne
of Lake Burley Griffin at the bottom of Anzac Parade in Canberra, and honoured the rol e of Turki sh
forces led by Kemal Ataturk with the Ataturk Memorial Garden in Canberra in 1985. New war
memorials were also announced, constructed and unveiled along Anzac Parade in Canbe rra duri ng
this period. They included the National Memorial to the Royal Navy unveiled in 1986, the Australian
Hellenic Memorial unveiled in 1988, the National Memorial to the Australian Army unveiled in 1989,
and the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in 1992. Hawke himself was the Chairman of
the Canberra National Memorials Committee during this period, and had a hand in their planning
(Hawke 1986b). In 1985, the government helped send a small group of nine surviving Gallipoli
veterans overseas to Anzac Cove to mark the 70th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, which was
also attended by Minister for Veterans Affairs Arthur Gietzelt (Cranston 1985, 15). In 1987, the
82
Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Bowen also travelled to Gallipoli to mark Anzac Day (Stephens 1987,
a d Viet a
ete a s e e that ea
el o ed ho e as the led the a
i the “ d e A za
Day march, with sustained applause and cheers from the crowd (The Sun-Herald 1987, 5).
Further, Hawke made his first Anzac Day address of his term in Greece in 1986, an early exampl e of
memorial diplomacy (Graves 2014, 169-170), that being:
…the i st u e talizatio of sites of e o , o
e o ati e e e ts a d atio al da s as a
vehicle for international relations. It might be defined as that dimension of diplomatic practice
that seeks to materialize and mobilize a shared sense of the past at the intersection of
collective memory and transnational history.
Hawke was in Europe at the time pu sui g talks ega di g Aust alia s t ade poli , a d i pa ti ul a
seeki g suppo t fo efo
of the Eu opea E o o i Co
u it s su sidisatio of ag i ultu al
products that were damaging the profitability and viability of Australian exports (AAP 1986, 3). In
Greece, he had raised this issue in talks with the Greek government, and had sought to reaffi rm the
li ks et ee Aust alia a d G ee e. I glis
,
a gues that Ha ke s pe so al i te est i
Greek (and Turkish) wartime honours was at least in pa t
oti ated
a …a o e
fo eth i
otes . This as efle ted i Ha ke s e phasis upo the elatio ship et ee Aust alia a d G ee e
in the 1986 Anzac Day address in Athens, where he recalled the sacrifice and comradeship of Greeks
and Australians during World War Two:
These shared experiences from the darkest and most bitter days of defeat have, however, left
lasting benefits.
For the Australians and other allies who fought alongside their Greek comrades it is the
staunch friendships which were forged then.
These friendships were tested to the utmost limits and have endured. They endure not only
among those who fought but have been passed down to the men and women of succeeding
generations (Hawke 1986a, 3).
Here Hawke takes on the role of national leader, speaking on behalf of the nation and imbuing Anzac
with meaning for the Australian people – f ie dship
et ee allies. “i ulta eousl , though,
Hawke is inhabiting the role of world leader, representing Australia to the world and building the
elatio ship
do
ith G ee e,
ith the f ie dship et ee the atio s e du i g a d ei g passed
. Fi all , Ha ke is alludi g to his ole as a poli
ad o ate a d elatio ship uilde to se tio s
of the domestic audience in Australia, as the Greek diaspora in Australia was an important
constituency for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) during the 1980s.
83
The speech also reflects some of the newly fashioned meanings of Anzac as conveyed by Gammage
and Weir in popular culture (see above). In particular was the more critical view on the rol e of the
British in the campaign:
On this day, seventy-one years ago, Australian and New Zealand soldiers landed on the shores
of Turkey and Gallipoli, many thousands of miles from their homeland, to fight in a war not of
their making. They became, under a British General, the Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps, and are remembered by that name. It was the first time the Australians fought as a
nation and it was a time which revealed so much of the Australian character – determined
spirit, mateship and egalitarianism (Hawke 1986a, 1).
Instead of fighting for God, Queen and country, as Fraser had incisively characterised the traditional
ea i g of A za , the A za s o
o
a ded
Aust alia
e e at Gallipoli to fight i a
a B itish Ge e al , ut he e the also fou d thei
ha a te – dete
i ed spi it,
ateship a d egalita ia is
a
ot of thei
aki g ,
atio al, ot thei I pe ial,
. And instead of imbuing
Anzac with a martial nationalism, Hawke ends the speech by invoking the International Year of
Peace. The speech illustrates how Hawke was beginning to engage Anzac in a more substantive and
entrepreneurial manner, and reflected newly emerging ideas about Anzac. So, whilst Anzac was stil l
a contested national narrative during the first half of the 1980s, tensions were beginning to ease,
and the space for reconciliation with Vietnam veterans, and incorporation of their e xperi ence i nto
Anzac, was opening up.
Welcome Home: Vietnam Veterans and Reconciliation
It
as i this setti g of easi g te sio
ega di g Aust alia s
ilita
se i e e o d that Viet a
veterans in Australian picked up on the idea of a welcome home parade similar to the ones
conducted in the United States, where veterans woul d march through city streets to a welcoming
and appreciative public. Having been floated as a possibility after the precedential American
parades in 1986, an organising committee was set up and was supported by veterans organisati ons,
the NSW RSL, and several local Sydney government representatives (Doyle 2002, 86). The we l come
home parade in Sydney in 1987 was significant, as it was the tipping point in the reconciliation
between veterans, the government and the wider public.
Hawke took up the proposal for a welcome home parade enthusiastically, telling the August 1987
RSL conference:
84
I firmly believe that the October parade will be the culmination of a long process of
reconciliation and community acceptance of its obligations to the veterans of Vietnam.
I believe we must honestly acknowledge that our involvement in Vietnam did cause deep
divisions in the Australian community.
But whatever our individual views on the merits of Australian involvement, we must equally
acknowledge the commitment, courage and integrity of our armed forces who served in
Vietnam.
No one should have ever questioned those characteristics – nor should anyone ever have
questioned our community obligations to the Vietnam veterans (Hawke 1987, 5).
The sincerity of this reco iliatio is e phasised
o
it e t I fi
l
Ha ke s
odalit a d high le el pe so al
elie e ; I elie e . The terms of the reconciliation are unambiguous and
declarative - No o e should ha e uestio ed - and the imperativeness of the cause is e mphasi sed
o o e;
e o iliato
e
ust . The si e it of Ha ke s i
o atio
a ati e of the da , situated as it as
oth efle ted a d ei fo ed the
ithi Ha ke s
ide dis ou se of atio al
policy consensus and reconciliation.
Thus, on October 3, 1987, around 22,000 Vietnam veterans marched in the welcome home parade
through the streets of Sydney (Ross 2009, 212). It was estimated that the parade was watche d by a
crowd of up to 100,000, including Hawke, and that it stood up to ten deep along the parade route i n
some places (The Sydney Morning Herald 1987, 4). The marchers carried more than 500 Australian
flags, each flag representing a serviceman who had lost his life during the Vietnam War. These
simple acts represented the reconciliatory nature of the event – the flags, standing for the nati on state, were accepted as a proper symbol for the fallen by the veterans and symbolised their
reconciliation with the body politic that they felt had rejected their rightful place in the Anzac
narrative after the end of the Vietnam conflict. The large crowd that watched and cheered the
parade, including the head of government, Prime Minister Hawke, demonstrated the sincere re gre t
the community felt at the treatment of Vietnam veterans and their welcoming into the Anzac
t aditio . “o e ete a s eje ted Ha ke s p ese e
de li i g to gi e e es ight the d ill
command for acknowledging and saluting commanders and dignitaries) as they marched by Hawke ,
perhaps remembering his role as ACTU president at the time when waterside workers de fied ACTU
policy and refused to unload a navy vessel in response to the Mỹ Lai
pu li all stated oppositio to the a Cu a
,
assa e, Ha ke s o
o the ALP s o e ge e alised opposi tio
to the conflict. However, this was the only tense moment of the day reported, and the media
e olle tio s of the e e t e e glo i g i thei app aisal of the da s positi e sig ifi a
e Wal ke
1987, 2; The Sydney Morning Herald 1987, 4). Despite apprehension and some continued
ese t e t, ost ete a s ea ted positi el too, ith o e e alli g I
o lo ge asha e d to sa
85
that I
a Viet a
ete a . No lo ge
ill I ha g
head. The people of “ d e
ade su e of that
(Giblett 1990, 69).
The use of Aust alia flags to ep ese t falle soldie s a d Ha ke s e do se e t as the head of
government, signified the reconciliation of the state with Vietnam veterans and their incorporati on
into Anzac. The terms of this reconciliation are what Schaap (2005, 13) calls restorative justice.
Under this concept, an offender has violated the established norms and limits of acceptability of
their community. The wrong-doer, having recognised the injustice of their actions and felt the gui l t
associated with such a violation, seeks to right their wrong via repentance – a disowning of their
prior actions and attendance to their wrongdoing through apology, reparation and penance. Having
sufficiently attended to these rituals, and the victim having accepted that the wrongdoer is
sufficiently chastened and willing to accept community norms, results in the offender being forgive n
and the parties are consequently reconciled.
Schaap argues that this process of restorative justice insufficiently addresses competin g political
interests:
In these terms, the reconcilability of political conflict is taken for granted. By promoting social
harmony as an unconditional public good, the terms within which this unity is constituted are
presented as unambiguous. Consequently, the representational space in which the terms of
reconciliation itself might be contested is diminished (Schaap, 2005, 20).
Reconciliation is here unification – a redeeming of a painful past in order to pursue a common future
(Schaap 2005, 18). Restorative justice is unpolitical – it requires forgetting the contingent and
political basis of the reconciliation between formerly adversarial parties (S chaap 2005, 21), and
institutes a form of reconciliation that purports to be essential and incontestable. It is an active
form of depoliticisation that newly demarcates a sphere of social relations where the political
behaviour of deliberation and contestation is taboo and conflict remains latent.
The notion of restorative justice leading to an unpolitical reconciliation is of particular importance on
this occasion. Having marginalised the experience of Vietnam veterans, excising them from the
discursive narrative of Anzac and allowing Anzac as a central national narrative to wither, the state ,
along with the Australian body politic, had committed a grievous wrong against established soci etal
norms. To repent, elaborate public rituals of atonement, such as the Royal Commission into the use
of Agent Orange, the welcome home parade, and the Vietnam Veterans war memorial that was
announced in 1988 and opened in 1992, are all used to redress the sins of the past. This atoneme nt
86
is repeated by the celebratory and nationalistic observance of Anzac Day every year, as a re mi nde r
not to violate these principles again and restoring the order that had been disturbed.
However, the nature of restorative justice precludes any contestation of the terms of the
reconciliation. The offender cannot contest the terms of the reconciliation because to do so woul d
fail to show the adequate level of repentance and enrage the victim, causing further, if not more,
hurt. This has had profound continuing effects, as Anzac has become a sacred, untouchable, and
therefore unpolitical, political discourse. Opposition was marginali sed as the conservative and
militaristic tendencies of Anzac were restored. Those who might have opposed the utilisation of
militaristic imagery as the foundational story of nationhood now faced powerful taboos that
sanctioned such courses of action, as opposition may open old wounds once again. An unpolitical
form of Anzac had consequences for Vietnam veterans too - their continuing claims to policy acti on
by government and incorporation of their particular and uncomfortable experience of war is
subsumed in an official, state driven, and sanitised story of the Anzac tradition centred on the
original landings at Gallipoli in 1915.
So, after the 1987 welcome home parade, the public expression of the contestability of Anzac
declined. Anzac becomes an uncontested ideograph – a culturally situated and well understood
rhetorical device, but one that is also malleable and unspecific. As McGee (1980, 15) notes:
Each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a
prere uisite fo
elo gi g to the so iet . A deg ee of tole a e is usual, ut people a e
expected to understand ideographs within a range of usage thought to be acceptable. The
society will inflict penalties on those who use ideographs in heretical ways and on those who
refuse to respond appropriately to claims on their behavior warranted through the agency of
ideograph.
Thus, after the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans and the Australian public, powerful social taboos
existed to sanction the use of Anzac in ways that did not exist in the recent past. Protests, such the
ones led by WAR activists, fell away. The 70th anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli in 1985, and
especially the 75th anniversary in 1990 saw renewed interest in Anzac and ideographic
ep ese tatio
of A za s e ol i g
ea i g, as A za e t ep e eu ship
Ha ke a d h is
government began to emerge. Elites like Hawke and his successors then employed the authority and
resources of the state to define and promote the terms which the body politic could engage with
this central national narrative and projected their own elite agenda onto this newly unpolitical
discursive realm.
87
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the evolution of Anzac from the el ection of the Whitlam government in
1972 to the welcome home pa ade fo Viet a
ete a s i
. P i e Mi iste s e gage e t
with Anzac during this period reflected the ambivalent nature of Anzac, as the limits and
appropriateness of this sphere of national identity were interrogated and contested by a range of
political and cultural agents. Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser did not ignore Anzac, but their
engagement was more sporadic, more local, and less spectacular than became the norm after 1990.
Hawke also reflected these tendencies at times, but began to demonstrate signs of Anzac
entrepreneurship.
This chapter has further argued that the period from about 1980 to 1987 saw the reconciliation of
previously marginalised Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian public, and the
(re)establishment of Anzac as a central, and now also unpolitical, Australian nationalist discourse
whose essentialism was taken for granted. Hawke enthusiastically supported this reconciliation, as it
fitted well with his wider political and policy style of consensus. This reconciliation was not neutral ,
however, as its form of restorative justice depoliticised Anzac and precluded the contestation of i ts
terms that had been occurring during the 1980s and, further, instituted powerful taboos against the
violation of this reconciliation.
The newly unpolitical version of Anzac ushered in by reconciliation had continuing effects regarding
Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and this is its crucially significant legacy. The period from
1990 saw continued Anzac entrepreneurship by Hawke, and his successors, but this took a particular
form due to the terms of restorative justice. Importantly, the politics of Anzac did not disappear
after this point, but its public expression tended to centre on the conservative policing of the
boundaries defined by this state-orientated version of Anzac, rather than on the agenda of social
movement or Vietnam veteran activists. Maintaining the unpolitical nature of Anzac involved the
emphasis upon the original landings at Gallipoli, and failed to emphasise Vietnam. It further tende d
to emphasise the state-orientated Anzac tradition, rather than the victimhood and trauma of war
that new discourses surrounding the Vietnam War and war remembrance did. Above all, this ne wly
unpolitical version of Anzac was operationalised by Prime Ministers as an ideograph - ripe with
meaning and significance regarding national identity, but also unspecific and malleable. In sum, the
reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian public that the Hawke government had
endorsed and encouraged was the tipping point where a ne wly depoliticised and unpolitical version
88
of Anzac emerged, a crucial factor in the steps towards more explicit Anzac entrepreneurs hip by
Hawke and his successors.
89
CHAPTER 5
Hawke and Anzac as Ideograph: Economic Reform, Multiculturalism
and Foreign Policy
Introduction
Now that the conditions in which Anzac entrepreneurship could occur have been established, a finer
grained analysis of the individual Anzac entrepreneurs of Hawke, Keating, and Howard may be
conducted. This hapte seeks to e plo e Ha ke s A za e t ep e eurship from 1988-1991, havi ng
p efa ed Ha ke s o se sual go e i g st le a d e plai ed ho A za e ol ed f o a o tested to
a u politi al atio alist dis ou se i Chapte
. Ha ke s A za e t ep e eu ship i
ol ed the
instrumental promotion of policy initiatives, and attempts to head off contestation. Further,
Ha ke s e gage e t ith A za had a o stituti e effe t ega di g atio al ide tit afte
, as
Anzac once again became a central nationalist discourse. However, Anzac did not remain static or
f oze
i
ti e. Whilst Ha ke s e gage e t
ith A za ge e all
o fo
ed to the ge e
boundaries of the Anzac tradition, it also took a new form that reflected the policy prioriti es of the
Hawke government – economic liberalism, middle power activism, multiculturalism, and
cosmopolitanism.
These changes occurred within the context of the profound reforms to Australian society and pol i cy
that were occurring during the 1980s and 1990s, neatly summarised by Kelly (1994) as the
abandonment of the Australia “ettle e t. “tokes
,
-20) critique and reformulation of
Kell s o st u tio of the Aust alia “ettle e t i luded …the follo i g i e luste s of pol i ti al
ideas and policies: White Australia; Terra Nullius; State Secularism; Masculinism; Au stralian
De o a ; “tate De elop e talis ; A it atio ; Welfa e Mi i alis ; I pe ial Nati o al is . Al l
these a eas eithe e pe ie ed o side a le i itial efo
atio du i g Ha ke s te
i go e
e t,
or the Hawke government grappled with the consequences of their ongoing change, which provided
the context of destabilised national identity that is necessary for successful nationalism
entrepreneurship. The chapter will thus focus on how Hawke aligned Anzac with reforms to the
Australian Settlement centred on the areas of economics, multiculturalism and national identity, and
foreign policy.
90
Hawke faced little challenge to his engagement with Anzac, and he embraced Anzac
entrepreneurship. How he came to be in this position will be explored in four main sections that
provide the necessary conditions for this to occur:
1. The first section outlines Ha ke s o se sus politi s, the p is
that defi ed Ha ke s
approach to government, and his Anzac entrepreneurship. The unpolitics of consensus
helped Hawke to define the parameters that Anzac took, and helped to prevent
contestation of this nationalist narrative.
2. This section sets out some of the economic, cultural, and foreign policy problems the Hawke
government faced. In particular, it looks at domestic economic reform, international trade
and defence policy in a changing world, and government policy regarding multicultural ism.
All these a eas e pe ie ed o side a le ha ge du i g Ha ke s te
i go e
e t. I
argue here that these policy challenges led Hawke to define Australianness in a manner that
e phasised the people s o
it e t to Aust alia s e o o i o petiti e ess.
3. In the third section, I will explore the relative difficulty Hawke had in mobilising this
conception of Australianness in a celebratory manner for the Bicentenary. The Bicentenary
had attracted contestation as the symbolism of the celebration of white settlement had
deeply ambivalent meaning, given the destruction that had been wrought upon Indigenous
peoples i Aust alia s ode
histo , a d its o ti ui g lega . This hal l e ge d Ha ke s
consensual political style, and his notion of competitive Australianness and commitment to
the state.
4.
In contrast to the difficulties that Hawke faced with the Bicentenary, he was successful with
his Anzac entrepreneurship. This section explores how Anzac was utilise d i nstrumentall y
and constitutively during these national occasions. I firstly set out some of the fe ature s of
Ha ke s A za Da add esses. I the a gue that the e l e o iled a d u politi al A za
post-1987 offered a golden opportunity to present a universalising and celebratory form of
nationalism and national identity during a time when this form of nationalism was
e o i g e ide tl u sta le. Fu the , I a gue that Ha ke s su ess at e plo i g A za
i st u e tall
a d o stituti el
set a p e ede t fo A za s future use and also
demonstrated its potential to future Prime Ministers. Nevertheless, Ha ke s A za Da
addresses in 1989 and 1991 reveal little of the ceremony evident in 1990, or later Prime
Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, demonstrating the still inchoate nature of Prime
Ministerial discourses of Anzac.
91
Ultimately, changes to Australian politics and society demanded new forms of Austral ian i de nti ty.
Ha ke s A za e t ep e eu ship as a le to su essfull fulfil the eed fo a efo
ulated e sio
of Australian nationalism that referenced his own nationalist vision because the newly depolitici sed
and unpolitical version of Anzac after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans operated as an
uncontested and popular nationalist narrative suitable for consensus building.
Hawke: Reconciliation, Consensus and the Governing of Group Claims
The Ha ke go e
e t had ee ele ted i
u de the sloga B i gi g Aust alia Togethe .
The slogan appealed to concerns regarding the divisions rent to the Australian polit
F ase s
term in office, but its more lasting consequence in government was a discursive call for unity,
consensus and reconciliation. This appeal to consensus was especially concerned with the
corporatist mediation of labour, business and government interests (Johnson 1989, 103) and the
management of dissent, with the goal being the introduction of economic reforms that would secure
a health
apitalist e o o
. This as to e a hie ed th ough egotiatio a d a gai i g a d the
creation of a forum [the Prices and Incomes Accord] for resolving the divisions which distract groups
from satisfying their shared mate ial aspi atio s Mills
Ha ke s o se sus politi s
, 26).
as li ked to electoralism (Jaensch 1989, 157-160; Gunther and
Diamond 2001, 25-29). Electoralism requires a party to see politics through the eyes of the
electorate and play to the catch-all imperatives that this demands (Jaensch 1989, 158). Doctri nai re
ideology has little place in this conception of electoral politics, as electoralism demands that parti e s
are cautious when formulating policy and that they work towards the interests and desires of the
electorate. Negative reactions from the public are considered and tested for through opinion polling
and surveying, and poli
i itiati es that a e fou d to ause da age to a go e
e t s sta di g a e
odified o d opped. Co se sus fitted ell ith ele to alis : It a ied a ood of togethe ess, of
rational resolution of any disputes, and made possible the smothering of an y criticism merely by
la elli g it as
ot o ki g fo o se sus
Jae s h
, 161). This saw the ALP seek out a range
of constituencies and interest groups as supporters, broadening its support base beyond the
confines of its labourist traditions.
Consensus limits and denies politics (see Mouffe 1999, 754-757; Little 2007, 154-158; Maddison
2014, 200-201). In Ha ke s ase, consensus had two important discursive consequences; first, it
built a powerful claim to incumbency based upon the delivery of a mediated and consensual
agreement between the forces of labour and business regarding the mutual goal o f mate ri al we ll92
being. Second, it discursively excluded political action by those who might oppose this conception of
government action, as opposition to consensus, self-interest and the attainment of material security
was illogical, churlish or unequivocally dangerous. Consensus was the framework that Hawke
attempted to apply to both the Bicentenary and to Anzac, but it was the unpolitical Anzac afte r the
reconciliation with Vietnam veterans that proved to be the more successful nationalist discourse, as
contestation of Anzac was now taboo.
The Ha ke Go er
e t’s Policy Challe ges
The following briefly introduces some of the policy challenges that the Hawke government faced. In
many ways, these policy challenges destabilised the Australian Settlement in the areas of the
domestic economy, international trade and defence policy, and multiculturalism. Further, the
dismantling of the Australian Settlement destabilised conceptions of Australianness base d upon i ts
assumptions.
The Economy
Hawke presided over a period of significant domestic economic turbulence. The recession which
brought him to power in 1983, and its mildly Keynesian expansionist res ponse, mutated into a
balance of payments crisis by 1985, a speculative boom in the second half the 1980s, and agai n i nto
crisis with the recession of 1991-92. These crises brought about a radical change in perspective
regarding the governability of the national economy and the Hawke government responded to thi s
by applying neo-liberal economic principles, which saw the post-war economic consensus, and its
associated state-driven and expansionist policy prescription to economic management, as the
problem.
At the macro-economic level, the government found early in its term that the financial regulation
which had underpinned the post-war Keynesian consensus was becoming increasingly difficult to
manage (Kelly 1994, 80-83). In response, the government decided to take a hands-off approach to
the governing of finance and floated the dollar and abolished controls over the exchange rate in
December 1983. Further changes occurred in 1984/85 with the abandonment of interest rate
controls and the opening of the Australian market to foreign banks (Bell 1997, 143-144). The
opening up of the economy forced market discipline upon the government, and the Accord, whi ch
originally had served a mildly expansionist purpose with its promise of compensating wage restrai nt
with an increase to the social wage, became increasingly a tool with which the ALP exercised
discipline over the labour movement. The argument was that Australia needed to improve its
93
international competitiveness and the Accord became a vehicle for wage moderation (Bell 1997,
186-
. Ha i g said that, the A o d also efle ted the ALP s la ou ist oots, d i e as it as
the professed end goal of enabling economic growth to ensure the security of all (Johnson 1989, 98).
Furthering the hands-off, deregulationist, policy initiatives at the macro-economic level was the
interrelated opening up of the micro-economy of Australia in the 1980s. Bell (1997) argues that thi s
took the form of substantial tariff cuts to the historically heavily protected Australian manufacturing
sector. Further, sectoral reform aimed at opening up these areas of the economy to marke t force s
by applying privatisation, corporatisation and cost reduction (Bell 1997, 216). Some of the costs
associated with these reforms were mediated through an industry policy that was ai me d at e asi ng
the pain of sectoral reform and encouraging growth in new, value -added industries, in combi nation
with an international trade policy that argued for international tariff reduction. However, these
changes also decimated Aust alia s
a ufa tu i g se to a d little o u ed to epla e it ith the
elaborately transformed manufactures that underpinned many competing Western and emerging
Asian economies.
Foreign and Defence Policy
The 1980s and early
s
as a ti e he the i te atio al o te t, a d Aust alia s pla e ithi it,
was radically changing too. The economic reform outlined above entailed the opening up of the
Australian economy to international economic forces, but there was no guarantee the national
economy would automatically benefit from international trade. The problem became economic
security, and the imperative was the creation of an internationally competitive national economy i n
order to secure national prosperity (Hindess 1998, 220-221). It was this pursuit of security that
d o e the Ha ke go e
e t s e gage e t
ith the i te atio al
a ketplace, in order to
capitalise on the competitive advantages that Australia naturally had and abandon those which were
holding competitive ad a tage a k. Thus, p ote tio fo Aust alia s i dust
as u ilate all
wound back in order to open up Australian industry to international competition in order to re duce
the drain on government. New markets were sought in Asia for Australian goods and service s, as i t
was recognised that relying on the traditional imperial trading links could no longer ensure
prosperity. Multilateral activism within the Eighth (Uruguay) Round of GATT negotiati ons was al so
undertaken, in order to pursue global trade reform towards free markets. This was especially
important for Australian agricultural producers – an area where Australia was identified as havi ng a
competitive advantage in the global marketplace (Higgott 1992, 134).
94
Ha ke s te
i offi e also oi ided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War. The
problem of the US defeat in the Vietnam War and its withdrawal from the region was still being
grappled with by defence planners when the Hawke government came to power in 1983
(Cheeseman 1992, 63). The Dibb report of 1986, and the subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper,
iti ised the old defe e do t i e of fo
a d defe e i suppo t of allies i dista t la ds to e su e
Australian security. To replace it was defence self-reliance, with a greater focus on the de fe nce of
o ti e tal Aust alia, a eo ie tatio of Aust alia s defe e postu e to the o th of the o ti e t,
a d a e phasis o Aust alia s o
it e t to the UN, i te atio al la , a d ultilate al solutio s
to international conflicts. This was, however, still firmly within the context of ANZUS, and in August
1990 Hawke quickly reverted to old patterns of forward defence when he committed Australian
naval ships to the Gulf War. This commitment was ostensibly due to a phone call from US Preside nt
Bush, though it seems clear that the decision to commit Australian personnel was reached before
this pho e all Co k u
,
, e oki g e o ies of Aust alia s e thusias to joi the Viet a
War. Further, defence planners faced funding restrictions that meant that defence procurement did
not match the ambition of the defence self-reliance policy documents (Cheeseman 1992, 76). These
instances demonstrate that whilst the ALP pursued multilateralism and supported international
organisations he atte pti g to e su e Aust alia s t adi g ad a tage, its defe e pla
i g as fa
more circumspect and tended to remain true to previous defence traditions.
Multiculturalism and National Identity
The changes to the Australian Settlement outlined above contributed to the changing support base
and make-up of the ALP. The removal of tariffs, the privatisation and/or contraction of governme nt
services and utilities, and the drive towards a service orientated economy, created significant
economic hardship fo the ALP s t aditio al,
ele to alis that d o e the ALP du i g Ha ke s te
ale a d lue-collar base. Further, the catch-all
i offi e Jae s h
led the ALP to seek out
a broad coalition of interest groups and supporters, and attempt to reconcile the competing
demands of its working class base, its progressive middle class, supporters, and the spe ci fic pol i cy
concerns of ethnic constituencies which made up a significant proportion of its electoral support i n
certain capital city seats (Jupp 2000).
However, the Hawke government faced tensions regarding the rate of immigration and
multiculturalism in the climate of economic difficulty. In 1984, historian Geoffrey Blai ne y i gnited a
race debate in Australia by questioning the rate of Asian immig atio a d the Aust alia pu li s
ability to integrate these new communities, and in 1988, Opposition leader John Howard questioned
95
the rate of Asian immigration, and expressed his preference to slow it if it began to thre ate n soci al
cohesion. The release of Immigration: a Commitment to Australia (the Fitzgerald report), which had
p o pted Ho a d s e a ks, also ide tified sig ifi a t o
u it o e
a out the i
i g atio
program and government failure to guide public opinion. The report noted that [i]t is the Australian
identity that matters most in Australia.
And if the Government will affirm that strongly,
multiculturalism might seem less divisive and threatening (Committee to Advise on Australia's
Immigration Policies 1988, 10-11).
The report recommended a reorientation of the immigration
program to more sharply reflect the national interest and emphasised the commitments that
immigrants were obliged to undertake as Australian residents. More specifically, and amongst other
recommendations, the report advised that immigrant selection methods needed a competitive and
economic focus, involving the selection of skilled, entrepreneurial and youthful immigrants with
competent English skills who could contribute to the process of economic reform ( Committee to
Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies 1988, 90).
In response, the government released The National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: sharing our
future policy document in 1989. The report emphasised economic imperatives, noting that it was
developed in the context of economic restraint and with efficiency in mind (Office of Mul ti cul tural
Affairs 1989, v). Multiculturalism had three dimensions:
1. cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to e xpre ss and
share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion;
2. social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and opportuni ty, and the
removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth;
and
3. economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilize effectively the skills and
talents of all Australians, regardless of background (Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989, vii).
But multiculturalism also had limits – as Jakubowicz (1989, 263-264) has noted, the state in Australia
has played a particularly important role in patrolling and policing the acceptable borders and l i mi ts
of national identity, both in a direct and coercive manner for immigrants, but also in terms which
ha e sig alled lea l to hite Aust alia … hat it ea s to e a a epta le Aust alia . Thus, the
poli
do u e t oted that
ulti ultu al poli ies a e ased upo the p e ise that al l Aust al i a s
should have an overriding commitment to Australia, to its i te ests a d futu e fi st a d fo e ost
(Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989, vii), which translated to acceptance of basic liberal civic virtues,
in addition to an individual commitment to the liberalisation of the economy. Thus, the new agen da
96
for multiculturalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s had two core components – first, the state s
liberal toleration of difference, in return for acquiescence to the liberal v alues of the state; and
second, the need for multiculturalism and the immigration program to reflect the economic
imperatives of the late 1980s.
The Competitive Australian
In sum, the 1980s saw a radical shift in the political economy of Australia and its place in a changi ng
world, and this change had profound effects for the conception of Australian national identi ty. The
changing rationality of rule regarding the governability of the national economy in the context of
globalising markets and the attendant discourse of economic insecurity and crisis meant that the
Hawke government strove to open up the Australian economy to the forces of the marketplace in
order to impose economic efficiency and encourage international competitiveness. National identity
needed to change to accommodate this shift – no longer could Australia be inward looking, parochial
or overtly racist. Thus, the solution for the Hawke government during this period was to pl ace the
ethnically diverse, cosmopolitan, competitive, and self-maximising, individual working towards the
economic good of the nation-state at the e t e of Aust alia
atio al ide tit . The o
Aust alia featu ed as a dis ipli i g dis ou se of atio al ide tit a d pu pose. I
it e t to
ig a ts ho
could meet this need would be welcomed regardless of ethnicity, and Australian residents of all
ethnic and class backgrounds were called upon to take up this new challenge as their patriotic duty.
Multi ultu alis he e efle ted the te sio that the ALP s at h-all imperative drew out, as it sought
to discipline the various groups who supported the ALP, and their policy demands.
Attempting to put the Competitive Australian into Practice: The Bicentennial
Ha ke atte pted to
o ilise the dis ou se of
o
it e t to Aust alia a d the o petiti e
Australian during the Bicentennial, but was largely unsuccessful in national consensus building. The
occasion was riven by political contestation and Hawke consequently found it difficult to find
universal values to base consensus upon. Preparations for the 1988 Bicentenary were characterised
from the start by disagreement and contestation as to the meaning of the day (Warhurst 1987, 9).
The Australian Bicentennial Authority (ABA), as the primary organising authority of the Bicentennial ,
had tried to balance the competing and contested demands of the day - the desire to celebrate the
successes of the nation and the need to acknowledge the unequal power relationships that these
successes were built upon and represented. This tension provided ammunition for critics dissatisfied
ith the ABA s app oach to the organisation and marking of the day. From the right, conservative
critics levelled claims that the ABA was unnecessarily playing down the success and achievement of
97
the atio i the past
ea s a d that Aust alia s ke
ultu al alues e e eing lost or attacke d.
These subverted and marginalised values included the British connection and monarchy,
Westminster democracy, liberal freedoms and even the Anzac tradition. To replace them, the
o se ati e
iti s a gued,
as a isio of …Aust alia as a land of incoherent diversity without
u if i g t aditio s a d alues Hut hi so
,
. F o left lea i g iti s a e a opposi g se t
of challenges to the event:
Critiques of the commercialisation of public rituals, of the anti-democratic nature of such mass
celebrations, of the tactlessness of celebrating white settlement at all, of the Philistinism
inherent in a popular rather than a more highbrow calendar of events, of the predictability and
repressiveness of the dominant discourses used to represent Australian nationalism – all
provided potentially powerful angles of analysis, no matter what form the Bicentenary
ultimately took (Turner 1994, 70).
Most prominent and powerful of all the critiques, however, was the challenge to the day pose d by
Indigenous Australians – the ancestors of those who had been dispossessed of their land by the
white settlement of Australia in 1788 and who continued to face discrimination and disadvantage i n
the contemporary context.
The role of Indigenous Australians in the Bicentennial celebration proved to be a significant
challenge to official, state-driven discourses of Australianness. As Hage (2002, 421) notes, the
origins of Australia as a white nation, and the accompanying genocidal practices which e stab l ishe d
hite hege o
th oughout the o ti e t, hau t the Aust alia ps he. Whe I dige ous
Australians do challenge white political and cultural dominance in Australia, it proves to be an
uncomfortable reminder of past injustice for those Australians whose wealth and political
dominance relies upon these constitutive genocidal actions. The Bicentennial prove d to be one of
those occasions where the collective attention of the nation was forced to focus on the colonial
violence that had established the Australian state. As a consequence, Spillman (1997, 114-115)
otes Aust alia o ga ize s a oided talk of the fi st settle e t the
ee o
e o ati g e ause
they feared, from the beginning, the opposition it would evoke from Aboriginal acti vists and the i r
suppo te s,
ho alled Aust alia Da
I
asio Da
a d de o st ated a o di gl . Fu the , the
organisers were anxious that the occasion would draw appropriate, and legitimating, i nternati onal
attention (Spillman, 1997 107-108), and these international observers were politely interested in
how Australia was addressing these past injustices. The significance of the occasion, coupl ed wi th
the international attention, therefore gave Aboriginal activists the opportunity to challenge the
meaning of the Bicentennial in a very public forum.
98
The public challenge to the Bicentenary centred on two marches in support of Indigenous rights and
in opposition to an optimistic and uncritical celebration of the day - one march solely for Indigenous
participants, and one march that included both Indigenous participants and their supporters. Issue s
of consequence which were being contested in these marches included land rights, continued
Indigenous disadvantage and discrimination, and the rejection of the Bicentennial as a cel e brati on,
and its competing representation as a year of Mourning. As Turner (1994, 87) argues, the protests
by Indigenous Australians and their supporters on Australia Day 1988 helped to problematise the
conception of Australianness and open it up to a more contested, ambiguous and just form.
This contested, ambiguous sense of national identity presented a problem for Hawke and the
utilisation of his standard consensus discourse. This problem was two-fold – firstly, the occasion had
descended into at times ugly partisan squabble over the right way to celebrate (or comme morate )
the event. As mentioned, conservative critics from within and outside the Coalition, but largely
li i g up alo g pa t li es, had halle ged the ALP s o ga isatio of the o asio . The ALP had
helped to engender this sense of partisanship by removing, or failing to renew, the service of several
Fraser-era ABA board members, the general manager, and the chairman of the board, and instead
replacing them with people of their own choosing. Further, the Authori ty placed under closer
government supervision in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Warhurst 1987, 16-17).
Secondly, was the question of how to incorporate the experiences, values and expe ctations of the
ALP s t aditio all so iall o se ati e blue-collar base, its multicultural immigrant support base ,
and its middle class progressive supporters. Despite the challenges faced by Indigenous Australians
in translating their small numbers into electoral clout, their experiences and demands were
especially important in this coalition. As such, they challenged the relatively stable negotiated
settlement between ALP constituencies, as the constitutive genocidal acts which had established the
white settlement of Australia, and the consequently unequal power relationship this had
established, were acknowledged.
The difficulty for Hawke was finding universal values upon which to establish consensus. As
Co h a e a d Good a
,
poi t out [t]he Bi e te a
ould ha e ee fa less t i g had
it come at a high point in the Menzies era: then we could have had a solid statement of good
government, cultural homogeneit a d o se sus. The idea of
se u e. Ha ke settled o a o
atio , then, was ontologically
it e t to Aust alia a ti ipati g the Fitzgerald report) as be i ng
the universalising value of Australianness and frequently asserted this during the Bicentenary events
as the only universally defining feature of an Australian. On the steps of the Opera House in Sydne y
99
on Australia Day 1988, Hawke gave his set speech to Australia regarding the meaning of the
Bicentenary, and the commitment to Australia theme featured prominently in a hierarchy of
importance. Hawke began this address by saying:
We begin these celebrations in no spirit of boastfulness or national self-glorification.
This is a day of commemoration.
E e
But,
o e i po ta t, it is a da of o
it e t…
fello Aust alia s, toda I use the
od
o
it e t i a spe ial se se.
For, our commitment to Australia is, in a very real way, the quality which best defines what it
means to be an Australian in 1988 (Hawke 1988a, 1-2).
In reference to the contestation of the occasion posed by Indigenous Australians, soberness in
remembrance of past (unnamed) injustice is present, justified as appropriate, and in turn, crass
jingoism is also rejected as an option. However, commemoration is placed as a lesser value to
o
it e t
the h pota is of the lauses,
before the following ai
alig i g of o
lause it is a da of o
ith the su o di ate lause e e
o e i po ta t
it e t . This is further emphasised by Ha ke s
it e t to a spe ial a d est definition of Australianness. A hierarchy of meaning
was being created by Hawke for the purpose of subordinating the contestation of the day to
Ha ke s o
essage of o
it e t, a d I dige ous eje tio of the o asio is u
e tio ed.
Hawke continued his speech by listing a set a characteristics and values which linked Australia of
1988 to its past:
What is it that li ks us…?
It is not only the fact that, for the past 200 years, and to this day, we have been a nation of
immigrants.
It is not only the fact that we share together this vast continent as our homeland.
It is not only the shared inheritance of all that has been built here, over the past 200 years.
And it is not only the common bond of institutions, standards, language and culture.
I deed, i toda s Aust alia, ou e
and strength of our community.
di e sit is a e e g o i g sou e of the i h ess, italit
It is true that all these things I have mentioned go to shape the Australian character and define
the Australian identity (Hawke 1998a, 2-3).
Here, Hawke listed the concerns and expectations of other groups competing for recognition i n the
Bicentena . Eth i g oups a d i
ig a ts e e assu ed that ou e di e sit is a e e g o i g
sou e of the i h ess, italit a d st e gth of ou o
iti s as atte pted
the efe e e to the o
o
u it . A effo t to pla ate o se ati e
o d of i stitutions, standards, language and
100
ultu e . Ho e e , the atte pt to i o po ate o peti g i te ests i to the
ea i g of the
Bicentenary implicitly acknowledged the contestation of the occasion and failed to meet the criteri a
of a universalising message. Hawke attempted to overcome this problem by again subordinating
these competing claims to the commitment to Australia. As Spillman (1997, 126; emphasi s adde d)
has oted [o]ga ize s [of the Bi e te a ] adopted heto i a d p og a s hi h lai ed di e sit
as characteristic of national identity, and addressed especially those groups from whom they feared
iti is … ha a terizing the nation as diverse was a central rhetorical strategy for representing
unity a oss diffe e e. Ha ke fi ished his add ess
e phasisi g this u it a oss diffe e e:
Yet beyond them, there remains one vital factor in the answer to the question: Who is an
Australian?
And that factor is: A commitment to Australia and its future.
It is that common commitment which binds the Australian-born of the seventh or eighth
generation and all those of their fellow-Australians born in any of the 130 countries from
which our peoples are drawn.
In Australia, there is no hierarchy of descent; there must be no privilege of origin.
The commitment is all.
The commitment to Australia is the only thing needful to be a true Australian.
Today in this historic place and at this historic hour, let us renew that commitment, our
o
it e t to Aust alia a d Aust alia s ause – the cause of freedom, fairness, justice and
peace (Hawke 1988a, 3-4).
Commitment here served as a universalising value, but it also neutralised critique and flattened
difference. Significant political and competing claims, whilst for the most part not rejected outright,
were, subordinate to the message of commitment, and their contestation was not al l owed to spi l l
over into the assumed meaning of the occasion or of Australianness. This revealed a tensi on i n the
logic of the competitive Australian - whilst Australia may have been diverse, and whi l e Austral ians
may have disagreed, Australians were all still somehow worki ng towards the same end goal. This
goal was left deliberately vague and presented as a set of uncontroversial liberal democratic
ideographs – the ause of f eedo , fai ess, justi e a d pea e .
The connection to neoliberal economic reform and the competitive Australian was made more
e pli it i Ha ke s add ess to the Natio al P ess Clu fou da s p io to Aust alia Da a d i his
release to the media for Australia Day, 1988. On both occasions he referred explicitly to the way
Australians had met the challenges posed by economic reform:
101
The world has seen that Australians are a people of great courage and determination who are
unafraid of meeting a challenge. We can all feel proud of our country, for whether it is in
matters of domestic economy, in the international arena, the arts, science, medicine, or on the
spo ts field, e ha e p o ed ti e a d agai that Aust alia s a e a hie e s…
Aust alia s su essful p og ess i to the t e t fi st e tu depe ds so u h o the effo ts of
every single Australian, regardless of our origins, wherever we live (Hawke, 1988a, 1).
And:
The reality is that our prosperity will not be handed to us on a platter. We will have to match
and better the productivity, the product quality, the creativity and the entrepreneurial flair of
the o ld s est a oss all se tio s of the e o o , e e those ot di e tl e gaged i t ade.
This is a task for all of us. It is not one we can take lightly. It is one which can be facilitated by
the actions of Government but in the end must be executed by individuals (Hawke 1988b, 8).
Thus, the success of Australia depended on the republican commitment of Australians to the i r ci vi c
dut , all of us a d e e
si gle Aust alia . Whilst not all Australians could be expected to
contribute to the fields of arts, science or sports, all Australians could be called upon to ensure
economic productivity – e e those ot di e tl e gaged i t ade . This as pa t of the sol uti o to
the problem of economic security identified by Hindess (1998, 223, emphasis added):
The pursuit of national economic security now seems to require that an overwhelming priority
be placed on competitive economic efficiency. As a result, anything (welfare, health services,
schooling and higher education) which might seem to have a bearing on economic life is
assessed not only in terms of the availability of resources, but also in terms of their
consequences for promoting or inhibiting the pursuit of national economic efficiency. Thus, in
hat is ofte see as a e o o i atio alist o eo-li e al atta k o the elfa e state, the
concern is not simply to save money but also to promote more efficient patterns of individual
and organisational behaviour by bringing market relationships into what had once been
regarded as non-market spheres of allocation.
Thus, the competitive Australian was to be always in the entrepreneurial search of a way to
monetise their actions, in order to ensure the prosperity of the nation. The commitment to the
economic health and vitality of the nation was the lesson of the Bicentenary.
The difficulties Hawke, and the Bicentennial, faced should not be overstated. Many Australians
participated in the Australia Day celebrations – by watching the tall ships enter Sydney Harbour,
listening to the speeches made by Prince Charles, Hawke and the Governor General Sir Ninian
Martin Stephen at Bennelong Point, spending the day on boats or the on foreshore around the
harbour, or watching the fireworks and entertainment that ended official proce edings in the
evening. By some estimations, one and half million crowded into Sydney on January 26th to
participate in the events (Turner 1994, 70). As Turner (1994, 71) notes:
102
There is overwhelming evidence from the press, television, film and radio talkback that
Australians participated in large numbers in Australia Day 1988 and experienced that
pa ti ipatio as a sou e of deep atio al p ide a d e hila atio … fo a Aust alia s the
Bicentenary produced a moving spectacle, moments of genuine pride and in some cases even
gestures toward a reconciliation of the great contradiction at the heart of nationhood
[reconciliation with indigenous Australians].
Ha ke s g appli g ith the o peti g a d o t adi to
lai s
ade
pa ti ipa ts o the da
also reflected some this success. By representing diversity as unity, Hawke was able to fal l back on
his tried and tested discourse of consensus – that the differences that divided Australians we re l e ss
important than the similarities, values and goals that united the national community. Hawke was
also a le to use the o asio to elati el f eel p o ote the go e
e t s poli
age da, a d hi s
conception of national identity and purpose with the competitive Australian. Additionally, some of
the sense of occasion that the Bicentenary presented rubbed off on Hawke as Prime Minister.
Further, the occasion had some success in opening up and challenging conceptions of
Australianness:
Active inclusion of non-British immigrants, and indigenous Australians, was sought by
government and community groups organising the Bicentenary. While those of British
ancestry remained culturally and politically dominant, events, publications, advertising and
festivities were aimed at, and reflected, a decreasingly British multicultural population
Pea so a d O Neill
,
.
As such, the Bicentenary should not be presented as an unmitigated failure at producing a se nse of
national occasion or that it was rejected by the public.
However, the Bicentenary did prove to be a difficult national occasion for Hawke. Firstly, this was
due to the i a ilit of Ha ke to ele ate the a tual e e t that as ei g a ked the l a di g of
white settlers in 1788) due to the devastation that this had wrought upon Indigenous Australians.
The inability to celebrate the origins of the nation raised the question as to what was being marke d
at all. This ambiguity was efle ted i Ha ke s Aust alia Da add ess, as he st uggled to i o po ate
an acceptable meaning for the day, as he lacked the fa ilia a d ide tifia l
Aust alia
a d
nationalist values that litter Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. Instead, Australians were
implored to make a commitment to Australia, with all the attendant materialistic implications of that
appeal, or to a set of uncontroversial, but hardly deeply nationalist, liberal democratic values as the
over-riding value to be celebrated. Secondly, however, the prominent and public contestation that
A o igi al a ti ist a ti it posed ea t that Ha ke s eso t to his consensus discourse fe lt hol low
and misplaced. As Indigenous Australians and their supporters marched through the city on
Aust alia Da , the pu li all
halle ged a
settled o
it e t to Aust alia a d its futu e . As
103
such, the Bicentennial proved to be a difficult and challenging national occasion for Hawke, one
encumbered by contestation over the origins of the nation and its current and future direction. The
next section will explore how the newly unpolitical discourse of Anzac did not face these s ame
problems.
Ha ke’s A zac – a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis
The follo i g se tio p ese ts so e data o Ha ke s A za Da add esses. Ha ke s add esses
were infrequent over his time in office, and only became regular from 1989. Hawke largely
conformed to the Anzac tradition in his speeches, though the protean natu re of his Anzac
entrepreneurship saw some of his addresses closely resemble a regular policy speech, and l ack the
high rhetoric and nationalism of his successors.
The Sites of Ha ke s A za Day Addresses
Hawke gave five Anzac Day addresses, and released one media statement during his term as Pri me
Mi iste . ‘efle ti g Ha ke s e e gi g A za e t ep e eu ship, a d the sig ifi a e of the
reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the Australian body politic, these speeches are cluste red i n
the last years of his term.
Year
Type
1984
One media release
1986
One speech
1989
One speech
1990
Two speeches
1991
One speech
Figure 13 – List of Ha ke s A za Day Add esses a d Media “tate e ts
Ha ke s spee hes
e e deli e ed i Aust alia and overseas. 1986 saw him deliver an address in
Greece, and he gave two speeches at Gallipoli for the 75 th anniversary of the landings in 1990.
Hawke did not go to significant sites of war remembrance in Australia, and instead delivered
addresses at the Heidelberg Repatriation Hospital in Melbourne on Anzac Day eve in 1989, and in
Darwin at the opening of a naval gymnasium in 1991. This was in contrast to his successors, who
delivered Anzac Day addresses almost exclusively at significant Australian-based and foreign sites of
Australian war remembrance, again reflecting the emerging norms of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day
addresses during this time.
104
The Location of Ha ke s Anzac
Ha ke s o eptio of he e A za
as lo ated as st o gl i flue ed
he e he as deli e i g
his speech, and what the context of that speech. Unlike his successors, Hawke did not evange li se a
particular war or site of Anzac, like Keating did with Kokoda and WWII, and Howard tended to do
with Gallipoli and WWI. As such, WWII (four out of five total mentions in the Hawke corpus) and the
Gulf War (all four mentions in the entire corpus featuring all Prime Ministers) feature in his 1991
address, as he honoured the service of ADF personnel who had served in the recent Gulf conflict,
and paid tribute to the Indigenous people who had served in World War II and who had not received
just recompense for that service. WWI is strongly alluded to in his 1990 addre sses at Gallipoli, but
only gains two named mentions in 1989.
The attle sites of Ha ke s A za Da add esses e e sed this te de
. Gallipoli do i ated his
addresses with seventeen named mentions, and other WWI sites are also predominant – France
(two mentions), Flanders, Lone Pine and Villers-Bretonneux (all one mention). The location and
context is also important here, as he also referenced Crete and Greece in his 1986 Athe ns addre ss,
and contemporary peacekeeping operations in 1989 and 1991. WWII sites did feature, but less
prominently – Greece (two mentions) and Crete (three mentions), Kokoda, El Alamein, Kokoda, Coral
Sea, Tobruk and the Burma Railway (all one mention each). Hawke also referenced Vietnam and
Long Tan in his 1989 address, and was the only Prime Minister to give that war any substantive
space in his addresses. Again, this reflected the context Hawke was working within, as he continue d
to endorse the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans and the Australian public.
Ha ke s Agents of Anzac
Ha ke s age ts of A za te ded to efle t u it a oss di e sit
“pill a
,
. The
references to the Gulf War in his 1991 address saw the proliferation of the conjoined gendered
nouns men and women (with seven out eight total gendered noun
e tio s i Ha ke s o pus ,
again reflecting the context that Hawke delivered his speeches in. The gender diversity of the
contemporary ADF necessitated such reference, but the fact that Hawke never in isolation
mentioned the gendered noun women, or the service type nursing, demonstrated that he was
unwilling to radically reformulate the masculine nature of Anzac.
Hawke was better at referencing diversity when discussing ethnicity. He was the only Prime Minister
in the corpus to refer to Indigenous Australians as agents of Anzac in an Anzac Day address. His Lone
Pi e add ess i
also efe e ed the di e sit of A za s age ts, a d thei u it despite that
105
difference, via their commitment to Australia. However, references to the diversity of Anz a s
age ts do ot featu e f e ue tl i Ha ke s A za Da add esses, a d he did ot e i agi e A za
with diversity as a central theme.
The Attributes of Ha ke s Anzac Agents
The att i utes of A za s age ts that Ha ke pe ei ed fu the ei fo es the otion that he di d not
radically reimagine Anzac, as the attributes he most frequently cited were closely aligned to the
Anzac tradition – sacrifice, courage, heroism and service.
Attributes
Frequency
Sacrifice
9
Courage/bravery
8
Heroism
4
Service/duty
3
Tenacity/perseverance
3
Debt Owed
2
Australianness
2
Suffering
1
Egalitarianism
1
Mateship
4
Comradeship
1
Ingenuity
1
Humour
1
Resourcefulness
1
Energy
1
Professionalism
1
Figure 14 – List of the F e ue y of Me tio s of the Att i utes of Age ts of A za i Ha ke s A za Day Add esses
Such a reading of Anzac reinforced its status as an ideograph, calling upon the public to re me mbe r
and honour the memory of those who had fought and died, but also providing the signifying
backbone to the new lessons of Anzac that Hawke filled his 1990 addresses with regarding
neoliberalism and Australian identity.
106
In sum, Hawke engaged with Anzac Day every year after 1988 until being ousted as Prime Minister in
December 1991. The speeches in 1989 and 1991 were prosaic and wide -ranging, covering a numbe r
of themes and Hawke government policy initiatives, and closely resembled the structure and style of
Ha ke s egula pu li poli
spee hes, de o st ati g the e
o i
atu e of P i e Mi i ste i al
Anzac Day addresses. However, as befits the significance of the 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli
landings, the 1990 Anzac Day addresses spoke more about the lessons that current Australians could
learn from the diggers and the meaning of the values that they embodied. The ideographi c nature
of Anzac in his 1990 addresses had both instrumental and constitutive consequences for Anzac as a
e t al Aust alia
atio alist dis ou se. As su h, Ha ke s A za e t ep e eu ship p ese ted a
universalising and celebratory form of Australian nationalism and national identity in the face of the
increasing problematisation of these forms of national identity.
Ha ke’s A zac Day Addresses: The Competitive Australian and Success with Anzac as
Ideograph
Anzac did not face the same difficulties that the Bicentenary faced after the 1987 welcome home
pa ade fo Viet a
ete a s, a d Ha ke as a le to e plo his o
it e t to Aust alia dis ou se
without difficulty. This was for two main reasons; firstly, the newly reconciled, depoliticised and
unpolitical Anzac that had arisen from the reincorporation of Vietnam veterans into the community
of Australian servicemen and women meant that powerful taboos existed to sanction conte stati on
of the nature present during the Bicentenary. Social movement activism like that of the early 1980 s,
such as WAR protests, had largely fallen away in the later years of the decade as activists concl ude d
that su h pu li halle ges … ould alie ate o e s
path tha it att a ted I glis
,
-442).
Secondly, and linked to the newly unpolitical and incontestable nature of Anzac, was the
ontologically secure nature of the birth of the Australian nation at Gallipoli and the val ue s that the
sacrificed diggers embodied. Unlike the Bicentenary, where the constitutive genocidal acts of whi te
settlers powerfully challenged any settled and just conception of the birth of the Australian nation or
national values and lessons for the present, the heroic sacrifice of Australian diggers at Gallipoli was
newly safe from such contestation (McKenna 2010, 121). As such, Anzac entrepreneurship by
Hawke was more secure than the Bicentenary had been as a forum to espouse Australian
nationalism.
Anzac Day Eve, 1989 – Our Debt Owed to Our Veterans
On Anzac Day eve,
, Ha ke ga e a ide a gi g spee h o his go e
ega di g ete a s affai s to a g oup atte di g the ope i g of a e
e t s a hie e e ts
i g to a epat iatio hospi tal
107
in Heidelberg, Melbourne. It was a largely prosaic affair, closely resembling any number of other
Hawke policy or interest group speeches, and addressed the concerns of the broad ex -se rvice me n
and women community, including newly reconciled Vietnam veterans after the 1987 welcome home
parade. The speech began by arguing that Anzac Day was an occasion where Australians were
o liged to … epa the de t e o e ou ete a s Ha ke
,
. The de ts o ed i thi s spe e h
centred on three main obligations, some more prosaic, some more symbolic – an obl i gati on to the
health of veterans, an obligation to Vietnam veterans, and an obligation to the original digge rs who
landed at Gallipoli and to the sense of Australianness that they defined.
Fi stl , Ha ke e plo ed the o asio
i st u e tall
to outli e his go e
achievements i the a ea of ete a s affai s. This as f a ed
veterans – … ith the ope i g of this e
dete
e t s poli
the de t that Aust alia s o ed
a d he e at Heidel e g, e a e de o st ati g a e ou
i atio to epa that de t as full as e a
Ha ke
,
. This involved an obligation to
ensure the health of ex-service personnel through the provision and upgrading of repatriation
hospitals, with Hawke outlining government spending on new facilities and equipment at
Heidelberg. Due to speculation about the continued existence of the Department of Veterans
Affairs, Hawke also made a commitment to the continued operation of the Department and to onl y
continue with a policy proposal to integrate repatriation hospitals with the state healthcare systems
with the consent of the RSL, reflecting the consensual approach that Hawke took with regards to
policy making and his alignment of this approach with his use of Anzac.
Secondly, the speech was an opportunity to remind the gathered audience of the taboos
surrounding the newly reincorporated and reconciled Vietnam veterans:
I ha e al a s ade it lea that hate e s o e s ie s a out the o t o e s that su ou ded
the Vietnam War, no one can ever doubt the commitment and the courage of the Australian
soldiers who were called upon to fight it.
I was very pleased to attend the Welcome Home Parade in Sydney in October 1987, which, at
last, gave fitting honours to the men who fought there (Hawke 1989, 3).
Ha ke s state e t ega di g the se i e of Viet a
unambiguous – I ha e
ade it lea ;
ete a s is once again declarative and
o o e a e e dou t – signalling that the terms of the
reconciliation and reincorporation of Vietnam veterans is non-negotiable. Hawke furthe r outl ined
that his government had pledged $200,000 towards the construction of the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial, and encouraged others to contribute towards its construction. The mention of Vi etnam
veterans is notable, as Hawke here still prioritised the explicit and active inclusion of Vietnam
108
veterans into official and state-driven discourses of Anzac. This is notable due to the conspicuous
su li atio o a se e of Viet a
ete a s pa ti ula a d p o le ati e pe ie e of a afte thi s
point in Prime Ministerial discourses of Anzac.
Finally, Hawke announced that the government had agreed to assist a group of very elderly Gallipol i
ete a s to ake the pilg i age to Gallipoli fo the
th
anniversary of the landings:
Next year, we will be celebrating the 75th anniversary of the event that in many ways still
defines the Australian identity and consciousness – the landing by the ANZACs at Gallipoli.
This will be an anniversary that Australians will want to mark with dignity and special
awareness of its significance.
It is not too early to begin now our planning of how we should honour that occasion.
… e ha e ag eed that the e ould e o o e fitti g a fo the atio to ho ou the
achievements of these veterans, and of recalling the sacrifices of their comrades-in-arms, than
to send a pa t of ete a s a k to A za Co e o A za Da ,
ea s afte the fi st la di g…
In addition, I feel that it would be appropriate for me as Prime Minister to attend this
ceremony – and might I add, I would also find it deeply moving in a personal sense to be
there. (Hawke 1989, 4).
Again, debt is the theme which characterised Ha ke s o
it e t. The Gallipoli ete a s a e to e
ho ou ed , fo thei se i e a d sa ifi e. The i po ta e of the la di gs la s i the a it still
defines the Australia ide tit a d o s ious ess and Hawke himself endorsed the occasion with his
emotive commitment to attend.
Thus, this Anzac Day address was fairly prosaic and largely indistinguishable from any othe r Hawke
policy advocate (Grube 2013, 52-53) address. It was given to a group of people unremarkable
enough to not be given any mention in the press release of the text of the speech, or the one me di a
report located on the speech in The Australian (Hannan 1989, 2). It was given in an unremarkable
location and for an unremarkable occasion – the opening of a new wing to a hospital. It l acke d the
pomp, sanctity and sense of occasion now usually attached to Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses
or the hallowed locations of Australian war remembrance. The speech demonstrates that Prime
Ministerial engagement with Anzac had not yet become institutionalised and that the parameters of
engagement were still flexible and porous. It did, however, set up his commitment to Anzac Day
and, in particular, to the 75th anniversary of the landings the following year.
Anzac Day, 1990 – The Commitment is All
1990 saw Hawke keep his promise to the Gallipoli veterans to honour their sacrifice and
achievements by sending 58 of them, himself, the Opposition leade r John Hewson, and a large party
109
of support staff to the Gallipoli peninsula for the April 25 commemoration (Macleod 2002, 154). It
was the single
ost sig ifi a t e e t of Ha ke s A za e t ep e eu ship, a d it esta lished a
pattern of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day remembrance that his successors have drawn upon and
followed. The trip lasted three days, was accompanied by 70 journalists, and consisted of three
Anzac Day ceremonies – a dawn service; a service at Lone Pine; and an international service,
attended by, among others, Hawke, Opposition Leader John Hewson, the President of Turkey Turgut
Özal, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher, the Governor-General of New
Zealand Sir Paul Reeves, the French Secretary of State for Veterans Af fairs and an ambassador from
the Federal Republic of Germany.
Due to the special significance of the occasion, being an anniversary and given the advanced ages of
the su i i g digge s
ho atte ded of age
a d a o e, Ha ke s A za Da add esses a d
interviews did not contain the same prosaic and explicit link to the policy achievements of his
government as his 1989 or 1991 addresses. There was significantly more focus on the meaning of
Anzac Day, how it defined Australianness and Australian values, and lessons that the occasion coul d
teach the present. For the occasion, Hawke fell back on his discourse of the competitive Austral ian
a d the ph ase the o
it e t is all .
The su ess that Ha ke had ith his use of the o
it e t is all
as due to the origin or bi rth of
the values being celebrated being secure, uncontested and unpolitical. In contrast to the
Bicentenary, where the origins and history of events that were being celebrated were publically
contested, and were therefore excised from Hawke s add esses, A za Da
fa ed o su h
problems (McKenna 2010, 121). Several factors fed into the unpolitical nature of the event. Firstl y,
and most importantly, was the newly reconciled, depoliticised and unpolitical sphere of Anzac afte r
reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. Deliberation, in the form of questioning of the continued
relevance of Anzac, was absent, as was questioning of the values that WAR activists purporte d the
day represented, such as hyper-masculinism, militarism, or rape during wartime. Criticism of the
a
i e sa
as la gel li ited to uestio i g of the ost of the e e t a d
(Macleod 2002, 156) or shut down by Hawke (1990a,
te
s of
I thi k ou a t
as little oti ed
easu e these thi gs i
o e . Also de o st ating the unpolitical nature of the event was the bipartisanship that
characterised the trip, with Opposition leader John Hewson being invited along and delivering a
speech at the Lone Pine ceremony (Hewson 1990), which contrasted with the partisan squabbles
that had characterised the planning of the Bicentenary. Another factor was Hawke again casting the
occasion as one where the nation owed a debt to the Anzacs who had fought – We shoul d i ste ad
110
dedicate ourselves – to keeping bright the memory of those men who so unstintingly di d what was
asked of them on our behalf – and to ensuring that the freedom and peace for which they so
ardently yearned, for which they so bravely fought, and for which so many of them so selflessly gave
their lives, shall ot pass (Hawke 1990b, 1). Finally, there was the repeatedly asserted sacredness of
the a
i e sa . Ha ke spoke f e ue tl of pilg i age to Gallipoli o the sa ed ess of the
la ds ape, due to the
a e a d the loodshed of the AN)ACs Ha ke
, 1). These multi pl e
factors combined to draw a line around Anzac and to prevent criticism of the event of the like of the
WAR protests on Anzac Day in the 1980s, or the Aboriginal protests of the Bicentenary.
The settled nature of the trip was also endorsed by the Turkish hosts. Old enemies were now
f ie ds, ith the Tu kish p eside t Özal oti g i his A za Da add ess that [t]he Ca akkal e
a s
have shown that there is no place for hatred and enmity in our ever-narrowing world. The
Canakkale wars are the best example that States, when they sincerely wish it, can establish
f ie dship e e o the fou datio s of past a s (Özal 1990, 2) and Hawke (1990c, 4) remarking
…the
utual espe t et ee ou
atio s
hi h
as fo ged o the attlefields of Gallipoli has
proved to be a sound and enduring foundation for the warm and substantial relationship whi ch has
de eloped et ee us… The t ip thus se ed as a othe e a ple of memorial diplomacy (Grave s
2014), continuing a trend that Hawke had begun with his Anzac Day in Greece in 1986.
Ha ke s A za e t ep e eu ship
as se u e he e e ause the e e ts ei g ele ated, a d the
values that these events embodied, were secure back home too. As Macleod (2002, 155) notes,
although so e
edia epo ts … ade e pli it references to the ambivalence that Anzac Day had
aroused at the time of Vietnam or the old fears that it was glorifying war, this was done not to
o ti ue to uestio , ut to p o ide a o t ast to the assu ed situatio of the p ese t. Thus, The
Australian oted It is p oof pe haps that
e edi g as so
a
ea s o , pu li i te est i Gallipoli is gai i g, ot
had fea ed a d p edi ted. It has etu ed to its o igi al ole as a u if i g fo e
(Kelly and Kershler 1990, 1). Thus, the origins of Anzac, and the events being commemorated and
celebrated, were secure and were being actively encouraged by the Prime Minister and were
accepted as appropriate by the public.
Hawke gave a number of addresses and interviews during the trip, with a number of theme s comi ng
through prominently as lessons for the present. These can be summarised under two headings – the
Australian values that the Anzacs epitomised, particularly mateship and unity in di ve rsity, and the
continued relevance of these values for the prese t da ; a d o e agai , the o
it e t is all
111
ef ai . Ha ke s spee h at Lo e Pi e as the
ost idel
epo ted, a d he e his oi e a ked
with emotion as he finished his speech (Stevens 1990, 6). It was also here that Hawke most
thoroughly expounded upon the lessons Australia could draw upon for the present. As Anzac was
now ostensibly unpolitical, Hawke was free to use Anzac as a sacred, incontestable ideograph
(McGee 1980). Though bound by the genre restrictions of Anzac (mateship, sacrifice, suf fering,
iole e, he ois , pilg i age, a d the i o i ph ase At the goi g do
o i g e
ill e e
e the
a e all
e tio ed i this spee h A za
of the su a d i the
as, at o e, p eg a t
with meaning and significance about national identity, national values and lessons for the pre se nt,
but also vague, unspecific and malleable, too. As Thomson (2013,
otes O e of the easo s fo
the success of the Anzac legend is its plasticity; the story and its meanings stretch and shift wi th the
times and i diffe e t o te ts a d this allea ilit helps e su e popula suppo t.
But, given the recently contested and only newly reconciled nature of Anzac, its contemporary
meaning was not self-evident – it needed explanation:
It is not in the waste of war that Australians find the meaning of Gallipoli – then or now.
I sa
the o
o
fo a p ofou d easo .
The meaning of the ANZAC tradition, forged in the fires of Gallipoli, must be learned anew,
from generation to generation.
Its meaning can endure only as long as each new generation of Australians finds the will to
reinterpret it - to breathe, as it were, new life into the old story: and, in separating the truth
from the legend, realise its relevance to a nation and a people, experiencing immense change
over the past three-quarters of a century (Hawke 1990d, 2).
Ha ke s all to e e the ea i g of A za a d to
eathe, as it e e, e life i to the old sto
,
reflected both the malleable nature of Anzac as ideograph, and the degree of flexibility avai labl e i n
interpreting its contemporary meaning. It actively encouraged remembrance and the renewal of
memory of war.
The lesson being taught is endorsed by the presence of the returning diggers attending the occasion,
whose experience is drawn upon to demonstrate the continued lessons of Anzac:
In the continuing quest for the real meaning of ANZAC, our way is lit by the shining presence
here today of the little band of first ANZACS who have returned.
This is, for all of us here, and for all our fellow Australians at home, an honour, an experience,
an emotion, which goes beyond words.
These men know the truth of Gallipoli.
They would be the last to claim that they were heroes – but indeed they were.
112
They did not pretend to fathom the deep and immense tides of history which brought them to
these shores, at the cross-roads of civilisation, so far from home, so far from all they knew and
loved.
They did not see themselves as holding in their hands the destiny of six mighty empires – all
now vanished.
Nor could they begin to imagine that the vast and terrible forces unleashed upon the world in
1914 would still be working their way through human history 75 years on (Hawke 1990d, 2).
Notable is the lack of oi e the digge s ha e i this spee h, o ,
o e ge e all , i Ha ke s
a
speeches and interviews given during the trip. Whilst the elderly diggers were certainly included i n
proceedings, the job of defining nationhood and the meaning of Anzac had l argely shifted to the
Prime Minister, whose role was emphasised and well-covered. So whilst the el de rly di ggers we re
e tai l p ese t, a d Ha ke s appo t ith the
as oted Hol ook
, 177), their presence
played a supporting role to the amplified essage of politi al elites. The digge s l a k of age
i
Ha ke s spee hes efle ted the shift to a ds a o e elite o ie tated atio alist dis ou se of A za ,
one where political elites such as Hawke, rather than the diggers themselves, spoke on behalf of
veterans and drove the continuing marking and celebration of Anzac. Thus, the uncomfortable
message of the Vietnam veterans during the 1987 welcome home parades, and acknowledged only a
year earlier by Hawke in his 1989 Anzac Day address – that war damages its participants and
continues to do so long after conflict has ended – is lost in a sanitised and official version of the
Anzac tradition centred on the landings at Gallipoli.
Hawke painted a picture of the world of the diggers in order to explain the current meaning of Anzac
circa 1990, which reflected this lack of agency. In 1914/15, great forces were at work in the world,
profoundly changing the glo al ala e of po e . The digge s fou d the sel es at the oss-roads
of i ilisatio ,
he e the fa ilia West
et the fo eig East, so fa f o
Gallipoli, the digge s helped shape the glo al geopoliti s of the e t
the destiny of six mighty empires – all o
ho e . By landing at
ea s, holding in their hands
a ished . But the diggers themselves had little
understanding of their profound role in these changes – the did ot p ete d to fatho
and immense tides of history which brought the
the de e p
to these sho es – with Hawke painting them
instead as humble, ordinary men:
But they knew two things:
They had a job to do; and they knew that in the end, they could only rely on each other to see
it through – they knew they depended on their mates…
In that recognition of the special meaning of Australian mateship, the self-recognition of their
dependence upon one another - these Australians, by no means all of them born in Australia,
113
drawn from every walk of life and different backgrounds, cast upon these hostile shores,
twelve thousand miles from home - there lay the genesis of the ANZAC tradition.
And at the heart of that tradition lay a commitment. It was a simple but deep commitment to
one another, each to his fellow Australian.
And in that commitment, I believe, lies the enduring meaning of ANZAC, then and today and
for the future.
It is that commitment, now as much as ever - now with all the vast changes occurring in our
nation, more than ever - it is that commitment to Australia, which defines, and alone defines,
what it is to be an Australian. The commitment is all (Hawke 1990d, 2-3; emphasis in the
original).
The digge s la k of sophisti ated u de sta di g of the e e ts that had
ought the to Gallipoli did
not, however, diminish their sense of duty – they knew two things: they had a job to do; and the y
knew that in the end, they could only rely on each other to see it through – they knew they
depe ded o thei
ates . They were unified and did this, despite their differences i n whe re the y
were born or their class status, because they were mates and because they could only rely upon one
another, which was the central lesson to be learnt from their example – there lay the genesis of the
AN)AC t aditio . Ha ke the fell back on the familiar refrain of commitment – the diggers were
committed to each other, as mates, and to getting the job done - the e lies the e du i g ea i g of
AN)AC, the a d toda a d fo the futu e . In sum, the lesson for the present was that a sense of
duty, the support of mates and a commitment to one another drove the diggers at Gallipoli, despite
their lack of understanding of the geopolitical forces at work reshaping the global balance of power.
A za had e o e a ehi le fo Ha ke s sta da d dis u sive message of consensus and ne ol iberal
economic reform – the o
it e t is all . The ateship of the digge s as o flated ith Ha ke s
well- ehea sed atio alist isio of a o petiti e Aust alia s o
it e t to the nation-state – it is
that commitment to Australia, which defines, and alone defines, what it is to be an Austral i an. The
o
it e t is all . The o st u tio of Ha ke s la guage he e pla ed the o
it e t is all
message above any other lesson to be learnt from Anzac – it was declarative and singular, as it
alo e defi es Aust alia
ess. A za he e se ed as a
etapho fo the appeal to itize s
commitment to the Australian state, and to the policy program of economic reform by the Hawke
government. Just like the diggers who came before them, Australians in the 1990s were also faci ng
profound geopolitical and economic changes that they may not have understood. And much the
sa e as the digge s, the did so at the oss- oads of i ilisatio , as the go e
e t e ou aged
them to look to Asia for future prosperity. Finally, just as the diggers had been diverse, ye t uni fi ed
by mateship, Australians in 1990 were multicultural and separated by class, yet still found consensus
i thei
o
it e t to the state a d its su ess. Ha ke s o sensus politics in this instance
114
atte pted to su su e all ide tities u de the aegis of the esta lished o se sus Little
losi g do
the spa e to o test the politi s of Ha ke s eoli e alis a d e o o i efo
,
,
. Thus,
whilst not as explicit as his 1989 Anzac Day address, Anzac was again utilised instrumentally by
Ha ke i alig
e t ith his go e
e t s poli
age da. The ideographic and unpolitical nature of
Anzac after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans allowed Hawke to subtly insert the political into
this speech. Hawke was able to do so without attracting sanction because he respected the
boundaries of Anzac by honouring its well understood meaning regarding service, sacrifice, and duty,
and thus insulated himself from criticism from partisan conservatives. Social movement activi sts , i f
at all roused by the occasion, were not reported upon by the media that year.
Ha ke s A za e t ep e eu ship had a o stituti e aspe t ega di g Aust alia
atio alis too, as it
marked the boundaries of Australian citizenship and identity. The message of commitment,
amplified by the unpolitical ideograph of Anzac, had two important effects in di sci plini ng some of
the varying groups the ALP was courting as supporters with its catch-all electoralism (Jaensch 1989).
Firstly, it sent a strong message to non-Anglo Australians that the terms of Australian citizenship and
identity would not be challenged. Anzac, and all its associations with white Australia, mascul inity,
militarism, and conservatism, that WAR and GESPA activists had pointed to in the early 1980s, would
remain (and be reinforced) as the framework for a central explanatory myth of Australianness,
despite concessions to modern sensibilities by including reference to the diversity of the di ggers.
Further, this message, and the newly unpolitical nature of Anzac, disciplined those Anglo Australians
uncomfortable with these associations and drew a line under the contestability of Anzac. WAR
activists or, more generally, social movement activists who were concerned with issues of pol i tical
identity, now had to contend with newly reconstituted taboos sanctioning Anzac Day protest activity
or the questioning of Anzac and its associated values. Secondly, it disciplined the ALP Anglo working
class base by placing the commitment to the new, competitive Australia, at the centre of the
message of a principal national occasion. Australians in 1990 needed to heed the example of the
diggers who had come before them and face the economic challenges that now confronted the
Australian economy, just as the diggers had faced the challenges of a changing world and had
sacrificed greatly. 75 years later, Australia faced the similar need to put aside selfish wants and
desires and sacrifice for the good of the nation in the face of a changing world. Further, in the
context of tension regarding multiculturalism during the period (Kalantzis 2003, 315-317), it sent a
clear message to these Australians that traditional conceptions of Australianness would remain at
the centre of national identity and citizenship and that they had nothing to fear from the challe nge s
being posed to Anglo-identity hegemony by the large scale immigration of the post-war years.
115
These elements discursively disciplined the various groups that the ALP was appealing to for
electoral support during the Hawke government. The catch-all imperatives that the Hawke
go e
e t s ele to alis
had posed guided Ha ke s atio alist dis ou se a d his esta lished
boundaries of Australian citizenship. This, i
o
i atio
ith the ALP s ideologi al o
it e t to
diversity and multiculturalism, led Hawke to incorporate the diversity of Australians into the scope of
consensus and reconciliation, whilst simultaneously drawing a boundary around the Australia n
citizenship ideal. The lesson of Anzac Day 1990 was that Australians could be diverse, but the y al so
needed to be unified in their end goal of service to the state. Anzac Day amplified and endorsed this
message, as the newly unpolitical Anzac was put to use. Thus, Anzac Day 1990 was an example of
Ha ke s A za e t ep e eu ship ei g e plo ed i
o ju tio
ith the e l
e o iled a d
unpolitical Anzac for instrumental and constitutive policy and national identity ends.
Anzac Day 1991 – Aust alia s Role in a Changing World
Anzac Day 1991 saw Hawke return to the largely prosaic, policy orientated, format of Anzac Day
address, much like his 1989 address. Unlike his Anzac Day 1990 addresses, which were filled with
rich, nationalist imagery and excluded direct references to policy, Anzac Day 1991 almost exclusively
referenced the policy agenda of the Hawke government. Speaking to an audience in Darwi n whi l st
ope i g a e
a al g
asiu , Ha ke s spee h ega
iefl pa i g t i ute to the sa i fi e of
former service-people in the World Wars, before linking that to the recent service of naval personnel
in the Gulf War, outlining the long overdue payment of Indigenous peoples who had served
alo gside defe e pe so
el i WWII, a d the go e
e t s e e nt defence reorientation afte r the
1986 Dibb Report.
Ha ke s
A za Da add ess agai de o st ated the still e ol i g atu e of P i e Mi i ste i al
Anzac Day addresses. Whilst Hawke had set an important precedent regarding the elite celebrati on
of Anzac with the 75th anniversary of the landings in 1990, he did not feel obliged to continue
observance of Anzac Day with ceremonial trips to overseas locations or at the Australian War
Memorial.
Further, he did not continue to observe the same reverence for the occasion
demonstrated in 1990 – the 1991 address failed to mention sacredness, overt nationalism or
epitomised Australian values, and there was little regarding sacrifice, debt or service. This
contrasted with the Anzac Day addresses of Prime Ministers Keating and Howard, who largely
conformed to the pomp, ceremony and nationalism of the example set by Hawke with the 75th
anniversary observance of Anzac Day.
116
Thus, this speech was once again largely indistinguishable from the policy and interest group
speeches that Hawke gave throughout his Prime Ministership. The speech began by arguing for the
morality of observing Anzac Day – O A za Da
to tu
to the e a d o e
, it is p ope fo the thoughts of all Aust alia s
ho a e se i g i the a
– and recognitio of the sa ifi e of se i e
ed fo es of ou ou t
Ha ke
e a d o e th oughout the histo
,
of Aust alia s
military service. However, the speech then linked the upcoming 50th anniversary of the attack on
Pearl Harbour, and the reconciliation of nations in the region after the War in the Pacific, with the
optimism for peace and prosperity that characterised international discourse in the early 1990s after
the fall of communism and international cooperation during the Gulf War. The naval personnel who
had se ed du i g the Gulf Wa
e e p aised fo p o i g, o e
o e, Aust alia s eputatio as a
nation which is willing and able to take a stand against aggression, and to meet its obligations as a
espo si le
e
e of the i te atio al o
u it
Ha ke
,
. Aust alia at this ti e
remained committed to supporting its allies in armed conflict far from home, in support of
Aust alia s o
i te ests, a d ith a ie to the o al obligations of participation in worl d affai rs,
despite the go e
e t a epti g the Di
epo t s eo ie tatio of the ADF to a ds o ti e tal
defence (Gelber 1992, 78).
Ha ke s spee h the paid tribute to a small group of Indigenous people who had serve d al ongside
Australian soldiers during WWII, but had not been formally enlisted, and therefore had not receive d
payment for their service. Speaking to an audience which reportedly contained members of this
group (Austin 1991, 2), Hawke outlined that his government would compensate the service of the se
people, a d that the Go e
e t de i es g eat pleasu e f o
dese ed e o pe se, the sig ifi a t o t i utio
(Hawke 1991, 3). The
e
ade
ei g e og ised had pe fo
ei g a le to e og ise, ith just a d
these
e
e s of ou
o
u it
ed duties i ludi g oast-watching and
patrols, taught bushcraft to white servicemen, trained in drill and tactics, located mines and rescue d
se i e e
Da is
, 4).
This example demonstrated ho
the ALP s o
itment to
multiculturalism and the inclusion of diversity into Australian nationalist discourse by Hawke i n hi s
Bicentenary and 1990 Anzac Day addresses opened up new opportunities to expand the boundari es
of Anzac and Australian national identity. Whilst Anzac remained a central Australian nationalist
discourse, with its attendant hegemonic associations with Anglo identity and mascul i sm, i t di d not
remain exclusively so. As such, it should be acknowledged that Anzac, as presented by Hawke , was
not exclusively white. The extent that it did present diversity, however, was dependent on outsi de r
groups conforming to the hegemonic strictures demanded by Anzac – in this case, these Indige nous
117
people were eligible to be included in the story of Anzac due to hav ing performed the duties of
soldiers, with the attendant compliance with service, sacrifice and duty to the state.
Finally, Hawke spent the remainder of the speech outlining some of the new defence thi nking that
the government had adopted after the 1987 defence white paper, along with its associated
spending, before again paying tribute to the service personnel of the Australian Defence Force.
Reflecting the shift to the north of Australia that continental defence required, Hawke (1991, 3)
argued that the:
Ai Fo e s hai of o the ai ases, the A
s e e gi g fa ilities i Da i fo Ca al
‘egi e t a d, ot least, the Na s Pat ol Boat ase a d o
u i atio s fa ilities he e, a e
testi o
to the Go e
e t s esol e to
ai tai a d e pa d the fundamental
infrastructure necessary to provide properly for our defence needs into the twenty first
century.
Ha ke
ade so e atte pt to li k this to A za
the pe so ope ati g it Ha ke
,
a d
a gui g that the e uip e t is o l as good as
iefl li ki g the Aust alia Defe e pe so
el s
service to those who had come before. However, the speech did little to engage with the rich
nationalist tradition offered by Anzac or link that with the policy agenda or announcements li ttered
throughout the spee h. La ki g the e e o
of the
A za Da e e ts, Ha ke s
A za
Day address therefore did little more than outline the policy commitments of the ALP gove rnme nt.
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day speeches had not yet institutionalised the high rhetoric of nati onal ism
as the predominant form of address.
Conclusion
This hapte has a gued that Ha ke s A za e t ep e eu ship e ou aged the e o iled ,
depoliticised and unpolitical nationalist discourse of Anzac for instrumental and consti tuti ve e nds.
Facing profound policy challenges to the areas of the economy, the changing international conte xt,
and tension regarding the conceptualisation of national identity and multiculturalism, in additi on to
the catch-all electoral priorities of the ALP in the 1980s and 1990s, meant that Hawke needed to a
new way of conceiving of national identity. Hawke had some success in welding these disparate
ele e ts togethe i to the o petiti e Aust alia du i g the Bi e te a , ut fa ed hall e ge s i
presenting this as a unifying message due to the contested nature of the occasion. However, the
contestation that faced the Bicentenary and Anzac Day in the first half of the 1980s was notably
absent from Anzac Day after the 1987 welcome home parades for Vietnam veterans. This allowed
Hawke to present his vision of national identity in an uncritical and celebratory environment. He di d
118
this for narrowly instrumental ends in 1989 and 1991, when his Anzac Day addresses were largely
similar to any number of similar policy addresses Hawke gave during his term as Prime Minister and
lacked the pomp and ceremony associated with later Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses, whi ch
demonstrated the still formative use of Anzac by Prime Ministers.
The 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1990, however, set a precedent regarding the
pote tial of A za e t ep e eu ship. The logi of Ha ke s
ide dis ou se of o se sus
as a
largely successful attempt to draw a line under policy contestation, conflict and politics. Having
applied this same logic to the reconciliation of Vietnam veterans with the wider Australian body
politic meant the restoration of a depoliticised and unpolitical form of Anzac that did little to give exservicemen a voice in the celebration of their achievements or acknowledge the uncomfortable
truths of Anzac regarding the damage that war inflicts upon its participants and their social networks
when they are killed in action or return home suffering mental and physical wounds. Anzac
therefore became insulated from the attacks of Vietnam veterans who sought to advance their
continuing policy concerns that stood outside state-sanctioned conceptions of their service or soci al
movement activists seeking to challenge established forms of Australianness or advance other
radical agendas. Not only that, but the established and well understood meaning of Anzac amongst
the Australian community meant that Anzac could operate as an unpolitical ideograph – bound by
certain genre conditions that needed to be respected, but malleable towards new nati onal ist e nds
too. As such, having reconciled Vietnam veterans with the wider body politic in a manner which
denied the political nature of such a reconciliation, led to an unpolitical Anzac ideograph too
pregnant with nationalist meaning for political elites like Hawke, and his successors, to ignore.
119
CHAPTER 6
Keating: Success and Failure in Anzac Entrepreneurship
Introduction
December 1991 saw Paul Keating defeat Bob Hawke as leader of the ALP and become Prime
Minister. The country was in the midst of recession, the polling for the ALP was poor, and the
Opposition was resurgent. However, over the coming months Keating managed to meet the
challenge that the Coalition had posed with their Fightback! policy program and the ALP
su se ue tl
ha a te ised
o
the u
i
a le
ele tio . His politi al st le as P i e Mi iste
as
his Big Pi tu e politi s:
… edefi i g the a ket as f ie d of the attle , efo i g Aust alia s e o o i i stitutio s to
succeed in an international age, reshaping Australian identity by abandoning the Crown for a
republic, reaching reconciliation with indigenous Australians, embracing engagement with Asia
as a national aspiration and entrenching the concept of a multicultural yet united nation (Kelly
2009, 4-5).
Keating also continued the practice of active Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac that had
egu
ith Ha ke a fe
ea s ea lie . Keati g s isio fo A za
as e t ed o the Pa ifi a d the
conflicts that had occurred the e du i g WWII, a d he sought to stee the Aust alia pu li s ie i
the same direction. This atio alist isio
as ou d up ith his Big Pi tu e politi s of e ol i e al
economic reform, engagement with Asia, and an Australian republic.
Keati g s embrace of Anzac, and nationalism more generally, marked Keating as another Prime
Ministerial Anzac entrepreneur, enthusiastically promoting Anzac as a central component of
Aust alia
atio alis . But Keati g s e gage e t ith A za also efle ted the i te rnal tension that
his outward looking cosmopolitanism and his aggressive and parochial nationalism posed. It wi l l be
argued that Keating was mostly unsuccessful with the main aim of his Anzac entrepreneurship, wi th
his bold attempt to shift Australian war remembrance from Gallipoli to the Pacific and Kokoda
ultimately failing. Holbrook (2014,
a do
a gues that this as due pa tl to Keati g s o f o tatio al
iousl pa tisa heto i a d pa tl due to Aust alia s o
e tio
ith the o i gi al sto
of
A za e t ed o Gallipoli a d WWI. Espe iall i po ta t i the eje tio of Keati g s eo ie tati o
was his baldly stated attempt to weld together the shift to the Pacific, Kokoda, and WWII, with
republicanism, Asian engagement, and neoliberalism. This was an agenda that stretched the
boundaries of the Anzac ideograph too far. By breaking these boundaries, Keating allowed his
120
version of Anzac to become political - more concerned with contestation than an attempt to
universalise, avoid conflict, and become unpolitical, as Hawke before him and Howard after him
oth
a aged
ith thei A za e t ep e eu ship. Pa tisa
o testatio of Keati g s A za
entrepreneurship was therefore fierce, and Keating failed to establish his version of Anzac as an
unpolitical sphere of Australian nationalism and social relations. Having said that, hi s ri gorous and
enthusiastic championing of the memorialisation of WWII did succeed in institutionalising the
previously neglected commemoration of the War in the Pacific, and in particular, the story of
Aust alia soldie s fighti g at Kokoda, as pa t of the a ati e of Aust alia s a se i e.
I o de to e plo e the su ess a d failu e of Keati g s A za e t ep e eu ship, it ill e e e ssa
to highlight Keati g s politi al style and the context in which Keating was operating. The chapter
does this in four sections:
1. This se tio p ese ts a al sis of Keati g s Big Pi tu e politi al st le , hi h is u ial to
u de sta di g his A za e t ep e eu ship. He e I d a
upo Joh so s
,
-25)
observation that Keating attempted to integrate the economic and social into a
cosmopolitan and electorally palatable discourse of government. The secti on shows how
Keati g s adi al atio alis
sat u o fo ta l
ith this os opolita is , a d eated
difficulties and tensions for his political style.
2. Next, I will highlight the key policy challenges that Keating faced as Prime Minister. The
first challenges were economic - the process of continued domestic economic re form and
unemployment, and the middle power internationalism of his multi -lateral engagement
with the region. The second group of challenges were social - the push towards a republic,
Mabo and indigenous land rights, and multiculturalism.
3. Following this, I will set out a brief corpus assisted discourse analysis of Keati g s A za Da
addresses to explore the overall ha a te isti s of Keati g s A za e t ep e eu ship. He e
it ill e a gued that hilst Keati g s atte pt to elo ate A za
o
, he othe
as a depa tu e f o
the
ise la gel kept to the pa a ete s of the A za t aditio like A za s othe
Prime Ministerial entrepreneurs.
4. Fi all , the hapte
ill te tuall e plo e Keati g s A za Da add esses. It ill e a gue d
that the most prominent theme of his addresses was the way they encouraged Australi ans
to look to Asia for their economic prosperity, and to think of themselves as independent of
Great Britain. The cosmopolitanism and radical nationalism of this push were not e nti re ly
o g ue t, ho e e , a d Keati g s politi al st le posed te sio s that e e ne ither e asi l y
reconciled nor ithout o t o e s . Keati g s adi al e o eptualisatio of A za i
121
and 1993 attracted significant opposition, and in 1994 and 1995 Anzac his addresses
became far less entrepreneurial and thus attracted less controversy.
As such, it will be argued that Keati g s e gage e t ith A za a d Aust alia s a histo
efle ted
an enthusiastic entrepreneurship that had some success in aligning his policy agenda with Anzac and
the furtherance of the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. Ulti mate ly,
ho e e , Keati g failed to i stitutio alise his pa ti ula isio of Aust alia s a se i e i the Pa ifi
and its pre-eminence over the original story of the Gallipoli landings of WWI.
Keating: the Economic, the Social and the Nationalist
The follo i g se tio e plo es Keati g s go e i g st le
e a i i g his tethe i g togethe of
economic, social and nationalist tendencies. Having come to power as Prime Minister after Hawke ,
a d ha i g pa ti ipated i ti atel i Ha ke s go ernment as treasurer, Keating face d many of the
same problems of government that Hawke had. The ALP still relied upon a broad coalition of soci al
groups for its electoral support – its traditional Anglo and blue-collar base, middle-class progressives,
and non-Anglo immigrants. It still maintained the same neoliberal mindset to the probl e m of how
best to orientate and reform the Australian economy in a globalising world. And the government
still faced the clamour of various social movement voices for social change and their demands for
accommodation of their political agenda. Hawke had solved the dilemma of these compe ting and
contradictory elements with his appeal to consensus, and the attendant vision of Austral ianne ss as
the Competitive Australian, a cosmopolitan and diverse Australian who was committed to the
success of the Australian state by putting their shoulder to the wheel of economic reform. This vision
of Australianness had left the status quo framework of Australian national identity largely un touched
– it was still masculine and Anglo-Celtic. Unlike Hawke, though, Keating was far more radi cal i n hi s
ambition to reform Australian nationalism and identity. Keating solved the difficulties that the
contradictory group and policy pulls posed, not with consensus, but with his Big Picture politics – the
idea that Australia could both be both economically and socially reformed.
Given the importance that the Hawke/Keating governments had placed upon economic reform and
the liberalisation of the Australian economy, the reform of the social needed to fol l ow the l ogic of
neoliberalism (Johnson 2000, 24). The difficulty for Keating was that many Australians, especially
ALP suppo te s, did ot see the sel es as o petiti e e o o i
a atte pt to sol e this p o le ,
efo
ei gs. Keati g s pol itical style was
i g the so ial i li e ith his go e
e tse o o i
vision. As Johnson (2000, 24) argues, the Hawke/Keating governments:
122
…t ied to i flue e the shape of so ial ide tities i a s that e e ompatible with their vision
of the new 21st e tu Aust alia the
a ted to uild… It as ot so u h the ase that
Keating was taking up a broad range of social and cultural issues, but that his government was
attempting to shape Australian culture and so ial ide tities to fit the go e
e t s oade
vision (Johnson 2000, 24).
As such, Big Picture politics engaged with the issues raised by social movement activists, but i t was
not defined by them. Instead, Keating adopted a selection of social issues and identities congrue nt
with economic reform:
Keating tended to privilege social issues that were compatible with his construction of
economic issues and not recognise others. Furthermore, he was trying to reshape
constructions of the social in ways that fitted his particular economic vision. This is not to deny
that the go e
e t s o eptio s i
ai st ea poli do u e ts ould go e o d a o
e o o i edu tio is
ut it is to suggest that the go e
e t s isio
as se e el li ited
by the underlyi g f a e o k a d that the so ial issues hi h te ded to e take up e e
ones that were seen as in some sense compatible with that framework (Johnson 2000, 31).
Under this framework, Australians were to be cosmopolitan, diverse and tolerant, as l ong a s the se
identities did not challenge the process of economic reform. There was a fundamental continuity
with traditional ALP narratives of work and harmonious employer/employee relations, a
characteristic which smothered contestation and which was extended to other identity relationships
with the Australian state and economy, such as femininity and masculinity, aboriginality and
ethnicity, and sexuality (Johnson 2000, 30-35). The culmination of this harmonious and inclusive
pluralism would lead Australia to the republic, constituted in the image of the economically and
so iall efo
ed ide tit of Keati g s politi al st le Joh so
,
-31).
However, the issue of an Australian republic points to the te sio i Keati g s isio of a e fo
ed
Australian identity. Whilst the republic was a means to restructure Australian identity i n l i ne wi th
os opolita is , tole a e, a d ha
o ious e o o i elatio ships, it also d e upo Keati g s
own deeply felt and unreconstructed radical nationalism. According to Cu a , Keati g s isio of
Australian national identity:
… as a e sio of the adi al atio alist
th i
hi h o ki g- lass t ue Aust alia s had
been involved in a constant struggle with an Anglo-phile middle class to achieve Australian
i depe de e … This t aditio sa i the pe iod
to
the g eat flo e i g of
Australian nationalism and social experimentation, lamented the supposed conservative
appropriation of the Anzac legend after World War I and argued that the Liberal-Country
pa t s politi al as e de
i the
s a d s had ee led a p i e i iste , “i ‘o e t
Me zies, ho as ot agg essi el Aust alia
a d ho e odied a o p o ised
atio alis . It as o p o ised si e, i Keati g s ie , Me zies i pe ial i agination, as
ell as his i a ilit to sepa ate his Aust alia ess f o his B itish ess has dela ed the
emergence and projection of a distinctive Australian outlook on the world (Curran 2006, 256).
123
This was the language of old Labor politics - class struggle, racial exclusion, and hyper-masculism not the language of economic reform, cosmopolitanism and pluralism. It was an instinctual
commitment, one where politics was felt personally and held to tightly, despite its narrow pol i tical
appeal and potential for critique and opposition (Curran 2006, 314; Tate 2014, 450-452).
Keati g s adi al atio alis
a e out i
o e ts of p essu e, o du i g u s ipted e a ks, a a
from the watchful influence of his speechwriter, Don Watson. Thus, in February 1992, Keating
announced his intention to push for an Australian republic, after a visit by the Queen, and was under
pressure from the Opposition for not showing adequate respect. He rose in the House of
Representatives to state:
I was told that I did not learn respect at school. I learned one thing: I learned about selfrespect and self-regard for Australia - not about some cultural cringe to a country which
decided not to defend the Malayan peninsula, not to worry about Singapore and not to give us
our troops back to keep ourselves free from Japanese domination. This was the country that
you people [the Coalition] wedded yourself to, and even as it walked out on you and joined the
Common Market, you were still looking for your MBEs and your knighthoods, and all the rest
of the regalia that comes with it. You would take Australia right back down the time tunnel to
the ultu al i ge he e ou ha e al a s o e f o … You a go a k to the fifties to ou
nostalgia, your Menzies, the Caseys and the whole lot. They were not aggressively Australian,
they were not aggressively proud of our culture, and we will have no bar of you or your sterile
ideology (Keating 1992a, 374).
“tate e ts like these efle ted the te sio s that e isted i Keati g s politi al st l e. The vi si on of
Australian independence from Britain presented here had less to do with a cosmopolitan and
outward looking Australia finding its way in the newly emerging markets of Asia, and much more to
do with contestation and settling old scores with conservatives, with all its attendant refe rence s to
pa o hialis , lass a tago is , a d hau i isti
atio alis . This is ot to de
that Keati g s
nationalism was deeply felt, or electorally popular amongst some sections of the Australian public. It
does suggest, ho e e , that the t o sides of Keati g s go e i g st le – the cosmopolitan neoliberal
and the radical nationalist – existed in tension, and in ways that were not easily reconciled. This
tension was to play out in his engagement with Anzac, as he sought to stee the ou t
s i si o of
its war service from Gallipoli and WWI, to Kokoda and the War in the Pacific, and revealed the
i he e tl politi al atu e of Keati g s atio alis e t ep e eu ship.
The Keati g Go er
e t’s Policy Challe ges
The Economy
The early 1990s had seen a severe and protracted recession, partly as a result of international
factors, partly as a result of domestic policy failure. The late 1980s had seen a massive spending and
124
investment boom, fuelled by debt, and financial and property speculation (Bell 1997, 154-155).
Interest rates soared in an effort to contain the speculative boom, and when the boom collapsed,
unemployment rose to over 10% - the double-digit territory that had coincided with the Fraser
government being defeated i
Keati g s halle ge Kell
. The e essio had hu t Ha ke s leade ship, had f a ed
, i , a d posed a sig ifi a t poli
halle ge to the sta t of hi s P i e
Ministership. As such, soon after taking office as Prime Minister, Keating announced the One Nation
policy document to the House of Representatives, where he defended the economi c re cord of the
ALP, and committed his government to further reform, in conjunction with Keynesian stimulus to
kick-start the economy. In practice, this involved new roads, rail and electricity infrastructure
projects and targeted assistance programs for families, the unemployed and certain industries, but it
did not wind back the neoliberal reforms that he had implemented as treasurer (Kelly 2009, 59 -60).
Instead, it committed the ALP to further reform in the areas of a national competition policy and
workplace reform with enterprise bargaining and superannuation (Keating 1992b). Despite the
challenges that the poor economic outlook was posing, Keating took the One Nation document to
the 1993 election and won.
Understandably, unemployment was a primary policy concern. Unemployment had peaked at 11.2%
in December 1992 (Henderson 1997, 113-114). As such, the government established an expert
committee to recommend on policy action that would restore full employment and the re sul t was
the Working Nation poli
do u e t of Ma
commitment to social justice – E plo
a e i sepa a le f o the Go e
social democracy – a ou t
e t sa
. The do u e t e hoed the ALP s t aditio al
e t a d a edu tio i the u
itio s fo Aust alia. The a
e of u e plo ed pe opl e
itio is to eate a d
hi h has ealised its e o o i pote tial Keati g
a i
a, 1), but was
also firmly wedded to the program of economic reform that had proceeded it (Watson 2011, 487).
Working Nation aimed resources at the long-termed unemployed and other disadvantaged groups in
order to get them into employment and had some moderate success, with unemployment lowering
to 8.1% by December 1995.
Internationally, the Keating government continued with the middle power activism of the Hawke
government (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1993). Keating promoted international free trade , acce ss
for Australian exports, and encouraged Australians to look to Asia for their future prosperity, all now
firmly linked this to his Big Picture politics. The record here was mixed - the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1994 did contain successes for agricultural producers like Australia,
but the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which set the framework for a European single market and the
125
creation of the EU, along with the creation of North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) i n the
same year, and moves by ASEAN to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement that excluded Australia, were
developments which worried Australian policy makers concerned about being locke d out of the se
regional trading blocs (Meredith and Dyster 1999, 290). Given the increasing importance of Japan,
China, and South-East Asian countries, as growing economies and important markets for Austral i an
exports, reducing trade protection barriers was of particular concern. The Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) was therefore a forum that Keating embraced to promote liberali sati on i n the
region, and the Bogor Treaty of 1994, committing APEC members to freer trade, was a major Keating
foreign policy success.
Social and Cultural Policy
The Keating government was also particularly preoccupied with social and cultural policy i ssues. In
October 1994, the government launched Creative Nations, the first time an Australian gove rnment
had developed a formal cultural policy. The document concerned itself broadly with the arts, fi l m,
television, radio, heritage and the possibilities that newly emerging information communication
technologies were presenting. The document also had an economic focus:
This ultu al poli is also a e o o i poli … The le el of ou
eati it su sta tiall
dete i es ou a ilit to adapt to e e o o i i pe ati es… It is essential to our economic
success (Department of Communications and the Arts 1994, 7).
I
additio
o
to ultu al poli , the Keati g go e
it e t to ulti ultu alis a d di e sit
e t o ti ued the Ha ke go e
e ts
ith li its . The High Cou t s Mabo decision of 1992
overturned the legal fiction of terra nullius and helped put Indigenous issues firmly onto the agenda.
Keati g s ‘edfe
“pee h
as a depa tu e f o
p e ious go e
e tal o
s he it e pli itl
acknowledged the destruction that white settlement had caused Indigenous peoples and cultures:
…the sta ti g poi t
Australians.
ight
e to e og ise that the p o le
sta ts
ith us o -Aboriginal
It begins, I think, with that act of recognition.
Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing.
We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life.
We brought the diseases. The alcohol.
We committed the murders.
We took the children from their mothers.
We practised discrimination and exclusion.
It was our ignorance and our prejudice (Keating 1992c, 3).
126
This speech earned Keating considerable goodwill amongst the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Isl ande r
people (Jennett 1995, 63) and signalled his championing of the reconciliation process. Keating
enacted this commitment by taking a personal role in negotiating the passage of the Native Title Act
1993 in the face of opposition from various stakeholders.
Fi all , Keati g also put the issue of a Aust alia epu li o the age da. Keati g s
campaign speech featured a o
it e t
the P i e Mi iste to set up a o
e l e ti o
ittee of e i e t
Aust alia s to e a i e the optio s fo a Aust alia epu li a d to put this to a efe e du
the
centenary of Federation in 2001 (Keating 1993c, 11-12). The republic was an issue that had
o side a le p o i e e th ough Keati g s te
to a ds a fo
as P i e Mi iste , as he e a gelised the shift
all i depe de t Aust alia. Keati g s a ti e ha pio i g of these so ial issues
helped to put them on the agenda, despite the imperatives of the dire economic situation.
Keati g’s A zac – a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis
The te sio s i Keati g s go e i g st le a
e i t odu ed ith corpus assisted discourse anal ysis
of his Anzac speeches. Two conclusions can be drawn from this data. Firstly, Keating atte mpted to
relocate visions of Anzac from Gallipoli and WWI to WWII, and especially to the War in Pacific and
Kokoda; and secondly, that in doing so, Keating did little else to challenge the accepted genre
conventions of official, state-driven discourses of Anzac. As such, whilst Keating attempted to
efo us Aust alia s o eptio of the lo atio of A za to Asia, i li e ith his Big Pi tu e politi s, hi s
Anzac Day addresses did little to encompass the other cosmopolitan elements of his governing style.
The Sites of Keati g s A za Day Addresses
Keating gave at least one Anzac Day address or released a media statement for every Anzac Day as
Prime Minister.
Keati g s fi st A za Da add esses e e held i Papua Ne Gui ea i
2, with an addre ss at the
dawn service in the Bomana War Cemetery in Port Moresby and again later that morning at Ela
Beach, Port Moresby. On April 26th 1992, Keating gave a further address in the village of Kokoda in
the PNG Highlands. In 1994, Keating laid a wreath at the Martin Place Cenotaph, Sydney, at 8.30am,
before the start of the march (McGregor 1994, 1), and released a statement to the media in place of
an address. Finally, the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1995 saw Keating make an
address after the dawn service, again at the Martin Place Cenotaph (Porter
,
. Keati g s
choice of location for marking Anzac Day was telling. By choosing to go to Papua New Guinea for hi s
127
first Anzac Day as Prime Minister, in particular to Kokoda, Keating was making a clear statement
about where he wished Anzac to be located and with which war he wanted Anzac to be associ ate d.
This message was reinforced by the multiple speeche s he gave in 1992, which signalled the
significance of the shift. The fact that Keating did not travel to Gallipoli for the 80 th anniversary of
the landings in 1995, despite the precedent that Hawke had set in 1990, and in fact, that he never
travelled to Gallipoli for an Anzac Day ceremony, is also instructive - Keating only ever marked Anzac
Day in Australia or in Papua New Guinea.
Year
Type
1992
Three speeches
1993
One speech
1994
One media release
1995
One speech
Figure 15 - List of Keati g s A za Day Add esses a d Media “tate e ts
The Location of Keati g s Anzac
Keati g s fo us as o the a s WWI a d WWII si
a ed e tio s ea h i Keati g s o pus , a d
their associated battles in Europe, the Middle East, the Pacifi c, and in particular, the battles at
Gallipoli (six named mentions), Kokoda (six named mentions), Papua New Guinea (5 named
mentions) and Singapore (four named mentions). He also highlighted the experiences of Austral i an
POWs on the Burma Railroad (three named mentions). He mentioned other battles and wars, but
gave none the same attention. They were glossed over by being mentioned in groups and fai l e d to
receive the same detailed attention from Keating.
Importantly, whilst Keating frequently mentioned Gallipoli, he did not give it the same promi ne nce
as Kokoda and the battles in the Pacific. This will be explored later in the chapter, so a short
example here will suffice. In 1992, at Kokoda, Keating said:
Even though we fought in many conflicts where we felt pangs of loyalty to what was then
known as the "Mother Country," to Britain and to the Empire, and we fought at Gallipoli with
heroism and in Belgium, in Flanders and in France and in other places, this was the first and
only time that we fought against an enemy to prevent the invasion of Australia, to secure the
way of life we had built for ourselves (Keating 1993b, 59).
Keating was creating a new hierarchy here, where the power of the original story of Anzac was
acknowledged, but at the same time was subordinate to the battles fought at Kokoda, demonstrated
the h pota is of the su o di ate lause efo e this as the f i st a d o l ti e… This hie a h ,
128
alo g ith the lo atio of Keati g s A za Da add esses p ese ted a o e, de o st ates Ke ati g s
attempt to relocate Anzac from Gallipoli to Kokoda.
Keati g s Age ts of A za
The age ts of A za i Keati g s spee hes e e o e
hel i gl
e
te
a ed e tio s . Me
was the only gendered noun used by Keating to refer to Australians in his 1992 addresses at Bomana
Wa Ce ete , Ela Bea h a d Kokoda. Me a d
e a d o e
as used i his
,
,a d
1995 statements (five named mentions); women alone was never used. Looking at the service type ,
only male associations were given attention – the
outsta di g ou age a d soldie s of the
e lusi el
th
e
Di isio
ou g
Keati g
e of the
ilitia , ai
e of
d, 3-4). As such, whilst not
as uli e, the age ts of Keati g s add esses e e de o st a l a d o e
hel i gl
men – they were the ones who were named specifically and they were the ones who were primaril y
acting and embodying Anzac.
Further, efe e es to di e sit a e also la gel a se t f o Keati g s A za Da add esses. Ha ke
had set a precedent regarding the inclusion of diversity into Anzac only a few years e arl i er, havi ng
efe ed to the diffe e t a kg ou ds of the original Anzacs in 1990 (Hawke 1990d, 3) and including
reference to Indigenous Australians and their war service in his 1991 address (Hawke 1991). One
might expect this to continue with Keating, given the emphasis he gave to his big picture politics and
the contemporary political context of the Mabo decision and reconciliation being played out.
However, one brief mention is made of diversity in 1993, and none to named ethnicity. These
patte s de o st ate that the ide tit issues of Keati g s Big Pi tu e politi s ade fe w inroads i nto
his Anzac Day addresses.
The Attributes of Keati g s A za Agents
What att i utes did Keati g s A za age ts ha e? As a
e see
elo , the att i utes that the
digge s of Keati g s spee hes possessed e e losel alig ed to the state o ientate d val ue s of the
Anzac tradition. Courage and sacrifice are the most prominent themes. Interestingly, given
Keati g s adi al atio alis , ele e ts of the digge t aditio , like suffe i g a d ateship, do o e
through. Suffering was especially unusual in the corpus, and reveals a more ambivalent meaning for
Anzac than was usual for Prime Ministers who tended to towards official and state orientated
versions of war remembrance that expunged such references. However, the predomi nance of the
Anzac tradition reinforces the notion that whilst Keating attempted to shift perceptions of Anzac
from Gallipoli to Kokoda, he did little to otherwise renovate the established conventions of Anzac.
129
Attributes
Frequency
Courage/bravery
10
Sacrifice
6
Tenacity/perseverance
3
Mateship
3
Heroism
2
Suffering
2
Honour
2
Service/duty
1
Debt Owed
1
Comradeship
1
Humour
1
Figure 16 - List of the F e ue y of Me tio s of the Att i utes of Age ts of A za i Keati g s A za Day Addresses
Ha i g esta lished so e of the ua titati e aspe ts of Keati g s A za Da add esses, the hapte
ill o
e a i e i g eate detail ho
Keati g s politi al st le
as
o e i to his A za Da
speeches.
Keati g’s A zac Day Addresses: Big Picture Politics
A lose e a i atio of Keati g s A za Da add esses efle ts the su ess a d failu e of hi s A za
e t ep e eu ship. The os opolita is a d adi al atio alis of Keati g s politi al st le e e ot
entirely congruent, and posed difficulty. Tensions quickly arose – why, when attempting to e ngage
with Asia as a reformed, liberal, cosmopolitan and tolerant nation, would Australia wish to place the
battles of WWII at the centre of national identity, where the central narrative was Australia figh ting
against Asian encroachment and with all the attendant colonial and racist legacies associ ated wi th
this? How would sections of the Australian population who ide ntified closely with the Anzac
tradition, the story of the original landings at Gallipoli, and their associations with Empire and
conservatism, react to attempts to reformulate a central Australian national narrative? Compl ying
with the opposing pulls of observing the conventions of Anzac Day, whilst also injecting a ne w, and
competing, perspe ti e
as e ide tl a diffi ult task. Keati g s spee h
ite , Do Watso ,
reflected upon the tension that this posed:
130
Paul Keating made so many of these speeches [about WWII] we feared that he might
eventually have to revert to the platitudes with which such occasions are generally observed.
Insofar as we avoided this, it made for better speeches, but also for controversy sometimes.
He was on sacred ground: and departure from the customary words and gestures would
always offend someone (Watson 2011, 182).
A d offe d people it did. The a kg ou d of Keati g s epu li a is , his pu li all stated de si e to
ha ge the Aust alia flag, a d his lose e gage e t ith the old e e
all p o oked ea tio
from the Opposition and from critics. In some ways, those critics have been vindicated –
o eptio s of A za still e ai
e t ed o the o igi al la di gs at Gallipoli. Ho e e , Ke ati g s
entrepreneurship in reorientating Anzac did help to enlarge the scope of Anzac and, to some extent,
it contributed to a e u de sta di g of Aust alia s a histo a d its ea i g fo
o te po a
Australians. Further, it demonstrates both the extent to which Prime Ministers can redefine Anzac,
whilst at the same time demonstrating the limits of this reorientation.
Anzac Day 1992 – Papua New Guinea
Anzac Day 1992 was the first for Keating as Prime Minister, and provided a clear enunciation of his
position. It was marked at several locations in Papua New Guinea - on Anzac Day in Port Moresby,
and the following day at the Highland village of Kokoda. It explicitly set out the reasons why he
regarded the battles at Kokoda and during WWII to be so significant and the values associated wi th
that significance, which were centred on the values of his political style, especially his radical
nationalism. It was a radical, shocking, novel, and explicit attempt by an Australian Prime Minister to
reorientate the location and meaning of Anzac Day and to align the occasion wi th the policy age nda
of the government of the day.
The occasion was preceded by a trip by Keating to Indonesia, the first overseas trip that he made as
Prime Minister, which helped to frame the subsequent trip to Papua New Guinea as a part of
Keati g s wider regional engagement. Arriving in Papua New Guinea the day before Anzac Day,
Keating told an audience at an official dinner that:
We [PNG and Australia] both know that we must seize the opportunity.
We both know that we must engage in the region as never before.
This is why, on my first trip overseas as Prime Minister, I am visiting Indonesia and Papua New
Gui ea…
That is why I say strengthening our regional linkages, initiating dialogue, multiplying our
common interests through widening our trading relationships – these measures will stay true
to the interests of the new generations of Australians (Keating 1992e, 1-2).
131
The ground was set by Keating here for framing the trip in terms of multilateralism, regional
engagement and trade.
Keating gave three addresses regarding Anzac during his trip to Papua New Guinea. The fi rst w as a
short address at the dawn service at the Bomana War Cemetery in Port Moresby, attended by
Keating, Rabbie Namaliu, the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, the Opposi tion leader John
Hewson, and the New Zealand defence minister, amongst others (Nelson 1997, 157). Afterwards,
Keating walked through the cemetery, observing the graves of the servicemen who were buried
there. Later in the morning, the party had assembled at the Ela Beach memorial gates in Port
Moresby, and the dignitaries again made speeches (Nelson 1997, 158). It was here at Ela Bach that
Keating gave his most wide-ranging speech on Anzac Day of the trip. The following day, Keating
travelled to the Highland village of Kokoda, where he dropped to his knees and kissed the ground i n
front of the modest memorial, and gave a shorter, but significant, speech. The speeches were
attended by a phalanx of journalists, eager to get a return on the money spent on their atte ndance
i o e seas lo atio s Nelso
,
, li ki g the P i e Mi iste s spee hes to the ge es of e s
reporting, and amplifying the message to the audience in Australia.
The brief speech at the Bomana War Cemetery closely followed many of the conventions of the
Anzac tradition identified above, and gave little indication of what was to follow at Ela Beach and
Kokoda. As su h, Keati g paid t i ute to the
o
adeship of the se i e e
ou t a d i the a e of f eedo
ho
a e
, e du a e , de otio , hu ou , a d
e e u ied at Bo a a,
ho had died i defe e of thei
(Keating 1992f, 1). The audience was called upon to remember
the sa ifi e of the se i e e , the ha dships the fa ed a d the o d the campaign had cre ate d
between Australians and Papua New Guineans. In many ways, the speech resorted to the kind of
platitudes that Don Watson had hoped to avoid, but with one exception – the (brief) recogni tion of
the horrors of war:
They suffered appalling hardship in an impossible terrain. They were debilitated by disease.
They suffered long after the war ended. Some still suffer now (Keating 1992f, 1).
This level of acknowledgement of the harm that war causes was somewhat of a departure for Pri me
Ministerial Anzac Day addresses. Whilst the numbers of war dead and wounded were often l i sted,
the ha
that is aused to those
oke
digge s ho etu
ho e, a d the o goi g dist ess a d
damage wrought upon their families and loved ones, was often ignored, despite the efforts of
Vietnam veterans to ameliorate this deficiency during this period. Whilst the listing of war dead
neatly fits narratives of dutiful sacrifice, the horror of the returned wounded and scarred challenges
132
neat, state-driven notions of honour, duty and sacrifice. Whilst not a dominant feature of the
Bomana speech, the acknowledgement of the horrors of war went some way to avoid the
platitudes that Do Watso ide tifies as ha a te isti of A za Da
e o ialisatio . O the
whole, though the Bomana address was a conventional and largely unremarkable Prime Mini sterial
Anzac Day address, closely following the accepted genre conventions of Anzac.
Keati g s t o follo i g spee hes, at Ela Bea h a d the follo i g da at Kokoda, offe ed fa
oe
radical departures from accepted Anzac norms. Both speeches followed similar narratives structures
– acknowledging the importance of Gallipoli before continuing on to argue that the battles fought at
Kokoda and Papua New Guinea were of greater significance, and created a greater sense of
Australian identity, because of the efforts to defend continental Australia instead of the de fence of
the British Empire in faraway lands. Both speeches went some way to acknowledge the horrors of
war, linked the allies that Australia fought with in WWII to contemporary relationships, had a fai rl y
thinly conceived notion of liberal values as the virtues being defended and, finally, we re sacral i sed
efe e e to eligiosit . The efe e ed Keati g s adi al atio alis a d ade allus ions to hi s
cosmopolitanism, though this was less explicit than his radical nationalism. The speeches
demonstrated both the ideographic quality of Anzac, in the sense that it could be uprooted and
relocated, but also the taboos that proscribed a too radical reinterpretation of the story and its
ea i g, ith the a se e of the so ial ele e ts of Keati g s ig pi tu e politi s.
Early in each speech, the significance of the original landings at Gallipoli in 1915, and how they
helped to define Australian identity, is acknowledged. At Ela Beach, Keating remarked:
Gallipoli a d the histo of the Aust alia atio a e i dissolu le. It is i s i ed i lege d… The
spirit of Anzac became the canon of Australian life: the ideals to which we aspire, the values by
which we live (Keating 1992d, 1).
Here the recognition of Gallipoli is explicit and unchallenged. However, at Kokoda the following day,
the centrality of Gallipoli and WWI was tacitly acknowledged, but also contested:
Even though we fought in many conflicts where we felt pangs of loyalty to what was then
k o
as the Mothe Cou t , to B itai a d to the E pi e, a d e fought at Gallipoli ith
heroism and in Belgium, in Flanders and in France and in other places, this [the battles along
the Kokoda Track] was the first and only time that we fought against an enemy to prevent the
invasion of Australia, to secure the way of life we had built for ourselves (Keating 1993b, 59).
Keating tacitly accepted the centrality of Gallipoli and the battles of the Western Front in Austral i an
life by acknowledging them as sites of Australian virtue. However, whilst Gallipoli and the battles of
133
WWI a e a k o ledged as sites of he ois
, they are grammatically placed below the battles al ong
the Kokoda Track. Only at Kokoda did Aust alia s p e e t the i
asio of Aust alia and secure our
way of life. Kokoda was ousting the preeminent place of Gallipoli in Anzac narratives of Austral ian
identity.
Both speeches went on to acknowledge death, suffering and sacrifice . At Kokoda, Keating simply
listed the numbers of Australian, American and Japanese dead –
of the [Aust al i a s] di ed .
At Ela Beach, Keating also listed the figures of the war dead in WWI – si t thousa d ou g
Aust alia s - and WWII –
,
i the “e o d , efo e a k o ledgi g the ha
aused to those
that survived and returned home – Cou tless othe s died p e atu el as a esult of a , o had
thei li es a d the li es of thei fa ilies s a ed
a
(Keating 1992d, 1-2). This explicit
acknowledgement of the damage that war inflicts upon its participants was a further challenge to
the accepted practices and meanings of Anzac Day. Having said that, reminding the audience of the
sa ifi es of a s pa ti ipa ts also seeks to p os i e o te station, as contestation would dishonour
the memory of those who had died or had been wounded.
At Ela Beach, Keating continued the speech by beginning the process of dismantling traditional
conceptions of Anzac, centred on the story of the Gallipoli landings:
Legends bind nations together. They define us to ourselves.
But they should not stifle us. They should not constrain our growth, or restrict us when we
have to change.
Anzac is a commemoration of the most universal human values.
But it does not confer on us a duty to see that the world stands still.
The Australians who went to two World Wars, or to Korea, Malaya, Vietnam, went to secure a
place in the world for their country and its ideals.
The world moves on. Our country must move with it (Keating 1992d, 2).
Keati g s politi al isio
ega to o e th ough he e, as he asked the audie e to move beyond
a epted u de sta di gs of the e t alit of A za . Lege ds like A za should ot sti fl e us - the
odal e
should o
itti g the audie e to Keati g s isio . The Australians who had fought i n
Aust alia s ilita histo had fought fo thei ou t
ut the
o ld had ha ged. Ou
ou t
ust
s pla e i the o ld a d a pla e fo its ideal s,
o e
ith it –
ust signalling the imperative
nature of the call for change, with no ambiguity. At Kokoda, Keating continued to contest the
e t alit of Gallipoli
si pl stati g It as he e ou g Aust alia
e fought fo the fi st ti e
134
against the prospect of the invasion of their count , of Aust alia Keati g
, 59). Australia was
being asked to move beyond the accepted narrative strictures of Anzac.
Back at Ela Beach, Keating declared two remembrance tasks – firstly, memorialising those who di e d
in the battles of WWII, or as POWs, a d se o dl , e e
a d Lo do a d Washi gto , where
Aust alia had e e
e i g the attle fought out i Ca
a ti e P i e Mi iste Joh Cu ti
e a
defied those people
efo e defied (Keating 1992d, 2). Curtin insisted that Australian troops come
home from the Middle East and return to defend Australia:
Joh Cu ti
as ight…
In doing this he took the Anzac legend to mean that Australia came first - that whatever the
claims of Empire on the loyalty of those who died in the Great war, the preeminent claim had
ee Aust alia s.
The Australians who served here in Papua New Guinea fought and died, not in the defence of
the old world, but the new world. Their world.
They died in defence or Australia and the civilisation and values which had grown up there.
That is why it might be said that, for Australians, the battles in Papua New Guinea were the
most important ever fought (Keating 1992d, 3; emphasis in the original).
The th eads of Keati g s Big Pi tu e politi s a d his adi al atio alis
i te se ted he e. Ha i g
alluded to his policy agenda by arguing that the world had changed, Keating execute d a temporal
shift a k i Aust alia s histo , efe e i g the e e ts su ou di g the Fall of “i gapo e a d a gui g
that the same lessons needed to be learnt again – Aust alia a e fi st . The soldiers who had
fought in Papua New Guinea during WWII had fought for Australia and the values that the country
ep ese ted, ot fo the E pi e a d its stale old o ld , a d as a o se ue e the
i po ta t e e fought . The spee h at Ela Bea h efle ted the atio alis
e e the
ost
of Keati g s A za Da
addresses – the rejection of the role of Great Britain in Australian history and the flowering of an
independent, proud and distinct Australia via the deeds of Australians in the War in the Pacific. Thi s
is ei fo ed
Keati g s efe e es to the a these attles in the Pacific had linked the nations of
Papua New Guinea and the United States, but he failed to do the same for the United Kingdom.
Having executed this shift, Keating ran into difficulty defining what Australian service personnel had
fought for. Older conceptions of Anzac had established answers to these questions – Australian
service personnel had fought for King and country, all underpinned by a racialised version of
Aust alia
ess. Keati g s os opolita is
had e ised Ki g a d o e t a is m from his political
repertoire, but his radical nationalism carried the rhetorical leftovers of older, raci al i se d, forms of
Australian identity. Thus, Keating purported that Australian servicemen and women had fought for
135
reasons of Australian, not Imperial, nationalism, and fairy thinly conceived liberal values. At Ela
Bea h, Aust alia s i
Papua Ne
i ilisatio , a d the u
Gui ea had fought fo the
a ed alues of
e
o ld , thei
s Aust alia. The efe e e to i ilisatio
ou t , its
as fi lled
with the ambiguity surrounding the hegemonic values of WWII Australia, and its associ ati ons wi th
Eu opea
i ilisatio
e sus the a a is
of the the
olo ised glo al south a d Aust al ia s
a
enemies. Later in this speech, Keating suggests that Australians fought for their beliefs – the
believed in Australia – in the democracy they had built, in the life they had made there, and the
futu e the
elie ed thei ou t had Keati g
d,
. At Kokoda, li e t is a a ed alue that
was defended by Australians in Papua New Guinea. These named liberal values operate as
ideog aphs, as do Aust alia , alues , thei i ilisatio , a d the futu e . Keati g s os opolita is
led him to leave the historical meaning of these terms ambiguous and the audience is left to
interpret their meaning.
Keati g s spee hes, a d thei atte pted t a sitio f o Gallipoli to Kokoda, e e sa al i sed
hi s
allusions to the sacredness and religiosity of the occasion. This sacralisation was important for
Keati g s effo ts to p ese t his A za e t ep e eu ship as u politi al. At Ela Bea h, Keati g said
that the spi it of A za
those
ho se ed
as the a o of Aust alia life (Keating 1992d, 1) and the memory of
as sa ed (Keating 1992d, 2). At Kokoda Keating became bolder. It was here
that Keating argued that:
…that these ou g e elie ed i Aust alia a d e eed to gi e Aust alia s, all Aust alia s,
but particularly young Australians, an Australia to believe in. We can't deny young Australians
their birthright to a past with meaning for them and a future with meaning. It has to be a
future with meaning and there can be no deeper spiritual basis to the meaning of the
Australian nation than the blood that was spilled on this very knoll, this very plateau, in
defence of the liberty of Australia (Keating 1993b, 59).
In the context of recovery from the recession, young Australians of 1992 still had much to ye arn for
in their future. In January of that year, it was reported that whilst the recession had seen the
unemployment rate rise to 10.3%, the unemployment rate for teenagers aged 15-19 years was
running at 30% (Encel 1992, 11). Keating offered a future made pure by the allusions to the
sacralisation of the blood sacrifice of the soldiers who had f ought and died at Kokoda – the lood
spilled o this e k oll i the a e of li e t . This lood sa ifi e as offe ed i pla e of the jo s
that did not exist and the attendant futures that employment entailed, their absence at least in part
because of the decisions made by Keating as Treasurer. Again, these ideographs are left vague and
ambiguous, free of definitive meaning and left open for audience interpretation, which reflected the
136
limits of engaging with nationalist sentiment in a plural and post-modern society that was
increasingly (though not exclusively) suspicious of exclusionary meta-narratives of nation.
The theme of sacrifice was immediately continued by Keating at Kokoda:
So can I thank you the people of New Guinea and those of you who actually fought in that
campaign, for those who died in that campaign, to the relatives here today of loved ones who
were lost but who gave their lives selflessly in the defence of Papua New Guinea and the
defence of Australia and the broader defence of liberty in the Pacific.
This was the place where I believe the depth and soul of the Australian nation was confirmed.
If it was founded at Gallipoli it was certainly confirmed in the defence of our homeland here
(Keating 1993b, 59).
At Kokoda, the soul of Aust alia is o fi
ed . Whilst a se ula i te p etatio of o fi
atio is
plausible, the preceding reference to the soul of the nation also suggests the Christian rite of
confirmation, where the Baptismal rites are finalised and seal the covenant between God and the
hu h
e
e . “o, agai st the a kg ou d of the t ope that Gallipoli as a aptis
Aust alia t oops, Keati g
akes the asse tio that Kokoda o fi
of fi e fo
ed the soul of the Australian
atio , o pleti g the ites of i itiatio . These religious allusions helped to insulate Ke ating from
critics who felt he was violating the accepted conventions of Anzac and, further, sacralised the
statements contained within the speeches.
Keati g s atte pt to elo ate A za f o Gallipoli to Kokoda did ot go u
oti ed a d u o te ste d
– it was not accepted as properly unpolitical. Aside from his speeches in Papua New Guinea,
controversy was further provoked by a microphone picki ng up Keating saying to a local child at
Kokoda
ho
those soo
o de
as
Watso
a dishi g a Aust alia flag Do t o
,
, so
,
e ll get ou a e
o e of
. Conservative critics quickly emerged to discipline Keating and
Keati g s pa tisanship and defend the essential and depoliticised version of Anzac that had
been newly re-established after reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. Of course, the se acti ons by
critics were political in of themselves, but they had the virtue of purporting to be unpolitical in the i r
defence of the essentialism of the traditionally conservative interpretation of Anzac. Opposition
leader John Hewson accused Keating of buying new friends in Asia, disowning old ones and
apologisi g fo Aust alia s past Mil e a d Ta lo
,
. Joh Ho a d, i a sig of thi gs to o e ,
e a ked that Keati g as usi g A za Da fo pa tisa politi al pu poses Mil e a d Ta l o
,
1). The now national vice-p eside t of the ‘“L, B u e ‘u to , as also u i p essed ith Ke ati g s
o
e ts o the Aust alia flag a d Keati g s epu li a is : Those thousa ds of Aust alia s
u ied i the Bo a a Wa Ce ete
ould ha e got up a d pushed hi
do
o e of the holes
137
(Tho pso
,
. ‘u to s o plai ts, ho e e , also e eal the ‘“L s g o i g a gi alisatio i
the process of defining of Anzac. Keating in 1992 was able to use the authority of his office to
relocate Anzac Day, both physically, away from the strictures of the capital city dawn service and
march, and rhetorically, away the influence of the RSL in the governing of Anzac narrative. As
Nelson (1997, 161) notes, the media was keen to get a return on its investment in sending journalists
overseas to cover the occasion. Their attention was squarely focused on the Prime Minister in
Papua New Guinea and the novel new ways that he was redefining Anzac, not the RSL.
Anzac Day 1993 - The Burma-Thailand Railway Book Launch
Anzac Day 1993 was more low-key for Keating, but no less provocative. No formal speech was
reported to have been made on Anzac Day, but he had attended a book launch on April 23 rd, and
ga e a add ess. A za Da
o e agai
lea l
efle ted the te sio s of Keati g s politi al
style. Keating again sought to relocate Anzac away from Gallipoli (never mentioning the battl e ) to
the War in the Pacific and once again derided the influence of the Empire on Australian identity,
claiming that the events of WWII had created an independent sense of Australian national i de nti ty.
This sense of independence was then explicitly linked to the Australian turn to Asia, and the
attendant cosmopolitanism of Big Picture politics. However, this was awkwardly juxtaposed with the
tenets of radical nationalism, and the racially exclusive and masculine language that thi s e ntai le d.
These tensions were not fully reconciled by Keating and Anzac Day 1993 demonstrated the
diffi ulties that Keati g s go e i g st le posed.
Keati g s
A za Da add ess
as ot an Anzac Day address in a conventional sense of the
word. It was conducted on April 23rd, a full two days before Anzac Day, rather than on Anzac Day
itself or immediately preceding or following it (although, Anzac Day falling on a Sunday that year
may have been a factor in the timing of the speech). Further, it launched a book, The BurmaThailand Railway: Memory and History, rather than being a speech delivered at a dedicated Anzac
Day event, like a dawn service or march. These factors demonstrate that Prime Ministerial
engagement with Anzac was still in a somewhat unsettled stage, not quite an institutionalised
practice, complete with attendant ceremonial tradition, routine, and procedures.
Keating began his 1993 address by acknowledging the horrors of war. Restrained in his language,
Keating argued that Australians knew little about their war history, especially their regional war
histo . Keati g k e
e ause
fathe s
othe had ee the e [“a daka ], a d died the e
138
(Keating 1993a, 1) but it was not taught at school and was not widely written about. Keating goes
on:
We knew the wars through legend and ritual.
And we knew World War I better than we knew World War II.
But e eall did 't k o
hat it had ee like…
And that, I think, is why we are shocked when we see the gravestones which remind us of how
many died, and their ages, and what they must have gone through, and the people they left
behind (Keating 1993a, 1-2).
There is little sense of the Anzac tradition of duty, service, bravery and sacrifice in this quote.
Keati g li ks his o
ith its
fa il s e pe ie e of a to the pau it of the atio s ide e gage e t
a histo . Keati g s ea tio is is e al, e p essi g sho k at the number of dead, their
youth, their suffering and the impact of their loss on their families and loved ones. Whilst still
restrained and refraining from gratuitous description of the violence of war, the degree of
recognition given to the horrors of war by Keating was a departure from the Anzac tradition.
This le el of a k o ledge e t i fo
ed the adi al atio alist the es of Keati g s spee h, as the
horrors visited upon the participants of war, especially the participants of WWII, were the
consequence of the incompetency and betrayal of Great Britai , a d, i additio , Aust alia s
subservient and passive relationship with the Empire. Keating was careful not to too explicitly draw
this link, once again conceding the power and significance of the original story of Anzac and WWI i n
the Australian imagi atio
sa ed to Aust alia Keati g
e ause these pla es [the attlefields of No the
F a e] a e t ul
a, 2). Significantly, though, Gallipoli itself was not mentioned
anywhere in the speech and immediately after this statement, Keating once again promoted his
relocation of Anzac from WWI and Gallipoli, to WWII and the War in the Pacific:
But the battlefields of the Asian and Pacific war are also sacred. In the next few years I hope
the battlefields of New Guinea, Borneo, Singapore and Malaya - and Burma and Thailand - will
become as important to our historical understanding as the battlefields of the Middle East and
Europe were to earlier generations of Australians.
Everyone should know about these battles.
Above all, they should know about the subject of this book - the prisoners of war who worked
on the Burma-Thailand Railway.
No Australian soldiers suffered more than these. Few had more reason to feel betrayed or
neglected – before, during and after their capture. None had to call on such reserves of faith
and spirit as they did: faith in themselves; faith in each other; faith - I like to think – in
Australia, what they had created there and what they hoped to create (Keating 1993a, 2).
139
The elo atio
suffe ed
as e pli it. E e o e should k o a out these attles a d o Aust alia sol die s
o e tha these are emphatic, declarative and unambiguous calls to recognise the
significance of the War in the Pacific and an attempt to locate them hierarchically on a scale with
them above WWI and Gallipoli, as o Aust alia soldie s suffe ed o e tha these . But more than
that, the statement condemned those
ho had put the
i that situatio , as the had
these Australian service personnel – fe had o e easo to feel et a ed o
age ts
ho had
et a ed these Aust alia
e e left u
et a ed
egle ted . Whilst the
a ed, Keati g s epu li a ism, his
Singapore outburst in Parliament the year before, or his 1992 Anzac Day statements, leave little
doubt that it was the British Empire that was the target here.
Keati g e t o to a gue that Aust alia s fou d, a d o ti ued to fi d, the sel es i Asia:
…these e e the fi st Aust alia s to go en masse into South East Asia. They saw it and dealt
with its peoples as no other Australians had.
They also saw the British empire [sic] as few Australians had ever seen it – and it led a lot of
them to conclude that we Australians had evolved into a different race. It raised their sense of
an independent identity.
So, it may be that in time the 8th Division will be seen as something more than soldiers or
prisoners of war – but as the first pioneers of Australia in Asia. The frontiersmen.
Somehow I think it would be the highest tribute we could pay them – both those who died and
those who managed to survive (Keating 1993a, 2).
Keating imbued the POWs with a purpose for which there is little historical antecede nt. As Curran
,
poi ts out, the e is little to suggest that Australian soldiers fighting in the Pacific saw
themselves as the creators of a new national myth that would come to replace the ideas of Empi re
ith Asia e gage e t. These histo i al i a u a ies ouple d with the insensitive language that
Keating uses – the fi st soldie s to go e
asse i to “outh East Asia… as the fi st pio ee s of
Aust alia i Asia - painted an unproblematic and power free picture of Australian engagement wi th
Asia, in the mould that Curran suggests above. It is oblivious to the fact that Australians were en
masse in South East Asia to protect the colonial territories of the British Empire and Australia against
the invasion of Japan, rather than as equal partners seeking mutual engagement and advantage.
E gage e t i this histo i al se se as also a o pa ied, a o di g to the late sta da ds Keati g
himself promoted, by blatant racism and crude stereotyping. These associations were not helped by
Keati g s ie that these Aust alia s had e ol ed i to a diffe e t a e , with Keating being:
…the o l p i e i iste i the post-1972 period to use the term race as a positive equivalent
to atio – e e though a e , ith its iologi al dete i a ts of lood a d sto k , as ell
as its unwavering devotion to histo i al issio o atio al desti , had falle i to dis epute
following the excesses and evils of fascism and Nazism (Curran 2006, 300).
140
Finally, the comparison was awkward because of the wildly differing circumstances of the eras – the
context of Australia defending itself against a (potentially) invading Japan, and all its associations
with the defence of colonialism and realpolitik, was a world away from the middle power
internationalism that Keating saw as central to his political style.
Aust alia s i
also fou d the sel es i Asia. I
ediatel follo i g Keati g s t i ute to the
th
di isio as the fi st pio ee s of Aust alia i Asia , he o ti ued by explaining what that tribute would
entail:
Such a tribute would depend on our succeeding in Asia, of course. It will mean that we will
have to succeed economically - as an entirely independent nation, aware of necessity and
confident of both our identity and our capabilities.
And that will depend on our developing greater mutual understanding between the countries
of Asia and ourselves, greater mutual respect
The men and women discussed in this book very often did just that - they developed a deep
respect for the Chinese and the Malays, the people of Borneo and Ambon and Sumatra who
very often risked their lives to help them.
They found in all sorts of circumstances that they shared common human ground with people
they had, for cultural and historical reasons, been inclined to patronise or despise.
There's surely a lesson in it we can come to terms with the countries of Asia and in doing so,
far from sacrificing our identity or our principles, strengthen them (Keating 1993a, 3).
In this case, Keating was much more sensitive to the cosmopolitanism of his political styl e, e ve n i f
the historical accuracy of his claims were suspect. It is also one of the rare occasions we re Ke ati ng
explicitly referenced diversity and tolerance in his Anzac Day addresses. Difference, though, is
e phasised
Keati g, ith atio alis
s us s the
di hotomy –
e a
o e to te
s ith the
ou t ies of Asia a d i doi g so, fa f o sa ifi i g ou ide tit o ou p i iples, st e gthe the
.
Asia reinforced Australianness.
Success in Asia was further conflated with mateship:
It has been around for a long time, that word [mateship] – a d those p i iples. But I
inclined to think that it is only in the last decade of so that we have begun to realise just what a
powerful force they can be in the economic life of a country and in seeing a country t hrough
g eat ha ges a d ha d ti es…
If we imbue all our endeavours in the next decade with those principles I am sure we will
succeed – and if we succeed, we will have paid the prisoners on the Burma Thailand Railway
the greatest possible tribute (Keating 1993a, 4).
Thus, the deeds and sacrifice of the POWs during the War in the Pacific were conflated with
eoli e al e o o i efo
, Aust alia s tu
to Asia, a d the push to a ds a epu li . To su eed i
141
Asia , Aust alia ust su eed e o o i all , ith that su ess ei g depe de t o ou de e l opi g
g eate
utual u de sta di g et ee
the ou t ies of Asia a d ou sel es . Mateship was
employed as a value to effect this change, and is reconstituted with a new, economi c, me aning – a
value that could see a ou t
th ough g eat ha ges a d ha d ti es . And by succeeding in this
e dea ou , Aust alia ould pa the p iso e s o the Bu
a Thaila d ‘ail a the g eatest possi le
t i ute . The se o d half of Keati g s spee h, the , la gel efle ted Keati g s go e i g st l e – the
oft-rehearsed message of encouraging Australians to look to Asia for their future prosperity was
once again repeated. Mateship, a value intimately tied to radical nationalism, is reconstituted wi th
new economic meanings for changing times, reflecting the way the social was conflated with the
economic by Keating. And the message is endorsed by the connection to the sacrifice of the digge rs
– by succeeding in these endeavours, Australia will have paid a suitable tribute to their suffering and
death.
Keati g s speech did not go unnoticed by the RSL or the Opposition, who both criticised the address.
Brigadier Alf Garland, the national president of the RSL, told the Canberra Times:
No , he a t his da edest ut he s e e goi g to e a le to ha ge the fact that that
[Gallipoli] was where the Australian character as we know it today, the Anzac spirit, was
displa ed to the o ld, a d all that e e a aged to do si e the is to uild o that…
He moves ground every time he wants to try and raise another point to suit his agenda and
nothing is more annoying to ex-service people, people who have been and laid their life on the
bloody line in operations for Australia, to hear somebody, a Johnny-come-lately, sort of telling
us why we were there and what it was all about (Garland, as cited by Brough 1993, 1).
The Oppositio
ea ted too. Taki g the lead i
iti ui g Keati g s spee h, Joh Ho a d e pe ated
themes that he had aired the previous year:
He s the fi st P i e Mi iste I k o that s t ied to put so e kind of spin, partisan political spin,
o
atte s asso iated ith A za Da a d I thi k it s ep ehe si le…
…I thi k it [A za Da ] is just o e of those o asio s he ou do t i t odu e a
political debate or political controversy (Howard, as cited by Brough 1993, 1).
ele e t of
Again, it should be emphasised that these criticism were political too. They were attempts at
defending the depoliticised and essential version of Anzac that they saw as proper. In doing so, the y
were trying to maintain a conservative version of Anzac that they argued was rightly delimited as
unpolitical, incontestable and taboo.
The public sanctioning of Keating demonstrated just how far he pushed the conception of Anzac
Day. By explicitly seeking to relocate Anzac to the Pacific, downplaying the role of Gallipoli, and
142
linking this manoeuvre with his republicanism, turn to Asia, and liberal internationalism, Keating was
violating many of the accepted tenets of Anzac. Conservative critics quickly appeared to defend
traditional conceptions of Anzac Day, and to sanction the Prime Minister for failing to adhere to the
confines of the Anzac tradition, and its associations with heroic sacrifice, duty and service. Most
iti all , Keati g s epu li a is , his desi e to ha ge the Australian flag, and his attempt to reform
Australian identity, were actions that conservative critics conflated with his failure to adequately
adhe e to the t aditio al st i tu es of A za Da a d
e e ui k to o de
. Keati g s A za
entrepreneurship had failed to maintain a suitable level of acceptance and unpolitics, and was
therefore largely unsuccessful.
Anzac Days 1994 and 1995 – The Martin Place Cenotaph, Sydney
Anzac Days 1994 and 1995 were more subdued affairs for Keating, both in terms of the themes
explored in his engagement with the day, and in terms of the controversy, critique and attention
that his A za e t ep e eu ship ga e ed. The o t adi to ele e ts of Keati g s pol iti al st le ,
his radical nationalism and his cosmopolitanism, were pushed to the background as Keati ng sought
instead to engage with Anzac in a manner which largely conformed to the accepted practice and
performance of Anzac Day – honouring the sacrifice of those who had served, reflecting on the way
Anzac unified the nation and, significantly, for the most part referring to the original story of Anzac
centred on the landings at Gallipoli in WWI instead of the War in the Pacific.
Ha i g said that, the su te t of Keati g s atte pt to eo ie tate A za
as still p e sent, with a
separate media release in 1994 announcing that the government would spend $1.5 million on
improving facilities at Kokoda (Keating 1994b). However, these announcements, and Kokoda and
the War in the Pacific more generally, were secondary featu es of Keati g s A za Da add esses
du i g these ea s. Whilst the o e te pe ed atu e of Keati g s e gage e t ith A za du i g
these years can be partly explained by the explosion of WWII memorialisation which was occurri ng
from 1994, and especially in 1995 with the Australia Remembers program (see Chapter 7), this
change in tone stands in sharp contrast to the previous two years.
The addresses were very similar, the first similarity being their location. 1994 and 1995 saw Keati ng
attend the Martin Place Cenotaph for Anzac Day. In 1994, Keating laid a wreath after the dawn
service and released a statement for the media in lieu of a speech, and in 1995 K eating gave a
speech after the dawn service. Significantly, for the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings in 1995,
Keating did not travel to the Gallipoli Peninsula, as Hawke had done in 1990 for the 75 th anniversary,
143
and as his successor Howard did in 2000 for the 85th anniversary and in 2005 for the 90th
anniversary. The 80th anniversary of the landings instead saw the Governor General Bill Hayden and
Vete a s Affai s i iste Co “ ia a atte d the A za Co e se i e. As su h, Keati g s a ti -Bri tish
nationalism was not entirely absent from the marking of Anzac Day during these years.
The second similarity was their themes. In place of the attempts to reorientate Anzac and the
adi al atio alis of Keati g s A za Da add esses i
a d
, his
a d
add esses
largely conformed to the strictures of the Anzac tradition, whilst being sensitive to contemporary
political values and current ADF deployments. Thus, Keating directed his focus to the origi nal story
of Anzac centred on Gallipoli and the WWI. In 1994, Keating begins his media release by stating
“i e that fateful Ap il day in 1915, a spirit of duty and courage that cannot be destroyed has be e n
s
olised
hat e k o as the AN)AC lege d Keati g
c,
, e pli itl li ki g the spi it of
the Anzac legend not to the War in the Pacific, but to the landings at Gall ipoli in 1915. Further,
Keating later links all subsequent service personnel ith the spi it o
at Gallipol i – Th ough al l
the years and all the wars, wherever Australians and New Zealanders have fought since , that spi ri t
born at Gallipoli has been a o d joi i g the
ith the AN)ACs of
Keati g
c, 1).
Comparable themes are present in 1995, as early in his speech, Keating again placed Gallipoli at the
centre of the occasion:
This is the eightieth anniversary of the event from which Anzac Day derives, the landing at
Gallipoli and the tragic and disastrous military campaign which followed it. Anzac Day is not a
celebration of military victory, or a glorification of war. But it is the most important and
profound day in Australia's national life (Keating 1995a, 1).
Here Gallipoli is not placed hierarchically below the battles along the Kokoda Track, or the suffe ri ng
of the POWs captured by the Japanese, as they had been in 1992 and 1993. Instead, the origin of
Anzac is identified solely with the landings at Gallipoli, and the traditions that sprung up to honour
those e e ts as the ost i po ta t a d p ofou d to Australia.
These spee hes a e also fa less spe ifi i thei ide tifi atio
his go e
e t s a ti ities o e ge e all . Thus, i
ith Keati g s poli i i tiati es o to
, o l passi g efe e e is
ade to …the
activities of our service men and women on duty abroad, particularly through our participation in
U ited Natio s ope atio s
Keati g
c, 1) in reference to ADF personnel deployed for UN
operations in Cambodia and Somalia. Keati g s
spee h la ked even these passing references to
his go e
ei g the ague e ho tatio to pa t i ute to
e t s poli age da, ith the e eptio
144
Australians who died so that we could live in peace and continue the task of building a good and
p ospe ous ou t
Keati g
a, 1).
I pla e of Keati g s e pli it efe e e to his go e
Do Watso
e t s poli
age da e e the platitudes that
a ed ould ha a te ise A za Da add esses. “o, e see e pla atio s of A za s
significance that centre on calls for unity and to remember the lessons of the Anzac tradition –
heroic sacrifice, duty, bravery and honour:
We took from Gallipoli, and we have taken from every subsequent war in which Australians
have fought and died, the message contained in that sacrifice: that it is good to be brave and
to endure difficulty, and that we are bravest, most able to endure and most likely to succeed
when we know we can rely on each other, when we stick together (Keating 1995a, 1).
Anzac, as presented by Keating here, lacks specificity and is rather bland – an ideograph imbued with
little in the way of contestable meaning and left to the audience to interpret. Instead of using Anzac
a ti el to p o ote his go e
e t s poli
age da, as he had do e i
a d
, Keati g i
1994 and 1995 was passive in his engagement with Anzac, largely conforming to the Anzac tradi ti on
and its accepted meaning and practice.
A othe
ha ge f o
Keati g s
a d
A za Da add esses
as his g eate se siti it
towards gender. Thus, in place of the exclusively masculine gendered nouns of 1992 and 1993,
Keating in both 1994 and 1995 refers to the men and women who had ser ed du i g Aust alia s
history. Whilst lacking the named and rich specificity that had characterised his eulogising of the
soldiers who had fought at Kokoda in 1992, or the POWs who had built the Burma-Thailand Rai l way
in 1993, Keating in his later addresses linked women to the traditional sentiments attached to mal e
pa ti ipa ts i Aust alia s
men and o e
a histo . “o, i
Keati g asks us …to pa t i ute to the galla t
ho had ade the ulti ate sa ifi e i the se i e of thei ou t
1; emphasis added a d i
…to e e
e ou
ou t
Keati g 1994c,
e and women who, because they
elie ed i Aust alia a d sa thei dut to it, e e p epa ed to la do
thei li es i
a
Ke ati g
1995a, 1; emphasis added).
The benign nature of Keating s
a d
A za Da add esses is e apsulated
the la k of
controversy his remarks attracted in the media, from the Opposition, and from the RSL. The RSL,
quick to defend Anzac tradition, was outraged by links being made between Anzac Day and th e
Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras, and the lack of instruction about Anzac in the school curriculum
in 1995, rather than with comments made by the Prime Minister (Porter, Le Grand and AAP 1995,
145
4). Having pushed his radical nationalism to the background, and having largely excised reference to
his go e
e t s poli
age da, Keati g s e gage e t
ith A za Da i these ea s passed
unchallenged.
Conclusion
Keati g s e gage e t
ith A za Da de o st ates oth the su ess a d failu e of his A za
entrepreneurship. It was successful in the sense that it further institutionalised the practice of Prime
Ministerial leadership of Anzac Day, increasingly (though not entirely) breaking free from the RSL
and marginalising the role they traditionally played in the definition and practice of Anzac. By
marking Anzac Day in Papua New Guinea in 1992, Keating was able to both keep the influence of the
‘“L at a
s le gth, a d also atte pt to edefi e the lo atio of A za a a f o Gallipoli a d WWI,
to Kokoda and WWII. Keating also consistently engaged with Anzac, making speeches or re l e asing
so e ki d of state e t to
a k the o asio e e
A za Da he
as P i e Mi iste . Keati g s
Anzac entrepreneurship emphasised neoliberal economic reform, republicanism, and e ngage ment
with Asia, as well as his radical nationalism, hostility towards Great Britain and Australian
conservatives who were identified with Britishness, and chauvinistic pride in Australianness. The se
efforts by Keating – his regular engagement, his sidelining of the RSL and his attempt to relocate
Anzac – all demonstrate just how much effort Keating put into defining Anzac on his terms. As his
spee h
ite Do Watso o se ed, …he had deli e ed a othe ki d of
custom [surroundi g A za ] ould ot est ai hi
Watso
,
essage, a el that
-184).
But also, however unrestrained Keating may have been, he was not entirely successful in his
e t ep e eu ship su ou di g A za . Co se ati e
iti s
e e ui k to ea t to Keati g s thi l
veiled swipes at the values that they associated with the Anzac tradition, the links to Empire, and the
atte pts to edefi e A za i te
s hi h alig ed losel
ith Keati g s go e i g st le a d pol i
agenda. Whilst the influence of the RSL was declining, it refused to be marginalised, and conti nue d
to age agai st atte pts to edefi e A za s
ea i g. Joh Ho a d also e e ged as a p o i e t
iti of Keati g s atte pt to elo ate a d edefi e A za – themes he continued when he took
office in 1996 (see Chapters 8 and 9). As such, whilst Keating was an enthusiastic Anzac
entrepreneur who contributed significantly to the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial
engagement with Anzac, he failed in his attempt to relocate and redefine Anzac Day in an i mage of
his own nationalism and politics.
146
CHAPTER 7
Keating and Manifold Memorialisation: War Remembrance Outside
of Anzac Day
Introduction
The last hapte de o st ated Keati g s egula a d a ti e A za e t ep e eu ship,
hi h
continued the institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac. It al so argue d that
Keating attempted to redefine Anzac in a manner which aligned with his political style, and that thi s
redefinition demonstrated a tension between the more chauvinistic aspects of his radical
atio alis
a d os opolita is . Keati g s e gage e t ith A za Da
as a o pa ied
a
parallel increase in war memorialisation and remembrance outside of Anzac Day, partly by
coincidence and partly by contrivance. Winter (2006, 26-27; 226-227) identifies this as part of the
second memory boom of the 20th century – the set of practices conducted by groups and individuals
i the pu suit of o i g …togethe i pu li to do the o k of e e
a e. This hapte seeks to
explore this process of memorialisation and remembrance by analysing four memorial occasions,
and examines how Keating engaged with memorialisation. Whilst Anzac Day is the focus of the
thesis, the shee s ale of
e o ialisatio that o u ed du i g Keati g s ti e i offi e, a d the
accompanying unprecedented level of government involvement, warrants attention.
Watso
,
a gues that Keati g la ked a
g eat e thusias fo Aust alia s a histo , a d
instead engaged with memorialisation because:
…the e is s a el a ou t y between Australia and Japan that does not have a cemetery with
Australian graves in it, or a monument to the sacrifice of Australian servicemen and women.
Whe , i a o da e ith his issio to se u e Aust alia s i te ests i the egio , Keati g
visited almost every country in East Asia at least once, invariably these places of indescribable
sadness became the backdrop for ceremonies commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the
war [WWII].
Watso s state e t is telli g – Keating felt the obligation to e gage ith A za a d Aust al i a s
a
history. But Keating did not let this obligation define the manner in which he would engage with
Anzac and memorialisation – his engagement was active and entrepreneurial, imbui ng Anzac wi th
his go e
e t s poli
agenda and priorities. At the international level, Keating enthusiastically
aligned the middle power internationalism that his government had pursued with hi s e ngagement
ith e o ialisatio , li ki g the
oade i g of Aust alia s outlook, its turn to Asia, and i ncre asi ng
147
do esti os opolita is
ith the ea i g of Aust alia s a histo , ia the p o ess of e o i al
diplomacy (Graves 2014). Memorial diplomacy created opportunities for Keating to employ his
political style and promote his policy agenda to polite foreign audiences and a media corps eager for
a story, all far away from the scrutiny of domestic critics. At the domestic level, however, Keating
was more circumspect in aligning the meanings of the interring of the Unknown Soldier and the
Australia Remembers program with his political style.
The s ale of Keati g s
e o ialisatio
ill e e plo ed th ough fou e a ples that de o st ate
varying levels of success and failure at nationalism entrepreneurship:
1. 1992 saw the culmination of the reconciliation process with Vietnam veterans with the
opening of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial on Anzac Parade in Canbe rra.
Keating continued to observe the terms of this reconciliation, and felt the effect of its taboos
when he failed to demonstrate an adequate level of o se a e of A za s st i tu es whe n
in Vietnam in 1994.
2. The 75th anniversary of Armistice in 1993 saw the interring of the Unknown Soldier in the
Hall of Memory of the Australian War Memorial, reflecting the shift away from imperial
u de sta di gs of Aust alia s a se i e I glis
. Despite this, Keati g as te pe ed
in his remembrance, and did not fill the occasion with his republicanism, which helped to
keep the occasion free from controversy.
3. Keating travelled to Europe for the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings in 1994, and
marked the occasion in the UK and France. Whilst there, he practiced memorial diplomacy,
and was successful in smoothing relationships with countries that he had offended wi th hi s
history of intemperate remarks.
4. Most significantly, the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, especially the War in the Pacifi c,
was commemorated by a series of government sponsored events with the Australia
Remembers program. It was a deliberate attempt by government at remembrance, and
involved an unprecedented level of government planning and funding. Significantly, Keating
demonstrated his cosmopolitanism more frequently during the Australia Remembers
program of events and managed to keep this initiative relatively depoliticised, essential and
therefore unpolitical.
Keati g s su ess i
e o ialisatio
as the efo e depe de t o his a ilit to kee p the
e o ial
occasions free of the controversy that he tended to attract when he spoke about issues of nati onal
identity. Keeping the occasions free of partisan political conflict was a higher priority for Ke ati ng i n
148
these examples than it had been on Anzac Day in 1992 and 1993. As such, the chapter provides
further evidence for the assertion that Anzac could operate as an ideograph, but that success in
Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship was dependent on maintaining the depoliticised and
unpolitical nature of Anzac, in conjunction with a form of Anzac that gelle d ith the pu li s o
sense of nationalism.
Keating and the Process of Memorialisation
The i
ease i
e o ialisatio
du i g Keati g s te
as P i e Mi iste
as pa tl due to
circumstance, and partly due to contrivance. The circumstantial aspects included the fact that his
term in office coincided with the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, the 75th anniversary of the end
of WWI and the culmination of the reconciliation process with Vietnam veterans wi th the ope ning
and dedication of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in 1992. Evidently, the timing of
the
a
a ki g of these o asio s
as la gel out of the go e
e t s ha ds, as e e go e
e ts
ot alte the dates of sig ifi a t o e ts i Aust alia s a histo . I additio , p op osal s for a
national memorial to the servicemen and women of the Vietnam War had emerged and been se t i n
train whilst Hawke was Prime Minister. Finally, the initial proposal to inter an Unknown Sol di e r i n
the Aust alia Wa Me o ial s Hall of Me o
Me o ial s o
staff I glis
,
had emerged from within the Australian War
. “uggestio s that the p oposal fo the p oje t had e e ge d
from the Prime Minister were misplaced (Inglis 1999, 17).
No etheless, Keati g s e gage e t ith these o asio s
as also contrived in the emphasis and
chosen significance placed these occasions, and the spectacular form that the marking of these
occasions took did in fact contain a significant degree of active Prime Ministerial engagement and
direction.18 That Keating chose to engage with these occasions is telling. There was a ce rtai n l ogi c
associated with his participation, as the head of government, and even the sense of obligation to do
so that Watson (2011) notes. This logic, however, was not unambiguous. For i sta e, Keati g s
role in the interring of the Unknown Soldier attracted some controversy at the time due to his
republicanism (Inglis 1999, 17) and continues to annoy conservative critics who see his picture of
Australianness as a wrongful re-imagination of Australian history and identity (see Bendl e 2014, 6).
It is not implausible to suggest, as critics did, that the non-partisan Governor General should have
been the only one to speak (Blainey 1993a, 2), or to have been the leader of the ceremony, as Bill
18
In addition to the influence of the Prime Minister, it should also be noted that Con Sciacca, the Minister for
Veterans Affairs from 1994-1996, also had an enormous influence over the Australia Remembers program, a nd a n
enthusiasm which helped drive memorialisation (Inglis 2008, 391; 393).
149
Hayden was in 1995 at Gallipoli for the 80th anniversary of the landings. Or, taking the example of
Australia Remembers - Keating could have chosen to focus on the War in Europe, but instead
focussed on his preferred theatre of war, the War in the Pacific. His government also could have
been more modest in its funding of the anniversary, but instead spent $9 million on commemorative
events to mark the occasion, along with $20,000 grants for each federal electorate for community
based memorial activities (ALP 1995, 224). As Reed (2004, 62 - 63) notes, Aust alia s e e u ged to
remember the past, but in reality it often seemed that the past was being created. The past
e e
e ed th ough Aust alia ‘e e
e s as desig ed to e o e the atio al e o .
So, what was being remembered with these memorial events? The structure that limits nationali sm
e t ep e eu s a ge of optio s as e ide t i t o o peti g a d so eti es o t adi to fa to s;
firstly, that, to a degree, Keating felt obliged to recognise these occasions, as befits the role as Prime
Minister following the reconstitution of an unpolitical Anzac, and also to allay suspicions re gardi ng
his radical nationalism. Secondly, though, the occasions were an opportunity for Keating to espouse
his nationalist vision, drawing deeply on his political style for a domestic audience, and linked to this,
at times an occasion to engage with particular nation-states and to promote outward looking middle
power activism and cosmopolitanism.
This presented a conundrum for Keating – in order for his Anzac entrepreneurship to be successful, it
needed to closely conform to the strictures of the Anzac tradition and to pay sufficient respect to the
key stakeholders of this institution. Keating had to temper his language and his radical nati onal i sm;
whilst his nationalism was a feature of his engagement with the process of memorialisation, i t was
far more subtle than the megaphone delivery that had characterised his 1992 and 1993 Anzac Day
addresses examined in Chapter 6.
On the other hand, memorialisation revealed the
cosmopolitanism of his political style to a far greater degree than his engagement with Anzac Day
itself did and provoked little controversy. This fact demonstrates that Anzac could be re novate d i n
ways that quite radically altered its historical form, but only to the extent that it could be prese nte d
in a manner that was accepted by the public, and therefore did not introduce political de li beration
and interrogation that threatened A za s u politi al atu e. Thus, Keati g s e gage e t ith
a
memorialisation throughout his term as Prime Minister provides further evidence for the success
and failure of his Anzac entrepreneurship, simultaneously demonstrati g the e plo
e t of A za s
ideographic nature to stretch the boundaries of Anzac, and the ultimate failure to break those
boundaries and redefine them wholly in his preferred image.
150
Honouring the Forces of the Vietnam War
As Prime Minister, Keating faced the continuing problem of how to honour the reconciliation of
Vietnam veterans. In some ways, Keating had little choice to do so – the unpolitical nature of the
reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the Australian state and public had been e st abl ishe d
during the Hawke governments, and Keating faced the ongoing need to respond to the logic and
events that this process posed. Chief among these was the completion and dedication of the
Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in October 1992, which was the culmination of the
reconciliation process that had begun with the Welcome Home parade of 1987. The date of the
dedication, October 3, made an explicit link to this beginning, being the five year anniversary of the
Welcome Home parade. Signalling the incorporation of Vietnam veterans into the Anzac tradi ti on,
the memorial was intended to link their service to the original Anzac diggers, and make reference to
the controversy the war provoked at home (Inglis 2008, 358). Whilst Inglis (2008, 385-387) argues
that the memorial does little to allude to that controversy, its form, location, and dedication di d al l
link with the memorialisation characteristics of established Anzac Day practices. This included its
form as a monumental memorial, location on Anzac Parade in Canberra amongst many other war
memorials and a short distance to the AWM, and its dedication, which took the form of a dawn
service, dedication, and then march by veterans.
Keating actively participated by making an address at the dedication ceremony, unlike Hawke, who
was an observer at the 1987 Welcome Home parade. The media reports of the day do not shed light
o
ete a s o ti ui g a ge at the go e
e t, o of that ei g di e ted at the P i e Mi iste
(see Wright and Cadzow 1992). This contrasted with the 1987 Welcome Home parades, where some
a he s de li ed to gi e e es ight
he passi g Ha ke o the pa ade oute see Chapte
. As
such, the dedication signalled the culmination of the reconciliation process.
Keating was sensitive to these issues in his dedication address. Early in the speech, Keating (1992 g,
1) linked Vietnam veterans and their service to previous generations of service personnel: We
honour them for the same reason we honour those previous generations of Australians who se rved
i
a s o fo eig soils. He e t o to list those easo s – their sacrifice, duty, brave ry, and the i r
belief in Australia, democracy and freedom (Keating 1992g, 1), all themes congruous with the Anzac
tradition. Keating then moved away from the Anzac tradition to explicitly acknowledge the hurt that
the divisions of the war had caused Vietnam veterans:
151
It is true that no war divided Australia like the Vietnam War. It is true that often we remember
those years more for the protests at home than for the fighting abroad.
The years of Vietnam corresponded with a great social and political upheaval in Australia. The
war was itself one of the catalysts of change.
There is no doubt that in all the turmoil we lost sight of the reality of Vietnam. We lost sight of
those who did the fighting, and the waiting. And by doing that we made their reality worse.
For all the drama in the streets, and parliaments and public halls, the real war was, as always,
on the battlefields where young men and women died.
The real tragedy was in their suffering and death and, as ever, in the loss which lives on in the
hearts and minds of those who loved them.
We cannot make good this hurt any more than we can undo the war itself (Keating 1992g, 1-2).
Keating shared the o us of ha
ith all
usi g the p o ou
e – a form that was more famously
repeated during his reconciliatory Redfern Speech later that year (see Chapter 6) . We lost si ght of
the death a d i ju
a d
that Viet a
e ade thei ealit
aused this hu t a d ha
aused,
e lost sight of the soldie s ho se ed a d suffe ed,
o se , ith ou failu e to e og ise the i ju of ou a tio s. But ha i g
,
e were exhorted by Keating to be the agents of reconciliation:
But, by this memorial, we can make good the memory.
It is the symbolic resting place of the 504 who died. It means that at last they will join the
exalted ranks of Australians who died in other wars.
It is a memorial to all the men and women who served in Vietnam. It is a memorial for all those
for whom the war has meant suffering and loss. All those whose experience of Vietnam still
haunts them. All those here today.
We should recognise, therefore, that it is a memorial for all Australians; because, as a nation,
we should all bear the burden (Keating 1992g, 1-2).
Once again, the link between Vietnam veterans and service personnel of the past is made e xpl i ci t,
a d, fu the , ho ou ed
the use of adje ti e e alted , with its allusions to status and sacre dne ss.
Finally, the speech concludes by reinforcing the terms of the reconciliation, calling upon the nati on
to olle ti el sha e the u de of the pai the a aused Viet a
ete a s. Keati g s de di ati o
speech reinforced the unpolitical terms that the reconciliation between Vietnam ve terans and the
Australian body politic imposed, and the taboos surrounding violation of these terms. Ke ati ng was
disciplining the audience - Vietnam veterans were to be accorded the same respect and honour that
had been bestowed upon previous generations of service personnel, the Australian community was
called upon to be united in that pursuit, and also united in the sharing of responsibility for the pai n
that division caused veterans.
152
The taboos surrounding any violation of this reconciliation came to the fore two years later as
Keating travelled to South-East Asia to develop ties with Laos, Thailand and Vietnam i n Apri l 1994.
The essage of the t ip as Aust alia s e politi al, e o o i a d st ategi e gage e t
i th the
region, a view that Keating wished to sell to the leaders of these countries and to the Australian
public (Watson 2011, 478; Baker 1994a, 16). The trip also saw Keating visit WWII war sites, and align
the memorialisation of these sites and those who had suffere d there as Japanese POWs with
Aust alia s e e gi g e gage e t
ith the egio . Keati g s t ip se ed as a othe e a ple of
memorial diplomacy, those memorial practices that take place on the fringes on international
summits or trips and serve to link and deepen relations between the participant countries via a
shared notion of the past (Graves 2014, 169-
. It
as a the e that ha a te ised Keati g s
international memorialisation, both on Anzac Day and more broadly.
Whilst in Thailand, Keating visited Kanchanaburi War Cemetery, the main cemetery for POWs who
were used as forced labour in the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railway, and made a spe e ch
that honoured both the service and the sacrifice of those servicemen and women. The spe e ch al so
aligned itself with the reasons for his trip:
It is worth remembering that Australia's first major engagement with Asia was in war. In Korea
and Malaya and Vietnam it was again war.
Today it is a partnership with Thailand and other countries of the region. A partnership which
will extend the domain of our common interest and reduce the ground for conflict.
It seems to me that there could be no better way to honour those Australians who suffered
and died here than to succeed in this enterprise. No better way to see that what they endured,
and what their allies and hundreds of thousands from the countries of Asia endured, will not
happen again (Keating 1994d, 2).
He e e see the sa e o
e tio s ei g ade et ee the histo of Aust alia s
a se
i ea d
Keati g s politi s of e gagement with the region that he made in his 1993 Anzac Day address (see
Chapter 6). A picture of liberal interstate cooperation is presented, as conflict gives way to a
pa t e ship
hi h
ill e te d the do ai of ou
o
o i te est a d edu e the g ou d for
o fli t . But more than that, this endeavour is endorsed by the memorialisation of those who had
here suffered, sacrificed and died – the e ould e o ette
a to ho ou those Aust al i a s
ho
suffered and died here than to succeed in this enterprise .
Keating and his advisors had been tipped off that some journalists in the travelling party were
preparing stories about how Keating would not be making a similar trip to memorial sites in
Vietnam, in particular Long Tan. This was ostensibly due to Vietnamese sensibilities surrounding
153
memorialisation given Aust alia s ole i the pe petuatio of that war (Watson 2011, 478-479). To
a elio ate this o issio ,
e tio of the Viet a
e pe ie e
as also i se ted i to Keati g s
Kanchanaburi address:
Tomorrow I go to Vietnam. The Australians who fought and died there have been justly
honoured in Australia as those who were here have been honoured, and for the same reasons
for the sacrifice they made, the faith they showed.
In Vietnam the lesson is the same. The wounds have to be healed. The terrible legacy of the
past must not cripple future generations.
We must never forget, but for the sake of future generations and in the name of those who
died, the memory should not hold us back but inspire us to find the way to peace and
friendship, justice and prosperity (Keating 1994d, 2).
This se siti it
as fo
ought he Keati g ea ted testil to a jou alist s uestio ega di g
h
he would not be commemorating Vietnam veterans in Vietnam given (unnamed) ete a s
e pe tatio that he ould do so, shooti g a k f a kl , h should the ? [e pe t P i e Mi iste i al
o
e o atio ] Watso
,
; Millett
,
. Keati g fu the e plai ed I isited he e [i
Thailand] a war cemetery because of the enormous atrocities committed to Australians in pri sone r of- a
a ps a d death
a hes. These thi gs did 't happe i Viet a
Keati g, as ited
Millett 1994, 28). The damage had been done, and the Opposition and some sections of the me di a
seized upon the e a ks as e ide e of Keati g s i se siti it o the issue a d la k of o pete e i
matters of memorialisation.
This small controversy demonstrates the hold that taboos surrounding the memorialisation of
Australian service personnel and, in particular, Vietnam veterans had taken during this period.
Keati g as fo ed to issue a state e t a k o ledgi g the dut to the past Watso
,
that he had as Prime Minister and to reiterate the reasons why it was not possible to fulfil these
obligatio s i Viet a itself: We did ot seek a e o ial se i e i Viet a p i ipall
e ause e
decided there was no suitable place in Vietnam to conduct one, and also because I did not think it
app op iate, hile i Viet a , to e i e itte
e o ies Keati g 1994e, . Keati g s di ffi ulti es
regarding the recognition of Vietnam veterans is an example of the structures imposed upon Pri me
Mi iste s i thei A za e t ep e eu ship, a d thei
eed to o se e a d ho ou Aust alia s ilita
history and its remembrance in forms that unambiguously respected A za s ta oos i o de to e
successful. But further, the incident also demonstrates that this process could be aligned with more
prosaic and instrumental ends – i se i e of Keati g s politi al st le a d policy agenda of Asian
engagement. Whilst largely overwhelmed by the controversy that his intemperate remarks
regarding the memorialisation of Vietnam veterans had provoked, his Kanchanaburi speech itself
154
saw positive reaction from the press and an apparent tacit acceptance of the li ki g of Aust al i a s
a histo
ith Keati g s poli
age da of the outlook to Asia see Bake
,
; Watso
,
478-480).
The Interring of the Unknown Soldier
In contrast to some of the difficulties that Keating faced with the memorialisation of the Vietnam
War, his role in the interring of the Unknown Soldier on Remembrance Day 1993 was more
successful. Despite some controversy regarding his participation, rea tio to Keati g s spee h
eulogising the Unknown Soldier was largely neutral or positive and did not provoke the same degree
of negative reaction from critics that his engagement with Anzac Day and memorialisation often did.
This section argues that this was due to Keating adopting themes for his speech that did not as
explicitly reference his political style or policy agenda and largely conformed to the genre stri cture s
of the Anzac tradition.
Proposals for the interment of an Unknown Soldier in the AWM had been circulating since 1921, but
had ostensibly been blocked because of imperial sentiment – the view that the Unknown Warrior
interred in Westminster Abbey the same year represented all the service personne l of the Empi re
(Inglis 1999, 10-11). AMW pla
the u k o
soldie
e s e e also o ied that …pa si o ious politi ia s ould
ot a pa t of the [as et u
ake
uilt] atio al e o ial ut a su stitute fo it I glis
1999, 11). Further proposals for the return of an Unknown Soldier to Australia emerged and were
rejected from time to time over the intervening years, but by 1991, Australia had become a
sufficiently post-imperial nation to accept a new proposal from within the AWM to consent to the
interment of an Unknown Soldier (Inglis 1999).
The fact that this proposal emerged from within the AWM is important – it did not arise from the
P i e Mi iste s offi e, o f o
ithi the go e
e t. Ho e e , as pla s p og essed to e hu e a
soldier buried near Villers-Bretonneux and return him to Australia to be interred in the Hall of
Memory in the AWM, some conservative critics took issue with the inclusion of Keating as an official
pallbearer during the ceremony.
Having studied the interring of the Unknown Warrior in
Westminster Abbey, the AWM had invited the Governor General Bill Hayden to be chief mourner
and to walk behind the coffin, as King George V had done. Keating, as Prime Minister, would also be
invited and would walk to the side of the coffin as the chief pallbearer, representing the head of the
Australian Government, and the two of them representing the Australian people (Wright 1993, 31).
The prominent Liberal Senator Bronwyn Bishop criticised the move, fulminating on talkback radio
155
that What appals
ele atio o o
e is the
a i
hi h the P i e Mi ister tries to politicise any important
e o atio of sa ifi e that Aust alia s ha e ade Bishop, as ite d
W i ght
1993, 31). Former RSL national president Alf Garland also criticised the Prime Minister, incorrectly
condemning Keating for installing himself as chief pallbearer and for ignoring se rvi ce pe rsonne l i n
the ceremony. In a letter to The Australian, Ga la d said [Keati g] has take e e oppo tu it to
tear down and destroy the Australian heritage, traditions and national identity which the Unknown
Soldier and his colleagues fought for and established [and has] the temerity to politi cise the e vent
[
ei g hief pall ea e ] Ga la d
,
, e hoi g Bishop s
iti ue. Ga la d s a d Bishop s
comments demonstrate just how much some conservative critics opposed the idea of Keating
participation in the interring of the Unknown Soldier due to what his presence represented –
republicanism, radical nationalism, and the strident repudiation of everything Liberal - rathe r than
due to any of his actual actions.
‘ea ti g to the Oppositio s
iti is , the AWM i
ited Oppositio Leade Joh He so to e a
pallbearer too, desiring to keep the occasion free of politics and continuing the practice of
bipartisanship that had occurred on Anzac Day in 1990 at Gallipoli, and in 1992 at Kokoda. Garland
was subsequently corrected in the pages of The Australian by the AWM Acting Director Michael
McKernan, and once Hewson had been invited to participate, such criticisms were isolated. The
occasion had been sufficiently removed from the sphere of the political , and partisan political
conduct had been circumscribed by the inclusion of Hewson in the ceremony.
Thus, Keati g pa ti ipated as pla
ed i the e e o
a d deli e ed a spee h i
hi h …he ashe d
no Pom, and did not even remark that the return of an unknown Australian after all those years in
which we were content to be represented by the remains in Westminster Abbey was an event
registering the e d of e pi e I glis
,
. The la k of Keati g s politi al age da a d st le i the
spee h i st iki g, though ot a se t. As su h, Keati g s e ho tatio that He is all of them. And he
is o e of us Keati g
d, 1; emphasis in the original) sees the Unknown Soldier ope rati ng as an
ideograph par excellence. The u k o a le atu e of the U k o
“oldie s ide tit f ees hi f o
any baggage that his rank, his class, his ethnicity, religion or sexuality, or even the nature of his
death, might have burdened him. He is a blank canvass upon which Keating could have pai nte d hi s
political image in bold colours, but perhaps sensitive to the critics, to the sense of occasion, or to the
ta oos su ou di g the e e
a e of Aust alia s
a histo , Keati g hose ot to. Keati g s
lessons from the Unknown Soldier adhere closely to the Anzac tradition – the speech is full of
efe e es to
a e
, dut
a d sa ifi e , and to honouring Aust alia s se i e personnel.
156
References to empire were even included, though as Holbrook (2014, 186) notes, he inverted the
usto a ph ase ki g a d ou t
to …the ha es a e he e t [to a ] fo
o othe easo tha
he believed it was his duty – the dut he o ed his ou t a d his Ki g Keati g
d, 1). Furthe r,
by sticking closely to the strictures of the Anzac tradition, Keating managed to avoid controversy and
e e
o p i ate plaudits f o
iti s, su h as Joh Ho a d,
ell? to Mi hael M Ke a afte Keati g s spee h Hol ook
ho e a ked did t the PM do us
,
.
But Keating could not resist inserting some of his own personality and political style into his spe ech.
Thus, reflecting his radical nationalism, he presented WWI not as a necessary war that Australian
go e
e ts, a d
a
Aust alia s, had felt a dut to suppo t, ut as …a
st uggle disti guished o e ofte tha
ot
ad,
utal, a ful
ilita a d politi al i o pete e Keati g
d,
1), a slight that alluded to the leaders of Great Britain who directed much of the Allied campaign.
Further, the central lessons of the Unknown Soldier, as emphasised by Keating, reflect the
democratic and egalitarian traditions of Australian politics, rather than references solely to duty,
sacrifice and empire:
For out of the war came a lesson which transcended the horror and tragedy and the
inexcusable folly.
It was a lesson about ordinary people - and the lesson was that they were not ordinary.
On all sides they were the heroes of that war: not the generals and the politicians, but the
soldiers and sailors and nurses - those who taught us to endure hardship, show courage, to be
bold as well as resilient, to believe in ourselves, to stick together.
The Unknown Australian Soldier we inter today was one of those who by his deeds proved that
real nobility and grandeur belongs not to empires and nations but to the people on whom
they, in the last resort, always depend.
That is surely at the heart of the Anzac story, the Australian legend which emerged from the
war. It is a legend not of sweeping military victories so much as triumphs against the odds, of
courage and ingenuity in adversity. It is a legend of free and independent spirits whose
discipline derived less from military formalities and customs than from the bonds of mateship
and the demands of necessity.
It is a democratic tradition, the tradition in which Australians have gone to war ever since
(Keating 1993d, 2).
Here, Keating played to the egalitarianism of radical nationalism without resorting to crude insults or
o e t hostilit
ith his di e t efe e e to the Aust alia lege d – the foll of unhe roic ge ne ral s
and politicians, and that the heroes of war were the ordinary folk who fought on the frontline.
Reference to the digger tradition is made –
ateship ot
ilita fo
alities – and the democratic
traditions that sustained the service personnel of WWI, and the service personnel who followed.
157
Finally, Keating made a point of using that democratic tradition in an attempt to overcome
difference and hierarchy, and he emphasised unity:
The Unknown Australian is not interred here to glorify war over peace; or to assert a soldier's
character above a civilian's; or one race or one nation or one religion above another; or men
above women; or the war in which he fought and died above any other war; or of one
generation above any that has or will come later.
The Unknown soldier honours the memory of all those men and women who laid down their
lives for Australia (Keating 1993d, 2).
Keating here listed dichotomised and oppositional identities central to his political style – an exalted
soldie s ha a te versus the ha a te of a o di a
i ilia ; se is that ould se e me n above
o e ; or bigotry via chauvinisti p ide i o e a e o o e atio o o e eligio a o e a
othe .
Keating imbued the Unknown Soldier with lessons that subtly chastised those who might have
preferred conservative, hierarchical, Australian national identities, rather than those identi ti es that
Keati g s i of os opolita is a d atio alis atte pted to eld togethe i to a plu alisti , ut
unified, national whole.
Having closely referenced the traditions of Anzac and tempered his political style provided Ke ati ng
with a platform upon which he could present his political values in an acceptable manne r. Ke ati ng
imbued the Unknown Soldier not with his policy agenda of an Australian republic or of the economic
outlook to Asia, as he had done on some previous Anzac Days or other memorial occasions, but
instead with less controversial contemporary political values based on cosmopolitanism, equality
and democracy. Thus, rea tio s to Keati g s spee h e e ostl positi e o
eut al Watso
,
443).
However, isolated i sta es of o t o e s e ai ed a ou d Keati g s eulogisi g of the U k o
Soldier. A week after Remembrance Day 1993, historian Geoffrey Blainey complained that Ke ati ng
had o itted efe e e to the U k o
hi
“oldie s p o a le, ut u k o a le, Ch istia it , o
… ithout his o se t a d, fo tu atel , ithout his k o ledge, i to a s
poli
Blai e
ol of go e
e ti g
e t
a, 2). Blainey further a used Keati g of lau hi g … et a othe eiled atta k
o the legiti a a d histo of the atio that the u k o
soldie ga e his life to defe d Blai e
1993a, 2). This was an issue which continued to irritate Blainey, who five years later as a council
member of AWM a aged to gai app o al to get the o ds K o
U k o
“oldie s to
Keati g s
of the U k o
‘e e
Hol ook
,
u to God e g a ed upo the
-188). More recently, Bendle (2014) condemned
a e Da add ess at the AWM to
a k the
“oldie , a gui g that Keati g p o oted a ihilisti
th
anniversary of the interri ng
ie of WWI, a pe spe ti e that
158
had roots in his political style, and which unjustly condemned the political and military leadership of
European powers.
These protestations were, and continue to be, largely isolated, but they reveal the depth of
antipathy and hostility towards Keating as Prime Minister for failing to uphold the political and policy
traditions of the Anzac tradition in his politics and in his engage e t ith Aust alia s a histo .
E e this elati el
ild a d u assu i g spee h
Keati g s sta da ds att a ted o ti ui g
sporadic opposition, despite the fact that it closely followed the traditions of the official and
conservative strand of Anzac and was largely accepted by the wider public without controversy. The
criticism reveals the boundaries that official government discourses of Anzac that seek to include
contemporary interpretations must contend with and the opposition that they continue to attract,
long after the events that drove them have passed. Nonetheless, the interring of the Unknown
“oldie
e eals the su ess that Keati g ould a hie e i the
e o ialisatio of Aust alia s
a
history, and his mixed record of effectively incorporating his own interpretation of Anzac into his
national addresses.
The 50th Anniversary of the D-Day Landings
In June 1994, Keating travelled to the UK and to France to commemorate the 50 th anniversary of the
D-Day landings. The trip was another opportunity for memorial diplomacy - simultaneously the
commemoration of D-Day and an opportunity for Keating to pursue domestic and foreign policy
e ds. I pa ti ula , the t ip as do i ated
issues di e tl pe tai i g to Keati g s politi al st le –
the republic, changing the Australian flag, creating opportunities for liberalised international trade ,
and promoting an outward looking and cosmopolitan Australia. It was an opportunity to mee t wi th
world leaders too – UK Prime Minister John Major and French President François Mitterrand both
had meetings with Keating, and the various ceremonies and events of the commemoration also
brought him into contact with the US President Bill Clinton and Queen Elizabeth.
Media reports of the occasion generally emphasised the success Keating had in his dealings with the
British and French leaders, but also remarked upon the tension that Keating had previously caused in
both countries and the need to repair relationships (see Wright 1994, 2). Wright was referring to
Keati g s …histo of i te pe ate o
e ts that ha e o hi fe ad i e s i B itish a d F e
po e i les. I pa ti ula , this i luded his i fa ous “i gapo e o
h
e ts, he e he e p esse d
the view that the UK had abandoned Australia and left the country to defend itself against the
Japanese during WWII (see chapter 6). It further referred to remarks Keating had made the previous
159
year in France where he had lambasted the French for their intransigence in the Uruguay round of
the GATT negotiations. Echoing the blunt language and pugnacious attitude of Billy Hughes at the
Versailles peace conference 75 years previously, Keating had rounded on the bemused local Fre nch
MP who had been sent to represent the French government during a wreath laying ceremony a t
Villers-Bretonneux, asserting incorrectly that Australia had lost 10% of its population defending
Europe, in particular France, and asking what that sacrifice was worth to French policy makers
holding out on agriculture concessions in GATT negotiations ( Kitney 1993, 13). Keating had then
repeated these sentiments to the press corps accompanying the Prime Minister:
Can I say that the flower of many countries' youth was lost here in France - unselfishly, for the
greater good of this country. And at an important time of world decision, we are not seeing
the magnanimity from France that all of us who have fought for and respected France have
shown it.
And I speak here about the GATT round; about selfishness which has crept into European
politi s… a d the selfishness which the French are pursuing in international policy.
And, I think, it is time for the French to reassess themselves and magnanimously be part of the
world rather than sitting out there by themselves thinking that the world owes them a living. It
doesn't and it's not going to give them one (Keating, as cited by Kitney 1993, 13).
U su p isi gl , F e h poli
ake s ea ted testil to Keati g s p o o atio . Both i i de ts se
as e a ples of Keati g s la k of i hi itio
poli
he it a e to e plo i g Aust alia s a histo
e ds. If he felt he ould ot ig o e Aust alia s
a histo , as Watso
e
fo
lai ed, the he
certainly did engage with it entrepreneurially and in a manner which aligned closely with his own
world view and policy agenda.
The trip had also been conducted in the context of remarks that Keating had made in Parliament just
prior to leaving for Europe. Rising to the despatch box to answer an Opposition question re gardi ng
his desire to change the Australian flag and whether he continued to plan on doing so gi ve n that i t
as a flag u de
hi h so a
Aust alia s fought a d died du i g Wo ld Wa II , Keati g asse te d
that Aust alia s fought u de the B itish flag du i g attles i WWI a d that digge s at Kokoda had
fought fo the ideals of Aust alia [ ot B itai ] ,
u h to the displeasu e of the Oppositio , ho
interjected frequently as Keating spoke (Keating 1994, 1318). These debates put the issue of the
Australian republic and the changing of the flag back firmly on the agenda as Keating set off for
Europe.
This was the context in which Keating found himself during June 1994. As Wright (1994, 2) argue d,
Keating faced two problems – fi stl , that Aust alia s i
ol e e t i the D-Day landings consti tuted
160
only a small p opo tio of the total Allied o t i utio , a d se o dl , that …to e e t f i e dshi ps
that are important in economic terms - he
ust u do so e of the da age he has
ought. But
further than repairing relationships, Keating was also playing to the domestic political issues that he
had fixed as central to his agenda – the epu li a d the ha gi g of Aust alia s ultu al s
efle t that i depe de e. Thus, Keati g s spee hes o tai
o e of the austi
o de
ol s to
ati o of
France or Great Britain that had characterised earlier Keating pronouncements on the respective
countries. Mimicking the mould of the Unknown Soldier address, Keating closely followed the
o
e tio s that go e
P i e Mi iste ial e gage e t ith Aust alia s a histo , a d paid due
respect to liberal values and to the sense of duty and sacrifice of service personnel. The logic of
memorial diplomacy was in effect – smoothing the relationships between the countries by
emphasising the shared histories of the nations and the public remembrance of those acts during
WWII.
As such, in a Keating speech to an audience in the UK, the values that Australians fought for were
uncontroversial – li e t , justi e a d hu a de e
– and praise is effusive for the UK - Britain
embodied the courage democracy needed. Britain inspired the free world and those whose freedom
had been taken from them. There can be no doubt she inspired those whose names are recorded
he e [at the Ai Fo es Me o ial, ‘u
ede] Keati g
were expressed – The e is a th ead i Aust alia s histo
g, 2). In France, similar sentiments
hi h has al a s li ked us to F a e. What
the F e h alled li e t , e ualit a d f ate it Aust alia s e e i li ed to all
fai go fo all Keati g
ateship a d the
h, 2). Both countries are praised by Keating for the values and ideals
that they helped to originate and uphold, values and ideals that Australia had incorporate d i nto i ts
own political culture: …i the e e ts of fift
o
o
alue as
itte
Keati g
ea s ago o
o
alues e e p o e d a d a story i n
h, 2). This emphasis on common values and praise of the
host countries were the words that Wright (1994) argued needed to be said in order to re me dy the
offences caused and open the doors of diplomacy.
The repair of damaged relationships was prominent in France, where Keating met with French
President Mitterrand, the kind of fringe meeting enabled by such memorial occasions. Keating
outlined to Mitterrand the reform of the Australian economy and culture that his gove rnme nt had
instituted and envisaged for the future. This involved changing French perceptions which, it was
argued, still viewed Australia as an outpost of the British Empire (Baker 1994, 23). It also occurred in
the context of domestic debate regarding the republic and the changing of the Austral i an fl ag that
had been on the agenda shortly before Keating had left for Europe the week before. As such,
161
Keating indicated to journalists that he had spoken with Mitterrand regarding these issues, a gui g I
told him that we were not a derivative of any other place, we were not a derivative of any other
so iet
hi h
e had ultu al asso iatio s
ith e ause ou
ultu e is ha gi g a d I said that I
thought the constitutional monarchy, though it had served Australia well, could not adequately
eithe ep ese t o se e Aust alia ell i to the futu e Keati g, as ited
Bake
,
.
This example further demonstrates the interplay of structure and agency in Prime Ministerial Anzac
entrepreneurship. The 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings had imposed an obligation upon
Keati g to atte d a d pa ti ipate i the o
e o atio of those e e ts a d Aust alia s a histo
that he could not easily refuse. But that did not mean that Keating would meekly compl y wi th the
script that memorialisation posed. Instead, Keating used the occasion entrepreneurially, and
promoted his vision for Australia to both an international and domestic audience. Thus, the
significance of the 50th anniversary of the D-Day landings is that whilst Keating could not easily
ignore the obligations that his office imposed upon him to mark such occasions, he could use those
occasions to pursue his own nationalist vision.
Australia Remembers – the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II
Australia Remembers was a year-long program of government sponsored events that marked the
50th anniversary of the end of WWII. The name of the program gave some indication of the
go e
e t s i te t - to explicitly, intentionally and deliberately remember and mark the hi stori cal
events and participants, and interpret and communicate meanings of the anniversary. Australia
Remembers was thus a conscious effort at nationalism entrepreneurship and government sponsored remembrance on a grand, year-long scale. It was deliberately and carefully planne d and
constructed by federal government design and supported by significant government promotion and
public funding. These efforts were furthered by extensive community and occasional corporate
engage e t, helpi g to o
e t the go e
e t s i te tio
ith the ide Aust alia
o
u it .
This section argues that the Australia Remembers program of memorial events once agai n al i gned
closely with the political style and policy agenda of the Keating government. Firstly, despite 1995
being the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings the program of events and media focus was
squarely on WWII, not WWI, and on the War in the Pacific, rather than the War in Europe (Reed
2004, 9). “e o dl , Keati g s speeches throughout the Australia Remembers program were less
radically nationalist and inflammatory than his Anzac Day addresses of 1992 and 1993. They
employed tempered language that more closely conformed to the Anzac tradition; furthermore they
162
were more cosmopolitan, explicitly and positively including a more pluralistic range of i de nti ties i n
his narrative of remembrance. Finally, this section argues that Australia Remembers was also a
mostly, though not entirely, successful exercise in nationalism e ntrepreneurship by Keating. Whi l st
he had to temper his language, and be less explicit about his policy agenda, Keating did do much to
renovate Anzac during Australia Remembers in ways that are still being observed – promoti ng and
institutionalising the recognition of WWII, the service of women and multiculturalism and, to a lesser
extent, Indigenous Australians. There are real boundaries to nationalism entrepreneurship that
Keating needed to observe but Australia Remembers demonstrated that these boundaries were
elastic – change could occur and stories previously ignored were included where once they were
not.
Australia Remembers – Structure and Planning
Whilst Australia Remembers had the endorsement of the Prime Minister, aligned as it was wi th hi s
wide u de sta di g of Aust alia s a histo , the i itiati e as also d i e
the e t ep e eu ial
a ti ities of Mi iste fo Vete a s Affai s, Co
. “ ia a s ge ui e
“ ia a I glis
,
enthusiasm for Australia Remembers helped to achieve bipartisanship for the project, and won hi m
espe t a d affe tio f o
di e se g oupi gs a d i di iduals, ega dless of thei o
philosophies a d affiliatio s
‘eed
,
. Fu the , “ ia a s pe so al histo
politi al
as a “i ilia
immigrant and his stated belief that Anzac could transcend its British origins to include Australians of
all ethnic backgrounds helped:
…to heal the p ofou d di isio s it [A za ] has eated
e o i g it f o its ilita
o te t
and extending it to former enemies and descendants of people who had no involvement in
World War I. More importantly, Sciacca had decentred the Anzac legend from its location at
the core of Anglo-Australian remembrance, offering it as a secular signifier of belonging within
the nation (Reed 2004, 122-123).
Sciacca was therefore an active participant in the re-i agi atio of Aust alia s a e e
a
ei
a more plural sense.
In addition to the goodwill that Sciacca helped to create in regards to Australia Remembers, he
played an enormous role in envisaging its purpose, and in planning and coordinating its program of
events. Speaking to the House of Representatives in February 1995, Sciacca outlined what the
Australia Remembers programs of events and initiatives were for:
163
…the ai s of those working on Australia Remembers are to thank the veterans who fought in
World War II; commemorate those who died; recognise the widows and children of those who
died; remember all who kept the home front running; recreate the joy felt at the end of the
war in the best way possible; educate the nation about World War II and leave a lasting legacy
(Sciacca 1995a, 915).
Thus, the purpose of Australia Remembers centred on two interrelated aims – to remembe r and to
educate. In the process, the government helped to steer public understandings of Australian war
history – challenging the primacy of World War I in Australian narratives of identity and attempti ng,
to varying degrees of success, to broaden the range of identities to be recognised, including women,
immigrant identities, and Indigenous Australians.
To achieve these ends, a number of elements to the program were planned - commemorative
ceremonies, most notably including three pilgrimages by veterans to overseas theatre of war
locations in London, Papua New Guinea, and Borneo, and major ceremonies for Victory in Europe
(VE) Day and Victory in the Pacific (VP) Day; seed funding for state capital and regional
commemorative committees; public funding for unit reunions and histories; certificates of
appreciation for veterans and those who served and contributed on the home front; engaging the
media in promotion of Australia Remembers; and the development of an education ki t for pri mary
and secondary school children on the events of World War II (Sciacca 1995a, 916-919).
In planning this program, Sciacca had envisaged the participation of a broad cross -section of the
government and the community. It was a federal affair – in addition to the Commonwealth
contribution, Australia Remembers also involved the participation and planning efforts of state and
territory governments and $20,000 worth of seed funding for each federal electorate to plan and
enact their own Australia Remembers events (ALP 1995, 250). Employing a whole -of-government
approach, Australia Remembers also engaged a range of Commonwealth government departments
and bodies. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), in conjunction wi th the
Department of Veterans Affairs, was asked to locate surviving uniformed and non -uniformed
Indigenous veterans, and to plan a commemorative service that would recognise their war efforts
(Sciacca 1995a,
. Of fu the
ote as the DVA s e plo
e t i itiati e ith the Depa t e t of
Employment, Education and Training entitled Operation Restoration, offering unemployed
Australians work and training opportunities to restore neglected or damaged war memorials and
remembrance driveways, and dovetailing with the employment policies of Working Nation (see
Chapter 6). Inglis notes that this was somewhat of a departure for the government and the DVA, as
small-scale local memorials were historically built and maintained by the funds and efforts of l ocal
164
communities, not the government. As it was, $10 million in Commonwealth funding was se t asi de
for this program (Inglis 2008, 391).
Educating young Australians about WWII was also a key priority of the Australia Remembers
program, with Sciacca (1995a, 918) remarking that the production of an education kit for Austral i an
s hool hild e
as o e of the
ost i po ta t tasks ei g u de take this ea . “tude ts e e
asked to engage with a number of themes centring not only on the rote and passive learning of
e e ts, ut ith a ti e tasks that e ou aged stude ts to i
a i thei lo al o
u ities “ ia a
estigate the pe so al e pe i e
es o f
a, 919), the state directing the linking of generations
through the act of remembrance. Further to this end, youth forums were conducted around
Australia during Australia Remembers, culminating with a Prime Ministerial address to the nati onal
youth conference on VP day. Keating (1995b, 2-3) told that audience of schoolchildren:
So it had to mean something. 50 years on, we can't say oh well that was just something in the
past. This sort of stoicism, this sort of bravery, heroism, belief in Australia, belief in what we
created here, belief in our values, had to mean something. And so I am exceptionally pleased
that so many Australians remember and so many young Australians remember and have
learned about the period.
Keati g s a iet that WWII as ot ei g p ope l e e
to
e ed is manifest in his language – it had
ea so ethi g , epeated fo effe t afte listi g the he oi att i utes of Aust alia s se i e
personnel –
a e
, stoi is
a d belief in Aust alia - reveals his tacit acceptance that such
ea i gs e e ot u i e sall u de stood o a epted. Co e
that the sig ifi a e of Aust al ia s
war history would be lost as the generations who experienced war aged and passed away had
preoccupied those sympathetic to Anzac for decades (see Macleod 2002; Holbrook 2014, 116-121)
a d Keati g s go e
e t had adopted a ta gi le poli
espo se – curriculum intervention – for
the expressed purpose of educating young Australians about their war history and e ncouraging their
continued remembrance of those events and their meanings.
Total Commonwealth funding for Australia Remembers stood at $9 million 19 (ALP 1995, 250; Firth
1995, 11). The marketplace was also sought as an active partner in remembrance, but Reed (2004,
160-161) notes the government had little success in garnering support from Australian compani es.
This did not stop licensed merchandise being produced, though, with 18 licensees produci ng goods
bearing the Australia Remembers logo on coasters, mugs, spoons, flags, clothing and even a CD
19
Reed (2004, 15) reports a total funding figure of $12 million, which has been repeated in Holbrook (2014, 1 89 ). I
have been unable to corroborate this figure with primary sources, so I have instead reported the $9 mi l lion fi gure
above, drawn from ALP (1995) and Firth (1995).
165
(Reed 2004, 161). Inglis (2008, 393) further notes that Cadbury chocolates and Tooheys beer both
produced war-time branded products, and that Australia Post and the Australian Mint produced war
hero stamps and coins.
Media coverage was also actively sought for the purposes of raising awareness and educating the
public about the significance and meaning of WWII (Sciacca 1995a, 918), and Reed (2004, 160) notes
the success that Australia Remembers had in this regard. TV specials featuring personalities like Ray
Martin interviewing the Prime Minister and newspaper reports and histories bearing the Austral ia
Remembers logo were prominent. In sum, Australia Remembers was an integrated and lavish
government led initiative of nationalism entrepreneurship and remembrance, on a scale not
previously seen for a war anniversary. It sought to involve all levels of government and the bre adth
of the public service; integrated wider government policy priorities with programs like Operation
Restoration; attempted to activate the consciousness of the public through media engagement,
corporate sponsorship, and an education kit for schools; and was, on the whole, very successful in its
aim to create remembrance and memory of the events and meanings of WWII.
Keating and the Meaning of Australia Remembers
Keati g e phasised the ho ou i g of Aust alia s se i e personnel as the preeminent me aning for
Australia Remembers. Whilst the values that were fought for and the continuing lessons that the se
values had for the present were referred to, they often were presented as uncontroversial
ideog aphs, a d the did ot di e tl efe e e Keati g s poli
age da. Thus, in his major VP Day
address, Keating said:
Time has changed our perspective on the world and on ourselves. We have had to adjust our
thinking to accommodate necessities. In many ways I think we are better for it. It may be that
we are less naive and more worldly than the Australians of fifty years ago. I believe we are
more tolerant and more open.
But if we are to succeed as we should we will always need their strength, their collective spirit,
their sense of duty, their faith. We will need their inspiration
I hope that this Australia Remembers year has reminded us all of these things
(Keating 1995c, 2).
This as as di e t a efe e e to his go e
e t s age da as Keati g was prepared to make duri ng
his Australia Remembers speeches. Keating here subtly referenced the changes that his government
had ushered in, the necessity of those reforms, and the positive cosmopolitan values that thi s had
ought ith it. A d Aust alia s a ge e atio
as p ese ted as a e a ple fo the p ese t – as
166
they faced change, so must the current generation – a repetition of a theme that he and Hawke had
utilised in their Anzac Day addresses.
Otherwise, Keating left this connection unspoken, instead filling his speeches with the
uncontroversial values and meanings closely aligned with the tenets of the Anzac tradition - duty,
sacrifice, courage, democracy, and peace.
In the same VP Day address as above, Keating
acknowledged the logic that compelled him to mark the war history of the nation in this mann e : It
has been my duty to utter some words of tribute on behalf of the Australian people and parti ci pate
i se i es to o
e o ate thei deeds a d sa ifi e
Keati g
c, 1). This duty not only
pertained to the need to make speeches, but to also say the right things, a lesson Keati ng had now
learnt from conservative reaction when he had strayed from the accepted narrative of such
o asio s. “u h a a al sis is suppo ted
‘e e
es
eassu i g the
p og a
Keati g s pu li l stated desi e to keep Aust alia
o -politi al , with The Courier-Mail reporting that Keating sent a letter to the RSL,
that You
e is ot pa t of a
ost e tai l
a tell ou
politi al a paig i
. As su h, a d seei g as Aust alia ‘e e
e
e s that the Aust alia ‘e e
Keati g, as ited
es
The Courier-Mail 1995,
e s al ead losel alig ed ith Keati g s p efe ed a
theatre of remembrance, the War in the Pacific, there was little gain to be had from provoking
partisan-political controversy.
Keating instead chose to honour the generation of people who had fought and lived through WWII,
a d to thus ta itl , athe tha e pli itl , ad a e his o eptio of the ea i g of Aust al ia s
a
history. US historians Strauss and Howe (1991) have advanced the thesis that this war generation
was exceptional - having grown up during the hardship of the Great Depression, and havi ng fought
fascism and won, they had then rebuilt US society during the long post-war boom. They were a
ge e atio of i to ious soldie s a d ‘osie the ‘i ete s…
thi gs do e “t auss a d Ho e
,
e s e
ho ha e k o
ho
to ge t
, hose olle ti e a -do effo ts e uilt the A e i a
nation and earned the thanks of a grateful public. Speaking about this same generation in the
Australia
o te t, Keati g alluded to “t auss a d Ho e s thesis o VE Da :
Someone once said of the Americans of that time that they were an heroic generation - they
refused to be broken by the Great Depression, they fought the war and then they built a great
country. Without a doubt, the same can be said about that generation of Australians. They
went about re-building their lives with confidence and purpose and their efforts gave rise to a
period of sustained national development (Keating 1995d, 2).
A lesson about remembrance can thus be inferred from the above – that despite this generation
facing enormous hardship, they had succeeded in building the prosperous modern Australian nation167
state, and were to be lauded for their efforts. The unnamed subtext of this is the repudiation of the
centrality of WWI narratives of national identity – it is the generation of the Second World War that
is he oi . They were the ones who refused to be broken by the hardships of the Great Depressi on,
the ones who stared down the threat of fascism and invasion, and the ones who returne d home to
rebuild the nation. This generation had built the contemporary Australian state out of the ashe s of
Depression and war, not the Anzacs of Gallipoli and the Western Front.
Keating emphasised the status of this generation with a sacralised place in the canon of Austral i an
national life. With allusions to the life and lessons of Christ as espoused in the Gospel Accordi ng to
John, Keating told a national audience on the major VP Day set speech that:
The story tells us that there was a generation of men and women who so loved this country,
and the freedoms and way of life we now enjoy, they were prepared to lay down their lives.
There were Australians who so loved what is just, they defended it to the death.
We cannot think about this without understanding the debt we owe them, and the duty we
have to honour their memory.
To truly honour them is much more than a ritual task. It is to take the knowledge of their
sacrifice into our daily lives and the life of Australia. It is to love this country and give to it as
they did which is to say with that same faith from which their inspiration, effort and endurance
flowed (Keating 1995c, 2).
Keati g s state e t is a alogous ith the essage of John 3:16 – Fo God so lo ed the
o l d that
He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have
e e lasti g life. The fa e of this e se Keal
,
a d its pe olatio th ough the ultu e of
nominally Christian societies such as the US and Australia makes it a reference point for sacral i si ng
the efforts of those WWII service personnel who lost their lives in the conflict. The first sentence of
Keati g s uote a o e pa allels Joh
:
losel – the WWII gene atio so lo ed this ou t
as God had so lo ed the o ld. Fu the , Joh
:
, just
s status as the gospel ithi the gospel a d i ts
allusion to the central New Testament message - eternal life granted to man via the sacrifice of
Christ with His crucifixion and resurrection (Kealy 1978, 64) - means that the sacrifice of WWII
service personnel takes on a kind of saviour status made comparable to the example of Christ.
This essage is fu the ei fo ed
Keati g s all to i o po ate the k o ledge of the i r sacri fi ce
i to ou dail li es a d the life of Aust alia . Lee (1994, 12-13) argues that the Gospel According to
John can be characterised as a series of narratives where the miracles and messages of Christ are
consistently misinterpreted as lite al a d pe tai i g to
ate ial ealit
His audie e, a d
he e
Christ then attempts to explain their deeper, symbolic meaning to the main characters of the
168
narratives. A similar narrative structure is employed by Keating here, where the national aud ience is
encouraged to look for the deeper meaning of the sacrifice of WWII service personnel. Thus, Keating
e ou ages the audie e to ot just pa lip se i e to the e o a d ea i g of thei sa ifi e To
truly honour them is much more than a ritual task , ut to i stead i o po ate the ea i g of that
sacrifice into their daily lives and the life of the nation, just as Christ encouraged His followers to
i o po ate His e a ple i to thei li es. Whilst othe , se ula , i te p etatio s of Keati g s
cha a te isatio he e of Aust alia s WWII se i e personnel could well be ventured, the fame of John
3:16 and its well-understood meaning regarding the message of Christ has been employed by the
Prime Minister. Its inclusion serves to sacralise the actions of WWII service personnel and the
meanings subsequently attached to them.
Broadening the Range of Australian War Remembrance Identities
The generation that Keating so admired was not presented as a homogenous collective. A priority of
the Australia Remembers program was the recognition of a variety of identities, opening up the
e e
a e of Aust alia s a histo i
a s that had ot previously been pursued with any great
vigour in official narratives of memorialisation and Anzac.
A number of identities were given
epeated p o i e e i Keati g s add esses – the veterans who fought battles in the Pacific and
Europe; those who served on the home-front in Australia; the families and loved ones of those who
lost their lives. Specific attention was also given to previously marginalised identities such as
women, Indigenous Australians and post-war immigrants.
Keati g s fo us i his Australia Remembers addresses was not exclusively, or even overwhel mi ngl y,
masculine, as had been the case with some of his Anzac Day addresses. Speaking at the launch of
the Australia Remembers program, Keating (1994i,
o e i
ol ed as e e
efo e i su h a o
had e a ked that We
a t Aust alian
e o atio . To fu the this e d, Ma h
as
set aside as Homefront Month in the calendar of events, highlighting especially the contri bution of
civilian women to the war effort (Reed 2004, 72). Further, female service personnel were honoured
with a separate commemorative ceremony three weeks before VP Day, where the Pri me Mi ni ste r
spoke, listing the services associated with the participation of women – the nurses who served in
various service branches, the Wo e s Au ilia
Aust alia Ai Fo e, Aust alia Wo e s A
“e i e, a d the Wo e s ‘o al Aust alia Na al “e i e Keati g,
e). Further, non-Service
contributions were also named and listed – the Aust alia Wo e s La d A
a d those o e
who worked towards the war effort on the home front, especially those 250,000 named as worki ng
in factories.
169
Speaking about their contribution, Keating (1995e,
said that [t]hei e pe ie e is pa t of the
Australian experience; it is inseparable from our military history, our national legends and traditions,
a d the i spi atio a d alues e d a f o these thi gs. I doi g so, Keati g as seeki g to i d
the contribution of women in WWII to the wider narrative of Anzac, in ways that that had previously
ee
la gel o itted. Thus,
o e s
a e pe ie es a e e uated
ith atio hood
e pe ie e is pa t of the Aust alia e pe ie e , all the thi gs asso iated
their
ith that national
lege ds a d t aditio s ) and the meanings and lessons that are thus drawn from such important and
e t al atio al effo ts i spi atio a d alues ). The imperativeness of the case is emphasise d not
only by its the link drawn to Aust alia
atio hood, ut also
the adje ti e i sepa a le being
used to also make the connection – the audience was being called on to always li k
o e s
experiences of war with Anzac.
Women were thus to be included in Australia Remembers in ways that had not previously been
entertained. Various authors have pointed out the ways that Anza a d Aust alia s a histo
ge de ed a d losel asso iated
ith
ale ess, a d the
a s that this had o s u ed
is
o e s
experiences of war (see Lake, 1992; Reed 2004). Keating, in his address celebrating the contribution
of women, attempted to reverse some of these omissions by including the stories of certai n name d
women who had been interned as POWs, had been bombed or torpedoed, or had otherwise se rved
with distinction. But, as Reed (2004, 75) points out Keating failed to reimagine Anzac:
The fiftieth a i e sa
of the a s e d p ese ted the oppo tu it fo … ge de ed
representations of the war to be reworked, for the paradigm of remembrance to be shifted
a a f o tales of o fli t a d glo ious suffe i g, asso iated ith e s e dea ou o the
fighting fronts. Instead, women were constructed as heroes also, equal to the men in their
contributions of labour on the home front. This extension of a heroic status to women simply
added another layer through which their voices struggled to be heard (Reed 2004, 75).
As su h, Keati g s ep ese tatio of
o e la gel fitted the he o ha a te isatio that ‘eed
outli es a o e, ith o e s a ed e pe ie es efle ti g the glo ious suffe i g a d sa ifi e that
as also asso iated ith e s e pe ie e of war.
Fu the , e e these fe ale e pe ie es la gel failed to pe et ate Keati g s ajo spee hes du i g
Australia Remembers, as they were absent from the widely attended and reported VP and VE Day
addresses. So, whilst women had been recognised to a greater extent than they had ever had
before, this recognition was contingent upon the tropes associated with Anzac remaining masculine,
to the extent that women were included at all. Such criticism should not be overstated – there
appeared to be a genuine effort by Keating and Australia Remembers planners to include women i n
170
Aust alia s a histo a d to add ess thei histo i al e lusio . But the poi t e ai s that o e s
inclusion was contingent on them fitting the masculine narrative of Anzac, and that opportunities to
efo
ulate e o ies of Aust alia s a histo i
a s that halle ged the ge de ed atu e of thi s
history were missed.
Similar problems existed for the recognition of Indigenous Australians. It was the intention of
Australia Remembers planners to ensure that a priority of the program was to be recognition of the
contribution of Indigenous Australians, in much the same way as the government had sought to
include the contribution of women in ways that had not been previously recogni sed. As Sciacca
(1995a, 917) had told Pa lia e t, it
as his go e
e t s i te tio to pla
…a app op iate
commemorative ceremony to recognise the special - and often unacknowledged - role played by
these people [Indigenous Australians] in the defence of Aust alia. As it happe ed, ho e e , the
recognition of Indigenous Australians was even more problematic than the recogni ti on of wome n,
despite the desire of Sciacca to ameliorate their historical omission. Indigenous service men had
featured in promotional material and commemorative stamps for Australia Remembers, but their
stories and memories were otherwise largely absent from the program of events (Reed 2004, 173).
This a se e is efle ted i Keati g s spee hes, ith the o t i utio of I dige ous Australians being
absent from his major speeches on VE and VP Day, and rating only a small, somewhat tokenistic,
mention in a speech honouring the contribution of Pacific Island veterans (Keating 1995f, 3-4). After
listing the contributions of Pacific Island service personnel in this speech, Keating turned to
Indigenous Australians, naming contributions by specific service personnel much as he had done i n
his add ess to Aust alia se i e
o e , a d the stati g E e if the Aust alia of the
s as
blind to their bravery and loyalty, we see it clearly now. And we acknowledge it now. It must not be
fo gotte
Keati g
f, 4). But if remembering the service of Indigenous Australians was so
important, then it must be asked why this recognition was placed here, sitting awkwardl y amongst
the honours for Pacific Island veterans? Why had they not been given their own cere mony, or had
other forms of Prime Ministerial recognition? Reed (2004, 173) suggests a partial explanation - that
ATSIC was largely uninterested in the occasion or organising ceremonies for Indigenous Australi ans,
being more preoccupied with present day issues of Indigenous disadvantage.
Ho e e , the la k of i te est f o
AT“IC fails to a ou t fo I dige ous Aust alia s toke isti
i lusio a d la k of oi e i Keati g s Aust alia ‘e e
e s add esses. I
u h the sa e a as
women found themselves defined by the gendered tropes of Anzac, Indigenous Australians were
171
included in Australia Remembers to the extent that they fitted with its heroic story of sacri fi ce and
service. Opportunities to challenge and redefine dominant discourses of nationhood by, for
instance, poi ti g to I dige ous se i e people s u paid ages fo thei se i e, o the i e
l usi o
from Australian society after their return from war, and the ways this was symptomatic of
continuing Indigenous disadvantage, were left unspoken. Once again, whi lst this critique should not
be overstated given the genuine concern that Australia Remembers planners had in ensuring
Indigenous stories about wartime were conveyed, the manner in which they were delivered did little
to challenge the Anglo-centric nature of Anzac.
I
ig a t ide tities e e gi e
o e e og itio i Keati g s Aust alia ‘e e
e s spe e hes fo
their transformative influence upon Australian society. In several major Australia Remembers
speeches Keating acknowledges those Australians who arrived in the country after the war and
contributed to post-war nation building. For example, after characterising the WWII generation as a
he oi ge e atio o VE Da , Keati g
d, 3) immediately said the following:
Among the builders were many thousands who had endured the war in their own countries
and left their shattered lives and devastated homes to start new lives in Australia.
I do not think we should let this day pass without reminding ourselves of how much they have
given Australia; how much we have gained by being open to the world, generous towards
those who have come here to escape oppression and hardship, and tolerant of cultural
differences.
In building new lives here they enriched us all. That is one of the great lessons of the fifty years
which have passed since the war ended, and one that we should not forget.
Keating thus grants immigrant identities the positive transformative role that was largely de nie d to
women and Indigenous Australians, with his openness to difference. It was immigrants who
e i hed us all and who the audience was called upon to ensure that they remembered how
immigrants had taught us values of generosity and tolerance. The values of tolerance that post -war
immigrants had taught Australians stood in contrast to the unnamed, but well-known, history of
prejudice that had characterised pre-war White Australia. By doing so, Keating was linking
Aust alia s
a histo
ith the u e t da
os opolita is
that his go e
e t as kee to
advance, and great care was taken throughout Australia Remembers to ensure that these immigrant
ide tities e e ot asso iated ith Aust alia s histo i al a e e ies. I stead, post-war immigrants
were given the role of positive transformers and nation-builders of the same stature as the he roi c
generation who had fought the war and returned to remake the nation. In the process of honouring
the contribution of these people, Keating made significant steps towards the opening up of
Aust alia s a histo to a o e di e se plu alit of identities.
172
Success and Contestation
Australia Remembers was largely successful in nationalism entrepreneurship, meeting its ai ms and,
in the process, helped to promote and institutionalise the remembrance of WWII. If, as argued
a o e, Aust alia ‘e e
e s ai s e e e t ed o
e e
a e a d education, then it surely was
successful in these matters. Australia Remembers events were well attended and received
considerable media coverage, aiding the aim of remembering the actions, sacrifices and meanings of
the generation who had fought and experienced WWII. Education had been achieved too, wi th the
intervention into school curriculums in the form of the education kit distributed to Australian
schools, the youth forums, and more generally, the consistent government-endorsed promotion and
coverage of the events and their meanings. Finally, wider government policy ai ms we re achi e ved
too, with the Operation Restoration program engaging the unemployed.
This was aided by attempts to ensure that Australia Remembers remained unpolitical. Sci acca had
made sure to anticipate controversies before they had arisen, and was successful in ensuring that
they did not escalate (Reed 2004, 165). His Opposition counterpart, Wilson Tuckey, was also keen to
see that Australia Remembers progressed without controversy, or unnecessary politicking from the
Oppositio , telli g the House of ‘ep ese tati es: The i iste
ill pe fo
to the hi ghe st l e el of
his responsibility in this year, I am sure. He can do so without any fear that the Coalition will se ek to
exploit i o a eas of dispute eithe et ee ou pa ties o
ithi the o
u it
Tu ke
,
920). Similar sentiments were expressed by Keating himself, assuring a suspicious RSL that he had
no intention of using Australia Remembers as a platform to promote the issue of an Australian
republic or as a campaign device for the upcoming election ( The Courier-Mail 1995, 7). Keating
la gel kept to his o d a d ef ai ed f o utilisi g Aust alia ‘e e
e s a d Aust alia s a histo
to explicitly promote his policy agenda as he had done on memorial occasions in the past.
O asio all , ho e e , suspi io s ega di g the go e
e t s, a d espe iall Keati g s, i te tio
arose. Two issues in particular caused strain – the use of the term Victory in the Pacific Day, rathe r
than the traditional Victory Over Japan (VJ) Day, and the failure of Australia Remembers planners to
fully include Opposition leader John Howard on VP Day, refusing a request to allow him to speak.
The VP/VJ Day controversy was largely confined to the pages of The Australian (Reed 2004, 169) and
the occasional interjection from the Opposition during Question Time. The choice to use VP Day,
rather than VJ Day, of course occurred in the context of lingering tension, and even racism, towards
the Japa ese due to the
a
i es o
itted
thei soldie s du i g the
a , a d Aust alia s
contemporary, post-war relationship with Japan as a significant trading partner. Sciacca atte mpte d
173
to respond to these concerns by noting that he had received advice from the AWM that the term VP
Day had been used at the end of the war and that the government had based its decision on this
information (Sciacca 1995b, 230). Whilst this issue continued to irritate some in the Opposition and
the community, a desire to see that the event remained unbesmirched by controversy saw a
begrudging acceptance of the term VP Day (see Tuckey 1995, 920). The second controversy, the
refusal to allow Howard the opportunity to speak at the VP Day ceremony was similarly resolved,
with Ho a d de li i g to o e tl atta k Keati g pu li all o e the issue, a d stati g: I do ot
to do a thi g that distu s to o o 's o se a e of ou
i to
o e the Japa ese
a t
ea s ago
(Howard, as cited by Wright 1995, 4). As such, Australia Remembers, like the interring of the
Unknown Soldier in 1993, had proceeded smoothly and largely without controversy, demonstrati ng
the success that Keating and his government had in its management of the occasion, despite allusion
to his policy agenda and political style. Continued government investment in WWII memorialisation,
and the increasing popularity of Kokoda as both a tourist destination and a site of remembrance,
demonstrates the success of Keating nationalism entrepreneurship with Australia Rememb ers, and
his evangelising of WWII remembrance more broadly (Beaumont 2011, 13-14; Holbrook 2014, 190).
Conclusion
Australia Remembers encapsulated both the success and failure that Keating had with Anzac
entrepreneurship. On one hand, Keating was unable to dislodge the story of the landings at Gallipoli
from its central place in Australian identity, and as a private citizen has expressed concern that he
may have even contributed to an over-e phasis upo Aust alia s a histo
Hol ook
,
.
Further, to be able to achieve some degree of influence over the conception of what was being
remembered, Keating had to restrain himself from his tendency towards pugnacious provocation,
temper his language, and pare back reference to his Big Picture vision for Australia. On the other
hand, Keating and his government were still able to put forward an entire year of remembrance
a ti ities a d e e o ies e t ed o Keati g s o eptio of Aust alia
a histo
a d to i se t
themes which closely, though subtly, referenced the twin threads of nationalism and
cosmopolitanism that characterised his political narrative. Ultimately, Australia Remembers
de o st ated the elasti
ou da ies that A za , a d Aust alia s
encompassed. Whilst Keati g had to o fo
a histo
o e ge e all ,
to so e of A za s st i tu es, he as a l e to e fo
them, largely without protest, too.
More broadly, the successes and limitations that Keating encountered during Australia Re members
reflects the overall success Keating had in putting forward his version of remembrance. Events of
Keati g s P i e Mi iste ship a
ell ha e i posed upo hi the i esisti le o ligatio to a k the
174
a
i e sa ies of Aust alia s a histo that Watso
lai ed, ut Keati g e tai l did ot l e t the se
obligations define the manner in which he would engage with them. We can see two periods of
e o ialisatio i Keati g s te
as P i e Mi iste – the early period reflecting his pugnacious
political persona, boldly and explicitly aligning his policy agenda and his radical nationalism with
Aust alia s
a histo
a d i agi i g Aust alia s se i e personnel as agents in these endeavours.
The second period revealed the more thoughtful and cosmopolitan Keating – subtly referencing the
social and economic agenda of his government and renovating Anzac in parallel, whilst at the same
ti e pa i g due espe t to A za s t aditio s a d
ea i gs. The pug a ious Keati g att a ted
condemnation and hostility from conservative defenders of Anzac; the cosmopolitan and plur al istic
Keating was largely left to conduct his interpretation of Anzac. Thus, Keating was quite successful i n
his endeavour to reinterpret A za a d Aust alia s a histo i a fashion that departed significantly
from the Anzac t aditio s a tial a d onservative origins, but only to the extent that he could keep
this version of memorialisation unpolitical and uncontested. This required him to pay due respect to
the sa ed ess of A za s
ou da ies,
ut it de o st ates that sig ifi a t P i e Mi iste ia l
reinterpretation of Anzac could be achieved.
175
CHAPTER 8
Howard: Anzac and a Unified Mainstream
Introduction
In 1996, John Howard and the Coalition won government at the federal level for the first time in
thirteen years. This election, centred on the Coalitio s ele tio sloga of Fo all of us a d e l i e f
that the La o Pa t
o lo ge u de stood
te plate fo the Ho a d go e
Ho a d had a paig ed ha d o
e t s te
ai st ea
Aust alia ,
i offi e fo the e t ele e
ould p o ide the dis u si e
ears (see Kelly 2009, 238).
hat he pe ei ed to e the ALP s i diffe e e to
Aust alia s e pe ie e of sig ifi a t so ial a d e o o i
ai st ea
ha ge a d espe iall o P i e Mi iste
Paul Keati g s ha pio i g of Big Pi tu e politi s - a progressive social policy agenda, a ne o -l i be ral
est u tu i g of the e o o
Pa ifi
, a d a eo ie tatio of Aust alia s fo eig elatio s to a ds the Asi a -
egio . The ALP s a a do
e t of the Aust alia “ettle e t had also halle ged the p e -
eminence of white Australians in the national narrative, as Australians were encouraged to thi nk of
themselves as diverse, cosmopolitan, and economic citizens.
Ho a d s oppositio to the ALP a d its o eptio of Aust alia ess did ot ea , ho e e , that he
was interested in rolling back the substantive neoliberal policy direction of the Hawke/Keating
governments in order to reassert the Anglo-centric nature of Australian society. Howard was,
however, keenly interested in changing the tone of government and the ways that Austral i ans saw
themselves and their place in the world. In particular, Howard was concerned that Australia was
being increasingly divided by the ALP. In this way, he was continuing a long Liberal tradition of
contrasting its concern for unity with the sectional interests of the ALP (Brett 2003, 187). In
pa ti ula , Ho a d s e phasis o
ai st ea Aust alia s a d thei pu po ted alues dis ipli ed ot
only those groups who stood outside the mainstream, but also those:
Anglo-Celtic heterosexuals and other me e s of the
ai st ea
to o st u t thei o
ide tit as u uestio i gl e t al a d othe ide tities as spe ial i te ests . It is a out
discouraging Anglo-Celts, heterosexuals and others who do not wish to privilege their identity
by denouncing the as politi all o e t , elitist, so ial e gi ee s ho a e dise po e i g
their compatriots (Johnson 2000, 42).
The sto
of Aust alia s i
ol e e t i the Gallipoli a paig of
as to pla a e t al ole i
this reorientation of Australian conceptions of identity.
176
Howard was a consistent Anzac entrepreneur. Like Hawke and Keating, he sought to engage with
Anzac to reconstitute Australian identity in a manner that was intimately bound together with his
go e
e t s poli age da. Ho a d as successful in this endeavour because he actively pol ice d
his depoliticised and unpolitical version of Anzac with his discourse of a unified mainstream. This
app oa h as i
o t ast to Ha ke, ho poli ed A za s u politi s less a ti el , a d to Keati g, h o
as i o siste t i his effo ts to
ake his A za e t ep e eu ship u politi al. Ho a d s poli i g
tacitly accepted that his Anzac entrepreneurship was attracting opposition, and that it was therefore
part of the political sphere of social relations. However, his emphasis on a unified mainstream wi th
his political style explicitly and effectively denied that his version of Anzac was partisan or pol i ti cal .
I stead, Ho a d s A za
as presented as depoliticised, essential and commonsensical. Further,
and importantly, it proved difficult to contest.
This hapte seeks to e plo e Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu ship th ough this p is of atio al u it ,
mainstream politics, and especially neoliberalism. It does so in four sections, as follows:
1. Ho a d s dis ou se of a u ified
ai st ea
ha a te ised his politi al st le. “u h a
dis ou se epudiated the ALP s app oa h to go e
marginalising identities and policy approaches that
ai st ea
e t,
ut also had the effe t of
e e ot o g ue t
ith Ho a d s
politi s.
2. The government that Howard led faced numerous policy challenges as they attempted to
further the process of economic reform and responded to the social and cultural legacy of
the Keating gove
e t. Ho a d s o
espo se to these issues efle ted his eoli e alis
and conservatism.
3. A corpus assisted discourse analysis of Ho a d s A za Da add esses e eals his e phasis
upo a o se ati e eadi g of A za . Ho a d s A za
as e t ed o Gallipoli, the Anzac
tradition, and national unity, and he consistently engaged in Anzac entrepreneurship duri ng
his time as Prime Minister by making multiple addresses at significant sites of Australian war
remembrance.
4. Ha i g esta lished these poi ts, I tu
i
o e detail to Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu shi p.
Howard emphasised national unity in his Anzac Day addresses, policed the conte station of
this unity actively, and constitutively reconceived Anzac with new neoliberal values that
aligned with the values of the Liberal Party of Australia.
As such, Howard during this period was setting up the conditions for his highly successful Anzac
entrepreneurship after 2001. Whilst Howard faced challenges to his version of Anzac, he had an
177
effective discourse to keep Anzac unpolitical and marginalise opposition. It was the di scourse of a
u ified ai st ea that helped Ho a d e o e A za s ost su essful e t ep e eu .
Howard: Unity and the Mainstream
When he returned as leader of the Coalition in January 1995, Howard set himself the task of
halle gi g Keati g s Big Pi tu e isio a d use of Aust alia histo
to de ig ate the Li e al s
o t i utio to Aust alia s p og ess. Aidi g this task as a i h ei of politi al dis ontent, as the
Australian economy was still performing sluggishly after the recession of the early 1990s and, as
Howard identified in a series of addresses from Opposition dubbed the Headland speeches, the ALP
government had become increasingly alienated from the concerns and desires of its traditional
working class constituency.
For Howard, the problem with the Labor Party was that it governed for some, not for all, and was
thus dividing the nation. This claim to govern for all continued the Liberal Party contrasting itself
with the ALP by arguing that it represented all Australians, not just the working class of the
electorate that the ALP represented (Loveday 1979, 240-1; Brett 2003,
the ALP s di isio
. Ho a d s solutio to
as to fall a k upo the guiding principles of Liberal Party political phi l osophy -
the cautious decision making of conservatism, coupled with a strong commitment to individualism.
The dual commitment to conservatism and liberalism engendered a narrow conception of social
groupings – families at the micro level and the nation-state at the macro level (Brett 2005, 25).
Allegiance to a social group larger than the family but lesser then the nation-state, such as class, was
dangerous, as it ran the risk of curtailing the freedom of the individual and encouraged the
spli te i g of the atio s u it
B ett
. The su -section of the electorate that the ALP
represented had evolved beyond the working class and now included all those Australians
s
patheti to Keati g s Big Pi ture politics:
…si e the
s lass a d the u io s ha e ee joi ed i the La o a p
othe
representatives of the part – feminists, environmentalists, the ethnic lobby, multiculturalists,
the Aboriginal industry – sometimes all simply lumped together as ois
i o it g oups o
vested interests (Brett 2003, 187).
The reassertion of the values of national unity and individual freedom was the twin anti dote to the
claims of these groups.
So to whom was Howard appealing? Much has been written on this subject (see Brett 2003; 2005;
Scalmer 1999; Dyrenfurth 2007; Wear 2008).
What characterises these accounts is an
178
a k o ledg e t of the i itial use
Ho a d of the ide tifie
attle as pa t of his appeal i the
lead up to the 1996 election. The battlers were a struggling section of Australian society, fighting to
su i e i Keati g s Aust alia. The
e e, at least i pa t, the ALP s atu al o stitue
a d the
had been let down by the ALP:
…La o has let do the t ue elie e s. The attle s have taken a fearsome battering from the
o f o Ba ksto
[Keati g]. It is little o de that he is see i easi gl
La o s
traditional constituents as a remote, elitist figure, comfortable with the chattering classes but
decidedly uncomfortable with the rank and file who spawned him (Howard 1995a, 20).
However, the battler discourse was not to endure, being quickly dropped when it was realised that it
was unreasonable to expect the electorate to continue battling once Howard had taken office
(Scalmer 1999). Battling was what the Keating and the ALP engendered and Howard was the
antithesis of this dystopia.
In power, Howard instead appealed to and governed for the mainstream – a discursive realm similar,
but distinct, to the image of the battler. The mainstream had a nebulous definition that
encompassed many, but excluded others. Its scope was set out early in the Headland speeches:
There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which sees government decisions
increasingly driven by the noisy, self-interested clamour of powerful vested interests with
scant regard for the national interest.
The po e of o e ai st ea
of a few interest groups.
has ee di i ished
this go e
e t s ea tio s to the fo e
Many Australians in the mainstream feel utterly powerless to compete with such groups, who
see to ha e the ea o pletel of the go e
e to
ajo issues… Howard 1995a)
The dis u si e o st u tio of the te
f ust ated
ested i te ests . The
ai st ea
ai st ea
o tai s a st o g se se of g ie a e – it was
suggested a olle ti e, do i a t idea, t e d,
constituency or ideology. To be located outside the mainst ea a d as a ested i te est
as to e
outside the majority of sensible, common-se se opi io . As su h, these po e ful ested i te ests
had a disproportionate influence on policy makers in the Keating government. So, whilst Howard
talked of o e
ai st ea
, a u ified a d u diffe e tiated Aust alia, at the sa e ti e he
as
marginalising groups that did not fit into that category.
Johnson (2000,
a gues that Ho a d e phasised
ai st ea
ide tit as Aust alia ide tit :
Part of making the Aust alia people feel ela ed a d o fo ta le… as p e isel to ei fo e
ai st ea
ide tities a d e su e that a gi alised ide tities sta ed o -threatening and
su o di ate. The ai st ea a d Aust alia ide tit e e ei g o st u ted as o e a d the
179
same thing by a sleight of hand that simultaneously talked of all Australians and marginalised
spe ial , i o it i te ests.
Howard himself embodied the image of the mainstream in his own persona and image of ordi nary,
unremarkable Australian identity (Brett 2005; Wear
. Ho a d s lo e of
i ket, his po e
walking in the morning in a Wallabies tracksuit, his plain speech and middle Australian accent all
projected an image of white, suburban Australia. This ordinariness also co-opted the Australian
Legend, especially the concept of mateship (see Brett 2003, 205; Dyrenfurth 2007). But at the same
time as projecting an image of the ordinary, it spoke of what was established and acceptabl e for an
Australian Prime Minister to embody and projected an image of Australian identity based upon thi s
ordinariness. This common-sense ordinariness was quite specific. It was white, it was heterosexual,
it was male, it was Christian, and it was classless. It served to govern those who were place d at the
centre of the national image by actively encouraging them to define their place as central and
preeminent (Johnson 2000, 42). Those Australians who were uncomfortable with being de fined as
the centre of identity were at once both excluded from the mainstream, and encouraged to abandon
their reservation and join the common-sense majority.
‘elated to Ho a d s o eptio of the
ai st ea
as his e gage e t ith the histo
a s.
Ho a d as ea ti g to Keati g s use of Aust alia histo fo pa tisa politi al purposes and had a
deep-seated desire to defend the conservative contribution to Australian history and life (see
Bonnell and Crotty 2008; Clark 2010). Howard purported that Keating had marginalised the place of
the LPA in Australian history, had equated what contribution it had made with a negative view of
Australian history, and was using this to unnecessarily politicise essential policy changes in a manne r
that
gove
as a titheti al to Aust alia s
e t ith the la k a
atio al i te est. This
a d ie
as the e uatio of the Keati g
of Australian history (see Blainey 1993b).
The equation of the Keating government with a negative view of Australian history conti nued wi th
the Headland speeches:
National identity develops in an organic way over time. It may be changed dramatically by
ata l s i e e ts like Gallipoli. But go e
e ts a d thei so ial e gi ee s should t t to
manipulate it, or to create a sense of crisis about identity. Constant debate about identity
i plies eithe that e do t al ead ha e o e o , o se, that it is so eho i ade uate… A
better understanding of the past would, I suggest, leave us more humble about the relative
significance of our current achievements but vastly more optimistic about our future
prospects.
It is currently fashionable in some quarters to underestimate what we have inherited – its
uniqueness, its basic fairness and its proven ability to be able to produce cohesion, tolerance
and stability unmatched in any other country around the world (Howard 1995b).
180
With this uote e a see the egi
alig
i gs of Ho a d s ie o the i o testa ilit of histo a d its
e t ith a t iu phalist a d o se ati e ie Aust alia s past. B e plo i g the adje ti e
o ga i i
elatio to the fo
atio of atio al identity, Howard is presenting identity as a natural
process, one unburdened by the weight of artificial or inauthentic construction, analysis and
critique. An organic view of the state is a common conservative view, where tradition and history
play the most important role in the explanation of the state, rather than an over-arching abstract
theory (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009, 269-274). Thus, to critique the historical development of
Aust alia
ess i sults us all . C iti al histo
that e a i es the e pe ience of multiple identity
groups, such as women or Indigenous Australians, challenges a conception of Australian history that
p o ides a positi e, ohe e t a d si gula
a ati e to e plai the atio s de elop e t. As a
consequence, critical history also undermines fundamental conservative values –
tole a e a d sta ilit . The p oof that ested i te ests a
ohesio ,
ot a ti el a d a tifi iall alte
identity and its historic basis, is Gallipoli – an organic ata l s i e e t unburdened by the
i flue e of go e
e ts a d so ial e gi ee s .
Thus, Ho a d s politi al st le a d dis ou se
as e t ed o
atio al u it . Politi al ide tities o
deconstructions of history that deviated from this purpose were forcefully and explicitly rejected by
Howard due to their deleterious effect upon national cohesion. The example of unity set by
Australian soldiers was one of the major themes in his Anzac Day addresses of 1996 to 2001.
The Howard Go er
e t’s Policy Challe ges
Unity was sorely needed by Howard in his first period in office, as a long list of controversies dogge d
his government. Issues like the rise of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation Party as a political force ,
the confrontation with the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) over waterfront reform, continuing
debate over the place of Indigenous peoples in Australian society (flamed by the Wi k de ci si on and
subsequent Native Title reform legislation, and the process of reconciliation), and controversies over
the repeated breaches of the self-imposed ministerial code of conduct by Coalition members had al l
bruised Howard. Further, the 1998 election campaign centred on the introduction of a Goods and
“e i es ta G“T fu the hu t the Coalitio go e
e t s popula it , a d at the ele tio i O tobe r
that year, the Coalition lost the popular vote, and their majority in the House of Representatives was
reduced from forty four seats to twelve. Having said that, by the time of the 2001 election, Howard
had succeeded in instituting a number of economic and social policy reforms.
181
The Economy
Howard was an enthusiastic supporter of further neoliberal economic reform during the 1996
election campaign. He continued to be in his time in office, pursuing policy reforms such as
privatising the telecommunications utility Telstra, introducing a GST, and the deregulation of the
labour market via the WorkChoices legislation. The introduction of the GST, in particular, was
complicated by increasing interest rates, rising petrol prices, and the weakness of the Australian
dollar. Howard showed a willingness to institute policy responses to mediate the difficulti es the se
events posed for mainstream Australia (Kelly 2009, 525-526). Less fortunate were welfare
recipients, on whom Howard imposed mutual obligation and work for the dole schemes. Such
effo ts e ealed the Ho a d go e
e t s atte pts to e te d the a ketpla e, as poli
efo
s to
the provision of unemployment services asked the unemployed to act as consumers in a
marketplace employment providers (Dean 1998).
Further, whilst his foreign policy direction emphasised a commitment to traditional We stern al l ie s
and economic ties, Ho a d s o
it e t to a ealist o eptio of the atio al i te est sa hi
oversee the increasing integration of Australia with the Asia-Pacific region (Wesley 2007, 24). Thi s
included a growing economic interconnectedness with China - cemented symbolically by the
invitation extended to Chinese President Hu Jintao to address the Federal Parliament the day afte r
US President George W. Bush did so in 2003 - extending credit to regional countries during the Asian
Financial Crisis, the seeking of bi-lateral free trade agreements in the region, with countries like
Singapore and Thailand, and encouraging increasing regional trade and investment (see Kelly 2009).
Social and Cultural Policy
Howard was compelled to deal with social and cultural issues like the republican debate and the
reconciliation process with Indigenous people inherited from the Keating government. Howard di d
ot let Keati g s lega defi e his positio , a d he epudiated a
of Keati g s i itiati es. With the
republic question he committed his government to holding a convention and referendum, but he
publically backed the retention of the constitutional monarchy and utilised the divisions within the
pro- epu li a
o e e t to ad a e that positio
Walsh
. The go e
e t s a e d e t of
the Native Title Act 1993 after the Wik decision weakened Indigenous rights regarding native title
(Patapan 2000, 38-
, a d Ho a d s efusal to apologise fo past go e
e t p a ti es ega di g
assimilation strained the reconciliation process (Sanders 2005).
182
Ho a d s dis ou se of the ai st ea also fed i to p a ti al poli
espo ses to issues pe tai i g to
multiculturalism and immigration. Howard quickly abolished the Office of Multicultural Affairs, and
he efused to use the o d multiculturalism fo the fi st fe
o te t of the ise of Pauli e Ha so , a d Ho a d
ea s of go e
el o ed the e
ope
e t. He did so i the
ess of de ate she
represented (Jupp 2005, 178-180). Howard continued to emphasise the economic contribution of
immigrants as a criterion for their acceptance (Jupp 2002), and reasserted the exclusionist
te de ies of Aust alia s efugee poli ies i the MV Tampa incident and the Pacific Sol uti on (El der
2007, 126-
.
These poli
halle ges, a d Ho a d s espo se to the , reflected the
predominance of neoliberalism and conservatism that underpinned his political style.
Ho ard’s A zac – a Corpus Assisted Discourse Analysis
A corpus assisted discourse analysis of Ho a d s A za Da add esses de o st ates his o e
with repudiati g Keati g s e sio of A za i fa ou of atio al u it . Ho a d s A za
losel
followed the genre conventions of Anzac Day and emphasised the campaigns at Gallipoli.
The Sites of Ho a d s Anzac Addresses
Howard marked every Anzac Day of his term with a public address or media release, producing
twenty speeches and media releases (Figure 17). He primarily marked Anzac Day in Austral i a, wi th
addresses at the Australian War Memorial in 2001 and 2003, in addition to his attendance and
wreath laying there in 1996, 2002, 2006, and 2007 (The Australian 2001, 2; Boogs 2002, 4; Doherty
2003, 4; Doherty 2006, 5; Karvelas, Parnell, and Dodd 2007; Rintoul 1996, 1). Howard also made a
speech at Greenslopes Private Hospital in Brisbane on Anzac Day 2007 before flying to Canbe rra to
lay a wreath at the AWM, and attended the dawn services at the North Ryde RSL in 1996, the Marti n
Place Cenotaph in 1997, and Melbourne in 1999 (The Australian 1999, 3; Howard 2007; Karvelas,
Parnell, and Dodd 2007; Lamont 1996, 1; Stephens 1997, 1). Howard also made two trips to Gallipoli
to mark the 85th anniversary of the landings in 2000 and the 90th anniversary in 2005 (Howard
2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2005a). He made two other over-seas trips for Anzac Day during his term – to
Thailand in 1998, where he gave two speeches at Hellfire Pass during the dawn service and
Kanchanaburi War Cemetery at the 11am ceremony; and to Iraq in 2004, where he gave two brief
reported addresses to troops (Howard 1998a; 1998b; 2004a; 2004b). Unli ke Keating, Howard did
not mark Anzac Day at Kokoda or in PNG. His regular attendance at the AWM also is of note – this,
in combination with his attendance at Gallipoli, continued the growing emphasis on Anzac as a day
of high spectacle, rather than as an act of local and low-key remembrance.
183
Year
Type
1996
One media release
1997
One media release
1998
Two speeches
1999
One media release
2000
Three speeches
2001
One speech
2002
One media release
2003
One speech, one media release
2004
Two speeches, two media releases
2005
One speech, one media release
2006
One media release
2007
One speech
Figure 17 - List of Ho a d s A za Day Add esses a d Media “tate e ts
The Location of Ho a d s Anzac
Ho a d s spe ifi all
a ed o fli ts ofte efe e ed o te po a ADF deplo
e ts. F e ue t
specific mentions of Anzac were associated with Iraq (twelve named mentions in the Howard
corpus), East Timor (five mentions), Afghanistan (three mentions), Solo mon Islands (three
mentions), and the War on Terror (two mentions). WWI was also frequently named spe cifical ly by
Howard (four mentions), reflecting his view that the events associated with that war were central to
Australian identity. In contrast to its p o i e e i Keati g s spee hes, WWII
as
e tio ed
explicitly only once, though Howard did mark Anzac Day 1998 in Thailand, where he frequent ly
alluded to WWII. Finally, he did not mention Vietnam by name, and the Korean War only once. It
should be noted that wars were often not named specifically by Howard. Instead, they were alluded
to by the location of his speeches, especially at Gallipoli. Howard frequently referred to all wars, and
the loss of
,
Aust alia li es i all o fli ts du i g Aust alia s histo . Ho a d s f e ue t
collective call to mark all wars and war dead served his discourse of unity, as it include d all se rvi ce
personnel, even as it privileged the Gallipoli campaign.
Gallipoli dominated the battles mentioned explicitly by Howard, with fifteen mentions (and an
additional three mentions of Lone Pine). Howard rarely mentioned Kokoda (one mention) or events
or battles during the War in the Pacific (two additional mentions). Long Tan was also acknowledge d
twice, and the Battle of Kapyong once. This pattern reinforces the view that Howard saw WWI, and
184
especially the landings at Gallipoli, as central to Anzac. His tendency to name current ADF the atre s
of deployment in his speeches also reflected his constitutive and instrumental al ignment of Anzac
with the War on Terror. Given the importance Howard placed upon the Australia-US relationship,
we might expect WWII to be a war that Howard would emphasise. However, WWII rarely fe ature d
in comparison to the more British sites of Anzac.20
Ho a d s Agents of Anzac
The age ts of A za i Ho a d s add esses a d
edia eleases also te ded to ei fo e his
conservative view of Australian war history. In gender terms, men are overwhelmingly the pri mary
agents of Anzac (twenty-five named mentions). Notably, men tend to be agents when Howard was
talki g histo i all a out A za , a d
e a d
o e
eightee
e tio s
as used o l
he
Howard talked about contemporary deployments, reflecting the changed make-up of Aust alia s
defe e fo es. Nu ses a e
issi g f o
Ho a d s add esses a d spee hes, de o st ati g the
continuing marginalised role women play in the Prime Ministerial Anzac narrative.
Ho a d s A za age ts also lack diversity. He briefly mentioned immigrants and their contri bution
to Australian life in his 2000 speech at Lone Pine (Howard 2000b), but made no other mention of
immigrants. No mention of Indigenous Australians was made by Howard, in contrast to Ha ke s
A za Da add esses a d Keati g s spee hes du i g Australia Remembers. Such references to
diversity were replaced by frequent references to the unity of service personnel and to unity being a
lesson that could be drawn from the example of Anzacs throughout history.
The Attributes of Ho a d s Anzac Agents
Given the above, it is unsurprising to see that the attributes that Howard saw Anzac agents as
possessing were closely aligned with conservative Anzac tradition. Bravery, sacrifice, service and
dut , a d the de t e o e A za s, all o e th ough st o gl i Ho a d s add esses. ‘efe e es to
the diggers as possessing identifiably Australian characteristics, such as mateship or larrikini sm al so
feature. The unity that the diggers displayed was mentioned several times and was used as a
reference point for lessons for today. The heroic status of diggers was also mentioned, and was
reinforced by references to the wild or reckless character of the Anzacs, a somewhat unusual feature
of Ho a d s A za Da dis ou se. Fo Ho a d, the A za s
aze attitude u de -fire helped
reinforce the heroic and special status of their service.
Credit, and my sincere thanks, for this observation must go to Dr. Robert Howard, Honorary Associate with
Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney.
20
185
Attributes
Frequency
Courage/bravery
22
Sacrifice
19
Debt Owed
13
Mateship
10
Service/duty
7
Heroism
6
Australianness
5
Tenacity/perseverance
4
Unity
4
Compassion
4
Suffering
4
Honour
3
Wild/reckless/daring
3
Fear
2
Discipline
1
Free
1
Figure 18 - List of the Frequency of Mentions of the Att i utes of Age ts of A za i Ho a d s A za Day Add esses
The e
as ua e to Ho a d s add esses though. “ofte
ha a te isti s featu e – he notes the
compassion that service personnel displayed, as well as their suffering during wartime. These
aspe ts e e espe iall p o i e t i Ho a d s
add esses i Thaila d, he e he dedi ated hi s
addresses to the remembrance of POWs. This gives the 1998 addresses something of an outlier
status i Ho a d s A za Da
o pus of spee hes a d edia eleases.
Howard saw Anzac as centred on the events of the Gallipoli campaign, and as closely aligned with
the conservatism of the Anzac tradition. In particular, he emphasised unity as a value in these
addresses. Having established quantitatively the core aspects of Ho a d s A za Da add esses a d
media releases, the chapter now turns to a deeper qualitative examination of how unity was
operationalised by Howard via his Anzac discourse.
Ho ard’s A zac Day Addresses: Unity and Neoliberalism, 1996-2001
The following section examines Howard Anzac Day addresses from 1996 to 2001. It notes that the
re-election of Howard in November 2001 was an affirmation of his sometimes controve rsial pol icy
186
agenda, a tipping point that marked the beginning of new policy priorities centred on national
se u it a d Aust alia s i
ol e e t i the War on Terror, and that it precipitated a change in
Ho a d s politi al pe so a to o e of st e gth see Kell
, espe iall
-627; Errington 2008,
223-224). This change is refle ted i Ho a d s late A za Da add esses see Chapte
‘ega di g Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu ship f o
to
,
o siste t appeal to u it . As oted a o e, Ho a d s fi st t o te
e a i
.
pa ti ula see a
s as P i e Mi iste had ee
bruising and hard-fought, characterised by the proposal and implementation of a number of
unpopular and controversial measures. In addition, unity served his deeper political style and
philosophy – to national patriotism and to individualism, whilst at the same ti me disregarding
attempts to frame identity based upon sub-national structures such as class, ethnicity, gender or
se ualit . Ho a d s as a ai st ea
eadi g of Aust alia histo that o stituted a o se ati e
and uncontroversial view of Anzac and Australianness. This mainstream reading progressively came
to constitute Anzac, replacing the sometimes controversial reimaging of Anzac that Keating had
atte pted. This is ot to suggest that Ho a d s e sio of A za
as u o t o e sial or non-
partisan – at times it attracted bitter opposition. But it is to suggest that Howard believed Anzac was
unpolitical, that is, esse tial a d a o e pa tisa politi s. Ho a d drew upon this understanding of
Anzac and actively policed opposition to his version Australianness. The following section examines
these themes by looking at how Howard constructed a unified Anzac, policed that unity, and aligned
this imagined Anzac with neoliberal values of the LPA.
Anzac Day 1998 – Prisoners of War and a Unified Australia
On Anzac Day, 1998 Howard travelled to Thailand to mark Anzac Day. On April 24, he opened a
museum at Hellfire Pass dedicated to the remembrance of Australian POWs held in captivity by the
Japanese, built in part with $1.6 million in funding from the Australian government (Inglis 2008,
528). On Anzac Day, he attended the dawn service at Hellfire Pass and an 11am ceremony at
Kanchanaburi War Cemetery. He gave three major set speeches at these occasions. The trip was
condu ted i the o te t of the e uptio of i dust ial u est ith the go e
ith do k
o ke s a d the Ma iti e U io of Aust alia MUA o e
e t s o f o tati o
ate f o t efo
. Ho a d s
performance on this trip won him some positive accolades in unlikely circumstances, given the
controversy that the waterfront confrontation had provoked. In particular, the emphasi s upon the
unity of the Australian POWs was to play a central role in this success.
187
The waterfront dispute was being bitterly fought as Howard left for Thailand. Having decide d upon
the necessity of waterfront reform and campaigning on that policy in 1996, the Howard government
had committed to a course of action that would see confrontation, rather than negotiation, with the
MUA (see Singleton 2000, 143; Howard 2010, 290-291). Having secured the commitment of Patrick
“te edo es a d Natio al Fa
e s Fede atio
suppo ted the dis issal of Pat i k s u io
a ked o -union labour, the government publicly
o kfo e o Ap il
a d thei e o al from the
dock by balaclava clad security, enforced with dogs. The MUA took its case to the courts and April
21st sa the Fede al Cou t fi d that …the e e e a gua le ases i
to epla e the Pat i k
espe t of u la ful o spi a
o kfo e a d i respect of the freedom of association provision of the
Wo kpla e ‘elatio s A t ei g
ea hed e plo ees te
i ated due to
e
e ship of a u io
(Singleton 2000, 145). On this date, the court had further ordered the reinstatement of the union
workforce.
This was the domestic context that Howard found himself in when he addressed the crowds at
Hellfire Pass and Kanchanaburi War Cemetery on Anzac Day. The speeches were full of lyrical prose,
high rhetoric, and references to sacredness, with the Prime Minister imbuing the occasions with
suitable decorum by having a hand in penning poetry that began the dawn service speech (Howard
1998a; McGregor 1998, 3). The speeches were full of references to the POWs who had laboured,
suffered and died whilst in Japanese captivity, with Howard making frequent reference in both
speeches to their suffering, the sacrifice that they had made for each other and their country, and
the compassion they had shown their mates.
Ho a d s spee h drew upon the familiar tropes of the Judean-Christian religious tradition and
especially upon the example of Christ. Whilst this had antecedents with Keating, who had also
alluded to the e a ple of Ch ist, Ho a d s references to Christianity were part of his wider poli ti cal
style (see Maddox 2005). For example, at the dawn service at Hellfire Pass, Howard had the
following to say about the Prisoners of the War in the Pacific:
Their story of sacrifice and suffering, of constancy and compassion, illuminates the very
essence of the Anzac spirit. For, of all our heroes, they were armed with human virtue alone
a d thei i to
as o e the da kest e esses of the hu a hea t…
To the world, proof was given that tyranny, in the end, has no power over the courage and
decency of ordinary men and women. It is an example to which we all aspire – as relevant in
peace as to war, to our future as to our past.
And on this sacred day, at this most sacred place, we honour all Australian service men and
o e
ho ga e o offe ed thei li es i a …
188
We would have them know of our firm and steadfast belief that they rest not in shades of
darkness but bask in the brightness of an Australian sun (Howard 1998a).
The parallel with the example of Christ comes through strongly - the p iso e s sto
ith the alues that Ch ist e
odied i his life. I
fa e o othe pe so al g atifi atio , ut fo
o e t e
i to
is analogous
ga e o offe ed thei li es , ot fo
o e the si of the da kest e esses of the
hu a hea t , just as Christ had willingly offered Himself to absolve the world of sin. They suffe red
this illi gl , as Ch ist did, ot ith a ge o despai
ut i stead ith o sta
a d o passi o
.
The example they set in their confinement demonstrated the clash between good and e vi l , si n and
salvation. These themes are alluded to with the binary oppositions represented – t a
da k ess ju taposed
e a ple to
hi h
ith
ou age , de e
,
a d
ight ess a d su . And this served as an
e all aspi e , as it p o ed to the o ld that evil will be overcome. Presenting
Anzac in these terms invoked the Manichaean theme of conflict between good and evil, placed
Aust alia fi
l o the side of good i this st uggle, a d helped to sa alise Ho a d s o ds.
Howard also noted the way that the p iso e s disti ti e Aust alia
ess had helpe d the
e du e
their captivity. This distinctive Australianness was conflated with unity by Howard at Kanchanaburi:
They were Australians.
Their accent was as evident in their manner and deeds as in their speech. There a bond, a
unity which branded them as different from others.
As an English officer stood in the driving rain and watched a group of Australians sing, trudging
back exhausted f o thei o k, he asked Just hat is it that these Aust alia s ha e?
The answer, plain now as it was then, was that they had each other. They had their mates
(Howard 1998b).
The fact that unity presents itself as a synonym here for bond is notable , as the two terms are not
e ti el a alogous. Ho a d s eadi g of e e ts e phasised that the p iso e s stood as a e a pl e
not only of the deeply felt love and comradeship which can develop amongst human beings in time s
of extreme hardship, but also of unity of purpose and the strength that this granted. They had e ach
other and only by having each other did they have strength. This unity, and the strength that it
granted them, marked them as different to other nationalities, granted them uniqueness, and a
special kind of exceptionalism. But as Dyrenfurth (2015, 146) has suggested that mateship amongst
POWs … as less utopia tha late ep ese ted. It a e to e ist o l i
s
di ates , usuall
i p iso
o sisti g of t o to si
o-operative groups, or
e , a d these relationships tightened as the
e t e a e o e halle gi g i the late stages of the a . Mo eo e , p iso e s at ti e s
displayed instances of poor morale, infighting, and collaboration with their Japanese captors
(Dyrenfurth 2015, 145-146). As this suggests, one can be bound without being unified. By linking
189
bond and unity, Howard obfuscated any differences that may have existed amongst the pri soners,
differences based on class, religion, rank, or even the means to see out the terrible co nditions of
internment.
In his emphasis on unity, Howard linked the experience of WWII POWs with the present day and
used their service as an example for current generations. The speech at Kanchanaburi began with
Howard referencing the pilgrimages that young Australians were making to sites of Austral i an war
histo
…d a
th ough the ea s to a ds the past Ho a d
the sel es a d Aust alia s a dead. This li k as ade i
atio alisti te
a d the li k et ee
s:
Pausing to read inscriptions engraved upon the headstones they [young Australians] find
countrymen who share their names, share their ages, their home towns. Men, some just boys,
who like those today, loved sport and the beach, a beer, and looked ahead towards brighter
lives of familiar places and loved ones (Howard 1998b).
This common-sense Australianness linked the present with the past:
…this ette
o ld e o e to those
ho est he e a d all ho se ed ith the .
They were the special ones, the unique Australians. But within each of us is carried their
legacy. And we will build our future upon foundations laid deep and strong. With such a base,
with their example as our corner stone, there is no height to which we cannot reach together
(Howard 1998b).
Howard imbued the prisoners with lessons for the present, with their sacrifice being the foundation
of what we have today, and appeals to the audience to draw upon that example in the future.
However, this serves more as an appeal for unity, rather than an assured declaration o f purpose.
Whilst
e
ill has a high degree of commitment, the future tense tacitly acknowledges that this
may not be a certain outcome. The very need to use the POWs as an example of unity for the
p ese t da de o st ated Ho a d s i pli it a k o ledgement that the nation was not united, and
his own lack of assuredness as uncertainty and division raged at home on the waterfront.
Ho a d s t ip a d spee hes o hi ge e all positi e ea tio s f o the p ess. He losel
et the
traditions of Anzac, and imbued the occasions with suitable respect and nationalism. Positive
reaction came from an unlikely source. Tom Uren, the former Whitlam government minister, ALP
left faction stalwart, and Japanese Prisoner of War, praised the Prime Minister for his ad dresses and
efforts on Anzac Day 1998. Uren, having never applied for his war service medals (but receiving
them in 1998 anyway, as the DVA applied for them on his behalf), had them presented to him by the
Prime Minister on Anzac Day eve in Bangkok. Uren had atte ded the pi ket at “ d e s Po t Bota
190
in support of the MUA a few days beforehand (Steketee 1998, 6). He subsequently wrote to The
Sydney Morning Herald:
I do not agree with the Howard Government's policy on the Australian waterfront, but in
politics I believe you give credit where it is due.
John Howard made an outstanding contribution on our visit to the Burma-Thai Railway where
he dedicated the Hellfire Pass museum to those who died and worked on the infamous
railway.
His address on Anzac Day in Kanchanaburi cemetery was so giving and moving that the Diggers
and their loved ones broke with tradition and gave him a spontaneous applause.
Prime Minister Howard did those who served and died on this hellhole proud. He did Australia
proud (Uren 1998, 18).
U e s p aise fo Ho a d s
a ki g of A za Da
pla ed eatl i to Ho a d s a ati e
regarding unity. Here was a former POW, ea hi g out a oss the pa tisa di ide to gi e credit
he e it is due for his marking of Anzac Day and recognition of POWs. Of course, this did not me an
that Howard had ameliorated the conflict the waterfront dispute had provoked with hi s Anzac Day
addresses. But it does demonstrate the manner in which Anzac Day could be engaged and how the
o e t e gage e t ould win plaudits in tough circumstances. It further demonstrates the
flexibility of Anzac, with the remembrance once again being imbued with new meanings and lessons
for the present.
The Boundaries of Unity
National unity was not a given and Howard keenly policed its boundaries with his Anzac
e t ep e eu ship. Ho a d s poli i g
as e pli itl e p essed
u politi al, telli g a epo te o A za Da
about anything that has a
that I ha e a golde
ki d of pa t politi al [ o
his p i iple that A za
as
ule o AN)AC Da I e e tal k
otatio ] Ho a d
a . Ho a d s A za
was both a crucial part of Australian national identity that deserved to be protected from di vi si on,
and a means to achieve (attempted) national unity. This policing tacitly accepted that Anzac was i n
fa t politi al, ut Ho a d s A za dis ou se was an attempt to depoliticise his version of Anzac and
present it as essential and unpolitical. The Anzac Days of 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000 all featured
attempts by Howard to police these boundaries.
The Boundaries of Unity - Anzac Day 1996
A za Da
sa Ho a d a
ou e o e of the Coalitio go e
e t s fi st poli
i itiati es –
introducing legislation in the first period of the new Parliament to ensure that the design of the
Australian flag could not be altered except by plebiscite. The Coalition had only just taken office.
191
The use of the occasion to announce a policy that was of little substantive importance but
symbolically reinforced Anglo-Celtic ide tit ,
state e t that as eleased a
as a
u ial sig al of Ho a d s i te t. I the
ou i g the i itiati e, Ho a d oted [i]t is pa ti ul a l g ati f i g
that some vestige of cynicism over ANZAC Day a generation ago appears to have evaporated with
young Australians taking more interest than ever in ANZAC Day and what it means for ou r nati onal
ide tit
Ho a d 1996). Howard often noted the way that Anzac was becoming increasingly
important for Australians, especially young Australians, and used this as evidence to support his
belief in the centrality of Anzac. Of course, Howard tacitly recognised that Anzac had not always
proved to be such an incontestable element of Australian identity with such statements. Howe ver,
the increasing numbers of Australians, especially young Australians, attending Anzac Day parade s or
the Gallipoli dawn service proved for Howard that the issue was now settled. The controversies
surrounding Anzac Day in particular, and Australian history in general, were now a thing of th e past.
Thus, he st essed the legislatio that he as i t odu i g ould e su e …that as thousa ds of ou g
children line the streets of cities and country towns tomorrow waving our flag, all Australians can be
assured that no one will be able to change our national symbol without the Natio s o se t
(Howard
. Ho a d s o se atis is e t al he e, ith the ei fo e e t of the e t al i t of
established Anglo-Celtic symbols and practices of national identity being pushed to the fore front of
Howard s thi ki g a d poli
aki g i the ea l pa t of his te
as P i e Mi iste . A za
as oth
being constructed as unpolitical and aligned explicitly with a policy change that sought to do the
same regarding other symbols of Australian identity.
The Boundaries of Unity - Anzac Day 1997
The lead up to Anzac Day 1997 saw further policing of the boundaries of Anzac by the Prime
Minister. The controversy arose as the ACT government had proposed to dedicate a section of the
Lake Burley Griffin foreshore to Ca
e a s siste it i Japa , Na a, a d a e the pa k Ca
Na a Pea e Pa k. The ‘“L as u happ
e a-
ith the p oposed a e due to …the failu e of Japa as a
nation to come to terms with its role in World War II, [and, as such] the RSL remains complete ly
opposed to alli g the pa k a pea e pa k
G ee e
,
. The ‘“L p o ptl
passed the ACT
government with their concerns and directly approached the Commonwealth, attracting the
attention of senior Coalition ministers and Howard himself. Howard reportedly heatedly impresse d
upo the ACT hief i iste Kate Ca ell that the o d pea e should e e o ed f o
the pa k s
name, and that if she chose to refuse that she would be overridden (Greene 1997, 27). Recogni si ng
defeat, the ACT government co plied ith Ho a d s th eat, a i g it the Ca
e a-Nara Park, but
192
not before the controversy produced significant negative media attention and sympathy for Carne l l
(see Sheridan 1997; Greene 1997; Cooke 1997). The increasing attention that the controvers y
attracted also threatened to become an issue as Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto was visiting
Australia the week after Anzac Day (Sheridan 1997, 4). Whilst the issue did not prove to cause any
pu li e
a ass e t fo the go e
e t du i g Hashi oto s visit, it did demonstrate the depth of
feeli g Ho a d had ega di g the app op iate o
e o atio of Aust alia s a histo . Histo
was being actively contested by Howard, and the boundaries surrounding Anzac were to be cl e arl y
marked.
The Boundaries of Unity – Anzac Day 1999
The o se ue e of Ho a d s e fo i g of u it
as li d ess to the
ultiple a d o peti g
commitments individuals may have to group identities. This tension is revealed in his interview with
John Faine from Anzac Day, Melbourne, 1999. This conversation took place against the background
of Serbian ex-servicemen in Brisbane and Sydney refusing to march in Anzac Day parades in prote st
agai st NATO s o
i g of “e
fo es i the fo
e Yugoslavia in 1999 (Hodge and Krupka 1999).
Serbian ex-servicemen in Melbourne chose to march.
FAINE: We ll e talki g late this o i g to M To a Bu ja i si
ho s the se eta of the
first sub-branch of Serbian ex-servicemen in Victoria. Made a point of some controversy, the
Serbian ex-ser i e e
ill e a hi g he e i Mel ou e…
PRIME MINISTER: Well I
FAINE: The
e ot
e
pleased a out that.
a hi g i “ d e …
PRIME MINISTER: No, ell I ea ….the a e Aust alia s of “e ia o igi a d the
ee
wonderful allies of the allies du i g Wo ld Wa II. I e see the fo ea s i the a hes i
“d e a d I
e pleased i deed that the a e a hi g he e e ause they are first and
foremost citizens of Australia and the people who fought alongside the allies during the war
are an honoured part of that experience, and they are an honoured part of the Australian
o
u it . That s uite sepa ate a d apa t f o judg e ts people ake a out hat is o
occurring.
FAINE: What s happe i g i “e ia o is a politi al dispute of toda . What
is so ethi g that happe ed…
e e ele ati g
PRIME MINISTER: Well hat e e e e e i g is so ethi g that happe ed o e tha
years ago and the Australians of Serbian descent were magnificent allies of ours and they
fought very bravely, and they tied down, on some estimates, helped to tie down 15 to 20
German divisions in World War II and they were wonderful allies. Now one of the great things
about ANZAC Day is that you can remember that and you can see that for the great deed that
it then presented. The fact that we can also very freely acknowledge without bitterness the
fact that we fought against other countries who have now contributed magnificently to the
ode da Aust alia populatio . I ea o e of the thi gs a out… ou a e e e
without that e e
a e eati g a p ese t da diffi ulties a d I thi k that s a ag ifi e t
thing too.
FAINE: I a t ag ee ith ou e ough a d ou said, the
e Aust alia fi st.
193
PRIME MINISTER: Exactly. I see people always as Australians first, an obviously we each of us
ha e ou disti ti e he itage hi h e a t to p ese e, a d that s fi e. But e e all
Australians first (Howard 1999a).
Here we can see the consequences of the theme of unity. The commitment to the nation -state was
first and foremost in Ho a d s
i d. He epeatedl a gues that the o
identity comes first and other identities are marginalised –
he itage
hi h
e
it e t to atio al
e ea h of us ha e ou disti ti e
a t to p ese e, a d that s fi e. But e e Aust alia s fi st . The use of the
egati e o ju tio
ut egates the si e it of the p e edi g o
e t, as does the use of fi e ,
a rather weakly positive commitment to acceptability. The interview went on:
FAINE: And what we can achieve in Australia as Australians is to put aside some of those
ancient disputes and rivalries that have in fact have been the cause for many of those people
to come here in the first place.
PRIME MINISTER: Well i deed, a d that applies, I ea
hethe it s a dispute i the Balka s,
or years and years ago a dispute in Ireland, or a dispute somewhere else. Once you come to
this ou t y so ethi g else takes o e a d that s hat e pa ti ula ly ha e to offe . A d e
are reminded on a day like this that that really is what those people fought for (Howard 1999a;
phasis added)
The incontestability of unity was reinforced by Howard when he added the sacrifice and consequent
sanctity of the death of servicemen and women –
e a e e i ded o a da like this that that eall
is what those people fought fo . Howard was not simply asking for a commitment to Australian law
or citizenship, he was asking for a commitment to Australian identity, as ethnicity was being pl ace d
squarely at a lower level than a commitment to the nation-state. This is an important di sti ncti on –
o se atis is ei g e phasised o e li e alis . Ho a d s i siste e o a i di idual adhe e
to a se se of Aust alia
ess sits u o fo ta l
ith li e alis
s o
e
it e t to i di idual f e edo
within the framework of limited legal constraints. Howard demonstrated his unease with challenges
to Australian identity and his tendency towards conservatism when presented with such a challenge.
This epito ised Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu ship – his worldview came though strongly in his
interpretation of events, this worldview was frequently and prominently commented upon, and was
ei fo ed
the u politi al atu e of A za Da . These fa to s
ade Ho a d s A za Da
pronouncements especially potent, giving them a power that was above the cut an d thrust of
everyday political contestation.
The Boundaries of Unity – Anzac Day 2000
Most difficult for Howard were not immigrants, but non-conforming Indigenous Australians, as
Anzac Day 2000 demonstrated. Howard had visited Gallipoli for Anzac Day for the first time in orde r
to mark the 85th anniversary of the landings. This trip, which also included visits to France, the
194
Somme and Israel, attracted significant media attention and Howard was enthusiastic in his appraisal
of the trip. After being asked in an interview what his personal reaction to visiting Gallipoli was,
Howard replied:
Very moving, it was, it had a special feel in the sense that you, I know it sounds corny to say it,
but you felt as though it was as much part of Australia as the block of land on which 19 Milner
Crescent, Wollstonecraft is built. And I think that was, and that was the same feeling I had
when I first went to the Somme, that I felt as though I had come home to a part of Australia
(Howard 2000d).
This visceral reactio f o
Ho a d
as epeated i othe i te ie s,
ith te
s like p ide ,
e otio al , uplifti g , e t ao di a , a d passio all being used in the interviews he gave duri ng
and immediately after the trip to describe his reaction to the visit. This e xperience was contraste d
with his position on an apology to Indigenous Australians, when interviewer Alex Kirk asked:
KIRK: Can you understand then, at an emotional level, for example how an apology could be so
significant and symbolic to aboriginal people?
PRIME MINISTER: Well I think Alexandra they are two separate issues. I understand that
diffe e t people ha e diffe e t e otio s a out diffe e t issues ut I do t thi k the e s
anything served by trying to link those two issues particularly as affection for what Australian
soldiers did in defence of this country is something that is above and beyond party politics
(Howard 2000e).
Howard was again actively constructing Anzac as unpolitical, despite the fact that his version of
Anzac was not clearly distinguished from the sphere of the political. Indigenous calls for apology
e e pa tisa , he eas A za
as a o e su h pa t politi s .
Returning home, Howard faced similar criticism from patrons of Sorry Day, former Prime Minister
Mal ol F ase a d D Lo itja O Do oghue. I a p ess o fe e e, O Do oghue e a ked:
Wh a t he use the sa e so t of s patheti o ds he used i elatio to Anzac Day and in
othe pla es as he st utted the o ld stage? We ll e hopi g he has a it of a ha ge of hea t
O Do oghue, as ited Go do
, 1).
When asked about this in a talkback interview with Neil Mitchell, Howard became exasperate d and
defensive:
MITCHELL: What a out D O Do oghue, she s thi ki g h a t he use the sa e so t of
sympathetic words that he used in relation to Anzac Day and other places that he strutted the
world stage?
PRIME MINISTER: Well I did t st ut the
Australian people.
o ld stage I went to Anzac Cove on behalf of all the
MITCHELL: Do you see a link?
195
PRIME MINISTER: No, o I do t I…
MITCHELL: I do t see the li k.
PRIME MINISTER: No ell I do t eithe , I do t see a li k at all. I ea all Aust alia s fought
i the a s a d the ole of i dige ous Aust alia s i the a as ag ifi e t a d the e all
pa t of the lege d of A za , the e all pa t of the t aditio . I do t thi k the e is a li k a d I
thi k it s u fo tu ate the e s a atte pt ei g ade to d a a link between the two things. Of
course I feel emotion about Anzac Day and I feel that on behalf of all the Australian people but
the e is o uestio of… I thi k she a tuall said that I as gi i g apologies. Well I did t
apologise at any stage during my visit to Turkey, heavens above (Howard 2000f).
The o t ast is sta k. Ho a d s ea tio to his t ip to Gallipoli a d the “o
e
as p ese ted as
natural, instinctual and positive. Emotions were freely expressed by Howard and demonstrated the
ease he felt about the issue, and Anzac is thus unpolitical. However, when confronted with the
possi ilit that this sa e e otio al ea tio
ight e appli a le to his go e
e t s poli
response to reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, Howard shut down the link.
e o iliatio a d A za
Instead,
as p ese ted as t o sepa ate issues . By separating them, Howard coul d
then hierarchically rank them in terms of appropriateness, with Anzac being privileged as once agai n
above the cut and thrust of the political. Indigenous issues and reconciliation were presented as
political, partisan and dirtied as a consequence. Linking the two was not only incorrect, but
sacrilegious. When challenged on this separation, Howard became defensive, flatly denying that he
acted inapp op iatel o e seas o that the e as a
li k at all between his visceral response to hi s
Anzac experiences and the expectation from supporters of reconciliation that he e xpre ss a si mi l ar
response to that process.
Indigenous Australians presented Howard with a challenge. Their Australianness was unde ni able,
but how to include them in a narrative of national identity that still privileged dominant white
conceptions of self proved difficult. When challenged, Howard linked Indigenous Austral ians wi t h
Anzac – the ole of i dige ous Aust alia s i the
lege d of A za , the
a
as
ag ifi e t a d the
e all pa t of the
e all pa t of the t aditio . Indigenous Australians are free to identify with
Anzac to the extent that this does not challenge existing discursive power relationships. Beyond that
realm were special interests that were inappropriate, political and dangerous.
Howard, Anzac and Conservative Neoliberalism
This fi al se tio e a i es the e o o i di e sio of Ho a d s A za Da addresses. Howard
i
ued the ideog aphi A za
ith lesso s ega di g Aust alia s eoli e al e o o i l i fe ,
his Anzac entrepreneur predecessors had.
u h as
However, in contrast to Keating, Howard was
understated in his allusions to neoliberalism, in kee ping with his view that Anzac Day should be
196
unpolitical. Fu the , efle ti g his pa t s politi s a d his o
politi al st le, Ho a d s A za
reflected his conservatism, with national identity and the family mediating the impulses of the
economic individual. This view was reinforced by the unity and sanctity with which Howard had
i
ued A za , a d as poli ed
‘efe e es to the Ho a d go e
his agg essi e gua di g of A za s u politi al atu e.
e t s e o o i poli ies
e e e ide t i Ho a d s t ip to
Thailand for Anzac Day 1998. The Australia-Thailand relationship had become closer the previous
year when Australia had provided $US1 billion to the country as part of a $US17.2 billion IMF bailout
during the Asian Financial Crisis, the only Western nation to do so (Alford 1998, 4). It was a sign
from the Howard government that Australia would help Asia, but it also helped establish Australia as
a creditor power (Kell
,
. As Baldi o
,
otes, i Ho a d s
i d the
isis
i di ated Aust alia s odel of laissez-faire economic reform and liberal democracy. Howard use d
the trip to announce that Australian aid would continue after 2000 (instead of finishing in that ye ar)
and would increase by $AUS13 million (Alford 1998, 4). These acts paint a story of unproblematic
Australian benevolence – lending a hand to the region, and Thailand in particular, in their time of
economic hardship.
Howard used the opening of the Hellfire Pass Museum on April 24 as an opportunity to reaffirm
Aust alia s o
it e t to Thaila d a d to Asia o e ge e all :
So too, can this museum be claimed as a legacy for the future. Let it exemplify the courage and
compassion which are the highest virtues to which our young can aspire. Let it be a prophecy
of Aust alia s o
it e t to Asia a d all its peoples. Of ou illi g ess to sta d togethe
during empty years of adversity as well as bountiful years of plenty. Let it warn off any nation
who may mistakenly judge that freedom loving countries will every allow tyranny to prevail.
And let it promise that the memory of what was done here, lost here, gained here will not be
forgotten (Howard 1998c).
Further reference was made to Australia s o
it e t to Asia at Ka ha a u i Wa Ce ete :
For we live in a world made safe, where opportunities and success are attainable by any
person with the heart and the will to achieve them.
A world of new and firm friendships with our neighbours. Friendships first nurtured in
wartime, but now grown to full maturity through the blessings of regional mateship and
mutual respect.
A world where nations, as in our own region, seek to learn from each other, knowing that our
futures will always lie in peaceful cooperation rather than in armed conflict.
All these changes, these differences, this better world we owe to those who rest here and all
who served with them (Howard 1998b).
197
We can again see evidence of the employment of memorial diplomacy in Prime Minis terial
e gage e t
ith A za . As Aust alia s
a histo
as i
easi gl
a ked o e seas
Pi e
Ministers, opportunities to engage in the soft power of diplomacy in the sacralised context of the
e e
a e of
a dead g e
neoliberal terms – the egio
ou d tightl
too. Aust alia s elatio ship with the region was presented in
ade safe
pea eful oope atio via increasing economic ties, and
the sha ed o ds of a ti e sa ifi e a d egio al ateship . But the se ti e s are
not unambiguous or power-f ee. The po e d
a i s that had
ought Aust alia s elatio ship ith
the region to this point, and the unspoken subtext of Australian triumphalism permeated these
o ds. The o fide e of Ho a d s attitude is e e plified
the use of regional mateship , the use
of the Australianism presenting the relationship as one dominated by Australian values, with
discredited cosmopolitan, Asian, or Thai, values being excluded. Thus, the powe r dynami cs of the
Western IMF forcing orthodox neoliberal austerity measures upon Thailand as part of its bailout
pa kage, a d Aust alia s i
ol e e t i that
sa alised sto of Aust alia s o
a oeu e, is su su ed
Ho a d i a
ide
it e t to Asia a d egio al ateship .
as e ide t i Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu ship he
Further, the ideographic nature of Anza
references to neoliberalism were also aimed at a domestic audience. What was evident in these
i sta es is eoli e alis
s a d Ho a d s o e
choices of i di idual itize s ‘ose
,
to go e
at a dista e …th ough the egulate d
, i a atte pt to
eate eoli e al i di iduals. I
particular, this was achieved through the discourse of mutual obligation, with its emphasis upon the
responsibility of citizens to act as economic individuals in the market place. As Johnson notes,
mutual obligation replaces citizen entitlements with citizen obligations, with the government
e gagi g …i fo
s of go e
e talit desig ed to e ou age
a ket elatio s a d pa ti ula
forms of self-managing and self-regulating behaviour amongst the citizen- lie ts Joh so
,
. Ho e e , these efe e es e e less e pli it tha Keati g s a d e e also f a ed i te
s of
Ho a d s o se atis .
Pa ti ula efe e e as ade to these ele e ts i Ho a d s
01 Anzac Day address:
But as importantly, we gather in ever-increasing numbers to each pledge anew our
determination, not merely to dwell upon the legacy of the past, but also to build upon it. To
extend a culture of proud self reliance and personal initiative. To create a just society where an
i di idual s ights a e espe ted ut thei espo si ilities a e also e og ised. To offe ou
children, and their children, all the possibilities of the world should they only have the heart
and the will to grasp them. To build strong communities where men and women strive
together for the common good and none need live in fear or isolation (Howard 2001).
198
Mutual obligation, and the importance of acting as a self-reliant economic individual, begins the
quote. Howard emphasised the individual, rather than the collective – self- elia e , pe so al
i itiati e , a d a i di idual s ights
e e all p ese ted as e t al alues de i ed f o
ou
A za
heritage that deserved to be built upon. Self-reliance, personal initiative and responsibilities are al l
te
s that e hoed the Ho a d go e
… to e ou age
eha iou … i
e t s dis ipli i g of elfa e e ipie ts ia utual-obligation,
a ket elatio s a d pa ti ula fo
e l
s of self-managing and self-regulating
eoliberal citizens (Johnson 2000, 105).
The creation of an economic
individual was furthered by the values they should embody – initiative and self-reliance were
eeded to g asp all the possi ilities of the o ld . The rights that were won for them by their Anzac
forbearers were contingent upon their recognition of their obligation to these responsibilities. There
was no place for class or structural disadvantage in this conception of Australian society – the
individual was being disciplined to grab whatever advantages they could.
But Howard did not simply extol unrestrained markets in this speech. Instead, the comforting
embrace of conservatism was employed to mediate the excesses of individualism and the market
place. The individual was called upon to uild st o g o
o
u ities , to strive together for the
o good a d to ot e a ious a out li i g i fea o isolatio . Ho a d o ti ued:
We gather to be reminded of the values so evident among Australians in time of war and
adversity but that we too can use to face the challenges within our own lives. Courage, unity of
purpose, compassion and selflessness – these virtues, so compelling and so commonplace
amid the horror of battle, seem to subside so often in the calm of peace. Anzac Day reminds us
all that it need not be so.
Anzac Day reminds us that we each have a task before us. Blessedly, not to fight new wars, not
to bear the loss of sons and daughters, but to use the peace and prosperity purchased for us at
so high a price. Anzac Day reminds us that our nation is capable of the most extraordinary
achievements if only we dare to reach them (Howard 2001).
Unity was again employed as a signifier of Anzac and as a lesson for the present. Values echoing the
Anzac and Christian traditions – ou age , o passio , selfless ess - were mobi l ised to re mi nd
citizens of tools they could use to face to the challenges of adversity. Conservatism for Howard was
the bulwark against the excesses of the marketplace and, not coincidently, these were th e values
especially embodied by the Anzacs. Australians were called upon to observe these l e ssons, and to
ho ou the sa ifi e of the A za s
e
od i g A za s e a ple i thei o
li es. Thus, Ho a d s
Anzac entrepreneurship here, and more generally, used the ideographic nature of Anzac to
constitute Australian nationalism with contemporary LPA values - neoliberal inspiration to build
upo , a d o se ati e alues to ediate eoli e alis
s old i di idualis .
199
Conclusion
This chapter has explored Howa d s A za e t ep e eu ship f o
to
. It has a gued that
Howard was keen to reinforce a depoliticised and unpolitical version of Anzac. This conservative and
ostensibly traditional form of Anzac was pa t of his
Aust alia ide tit a d poli
age da. This
ide epudiatio of Keati g s eimaging of
as a hie ed
ith a e phasis upo a
ai st ea
reading of Anzac that emphasised the Anglo-Celtic heritage of Anzac, the centrality of Gallipoli, and
contained little reference to diversity. Howard aligned the unpolitical nature of his version of Anzac
with the subtle endorsement of his political style of neoliberalism and conservatism. This was
directed towards external relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region and to a domestic
audience, both of whom were encouraged to adopt the strictures of laissez-faire economics.
Whilst Ho a d s kee
hi
ef ai f o
o to es
ess to e su e that A za e ai ed depoliticised, essential and unpolitical saw
the o e tl pa tisa st le of Keati g s A za Da add esses, it did not mean that
as a se t. Ho a d s e phasis upo u it i his A za Da add esses had to e
actively policed, and this depoliticisation occasionally attracted controversy that threatened his
attempts to keep Anzac unpolitical. Ha i g said that, Ho a d s A za Da add esses la gel failed to
att a t the epudiatio f o A za s gua dia s p e iousl le elled at Keati g. Ho a d s su
e ss i
keeping his version of Anzac unpolitical was to play out after 2001, as the response to terrorism
do i ated the go e
e t s age da.
200
CHAPTER 9
Howard: Anzac in the Age of Terror
Introduction
Prime Minister John Howard was in Washington marking the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty
when passenger aircraft were used as part of a terrorist attack upon the US on September 11, 2001.
The e e ts that t a spi ed that da helped e t e h Ho a d s app oa h to fo eig poli
view of the world, a prefe e e fo
e thusiasti e
ilate alis a d s epti is of ultilate al is
a e of i te e tio is
i
– a re al i st
s al ue, a d the
oth the Middle East a d i Aust alia s egio agai st
perceived threats from terrorism and failed/failing states (see Cotton and Ravenh ill 2007). This
approach led to various foreign policy outcomes, including the strengthening of the Australia/US
allia e, a eo ie tatio of Aust alia s defe e-force structure to reflect the new security si tuation,
the increasing pursuit of bilateralism i Aust alia s elatio ships, a d fi all , Aust alia pa ti ipatio
i i te e tio is
i
oth the Middle East a d Aust alia s egio . Whilst
a
of these the es
were touched upon by Howard in his Anzac Day addresses from 2002-2007, the foreign policy
te de
that Ho a d ost e phasised as Aust alia s pa ti ipatio i i te e tio is , espe ial l
Aust alia s o
it e t to the I a Wa . This hapte seeks to e plo e this the e of Ho a d s
Anzac entrepreneurship, and demonstrate how it institutionalised a precedential form of Prime
Ministerial engagement with Anzac that has had a continuing influence. Further, the chapter argue s
that the growing institutionalisation of Anzac had unintended consequences – the anxieties,
tensions, and ambiguities that reimagining Anzac in a contemporary setting posed Australian
identity and nationalism, which needed to be managed by the Prime Minister.
The chapter explores the institutionalisation of this form of Prime Ministerial Anzac obse rvance i n
four parts:
1. The develop e t of Ho a d s fo eig poli
app oa h du i g the latte half of his te
as
Prime Minister is crucial to understanding the evolution of his Anzac entrepre neurshi p. In
particular, it notes the way that Howard became a war leader and how he linked that to the
imagery of Anzac.
2. Secondly, the chapter examines how Anzac developed during the period. The changed
se u it e
io
e t a d Ho a d s g o i g poli
o fide e afte his
ele tio
i to
is reflected in Anzac, as it became increasingly institutionalised, spectacular, and ce ntral to
201
Aust alia
atio al ide tit . This
as h pe -A za
i spi i g, ide tifia le, a d eal tha olde fo
– a form of Anzac that was more
s of A za o h pe - ealit ge e al l , se e
Eco 1990).
3. The chapter will the tu
to te tual a al sis of Ho a d s A za Da add esses. Ho a d s
addresses from 2002-2004 were quite similar to his earlier Anzac Day speeches in terms of
emphasis on national unity and conservative values, but these themes were now e xpli citly
constituted in conjunction with current ADF personnel serving overseas and in guardi ng the
boundaries of opposition to these deployments.
4. Finally, it will be argued that the engendering of hyper-Anzac in an environment of
heightened security risk led to public demands and anxieties that were not easily manage d.
Much like his predecessors, Howard faced the need to manage the expectations of his socio political context and was not an entirely free agent in his Anzac entrepreneurship.
Ho a d s e gage e t
ith Anzac during this period demonstrated the success of his Anzac
entrepreneurship. This engagement was just as, if not more so, explicitly and unambiguously
politi al as Keati g s had ee . It was controversial and contested, but the evidence from the
pe iod suggests that Ho a d s o se ati e follo i g of the t aditio s of A za , a d a ti e pol i i g
of o testatio , la gel kept his A za e t ep e eu ship u politi al. Fu the , Ho a d s li ki g of
Anzac with a celebratory and chauvinistic patriotism contributed significantly to the form of hype rA za a d A za s fu the i stitutio alisatio i Aust alia pu li life a d ide tit .
Howard and Foreign Policy
Howard was focused upon the domestic sphere during the early years of his term as Prime Mi ni ste r
(see Chapter 8). He had well-developed and long-held foreign policy views (DeBats, McDonal d and
Williams 2007, 235-6), but they took a backseat to his domestic political agenda during his early
ea s as P i e Mi iste . This ha ged d a ati all , fi stl
ith Aust alia s i tervention in East Timor
in 1999, and especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks upon the US. Both these events helped
Howard establish himself as a war leader (Kelly 2009, 481; Baldino 2005, 204) and gave him
contemporary real life examples of the Anzac legend to embrace (Kelly 2009, 485).
Whilst the i te e tio i East Ti o
as e tai l
ot Ho a d s fi st ajo fo eig poli
(see Chapter 8), it did help to shift the emphasis of his poli
e dea ou
age da. Ho a d s a ti e e gage e t
with Indonesia regarding the desirability of a plebiscite to consider East Timorese independence,
Aust alia s le el of espo si ilit fo the iole e that the e upted as p o -Indonesian militia
atte pted to dis upt the ote a d i ti idate the popula e, a d Aust alia s interventionist response
202
under the umbrella of the UN and with international cooperation, defies easy assessment (see Ke ll y
2009; Baldino 2005; and Cotton 2004). However, it was rated by Howard himself as one his
proudest achievements as Prime Minister (Howard 2010, 336) and this pride was reflected in publ ic
e a ks as he see ed to ag ee ith depi tio s of Aust alia as a e fo e o deput she iff to the
US in the region.
A o di g to Kell
,
, su h e a ks de o st ated the hu is of the government afte r i ts
successes in handling the East Timor conflict and the Asian Financial Crisis. This confidence in the
go e
e t s fo eig poli positio
as o e full a ti ulated
Ho a d the da afte the l au
h
of the International Force for East Ti o INTE‘FET i te e tio , he e he outli ed ho e t uths
a out Aust alia s elatio ship ith Asia. This assess e t of Aust alia s elatio ship ith Asia as
ased upo Aust alia s atio al i te est, Aust alia s geog aphi al positio i Asia a d histori cal and
ultu al li ks to Eu ope a d the U“, Aust alia s allia e ith the U“, the u e tai t of Aust alia s
defence position, and the values of the Australian community (Cotton 2004, 100-
. Aust alia s
foreign policy priorities reflected the realist assumptions of Howard and his government and his
dete
i atio to see A glosphe ist alues ased upo Aust alia s histo i al li ks to the U“ a d the
UK efle ted i his go e
e t s fo eig poli
Gul a elli
. Fu the , it as a e pudi ati o o f
the multilateralism and cosmopolitanism that the Keating government had pursued in the region
(see Johnson 2007, 200).
These o e s, a d espe iall dou ts a out Aust alia s defe e positio a d the ADF s a ilit to
cope with future regional instability, were reflected in the Defence White Paper of 2000. The
government recognised the changing security environment of the region and attempted to
incorporate the implications of these shifts into defence policy. As White (2007, 182) notes:
The central policy choice considered in the development of the White Paper was between, on
the one hand, the development of larger light land forces to provide more capability for the
new non-state security tasks such as East Timor and, on the other, sustaining high investment
i Aust alia s ai a d a al fo es agai st the isk of o e tio al o fli t i Asia. Mi iste s
decided to do both.
What this meant was a melding of ALP-era continental defence priorities with the de velopment of
light, deployable land forces of the type needed to react to and ameliorate instances of regional
instability like East Timor (White 2007, 182). These light forces were later envisaged as necessary for
operations with the US during the War on Terror.
203
In September 2001, Howard found himself in Washington, meeting with the newly elected US
president George W. Bush and marking the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty. Howard had gone
to the US with three primary aims:
1. To establish a personal relationship with the new President and senior members of the ne w
Administration;
2. To reinvigorate the strategic relationship;
3. To seek ways of enhancing the economic relationship (DeBats, McDonald and Williams 2007,
241).
Ho a d s p ese e i Washi gto at the ti e of the /
te o ist atta ks, his unequivocal support
of the US and its people in the days after 9/11, his invocation of the ANZUS treaty, and his
appearance without fanfare in the public galleries of Congress on September 12 to show sol i dari ty
with the US people, were all acts which US lawmakers recognised and were grateful for, and he l pe d
to fulfil the aims of the trip (DeBats, McDonald and Williams 2007). As Howard (2010, 392) himself
oted …the epo h-changing events of [9/11] were to take the alliance to new levels of intimacy.
The personal relationship between the American President and me would become the closest of any
between the respective heads of government of the two countries . The closeness of the
elatio ship o ti ued th oughout the e ai de of Ho a d s te
Aust alia s espo se to the e e ts of /
ha de i g of Ho a d s fo eig poli
.
a d its pa ti ipatio i the War on Terror reflected the
ie s. The Aust alia -US alliance was reinvigorated, leading to
a range of related outcomes including Australian participation in US-led operations i n Afghani stan
and Iraq, the Australia-US free trade agreement in 2005, and managing relationships in the region
gi e Aust alia s lose ess to the glo al hege o
Bell,
. I te e tio is
as e
a ed
further, both in the Middle East u de the Bush Do t i e as pa t of the Coalitio of the Willi g ,
and in the region, where the government after the Bali Bombings in 2002 reserved the right to act
pre-emptively (Cotton 2004, 144), and intervened in locations like the Solomon Isla ds O Keefe
2007, 131). In sum, Howard had firmly entrenched his view of foreign policy and global politics by
the end of his term in office. Australian actions in the region and globally were now predicated upon
a view of the national interest that te ded to a ds i te e tio is
a d efle ted Ho a d s
preference for the US alliance.
204
Howard and the Evolution of Hyper-Anzac from 2002-2007
The changing security environment during the period from 1999 to 2007, and the Australian
go e
e t s poli
espo se to it, as efle ted i Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu ship, a d A za s
continuing evolution as a central nationalist discourse. Discourses of Anzac during this peri od we re
intertwined with a fear of the Middle-Eastern other in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks and the
continued assertion of Anglo-Celti ide tit , all ta itl e do sed
i
o atio of A za . A za f o
also i
easi gl
the P i e Mi iste s o se ati e
e a e less a out epudiati g Keati g s
Australia and more about the changed domestic and global security environment, especially
regarding the involvement of ADF personnel deployed in regional and Middle Eastern interventions.
Fu the , Ho a d s pe so al i
est e t i A za a d the pu li s e thusias fo pu li e p essi o s
of A za ide tit oi ided ith the go e
e t si
easi g i stitutio alisatio of the atio al a d
spectacular remembrance of Anzac Day, shifting further away from more local and suburban
commemorations. This heady mix of factors helped to engender a f orm of hyper-Anzac not seen
else he e du i g the pe iod u de e a i atio . This tu o- ha ged e sio of A za
as
oe
real than real – to paraphrase Eco (1990, 8), when the Australian public demanded the real Anzac,
the fabrication of reality was required in order to attain this authenticity. It was the government
that continued to reproduce the authentic Anzac as the last of the men and women who had directly
experienced the Gallipoli campaign passed away and the RSL continued to decline in importance.
This form of hyper-Anzac was more spectacular in its staging, more controversial in its politics, more
actively engendered by the government, and more rapturously received by the publ i c, than i n any
other time period from 1973.
Anzac and the ADF – 1999-2007
Hyper-A za
as i
o s all pa t o
e ted to Aust alia s i
easi g deplo
e t of ADF pe so
el
i fo eig theat es of o fli t, a d pa ti ula l Ho a d s oft-repeated calls to support these troops.
According to Howard, the East Timor conflict had o t i uted to the Aust alia pu li s g o i g
admiration of Australian military tradition and history (Howard 2010, 358; Holbrook 2014, 201).
However, this shift was not entirely organic, being at least in part due to the promoti on of the ADF
by the Prime Minister himself. Howard frequently spoke both of and to the ADF in a manner that
honoured its role in Australian society and policed the acceptable boundaries of civilian response to
the ADF. This was conducted via addresses to ADF personnel and calls to support the troops.
In his auto-biography, Howard notes the concern that he and military leaders had regarding the
possibility of Australian casualties in the East Timor operations, the way that this weighed on his
205
mind, and his determination to personally farewell, welcome home, and thank the troops (Howard
2010, 351-
. This o e
as efle ted i Ho a d s f e ue t add esses to depa ti g, se i g
and returning troops, not just in East Timor, but throughout this period as Australia pursued
interventionism. Instances of this precedent were therefore also seen in occasions such as (but not
limited to) the welcome home addresses to troops returning from Afghanistan in 2002, farewell and
welcome home addresses for troops deployed to Iraq and the Solomon Islands in 2003, and the
marking of Anzac Day by visiting deployed troops in Iraq in 2004.
Also d i i g Ho a d s dete
i atio to ho ou ADF pe so
el se t to a
his go e
e t
as
the legacy of the treatment of Vietnam veterans:
I was also mindful of the miserable fashion in which Australia had treated soldiers returning
f o se i e i Viet a … As I o ed a ou d the ou t i the lead-up to the sending of our
forces to East Timor, veteran after veteran who had served in Vietnam raised t his issue with
me and, in some cases, pleaded that I make sure that when our troops came home from East
Timor, no matter what the circumstances, they were openly greeted as patriots who had done
their duty by Australia. I promised them, and I promised myself, that I would make sure that
this happened (Howard 2010, 352).
Howard was honouring the terms of the reconciliation between Vietnam veterans and the Australian
body politic that Hawke helped strike a decade and a half earlier. Howard furthered this
reconciliation by issuing a statement of regret on behalf of the government and the Australian
people for the inadequacies of past treatment and recognition of Vietnam veterans on the 40 th
anniversary of the Battle of Long Tan on 17 August 200621 (Howard 2006a, 62).
Finally, Howard was anxious to see that currently serving ADF personnel were not only personally
thanked by himself, but that they were adequately honoured by the wider Australian publi c. So, i n
an address to the troops in East Timor on November 28 1999, he (1999b) said:
Can I assure you that your mission here has the total support of the entire Australian
population... Irrespective of differences back home over other issues, there is very widespread
support that you're right to be here, that you've done it well, and that in the process you have
added a great deal of lustre to a very proud Australian military tradition.
The use of the te
eg et , i stead of apolog o so
I say to our Vietnam veterans that we honour
everything you did. You deserve the respect and the affection of a grateful nation. We regret the inadequacies of the
past, and we hope that the extension of the ha d of f ie dship a d ho ou
toda s Aust alia s ill e of o fo t
and value to all of you Ho a d
a, ; e phasis added e hoed the la guage used Ho a d i his efusal to
formally apologise on behalf of the Australian nation for the actions of Australian governments in perpetua ting the
removal of Aboriginal children from their families.
21
206
In the case of East Timor, making sure that the Australian public honoured the ADF was ensured by a
welcome home parade through the streets of Sydney for ADF personnel who had served in the
INTEREFT operations on April 20 2000 attended by the Prime Minister, General Cosgrove, and
thousands of Sydneysiders (Hill 2000, 3). ADF personnel serving in the Middle East, especi all y Ira q,
had welcome home parades in Sydney and Perth during June 2003, with the Prime Minister
attending and delivering speeches (Howard 2003b; Howard 2003c). Howard appeared to be
genuinely committed to the well-being and honouring of the ADF and keen to avoid the mistake s of
the past.
Nonetheless, these Howard-led events helped set a public discourse that strongly supported
Australian troop deployments, and had effects that went beyond simply honouring the actions of
Australian troops. As Gleeson (2014, 152 a gues ega di g Ho a d s i
o atio of the all to
support the troops during the Iraq War:
The all to suppo t ou t oops is pa ti ula l eso a t i the Aust alia o te t, pa tl
because of the sense of reverence tied to military service and sacrifice (McKenna 2007), and
also as a result of the collective public shame over the treatment of service personnel upon
their return from the Vietnam War. Demanding that Australians support the troops
interpellates audience members by evoking these national narratives and memories.
Thus, the t i fa to s i Ho a d s A za dis ou se of the past t eatment of Vietnam veterans and
the alignment of current ADF personnel with the traditions of Anzac had the effect of limiting
iti is of Aust alia s pa ti ipatio i the War on Terror by conflating the service of troops involve d
in current operations with the commonly understood lessons and memories of mistreated Vi etnam
ete a s a d of Aust alia s ilita t aditio s. Fo e a ple, i his add ess to the atio o the e e
of the Iraq invasion in March 2003, Howard said:
To those in the community who may not agree with me, please vent your anger against me
and towards the government. Remember that our forces are on duty in the Gulf in our name
and doing their job in the best traditions of Australia's defence forces.
Can I say something that I know will find an echo from all of you whether or not you agree with
the Government. And that is to say to the men and women of the Australian Defence Force in
the Gulf – we admire you, we are thinking of you, we want all of you come to back home safe
and sound. We care for and we anguish with your loved ones back here in Australia. Our
prayers and our hopes are with all of you (Howard 2003d).
Ho a d alig ed the I a deplo
e t ith the est t aditio s of Aust alia's defe e fo es i a
discursive shift that sublimated the controversial lack of UN approval for the Iraq invasion by cal l i ng
o the Aust alia people to ad i e , thi k of , a guish a d p a for the troops. Howard conflated
the positively perceived traditions and nationalism of the Australian military with the Iraq invasion in
207
a move that had the effect of limiting criticism of both the troops and the war by calling on the
audience to sympathise with the troops and to view them as positi e age ts of A za s t aditio s of
service, duty, and heroism. This move limited the interrogation of the violence that those troops
would soon visit upon the Iraqi military and population as agents of Western powers and interests or
their role as invaders without a UN mandate for war.
These o te po a e a ples of the A za t aditio i Aust alia s region and in the Middle East, as
well as Ho a d s o e
to p ote t ADF pe so
legitimate his govern e t s fo eig poli
el a d thei ope atio s f o
ep oa h, helped to
di e tio by attempting to discipline public re acti on and
sentiment. Howard successfully conflated his inherently political foreign policy agenda and the
depoliticised and essential sphere of the Anzac tradition that he had active ly engendered duri ng hi s
earlier period in office. In doing so, he furthered the depoliticisation of Anzac and reinforced the
essentialism and unpolitical nature of Anzac that had been building since 1990. Further, i t was thi s
confluence of factors that contributed to the inte sifi atio of a h pe -A za du i g Ho a d s late
term in office.
Anzac at Home During the War on Terror
At ho e, A za o ti ued its a h i to the e t e of Aust alia s atio al o s ious ess. A za Da
was growing as a spectacle, with the increasingly grandiose marking of the day at home and at
Gallipoli. Previous Prime Ministers, and Howard himself during the first half of his Prime
Ministership, marked Anzac Day in an ad-hoc fashion – sometimes with fanfare at a foreign
battlefield site like Gallipoli or Kokoda or at the AWM, sometimes with little pomp or ceremony at a
state capital or local electorate. From 2000 onwards, however, Howard marked every Anzac Day
with an appearance or speech at either the AWM or Gallipoli, with the exception of his highly stage a aged a d e te si el o e ed I a t ip i
see hapte
. The P i e Mi iste s shi ft f o
the lo al a d su u a , to the atio s apital o to Gallipoli, the site of A za , added to the g a i tas
of Anzac Day. The public was responding too, and increasing large crowds turned out to mark the
holiday, especially at the dawn service (see Chapter 3). The dawn service was the hyper-real Anzac,
full of ceremony and spectacle, as opposed to the march, with its comp aratively mundane and
unmediated parade of ex-service personnel and their descendants.
The growing crowds at home were mirrored in the crowds that were now appearing at the Gal l i pol i
Peninsula on Anzac Day. From intimate gatherings of barely a dozen individuals in the mid-1970s, by
the
th a
i e sa
of the la di gs i
,
,
people
ade the pilg i age to Gallipoli to
208
mark Anzac Day, further growing to a reported 20,000 by 2005 (Scates 2006, 193-194; the Canberra
Times 2005, 11). The pursuit of authentic hyper-reality at Gallipoli provoked controversy, as roadworks that altered the landscape at the site, and bawdy crowds diverted by big screens and pop
music before the dawn service, were required to accommodate and entertain the crowds (see Z i i no
2006).
It was around this period in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the federal government entrenched
its usu pi g of the elde l a d o se ati e ‘“L as the
e p o ote s of A za , ia the DVA a d
the AWM (Lake 2010, 139; Inglis 2008, 554-555). As Lake (2010, 139) notes:
Providing extensive curriculum materials, teaching resources and websites to schools, through
its own publications and publication subsidies, the funding of documentary films and travelling
museum exhibitions as well as the expansion and renovation of community war memorials,
the federal government has lent its authority and vast resources to a new pedagogical project
we might call the militarisation of Australian history.
In 1996, the DVA established a commemoration branch, adding to its traditional functions of
pensions, repatriation benefits, and the maintenance of war graves (Inglis 2008, 554). Signalling the
go e
e t s takeo e of the ustodia ship of A za , the DVA s o
e o ati e
a h a ti i tie s
included many of the thi gs the ‘“L used to take espo si ilit fo : Natio al da s of e e
Me o ials, “ig ifi a t e e ts, Edu atio , a d Co
DVA s udget fo o
e o ati e a ti ities also i
u it a a e ess I glis
eased see Chapte
,
a
e,
, a d the
.
The edu atio of Aust alia s hild e ega di g A za that had egu du i g the Keati g go e
e t
intensified under Howard. An initiative from the DVA in 2002 distributed curriculum materials for
everyday teaching, not just for anniversaries (Lake 2010, 148). This was a measure of the history
wars that also saw Howard bemoan the state of the study of Australian history in schools and
institute a panel stacked with conservative sympathisers to develop a new national curriculum
(Howard 2006b; Bonnell and Crotty 2008, 161). An increase in memorial construction during the
period - It is p o a le that o e e
tha i a
de ade si e the
a
e o ials e e e e ted i the ea s e t e e
s I glis
,
a d
- and the continued restoration of older
memorials ensured that instructive reminders for the general public were also distributed
throughout the Australian landscape.
The death of the last remaining Gallipoli veteran, Alec Campbell, who passed away in May 2002,
further signalled the shift in custodianship of Anzac from the RSL and the diggers to the federal
go e
e t. The go e
e t ho ou ed Ca p ell s pla e i the life of the atio
ith a state
209
funeral, which included a Prime Ministerial address. The ceremonial honours were thrust upon a
so e hat elu ta t fa il , ith Ca p ell s ife, Kate Ca p ell, telli g a jou alist: I thi k that he
[Alec] would have thought it all rather ridiculous. Again, he would think of the other soldiers who
had gone missi g a d had 't o e a k, o
e e o lo ge he e Da
,
. Ca p ell s
family may have been reluctant recruits to the process of national eulogising and memori al isation,
but the Prime Minister pressed on anyway, providing an example of the manner in which the
pa ti ipa ts of Aust alia s
a histo
had lost o t ol of thei e e
a e as the had aged a d
passed on, and as their representative organisation, the RSL, was losing its relevance as it was losi ng
its membership.
Overt Australian patriotism was on the rise too, especially during the Sydney 2000 Ol ympi c Game s
(Dyrenfurth 2015, 206). The Australian flag rose in prominence in the public sphere (Gleeson 2014,
163), being worn as a cape by some Australian patriots, and was accompanied by cha ts of Aussi e ,
Aussie, Aussie - Oi, Oi, Oi! at pu li e e ts. This o e t a d hau i isti
atio alis
as e ou aged
Ho a d s ele ato to e that he ega to i t odu e i to his A za Da add esses du i g the
period (McKenna 2010, 126-127).
Ho a d s pat iotis , i fo
ed as it as
the p i ilegi g of A glo-Celtic identity, found its ugly
expression in the events of the December 2005 Cronulla riots, where Anglo-Australian be ach-goers
lashed ith Middle-Easte
othe s
ho had i
aded the racially Anglo-Celtic space of the beach
and violated the norms of its usage (Elder 2007, 305-306). Johns (2008, 9) shows that Anglo
participants in this violent clash justified it in terms that aligned with the Anzac legend:
Significantly, more than one Cronulla local located the violence in defending the Anzac
t aditio … The follo i g e e pt f o The Aust alia … elates the o f o tatio o
De e e to the lega
of A za : This is hat e e fighti g fo …ou fathe s, ou
grandfathers, fought for these ea hes, a d o it s ou tu
The Aust alia
De e e
2005). This comment specifically situates the beach as a privileged space for defending notions
of Australian culture, connecting up practices of territorial belonging with national/ethnic
inheritance.
The C o ulla iots de o st ated ho
Ho a d s dis ou se of the Aust alia
ai st ea
ould e
given racially exclusive, gendered, and violent, expression. Some Cronulla locals saw the violation of
thei
o e a d thei spa e
Middle-Eastern others as the contemporary invasion of the
nation. And the need to defend this sense of Australianness was given expression by the ri ote rs i n
what they interpreted to be the best traditions of Anzac. This was the context in which Anzac was
210
being increasingly institutionalised at the centre of official government narratives of national
identity.
This was a concrete expression of hyper-Anzac. Hyper-Anzac developed in an environment of
heightened security concern, closer relations with the US, international interventionism, ti ghtening
domestic security, the passing of the last members of the Gallipoli campaign, the continuing decl ine
in influence of the RSL, the growing promotion of Anzac by the government, and the success of
Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu ship.
These factors highlighted and promoted conservative
foundations of the Anzac tradition centred on duty, service, and sacrifice, alongside the some times
crudely chauvinistic expression of Australianness emphasising racial exclusivity and the paranoid
guarding of the boundaries of belonging in Australian national life. It displaced the attempts that
Ho a d s ALP p ede esso s had ade to ope up A za to diffe e e a d i
easi gl
a gi ali sed
the participants of war in the memorialisation of their own experience of conflict and its violent and
damaging consequences. In their place was an unproblematic, unpolitical, and highly promoted
hyper-Anzac that was increasingly spectacularly mediated by the federal government. The chapte r
will now turn to examine how this fo
of A za fou d its e p essio i Ho a d s A za Da a d
Anzac-related addresses from 2002 to 2007.
Howard, Anzac Day and the War on Terror, 2002-2004
Ho a d s A za Da spee hes f o
to
o ti ued to e phasise atio al u it ,
a
against challenges to that unity, and reflected his conservative interpretation of Anzac and its
meaning; however, now these themes were aligned explicitly with ADF personnel on deployme nt i n
various foreign theatres of conflict. This alignment had the effect of endorsing the deployments in a
manner which headed off critique and further engendered an incontestable form of hyper-Anzac.
Anzac Day 2002 and the Death of Alec Campbell
Anzac Day 2002 was the first after the events of 9/11 and the deployment of Aus tralian ADF
personnel in Afghanistan in late 2001. Howard marked the day at the AWM where he laid a wreath.
He released a media statement but, significantly, did not make a speech. Instead, Defence Mini ster
Robert Hill gave the address. The fact that the Defence Minister spoke, instead of a more senior
representative of the nation in the form of the Prime Minister or the Governor General, reflected
the ha ged se u it e
audience of a ou d
,
io
e t a d Aust alia s
Boogs
,
that A za
a footi g. “e ato Hill told the gathe ed
as oth a da of sole
e e
a ea d
…also a da of ele atio . Cele atio of hat it is to e Aust alia . A ele atio of the e e fits
211
we enjoy for which men and women have been prepared to fight to defend, even to sacri fi ce the ir
li es
Hill
. This all to ele ate the
ea i g of A za asked the audie e to e el i
Australian nationalism. Hill then turned to the current deployment of Australian troops i n the War
on Terror and in peace-keeping operations:
A d it s ti el to also e e e toda those ou g Aust alia s i ha s a , fighti g the a
against terrorism in Afghanistan, the Arabian Gulf, in Kyrgyzstan, in protecting Diego Garcia
and to remember our peacekeepers in East Timor, on Bougainville and elsewhere.
They also are doing a wonderful job in protecting our freedom and our interests.
The efo e he
e spe d a o e t s sile e toda thi ki g of those
spare a moment to think of those who are still serving (Hill 2002).
He e, the u
ho died e should also
iti al alls to ele ate A za s pa ti ula efle tio of Aust alia ess is o flated ith
the new generation of Anzacs fighting in Afghanistan and deployed in the region. Their protection of
ou f eedo
a d ou i te ests' mirrored the go e
ideog aph f eedo
efle ti g the go e
e ts o e
e t s app oa h to fo eig poli ,
to p oje t Weste
ith the
alues a d i te e sts
echoing the realist language employed by Howard in foreign policy matters.
Similar themes were advanced by Howard in his Anzac Day media statement. With references to the
sacredness of Anzac and its ability to unite Australians, Howard asked Australians to remember
Aust alia s allies: O this da
e also gi e tha ks to f ie ds a d allies ho sha ed ou r danger and we
add ou pledge that thei lo alt
ill eithe
e fo gotte
o u etu ed Ho a d
a). Here,
Howard alluded to the invocation of ANZUS that he made after 9/11 and recommitted Australia to
the U“ allia e. Ho a d s
essage
e t o to explicitly link Anzac, Australian values, and the
current deployment of troops in foreign theatres of conflict:
As well as providing a day of commemoration, Anzac Day is also a time for all of us to reflect
with gratitude on those great values that unite us as Australians - values such as mateship,
courage, initiative and determination.
This is because the same Anzac spirit that has guided us through adversity and triumph seems
to slumber periodically only to draw new breath when the national interest calls to bring
Australians together in times of need (Howard 2002a).
Anzac Day represented Australianness –
alues
hi h u p o le ati all
ateship , ou age , i itiati e , a d dete
i atio
– al l
u ite the nation. The unity of the nation, and the atio s
commitment to that unity, was further reflected in the repeated reference to the possessive
dete
i e ou - ou
atio al i te est o ou t oops . These alues of Aust alia ess
e e ui te
particular, reflecting the conservative elements of the Anzac tradition, rather than its radi cal i sm or
anti-authoritarianism. Howard continued:
212
On this Anzac Day we especially honour those Australian Defence Force personnel currently
serving in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism and elsewhere to support our national
interest.
Our young soldiers, sailors and airmen stand today as their Anzac forebears did more than
three quarters of a century ago - willing to serve their nation and eager to defend its freedoms
(Howard 2002a).
This generation of Australian troops reflected Anzac – ou
toda as thei A za fo e ea s did
o
e ed
o e tha th ee ua te s of a e tu
ith the possessi e dete
t oops. The efo e, Aust alia
ess
ou g soldie s, sailo s a d ai
i e ou ,
ago . This
as agai
hi h atte pted to u ite the aud ience and the
as o flated ith Aust alia t oop deplo
illi g ess to se e the atio a d suppo t ou
e sta d
atio al i te est
e ts. The t oops
o e togethe the fo eig poli
goals of the government with national identity. As such, Howard had constructed a discourse of
Anzac where the wisdom of the Afghan or regional deployments, the efficacy of defence planning for
their support, or contemplation of the long-term outcome of intervention, all became that much
harder to question, as to question and critique would be to challenge Australianness itself.
“i ila the es
e e e ealed i Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu ship a fe
eeks afte A za Da
2002, as the last surviving Gallipoli veteran, Alec Campbell, passed away after a short illness on May
16, aged 103. Campbell had served six weeks at Gallipoli as an underage recruit before being
discharged from the army in 1916 on medical grounds (Flanagan 2002, 1). His passing severed the
final link between the men and women who had directly experienced the Gallipoli campaign and
Anzac. Whilst it certainly did not cause the transferral of Anzac custodianship from the RSL to the
state, it was symptomatic of that shift.
Campbell was given a state funeral, with the Prime Minister, the Governor General, and further state
and federal dignitaries in attendance (Flanagan 2002, 1). Further, Howard gave an address at
Ca p ell s fu e al se i e, despite his fa il s isgi i gs a out the a he as ei g e p e se ted
as the embodiment of Anzac (Flanagan 2002; Darby 2002, 11). Campbell became the embodiment
of the atio itself i the add ess: Withi this o e a s jou e , e a
ha t the sto
of Aust alia
itself. Within this one life are illustrated the living values that transformed Australia from the hopeful
ou g fede atio of Ale s hildhood to o e of the g eat de eloped atio s of the
ode
ea
(Howard 2002b). But as Brett (2003, 204-205) points out, Campbell had spent only a brief moment
of his life at Gallipoli and as a soldie : Most of his life he
as a adi al t ade u io ist a d offi e
ea e , a d so to Li e al e es a ea e of the a ious i es of
ilita t u io is . This fa t as
glossed over by Howard, whose eulogy instead imbued Campbell with values echoing Li be ral Party
213
traditions – self- elia e , e dea ou , a d se i e all featu ed as ideals that Ca p ell e
odied
during his lifetime.
Ho a d also alig ed Ca p ell s life ith his go e
e t s fo eig poli :
… the espe tful o se a e of this o e a s death, ou atio pledges itself o e o e to
an ethos of selflessness and shared determination, courage and compassion. We make a silent
promise that the values for which so many Australians have died and by which others, like Alec
Campbell, have lived, will remain secure within our own lives. We signal our understanding
that the freedom under which we shelter needs to be nurtured and, at times, defended anew.
We think of the men and women of the Australian Defence Force now serving in Afghanistan,
East Timor, Bougainville and elsewhere.
The spi it e ueathed Ale a d his ge e atio though o of a s ad e sit , still slu e s
within our people, ready to rise and draw new breath when disaster strikes or danger
th eate s. A esse e that o ti ues to defi e ou atio s ide tit a d the sta da ds
which we judge ourselves (Howard 2002b).
Campbell here becomes almost totemic – a spiritual being imbued with meaning and ve ne rated by
the nation (Trompf 2005, 102; Durkheim 2008, 113; 119). Campbell and his Anzac compatriots were
a alogous ith supe atu al ei gs e ueathi g a spi it o esse e to the Australian peopl e that
all at o e defi ed ou
atio s ide tit , p o ided a o al ode to li e
the standards by whi ch
we judge ourselves), and could totem-like e used to p ote t the atio f o
st ikes o da ge th eate s . Ca p ell s tote is is e plo ed
e e
ha
if disaste
Ho a d to all upo the atio to
e the eed to e e A za s alues and protect them in the face of new dangers, wi th the
Aust alia Defe e Fo e o se i g i Afgha ista , East Ti o , Bougai
ille a d else he e being
the vessels now imbued with the essence that Campbell has bestowed. Much like his Anzac Day
message, the o st u tio of Ho a d s la guage he e e pli itl li ks A za
o te po a
ADF, a d his go e
e t s fo eig poli , i a
a
ith Australianness, the
e that
akes it e t e el
difficult to question or critique.
Anzac Day 2003 and the Iraq War
Anzac Day 2003 occurred in the context of the Iraq War, which had begun a month previously on
March 20. The war had gone well up until this point, with the US-led Coalitio s
ilita st e gth
proving too much for a weak and demoralised Iraqi opposition. Coalition forces had entered
Baghdad in early April, and declared victory in this endeavour on April 14. A statue of Saddam
Hussein in Baghdad s Fi dos “ ua e had ee toppled o Ap il ,
ith the highl
ediated
symbolism of the event beamed live to television audiences around the world. In Australia, by Apri l
2003 support for the war had grown to represent a solid majority of opinion, after a lead -up pe ri od
214
to the a
he e pu li suppo t fo Aust alia s i
ol e e t i the a had see
o e Aust alia s
opposing involvement, or bare majorities in support (see Figure 19).
Figure 19 –Source: Goot (2007, 272).
The support for the war was reflected in the reaction of some the crowd that turned out for Anzac
Day. At the AWM in Canberra, The Australian oted that the P i e Mi iste
e eptio
‘i toul
,
as gi e a aptu ous
. At the “ d e A za Da pa ade, The Sydney Morning Herald reporte d
overt and aggressive patriotism amongst more benign expressions of Australianness:
Children pressed up against the barricades, waving Australian flags or reaching out to
congratulate another generation as it passed by. Elderly women sat with rugs over their knees
while, nearby, young men revived the "Aussie, Aussie, Aussie" chants of the Olympic Games.
Workers from Star Track Express, Minchinbury, donned blue T-shirts proclaiming "Australia:
love it or leave it" and "We support the troops past and present". One said anti-war opposition
had been disgraceful.
Charlie Scannell, 83, of Carlton, who served as an infantryman in New Guinea and has been
marching on Anzac Day since 1960, said those who protested against Australia's involvement
were "a disgrace". "Half of them don't even know what they're protesting about. No one wants
war, but sometimes it has to happen." (Stevenson, Allard and Thompson 2003, 1).
Hyper-Anzac was continuing to emerge as Anzac Day was mixed with the Iraq War, overt patriotism,
and expressions of exclusionism amongst some of the crowd who attended Anzac Day 2003.
These reactions reflected the success that Howard had in linking Anzac, Australianness, and
legitimisation of the Iraq War. As McDonald and Merefield (2010, 201) ote: …the effe ti e li ki g
of intervention to Australian core values and national identity, and the rhetorical marginalisation
a d oe io of oppo e ts th ough st ategi ep ese tatio s e e… u ial di e sio s i e su i g
215
that intervention in Iraq was ie ed as a legiti ate fo eig a d se u it poli optio . Ho a d di d
this on Anzac Day 2003 via two public addresses – one a speech to the audience assembled at the
AWM, another via a recorded message hosted on pm.gov.au (Howard 2003a; Howard 2003e). Both
addresses followed a similar narrative structure, though the recorded message is far shorte r. Both
speeches asked the audience early on to reflect upon the growing hold Anzac Day has upon the
nation, both asked Australians to remember and honour all 100,000 Australians who had died in
war, both explicitly located the origin of Anzac at Gallipoli and April 25 th 1915, and both conclude
with links between Anzac and contemporary ADF deployments in Iraq. As in the previous year,
Howard called upon the nation to celebrate Anzac and its conservative representation of
Australianness – It [A za ] is a out the ele atio of so e o de ful alues, of ou age, of alou ,
of mateship, of decency, of a willingness as a nation to do the right thing, whatever the ost
(Howard 2003a . Ho a d s
A za Da add esses follo ed
u h the sa e patte
as the o e
set in 2002.
However, in contrast to 2002, Howard was much more explicit in his attempts to link Anzac
o
ati el
ith his go e
e t s fo eig poli . In his message to the nation, Howard said that
toda s A za s a e o deplo
e t i …I a , i East Ti o , i Bougai
2003e . At the AWM, these
ode
da A za s … e t i ou
il le, a d else he e Ho a d
a e i a just ause to do good
things to liberate a people. They are part of a great tradition of honourable service by the Australia n
ilita
fo es Ho a d
ADF s a tio s i
dete
i e ou
Ia
a). The string of positive adjectives and verbs used to describe the
just , good , li e ate
as used i
o ju
tion with the possessive
a e to call upon the audience to endorse the Iraq deployment as an extension of
their sense of self and identification with nation. The fact that the ostensible justification for the
invasion of Iraq was to ensure the Iraqi regime was disarmed of WMDs, not to liberate a people, and
that oth those easo s fo
were, a priori,
a did ot e jo UN app o al, as eatl defle ted as the ADF s a tio s
ade ho ou a le as pa t of a g eat t aditio . Ho a d s A za e t e preneurship put
forward self-serving post-hoc justifications for sending Australian troops into a war that lacked
legitimacy under international law and lacked a long-term vision of how the peace would be won i n
a post-“adda I a . Ho a d s A za e t ep eneurship successfully employed the unpolitical tenets
of Anzac that he had carefully cultivated in the years prior to the Iraq War to discipline public
se ti e t ega di g his go e
e t s se u it a d defe e p io ities i the age of te o .
216
Anzac Day 2004 in Iraq
Howard marked Anzac Day 2004 by travelling to Iraq to visit the troops. It was a flying visit,
conducted under strict secrecy and attended by only a few government selected media
representatives. Leaving on April 24, Howard arrived to address the troops stationed at Doha, Qatar
at 3am April 25 (Australian time), before flying to Baghdad, Iraq to address the troops again at the
dawn service (11am Australian time), play two-up, and hold talks with the Administrator of the
Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, Paul Bremer, General John Abizaid, and Lieutenant Ge neral
Ricardo Sanchez (Allard 2004, 5). The Iraq War had entered a difficult stage as fighting with
insurgents intensified in spring 2004, leading to the Coalition losing ground and suffering casual ti es.
In Australia, support for the war was dropping. April 2004 saw a bare majority of those surveyed
supporting the war (50%), dropping to less than 50% in May as the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, where
support remained (see Figure 19). The disciplining that Howard had engendered on Anzac Day 2003
was losing its potency.
The trip was both full of drama and tightly stage-managed. In Baghdad, automatic gunfire was heard
in the background as wreaths were laid during the dawn service (All ard 2004, 5). As Howard left
Baghdad, the plane carrying him and the media was forced to take evasive action for thirty minutes,
zig-zagging low to the ground to avoid a potential surface-to-air missile lock that had been detecte d
(Allard and Banham 2004, 1). And a leg of the trip to visit navy personnel on the frigate HMAS Stuart
was cancelled after the ship was called into action to assist US sailors injured in a suicide bombing
(Banham 2004, 4). The danger of these events added to the drama and newsworthiness of the tri p,
ith the P i e Mi iste pla i g hi self i ha
s a i o de to isit the t oops deplo ed i a tio .
But this message was also tightly presented. Criticism was levelled at the government for al l owing
only a select few media organisations to attend, with a point of contention being that the
government favoured TV network Channel 9 was the only TV news cre w invited, to the exclusi on of
the national broadcaster, the ABC (Grattan 2004, 17). The secrecy of the trip, ostensibly for securi ty
reasons, also provided the story with a surprise element that ensured maximum interest, whilst
further providing a plausible reason for the limited selection of journalists and media organisations.
The presentation of the Prime Minister in the utmost of positive lights was aimed for, wi th i mage s
alluding to Australian masculinity and Anzac being emphasised. For example, im ages such as
Howard playing two-up or donning a flak jacket labelled HOWARD was emphasised, whilst sl ightly
embarrassing footage of the Prime Minister trying on an ill-fitting helmet was vetted by government
i de s fo se u it
easo s G atta
,
; I glis
,
. The go e
e t s failu e to
217
i
ite Oppositio Leade Ma k Latha o the t ip e hoed Ho a d s e lusio o VP Da
,
he
he had been not been Included in the speakers. This helped ensure the focus was upon Howard and
his gover
e t s age da, athe tha the poli
o test et ee the Coalitio a d the ALP o e the
continued deployment of Australian troops to Iraq.
The central purported aim and message of the trip was to visit and support the troops that the
Howard government had sent to war. As previously noted, Howard had felt an obligation to
personally thank Australian ADF personnel for their service, making frequent appearances at
departure and return ceremonies. The 2004 Iraq trip confirmed this already established pat te rn by
Howard. In Doha, Howard thanked the troops by saying:
There is naturally and very understandably a special focus on what is occurring in and around
Iraq and you are very much in the thoughts and the hearts of all of the Australian people. You
do a great job. You bring us great honour. We wish you well and our thoughts and prayers stay
very much with you and thank you very much. And I look forward to meeting as many of you
as I can tonight over something that is very Australian - a barbecue (Howard 2004a).
At Baghdad, he expressed similar sentiments:
I e o e to I a o A za Da e deli e atel to e p ess
pe so al tha ks a d ad i atio
to the men and women of the Australian Defence Force for the work that they have done and
they continue to do i e
halle gi g i u sta es. But it s ot o l to the that I e te d
my thanks and the thanks of the Australian people. But also to many civilian people [in Iraq in
se i e] f o Aust alia…
What you are doing is for the future of the Iraqi people. It s a just ause. The atio is u ited i
its prayers and hopes for your well being and your safety and your continued contribution to
building a better future for the Iraqi people. And how better and how appropriate I guess it is
to express that sentiment on behalf of the Australian people on Anzac Day (Howard 2004b).
Finally, the message was repeated to journalists at a press conference in Baghdad:
I came to say thank you to the men and women of the ADF and the most evocative effective
way that I could say thank you was to join them in the Anzac Day dawn service. There is no
service in the Australian calendar that is more evocative of that particular part of our character
a d I elie ed it as a a that I ould sa tha k ou. I ad i e hat the e doing. They are
here in a just cause and I wanted to personally thank them (Howard 2004g).
Ho e e , Ho a d s la guage i these i sta es e ealed that the e
tha ki g the t oops. “e e al ele e ts
as
o e to the t ip tha
e e at pla i Ho a d s la guage – the call to thank and
support the troops, the linking of Anzac to Australianness, the contention that Anzac Day is the most
appropriate day to give thanks, and the normative justification for the Iraq War. These elements, i n
the context of the difficulties the Coalition forces were facing in Iraq, and the policy difference
218
between the Coalition, who supported the war, and the ALP who opposed the continued
deployment of the ADF in Iraq, reveal that Howard was also employing Anzac to make a political
point.
The language used by Howard continued and intensified the support the troops discourse that
permeated his Anzac Day addresses during the War on Terror. Howard frequently told the
assembled audiences during the trip, and the viewers back home via the travelling media contingent,
that both he and the Australian public supported them and their cause in Iraq, conflating the two.
The troops and the cause in Iraq were frequently spoke of in effusively positive and normative terms
– just ause , g eat ho ou ,
ette futu e – recalling the positive values of service, duty and
sacrifice present in the Anzac tradition. This had the effect of merging the positive associ ations of
the ADF ith the go e
e t s fa f o u o te tious defe e poli
ega di g I a . Thi s
as al l
underpinned by the frequent intermingling of these actions with Au stralianness, with Howard
se e al ti es efe e i g A za as the
ost e o ati e o
ost app op iate day to express such
atio alist se ti e ts. This i of la guage elied Ho a d s asse tio that the pu pose of the t i p
was solely to thank the troops – the unpolitical and incontestable nature of Anzac was being
employed to defend a very political point regarding Australian defence deployments.
The support the troops discourse evident on Anzac Day 2004 was employed by the Howard
government to critique the ALP and their policy position of withdrawing troops from Iraq. In the
days after the Iraq trip, Opposition defence spokesman Chris Evans, and then Opposition Leader
Mark Latham, attempted to make the point that Australian troops should be removed from Iraq,
since the original reasons for going to war (discovering WMDs and disarming the Iraqi re gi me ) had
ot ee fulfilled, a d the ADF s o ti ued p ese e
as s
oli
Lath am 2004). Howard
responded:
I am appalled at the repeated and inaccurate assertions by the Leader of the Opposition and
the Defence spokesman for the Labor Party that Australia's military contribution in and around
Iraq is merely symbolic. This is insulting to our personnel who face constant danger in their
efforts to bring security and stability to Iraq (Howard 2004i).
Ho a d s espo se eatl sidestepped the substantive point the ALP was trying to make re gardi ng
the failu e to fi d a
WMDs a d the isdo of Aust alia s o ti ued p ese e i I a
e uati g
the ALP s position with an attack on the troops themselves. Such an equation fed upon all the
positively associated traditions of Anzac and the legacy of the mistreatment of Vietnam veterans to
219
create a powerful rhetorical weapon. Latham found this difficult to contest, with the Canberra
Times reporting:
Asked yesterday if the troops were there for domestic political reasons, Mr Latham would only
say Labor supported the troops. ''I dealt with this yesterday,'' he said. ''It is true to say that
Labor supports the troops 100 per cent but we are entitled as an Opposition to raise these
policy differences. ''They [the troops] have their tasks to discharge and our mention of
s
olis if ou like, it is politi al s
olis . Peake
,
The sto
as less a out the ALP s
iti is
of the go e
e t s poli
ega di g I a , a d
oe
about the failure of Latham to adequately and appropriately honour the troops. The sacralised
status of the ADF provided Howard with an effective rhetorical device to head off a potential
oppo tu it fo the ALP to o test the go e
e t s o ti ued deplo
e t of t oops to I a .
The first few years after 9/11 demonstrated how effective Anzac entrepreneurship could be in
defe di g a poli
p og a . Ho a d s a ti e e ou age e t of h pe -Anzac assisted the effectively
incontestable discourse of national identity that he enthusiastically had aligned with his policy
age da. It ha dl
atte ed that Ho a d s a ts a d dis ou se a
Opposition upon Keating for atte pti g to e gi ee
ou te to his ea lie atta ks i
atio al ide tit . Ho a d s atio alis
entrepreneurship had effectively captured Anzac for his government and he was enjoying the warm
glow of positive association.
Howard, Anzac Day and the Continuing Institutionalisation of Hyper-Anzac, 2005-2007
The Coalition won the 2004 election convincingly, comfortably defeating the ALP and, somewhat
u usuall , also i
i g o t ol of the “e ate. The totalit of the i to fu the o fi
ed Ho a d s
belief in the correctness of his approach to government. Writing in his autobiography, Howard
reflected on this period by saying:
Large swathes of traditional Labor voters supported the Coalition in 1996, 2001 and 2004. The
Ho a d attle liked the e o o i se u it
go e
e t deli e ed,
as socially
conservative, strongly supported our policy on asylum-seekers and was suspicious of policies
hi h satiated e i o e tal p ejudi es at the e pe se of othe people s jo s Ho a d
,
485).
Such a belief, and the e e uti e s do i a e of Parliament, saw Howard pursue a series of policy
reforms that sought to entrench his vision for Australia. This was symbolised most starkly by his
pursuit of industrial relations reform via the WorkChoices legislative changes, but also by his
increasingly strident participation in the culture wars. His final term as Prime Minister saw him
institute initiatives such as conservative review of the national history curriculum, introduce a
220
itize ship test ased upo Aust alia
alues , a d i
easi gl efe e e Aust alia s A gl o-Cel ti
heritage (Johnson 2007, 197-198; Gulmanelli 2014, 585).
Ho a d s e t e hi g of A za as a e t al atio alist dis ou se as pu sued as pa t of this push.
The success of this activity is noted by McKenna (2010, 128-129), who argues that the period 2004sa
i
easi g popula
phe o e o
o de
atio of the u pat ioti past of the
hi h he pa tl att i utes to Ho a d s p o otio of that popula
fervour for entrenching this view of histo
si ulta eousl
sa d
s,a
e o . Ho a d s
et a ed his a ieties a out A za s
contemporary commemoration (Ziino 2006), and the Anzac controversies that dogged the
government during this period. The spectacle of hyper-Anzac generated forms of remembrance that
were in tensio
ith A za s t aditio ally understated commemoration, and led new e xpectati ons
about war remembrance that Howard needed to observe and manage with his Anzac
entrepreneurship.
The 90th Anniversary of the Gallipoli Landings, 2005
This mix of confidence, stridency, anxiety and ambiguity was evident in the 90th anni ve rsary of the
Gallipoli landings i
. Ho a d s filled his da
his su et of his positio a d ie s. The e
us g o s tighte
ho fought at Gallipoli fo ged a lege d hose g ip o
ith ea h passi g ea a d
their sto ies Ho a d
service address at Anzac Cove with signi fie rs of
hat s ells
ith ea h A za seaso is a hu ge fo
a , lai s that efle t the g o i g i stitutio alisatio of h pe -Anzac.
Anzac had grown into an irresistible force, enveloping contemporary Australian national life:
Those ho fought he e i pla es like Qui s Post, Pope s Hill a d the Nek changed forever the
way we saw our world and ourselves. They bequeathed Australia a lasting sense of national
ide tit . The sha pe ed ou de o ati te pe a d ou uestio i g e e to a ds autho it …
It [Anzac] lives on in the valour and the sacrifice of young men and women that ennoble
Australia in our time, in scrub in the Solomons, in the villages of Timor, in the deserts of Iraq
a d the oast of Nias. It li es o th ough a atio s eas fa ilia it , th ough Aust alia s looki g
out for each other, through courage and compassion in the face of adversity.
And so we dedicate ourselves at this hour, at this place, not just to the memory of Anzac but to
its eternal place in the Australian soul (Howard 2005a).
As in previous speeches, Anzac is here the source, and continuing reference point, for Australian
ide tit . A za li ed o i the ADF a d a o gst the atio s people, esto i g Aust al ia s
o se ati e alues of sa ifi e , ou age a d
Legend – ou de o ati te pe a d ou
i th
alou . Howard also referenced the Australian
uestio i g e e to a ds autho it - but the impli cati ons
of these values were left as ideographs of an uncomplicated and unified Australianness, and di d not
221
imply any politics or contestation. He referred to Austral ian interventionism, but omitted the
explicitly normative connection to the Iraq War that had characterised his earlier Anzac Day
addresses. In this subtler approach, the ADF deployments in the Solomon Islands and East Timor
preceded mention of the contro e sial I a Wa
oth i this spee h a d i Ho a d s A za Da
message media release (Howard 2005a; Howard 2005b). The illegal Iraq War had become less
popular as it had dragged on, while the Solomon Islands and East Timor had more positive and
unproblematic associations.
The dawn service address of 2005 once again largely followed many of the narrative and linguistic
structures that Howard had established in his language of Anzac and further reflected the
confidence he had in its central place in Australia s atio al ide tit . Not fo Ho a d
e e the
conclusions that the chief of the New Zealand Defence Forces, Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, drew
from the campaign when he spoke at the dawn se i e e e o : Pe haps the Gallipoli a pai g
was the high-water mark of our nations' imperial subservience. We learned that we must shake off
the sha kles of olo ial depe de e Fe guso , as ited
Ha t he
,
. I stead, A za Da
2005 confirmed for Howard that Anzac defined Australianness:
The original ANZACs could not have known at the time that their service would leave all
Australians with another enduring legacy: our sense of self. The ANZAC legend has helped us
to define who we are as Australians. ANZAC Day is a chance to reflect with pride on what it
means to be Australian and the values we hold dear: determination, courage, compassion and
resourcefulness (Howard 2005b).
All that
as A za , a d the efo e all that
as Aust alia ,
i o ed Ho a d s se se of self – his
conservative values and his implicit privileging of Anglo-Celtic and masculine identity. And the
certainty that Howard had in the transformation of Anzac was demonstrated when he told an
i te ie e at Gallipoli all the
proud of
i is
of so e ea s ago has d opped a a a d people a e e
hat the ou g of Aust alia did those ea s ago a d I thi k that s fa tasti
Ho a d
2005c). Howard felt that he had repudiated Keating and won the partisan contest over the meaning
of Anzac.
But anxiety about what Anzac was becoming was reveale d by a series of minor controversies
su ou di g A za Da
. Fi stl
as the uestio of ho o
ed Gallipoli a d had a ight to
dictate the management of the site. A domestic dispute had erupted in the lead-up to Anzac Day as
road-works on the Gallipoli peninsula to help accommodate the influx of visitors offended some
Australians who saw the whole site as a sacred war grave that should not be disturbed. A 2003
p oposal to list A za Co e o the Ho a d go e
e t s Natio al He itage List as fi all y and
222
unambiguously rejected by Turkish authorities in the lead up to Anzac Day, with the Turks expressing
a concern that such a course of action would impinge upon Turkish sovereignty (Ziino 2006, 6).
Howard coyly played on these controversies whilst at Gallipoli, telli g a i te ie e …I fe e l I'
at
ho e he e. This is Aust alia, it is Tu ke ... ut ou k o , i a e otio al a , it s pa t of Aust al i a it al a s ill e Ho a d
. This was a i k a d od that efe e ed Atatu k s
the A za s – You, the othe s ho se t thei so s f o fa a a
t i ute t o
ou t ies, ipe a a
ou te a s;
your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land the y
ha e e o e ou so s as
ell . The go e
e t s hu is and arrogance here was revealed by its
failure to anticipate or accommodate the sensitivity of Turkish authorities to Australian overtures of
sovereignty over a site that Australian forces had attempted to invade 90 years earlier and the
contribution that the victory over the Allied forces at Gallipoli had made towards Turkish
nationalism. But for all the coyness, arrogance, and wink and nod to domestic audiences, the
controversy surrounding questions of sovereignty on Anzac Day 2005 also revealed the i mpotence of
the government regarding the management of such a crucial site of Australian identity.
The anxiety that surrounded the impotence of the Australian government regarding sovereignty
over Gallipoli was further demonstrated by Coalition MP and former Veterans Affairs Minister Danna
Vale s p oposal late i
to e eate the Gallipoli la ds ape, i ludi g the
attlefields, alo g the u a
il si ila Mo i gto Pe i sula o the Vi to ia
e o ials a d
oastli e “e o
e
2005, 1). This was another expression of hyper-Anzac – seeking authenticity in a realistic fabrication.
The proposal was roundly criticised by the RSL, historians, and Victorian Premier Steve Bracks, and
further rejected by Howard within hours of it being made public (Peake 2005, 5). Nonethe l ess, the
fa t that su h a p oposal as e e e te tai ed, afte Ho a d s allusio to Aust alia p ete sio s of
authority over the meaning and management of Gallipoli, reflected the frustration that hyperA za s
ost fervent entrepreneurs felt about the lack of Australian control over the site and its
meanings. With Gallipoli located outside the borders of Australian sovereignty, the government was
forced to be the subservient partner in the sharing of the control of the space and its meaning.
A second controversy involving hyper-Anzac expression concerned the way Anzac Day 2005 was
marked at Gallipoli. The Canberra Times
,
o de ed … hethe a e e t that
as o
ea
sobering remembrance hasn't become a hyped-up, stage-managed i us , as the crowd of 20,000 at
the dawn se i e
“ta i
as e te tai ed o the p e ious ight
Ali e )ii o
,
, displa ed i sta es of d u ke
a ig s ee pla i g the Bee Gee s
ess, a d late left la ge a ou ts of
rubbish around the site. As Ziino (2006, 9) notes, this ignited popular debate about whe the r Anzac
223
Day was appropriately marked by commemoration or celebration. Members of the crowd might
have been forgiven for being confused at the ferocity of the condemnation, given that the Prime
Minister had been calling for commemoration and celebration on Anzac Day for several years.
Howard leapt to their defence, responding to a question at a press conference in Istanbul on April 26
regarding the appropriateness of the marking of Anzac Day 2005:
But I am, on this occasion, I am defiantly sticking up for the behaviour and the decorum and
the general reverence of the young of Australia. I thought they were outstanding and it was
one of the greatest experiences I've had as Prime Minister to be with them yesterday, to meet
them, to have transmitted to me their sense of occasion, their sense of enthusiasm, their
sense of pride and their sense of being Australian. Now I thought it was great and therefore
the things that have contributed to that feeling, which ought to make even the most
traditional expression of Australian patriotism by a person well satisfied (Howard 2005d).
Whilst Howard was quick to defend those young Australians who he saw as the new standardbearers of Anzac, the controversy surrounding their participation in, and representation of, Anzac
Day revealed that hyper-Anzac sometimes existed in tension with older, more restrai ned, forms of
Anzac remembrance.
These tensions revealed ambiguities about the appropriate form of
remembrance - commemoration or celebration - and that this could manifest in contestation of the
go e
e t s e ou age e t of h pe -Anzac. Further, it demonstrated that whilst Howard was
largely successful in his Anzac entrepreneurship, he was not entirely free to define Anzac as he
pleased.
Anzac Day 2006 and the Death of Private Jacob Kovco
Anzac Day 2006 revealed similar tensions, ambiguities, and difficulties. Howard did not speak on
Anzac Day that year, but did release a media statement where themes of honouring the sacri fi ce of
service personnel were expressed, but primarily announced that the Australian War Me mori al and
Ca
e a s A za Pa ade
ould e i luded o the Natio al He itage List. I glis
that du i g the Ho a d ea s the AWM had e o e
o e ilita i
,
otes
ha a te , o e e te p i si g
in the pursuit of tourists, and more richly endowed, by a government whose beneficence it
a k o ledged . Fu the , it had e o e o e edu ati e, ith e e hi itio s gea ed to a ds thi s
exercise and a federal government scheme that subsidised travel for schoolchildren to Canbe rra fo r
Ci i s a d Citize ship Edu atio
I glis
e o ials ope ed du i g Ho a d s te
,
-499). Anzac Parade had also seen several new
, i ludi g the Aust alia “e i e Nu ses Natio al Me o ial
in 1999, the Australian National Korean War Memorial in 2000, the New Zealand Memorial the day
before Anzac Day 2001 (a rare example of Australia acknowledging New Zealand around Anzac Day),
and a refurbished Royal Australian Air Force Memorial in 2002 (Inglis 2008, 481-
. Ho a d s
224
announcement that they were both to be included on the National Heritage List confirmed their
status in Australian life and extended the reach of Anzac.
Anzac Day 2006 also presented Howard with challenges. On April 21, Private Jacob Kovco died
whilst serving in Iraq, only the second Australian death in combat since Vietnam (the first being
Sergeant Andrew Russell in Afghanistan in 2002). The circumstances of his death were poorly
o
u i ated to Ko o s fa il a d the pu li
Defe e Mi iste B e da Nelso
22
and the
repatriation of his body to Australia was bungled, with a mix-up seeing the body of a Bosnian soldie r
se t to Aust alia i stead of Ko o s Mu ph et al
of Ko o s fa il a d a
ith
ilita
ho ou s,
i
edi l so
,
. The u gli g o pou ded the a gui sh
Ho a d soo
he e a ho ou gua d f o
ade eparations by organising a funeral
Ko o s egi e t li ed the path of the gu
carriage bearing the coffin and fired three volleys as it was lowered into the ground. An army band
played, a bugler sounded the Last Post, a d the ‘AAF ‘oulettes pe fo
ed a fl o e
I glis
,
oth atte ded the fu e al, ith Ho a d ei g photog aphed huggi g Ko
o s
580; Murphy et al 2006, 23).
Ho a d a d Nelso
widow Shelley (Inglis 2008, 580). The ceremony of the funeral reportedly upset some veterans, who
criticised its excesses (Inglis 2008, 580). More recently, Brown (2014, 62-63) has argued that the
u gli g of the epat iatio of Ko o s od led to the a ide tal esta lish e t of a e
of Prime Ministe ial atte da e at ilita fu e als, he e e e
a p ee o
o
e tio
e a e a A za
Day . Brown (2014) argues that this new convention has combined with the tight control of media
reports from Iraq and Afghanistan and the poor articulation for the reasons why Australia should be
involved in these conflicts by the government, and has consequently been a contri buti ng factor i n
the Aust alia pu li s lo tole a e fo Aust alia deaths i
o
at. This fed i to the fall i pu l i
support for continued participation in these wars, as the only thing the public sees from the
Australian troop involvement in the War on Terror is death, rather than positive stories of what the
ADF was achieving in the War on Terror. As su h, Ho a d s h pe -Anzac had unintended and
uncontrollable consequences - e essitati g the es alatio of ho ou s a d e e o
fo Aust al i a s
Kovco had been accidently shot in the head by his own hand whilst in his quarters in Bagdad. Nelson initially said
he had been handling a gun while cleaning it and it had gone off, before later saying that he ha d not i n fa c t been
handling the weapon and that it discharged accidently after being bumped (Murphy et al 2006, 23). Also confusing
atte s as the efe e e to his death as a a ide tal shooti g , a euphe is fo sui ide i
ilita pa la e
(Murphy et al 2005, 23 . A ilita
oa d of i ui i
fou d that Ko o had ee sk la ki g he the
a ide t o u ed, ith a o o ial i uest i
si ila l fi di g that the gu shot ou d had ee i espo si l
self-i fli ted “taffo d
.
22
225
a dead, ut si ulta eousl
o t i uti g to the pu li s i
easi g dissatisfa tio
i th the ADF s
participation in the War on Terror.
Anzac Day 2007, Brisbane and Canberra
Anzac Day 2007 was more successful for Howard and saw him mobilising Anzac Day for partisan
ends. Howard gave an Anzac Day address at Greenslopes Private Hospital in Brisbane, a setting
located in newly ascendant Opposition leader Kevin ‘udd s seat of G iffith. Ho a d as def i g
expectations that he would return to Canberra on Tuesday night after a two-day Brisbane visit to
atte d the t aditio al da
se i e [at the AWM] Ka elas, Pa ell, a d Dodd
. Ha i g
trumped Rudd, who sent his daughter Jessica to stand in for him, Howard delivered a speech, before
returning to Canberra to attend the 11am ceremony at the AWM and lay a wreath. The speech
i
ed ith Ho a d s o fide e i his e sio of A za a d its i stitutio alisation i n Austral i an
public life:
It has undoubtedly been one of the most warming experiences of the Australian nation,
particularly of those generations who fought in the wars in which this country has been
involved to see over the last 10 or 20 years a resurgence of affection for and observance of
ANZAC Day. The extraordinary scenes of thousands of young Australians going to Gallipoli
Peninsula on ANZAC Day, the growing numbers of young people attending ANZAC Day services
sends a very powerful message of reassurance to all generations of Australians that this most
special of all Australian days will always be at the centre of our national life (Howard 2007).
Howard was reflecting upon the growing centrality of Anzac and was pleased with what he saw. He
spoke wa
l of the esu ge e of affe tio fo a d o se a e of A za Da a d as eassu ed
that it ould e ai at the e t e of ou
atio al life . This assuredness of the continuity of Anzac
was built upon the Australian values that Anzac established:
But in addition to our sense of gratitude and that sense of owing a debt that can never be
repaid, there is another reason why ANZAC Day will always be at the centre of the affections
and the observance of what it means to be an Australian. And that is the values that the
ANZAC tradition represent in our national life. Those values of courage, of mateship, of
irreverence and larrikinism where that was appropriate; of sterling discipline and tenacious
commitment when that was appropriate and a willingness to risk all for the defence of the
country we love and the people we love. And it is the values of ANZAC Day as well as the sense
of gratitude and remembrance that make it a special day in our national life. And as the years
go by, so far from the tradition and the legend of ANZAC diminishing, it will occupy an
evermore hallowed place in the recollection and the observance of this country (Howard
2007).
A check-list of Howard signifiers of national identity was reeled off. Conservative values like
ou age a d dis ipli e were included, along with the newly reconstituted conservative val ues of
the Australian legend – la iki is
, i e ee ea d
ateship when appropriate. The ne gati ve
226
o ju tio
ut te pe ed the alues of the Aust alia lege d,
aking them subservient to the
conservative values of the Anzac tradition. Howard seemed to feel no qualms about expressing
u a ashed pat iotis
fo the
ou t
e lo e o pla i g A za at the e t e of the atio s
identity.
But whilst Howard was publicly confident and self-assured, the fact that he felt the need to mobili se
his Anzac entrepreneurship in such a partisan manner revealed the weakness of his position. On
April 17 2007, Newspoll showed Labor leading the Coalition by 59 points to 41 on a t wo partypreferred basis, and similar figures were reported on April 23 in a Herald/ACNielsen poll, with Labor
leading the Coalition by 58 per cent to 42 per on a two party-preferred basis (The Australian 2007;
Henderson 2007). Whist Howard would soon be gone, his government losing office and he hi mse lf
losing his seat, the intensely sacralised, spectacular and central Anzac he helped engender would
remain.
Conclusion
This hapte has de o st ated the su ess of Ho a d s A za e t ep e eu ship. The o te t of the
War on Terror ga e i petus to Ho a d s e o eptualisatio of Aust alia ide tit i l i e
ith hi s
foreign policy and security setting. This meant aligning the contemporary deployment of the ADF i n
the Middle East and the region with the traditions of service, sacrifice, heroism and honour that the
original Anzacs at Gallipoli had displayed. This has the effect of making it difficult to contest the
deployment of the ADF, especially in the Iraq invasion, as Howard conflated the support of
Aust alia t oops a d Aust alia
ess
ith suppo t fo the go e
e t s fo eig poli . Ho a d
reinforced this message by continuing to police the unpolitical nature of Anzac. These factors once
again demonstrated the ideographic nature of Anzac, and how it could be reimagined by
entrepreneurial Prime Ministers with new meanings that matched their political styles and policy
agendas.
Whilst Howard had enormous success with his Anzac entrepreneurship, he was not able to wholly
control Anzac. The spectacular hyper-Anzac that his government helped engender pose d te nsions
with older, more traditional and more sober forms of war remembrance, and these in turn posed
problems for Howard that he could not wholly control. This chapter provided evidence for the
operation of agency and structure in nationalism entrepreneurship – hilst Ho a d
as A za s
most successful Prime Ministerial entrepreneur, he could not employ Anzac for sol ely instrumental
ends. I stead, pa t of Ho a d s su ess as due to his a efull attu ed eadi g of pu li se ti e t
227
surrounding Anzac, and his attempts to manage this sentiment in order to maintain what he
believed to be the essential unpolitical nature of Anzac. In the process, Howard helped to
institutionalise a pattern of Anzac remembrance that replaced the central role of the RSL with a
dominant role for the Australian government.
228
CHAPTER 10
Co clusio : A zac’s Entrepreneurs in Retrospect
The intensely protected and sacralised hyper-Anzac that Howard had helped establish remained
after the November 2007 federal election that saw Howard and his government resoundingly
defeated.
His Prime Ministerial successors have been cooler towards Anzac, ne ver quite
emphasising Anzac in their narratives of Australian identity to the extent that Howard did. However,
all have followed the Anzac conventions that Howard, Hawke, and Keating, helped to establish making celebratory Anzac Day addresses at the AWM, Gallipoli, or other significant sites of
Australian war remembrance, that were attended by the Australian public in seemingly ever-growing
numbers. That Prime Ministers continue to observe Anzac in a spectacular and celebratory manne r,
and that this practice is endorsed by the public with their attendance at Anzac Day ceremonies, their
consumption of Anzac related media, and their incorporation of Anzac into their own identities, i s a
reflection of the success that Howard, and his predecessors, had in de fining Anzac for the 21st
century.
This thesis has employed the framework of nationalism entrepreneurship, in conjunction with
critical discourse analysis, to explore this Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac. It has identified constants
and changes in the way that Prime Ministers conceive Anzac and Australian national identi ty i n the
context of economic reform, globalisation, and international terror, and has identified Hawke,
Keating, and Howard, as significant and influential Anzac entrepreneurs. Themes that have been
examined in this regard have centred on the ideographic nature of Anzac; the varying levels of
commitment by Prime Ministers to keep Anzac unpolitical; how they have maintained the unpolitical
nature of Anzac; the increasing engagement of Prime Ministers with Anzac; and their ro le in the
institutionalisation of a form of Anzac that is spectacular, elite driven, and rapturously received.
Critical Discourse Analysis has been employed to explore the qualitative and quantitative textual
representation of Anzac by Prime Ministers, as well as guiding the analysis with its triangulation vi a
multiple methods, and the discourse-historical approach which encouraged the examination of the
research question over time. The thesis therefore also offers suggestions for further re se arch that
could employ CDA, or could take a different approach to the study of nationalism or political
language.
229
Change and Constancy in Prime Ministerial Anzac Entrepreneurship
The thesis has identified several key themes in Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship that have
displayed varying levels of consistency and change from 1973 to 2007. To reiterate, nationalism
entrepreneurship attempts to address issues pertaining to the competing causal explanation of
structure versus agency in the operation of nationalist actors by paying close attention to the role of
both these elements. Particular powerful and entrepreneurial nationalist actors have enormous
influence over the conception of national identity, but they cannot wholly define that conce pti on.
They are products of their environment, and they must respond to that context, and further, they
internalise forms of national identity that arise from this environment. These actors do not pursue
nationalist ends for solely instrumental ends exogenous to nationalism, such as power, pre sti ge , or
influence over a policy agenda or program. Whilst these factors are often bound up in the
atio alis
e t ep e eu s e ds, the e d goal fo
atio alis
e t ep e eu s is also a atio alist
one, and we must take their claims to be genuine nationalists seriously if we are to understand the i r
motivations and the consequences of their entrepreneurship as it works its way through a
community. The operation of this dynamic has informed the following themes throughout the
thesis.
The Ideographic Nature of Anzac
An ideograph is a rhetorical device, with a nebulous, but well -understood and culturally situated
meaning. Ideographs have a degree of malleability, but those actors who stretch the meaning of an
ideograph to breaking face sanction from the community (McGee 1980).
de o st ated the ideog aphi
The thesis has
atu e of A za , a d has p oposed that A za s e t ep e e u s ha e
consistently engaged with Anzac in this manner in order to fill Anzac with new meani ng. Thi s ne w
meaning consistently reflected the emerging realities of the collapse of older forms of
Australianness, globalisation and neoliberal economic reform, and later, the conte xt of gl obal ised
terror and interventionism. Hawke appealed for consensus and commitmen t to Australia as he
grappled with the issue of how to reflect the changed circumstances of economic reform and
multiculturalism in Australian identity (see Chapter 5). Keating filled his Anzac ideographs with
si ila
ea i g to Ha ke s, ut as fa
o e explicit about his partisan and nationalist intentions,
which attracted strong opposition. Keating, in the view of some conservative critics, had broken the
ou da ies of a epta ilit
ith his A za
e t ep e eu ship, a d Keati g s late A za
entrepreneurship was more tempered in response (see Chapters 6 and 7). Howard engaged with
Anzac in a manner that also emphasised neoliberalism, but this was also far more conservative than
that of his ALP predecessors. Howard also reflected the changing security context, as he filled Anzac
230
with meaning aligned with the service of contemporary ADF personnel in the region and the Mi ddl e
East. Howard also attracted opposition, but his conservative and traditional reading of Anzac helped
him police this opposition (see Chapters 8 and 9). The ideographic nature of Anzac suggests that
Prime Ministers have the ability to redefine Anzac, but that redefinition also has real limits and
boundaries that must be observed if redefinition is to be accepted.
The Unpolitical Nature of Anzac
The e
ea i gs that A za s e t ep e eu s filled Aust alia s
a e e
a e
ith
ee
reinforced, somewhat inconsistently, by their attempts to depoliticise Anzac and guard its
purportedly unpolitical nature. Anzac had not always been unpolitical, as the analysis of the pe ri od
from the Vietnam War until 1987 demonstrated. And it did not remain
o -politi al in the sense
that Anzac was outside the realms of choice, agency, deliberation and social interaction that Hay
(2007) defines as the arena of the political (see Chapter 1). Ho e e , A za s e t ep e eu s
frequently p ese ted it as su h, a d atte pted to gua d A za s pu po ted i o testa ilit a d
essential character. The absence of radical opposition to Anzac, as occurred in period after the
Viet a
Wa , suggests that P i e Mi iste s ha e ee su essful i thei gua di g of A za s
unpolitical nature and in depoliticising this sphere of Australian nationalist discourse . Hawke had
begun this process, being a central agent in the unpolitical reconciliation (Schaap 2005) of Vi e tnam
veterans and the Australian body politic. His appeal to consensus and commitment was also
presented in an unpolitical manner, attempting to excise contestation from his version of Austral i an
nationalism (see Chapters 4 and 5). Keating, on the other hand, was at times happy to accept the
intrusion of the political and partisan contestation in advancement of his Anzac entrepreneurship, as
he decried the supposed role of the Coalition and conservatives in holding back the emergence of an
independent Australian identity (see Chapter 6). At other times, Keating felt the disciplining e ffects
of criticism, tempered his language, and assured critics that his observance of war remembrance
would not contain partisan contestation. Keating was more successful in his Anzac entrepreneurship
when he did so (see, especially, Chapter 7). Howard actively policed the unpolitical nature of Anzac,
sanctioning those he felt were advancing partisan positions in relation to Anzac, whilst presenting his
own partisan agendas as outside the realm of the political . Howard thus frequently e xpressed the
view that Anzac was above partisan politics, and that it unified Australians. His need to pol i ce thi s
position, however, revealed the tacit concession that Anzac was not, in fact, depoliticised and
unpolitical at all. However, he was very successful in maintaining this fiction, and with his Anzac
entrepreneurship, as a consequence (see Chapters 8 and 9). The policing of the unpolitical nature of
Anzac provides evidence for the assertion that nationalism entrepreneurs must be se nsi tive to the
231
socio-political context they are operating within, and careful to guard against opposition to their
forms of nationalist identity if they are to be successful.
Maintaining the Unpolitical Nature of Anzac – Reconciliation, Sacredness, and the Debt
Owed
Attempts to depoliticise and guard the unpolitical nature of Anzac took many forms, but some of the
most consistently experienced were the effects of reconciliation with Vietnam veterans, al l usion to
the sacredness of Anzac, and calls upon Australians to observe the debt owed those who had serve d
a d died. A za s e t ep e eu s felt the continuing effects of the unpolitical reconciliation of
Vietnam veterans with the Australian community in 1987, and ensured that they paid adequate
respect to the service of ADF personnel. As has been demonstrated, this only rarely involved directly
addressing the uncomfortable experiences of Vietnam veterans, as their claims to continuing
recognition were often accompanied by contestation with government, but the lesson of their
discursive exclusion from Anzac was observed by Hawke (see Chapter 4 and 5), Keating (see Chapter
7), and Howard (see Chapter 9). Howard especially conflated the lessons of past mistreatment of
Vietnam veterans with his support for the contemporary ADF personnel serving in the War on
Terror, which had the effect of disciplining opposition to the War in Iraq especially. These
de elop e ts p o ided e ide e fo “ haap s
iti al e a i atio of the li its of fo
s of
reconciliation based upon restorative justice. The unpolitical nature of Anzac was also reinforced by
references to its sacred nature. Hawke was fairly circumspect with allusion to sacredness, but
Keating and Howard both filled their speeches with instances of rich and sustained references to the
sacredness of Anzac. Often, these references alluded to the Chri stian faith and its lessons and
traditions. Finally, the essential and taboo character of Anzac was reinforced by frequent calls to
remember the debt owed the service people who had fought and died. This was a theme that al l of
A za s e t ep e eu s eturned to, as they asked their audiences to honour the sacrifice of
Aust alia s a dead
o se i g the ideog aphi
ea i gs a d lesso s ith hi h the had fi l le d
Anzac.
Increasing Prime Ministerial Engagement with Anzac
The themes examined above primarily reflect constancy and consistency, but there were changes
too. One of the most significant original empirical contributions of the thesis has been the
comprehensive tracing of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac over time, from 1973 to 2007.
The collation of every known Prime Ministerial speech and media release during this period has
confirmed the observation that Prime Ministers have shifted from being participants, to central
232
actors, in the commemoration of Anzac, replacing the RSL (Holbrook 2014, 6; Lake 2010, 139; Inglis
2008, 554-555). But it has also demonstrated that some attributes of Prime Ministerial engagement
with Anzac that have been attributed to Howard by other scholars, like the conservative co -option of
mateship (Dyrenfurth 2015, 201) or calls to celebrate Anzac (McKenna 2010, 126-127), in fact have
longer histories. More generally, the thesis has demonstrated that Prime Ministeri al e ngagement
with Anzac used to be sporadic, more local, and less spectacular. It has traced the i ncreasing shift to
spectacular and regular remembrance at significant sites of Australian war memory and the
corresponding reaction of the public. Finally, by examining the increase in crowd attendances at
Anzac Day by population, it has been shown that consistent media reports of annual record crowds
at A za Da ha e led to a so e hat e agge ated pe eptio of A za s popula it .
The Institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac Remembrance
The thesis has also demonstrated the increasing institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial engagement
ith A za . A za s e t ep e eu s all utilised the po e esou es of the state to p o ote thei
atio alist isio s, ith oots ea l i Ha ke s ti e i go e
e t as he e gaged the ‘“L, sa
o e
new memorial construction, and facilitated the reconciliation with Vietnam veterans. 1990 saw the
first foray of government into spectacular war remembrance, but this was inconsistently taken up by
Hawke, as he also gave Anzac Day addresses that more closely resembled a policy speech (see
Chapter 5). Keating reflected similar inconsistency, as big events like Anzac Day 1992 in Papua Ne w
Guinea and Australia Remembers were also interspersed with book launches and low key
participation at the Martin Place Cenotaph in Sydney (see Chapters 6 and 7). Australia Re me mbers
was another precedential set of events that demonstrated how far the government could go in
institutionalising Anzac remembrance in a spectacular, government mediated, fashion. Howard
institutionalised a spectacular hyper-Anzac, a form of Anzac remembrance more compre he nsi ve ly
mediated by the government (see Chapter 9), and far less prosaic than Hawke had been. The powe r
resources of the state have aided Prime Ministerial success in Anzac entrepreneurship. Whilst othe r
actors and social forces have of course aided the resurgence of Anzac, the evidence presented in the
thesis demonstrates the power of nationalism entrepreneurs in defining and influencing nati onali st
observance when they can access and employ po e
esou es. I the p o ess, A za s P i e
Ministerial entrepreneurs increasingly displaced the RSL as the custodians of Anzac
Critical Discourse Analysis and Prime Ministerial Anzac Entrepreneurship
The thesis has employed the methodological approach to critical discourse analysis advanced by
Fairclough (2005) and other CDA practitioners in order to analyse the Prime Ministerial turn to
233
Anzac. This method was chosen because previous studies of Prime Ministerial engagement with
Anzac have not simultaneously addressed the social and political context of this engagement, and, at
the same time, provided systematic linguistic analysis of their language, or thoroughly compared
Prime Ministerial engagement over time. CDA commits to examination of social pr acti ce s and the
social world, in conjunction with textual analysis, and to critical investigation of the interaction of
these two elements when exploring power relationships (Fairclough 1995, 3). Fairclough (2005) has
presented a guide to CDA that has info
ed the thesis a d its a al sis see Chapte
. Fai l ough s
approach to CDA has been augmented with the discourse -historical method and commitment to
ultiple t ia gulated
ethods, i o de to ei fo e the e pi i al e a it of the fi di gs. The
qualitative tendency of CDA has thus been augmented by quantitative corpus assisted discourse
analysis, an approach that adopts some of the quantitative methods of corpus linguistics in orde r to
explore the corpus and reinforce the validity of findings (Bayley 2007; Duguid 2007).
The discourse-historical method, triangulation, and corpus assisted discourse analysis, have all
underpinned the general methodological approach to the thesis, and have proven their use ful ne ss.
The thesis has sought to examine Prime Ministerial engagement over time, and has attempted to
include as rich and comprehensive a picture of this turn as possible. Doing so has supported some of
the claims of the literature surrounding Anzac, while others have been revealed to be less
persuasive. There seems to be a particular blind-spot among scholars when it comes to the e ffe cts
of Howard on Anzac, and the thesis has quantitatively demonstrated much consistency over the time
period for effects that critics have qualitatively attributed to him. Further, the collation of Anzac Day
attendances by percentage of the city population has suggested that whilst embryonic revival of
Anzac may have been occurring during the 1980s (see Holbrook 2014), the public has really
responded after Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship from 1990. The thesis has therefore
made an original contribution to the literature by applying these general approaches to CDA.
More specifically, the thesis has adopted the approach to CDA outlined by Fairclough (2005) . Some
of the elements of this specific approach have been employed quite explicitly, and some have
i fo
ed the stud
o e i pli itl . Mo e o
etel a al sed ele e ts of Fai lough s app oa h to
CDA have included the analysis of genre, discourses, dif ference, assumptions, semantic and
grammatical relations, grammatical mood, and modality and evaluation. Genre analysis informed
the approach to Chapter 3, where the general parameters of Prime Ministerial Anzac Day addresses,
and their evolution over time, was set out. This contributed significantly to the analysis of the
institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial Anzac day addresses, formed the empirical baseline that
234
informed the rest of the analysis, and was one of the major empirical findings of the t he si s. Pri me
Ministerial discourses of Anzac have been analysed by examining their textual representation,
including specific consideration of elements like modality and evaluation, grammatical mood,
semantic and grammatical relations between sentences and clauses, and the assumptions that
underpin these discourses. These have often revealed the hierarchies of meaning that Prime
Ministers have attempted to create, which privilege certain meanings of Anzac, and attempt to
exclude others. This has been particularly revealed when they have attempted to employ the
ideographic nature of Anzac to convey and reinforce new neoliberal and securitised meanings for
A za . Fi all , CDA s o e
to e eal po e elatio ships ased upo diffe e e has ee a u ial
contribution to the thesis, and has revealed that the activism of cultural agents that have sought to
create a more inclusive and progressive Anzac largely failed to penetrate the precedential spee che s
of A za s e t ep e eu s.
Ele e ts of Fai lough s approach that have been more implicit, or have proven to be less useful,
have included social events, intertextuality, speech exchanges, and styles. The examination of social
events (the social structures, practices, and actors that Fariclough (2005, 223) o te ds o stitute
hat is a tual a d i te te tualit a a e ess of hat oi es a
e ele a t to the te t ha e oth
informed the qualitative awareness required to analyse Prime Ministerial Anzac entrepreneurship.
However, this has been largely incorporated as a methodological concern that has informed the
selection of primary and secondary theoretical and empirical materials, rather than being an explicit
site for examination. Speech exchanges have featured rarely, as Prime Ministerial addresses d o not
follow this rhetorical pattern. Finally, style has been alluded to on occasion, especially in relation to
Howard and his plain and suburban style, or to the political style that characterised Prime Ministerial
discourses. One possibility for future research would be a fuller, and more visual, analysis of Pri me
Ministerial style, including body language, accent, and pronunciation, or closer visual examination of
the setting of the social events that constitute Anzac.
Potential future research directions
Considering different theoretical or methodological approaches to the general topic of Prime
Ministerial engagement with Anzac reveals fruitful future avenues for examination. Researchers i n
the future may like to expand the examination of Prime Ministerial nationalist rhetoric beyond Anzac
Day and compare it to Australia Day or Remembrance Day. Such a study has antecedents with
Curran (2006), but the systematic approach to content and textual analysis offered by CDA promise s
to provide new perspectives on these questions. Of particular interest would be whether the same
235
limited acknowledgement of difference and attempts to discipline public reaction that characterise d
Prime Ministerial Anzac Day discourse are revealed on these occasions, and i f so, whethe r the y are
as successful. Such an approach was alluded to in comparison of the Bicentenary with Anzac Day
1990 in Chapter 5, but could be expanded and tested for veracity over time. Another approach
might like to situate the increasing institutionalisation of Prime Ministerial power over the conduct
of Anzac within the wider trend towards greater Prime Ministerial power, captured conte stably by
the te
ee
p eside tialisatio . As G u e
,
o e e t al to the a ti ities of go e
otes ' The o ds of a p i e i iste ha e e e
e t tha the a e toda , a d e a i atio of thei
rhetorical role in the increasing accrual (or otherwise) of power would reveal much about their
evolving institutional role. Finally, nationalism entrepreneurship has been reveale d to be a use ful
approach to the study of Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac, and testing its tenets against
other instances of the success or failure of nationalist actors would help measure its empirical
veracity. All these avenues for further research would be further enriched by comparative study
with other polities in order to reveal interesting differences and commonalties, and enhance the
empirical veracity of the findings.
Conclusion
This thesis has traced Prime Ministerial engagement with Anzac from 1973 to 2007. It has argued
that P i e Mi iste s Ha ke, Keati g, a d Ho a d e e atio alist e t ep e eu s, ho p o oted
their nationalist visions with their Anzac discourses, imbuing Anzac with new meanings that grappled
with multiculturalism, neoliberalism, and global terrorism and interventionism. Whilst the
approaches of these Anzac entrepreneurs have not been entirely similar, they have demonstrated a
remarkable amount of consistency. This suggests that Prime Ministers are not entirely free to define
Anzac in their own image by mobilising their access to the power resources of the state. Despite
their power, they have had to pay close attention to the social and political context in which they
operated. Any further research into the areas of nationalism, Prime Ministerial power, or pol i tical
language, should pay close attention to the dynamic of structure and agency which has been central
in explaining the Prime Ministerial turn to Anzac.
236
APPENDIX
The Corpus – Prime Ministerial Anzac Day Addresses and Media Statements or Releases
The following is a compendium of the Anzac Day speeches and media statements or releases by Prime Ministers from 1973 – 2007. To the best knowl e dge
of the author, it contains every speech, media statement or release by a Prime Minister on, or around, Anzac Day that substantively addresses Anzac an d its
meaning, in a form that closely resembles the Prime Ministerial rhetorical category of national representative, that being when Prime Ministers are cal l e d
upon to reflect the collective feeling regarding the meaning of the nation (Grube 2013, 54).
Date
Speech Title In Archive
Address
Type
Location
Source
25/4/1979
Anzac Day Esperance
Speech
Esperance
National Archives
M1263/828
24/4/1984
Unknown
Media
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/1986
Speech by Bob Hawke at the Anzac Day Ceremony, Athens
Speech
Athens
The Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial
Library - Series RH21, Box 1, Folder F9
24/4/1989
Speech by the Prime Minister Opening of the extensions at the Speech
Heidelberg Repatriation General Hospital Melbourne - 24 April
1989
Melbourne
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
of
Australia -
237
Date
Speech Title In Archive
Address
Type
Location
Source
25/4/1990
Speech by the Prime Minister Dawn Service, Gallipoli 25 April 1990
Speech
Gallipoli
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/1990
Speech at Lone Pine Ceremony, Gallipoli - 25 April 1990
Speech
Gallipoli
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/1991
Speech by the Prime Minister Opening of gymnasium at HMAS Speech
Coonawarra Darwin - 25 April 1991
Darwin
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/1992
Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon P J Keating, MP Anzac Day Speech
Dawn Service, Bomana War Cemetery Port Moresby - Saturday, 25
April 1992
Bomana
Cemetery
25/4/1992
Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon P J Keating, MP Anzac Day
- Ela Beach, Port Moresby, 10.30AM Saturday 25 April 1992
Speech
Port Moresby
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
26/4/1992
Kokoda Papua New Guinea 26 April 1992
Speech
Kokoda
Paul Keating Prime Minister: major
speeches of the first year
23/4/1993
Launch of the Burma-Thailand Railway
Speech
Canberra
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/1994
Statement by the Prime Minister The Hon P J Keating MP Anzac Media
Day
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/1995
Statement by the Prime Minister, The Hon P.J. Keating MP Anzac Speech
Day 1995
Sydney
Cenotaph
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
War Paul Keating's Personal Archive - Paul
Keating's Office
238
Date
Speech Title In Archive
Address
Type
Location
Source
25/4/1996
ANZAC Day
Media
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/1997
Anzac Day
Media
Release
Not Applicable
ParlInfo - aph.gov.au
25/4/1998
Address by the Prime Minister The Hon John Howard MP at Speech
Kanchanaburi War Cemetery 11 Am 25 April 1998
Kanchanaburi
PANDORA, Australia's Web Archive
25/4/1998
Commemorative Address at Hellfire Pass, Thailand
Speech
Hellfire Pass
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/1999
ANZAC DAY
Media
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2000
Address at Lone Pine, Gallipoli, Turkey - ANZAC Day 25 April 2000
Speech
Gallipoli
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2000
Turkish International Service at Mehmetcik Abide
Speech
Gallipoli
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2000
Dawn Service, Gallipoli, Turkey
Speech
Gallipoli
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2001
Address at the ANZAC Day Parade, Canberra
Speech
AWM
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2002
ANZAC DAY 2002
Media
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
239
Date
Speech Title In Archive
Address
Type
Location
Source
25/4/2003
Address at Anzac Day Parade Canberra
Speech
AWM
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2003
Transcript of the Prime Minister The Hon John Howard MP Anzac Speech
Day Message
Not Applicable
PANDORA, Australia's Web Archive
25/4/2004
Address to Australian Troops Dohar, Iraq
Speech
Iraq (Qatar)
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2004
Anzac Day
Media
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2004
Anzac Celebrations
Media
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2004
Address to the Australian Troops Baghdad, Iraq
Speech
Iraq
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2005
Address at Anzac Day Dawn Service Gallipoli
Speech
Gallipoli
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2005
Message: Anzac Day 2005
Media
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2006
Honouring Australia's Anzac Heritage
Media
Release
Not Applicable
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
25/4/2007
ANZAC Day Address Greenslopes Private Hospital, Brisbane
Speech
Brisbane
PM Transcripts - Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet
240
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