Suicide Bombers: Beyond Cultural Dopes and Rational Fools
Robert J. Brym
Department of Sociology
University of Toronto
725 Spadina Avenue
Toronto M5S 1A1
Canada
rbrym@chass.utoronto.ca
and
Cynthia Hamlin
Department of Social Sciences
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
Av. Academico Helio Ramos
S/N Cidade Universitaria 50.670-901
Recife PE
Brazil
cynthiahamlin@hotmail.com
© 2008
4,979 words
To be published in Mohamed Cherkaoui and Peter Hamilton (eds) (2008) Raymond
Boudon: A Life in Sociology, 4 vols. Oxford, Bardwell Press.
1
Cultural Dopes vs. Rational Fools
Between December 1981 and mid-March 2008, 1,840 suicide attacks killed more than
21,000 people and injured another 50,000 worldwide (Wright 2008). Were the
perpetrators of these horrific acts cultural dopes or rational fools? These are the two main
images that a generation of journalists, government officials, and academics have
sketched in their attempt to understand suicide missions. The cultural dope: an
“ideological zealot trapped by rigid adherence to dogma” (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenhaler
2006: 299; Moghaddam 2006). The rational fool: a calculating machine who aims to
liberate occupied territory by the most efficient means possible (Sprinzak 2000, Bloom
2005, Pape 2005).
Social scientists will immediately recognize these two social types from a wide
variety of other contexts. The cultural dope is Harold Garfinkel’s term for the
oversocialized conception of men and women that is embedded in the work of social
theorists from Durkheim to Parsons (Garfinkel 1967). Cultural dopes are empty vessels
into which society pours a defined assortment of goals, beliefs, symbols, norms, and
values. These elements of culture determine the actions of individuals. Sometimes,
individuals come into conflict, but when they do, they are merely expressing cultural
requirements that are at odds. That is why, according to some proponents of the image of
the cultural dope, suicide bombers today signify a clash not between political groups, but
between Muslim and Judeo-Christian civilizations (Huntington 1989).
In contrast, rational fools, as Amartya Sen (1977) calls them, are utility
maximizers. They assign values to states of affairs based on the perceived capacity of
those states of affairs to generate welfare or satisfaction (an assumption known as
“welfarism”). They choose actions based on their expected consequences (an assumption
known as “consequentialism”) (Sen and Williams 1994). For example, suicide bombers
supposedly gauge their tactic to be an especially effective means of mobilizing support
for, and achieving, their ultimate goal of liberating occupied territory. They recognize
that, as relative powerless antagonists, they possess few if any alternative tactics that
could more efficiently promote their aims. Welfarism and consequentialism thus
circumscribe the scope of their action.
2
In this paper, we argue that cultural-determinist and rational-choice theories fail to
offer credible explanations of the phenomena they purport to explain because they
employ unrealistic conceptions of social actors. After demonstrating some of the
empirical shortcomings of these theories as they apply to suicide bombers, we propose an
alternative based on Raymond Boudon’s theory of action. Boudon introduces the notion
of “ordinary rationality” as the backbone of sociological explanation. His idea aims to
overcome the problems inherent in conceptions of social actors as either utility
maximizers who accept cultural preferences as given or as automata whose goals, beliefs,
symbols, norms, and values are reflexes of socialization. We find Boudon’s concept of
ordinary rationality a promising device for making sense of suicide bombers. We
conclude our discussion by illustrating his model of ordinary rational action through a
brief analysis of Paradise Now, a film about suicide bombers that was nominated for an
Oscar as best foreign-language film of 2005.
Empirical Criticisms
Cultural determinists usually associate propensity to engage in suicide attacks with
adherence to fundamentalist Islam. Yet the historical record calls the association into
question. Thus, the first known suicide attack involved a Western assault on Persian
forces; one of the two Spartans who survived the battle of Thermopylae in 480 BCE went
on a suicide mission against the Persian invaders (Boyle 2006). About 600 years later,
Jewish Zealots launched suicide missions against Roman occupiers. In modern times,
Japanese kamikaze pilots and kaiten torpedo pilots attacked American vessels in the
Pacific during World War II, and the Viet Cong engaged in suicide attacks to liberate
their homeland in the 1960s. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka – a nonMuslim and non-religious group – accounted for 60 percent of the world’s suicide attacks
between 1983 and 2000 (Sprinzak 2000). Among the 83 percent of suicide attackers
worldwide between 1980 and 2003 for whom data on cultural background is available,
only 43 percent were discernibly religious (Pape 2005). In approximately the same
3
period, fundamentalist Muslims conducted fewer than half of all suicide missions in
Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (Ricolfi 2005).
If many cultural groups, not all of them religious, have engaged in suicide attacks,
then Muslims have employed the tactic only sporadically. Members of the Shi’a Isma’ili
sect, known as Assassins, engaged in suicide attacks against Sunni leaders in the 11th
century. Muslim suicide attackers next resurfaced in the 18th century in parts of India,
Indonesia, and the Philippines in opposition to vastly superior colonizing forces from
Europe and America, and again in the late 20th century in various parts of the Muslim
world (Dale 1988).
It is true that since 2003 Muslim fundamentalists have been responsible for most
suicide bombings worldwide (Moghaddam 2006). Significantly, however, many if not
most of the recent attacks have had a specific political aim. They have often sought to
liberate territory by attacking occupying armies and their allies, especially in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Moreover, suicide attacks have often spiked in response to identifiable
political circumstances. In Iraq between 2003 and 2006, for example, suicide bombing
campaigns tended to follow either big counterinsurgency offensives or developments
suggesting that the country had reached a turning point on the road to political stability.
In the former case, they were intended to punish governments and their allies, show them
that the jihadis would not be deterred, and recruit new cadres eager to seek revenge by
exploiting the jihadi image of victim and martyr. The wave of suicide bombings that took
place around the January 2005 election for an Iraqi constitutional assembly, when the
new Iraqi constitution was endorsed in August 2005, and around the December 2005
Iraqi parliamentary election illustrate the latter case: suicide bombing campaigns were
sometimes intended to demonstrate the resilience of jihadi power and opposition to
political stability (Hafez 2006).
Historically speaking, then, propensity to engage in suicide missions is not
associated with fundamentalist Islam alone. Moreover, among Muslim fundamentalists,
political factors are often associated with frequency of suicide attacks. No cultural
constant can explain such variation (Brym 2008).
Rational-choice theory is similarly unable to account for variation in the
frequency of suicide missions. The Palestinian case illustrates this fact well. Are the
4
motives for Palestinian suicide missions overwhelmingly utilitarian? Hardly. During the
second Palestinian intifada or uprising against the Israeli state and people (2000-05), 138
suicide attacks took place. In most cases, suicide bombers issued statements just before
their attacks explaining why they were about to martyr themselves. Following each
attack, newspapers reported interviews with relatives and friends outlining the factors that
prompted the suicide bombers to act, and militant organizations issued official statements
outlining their rationales for supporting the suicide missions. Systematic analysis of this
rich body of evidence reveals that bombers and their sponsors often expressed support for
liberating territory from foreign occupation. However, another animus figured even more
prominently, especially at the individual level. Not the desire for collective welfare, but
revenge for specific acts of Israeli repression was the main reason suicide bombers and
their organizational sponsors gave for their actions (Brym and Araj 2006).1 Although
1
One could argue that revenge is as legitimate a goal as any other in terms of welfare, but
it is hard to believe that this is the case when the means to attaining that goal (suicide) is
incompatible with the notion of individual welfare, at least in this life. It makes more
sense to assume that suicide bombing which is motivated by reasons such as revenge and
religious belief is based either on affective causes or on what Weber called “valuerationality”. This type of rationality, contrary to the strategic logic that characterizes
utilitarianism, rests on a commitment to values that compels individuals to act even if it
leaves them worse off (Sen 1977). Although it is possible to extend rational choice theory
to religion and argue, for instance, that radical Islamic groups “offer spiritual…incentives
to individuals who are concerned with the hereafter” (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenhaler 2006:
295), this “religion-as-economy” mode of analysis rests on a number of problematic
principles and inferences, including “its psychologistic representation of the spiritual
actor as a calculating maximizer; its transfiguring reconceptualization of religious culture
and practice as a sublimated trafficking in commodified utilities; its strained assimilation
of religious organizations to profit-seeking business firms; …its chronic ‘homogenizing’
or ‘flattening out’ of the complexities of history… as is induced by a positivistic
commitment to the deductive deploy of universal axioms... [and] the risk of metaphorical
misspecification that is inherent in an analytical strategy which proceeds by extending
5
revenge is less important and strategic logic more important in other cases, such as Iraq,
one is obliged to conclude that the reason for suicide attacks cannot reasonably be
reduced to strategic gain.
Even if we consider only the collective or organizational level of suicide
missions, the type of explanation favoured by rational choice theorists cannot account for
all cases. It is true that suicide bombings often occur in clusters as part of an organized
campaign, and their initiators often time such campaigns to maximize strategic gains. A
classic example is the campaign launched by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
from 1993 to 1997. In the wake of the Oslo accords, fearing that a settlement between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority would prevent the Palestinians from gaining control
over all of Israel, Hamas and PIJ aimed to scuttle peace negotiations by unleashing a
small army of suicide bombers. Still, one cannot conclude that such strategic reasoning
governs all suicide bombing campaigns because they often occur without apparent
strategic justification. For example, the second intifada, which witnessed six times as
many suicide attacks as the 1993-97 campaign, erupted after negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinian Authority broke down in 2000.
Finally, we may consider whether suicide missions are rational in consequentialist
terms, that is, in terms of expected results. Some analysts say that suicide bombing serves
the instrumental goal of increasing popular support for its organizational sponsors. Again,
evidence fails to support the universality of the claim. Secondary analysis of more than a
dozen Palestinian public opinion polls conducted during the second intifada found that
the correlation between popular support for suicide bombing and the frequency of suicide
bombings in the preceding month was not statistically significant. Increased popular
support for Fatah was not preceded by a statistically significant increase in the frequency
of suicide bombings by Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Nor was increased popular
support for Hamas preceded by a statistically significant increase in the frequency of
suicide bombings by Hamas (Brym and Araj 2008).
categories and theorems beyond their original domain of derivation and application”
(Bryant 2000: 521-2). A similar critique can be made of Gary Becker’s extension of the
notion of the market to explain marriage and suicide (Hamlin 2002).
6
Also relevant to the consequentialist assumption is research showing that while
suicide bombing campaigns sometimes result in minor concessions, they typically fail to
achieve their territorial or other strategic aims (Moghaddam 2006). For example, the
1993-97 Palestinian campaign did not cause Israel to break off negotiations with the
Palestinian Authority. To the contrary, negotiations continued, and Israel exercised
remarkable restraint as measured by the exceptionally low ratio of Palestinian to Israeli
deaths due to conflict throughout this period (Brym and Anderson 2008). Eventually,
Israel and the Palestinian Authority negotiated an Israeli withdrawal from much of the
West Bank and Gaza. However, when the suicide bombing campaign of the second
intifada broke out, Israel reoccupied much of the West Bank and Gaza: hardly evidence
of the strategic success of suicide bombing. Finally, while Israel withdrew from Gaza in
2005, its action cannot be interpreted as a result of suicide bombing because hardly any
suicide bombers came from Gaza, hardly any attacks were launched from there, and
hardly any suicide attacks took place there (Brym and Maoz-Shai 2008).
In sum, whether one measures the strategic basis of Palestinian suicide bombing
in terms of its alleged successes, timing, individual motivations or organizational
rationales, one sometimes detects instrumentally rational action and sometimes not.
Neither the calculating machine idealized by rational-choice theorists nor the religious
homunculus idealized by cultural determinists operate universally.
Boudon’s Synthetic Model of Rationality
Boudon seeks to integrate and go beyond the two approaches to the understanding and
explanation of human action that we have introduced. His efforts are worth considering
because they provide a more credible means than the alternatives of accounting for the
actions of suicide bombers (see especially Boudon 2006).
Boudon develops his ideas by first identifying key problems in the way Pareto
and Durkheim sought to explain social action. Pareto introduced the notion of “nonlogical action” to underscore the insufficiency of instrumental rationality as an
explanation for a range of social actions that are neither utilitarian nor irrational. In his
7
model, non-observable sentiments, not rationality or logical-experimental reasoning,
underlie most human action. One can observe vestiges of these unobservable sentiments
in so-called “residues”, or basic drives for “conservation”, “innovation”, and so on.
However, because people are not aware of these sentiments, they often rationalize their
actions through rhetorical arguments or “derivations”. For Pareto, then, many of the
reasons people give for their beliefs and actions are mere rationalizations of drives of
which they are not aware.
Boudon takes exception with Pareto’s approach. For Boudon (1995), many
reasons offered by actors that are not based on logical-experimental reasoning do not
have a mere covering-up function. Instead, they may be sensible insofar as people have
good reason for believing them. Said differently, people’s actions are not always or even
frequently determined by causes that escape their consciousness, but by reasons that,
despite not being objectively valid, are sufficiently solid given the situation in which
people find themselves.
This is where Boudon (2006) invokes one of Durkheim’s main intuitions – that
social structures and cultures influence people’s actions and beliefs. For instance, instead
of postulating that people in “primitive” societies perform magical rituals because they
have a “primitive mentality”, or because they have sentiments or instincts to which they
have no conscious access, Durkheim assumed that people in such societies have
“theories” which make sense to them, given what we could call their “stock of
knowledge”. They rely on a religious interpretation of the world that people in their
societies consider a legitimate source of knowledge. Not unlike modern scientists, they
often “rescue” their theories by introducing ad hoc hypotheses to reconcile them with
data; if rain dancing does not produce rain, perhaps the ritual was executed improperly.
Despite Durkheim’s advance, Boudon notes that Durkheim’s methodological rule
of explaining social facts by other social facts did not always allow him to consider the
intentional aspects of human action. This led in Durkheim’s work and in that of his
followers to a conception of homo sociologicus as a passive subject, a sort of automaton
whose action is the product solely of the forces of socialization.
The solution Boudon proposes to the problems raised by the work of Pareto and
Durkheim is a view of homo sociologicus as both socially situated, as in Durkheim, and
8
active, as in Pareto. His model of social action employs utilitarianism as a starting point
but allows for non-utilitarian action (Hamlin 2002, 67-96). He variously terms his model
subjective rationality, cognitive rationality, and, most recently, ordinary rationality.
In Boudon’s view, Weber came closest to defining rationality in a satisfactory
manner. Weber assumed that explaining and understanding usually involve retrieving
actors’ reasons for their actions. However, Weber recognized that some actions result
from emotional responses that lack a cognitive component and are therefore not based on
reasons. Weber also distinguished between reasons that actors give to explain their
actions and reasons that exert an actual causal impact on those actions. The two may not
be the same; actors’ stated reasons may serve merely to rationalize action. However,
unlike Pareto, Weber did not assume that all non-rational action falls under this category.
Boudon thus concludes that Weber’s notion of rationality rests on the distinction between
objective and subjective reasons and that, although the latter are not necessarily
objectively valid, they are not arbitrary either, but based on good reasons from the actor’s
viewpoint (Boudon 1989).
According to Boudon, subjectively good reasons are neither arbitrary nor
dependent on the subjects’ idiosyncrasies, but tend to be general in the sense that all
individuals who are placed in the same situation will tend to perceive the same reasons as
good (Boudon 1990). Boudon’s notion of subjective or ordinary rationality follows from
this distinction (Boudon 2008).
Finally, Boudon distinguishes positive beliefs (which describe what the world is)
from normative beliefs (which describe what the world ought to be). He does not deny
the existence of an affective dimension of action, particularly moral action, but his
cognitivist perspective contrasts sharply with models that prioritize desire over belief. In
Boudon’s view, adherence to moral principles is triggered by what actors judge to be
right, good or fair, not by sentiment or affect, which is related to desire (Hollis 1987, 689). In Boudon’s words, “the sentiments of justice or injustice, legitimacy or illegitimacy
are rightly so called since they include an affective dimension: nothing is more painful
than injustice. However, they are, at the same time, grounded on reasons. Moreover, the
strength of the sentiments is proportional to the strength of the reasons: I suffer more
9
from injustice if I am convinced of the validity of my rights” (Boudon 1997, 21). 2
Let us now illustrate the advantages of Boudon’s approach by considering the
portrayal of suicide bombers in Paradise Now.
Suicide Bombers and Ordinary Rationality
Khaled and Said are single men in their twenties –mechanics and best friends. They
reside in Nablus, which means they have lived under Israeli military occupation their
entire lives. Because of the occupation, they have never been able to travel outside the
West Bank. They enjoy few opportunities for upward mobility, are bored stiff, and have
been robbed of their dignity. Like most Palestinians, they want the Israelis out so they
can establish an independent country of their own. However, years of demonstrations,
rock throwing, commercial strikes, and armed attacks have had little effect on the
powerful Israeli regime. A succession of scholarly reinterpretations has removed
religious proscriptions against suicide missions and reinterpreted them as acts of
2
In our view, Boudon’s model is superior to rational-choice theories like Elster’s, which
try to explain the actor’s adherence to norms and beliefs in terms of sub-intentional
causality. When Elster states that beliefs, desires, and emotions cause actions, he
subscribes to Donald Davidson’s notion of causality. Davidson holds that stating that a
belief or a desire is the cause of an action is just a convenient way of rephrasing an
intentional explanation to indicate the existence of an unknown causal explanation (Elster
1983, 22). In contrast, Boudon’s notion of rationality allows one to treat beliefs, desires,
and emotions in causal terms, not as black boxes; their emergence is not just postulated,
but can be explained. We take issue only with Boudon’s methodological individualism,
which he is unable to sustain. Whereas intentions are personal, meanings are inherently
social (Bhaskar 1979), as is suggested by his interpretation of Durkheim. A review of
Boudon’s use of causal explanation allows us to observe that he always smuggles
collective concepts such as norms and values into his analysis, thus contradicting his
individualistic claims (Hamlin 1999, 2000, 2002).
10
martyrdom. As a result, the popularity of suicide bombing in Palestinian society has
grown enormously. To Khaled and Said, it thus seems entirely natural to volunteer as
weapons of last resort: suicide bombers.
Forty-eight hours before the scheduled mission, their handlers take them to a
secret, guarded location. There they receive instruction on how to carry out the attack.
The handlers tell Khaled and Said to bathe, shave, get their hair cut short, pray, and
prepare a martyrdom video explaining their actions. Khaled and Said are not especially
religious men, which is perhaps why serenity and solemnity evade them. They express
deep fear, and they pepper their preparations with humour, errors, and everyday trivia
that make them seem like very ordinary people. For example, in the middle of recording
his martyrdom video, full of high-sounding political rhetoric and abstruse Koranic
allusions, Khaled alerts his mother, whom he knows will watch the tape, to a bargain on
water filters at a local merchant’s shop.
Something goes wrong on the first attempt to carry out the mission. On the second
attempt, Khaled and Said are separated, but Khaled makes it over the border and gets as
far as a bus stop. As the vehicle that is intended to contain the explosion that will kill its
passengers approaches, he stares at the young Israeli mother and daughter who wait with
him. He recognizes the inhumanity of his planned action and returns to Nablus.
Said, however, goes through with the attack on his second attempt, but not before
we get the full story about what drives him. Suha, the woman he loves, is the daughter of
a famous martyr for the Palestinian cause. Yet she strongly opposes suicide bombing.
Said listens intently as Suha argues that suicide missions defile Islam’s spirit, kill
innocent victims, and accomplish nothing positive because they invite retaliation in a
never-ending cycle of violence. In the end, however, Said finds the forces pushing him to
carry out the attack more compelling than Suha’s arguments. Thousands of Palestinians
are paid, threatened, and blackmailed to serve as informants for the Israelis. Said’s father
was one of them. Palestinian militants apprehended and executed him. Said has been
deeply ashamed of his father’s actions for much of his life, and angry with the Israelis for
forcing his father to serve as a collaborator. His ultimate motivation for becoming a
suicide bomber is his sense of injustice, which prompts his desire for revenge and the
reclamation of his dignity.
11
The story of Khaled and Said is fictional. However, its empirically grounded and
finely woven characterization of the two main protagonists makes it a useful illustration
of Boudon’s model of ordinary rational action. We see that the plan of Khaled and Said
to engage in a suicide attack rests on a complex mix of reasons. They are in part
utilitarian insofar as they are based on an assessment of the best means to advance the
cause of Palestinian statehood. But it is unclear why Khaled and Said do not elect to
become free riders. Plenty of others are perfectly willing to volunteer their lives, so why
not rely on their bravery rather than sacrificing oneself? Deciphering Khaled and Said’s
decision requires understanding why they opt to surrender their own immediate welfare.
It is helpful in this connection to refer to an affective (though not necessarily irrational)
reason, notably their desire for revenge. We may further enrich our explanation by
referring to cultural values, showing that they select a popular and religiously sanctioned
tactic from the available repertoire of means of collective violence. However, this still
does not explain why they see suicide bombing as a viable action, especially when one
considers that Islam is strongly opposed to suicide. We must recognize that such actions
had to be reinterpreted and legitimized as something different from suicide, namely
martyrdom (Gambetta 2005). As is always the case, irrespective of context, interpreting a
particular type of death as suicide must fulfill certain criteria of meaning attribution that
refer to particular social situations and cultures (Hamlin and Brym 2006).
The decisions that Khaled and Said make are theoretically interesting also
because they are shot through with ambivalence, as decisions often are when real fleshand-blood men and women make them. Khaled and Said think their action will bring
political benefits – but they are not sure. They clothe their decision in terms of religious
rectitude – but they are not very religious themselves, fear death, and are uncertain they
will enter paradise when they complete their task. They seek revenge – but the
inhumanity of their plan troubles them and causes one of them to experience a change of
heart. Above all, Khaled and Said understand that they can choose how to act. They know
they can change their mind. Their plans are in effect only until further notice, as it were.
We, the viewers of Paradise Now, are bound to conclude that Khaled and Said are
a lot like us, and that if we found ourselves in similar circumstances we might turn out to
be a lot like them. By revealing the reasons for their action in their full complexity,
12
Paradise Now renders their actions understandable and makes Khaled and Said seem
fully human. We would not find their actions plausible if they acted as mere cultural
dopes. We would see them as less than human if they acted as rational fools. What makes
Paradise Now art – and what renders Boudon’s theory of action superior to the
alternatives – is that they both make it possible for the outside observer to experience
empathy for previously inscrutable others.
13
References
ABC News (2005) “Experts: Suicide Bombers Not Crazy”.
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/LondonBlasts/story?id=1004809&page=1
(accessed 12 July 2008).
Bhaskar, Roy (1979) The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the
Contemporary Human Sciences. Brighton, Harvester Press.
Bloom, Mia M. (2005) Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York, Columbia
University Press.
Boudon, Raymond (1979) La Logique du Social: Introduction a L’Analyse
Sociologique. Paris, Hachette.
Boudon, Raymond (1989) “La Théorie de L’Action Sociale de Parsons: La Conserver,
mais la Dépasser”. Sociologie et Sociétés, 21, 1: 55-67.
Boudon, Raymond (1990) L’Art de se Persuader: Des Idées Douteuses, Fragiles ou
Fausses. Paris, Fayard.
Boudon, Raymond (1995) Le Juste et le Vrai: Études sur L’Objectivité des Valeurs e de
la Connaissance. Paris, Fayard.
Boudon, Raymond (1997) “The Moral Sense”. International Sociology, 12: 5-24.
Boudon, Raymond (1999) Le Sens des Valeurs. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.
Boudon, Raymond (2006) “Homo Sociologicus: Neither a Rational nor an Irrational
Idiot.” Papers 80: 149-69.
Boudon, Raymond (2008) “Ordinary Rationality: The Backbone of the Social Sciences.”
Communication, International Institute of Sociology, Budapest.
Boyle, Brendan (2006) “Thermopylae: Round One in the Clash of Civilizations”. New
York Sun, 4 December. http://www.nysun.com/arts/thermopylae-round-one-inthe-clash/44526/ (accessed 26 July 2008).
Bryant, Joseph M. (2000) “Cost-Benefit Accounting and the Piety Business: Is Homo
Religiosus, at Bottom, a Homo Economicus?” Method and Theory in the Study of
Religion, 12: 520-48.
Brym, Robert J. (2008) “Religion, Politics, and Suicide Bombing: An Interpretive
Essay”. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 33: 89-108.
14
http://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/CJS/article/view/1537/1061
(accessed 12 July 2008)
Brym, Robert J. and Robert Andersen (2008) “Strategies of Lethality in Low-intensity
Warfare: Normal Violence, Overkill, and Underkill in the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, 1987-2007”. Unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University
of Toronto.
Brym, Robert J. and Bader Araj (2006) “Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction:
The Case of the Second Intifada”. Social Forces, 84: 1965-82.
Brym, Robert J. and Bader Araj (2008) “Palestinian Suicide Bombing Revisited: A
Critique of the Outbidding Thesis”. Political Science Quarterly, 134: 1-15.
Brym, Robert J. and Yael Maoz-Shai (2008) “State Violence during the Second Intifada:
Combining New Institutionalist and Rational Choice Approaches”. Unpublished
paper, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto.
Dale, Stephen Frederic (1988) “Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: Anticolonial Terrorism
in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 32: 37–59.
Elster, Jon (1983) Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of
Science. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Gambetta, Diego (2005) “Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?” Pp. 259-99 in
Diego Gambetta (ed) Making Sense of Suicide Missions. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Garfinkel, Harold (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs NJ: PrenticeHall.
Hafez, Mohammed M. (2006) “Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of
the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence”. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 29: 591-619.
Hamlin, Cynthia Lins (1999) “Raymond Boudon: Agência, Estrutura e Individualismo
Metodológico”. Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e Politica. 48: 63-92.
Hamlin, Cynthia Lins (2000) “L’Ontologia Sociale della Teoria della Razionalita
Cognitiva: Replica a ‘La relativita del relativismo’ di Enzo Di Nuoscio”. Pp. 11136 in Dario Antisseri (ed), Spiegazione Scientifica e Relativismo Culturale. Rome,
LUISS Edizioni.
15
Hamlin, Cynthia Lins (2002) Beyond Relativism: Raymond Boudon, Cognitive
Rationality and Critical Realism. London, Routledge.
Hamlin, Cynthia Lins and Robert J. Brym (2006) “The Return of the Native: A Cultural
and Social-psychological Critique of Durkheim’s Suicide Based on the GuaraniKaiowá of Southwestern Brazil”, Sociological Theory 24: 42-57
Hollis, Martin (1987) The Cunning of Reason. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World
Order. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Moghaddam, Assaf. 2006. “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of
Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:
707-29.
Pape, Robert A. (2005) Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New
York: Random House.
Ricolfi, Luca (2005) “Palestinians, 1981-2003”. Pp. 77-129 in Diego Gambetta, ed.
Making Sense of Suicide Missions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya (1977) “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of
Economic Theory”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6: 317-44.
Sen, Amartya and Bernard Williams (1994) “Introduction”. Pp. 1-22 in Amartya Sen and
Bernard Williams (eds) Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge and Paris:
Cambridge University Press and Editions de la Maison de Sciences de L’Homme.
Sprinzak, Ehud (2000) “Rational Fanatics”. Foreign Policy, 120: 66-73.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan and Karl Kaltenthaler (2006) “The Rationality of Radical Islam”.
Political Science Quarterly, 121: 295-319.
Wright, Robin (2008) “Since 2001, a Dramatic Increase in Suicide Bombings”.
Washingtonpost.com 18 April. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/04/18/ST2008041800913.html (accessed 17 July 2008).
16