Middle Eastern Studies
ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20
The Balkan Entente in Turkish–Yugoslav relations
(1934–41): the Yugoslav perspective
Dilek Barlas & Anđelko Vlašić
To cite this article: Dilek Barlas & Anđelko Vlašić (2016) The Balkan Entente in
Turkish–Yugoslav relations (1934–41): the Yugoslav perspective, Middle Eastern Studies, 52:6,
1011-1024, DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2016.1198328
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2016.1198328
Published online: 18 Aug 2016.
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Date: 18 October 2016, At: 04:54
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, 2016
VOL. 52, NO. 6, 1011 1024
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2016.1198328
The Balkan Entente in Turkish Yugoslav relations (1934 41):
the Yugoslav perspective
Dilek Barlasa and Anđelko Vlasicb
a
Department of History, Koç University, _Istanbul, Turkey; bCroatian Institute of History, Branch for the History
of Slavonia, Syrmia and Baranya, Slavonski Brod, Croatia
Most of the works written in Turkey on the formation of the Balkan Entente in 1934 and its
effects on the region reflect the Turkish perspective. This perspective intended to glorify
the role of Turkey, by emphasizing how Ankara initiated such a pact and was able to convince other Balkan countries to participate in its establishment. In other words, the Turkish
perspective underlined how Ankara’s policy was driven not by self-interest, but by the
interests of all Balkan countries during the formation of the Balkan Entente.1 However, in
other Balkan countries, there exist more nuanced views of the Balkan Entente and the
Turkish role in its formation. When Italy attacked Greece in 1940, Athens insisted that Turkey should have come to the help of Greece under the obligations of the Balkan Entente.
Turkey defended itself by pointing out that Greece included a reservation in the text of
the entente that ruled out declaration of war on Italy under any condition.2 But what is
less known is that Yugoslavia criticized Turkey’s reluctance to consider its obligations
when Germany invaded Belgrade in 1941 in an attack that originated from Bulgarian territory. Therefore, this article analyzes Turkish Yugoslav relations within the Balkan Entente
based mainly on Yugoslav archival documents and aims to provide an alternative narrative that contests the conventional Turkish view.
The Balkan Entente was signed in February 1934 between Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece
and Romania. By signing the document, these countries declared their guarantee of
mutual security over the Balkan frontiers. The entente was to protect the Balkan frontiers
against any attack from within. Bulgaria was the country in question, as it did not want to
become a member. Since Bulgaria aimed first to annex the territories that it had lost during the First World War, it refused to collaborate with other Balkan states.3 Two of the Balkan Entente countries, Turkey and Yugoslavia, had the same concern about a potential
Bulgarian collaboration with Italy in an attack on their territories. Thus, the minor power
Bulgaria could reach its goal with the support of Mussolini’s revisionist Italy. Not only Bulgaria had territorial aspirations on Macedonia, but also Italy on Dalmatia.4 As far as Turkey
was concerned, Bulgaria’s aim of securing an outlet in the Aegean could have served Italy,
which had already acquired the Dodecanese Islands in the south.
Thus, after its formation, the leaders of the four countries believed that the Balkan
Entente was to guarantee security against any revisionist demands over the Balkans. To
be precise, the Turkish political leadership believed that an attack might come on the
CONTACT Dilek Barlas
dbarlas@ku.edu.tr
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
1012
D. BARLAS AND A. VLASIC
Balkans over the northern Yugoslav border.5 Therefore, Turkey concluded separate military accords with Yugoslavia and Romania, according to which each of the parties would
declare war to help the other in the event of a Balkan attack, with or without the support
of any other country. In other words, these accords reinforced the security dimension of
Turkish Yugoslav relations. In fact, Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu stated
that Yugoslavia and Romania had to ‘ratify immediately’ the entente because they were
now ‘confident in Turkey’ and convinced that military conventions would strengthen the
bond.6 Yugoslavia and Turkey ratified the Balkan Entente in June and October 1934,
respectively.
The Balkan Entente was positively received by the Turkish press. It was perceived as an
agreement that would confront all kinds of aggression. It was to protect the borders and
peace. It was even seen as one of the most important documents signed since the First
World War, forming the basis for peace, not only on the Balkans, but also in all of Europe.
The Turkish public opinion was disappointed by the absence of Bulgaria in the Balkan
Entente and wished for its participation.7 The participation of Bulgaria in the Entente was
also one of the major topics in Yugoslav public debate at that time. It was believed that
the entente would bear few, if any, results without Bulgaria. Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Bogoljub Jevtic declared that they had done everything possible to convince Bulgaria to
be part, but that they could not do so by force. The Yugoslav King Alexander addressed
concerns about the topic and argued that, thanks to the Balkan Entente, there would be
no war on the Balkans.8
Even though the political leaders in Turkey and Yugoslavia became more optimistic
about the future of the region after having signed the Balkan Entente, these two countries
did not always have overlapping concerns. Changing governments and leaders pursued
different agendas. Moreover, the priorities of the two countries differed based on the rapidly changing conditions in Europe. Consequently, their perception of threat changed
over time. In other words, the Balkan countries, including Turkey and Yugoslavia, could
not feel sufficiently secure within a regional entente during the increasing instability in
Europe.
In the beginning, Turkey and Yugoslavia had joined their forces in order to resist the
Italian expansionist policy. When Mussolini came to power in Italy, he claimed Fiume/
Rijeka, a coastal city in Yugoslavia, and forced Belgrade to recognize Italy’s sovereignty
over the city in 1924. Similarly, Turkey was concerned about the Italian military presence
along its Aegean border, on the Dodecanese islands. Furthermore, a decade later, in
March 1934, Turkey and Yugoslavia were shaken by two events. The first was a speech by
Benito Mussolini stating Italy’s intention on expansion in Asia and Africa and the need for
some countries to be armed. This speech influenced the Turkish government to accord
greater significance to the rearmament of its military and to pass laws to this end in the
Turkish parliament in 1934.9 Since there was no military agreement between the four
countries of the Balkan Entente, Ankara believed that it could not rely solely on the defensive nature of the entente and that it had to make additional efforts towards strengthening its military potential.
The second event was the signing of the Rome Protocols between Italy, Austria, and
Hungary. Shortly after the signing of the protocols, Mussolini made a declaration supporting Hungarian territorial ambitions on the Balkans. Yugoslavia was the first Balkan Entente
country in their path after Austria, and Hungary seemed to have been wooed by Italy’s
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
1013
promises in the Rome Protocols.10 Therefore, Yugoslavia reacted very negatively to the
Rome Protocols due to its fear of a hostile encirclement around its borders and of a possible restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.11 In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik
€ ştu
€ Aras visited the Yugoslav ambassador in Vienna to receive first-hand information
Ru
on an anti-Yugoslav propaganda campaign launched by Hungary.12
Another indication of Turkey’s support to Yugoslavia came after the assassination of
King Alexander on 9 October 1934. Immediately after the king’s death, Atat€
urk declared
that Turkey was ready to send its troops to the Turkish Bulgarian border in order to demonstrate its readiness to stop potential Bulgarian interference in the situation in Yugoslavia.13 King Alexander’s death did not have an abrupt negative effect, neither on the
firmness of the Balkan Entente, nor on Turkish Yugoslav relations. However, it opened a
way for future prime ministers to set their own direction in Yugoslavia’s foreign affairs,
owing to the fact that Regent Prince Paul was less authoritarian in leading the country.
Thus, Milan Stojadinovic, who became prime minister on 24 June 1935, was oriented
towards a rapprochement with Bulgaria and Italy. This move gradually undermined the
Balkan Entente.
From 1935 onwards, Turkey and Bulgaria accused each other of concentrating troops
on their shared border.14 Under these circumstances, Turkey was not only holding its regular annual military manoeuvres in Thrace, but also modernizing its army.15 For instance,
on 12 October 1935, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister was informed that, in Turkey, there
was ‘a strong movement aimed at not letting Bulgaria have access to the Aegean Sea and
reclaiming the whole of Thrace’. According to the Yugoslav report, Bulgarian military officers ‘realized that the only way in which Bulgaria would gain access to the Aegean Sea
and recover Thrace was through friendship with Yugoslavia’. For that reason, ‘all officers
in Bulgaria, regardless of their political affiliations, wished a sincere rapprochement with
Yugoslavia’.16
However, the Yugoslav legation in Ankara interpreted these manoeuvres as being
defensive in character and against any possible attack coming from the Bulgarian Turkish
border.17 Turkey placed new orders of war materials from countries such as Germany and
Czechoslovakia. These Turkish efforts also reflected Ankara’s concern, because of the Italian military presence on the Dodecanese Islands and aggression towards Abyssinia. In
fact, concerning the imposition of sanctions against Italy during the Italian Abyssinian
War (1935 36), there was full unanimity between the Yugoslav and Turkish governments,
as well as the governments of other member states of the Balkan Entente, as the Yugoslav
envoy reported.18 Regarding the Italian policy in the region, the priority of Turkey was to
remilitarize the Straits, and this intention was openly declared at the League of Nations in
November 1935 and again in April 1936. This Turkish move was supported by the Yugoslav delegation that ‘wholeheartedly advocated’ Turkish control over the Straits at the
Montreux Conference in July 1936. Yugoslav support of Turkey could be interpreted as solidarity among the Balkan Entente countries, which was bringing ‘concrete results’ to its
member states. Shortly thereafter, during Stojadinovic’s visit to Ankara, a Turkish
communiqu
e emphasized ‘identification of interests and a total unanimity of views in all
questions’.19
Stojadinovic wrote that, in November 1936, he and the Turkish leaders agreed on the
main principles for the future direction of their bilateral relations that were keeping them
away from the conflicts among the great powers and from ideological fronts. Another
1014
D. BARLAS AND A. VLASIC
principle was encouraging solidarity between the four Balkan countries for maintaining
peace in this part of Europe. At the same time, Stojadinovic stated that he was able to
secure the Turkish leaders’ acceptance of a possible Bulgarian Yugoslav agreement, and
this seemed to him ‘the biggest success’ of his visit to Turkey.20 Stojadinovic’s statement
proves that he was already preparing the ground for a Bulgarian Yugoslav agreement.
There is no further evidence that Turkey accepted such an initiative. The Turkish leaders,
however, could have talked with Stojadinovic about the possibility of a Yugoslav initiative
to convince the Bulgarians to come to an agreement with all the Balkan Entente countries.
The Yugoslav move towards Bulgaria was one of the events that demonstrated Yugoslavia’s insecurity and exposed the instability of the Balkan Entente, which reacted only in
words to this Yugoslav double play.
It was clear that, although Turkish and Yugoslav diplomats expressed their sincerity and
their resolve to assure peace on the Balkans, the Yugoslav government was pursuing a
double policy and wished to be as close as it could possibly be to both the Balkan Entente
countries and to its obvious enemies, Italy and Bulgaria.21 After the signing of the Treaty
of Eternal Friendship with Bulgaria in January 1937, Yugoslavia tried to further secure its
international position by consolidating its relations with the Balkan Entente, in case the
treaty with Bulgaria failed. However, by signing agreements with Yugoslavia’s uneasy
neighbours, Stojadinovic damaged the fragile Balkan Entente and the relations among its
member countries.22 Stojadinovic’s government had also gradually started to change
Yugoslav pro-French policy by shifting relations with Germany and Italy, in addition to
other smaller countries in the neighbourhood, which were regarded as enemies, but
needed to be appeased.23
Belgrade apparently did not trust the Balkan Entente and the Little Entente as guarantees against Germany’s and Italy’s expansionist tendencies. In March 1937, Yugoslavia
signed the Treaty of Friendship with Italy. The Italian intention to undermine the Balkan
Entente was combined with Stojadinovic’s wish to continue his policy of appeasing Yugoslavia’s neighbours with a series of agreements, to the detriment of the Balkan Entente.24
Although Stojadinovic claimed that these treaties would not compromise Yugoslav
responsibilities towards the Balkan Entente, other Balkan Entente countries considered
these treaties as contrary to the aims of the entente because Yugoslavia had signed treaties with revisionist countries.25 These Yugoslav agreements can be viewed as the first
signs of weakness of the Balkan Entente, from which it could not recover in the following
years when the political tensions in Europe further increased. A pact based solely on
mutual trust, without a military component, resisted for less than three years (February
1934 January 1937) before being undermined by Yugoslavia. And the dark pre-war years
were still to come.
The Turkish legation in Belgrade closely followed Stojadinovic’s diplomatic actions and
the effects of his policies on the stability of the Balkan Entente.26 The Yugoslav treaties
€nu
€ and
undoubtedly worried Turkey and prompted the Belgrade visit of Prime Minister _Ino
Foreign Minister Aras in April 1937.27 The aim of their visit was to renew the weakened
trust between Turkey and Yugoslavia. Even though Turkish and Yugoslav diplomats
assured the Yugoslav press that there was no risk of dissolution or weakening of the Balkan Entente, the diplomatic situation remained as tense as it had been before.
The double policy implemented by Stojadinovic continued with his visits to Italy in
December 1937 and to Germany in January 1938. He was greeted extremely cordially in
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
1015
both countries. In Italy, he accepted to ‘work against the spreading of German influence
towards the Adriatic and the Danube basin’. In Berlin, Stojadinovic declared to Hitler that
Yugoslavia would not enter into alliances directed against Germany. These visits further
eroded the credibility of Yugoslavia as a member of the Balkan Entente.28 During the
same year, in June 1937, German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath visited Yugoslavia, on which occasion Stojadinovic expressed Yugoslav friendship towards Germany
and stated that Yugoslavia ‘could not and would not’ come to Czechoslovakia’s help in
the case of German aggression.29 Stojadinovic’s promise to Germany concerning Czechoslovakia was a sign of Belgrade’s denial of the mutual defence agreement with this country based on the Little Entente.30
Overall, the friendly visit of Neurath was viewed negatively in other Balkan countries
and as a sign of Yugoslavia’s pro-German rather than pro-Balkan Entente attitude. The
pro-Axis tendencies of Belgrade did not reflect the views of all Yugoslav political leaders
and the public, who were generally pro-French and anti-German. In general, most of the
Serbian political leaders, who followed the policies of the late king, thought that
Stojadinovic’s pro-Axis policy was too radical and against the ‘natural’ leanings of the Serbian foreign policy for example, its leaning towards France.31 Stojadinovic, who did not
want to confront other countries, travelled to Paris in 1937 to renew the treaty of friendship with France, under which Paris did not assume any obligation to secure Yugoslavia
from aggression.
The Turkish political leadership, although not in the same way as the Yugoslav one,
was also oscillating from one side to another because of the rapidly changing balance
of power in Europe. On the one hand, Turkey was feeling strongly threatened by the
Italian military presence, but at the same time it was gradually falling under German
economic domination by signing clearing agreements, as did other Balkan states.32 On
the other hand, its relations with Britain were improving since London signed the Montreux Convention in 1936. Ankara Paris interactions were not yet settled due to the
Hatay issue, despite the British efforts to ameliorate this situation. An indication of Turkey’s inclination to keep all its options open can be found in Aras’s statement to the
Yugoslav envoy in December 1937. Aras said that the Balkan Entente served its purpose
well, but that it was ‘still mainly ideological’ and that, ‘if it ceased to exist for some reason, that would not be a loss for Turkey’, because the resulting ‘void would be automatically filled with the Greek Turkish pact which came into existence before the Balkan
Entente; and the former fused into the latter, not to perish in it but to rise again the
moment the Balkan Entente disappeared’.33 This statement can also be seen as Turkish
precaution, its contingency plan for a future action in the case the Balkan Entente
proved faulty or failed. And Yugoslavia had its agreements with Bulgaria and Italy as
plan B, in the case the entente failed. At this time, the entente already turned into a broken shell of a pact, which had to be replaced with other plans. Since both Turkey and
Yugoslavia were making contingency plans, the leaders of these countries were already
convinced that relying solely on the Balkan Entente would not guarantee their security.
Yugoslavia had signed agreements with Bulgaria and Italy, against which the entente
was actually formed. Turkey ameliorated its relations with Britain after London’s acceptance of Montreux. Yet, representatives of the Balkan Entente countries continued to
meet, despite plan B conceived of by some of the countries. In fact, they thought that
all options should remain open.
1016
D. BARLAS AND A. VLASIC
As a reaction to the Yugoslav agreements with Bulgaria and Italy, Turkey came to a special agreement with another Balkan Entente country, Greece.34 The Yugoslav envoy commented that Greece and Turkey had common interests in the Aegean Sea and in Thrace,
as well as common enemies: Italy with its fortifications on the Dodecanese Islands, and
Bulgaria with its pretensions on the Thracian corridor. Moreover, they were concerned
because of a possible establishment of a South Slav bloc on the Balkans. The Greek
ambassador said that the Bulgarian Yugoslav agreement ‘sparked uneasiness’, but that
Stojadinovic ‘cleared the situation’ by saying that the Balkan Entente was above the Bulgarian Yugoslav agreement in order of importance. Nevertheless, the mentioned agreement had been remembered as ‘inconvenient’.35 Aras stated his hope to the Yugoslav
envoy that the additional Greek Turkish agreement ‘could serve as a model to other
members of the Balkan agreement, here including Bulgaria, too’.36 But the earlier Yugoslav
agreement with Bulgaria was still viewed negatively.
Having in mind the Anschluss, Aras said to the Yugoslav envoy that ‘certain conditions
in Central Europe evolved faster than it could have been presumed and their repercussions could have an effect on all Balkan countries. To make the Balkan Entente an adequate buffer, it should be reinforced from the outside and from the inside: from the
outside through the inclusion of Bulgaria; and from the inside by enhancing precise
mutual obligations’. Interestingly enough, Aras was also warning the Yugoslav envoy by
stating that ‘Turkey is exposed to possible surprises only indirectly, [and] it leaves the initiative to those who are directly exposed to possible repercussions, but with the readiness
to accept the initiative and help’. Here, Yugoslavia constituted probably the one country
that was ‘exposed to possible repercussions’. Aras also added that ‘all sides [of the Balkan
Entente] are free in their actions, but a mutual guarantee of integrity and military cooperation supersedes everything in case of need’.37
Accordingly, the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente was held in Athens in February 1937 and ratified military conventions concluded in November 1936. These conventions eased the tensions between the Balkan Entente countries, because they entailed a
military cooperation in the case of a Bulgarian attack on one of the members of the Balkan
Entente.38 Moreover, there were reciprocal military visits between Turkey and Yugoslavia.
While the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff, General Milutin Nedic, was present during
the annual Turkish military manoeuvres in Thrace in August 1937, Turkish Chief of Staff
Marshal Fevzi Çakmak attended the Yugoslav military manoeuvres in September of the
same year.39 According to the Yugoslav envoy, Çakmak had ‘the best impressions’ about
the Yugoslav military and hospitality.40 However, neither Çakmak’s impressions nor the
praises of the Yugoslav military readiness coming from the Turkish press reflected reality.
The Yugoslav army was in poor condition; it had only a few armoured or mechanized units
and was thus incapable of successfully defending itself in the event of an Axis attack.41
Çakmak’s visit to the Yugoslav military manoeuvres was followed by the Yugoslav War
and Navy Minister Ljubomir Maric’s visit to Turkey in May 1938, which included an extensive inspection of Turkey’s military power, including its army, navy, arms factories, and so
on.42 During this visit, Aras told Maric that it was in the interest of Turkey for Yugoslavia to
be ‘as strong as possible because the only serious attack on Turkey comes through the
Balkans’. He also said that Turkey did not expect ‘any active help’; instead, passive help
was enough that is, ‘for a strong Yugoslavia to stop the intrusion of other nations into
the Balkans by its very existence’. The Yugoslav military attache in Turkey throughout his
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
1017
report on Maric’s visit never missed the chance to compare the words of Turkish officials
with the Yugoslav information on the state of the Turkish army and arms factories. Identifying discrepancies, he wrote that some Turkish military numbers concerning their industrial capacity were exaggerated, as well as the capacity of the factories to meet Turkish
military needs.43
Nevertheless, such Turkish Yugoslav military cooperation demonstrated their self-confidence and possible self-reliance when it came to handling the Axis threat. Furthermore,
during the meeting between the Turkish Foreign Ministry Secretary General, Numan
lu, and the Greek and Yugoslav envoys in September 1937, Menemenciog
lu
Menemenciog
stated that in the wake of the troubling situation in Europe, the Balkan Entente countries
‘had to take into account only their own interests’ and cooperate in all matters, while at
the same time not allowing Britain and France to ‘use’ smaller countries, as they had done
in the matter of sanctions against Italy, and ‘then to leave them on their own again’.44
The Balkan Entente countries wished to prevent Bulgaria from falling under the influence of the Axis and collaborating with them to remove the status quo on the Balkans.
Since the Entente members were unsuccessful in their attempts to draw Bulgaria into their
alliance, they resorted to another solution, which was to sign an agreement that would
give Bulgaria some concessions in exchange for its neutral stance vis-a-vis its neighbours.
This deal demanded that the Entente countries disregard the fact that Bulgaria was rearming itself and accept the view that Bulgaria alone could not threaten the Entente, as long
as its members were united in their actions. The signing of the military alliance in Athens
in February 1937 was one of the facts that emboldened them in their attitude.
Thus came about the Thessaloniki Accord (or Salonika Agreement), signed in July 1938
between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente. With this agreement, Bulgaria rid itself of the
arms restrictions that had been placed on it by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine in November 1919; furthermore, Bulgaria was allowed to re-militarize the demilitarized zone on its
border with Greece and Turkey. In exchange, Bulgaria committed itself to a policy of nonaggression toward its neighbours.45 The Yugoslav charge d’affaires in Ankara reported
that ‘the entire Turkish press received with great pleasure’ the news of the signing of the
accord and called it ‘the first step in the orientation of Bulgaria towards the Balkan Agreement and a prelude to an effective cooperation among Balkan countries’.46 Yet, just a few
lu did not forget to
months later, on 14 November 1938, Turkish Foreign Minister Saracog
tell the Yugoslav envoy that ‘the foreign policy of Turkey remains unchanged’; he emphasized that the Balkan Entente ‘presents an important fact on which the Turkish foreign policy is relying’ and wanted Yugoslav leaders to know that.47
In February 1939, the Balkan Entente countries during their conference in Bucharest
made the statement that they must follow a policy of mutual defence without firm support from the British or French and proclaim neutrality towards great alliances.48 This
statement coincided with the fall of Stojadinovic from power as a consequence of his
political party’s poor results in the December 1938 elections. Furthermore, the radical shift
that he had made in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and the strengthening of his position as
both prime minister and foreign minister were obvious reasons for Prince Paul’s decision
to remove him from his post. Dragisa Cvetkovic replaced him as the new prime minister,
and Aleksandar Cincar-Markovic became the new foreign minister.
Cincar-Markovic was a former envoy to Berlin and a very prudent diplomat loyal to
Prince Paul. German comments showed that their plans for Yugoslavia were hindered by
1018
D. BARLAS AND A. VLASIC
the fall of Stojadinovic, whereas the Cvetkovic administration tried to remain neutral and
distanced to both blocs. In fact, Yugoslavia proclaimed its neutrality during the German
invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and the Italian occupation of Albania in April
1939, and demonstrated its will to respect good relations with the Axis. Immediately following these events, Cincar-Markovic visited Italy and Germany to make sure of their
peaceful intentions towards Yugoslavia, which was staying out of the war.49
Caution became the most prominent feature of the new Yugoslav foreign policy.
When the Anglo-Turkish declaration was signed in May 1939, Yugoslavia’s view was
that Turkey had violated the Balkan Entente because it had signed a treaty without
the consent of the signatories of the entente. Cincar-Markovic feared that the Axis
would be encouraged by the fact that the Entente now abandoned its policy of neutrality, and he held Turkey responsible for breaking the neutral policy set out by the
member countries.50 During Prince Paul’s and Cincar-Markovic’s visit to Germany in
May 1939, they declined Hitler’s wish that they sign the Anti-Comintern Pact and that
Yugoslavia leave the League of Nations. Also, they refused to sign a statement of
friendship towards Germany.
Prince Paul only then realized that a Yugoslav programme of rearmament was badly
needed. Reciprocal visits of their armies’ chiefs of staff during the previous year were misleading, making them overconfident in their capacity to confront the superior armies of
the Axis. In July 1939, Germany demanded that Yugoslavia leave the Entente, which Belgrade refused to do. Yugoslavia then tried to bring Bulgaria into the Entente; however,
this effort failed.51 Therefore, the Entente was then still a guarantee of security on the Balkans, and even though Germany tried to dismantle it before acting more radically, Yugoslavia believed that a united Balkan alliance with Bulgaria would ameliorate their position.
After the German invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Italian occupation of Albania, Turkey’s permanent concern for its own security and the security of the Balkans became
especially strong.52 The Italian entry into the Balkans was the incentive for Turkey to step
lu confirmed to the Yugoslav envoy that the fall of
into action.53 For instance, Saracog
Albania was the reason for the Turkish abandonment of the policy of neutrality and the
move towards the ‘front of peace’.54 According to a Yugoslav report written in May 1939,
Turkish troops were at that time concentrated in Thrace and on the Dardanelles and were
involved in a large mobilization of reserves. Yugoslav diplomats attentively followed the
events during the coordination of the defense of Thrace and reported that these activities
did not include other Balkan Entente members, but only Greece.55 Turkey, in fact, was
already putting into effect its plan B.
Turkish Yugoslav relations became less sincere after the British Turkish Declaration of
Mutual Assistance on 12 May 1939, because Yugoslavia did not approve of the Turkish
rapprochement with Britain and France. According to Yugoslav reports, with this declaration, Turkish foreign policy changed its course from ‘a principled neutrality’ to an inclination towards ‘the democratic belt’ and ‘appeared on the international diplomatic field in
its new role of the British representative in the Mediterranean’.56 The reason for this Yugoslav stance was that Germany and Italy might have considered Yugoslavia leaning towards
Britain and France as well. After all, its ally from the Balkan Entente was now tied to clear
enemies of German and Italian interests on the Balkans. Although the Yugoslav government expressed its dissatisfaction to Turkey through diplomatic means, Turkey had no
intention of changing its attitude.57 The Yugoslav agreement with Bulgaria in January
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
1019
1937 had shaken the Entente, and Turkey’s agreement with the Allies had damaged it
irreversibly.
A Yugoslav report from that time states that Turkey was demonstrating understanding
and trust towards Yugoslavia and its position, ‘but that was not stopping the Turkish press’
from writing about the Yugoslav foreign policy ‘from a certain high position, giving advice
in the tone of a much older brother to a younger brother, which exactly matches the tone
of self-confidence which was reigning in the Turkish circles’ after the British Turkish
Declaration.58 It was as if the declaration had helped Turkey to regain its confidence that
had been shaken by the lack of security stemming from the weakened Entente. Nevertheless, Turkey was trying to convince Yugoslavia that its attitude toward Britain and France
was not compromising the Yugoslav ‘wish to maintain neutrality under all circumstances’
and responded with Prime Minister Refik Saydam’s statement in the Turkish parliament, in
which he strongly emphasized Turkish neutrality.59
A Yugoslav report stated that, after the signing of the declaration, ‘the attitude of Turkey towards Bulgaria remained unchanged: Turkey is ready to plead for the accession—
but an unconditional one—of Bulgaria to the Balkan Entente, but at the same time it is
prepared to most vigorously stop any Bulgarian attempt to cause a violent change of Balkan borders with the help of other forces’.60 The report stated that seven Turkish divisions
on the Bulgarian border clearly attested to this Turkish intention and also had the task of
lu said to the
stopping the Italian penetration into Thrace. Within this context, Saracog
Yugoslav envoy that the Balkan Entente guaranteed the borders of its members only from
a Bulgarian attack, and that it was needed to ensure guarantees against all other possible
attackers.61 He also added that Yugoslav neutrality would have helped the independence
of the Balkans in the face of the Axis danger, ‘but Germany knows that too and this is
why, when the time comes, it will not respect that neutrality which is tying its hands’.
_Ino
€ nu
€ also pointed out to the Yugoslav envoy that the Axis danger could have been
avoided ‘only if these powers know that the Balkan Entente is firm’.62
Just before the war spread into the Mediterranean, the Yugoslav government wanted
to be informed about the position of Ankara concerning Balkan security before the Axis
lu replied that Turkey was faithful to the decisions of the Balkan Entente
threat. Saracog
Permanent Council meeting in Belgrade, ‘concerning solidarity in the case of an attack on
the Balkans and military collaboration’.63 According to him, a preparation of military plans
for the Balkan Entente was imperative, with or without its political counterparts. The Turkish government deemed it necessary to conclude military agreements, because ‘without
them, the political agreements would have no real value’. Therefore, Turkey insisted on an
urgent meeting of the general staffs of the Balkan Entente members in Athens. At the
lu declared that Turkey was ‘ready to take upon itself the responsibility
same time, Saracog
of defending Yugoslavia in all cases of an attack through Yugoslavia’,64 under the condition that Yugoslavia did the same.
Concerning the question of an attack on the Balkans through Yugoslavia and Turkey,
lu’s answers ‘conditional’. The ambassador comthe Yugoslav ambassador called Saracog
mented that it looked as if the Turkish government was setting a condition for Yugoslavia
to defend Turkey from an attack through the Balkans, or from any other side, but that Turkey would unlikely defend Yugoslavia, even if it accepted this Turkish condition. He based
lu, who mentioned that, during the preparation
his assumptions on the words of Saracog
of the Tripartite Agreement, the Turkish security zone included only Bulgaria. It seemed to
1020
D. BARLAS AND A. VLASIC
him that Turkey was ready to ‘let Yugoslavia fall’ and enter the war when the enemies
reached the Bulgarian Turkish and Greek Turkish borders. The ambassador also concluded that Turkey wanted Yugoslavia ‘to accept military talks, and then Turkey would
have precisely declared its political position in all possible contingencies’.65
When Ankara received new information on the movements of German troops in Romania towards the Yugoslav and Bulgarian borders in January 1941, it instructed the Turkish
ambassador in Belgrade to be ‘in permanent contact’ with the Yugoslav foreign minister,
to ‘exchange information and to consult him on the attitude of Yugoslavia’.66 After having
lu that Yugoslavia was
talks in Belgrade, the Turkish ambassador reported to Saracog
67
extending its ‘policy of extreme caution’. Yugoslav Regent Prince Paul considered such
an attitude a provocation towards Germany and a good excuse for the Germans to invade
the Balkans.68 But Turkey was still waiting for a Yugoslav response to the following question: ‘If Germany attacks Greece through Bulgaria, will Yugoslavia mobilize and step into
action against the attackers?’69 The Yugoslav ambassador viewed the Turkish position as
contradictory: ‘On one side sternness, precision and insistence when it comes to the suggestion of the Turkish government to us, and on the other side impreciseness and a certain calmness when the German attack on Greece through Bulgaria is in question, as well
as hesitance in the question of infiltration.’70
lu was still pressuring Yugoslavia to confirm that there was a
In February 1941, Saracog
danger for both countries and to agree on a common action. He also said that it was
‘impossible’ to explain what the Turkish intentions were before Yugoslavia gave a
response, because the actions would be different with or without Yugoslav collaboration.
The British and the Greek ambassadors told the Yugoslav ambassador that the question
of Yugoslav collaboration was important for the Turkish decision as to whether to take
action
then Turkey would be prepared to have ‘military combinations which would
refute the rumors about the strictly defensive character of Turkish military intentions’.71
Yet, Yugoslavia did not want to incite German reaction with its cooperation with other Balkan countries.
lu expressed his fear that it
However, once German troops entered Bulgaria, Saracog
was too late for mutual activity. He thought that Germany ‘would be able to finish up
lu did not immedievery single country on the Balkans’.72 Under these conditions, Saracog
ately want to respond to Yugoslav questions about establishing ‘full trust, especially considering military plans and intentions of Turkey and its allies’.73 This gave the impression
that he did not give the same importance to permanent diplomatic cooperation as he
had done before. Additionally, two events
Yugoslavia joining the Tripartite Pact (25
March 1941) and a pro-Allied coup d’
etat in Yugoslavia two days later
changed the
course of events. This time the efforts by Yugoslavia and its military mission to Turkey
towards a possible Turkish Yugoslav cooperation intensified unsuccessfully. A few days
lu also commented that
after the German invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, Saracog
Turkey had wished for a mutual action with Yugoslavia, but that after the aggression on
Yugoslavia it was too late.74
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Momcilo Nincic insisted on Turkish action according to the
above-mentioned 1934 Turkish Yugoslav military convention.75 Turkey refused the Yugoslav demand of intervention, stating that this bilateral military convention was an annex of
the Balkan Entente and that one could invoke it only if they had the right to invoke the
Balkan Entente; this right belonged to the signatories only under the condition that all of
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
1021
its signatories respected the Entente’s obligations. Romania officially proclaimed that the
Entente had lost its value. Yugoslavia had signed the Tripartite Pact and therefore automatically come into a position of being in pact with Bulgaria, and that was contrary to Article 2 of the Entente. Therefore, the Yugoslav ambassador reported that Yugoslavia had
dismissed the principles of the Entente that it was now invoking.76
The members of the Balkan Entente, especially Yugoslavia and Turkey, did not feel that
the Entente had guaranteed full security to its members as early as in 1937, and the additional military conventions did not help in the way in which they were supposed to. The
Entente was dismantled not through military aggression, but through the agreements,
which its members signed with other countries. This did not stop them from referring to
the entente in their relations up until 1941, when it became as inappropriate as the comment in the paragraph above states: ‘Yugoslavia had dismissed the principles of the pact
that it was now invoking.’77
Finally, when comparing Turkey and Yugoslavia with respect to their position towards
the Balkan Entente, one can draw the following conclusions: Turkey’s Balkan Entente policy formed a precursor to its neutrality policy during the Second World War. Ankara saw
the entente as a means of deterrence to stay away from the war. When the Turkish political leadership was faced with war, they signed the Tripartite Alliance with Britain and
France in October 1939 in order to be on the safe side. In order not to become involved in
the war, Turkey avoided coming to the help of Yugoslavia, even though it signed a military
agreement with this country. Indeed, it managed to stay out of the war. As for Yugoslavia,
even though it resisted being drawn into the war the longest of the other two member
states, it was invaded by Germany in 1941. Because of its geographic proximity to the Axis
powers, Yugoslavia was more vulnerable in comparison to Turkey. Yet, Stojadinovic’s proAxis policy had prepared the ground for this vulnerability. Yugoslavia, in contrast to
Turkey, already in 1937 started not seeing the Balkan Entente as a factor of deterrence. On
the eve of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, Belgrade referred to Turkey, a member of
the Balkan Entente with which it had signed a military agreement, as a last resort in the
face of impending disaster.
Acknowledgements
Anđelko Vlasic gratefully acknowledges the financial support granted to him by the Scientific and
€ _ITAK) under the Research Fellowship Program for
Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUB
_
_
International Researchers (TUBITAK BIDEB 2216). Both authors would like to thank Serhat G€
uvenç for
his valuable comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Among these works are _I. Soysal, ‘Balkan Paktı’, in Y. Y€
ucel (ed.), Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur’a
an (Ankara: T€
Armag
urk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985) and B. Ertem, ‘Atat€
urk’€
un Balkan Politikası
€neminde T€
ve Atat€
urk Do
urkiye Balkan Devletleri _Ilişkileri’, Akademik Bakış Dergisi, Vol.21 (2010).
urkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları (Ankara T€
urk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), p.458.
2. _I. Soysal (ed.), T€
1022
D. BARLAS AND A. VLASIC
3. D. Barlas and S. G€
uvenç, Turkey in the Mediterranean During the Interwar Era (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies Series, 2010), p.144.
4. M. T€
urkeş, ‘The Balkan Pact and Its Immediate Implications for the Balkan States, 1930 34’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.30 (1994), p.140.
€ uz, ‘The Reflections of the Balkan Pact in Turkish and European Public Opinion’, in Turkish
5. H. Oks€
Review of Balkan Studies, Annual, Vol.11 (_Istanbul: Bigart, 2006), p.165.
6. AY (The Archives of Yugoslavia), Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in
Turkey Constantinople, Ankara, document No.370-43-212, 7 May 1934.
7. N. Uzman, ‘Balkan Paktı ve Basındaki Yansımaları’, in Yedinci Uluslararası Atat€
urk Kongresi, Vol.II
(Ankara: Atat€
urk Araştırma Merkezi, 2015), pp.1270 72.
8. Uzman, pp.1278 80.
9. Consequently, the budget of the Turkish Ministry for National Defense for 1935/36 was
10,000,000 Turkish Lira more than it had been in the previous year: AY, Fond No.370, Legation
of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey
Constantinople, Ankara, document No.370-3-190,
370-3-191, 4 Jan. 1936.
10. M. Radojevic, ‘Predgovor’, in N. Petrovic (ed.), Izvestaji Ministarstva inostranih poslova Kraljevine
Jugoslavije 1935 (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011), pp.V VI, XIII XIV. Italy obliged itself to help
the economic development of Hungary and Austria through economic cooperation and implied
that it would support their political aspirations against other countries, for example, Hungarian
aspirations against Yugoslavia. In his above-mentioned speech, Mussolini explicitly supported
Hungarian aspirations. As for Austria, Mussolini promised to defend its sovereignty against German aspirations.
11. M. Ristovic, ‘Predgovor’, in N. Petrovic and J. Đurisic (eds.), Izvestaji Ministarstva inostranih poslova Kraljevine Jugoslavije za 1934. Godinu (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2010), p.IX.
ı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 78.
12. Cumhurbaşkanlıg
Avramovski, Balkanske zemlje i velike sile 1935 1937 (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1968), p.21; M.
13. Z.
Ristovic, Turska osmatracnica. Jugoslovensko-turski odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu i njihov bal
stampa; Udruzenje za drustvenu istoriju, 2013), p.22.
kanski kontekst (Belgrade: Cigoja
14. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-3-8, 370-3-9, 3 April 1935; 370-3-19, 370-3-20, 12 April 1935.
15. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-3-562, 16 Aug. 1936; 370-3-212, 3 Sep. 1936; 370-3-604, 3 Sep. 1937; S. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.32, 36.
16. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-3-28, 12 Oct. 1935.
17. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-3-562, 16 Aug. 1936; 370-3-212, 3 Sep. 1936.
18. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-3-190, 4 Jan. 1936.
19. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-14-374.
20. M. Stojadinovic, Ni rat ni pakt. Jugoslavija između dva rata (Rijeka: Otokar Kersovani, 1970),
pp.389 90, 397 402.
€
21. A. Ozgiray,
‘T€
urkiye-Yugoslavya _Ilişkileri (1920 1938)’, Tarih _Incelemeleri Dergisi, Vol. XIV (1999),
pp.21 2.
c, ‘Predgovor’, in N. Petrovic (ed.), Izvestaji Ministarstva inostranih poslova Kraljevine
22. A. Zivoti
Jugoslavije 1937 (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2013), pp.XI XII, XIX XX.
23. M. Radojevic, ‘Predgovor’, in N. Petrovic (ed.), Izvestaji Ministarstva inostranih poslova Kraljevine
Jugoslavije 1935 (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011), p.XIV.
24. E. Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia in the Interwar Period, 1919 1941 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.217 18.
erli, ‘Balkan Pact and Turkey’, Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi The Journal of
25. E.S. Deg
Avramovski, Balkanske zemlje i velike sile
International Social Research, Vol.2 (2009), p.144; Z.
1935 1937 (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1968), pp. 309 17.
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
1023
26. This can be concluded from the reports sent by the Turkish legation in Belgrade to Ankara,
which included transcripts of Stojadinovic’s speeches held in 1936 and 1937: BCA (Turkey’s
Prime Minister’s Rebuplican Archives), BMGM, No.30.10.0.0/252.701.5, 3 April 1936; 30.10.0.0/
253.702.5, 21 July 1936; 30.10.0.0/253.703.3, 17 Feb. 1937.
27. M. L. van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy: The Balkan Clue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1974), pp.75 7; M. Ristovic, Turska osmatracnica. Jugoslovensko-turski odnosi u Drugom svet
stampa; Udruzenje za drustvenu istoriju,
skom ratu i njihov balkanski kontekst (Belgrade: Cigoja
2013), p.30.
28. M. Radojevic, ‘Predgovor’, in J. Đurisic (ed.), Izvestaji Ministarstva inostranih poslova Kraljevine
Jugoslavije 1938 (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2014), pp.IX X; E. Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia in the Interwar Period, 1919 1941 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993), pp.225, 232 3.
29. Boia, pp.218 19.
30. The Little Entente was a mutual defense arrangement between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
Romania, based on several treaties (1920 21). In fact, it aimed at the protection of the members’ territorial integrity and political independence against German and Hungarian
domination.
31. Boia, pp.220 21.
32. D. Barlas, Etatism & Diplomacy in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp.146 55.
33. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-43-581, 19 Jan. 1938.
34. After Greek Prime Minister Metaxas’s visit to Ankara in October 1937 and again in February
1938, Bayar and Aras went to Athens on 27 April 1938 to sign the Additional Treaty to the Treaty
of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration (signed on 30 Oct. 1930) and to the Pact of
Cordial Friendship (14 Sep. 1933): AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in
Turkey Constantinople, Ankara, document No.370-4-9, 5 March 1938; 370-4-20, 7 May 1938.
35. Ibid.
36. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-4-20, 5 May 1938.
37. Ibid.
c, pp.XVIII XIX. The agreement was signed by the chiefs of general staff of the Balkan
38. Zivoti
Entente countries in November 1936 and confirmed in Athens in February 1937 as a military
agreement intended to expand the Balkan Entente with (until then non-existent) military
obligations.
39. BCA, BMGM, No.30.10.0.0/252.703.13, 21 Aug. 1937; 30.18.1.2/78.74.9, 26 Aug. 1937; 30.18.1.2/
78.78.6, 10 Sep. 1937.
40. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-7-628, 20 Oct. 1937.
41. Z. Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933 1939 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), p.120.
42. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-4-24, 1 June 1938; No.370-8-7, 13 June 1938; Ayın Tarihi, Basın Genel
€rl€
u
€, No.54 (May 1938), pp.136 43.
Direkto
ug
43. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-8-9, 370-8-10, 370-8-11, 370-8-12, 370-8-13, 370-8-14, 370-8-15, 370-8-16,
370-8-17, 13 June 1938; Ayın Tarihi, pp.136 43.
44. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-43-549, 8 Sep. 1937.
45. G. Schreiber, B. Stegemann, and D. Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, Vol III: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939 1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), p. 375.
46. The process of ratification of the agreement in the Entente members’ parliaments lasted until
February 1939: AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara, document No.370-4-44, 370-4-45, 1 Sep. 1938; 370-43-653, 25 Feb. 1939.
1024
D. BARLAS AND A. VLASIC
47. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-8-52, 14 Nov. 1938.
48. Boia, pp. 255 6.
49. Boia, p.259.
50. Boia, p.261. It was as if he had forgotten that his predecessor Stojadinovic had also endangered
the entente by doing in 1937 the same thing that Turkey did two years later.
51. Boia, pp.262 3.
52. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-4-489, no date; M.L. van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy: The Balkan Clue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp.75 7; Ristovic, p.30.
53. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-4-410, 3 June 1939; 370-4-439, no date; 370-4-654, 8 July 1939.
54. The Archives of Yugoslavia, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey
Constantinople, Ankara, document No.370-4-489, no date.
55. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-4-613, 370-4-614, 370-4-615 and No.370-4-651.
56. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-4-408, 370-4-409, 3 June 1939.
57. N. Tamkin, Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union, 1940 1945: Strategy, Diplomacy and Intelligence
in Eastern Mediterranean (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.33; Ristovic, pp.24 5.
58. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-4-411, 3 June 1939.
59. AY, Fond No.370-4-415, 5 July 1939.
60. AY, Fond No.370-4-411, 3 June 1939.
61. AY, Fond No.370-4-489, 370-4-490, no date.
62. Ibid.
63. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-8-342, 19 May 1940; 370-8-343, 370-8-344, 21 May 1940.
64. Whether from Italy, from Germany, or from Italy and Germany together.
65. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-8-343, 370-8-344, 370-8-345, 21 May 1940.
66. AY, Fond No.370-8-432, 13 Jan. 1936.
67. AY, Fond No.370-8-483, 370-8-484, 24 Jan. 1941.
68. H. Knoll, Jugoslawien in Strategie und Politik der Alliierten 1940 1943 (M€
unchen: Oldenburg Verlag, 1986), pp.78 9; L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HM
Stationery Office, 1962), pp.130-31; Ristovic, p.36.
69. Creveld, p.122; Ristovic, pp.35 7.
70. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-8-492, 370-8-493, 370-8-494, 1 Feb. 1941.
71. AY, Fond No.370-8-531, 25 Feb. 1941. M. Ristovic, Turska osmatracnica. Jugoslovensko-turski
stampa Udruzenje
odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu i njihov balkanski kontekst (Belgrade: Cigoja
za drustvenu istoriju, 2013), pp.40 41.
72. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-8-549, 370-8-550, 3 March 1941.
73. Ibid.
74. AY, Fond No.370-8-640, 9 April 1941; 370-8-597, 4 April 1941; 370-8-598, 6 April 1941; 370-8-643,
10 April 1941; Ristovic, 43.
75. AY, Fond No.370, Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Constantinople, Ankara,
document No.370-8-643, 10 April 1941.
76. AY, Fond No.370-8-652, 14 April 1941.
77. Ibid.